Professional Documents
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Combustible Dust:: Safety and Injury Prevention
Combustible Dust:: Safety and Injury Prevention
Combustible Dust:: Safety and Injury Prevention
Instructors Manual
Kirkwood Community College
Community Training and Response Center
Combustible Dust
OVH 3
Disclaimer
Disclaimer: This material was produced under grant number SH-17797-08-60-F-9
from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.
It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor,
nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply
endorsement by the U.S. Government. This training manual was produced by
Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
The information in this publication has been compiled from a variety of sources
believed to be reliable and to represent the best current opinion on the subject.
However, neither Kirkwood Community College nor its authors guarantee accuracy
or completeness of any information contained in this publication, and neither
Kirkwood Community College or its authors shall be responsible for any errors,
omissions, or damages arising out of the use of this information. Additional safety
measures may be required under particular circumstances.
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Table of Contents
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References................................................................................................................ 46
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CFR
CPR
CSB
JHA
LEL
MEC
MSDS
NEC
NFPA
NGFA
NOC
NIOSH
OEC
OSHA
SIC
UEL
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OVH4
Overview
Dust explosions are a serious problem in many industries in the U.S. Over the last
28 years, there have been approximately 3,500 combustible dust explosions. Of
those explosions, 281 have been major incidents resulting in the deaths of 119
workers and 718 workers sustained injuries. In 2005 alone, there were 13 reported
agricultural dust explosions in the US, resulting in two fatalities and 11 injuries.
These explosions have occurred in many different industries, including agriculture,
food products, chemicals, textiles, forest and furniture, woodworking, metal
processing, paper products, pharmaceuticals, and coal dust. Not only can these
explosions cost lives and permanently change the lives of workers who are injured,
there can also be serious economic hardships on workers and business owners
alike. Businesses that suffer these explosions can be closed while the facility is
being rebuilt; resulting in possible lost wages for employees and income for
businesses. Some businesses may be forced to close permanently. The cost of
these explosions can run into the millions of dollars.
One way to significantly reduce the possibility of dust explosions in businesses is
through an aggressive education and training program designed to minimize the risk.
Providing all employees in at-risk facilities with awareness training in combustible
dust explosions will certainly help to reduce the potential of such explosions in the
work place. This training should include an overview of dust explosions, and provide
explanations of what they are, how they occur and what can be done to prevent
them. Through ongoing education and training, companies will reduce the risk to
both their employees and facilities.
OVH 5
Goal
The goal of this training is to improve the safety of workers in environments where
combustible dusts may be encountered by increasing employee awareness of this
hazard, and by demonstrating how the hazard can be recognized and addressed in
their workplace.
OVH 6
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OVH7
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OVH 8
Introduction
The first documented dust explosion occurred in a
Turin, Italy, bakery in 1785. The explosion was
caused by the ignition of flour dust by a lamp in a
bakery storeroom. Fortunately, the explosion did not
cause any fatalities. It did lead to the realization that
grain dust is a highly explosive substance that must
be handled carefully.1
A famous modern-day grain dust explosion occurred at a large export grain silo plant in
Corpus Christi, Texas in April of 1981. This explosion resulted in nine fatalities, 30
injuries, and more than $30 million in actual material damages. The suspected cause of
the explosion was thought to be smoldering lumps of milo grain which ignited a dust
cloud in a bucket elevator, though there has never been a consensus as to the cause.
Iowa
Illinois
Kansas
Nebraska
Minnesota
Ohio
Indiana
South Dakota
Texas
Louisiana
Washington
Missouri
1959-1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
10 Year
Total
64
58
38
65
41
26
22
8
42
17
7
27
3
1
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
5
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
4
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
10
12
7
12
7
4
4
2
0
0
1
Parekh, Manisha, Grain Dust Peril. Industrial Fire World, Volume 13 Issue 4.
Schoeff, Robert W., Kansas State University, in cooperation with FGIS-USDA, 20 Mar 2006.
3
ibid
2
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OVHS 10,11,12,13,14,15,16, Used to explain that they do happen and the results
are very tremendous.
OVH 17
OVH 18 Video 1976
Williamsburg Iowa grain fire and
resulting dust explosion injured 3
firefighters
OVH19
Kaulfersch, Joseph A., Preventing Dust Explosions. Control Engineering, January 11, 2007.
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OVH 20
OVH 21 through 33
Shows progression of a dust explosion with time sequence and how much damage might be
caused.
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OVH 34
OVH 35
Required Conditions
For a dust explosion to take place, several key conditions must be present:
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OVH 36
Ignition Sources of Dust Explosions7
Notice that 11.5% of ignition sources are unknown. This is because the totality of the
destruction caused by the explosion makes it impossible to determine the cause of
the ignition.
Other conditions under which a dust explosion occurs can result from the following:
When these conditions are present and the concentration of suspended dust
exceeds the minimum explosive concentration (MEC) of that particular dust, an
explosion results.
OVH 37
Instructor Note
Deflagration is a technical term describing subsonic combustion that usually propagates
through thermal conductivity (hot burning material heats the next layer of cold material and
ignites it). Most "fire" found in daily life, from flames to explosions, is technically deflagration.
Deflagration is different from detonation which is supersonic and propagates through shock
compression.
In engineering applications, deflagrations are easier to control than detonations.
Consequently, they are better suited when the goal is to move an object (a bullet in a gun, or
7
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a piston in an internal combustion engine) with the force of the expanding gas. Typical
examples of deflagrations are combustion of a gas-air mixture in a gas stove or a fuel-air
mixture in an internal combustion engine, a rapid burning of a gunpowder in a firearm or
pyrotechnic mixtures in fireworks.
Explosive Concentrations
The minimum explosive concentration (MEC) for grain dust, grain flour, or ground
feed ingredients varies according to the particle size (smaller particles are more
powerful) and energy (caloric) nature of the product. Extracted flour from wheat,
oats, and corn may have different explosive energy than wheat, corn, sorghum, milo,
and oat dust. All grain dust and flour should be considered very dangerous.
OVH 38
As the size of the particle decreases, the risk of a deflagration or explosion
increases. In order for a dust explosion to take place, the concentration must be
between 40 grams per cubic meter and 4000 grams per cubic meter. The actual
limits may vary based upon particle size and composition.
The optimum explosive concentration (OEC) value of 0.5 to 1.0 ounces of wheat
flour per cubic foot equates to about 1.5 to 3.0 cubic inches of grain dust per cubic
foot of volume. The MEC would be about 0.15 to 0.30 cubic inches per cubic foot.
In a 1.0 cubic foot chamber, the bottom would be covered to a depth of 0.01 inches
to 0.02 inches at the OEC level.
The following examples help put these values of MEC and OEC into visual
perspective in elevator, mill housekeeping, or sanitation terms. If the dust layer on
the floor of a 10-foot by 10-foot Texas house gallery is at the OEC, dust will be one
to two inches deep. In a 7-foot by 7-foot belt tunnel (roughly half the volume of the
10-ft by 10-ft Texas house gallery), a one half- to one-inch layer of dust would cover
the floor. At the MEC level of 0.05 to 0.10 ounces per cubic foot, the dust layer
would be about one eighth- to one fourth-inch deep in the gallery and about one
sixteenth- to one eighth-inch deep in the tunnel.8
OVH 39
Explosive Limits
The MEC and OEC can be compared to the lower explosive limit (LEL) and the
upper explosive limit (UEL) for vapors. The LEL is the lowest mixture of air and
chemical vapor that will support combustion if ignited. LEL is measured as a
percentage of air by volume. The UEL is the highest mixture in air that will
support combustion if ignited. The flammable range is the mixture in air between
the LEL and the UEL. Most dust is rated for the lower or MEC at 15m/g to 1200g/m.
Noyes, Ronald T., Preventing Grain Dust Explosions. Current Report, CR-1737, OSU
Extension Service.
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Cosmetics
Coal
Dyes
Grain and other dry foods
Metal
Pharmaceuticals
Plastic and rubber
Printer toner
Soaps
Textiles
Wood and paper
Recent Trends
Between 2006 and 2008, there were 82 dust-related fires or explosions. In response
to recent dust explosions, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(CSB) recommended that government agencies, insurers, and others
provide their inspectors with increased training on recognition and
prevention of dust explosion hazards. This and the publicity from
recent catastrophic dust explosions will likely increase enforcement of
standards for the prevention of dust explosions by inspectors.9
OVH 43
Bucket Elevator
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in grain elevators, and 48 were in grain milling facilities (wheat, corn, oat, and rice
mills). The remaining 17 were in storage areas.
In 1997, 50 percent of primary explosions occurred in elevator legs (Schoeff, 1998).
Stored grain typically contains two to 10 pounds of grain dust per ton (Parnell, 1998).
If a 12,000-bushel per hour leg handles wheat at 360 tons per hour, at the lower level
of two pounds of dust per ton, 720 pounds per hour of grain dust is moving with the
grain. If this leg is 130 feet high, the leg trunk casing volume is about 500 cubic feet.
At the MEC level of 0.05 ounces per cubic foot, only 25 ounces, or 1.56 pounds, of
free grain dust re-circulating in the air inside the leg is needed to reach the MEC.
OVH 44, 51
A National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) report on grain dust levels in bucket
elevators states that Concentrations in the bucket elevator almost always exceed
the minimum limits and thus constitute an explosive condition (Buss, 1981). So,
when only 0.05 ounces of dust per cubic foot is needed to reach the MEC, as dust
concentrations build inside a leg, they can quickly exceed the MEC, even in some
aspirated or ventilated legs when excessively dusty grain, like sorghum, is being
transferred. Belt speeds for a 12,000-bushel per hour leg typically run between 600
and 800 feet per minute, or about 10 to 13 feet per second. The belt in a 130-foot
leg makes one revolution in about 20 seconds. Part of the airborne dust tends to
circulate continuously as the air is dragged along by the cups in the leg casing. Even
though only a portion of the total dust is entrained in the air in the leg casing, much of
the dust in non-ventilated legs remains concentrated in the air circulating in the leg
housing during continuous operation, usually exceeding NGFAs MEC value of 0.05
ounces per cubic foot.10
OVH 52
Explosion Safeguards
Safeguards need to be activated to control the chances of a dust explosion. These
safeguards are prevention, housekeeping dust control, eliminating fugitive dust (dust
leaking from other sources), keeping the environment clean, and eliminating as many
hazards as possible.
Continuous housekeeping and sanitation and regularly scheduled bearing service
should be top priorities at all grain elevators and flour and feed mills.
Many insurance companies insist on strict housekeeping, sanitation, and preventive
maintenance at insured elevators. Grain, broken kernels, and grain dust accumulate
in the leg boots and should be cleaned out periodically. Some elevators install easily
removable doors on leg boot side panels for quick, easy cleanout.
10
ibid
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OVH 53
Prevention
Fire Prevention and Protection
Fires represent a major concern for many industries, including grain and feed mills,
and result from many different causes. The end result of a fire, however, is always
the same: personal injury, death, or loss of property.
The first and most important step in fire prevention is establishing a program to
prevent fires from starting. This is particularly important in the feed and grain
industries because of the potential for explosions and the track record of this industry
for fires. A
comprehensive fire
prevention program not
only addresses
housekeeping issues,
but also addresses all
work activities in which
the conditions for starting
a fire are present such
as hot work, electrical
machinery, belts and drives, and grain dryers.
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OVH 54, 55
The fire prevention and protection program must address the following topics:
OVH 56
Housekeeping
A crucial key to the reduction of fires and explosions is housekeeping.
Housekeeping, however, relates to hazards in addition to fires and explosions.
Research has shown that facilities that are well maintained experience fewer fires,
explosions, and other accidents, and are more profitable as well. Using vacuum
cleaners to pick up the dust is a very good way to eliminate the hazard. It is
extremely important to ensure that the vacuum cleaner is designated intrinsically
safe for the job. These vacuums must be approved for the Class II Division 1 Group
EFG Hazardous Location use, which can be found in NFPA 654.
11
12
Amyotte, Paul, Reduce Dust Explosions The Inherently Safer Way. CEP Magazine, 2003.
Ibid, OSU Current Report, CR-1737.
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OVH 57, 63
Dust Control
Reducing dust accumulations is a major concern for facilities that produce dust. A
good housekeeping program depends upon a combination of methods to control
dust. The methods used in a given facility will depend upon the type of facility and
the volume of organic material handled or produced.
In accordance with 29 CFR 1910.272(j), employers must develop, implement, and
maintain a written housekeeping program that reduces accumulations of fugitive dust
on ledges, floors, equipment and other surfaces. Fugitive dust is defined as
combustible particles of a particular size. For grain elevators, the housekeeping
program must address fugitive dust accumulations in the following priority areas:
Floors of enclosed areas containing grain dryers located inside the facility`
In priority areas, fugitive grain dust accumulations may not exceed 1/8 inch. The
removal of fugitive grain dust by use of compressed air (to blow dust from
equipment, ledges, etc.) is not permitted when machinery that presents an ignition
source is energized. The use of compressed air for cleaning (blow down) is not
permitted unless all potential ignition sources are removed from the area.
Additionally, the housekeeping program must address proper procedures for
removing grain dust spills from the work area. However, a grain dust spill is not
considered fugitive grain dust.
OVH 64
DustControlMethods
Methods for controlling grain dust accumulations include the following:
Vacuum areas where dust accumulation is constant due to the job task being
performed.
Wash down procedures where hoses and water can be used to remove
accumulated dust.
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OVH 68, 69
Engineering Controls
The following guideline and engineering controls will help to minimize the conditions
under which a grain dust explosion could occur. These same guidelines have
application to any facility where dust is an issue.
13
Use a food-grade mineral oil spray system on grain during transfer and
loadout.
Install bearing temperature monitors on leg boot, head, and knee pulley
shafts, on horizontal drag head and boot bearings, and on belt conveyor drive
and idler bearings.
Install belt rub sensors inside bucket elevator leg casings to detect belt
misalignment to prevent friction heating.
Use anti-static belting material in legs and horizontal belt conveyors. Install
quick-opening cleanout doors on leg boot side panels for grain and dust
cleanout.
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Clean out dust collectors and change filter bags at intervals recommended by
the manufacturer.
Install dump pit baffles on truck dump pits to provide a major reduction in
airborne dust during dumping operation.
OVH 70
Avoid the use of compressed air (blow down), dry sweeping, or other
cleaning methods that can disperse combustible dust into the air when
feasible.
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Lessons Learned
CSB Investigations of Dust Explosions15
West Pharmaceutical Services, Inc.
On January 29, 2003, a massive dust explosion at the West Pharmaceutical
Services facility in Kinston, North Carolina, killed six workers and destroyed the
facility. The explosion involved a part of the building used to compound rubber.
West produced rubber syringe plungers and other pharmaceutical devices at the
facility. In the rubber compounding process, freshly milled rubber strips were dipped
into a slurry of polyethylene, water, and surfactant to cool the rubber and provide an
anti-tack coating. As the rubber dried, fine polyethylene powder drifted on air
currents to the space above a suspended ceiling.
Polyethylene powder accumulated on surfaces above the suspended ceiling,
providing fuel for a devastating secondary explosion. While the visible production
areas were kept extremely clean, few employees were aware of the dust
accumulation hidden above the suspended ceiling, and the MSDS for the
polyethylene slurry included no dust explosion warning. Even those employees who
were aware of the dust accumulation had not been trained about the hazards of
combustible dust. West did use a safety review process when the compounding
system was designed and modified, but the dust explosion hazard was not
addressed during the reviews.
14
15
ibid
Chemical Safety Hazard Investigation Board, Report No. 2006-H-1, November 2006.
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The West Pharmaceutical Services Explosion That Killed Six
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The MSDS for the resin used at CTA did not adequately communicate that the
material posed a dust explosion hazard. In addition, the resin supplier, Borden
Chemical had not communicated to CTA the safety lessons from the 1999 Jahn
Foundry resin dust explosion, even though documents obtained by the CSB
indicated that Borden was aware of the explosion, which involved a resin similar to
the one used at CTA.
The Kentucky Office of Occupational Safety and Health (KYOSHA) had inspected
the facility, but had not issued citations regarding combustible dust hazards. In
addition, the CTA facility had never been inspected by the Kentucky State Fire
Marshals Office, and frequent inspections by CTAs insurer had failed to identify
phenolic resin as an explosion hazard. The CSB determined that if CTA had
adhered to NFPA 654 (2000) standards for housekeeping and fire/explosion barriers,
the explosions could have been prevented or minimized.
OVH 75, 76
Hayes Lemmerz International
On October 29, 2003, aluminum dust exploded at the Hayes Lemmerz International
facility in Huntington, Indiana, killing one worker and injuring several others. This
explosion, which involved equipment used to re-melt scrap aluminum, occurred in a
part of the building where Hayes made cast aluminum and aluminum alloy
automobile wheels.
Scrap aluminum from the wheel manufacturing lines was chopped into small chips,
pneumatically conveyed to the scrap processing area, dried, and fed into a melt
furnace. Transporting and drying the aluminum chips generated explosive aluminum
dust, which was then pulled into a dust collector.
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The CSB determined that the explosion likely originated in the dust collector, which
had not been adequately vented or cleaned, and was located too close to the
aluminum scrap processing area. The initial explosion spread through ducting,
causing a large fireball to emerge from the furnace.
The dust collector system was not designed or maintained to prevent dust
explosions, or to prevent a dust collector explosion from spreading through ducting.
When the scrap and dust collector systems were added to the facility, Hayes did not
follow management of change procedures that might have identified the dust
explosion hazard.
Hayes had also not cleaned dust from overhead beams and other structures. Some
of this accumulated dust exploded (a secondary explosion), damaging the building
roof. Previous dust fires at the facility were not investigated, facility employees had
not been trained on the explosive nature of aluminum dust, and the Indiana
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (IOSHA) had not identified dust
explosion hazards during previous facility inspections. The CSB, in its report,
determined that if Hayes Lemmerz had adhered to the NFPA 484 (2000) standard for
combustible metals, the explosion could have been prevented or minimized. The
CSB report also included a recommendation for additional research to develop
improved explosion protection for dust collectors in aluminum service.
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OVH 77, 78 : stress importance of these lessons that were learned from the
tragedies mentioned in the prior three incidents
Lessons Learned
Safety Issues Neglected
The three examples provided above, along with most other incidents, reveal several
common factors which can contribute to an explosion. These factors include the
following:
Facility management failed to conform to NFPA standards that would have prevented
or reduced the effects of the explosions.
OVH 79, 80
Summary
Dust explosions continue to be a persistent problem for many industries in the U.S
resulting in loss of life, injuries and destruction of property. Even those individuals
most highly trained, including government enforcement officials, insurance
underwriters and company safety professionals often lack awareness of combustible
dust hazards. MSDSs are also ineffective in communicating to employers and
workers the hazards of combustible dust explosions and ways to prevent them. This
is all the more reason for all employees to have a basic awareness of the hazards of
dust explosions and the best way to mitigate those risks.
Investigations into numerous serious dust explosions have found several common
causal factors for dust incidents. These factors include:
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Instructor note: The following sections cover the OSHA standard and NFP
regulations on combustible dust, most questions that may be asked the answers can
be found in these sections.
Examples presented in this appendix may not be the only means of achieving the
performance goals in the standard.
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Section 3 -- Training
It is important that employees be trained in the recognition and prevention of hazards
associated with grain facilities, especially those hazards associated with their own
work tasks. Employees should understand the factors which are necessary to
produce a fire or explosion, i.e., fuel (such as grain dust), oxygen, ignition source,
and (in the case of explosions) confinement. Employees should be made aware that
any efforts they make to keep these factors from occurring simultaneously will be an
important step in reducing the potential for fires and explosions.
The standard provides flexibility for the employer to design a training program which
fulfills the needs of a facility. The type, amount, and frequency of training will need to
reflect the tasks that employees are expected to perform. Although training is to be
provided to employees at least annually, it is recommended that safety meetings or
discussions and drills be conducted at more frequent intervals.
The training program should include those topics applicable to the particular facility,
as well as topics such as:
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The types of work clothing should also be considered in the program at least to
caution against using polyester clothing that easily melts and increases the severity
of burns, as compared to wool or fire retardant cotton.
In implementing the training program, it is recommended that the employer utilize
films, slide-tape presentations, pamphlets, and other information which can be
obtained from such sources as the Grain Elevator and Processing Society, the
Cooperative Extension Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Kansas State
University's Extension Grain Science and Industry, and other state agriculture
schools, industry associations, union organizations, and insurance groups.
Permits are not required for hot work operations conducted in the presence of the
employer or the employer's authorized representative who would otherwise issue the
permit, or in an employer authorized welding shop or when work is conducted
outside and away from the facility.
It should be noted that the permit is not a record, but is an authorization of the
employer certifying that certain safety precautions have been implemented prior to
the beginning of work operations.
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Section 6 -- Contractors
These provisions of the standard are intended to ensure that outside contractors are
cognizant of the hazards associated with grain handling facilities, particularly in
relation to the work they are to perform for the employer. Also, in the event of an
emergency, contractors should be able to take appropriate action as a part of the
overall facility emergency action plan. Contractors should also be aware of the
employer's permit systems. Contractors should develop specified procedures for
performing hot work and for entry into bins, silos, and tanks and these activities
should be coordinated with the employer.
This coordination will help to ensure that employers know what work is being
performed at the facility by contractors; where it is being performed; and, that it is
being performed in a manner that will not endanger employees.
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Section 7 -- Housekeeping
The housekeeping program is to be designed to keep dust accumulations and
emissions under control inside grain facilities. The housekeeping program, which is
to be written, is to specify the frequency and method(s) used to best reduce dust
accumulations.
Ship, barge, and rail loadout and receiving areas which are located outside the
facility need not be addressed in the housekeeping program. Additionally, truck
dumps which are open on two or more sides need not be addressed by the
housekeeping program. Other truck dumps should be addressed in the
housekeeping program to provide for regular cleaning during periods of receiving
grain or agricultural products. The housekeeping program should provide coverage
for all workspaces in the facility and include walls, beams, etc., especially in relation
to the extent that dust could accumulate.
Dust Accumulations
Almost all facilities will require some level of manual housekeeping. Manual
housekeeping methods, such as vacuuming or sweeping with soft bristle brooms,
should be used which will minimize the possibility of layered dust being suspended in
the air when it is being removed.
The housekeeping program should include a contingency plan to respond to
situations where dust accumulates rapidly due to a failure of a dust enclosure hood,
an unexpected breakdown of the dust control system, a dust-tight connection
inadvertently knocked open, etc.
The housekeeping program should also specify the manner of handling spills. Grain
spills are not considered to be dust accumulations.
A fully enclosed horizontal belt conveying system where the return belt is inside the
enclosure should have inspection access such as sliding panels or doors to permit
checking of equipment, checking for dust accumulations and facilitate cleaning if
needed.
Dust Emissions
Employers should analyze the entire stock handling system to determine the location
of dust emissions and effective methods to control or to eliminate them. The
employer should make sure that holes in spouting, casings of bucket elevators,
pneumatic conveying pipes, screw augers, or drag conveyor casings, are patched or
otherwise properly repaired to prevent leakage. Minimizing free falls of grain or grain
products by using choke feeding techniques, and utilization of dust-tight enclosures
at transfer points, can be effective in reducing dust emissions.
Each housekeeping program should specify the schedules and control measures
which will be used to control dust emitted from the stock handling system. The
housekeeping program should address the schedules to be used for cleaning dust
accumulations from motors, critical bearings and other potential ignition sources in
the working areas. Also, the areas around bucket elevator legs, milling machinery
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and similar equipment should be given priority in the cleaning schedule. The method
of disposal of the dust which is swept or vacuumed should also be planned.
Dust may accumulate in somewhat inaccessible areas, such as those areas where
ladders or scaffolds might be necessary to reach them. The employer may want to
consider the use of compressed air and long lances to blow down these areas
frequently. The employer may also want to consider the periodic use of water and
hoselines to wash down these areas. If these methods are used, they are to be
specified in the housekeeping program along with the appropriate safety precautions,
including the use of personal protective equipment such as eyewear and dust
respirators.
Several methods have been effective in controlling dust emissions. A frequently
used method of controlling dust emissions is a pneumatic dust collection system.
However, the installation of a poorly designed pneumatic dust collection system has
fostered a false sense of security and has often led to an inappropriate reduction in
manual housekeeping. Therefore, it is imperative that the system be designed
properly and installed by a competent contractor. Those employers who have a
pneumatic dust control system that is not working according to expectations should
request the engineering design firm, or the manufacturer of the filter and related
equipment, to conduct an evaluation of the system to determine the corrections
necessary for proper operation of the system. If the design firm or manufacturer of
the equipment is not known, employers should contact their trade association for
recommendations of competent designers of pneumatic dust control systems who
could provide assistance.
When installing a new or upgraded pneumatic control system, the employer should
insist on an acceptance test period of 30 to 45 days of operation to ensure that the
system is operating as intended and designed. The employer should also obtain
maintenance, testing, and inspection information from the manufacturer to ensure
that the system will continue to operate as designed.
Aspiration of the leg, as part of a pneumatic dust collection system, is another
effective method of controlling dust emissions. Aspiration of the leg consists of a
flow of air across the entire boot, which entrains the liberated dust and carries it up
the up-leg to take-off points. With proper aspiration, dust concentrations in the leg
can be lowered below the lower explosive limit. Where a prototype leg installation
has been instrumented and shown to be effective in keeping the dust level 25%
below the lower explosive limit during normal operations for the various products
handled, then other legs of similar size, capacity and products being handled which
have the same design criteria for the air aspiration would be acceptable to OSHA,
provided the prototype test report is available on site.
Another method of controlling dust emissions is enclosing the conveying system,
pressurizing the general work area, and providing a lower pressure inside the
enclosed conveying system. Although this method is effective in controlling dust
emissions from the conveying system, adequate access to the inside of the
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hopper until the filter becomes clogged. Another instrument is a level indicator which
is installed in the hopper of the filter to detect the buildup of dust that would
otherwise cause the filter hopper to be plugged. The installation of these instruments
should be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.
All of these monitoring devices and instruments are to be capable of being read at an
accessible location and checked as frequently as specified in the preventive
maintenance program.
Filter collectors on portable vacuum cleaners, and those used where fans are not
part of the system, are not covered by requirements of paragraph (l) of the standard.
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Section 12 -- Dryers
Liquefied petroleum gas fired dryers should have the vaporizers installed at least ten
feet from the dryer. The gas piping system should be protected from mechanical
damage. The employer should establish procedures for locating and repairing leaks
when there is a strong odor of gas or other signs of a leak.
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The American Society for Testing and Materials D257-76, "Standard Test
Methods for D-C Resistance or Conductance of Insulating Materials"
The International Standards Organization's #284, "Conveyor Belts, Electrical
Conductivity, Specification and Method of Test."
When an employer has a written certification from the manufacturer that a belt has
been tested using one of the above test methods, and meets the 300 megohm
criterion, the belt is acceptable as meeting this standard. When using conductive
belts, the employer should make certain that the head pulley and shaft are grounded
through the drive motor ground or by some other equally effective means. V-type
drive belts should not be used to transmit power to the head pulley assembly from
the motor drive shaft because of the break in electrical continuity to the motor
ground.
Employers should also consider purchasing new belts that are flame retardant or fire
resistive. A flame resistance test for belts is contained in 30 CFR 18.65.
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Appendix C
Other NFPA Standards Related to Combustible Dust Explosion
Hazards16
Appendix A
NFPA Publications Relevant to Combustible Dust Hazard Controls
NFPA
Number
16
Current
Edition
Title
61
2008
68
2007
69
2008
70
2008
77
2007
85
2007
86
2007
91
2004
484
2006
499
2008
654
Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate
Solids
2006
655
2007
664
2007
ibid
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Appendix D
NIOSH Alert Publication Number: 86-118, July 1986
RequestforAssistancein...
WARNING!
Fire departments responding to incidents involving oxygen-limiting silos are
cautioned that directing water or foam onto the fire through the top openings
of an oxygen-limiting silo may result in the silo exploding.
SUMMARY
This Alert requests the assistance of fire department personnel, farm owners and
workers, and silo manufacturers in the prevention of fatalities due to fires and
explosions occurring in oxygen-limiting silos.
Several recent incidents occurred while fighting oxygen-limiting silo fires which
resulted in the death of fire fighters. Other fire fighters lost their lives as a result of
similar explosions in the late 1960s. The problems associated with burning silos
appeared to have abated during recent years, but these incidents demonstrate the need
to renew efforts to minimize their recurrence. A concerted effort should be made to
prevent silo fires from occurring and to provide training programs on controlling this
type of fire.
BACKGROUND
Oxygen-limiting silos by design have all their openings sealed to prevent oxygen
from entering the silo. Generally, these silos are of steel or concrete construction of
varying heights and diameters. The openings (bottom and top) are normally sealed
with rubber-gasketed hatches. When these hatches are tightly closed and the silo is
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filled, the oxygen concentration should be insufficient to support a fire. If the hatches
are left open or the oxygen-limiting features are not properly maintained, spontaneous
heating can occur with subsequent ignition of the silage [1].
If improperly sealed or otherwise not operating as designed, the amount of oxygen
entering the silo may be sufficient to allow a fire to smolder, causing an accumulation
of combustible gases due to incomplete combustion. Any additional increase in
oxygen content in such an environment can create an explosive atmosphere. Thus,
merely opening the top hatches of such silos, or applying water or foam by hose
stream from the top of the silo, could allow sufficient oxygen to enter the silo and
create an explosive atmosphere [1-4]. Dust explosions may also occur if dust inside
the silo becomes suspended as a result of the hose stream, and is ignited by the heat of
the smoldering fire [3,5].
CASE REPORT OF A FATAL INCIDENT
The following case report resulted from a NIOSH investigation of the circumstances
of the incident as part of the NIOSH Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology
Program.
On August 27, 1985, three fire fighters were killed when a burning oxygen-limiting
silo exploded. The fire fighters were spraying water onto the fire from the top of the
silo at the time of the explosion. The explosion lifted the concrete roof of the silo
approximately four feet in the air and the fire fighters were thrown from the silo.
This explosion was due either to a build up of combustible gases from incomplete
combustion or a dust explosion, or a combination of the two. Regardless of the
ultimate cause of the explosion, directing water into the top of the silo appears to have
been an improper method for fighting this silo fire.
In this incident nothing should have been done to increase the level of oxygen inside
the silo. Opening the top hatches to apply water to the fire could have increased the
level of oxygen and created an explosive atmosphere. Air entrained in the water
stream may have also contributed. Additionally, the water spray could have
suspended the dust and increased the risk of explosion.
NIOSH is aware of three other explosions that occurred in oxygen-limiting silos at
about the same time as the incident described in the case report. Two of the
incidences occurred in the same geographical area as the incident described above.
No fire fighters were applying water to these silos at the time, and there were no
injuries. The third fire which occurred in another geographical area resulted in the
fatal injury of one fire fighter [4].
REGULATORY STATUS
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The following collected in this case study suggests that the following factors may
have contributed to the fatal accident as reported:
1. Improper fire fighting methods; and
2. Lack of proper operating and maintenance procedures on the silo.
B.RecommendedMeasures
Acknowledging concern for the above factors, NIOSH recommends the following
steps for both the prevention of fires and explosions in oxygen-limiting silos, and for
fire control procedures once a fire has developed:
1.Prevention
a. When not being filled or emptied, oxygen-limiting silo hatches should be kept
closed. If an oxygen-limiting silo is properly sealed, there is very little likelihood of a
fire occurring by spontaneous heating, since the amount of oxygen trapped in the silo
is usually insufficient to support a fire.
b. Proper maintenance of the silo should be performed to ensure the integrity of the
oxygen-limiting features. The manufacturer of the silo should be contacted for proper
operating and maintenance procedures for the silo.
c. The moisture content of stored silage should be controlled, as should the type of cut
of the silage. Filling rates recommended by the manufacturer should also be followed
to reduce the possibility of spontaneous heating of stored silage. "Elements of good
silage" can be obtained from the bulletin, "Extinguishing Silo Fires," NRAES-18,
published by the Northeast Regional Agricultural Engineering Service, Cornell
University, Riley Robb Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853.
2.FireControl
a. During fire fighting operations on oxygen-limiting silos, water or foam should not
be directed onto the fire through the top hatches, since this may allow oxygen to enter
the silo and cause the suspension of explosive dust.
b. Placards should be placed on the oxygen-limiting silos warning fire fighters that
the silo is in fact an oxygen-limiting silo, and should include information concerning
the proper extinguishing techniques.
c. If the roof hatches of oxygen-limiting silos are open, no attempt should be made to
close them if there is smoke or steam coming from the open hatches or if the silo is
vibrating.
d. The roof hatches should be safe to close if the silo is quiet and there has been no
smoke or steam coming from the hatches for several hours. Do not secure the hatch.
This will permit the relief of any subsequent pressure that may build up.
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e. Large quantities* of carbon dioxide or liquid nitrogen should be injected into the
silo to extinguish the fire. Some silos have valves specifically designed for this. If it is
necessary to drill a small hole in the side of the silo for insertion of the gas tube, care
should be taken not to allow additional oxygen to be pulled into the silo. All
precautions normally associated with either nitrogen or carbon dioxide should be
taken when handling these gases.
f. Manufacturers, in conjunction with local fire departments, should establish a
program to provide valves designed for injection of gases for fire control on all new
and existing oxygen-limiting silos.
g. Certain manufacturers have step-by-step instructions on how to extinguish fires in
their silos. Therefore, farm owners are encouraged to contact the silo manufacturer to
obtain these instructions.
NIOSH has published the following documents which contain further information.
NIOSH Alert: Request for Assistance in Preventing Hazards in the Use of Water
Spray (Fog) Streams to Prevent or Control Ignition of Flammable Atmospheres,
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 85-112.
Occupational Safety in Grain Elevators and Feed Mills, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication
No. 83-126.
NIOSH requests that the technical information and warning contained in this Alert be
disseminated to personnel of fire departments, fire training academies, other
emergency response organizations, farm extension associations, farm workers and
owners, and manufacturers of silos.
Requests for additional information or questions related to this announcement should
be directed to Mr. John Moran, Director, Division of Safety Research, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 944 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown,
West Virginia 26505, Telephone (304) 291-4595.
We greatly appreciate your assistance.
[signature]
J. Donald Millar, M.D., D.T.P.H. (Lond.)
Assistant Surgeon General
Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health
Centers for Disease Control
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NOTE
REFERENCES
1. Murphy, DJ, Arble WC: Extinguishing Silo Fires. NRAES-18. Ithaca, NY:
Northeast Regional Agricultural Engineering Service (1982).
2. NIOSH Alert: Request for Assistance in Preventing Hazards in the Use of
Water Spray (Fog) Streams to Prevent or Control Ignition of Flammable
Atmospheres. DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 85-112. National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 4 pages (1985).
3. Bahme CW: Fire Officer's Guide to Emergency Action. NFPA No. FSP-38.
Boston, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 185 pp. (1974).
4. Upgrade Training Programs Aimed at Controlling Silo Explosions, Say
National Volunteers. Fire Control Digest, 12(2):6 (1986).
5. Occupational Safety in Grain Elevators and Feed Mills, DHHS (NIOSH)
Publication No. 83-126. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
85 pp. (1983).
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References
Allison, A., Effectiveness of Ultrafine Water Fog as a Dust Suppressant. Final
Report. Peavey Company, Con Agra, Omaha, NE, 1993.
American Insurance Association, Special Loss Control Bulletin. New York, N.Y,
1978.
ASAE, ASAE Standard D245.4 Moisture Relationships of Grains. ASAE Standards
1994-Standards Engineering Practices Data, St. Joseph, MI, 1994.
Arkansas Department of Labor, Grain Elevator Hazards. Little Rock, AR, 1979.
Association of Mill and Elevator Mutual Insurance Companies, Suggestions for
Precautions and Safe Practices in Welding and Cutting. Chicago, IL, 1977 (5905-77).
Buss, Kenneth L., Dust Control for Grain Elevators, National Grain and Feed
Association, Washington, DC, 1981, pp. 64-87.
doPico, G.A., Report on Diseases. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol. 10,
1986, pp. 261-265.
Ferry, Ted. S. Safety Management Planning. The Merritt Company. Santa Monica,
CA, 1987.
Gillis, Joseph P., Retrofitting and Construction Grain Elevators. National Grain and
Feed Association, Washington, DC, 1985, pp. 42-43.
Grain Journal, Foundation Funds Dust Emission Study. March/April 1995, p. 27.
Hammer, Willie. Occupational Safety Management and Engineering. Prentice Hall,
Englewood, CA, 1985.
Hazardous Chemicals Right to Know Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 95-173 through 95-218
(1990).
NFPA, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 61B, Standards for the Prevention
of Fires and Explosions in Grain Elevators and Facilities Handling Bulk Raw
Agricultural Commodities. Quincy, MA, 1994, pp. 61B-1 to 61B-20.
National Fire Protection Association, Industrial Fire Hazards Handbook. Quincy, MA,
1988.
National Materials Advisory Board, Prevention of Grain Elevator and Mill Explosions.
National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1982 (NMAB 367-2).
National Safety Council, OSHA up-to-date, Vol. 20(2) (1991): 2.
N.C. Department of Labor, North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Standards
for General Industry. Division of Occupational Safety and Health, 1989. (See, in
particular, Appendix C to 29 CFR 1910.272 for a rich bibliography on grain handling
facilities.)
Nelson, G.S., Grain Dust Explosions Can Be Prevented. Grain Age, 1979, pp. 34-44.
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