Sam Nolan Undergraduate Dissertation

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CAUSES OF

CHANGING ATTITUDES
Sam Nolan
Department of Government, University of Essex
April 2015
Undergraduate Dissertation
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................2
Theorising Party Attitudes towards European Integration............................................3
Hypothesis....................................................................................................................6
General Trends in Europe............................................................................................9
Case Study Selection..................................................................................................11
The British Conservative Party...................................................................................14
Irish Conservative Parties...........................................................................................30
Conclusion..................................................................................................................41
Bibliography................................................................................................................44
Introduction
European integration has emerged as an unavoidable issue for almost every party
within Europe. As the European Union looks to continue to develop into a deeper,
more integrated association to tackle the significant economic and social challenges
facing Europe today, for most parties European integration continues to be a
complex and ever changing issue.
Conservative parties, more than any other party families, have arguably had the
most complicated relationship with European integration. However it could be
suggested that the bulk of academic research on the issue of party attitudes and
European integration have failed to explain the complexity of this relationship.
By assessing the changing nature of the European project and conservative parties
historical associations, this paper sets out to explain the causes of the changing
attitudes towards European integration within conservative parties, with particular
attention on the conservative parties of the UK and Ireland.
Theorising Party Attitudes towards European Integration

One school of thought sees parties as goal-oriented organisations that adjust their
attitudes accordingly. Arguably the most successful founding academic of this school
was Anthony Downs. Downs, under the assumption that there is a two-party system,
stated that political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of
gaining votes1. Downs theory dictates that parties compete for the median voter 2.
By gaining the median voter parties will therefore achieve 50 per cent of the vote
share, plus one; thus winning the election. Downs contended that mainstream
parties converge to a central policy position in order to maximise the number of votes
they achieve and gain the essential support of the median voter 3.
Kaare Strm and Wolfgang Muller expanded on Downs theory in their attempt to
answer the question how political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions,
and established that parties develop strategy and attitudes in accordance with three
goals; attaining government office, impacting public policy, or maximising their
electoral support4.
However subscribing to this idea can essentially neglect contextual and historical
factors that make up political parties. Party competition does not occur in a vacuum;
1 Downs, A., An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy in Journal of
Political Economy, (Apr., 1957), p.137
2 Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, pp.142-144
4 Muller, W., Strm, K., Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western
Europe Make Hard Decisions, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1999),
pp.1-35
3
an isolated situation, void of underlying influences where actors behave completely

rationally in order to establish party attitudes 5. Instead, as Seymour Lipset and Stein
Rokkan contended; parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizens
at each election6; there is a level of continuity within stable parties in order to
maintain essential requisites for winning elections, such as credibility. That is not to
say that political parties are not at all goal-oriented, but instead attaining government
office, impacting public policy, or maximising electoral support is not the only factors
of which parties consider when formulating policy7.
Lipset and Rokkan established arguably one of the most influential and coherent
accounts of the development of political parties in Europe. Lipset and Rokkan
established the theory that historical social conflicts throughout European history,
such as those surrounding state building, democratisation, and industrialisation,
shaped the modern party systems 8. These conflicts result in divisions, or cleavages,
that created highly resilient identities. This accumulated into the creation of the party
families observable in Europe today; including social democratic, liberal, Christian
democratic, and conservative parties9.
5 Almeida, D., The Impact of European Integration of Political Parties: Beyond the
Permissive Consensus, (Routledge, Oxon: 2012), pp.18-23
6 Lipset, S., Rokkan, S., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: cross-national
perspectives, (The Free Press, New York: 1967), p.2
7 Almeida, The Impact of European Integration of Political Parties, p.41
8 Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P., Representative Government in Modern Europe,
(McGraw-Hill Education, Berkshire: 2011), pp.280-285
9 Lipset, Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p.2-27
4
For a cleavage to become a political party it must firstly involve a social division
which can clearly separate one group of people from another, secondly the groups of
people must be conscious of their identity and have a sense of belonging to it, and
finally there must be an organisational element of which the social group shapes
into10.
Gary Marks and Carole Wilson further developed Lipset and Rokkans theory by
extending it to attitudes towards European integration. Marks and Wilson
hypothesised that cleavages may still be powerful in structuring the way political
parties respond to new issues11. Marks and Wilson assert that social cleavages do
not act as a constraint on party attitudes, but instead form frameworks or prisms 12,
through which parties formulate ideas 13. As Dimitri Alemida contends; using ideology
as a method to formulate policy is a rational response for political parties, as
cleavage-based ideology can be seen as cognitive cues for voters that reduce
transaction costs under conditions of uncertainty 14.
10 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, pp.280285

11 Marks, G., Wilson, C., The past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party
Response to European Integration in British Journal of Political Science, (July,
2000), p.433
12 Marks, Wilson, The past in the Present, p.433-459
14 Almeida, The Impact of European Integration of Political Parties, p.19
5
Hypothesis
The dual character of European integration (economic and political integration) have
caused greatest tension within parties that are formed out of the class cleavage;
social democratic and conservative parties. Conservative parties traditionally
represented middle and upper class voters, and therefore support their interests
such as economic liberalism, but also wish to maintain their culturally heritage 15.
Ernst Haas argued in the late 1950s (during the early stages of European economic
integration) that the integration was a product of consensus amongst conservative
and liberal parties in Europe. Haas stated that the original economic integration was
due to a belief in market liberalism with limited market regulation; beliefs closely
associated with centre and conservative parties16.
The position of conservative parties on the EU is complex due to the modern makeup of the parties: the majority of modern conservative parties are a mix of nationalist
conservatives and neo-liberals, often the source of much conflict and in-fighting
within parties17.
The neo-liberals within the European conservative parties stand for free markets and
minimised state intervention. For many neo-liberals European integration has
successfully created a single market which deters state intervention in the economy

16 Haas, E., The Uniting Europe, (Stanford University Press: California, 1958), pp.69
17 Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Multi-level Governance and European Integration.
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp.180-185
6
and has abolished or reduced the majority of trade barriers. It could be argued that
neo-liberals are willing to accept limited loss of national sovereignty in order to
preserve the free market18. However there continue to be many on the neo-liberal
wing of conservative parties that argue that the sole purpose of European integration
should be purely economic. For most neo-liberals the completion of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) was the final desired step towards an integrated
Europe19.
The neo-liberals often occupy a conservative party, sometimes uncomfortably, with
nationalist conservatives. The nationalists consider national sovereignty to be a
fundamental asset for the state to defend. Nationalists argue that sovereignty is
necessary to defend national culture, control levels of immigration and uphold
against external pressures20. Despite differences within parties, it is suggested that
both camps essentially believe in the advantages of economic integration, but a
common ground is forced to be found in terms of political integration 21.
Therefore Western European conservative parties model vision, or ideal point, of
European integration could be described. Firstly there would be, almost complete
economic integration, due to the popular belief in free markets, but also certain
conservative parties were hostile to a monetary union (to be discussed below) 22.
18 Hooghe, Marks, Multi-level Governance, pp.180-185
20 Hooghe, Marks, Multi-level Governance, pp.180-185
7
Secondly the conservative ideal point would arguably be somewhere between no

political integration of European states to very limited political integration 23.
Thus it could be argued that as the European Union becomes more politically
integrated, it moves further away from conservative parties ideal point.
Hypothesis 1: As the EU becomes more politically integrated, Western European
conservative parties will become more Eurosceptic.
Furthermore, as mentioned, using Lipset and Rokkans theory; cleavage-based
ideology accounts for conservative parties position on European integration.
Therefore it could be assumed that if a conservative party has weak, or no,
connection to historical social cleavages then their position on European integration
would be more flexible and pragmatic; most likely to be explained by Downs theory
on voter maximisation.
Hypothesis 2: Conservative parties with strong connections to historical cleavages
will be less willing to change their attitude towards European integration, even if their
attitudes are electorally disadvantageous.

8
General Trends in Europe

European economic integration was the primary goal of the European project
beginning in the 1950s. Economic integration involves the removal of trade barriers
to allow the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour 24. The three major
European Treaties that integrated member states closer economically were The
Treaty of Rome (1957), The Single European Act (1986), and The Treaty of
Maastricht (1993)25.
Amid the sentiments of peace and cooperation within Europe, the Treaty of Rome
was signed in 1957 by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, the
Netherlands
and
Italy,
with
very
little
opposition.
Despite
establishing
intergovernmental institutions, including the Council of Ministers, a European

Parliament, a Court of Justice, and a European Commission, the Treaty was
fundamentally an economic agreement, tasked with establishing closer economic
cooperation and the reduction of trade barriers 26. The Treaty of Rome remained the
foundation of European integration until the 1980s 27.
The Single European Act (SEA) came into force on 1 st July 1987. Despite the Treaty
of Rome creating the European Community, a true common market had not been
established. The main aim of the SEA was to implement a fully functional common
26 Urwin, D., The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since
1945, (Routledge, New York: 1995), pp.58-88
27 James, W., Treaty of Rome in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007),
pp.3-6
9
market by 1992. Although by nature the Single European Act was essentially
economic, it also established the groundwork for closer political integration; including
strengthening the power of the Parliament and the loosening of voting rules within
the Council of Ministers28.
The Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 st November 1993, launching the
European Union. The Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on the European
Union, consolidated the Single European Act, completing the single European
market29. The Treaty included the creation of the European Union and its three
pillars; including the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), closer cooperation on
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP)30.
The Treaty represented a significant new stage of European integration with an
explicit political element to it. As Jacques Delors, the European Commission
President, stated in 1993; were not just here to make a single market, but a political
union31, German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, went even further and declared: The
28 James, W., Single European Act in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007),
p.2
29 The European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, (15/10/10),
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastri
cht_en.htm>, accessed 15/12/14
30 Delors, J., The Maastricht Treaty IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (1994),
pp. 47-49
31 James, W., Treaty of Maastricht in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007),
pp.3-6
10
European Union Treaty [The Maastricht Treaty] within a few years will lead to the
creation of the United States of Europe32.
The Maastricht Treaty came up against the strongest opposition within conservative
parties with strong nationalist wings; including conservative parties in the UK,
France, and the Benelux countries33.
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was arguably the first primarily political agreement
within the European Union; providing the framework for new member states from
Eastern Europe, incorporating the Schengen Agreement (creating open borders for
the majority of members states) into the EU, created the position of The High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to oversee EU
foreign policy, and extended the powers of the European policing agency; Europol 34.
The Treaty of Nice (2000) was concerned with reforming the EU in order to
accommodate the forthcoming enlargement of the Union 35.
Case Study Selection
This paper will concentrate on conservative parties in the Republic of Ireland and the
United Kingdom for the following reasons. Firstly the Irish party system can be seen
as unique within Europe as it is dominated by two conservative parties, Fianna Fil
32 James, W., Treaty of Maastricht, pp.3-6
33 Hooghe, L., Marks, G., The Making of a Polity: The Struggle Over European
Integration in European Integration online Papers, (1997), pp.9-12
34 James, W., Treaty of Amsterdam in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007),
p.2
35 James, W., Treaty of Nice in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007), p.2
11
and Fine Gael36, while the UK Conservative Party is the only major party to occupy
the centre-right ground in the UK37.
Secondly the Irish society is seen as fairly homogenous and lacking any major social
cleavages. Although some parties perform stronger in certain areas (such as Fianna
Fil in the rural west of Ireland) and others perform better within certain social groups
(such as Fine Gael and farmers), these connections are tenuous 38. Ireland never
experienced an industrial revolution, therefore never developed a worker owner
social conflict39. Tom Garvin concluded that; each side was a cross-class, crossregion and cross-tradition coalition 40. Michael Gallagher, building on Garvins
research, contended support for Irish political parties has rested upon clearer social
and economic bases than some observers have suggested, although these have
generally been less distinct than those underlying the support of parties in most
Western democracies41. Therefore the two Irish conservative parties have no
historical connections to any social cleavages.
36 Gaffney, J., Political Parties and the European Union, (New York: Taylor &
Francis, Inc.; 1996.) pp.191-204
37 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, pp.197201
38 Byrne, K., OMalley, E., Politics with Hidden Bases: Unearthing the deep roots of
party systems in European Journal of Political Research, (2003), pp.6-12
39 Byrne, OMalley, Politics with Hidden Bases, pp.6-12
40 Garvin, T., Evolution of Irish nationalist politics, (Gill and Macmillan, Michigan:
1981), p.176
41 Gallagher, M., Electoral Support for Irish Political Parties, 1927-73, (SAGE
Publications Ltd: 1976), p.69
12
Whilst the UK, according to Gallagher, Laver and Mair, has perhaps the simplest
cleavage structure in Europe 42; made up of a traditional class cleavage which
arguably continues to be relevant even today 43. Traditionally it was assumed that
members of the middle and upper classes vote for The Conservative Party and
working class voters side with The Labour Party. Although arguably voting along
class-lines has declined, the Class Voting Index suggests that class voting
continues to play a role in UK elections44.
Additionally both Ireland and the UK have differing levels of integration within the
European Union. For example the Republic of Ireland uses the Euro, while the UK
opted out of the single currency, Moreover the UK is more engaged and supportive
of common defence initiatives within the EU, while Ireland is not 45 46.
However, despite the number of differences between the two countries, theyre not
so dissimilar that it would be arbitrary to attempt to compare. For one, Ireland and
the UK share a common history; with the same language and both joining the
42 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, p.287

43 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, p.287
44 Choe, Y., Social Cleavage and Party Support: A Comparison of Japan, South
Korea and the United Kingdom in Research Reports (2002), pp.61-47
45 The European Union, United Kingdom, (March 2015), <http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/unitedkingdom/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
46 The European Union, Ireland, (March 2015), < http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/ireland/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
13
European Community in 1973, in addition neither country is a member of the

Schengen Area47 48.
Szczerbiak and Taggart developed a theory which differentiated Eurosceptic political
parties by whether they are soft Eurosceptic or hard Eurosceptic. Soft
Euroscepticism refers to a party that criticises only one policy or one element of the
EU, but does not argue for exiting the Union. Hard Euroscepticism is when a party
argues for complete withdrawal from the EU 49. Neither The Conservative Party, nor
Fianna Fil or Fine Gael can be described as hard Eurosceptics, at neither advocate
complete withdrawal from the European Union; however both parties criticise various
elements of the EU50.
Furthermore the conservative parties in Ireland and the UK all have neo-liberal
wings, arguing for free markets and minimised state intervention, and nationalist
conservatives, attempting to defend national culture and control levels of
immigration51.
47 The European Union, United Kingdom, (March 2015), <http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/unitedkingdom/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
48 The European Union, Ireland, (March 2015), < http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/ireland/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
49 Taggart, P., Szczerbiak, A., The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member
and Candidate States in SEI Working Paper: Opposing Europe Research Network
Working Paper, (2002), pp.6-8
50 Gaffney, J., Political Parties and the European Union, (New York: Taylor &
Francis, Inc.; 1996.) pp.191-204
14
The British Conservative Party
Source: Volkens, et a
The data in this graph is derived from subtracting the percentage of anti-European integration sentences from the ma
To attempt to analyse the entire history of The Conservative Partys relationship with
European integration would require a look back at over one hundred years of history,
which is arguably unhelpful for the purposes of this paper.
The UK Conservative Party has arguably always had a complex relationship with
European integration. As mentioned, Yhe Conservative Partys approach towards
Europe can be seen as the classic neo-liberal supporters for free markets at odds
against the national conservatism in favour of retaining national sovereignty. Neoliberals are willing to surrender a limited amount of national control in return for
increased economic freedom, while nationalists strongly oppose such idea 52.
52 Hooghe, et al. Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European

Integration?, p.982
15
This clash between the two strains of the party came to a sharp focus surrounding
the Maastricht Treaty53. Up until the early 1990s it could be argued that the neoliberals within The Conservative Party were arguably winning the debate on
Europe54.
In 1961 Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, submitted Britains first
application to join the European Economic Community (EEC). However even then
the traditional nationalist ideas of The Conservative Party were being tested. As
Macmillan admitted in 1961; a great issue like the Common Market which involves a
reorientation of much Conservative thought and tradition is a pretty big thing to
undertake55. Despite the first (and second) application to join the EEC being
blocked, the Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, again launched a
campaign for the UK to join the EEC in 1970. This resulted in a public referendum on
Britains entry into the EEC in 1975; which The Conservative Party leadership
campaigned strongly for56.
British entry into the EEC is in line with this papers first hypothesis; as the European
states integrated towards the Conservative ideal point, the UK Conservative Party

Integration?, p.982
Integration?, p.982
55 Crowson, N., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At
the heart of Europe? (Routledge; New York, 2007), p.29
56 Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945, pp.4144
16
enthusiastically supported the integration. Furthermore this stage of integration was

primarily economic, not political; therefore was palatable for The Conservative Party.
Thatcher and Europe
Margaret Thatcher became leader of The Conservative Party in 1975 and Prime
Minister in 1979. Thatcher brought in a new emphasis on neo-liberal economic
ideals, and her attitude towards Europe was arguably and expression of these
principles. Thatcher, and her government, was supportive of the single market,
seeing it as an representation of the free market on a larger, European scale 57. As a
neo-liberal, Thatcher was willing to accept a partial surrendering of national
sovereignty in order to further the free market 58. This led to the Single European Act
(SEA) being widely accepted by The Conservative Party in 1986 and seen as a force
for good within both Europe and the UK59.
As Europe became increasingly economically integrated The Conservative Party
continued to offer its support. The anti-Marketeers within the parliamentary party
were forever in the minority in the 1980s and Conservative Party for a time enjoyed a
unifying position on Europe 60. It could be suggested that if the European Community
decided against further political integration then at the level of the 1980s then the
17
issue of Europe would arguably always be one of consensus within The

Conservative Party.
However, as the European Community began to move towards political integration
the support of the Party began to dwindle 61. As shown in figure 1; the support for
European integration dropped dramatically from 1.8 points in 1983 to -0.5 in 1987.
As European Commission President, Jacques Delors expressed a desire to create a
federalist Europe with significant political integration between member states. For
Thatcher, and many Conservatives, this was an unpalatable step in the wrong
direction62. Thatcher remarked in 1988 that we have not successfully rolled back the
frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with
a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels 63.
The Maastricht Treaty
The Maastricht Treaty became a defining moment in The Conservative Party and
fully exposed the divisions within the party. The Treaty, as mentioned, was unlike any
agreement set out within the European Community before. The Treaty extended
majority voting within the European Council, set out a timetable for the single
currency and the monetary union, and established the Social Chapter. The Social
63 Thatcher, M., Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech") in
Thatcher Archive: COI transcript, (Sept. 1988), p.3
18
Chapter was the source of the majority of distain within The Conservative Party 64.
The Social Chapter, or the Social Policy Agreement, delegated greater powers to the
European Union on issues such as working conditions, gender equality, and social
security65.
This meant that the Maastricht Treaty was not an economic treaty, but more a
political treaty. This was the first time when the European community had clearly and
intentionally acquired a political dimension 66.
When first presented to parliament Conservative Prime Minister, John Major,
described the Treaty as a good agreement for Europe, and a good agreement for
the United Kingdom67, which safeguards and advances our national interests 68. In
the 1992 manifesto, during the election before the Treaty passed parliament, the
Treaty was described as a success both for Britain and for the rest of Europe. British
proposals helped to shape the key provisions of the Treaty, including those
strengthening the enforcement of the Community law, defence, subsidiarity and law
64 Berrington, H., Hague, R., Europe, Thatcherism and traditionalism: Opinion,

rebellion and the Maastricht treaty in the backbench conservative party, 19921994
in West European Politics, (1998) 21:1, pp.44-71
65 Lourie, J., The Social Chapter: Research Paper 97/102 in House of Commons
Library, (1997), pp.7-11
66 The European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, (15/10/10),
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastri
cht_en.htm>, accessed 15/12/14
67 HC Deb 11 December 1991 vol 200 cc862
68 HC Deb 11 December 1991 vol 200 cc862
19
and order 69. In fact the issue of Europe featured heavily in the 1992 manifesto, as
shown in figure 2.
Source: Volkens, et al., The Manifesto Document Collection. Ma
The data in this graph is obtained from the Manifesto Project database. The figures include both % of positive and % n
The Maastricht Treaty ignited one of the longest running parliamentary rebellions in
Conservative Party history, causing Conservative MPs to rebel against their party at
every stage, with rebellions of between 32 and 46 MPs either voting against the bill
or intentionally abstaining70. Former Conservative Party leader, Margaret Thatcher,
argued in parliament that the answer is not in the Maastricht Treaty 71, and that she
69 The Conservative Party, The Best Future for Britain: The Conservative Manifesto
1992, (Conservative Central Office, 1992), p.9
70 Baker, D., Gamble, A., Ludlam, S., The parliamentary siege of Maastricht 1993:
Conservative divisions and British ratification in Parliamentary Affairs (1994) pp.3760.
71 HL Deb 07 June 1993 vol 546 cc565
20
herself could never have signed this treaty 72. Thatcher argued that the Treaty would
undermine our age-old parliamentary and legal institutions, both far older than those
in the Community73.
The bill was eventually passed in parliament after 210 hours of debate, 23 days in
committee and over 600 amendments 74. The neo-liberals had won the debate over
Europe within The Conservative Party; arguing that a surrender of sovereignty was
necessary in order to achieve closer economic union; as John Major argued that
despite the new ways in which the European Union had influence over the nooks
and crannies of everyday life some intrusion is necessary and is in our interests 75.
According to figure 1 after 1992 support for European integration dropped
dramatically within The Conservative Party. The 1997 manifesto expressed one of
the most anti-European attitudes, a significant departure from previous elections 76.
The party used a phrase which became a continued theme when the party discussed
European integration; we want to be in Europe but not run by Europe 77. The party
clarified this by stating that they will push for completion of the European Single
72 HL Deb 07 June 1993 vol 546 cc565
73 HL Deb 07 June 1993 vol 546 cc565
74 Baker, et al. The parliamentary siege of Maastricht 1993, pp.37-60
75 Patterson, B., The Conservative Party and Europe, (John Harper Publishing;
London, 2011), p.193
76 Volkens, A. Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, S., Werner, A., The Manifesto
Document Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung (WZB)
77 The Conservative Party, 1997 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: You can only be
sure with the Conservatives, (Conservative Central Office, 1997), p.32
21
Market78 and seek more cooperation between national governments on areas of

common interest - defence, foreign policy and the fight against international crime
and drugs79. However the gap between economic and political integration was
increasingly clear. The 1997 manifesto argued in favour of protecting our opt-out
from the Social Chapter 80, maintaining our border controls 81, preserving our budget
rebate82, defend[ing] the rights of national parliaments and oppos[ing] more powers
being given to the European Parliament at the expense of national parliaments 83,
and argued that a British Conservative Government will not allow Britain to be part
of a federal European state84.
78 The Conservative Party, 1997 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto:

You can only be sure with the Conservatives, (Conservative Central Office, 1997),
p.32
p.32
p.32
p.32
p.32
p.32
22
Once again, the political fallout surrounding the Maastricht Treaty complies with the
first hypothesis; as the European states started to become integrated beyond the
Conservatives ideal point of European integration, the anti-European sentiment
rises.
In Opposition
After the resignation of John Major, after the Conservative defeat in the 1997 general
election, the Conservative leadership election was centred on attitudes towards
Europe. The contest came down to two candidates; Kenneth Clarke, arguably the
most outspoken pro-European within The Conservative Party at the time, and
William Hague, a Thatcherite Eurosceptic. Other candidates included staunch
Eurosceptics such as John Redwood, Peter Lilley and Michael Howard. Due to the
number of Eurosceptic candidates the Eurosceptic vote of the parliamentary party
was split, allowing pro-European Clarke to remain until the final ballot, where William
Hague eventually won85.
According to figure 1, 2001 saw the lowest level of support for European integration
within The Conservative Party; with 29 negative mentions of European integration,
compared to only 7 positive mentions 86. Once again in the 2001 manifesto the

p.32
85 Quinn, T., Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain, (Palgrave MacMillan;
Hampshire, 2012), pp.40-43
23
Conservatives restated their commitment of being in Europe, but not run by

Europe87. The Conservative pledged to maintain the national veto, not ratify the Nice
Treaty, refuse to participate in a European defence organisation outside of NATO,
and to reduce the EU budget by reducing waste and abandoning ill-considered
programmes88.
After the Conservative defeat in the 2001 general election and the subsequent
resignation of William Hague as party leader another leadership election was fought
in 2001. This was the first leadership election in The Conservative Party which
allowed the party members to vote on the new leader after rounds of voting by
members of the parliamentary party; therefore it could be suggested that the
leadership more closely represents the view of the party as a whole, rather than
narrow interests89.
The only candidate to step forward with outwardly pro-European views was, again,
Kenneth Clarke, who recognised the increasingly Euroscepticism of his party thus
emphasised his electoral history and extensive experience in government. The other
candidates included Iain Duncan Smith, who rebelled against the government over
the Maastricht Treaty and continued to be outspoken about his opposition to the EU.
In addition, Eurosceptics, including Michael Portillo, David Davis, and Michael
Ancram, also ran for leadership90.

Time for Common Sense, (Conservative Central Office, 2001), p.12
Time for Common Sense, (Conservative Central Office, 2001), pp.13-16
89 Quinn, Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain, pp.103-107
24
After two rounds of voting by members of the parliamentary party, Iain Duncan Smith
and Kenneth Clarke faced party members to decide. The party members voted
clearly in favour of Iain Duncan Smith, with 60.7 per cent of the vote 91. Arguably party
members voted against Clarke as they feared his pro-European leanings; 86 per
cent of members polled considered Europe to be very or quite important when
deciding a new leader92.
Despite two consecutive election defeats against the fairly pro-European Labour
Party, the 2005 manifesto continued the theme of deliberate Euroscepticism. The
manifesto stated that a Conservative government would bring powers back from
Brussels to Britain93, negotiate to restore our opt-out from the European Social
Chapter94, oppose the EU Constitution95, give the British people the chance to
reject its provisions in a referendum 96, and will not join the Euro97. The

Are you thinking what were thinking? Its Time for Action, (Conservative Central
Office, 2005), pp.24-28
Office, 2005), pp.24-28
Office, 2005), pp.24-28
25
Conservatives again argued that military cooperation should only take place under a
NATO framework and that the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is unsustainable 98.
Downsian theory would dictate that a party would act rational in the face of electoral
defeat by moving its policies towards the centre-ground in order to maximise their
vote share99. In fact the opposite occurred (see figure 3). As the Labour Party, with a
clear pro-European outlook, won in 1997, The Conservative Party continued to adopt
anti-European attitudes. Even after two further election defeats, the Party only
decreased their anti-European sentiments insubstantially, and could still not be
described as pro-European100. This suggests that the Downsian assumption of votemaximisation fails to explain the actions of The Conservative Party in the early
2000s. Instead it could be assumed that the Partys cleavage-based ideology
accounts for the attitude towards European integration, as predicted 101. Of course
there may have been policy convergences in other policy areas; but the fact remains

Office, 2005), pp.24-28
Office, 2005), pp.24-28
Office, 2005), pp.24-28
26
that Downs theory fails to explain The Conservative Partys attitude towards
European integration in the early 2000s.
Figure 3: Attitudes towards European Integration
UK Conservative Party
UK Labour Party
David Cameron was elected Conservative Party leader in 2005; being seen as an
economically neo-liberal but distanced himself from Thatcher, by emphasising his
support for social liberalism 102. During the leadership election and for a time after,
Camerons position on Europe was unclear; partly due to his attempt to move his
party away from focusing on the issue. However in 2009 Cameron removed his party
from the European Parliament party grouping, the European Peoples Party (EPP),
and established a more Eurosceptic and anti-Federalist grouping; the European
Conservative and Reformist Group (ECR)103.
102 Dorey, P., Garnett, M., Denham, A., From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative
Party, 1997-2010, (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2011), pp.178-179
103 Hayton, R., Reconstructing Conservatism? The Conservative Party in
Opposition, 1997-2010, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2012), pp.72-74
27
Despite increases in pro-European sentiment in the Conservative manifesto in 2010,

the overall tone of the document arguably remained essentially sceptical of the
European Union. The manifesto praised the European Unions role in spreading
democracy and the rule of law across our continent 104 and claimed that a
Conservative government would be positive members of the European Union 105.
However the Party also claimed that the steady and unaccountable intrusion of the
European Union into almost every aspect of our lives has gone too far 106 and there
should be no further extension of the EUs power over the UK without the British
peoples consent107. Furthermore a Conservative government would ensure that by
law no future government can hand over areas of power to the EU or join the Euro
without a referendum of the British people 108. Moreover, the Party claimed that they
would work to bring back key powers over legal rights, criminal justice and social
Invitation to join the Government of Britain, (Conservative Central Office, 2010),
p.113
p.113
p.113
p.113
p.113
28
and employment legislation to the UK 109, and argued that they would never allow
Britain to slide into a federal Europe 110. The 2010 manifesto described the ratification
of the Lisbon Treaty as a betrayal of this countrys democratic traditions 111 and a
shameful episode112. In total there were 16 unfavourable mentions of European
integration, and only 11 favourable mentions113.
In Government: Towards Hard Euroscepticism?

After the 2010 general election The Conservative Party failed to achieve a
parliamentary majority and formed a coalition with The Liberal Democrats 114. The
Liberal Democrats have been seen as the most consistent supporters of the
European Union, compared to all other UK parties, and have historically argued for
p.113
p.113
p.113
p.114
29
closer integration within Europe115. In their 2010 manifesto the Liberal Democrats
stated that the party believe that European co-operation is the best way for Britain to
be strong, safe and influential in the future 116, and that the party supports the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice, a common defence policy and for Britain to
eventually join the Euro117.
Therefore it could be suggested that the issue of European integration has been a
subject of conflict within the paradox of coalition politics as the deeply pro-European
Liberal Democrats entered into government with The Conservative Party, which in
2010 could be described as, at least; soft Eurosceptic 118.
The two parties published The Coalition: our programme for government as a
guideline for the next parliament and the compromises which the parties came to.
Arguably the programme for government much more closely resembled The
Conservative Party manifesto, than that of the Liberal Democrats, on the issue of
114 BBC News, David Cameron and Nick Clegg pledge 'united' coalition,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8676607.stm>, accessed
24/03/15
115 Jeremy Hargreaves, The Liberal Democrats and Europe,
<http://www.jeremyhargreaves.org/europe/the-liberal-democrats-and-europe/>,
accessed 24/03/15
116 The Liberal Democrats, 2010 Liberal Democrats General Election Manifesto:
Change that works for you, Building a Fairer Britain, p.56
117 The Liberal Democrats, 2010 Liberal Democrats General Election Manifesto:
Change that works for you, Building a Fairer Britain, p.56
118 Taggart, Szczerbiak, The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and
Candidate States, p.7
30
European integration119. Although the programme argued that the Coalition would
ensure that the British Government is a positive participant in the European Union 120
and support the further enlargement of the EU 121, it also ruled out the UK joining the
Euro122, and argued that no further powers should be transferred to Brussels without
a referendum123.
In the early stages of the legislative programme, the Coalition government
introduced the European Union Act, which stated that in future, a referendum would
be held before the UK could agree to an amendment of the Treaty on European
Union if these would transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU 124. The
bill was signed into law in July 2011125.
In October 2011, 79 Conservative MPs defied the party whip by voting for a
referendum on the UKs membership with the European Union. That accounted for
around half of the backbench Conservative MPs, in addition two Tory MPs registered
an abstention, 12 did not vote, and two junior ministers resigned in order to vote
119 HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, (Cabinet

Office, May 2010), p.19
120 HM Government, The Coalition, p.19
124 UK Government, European Union Act 2011 in Explanatory Notes, (2011), p.3
125 UK Government, European Union Act 2011 in Explanatory Notes, (2011), pp.49
31
against the government126. The vote came about after a backbench Conservative
MP, David Nuttal, proposed the motion against the governments wishes 127. Despite
claims that the referendum would be to rebalance the democratic legitimacy of the
European Union, it was clear that there was a Eurosceptic tone to the proposal; as
Nuttal claimed that it was due to the growing sense that this country, indeed this
Parliament, is becoming ever more impotent as more and more decisions are taken
in Brussels and then passed down to the United Kingdom to implement, whether we
like it or not128.
This was arguably a significant moment for The Conservative Party and their attitude
towards Europe for several reasons. Firstly; this was the largest ever Conservative
rebellion on the issue of Europe; the previous largest European rebellion were the 46
MPs who voted against the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 33 less than the rebellion in
2011129. Although there are obvious differences between voting against the
ratification of a European treaty and voting in favour of a backbench motion, both
actions involve defying the partys orders in order to express dissatisfaction with the
126 The Telegraph, EU referendum: David Cameron hit by biggest Conservative
rebellion, (Oct. 2011),
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8847032/EU-referendumDavid-Cameron-hit-by-biggest-Conservative-rebellion.html>, accessed 28/03/15
128 HC Deb 24 October 2011 col46
129 Cowley, P., Stuart, M., How to measure todays rebellion, (Oct. 2011),
<http://nottspolitics.org/2011/10/24/how-to-measure-today%E2%80%99s-rebellion/>,
accessed 28/03/15
32
governments policy on the European Union. Therefore a suggestion could be made

that levels of Euroscepticism within The Conservative Party (or at least the nonleadership parliamentary wing) had increased since the 1990s.
Secondly; although the MPs that voted in favour of the motion made up only around
a quarter of Conservative MPs, this vote arguably changed the outlook of the party.
The governments reason for not backing the motion was not due to a pro-European
disposition but instead a belief that it was the wrong question at the wrong time 130,
according to the Foreign Secretary, William Hague. Cameron declared to his party,
there could be a referendum in the future, but only after renegotiations 131. As Andrew
Sparrow concluded after the vote; The Conservative Party used to be genuinely split
between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans. Now the only split in the party is between
patient Eurosceptics and impatient Eurosceptics 132.
Finally; this episode arguably began The Conservative Partys move towards hard
Euroscepticism. As mentioned, Szczerbiak and Taggart developed a theory which
differentiated Eurosceptic political parties by whether they are soft Eurosceptic or
hard Eurosceptic. Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that hard Euroscepticism comes
in two forms. The first form is a single-issue party, where the sole principle is antiEuropean and its singular aim is withdrawal from the European Union 133. The second
form of hard Euroscepticism is when a party frames discussion around the EU in
131 The Guardian, EU referendum Commons vote Monday 24 October 2011,
(Oct. 2011), <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/eu-referendumcommons-vote-live-coverage#block-18>, accessed 28/03/15
132 The Guardian, EU referendum Commons vote Monday 24 October 2011,
(Oct. 2011), <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/eu-referendumcommons-vote-live-coverage#block-18>, accessed 28/03/15
33
language that stresses that it is too capitalist/socialist/neoliberal/bureaucratic,

depending on ideological position134, and calls for a fundamental re-casting of the
terms on which their country is an EU member that is incompatible with the present
trajectory of the European project 135. This could be interpreted as a party seeking
renegotiation of membership of the EU, sometimes with clearly unreasonable and
unrealistic terms of negotiation136; a commitment that would later become the
cornerstone of Conservative Party European policy137.
Two months after the vote on the EU referendum, during a European summit, David
Cameron vetoed a new EU-wide fiscal treaty aimed at tackling the financial crisis
within the Eurozone. Cameron argued that the new Treaty would subject British
financial services to new and harmful European regulation 138. The Party framed the
veto as a victory, stating in their 2014 European election manifesto that they

137 The Conservative Party, For Real Change In Europe, Vote Conservative,
<https://www.conservatives.com/landing_pages/european_election.aspx>, accessed
28/03/15
138 The Guardian, David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift
in Europe, (Dec. 2011), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/davidcameron-blocks-eu-treaty>, accessed 29/03/15
34
successfully vetoed a treaty that would have damaged Britains interests 139.This
incident was significant as it was a clear moment where a conservative party has
rejected further integration within the European Union due to the increased distance
between the conservative ideal point and the level of European integration; as this
papers hypothesis predicted.
In January 2013, around fifteen months after claiming that a referendum on the UKs
membership of the European Union was the wrong question at the wrong time 140,
Cameron announced that an EU referendum would be held in 2017, after Treaty
renegotiations141. This move arguably expressed the increasingly anti-European
sentiment within the Party; initially demonstrated when 79 MPs voted against their
own party whip to endorse an EU referendum142.
This also demonstrates that the two strains of Euroscepticism, soft and hard, now
arguably dominate The Conservative Party. Arguably either Conservative MPs
support a treaty renegotiation, but not withdrawal from the EU, or support the end of
UK membership of the Union. It could be contemplated that no Conservative MP
would now (publicly) express support for the current level of integration within the EU
and no one would contend that further integration would be beneficial. This is in
139 The Conservative Party, Conservative party European Election Manifesto 2014
(Conservative Central Office, 2014), p.2
141 The BBC, David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU, (Jan. 2013),
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282>, accessed 29/03/15
35
accordance with predictions set out in the first hypothesis; as the EU becomes more
politically integrated, Western European conservative parties will become more
Eurosceptic.
One may argue that the seemingly increasing Euroscepticism within the UK
Conservative Party could be due to a reaction to the increasing support of the hard
Eurosceptic party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP gained the largest
number of votes in the 2014 European Elections, with 27 per cent of the vote 143. As
of 2015, UKIP has around 42,000 members, more than the Liberal Democrats, and
have two Members of Parliament144.
Therefore one might suggest, as many do, that the growing support of UKIP has
caused The Conservative Party to become increasingly Eurosceptic in order to retain
votes that may be lost to UKIP. However this argument ignores the general trend of
growing anti-European sentiment within The Conservative Party since the 1990s,
when UKIP was not an electoral threat (UKIP only gained 0.3 per cent of the vote in
1997, 1.5 per cent in 2001, and 2.2 per cent in 2005) 145.
143 BBC News, Vote 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-ukresults>, accessed 28/02/15

144 Keen, R., Membership of UK Political Parties in House of Commons Library,
(Jan. 2015), pp.6-9
145 Mellows-Facer, A., General Election 2005: Research Paper 05/33 in House of
Commons Library, (2005), p.47
36
Irish Conservative Parties

The Irish party system can be seen as unique within Europe, partly as it is dominated
by two conservative parties, Fianna Fil and Fine Gael. Fine Gael was formed in the
1930s and established the first government of Ireland. However since then Fine Gael
has never been able to form a majority in parliament. Despite radical strains within
the party, it has maintained a pluralistic social platform and advocated more
conservative economic policies. Founded on strong nationalistic ideals, Fianna Fil
has become increasingly socially conservative since the 1960s 146.
After the Second World War Irish foreign policy was mainly concerned with
attempting to find support against partition of Ireland 147. In 1949 Ireland joined the
Council of Europe, but not without reservations. Irish politician Conor OBrien, who
worked on the governments attempts to gather support for the anti-partition
movement, wrote of the Council of Europe: our Parliamentary delegates to the
Council of Europe seemed to devote their time to making speeches about partition;
speeches which were designed to be read at home, but which unfortunately had to
be listened to abroad148. In the 1960s the Irish economy began to develop away from
an agricultural based economy and towards an economy based on trade and
investment. This made entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) a
desirable option within both main parties 149.
146 Gaffney, Political Parties and the European Union, pp.191-204

148 Fitzgerald, M., Protectionism and Liberalisation: Ireland and the Election, 19571966. (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Limited; 2001), pp.14-15
37
Fine Gael and Fianna Fil have both supported every referendum on European
treaties and agreements150. As Fianna Fil stated in 1992: Fianna Fil has always
led the path to European Unity. That process began with Sean Lemass [Irish Prime
Minster between 1959 and 1966]. Jack Lynch [Irish Prime Minster between 1966 and
1973] led us into the EEC in 1973. Charles J. Haughey [Irish Prime Minster between
1987 and 1992] brought us into the EC with the passing of the Single European Act
in 1987151.
Source: Volkens, e
The data in this graph is derived from subtracting the percentage of anti-European integration sentences from the ma
1997 Onwards
151 Irish Election Literature, 1992 Leaflet For The Fianna Fil National Collection
And Vote Yes To The Maastricht Referendum, (Aug. 2014)
<http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com/2014/08/14/1992-leaflet-for-the-fiannafail-national-collection-and-vote-yes-to-the-maastricht-referendum/>, accessed
16/12/14
38
1997 was arguably a turning point for the Irish conservative parties. The election of
1997 was the first general election in the Republic of Ireland since the Maastricht
Treaty came into force. As shown in figure 4, there was a significant drop in support
for European integration152. In the 1997 election manifestos both Fine Gael and
Fianna Fil published unfavourable mentions of European integration for the first
time in their histories153. Fine Gaels manifesto mentioned European integration in a
negative way eight times, while Fianna Fil had ten unfavourable mentions of
Europe154.
In their 1997 manifesto Fianna Fil expressed concern that the European Union may
head towards becoming a military superpower or a federal super-state 155, and
instead argued that Ireland should strive to achieve a fresh vision of the European
Union156. In addition, Fianna Fil believed that the European Union should rid itself
of bureaucratic jargon157.
152 O'Duffy, B., Swapping the reins of the Emerald Tiger: The Irish general election of June 1997 in
West European Politics (1998), pp.178-186
155 Fianna Fil, 1997 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Choice before
Ireland in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1997), pp.9-12
39
Furthermore Fine Gael argued that the expansion of the EU would bring both
opportunities and threats158, this includes both further assurance for continuing
peace and stability 159 and on the other hand concerns over reforms of voting
rights160. Fine Gael argued that the biggest threat to our economic interests 161 was
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)162.
This was a significant departure from previous years of unwavering support for
European integration. For example, in 1987 Fianna Fil argued that it was fully
committed to active membership of the European Community 163 and Fine Gael
believed that European integration was essential to further Irish interests 164.
Furthermore in 1992 Fine Gael argued that Ireland should be at the centre of
158 Fine Gael, 1997 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Securing and sharing
our prosperity in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1997), pp.24-25
163 Fianna Fil, 1987 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Programme for
National Recovery in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1987), pp.16-19
164 Fine Gael, 1987 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: We've Done The
Groundwork Now Let's Build The Nation: Breaking out of the vicious circle in Irish
Election Manifesto Archive, (1987), pp.21-25
40
Europes inner policy making circle 165 and Fianna Fil stated that the party was fully
committed to European Union and to ensuring that Ireland has a strong voice in the
new Europe as it evolves166.
The 1997 election in Ireland could be used to argue against this papers hypothesis;
as the European Union became increasingly integrated, the two Irish parties, with no
connection to historical social-cleavages, became seemingly more anti-European.
However the argument could be made that the changing attitude towards European
integration was not due to the EU becoming more politically integrated, but instead it
was a reaction to the Eurosceptic political parties in Ireland becoming increasingly
electorally successful. There is an argument to be made that as the Irish Eurosceptic
parties, Sinn Fin and The Green Party, increased their vote share in the 1990s 167,
Downs theory168 would dictate that in order for Fianna Fil and Fine Gael to
maximise their vote share they would be required to be less pro-European.
In addition, it could be suggested that if the two parties continued to convey antiEuropean sentiment then this alternative line of argument may be valid. However
after 1997 both parties again expressed enthusiastic support for European
integration.
165 Fine Gael, 1992 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Let's Bring Out The
Best In The Country in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1992), p.24
166 Fianna Fil, 1992 Fianna Gael General Election Manifesto: The Six-Point Plan For National
ProgressWe Can Make It Happen. in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1992), p.12
167 Laffan, B., OMahony, J., Ireland and the European Union, (Palgrave MacMillan:
New York, 2008), pp.86-89
41
In the 2002 general election, both parties chose to express their pro-European
credentials. Fianna Fil stated that the party believed that a strong and effective EU
will be as important a part of our future as it has been of our recent past 169.
Additionally, Fine Gael contended that Ireland benefits, financially, commercially and
politically, from its enthusiastic participation in the European Union 170. However,
Fianna Fil expressed concern with Fine Gaels federalist suggestion 171.
In total, Fianna Fil referred to European integration in a positive way a considerable
51 times, and only unfavourable three times. Similarly; Fine Gael mentioned
integration favourably 28 times and only twice in a negative way 172.
The pro-European sentiment expressed by the two conservative parties in 2002
continued into the 2007 election. Fianna Fil were defiantly pro-European stating
that; the EU has been the greatest force for peace and prosperity in the history of
169 Fianna Fil, 2002 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto in Irish Election
Manifesto Archive, (2002), p.12
170 Fine Gael, 2002 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Choosing the kind of
Ireland we want in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2002), p.3
171 Fine Gael, 2002 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Choosing the kind of
Ireland we want in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2002), p.3
42
Europe173. In fact, the 2007 Fianna Fil election manifesto did not contain a single
unfavourable mention of European integration 174.
It is worth noting that figure 4 uses data from the Manifesto Project Database that
assumes the position that the saliency of an issue indicates the level of party
support. Therefore although it may be seen as support for European integration may
have decreased after 2002, this can be explained by a decrease in the number of
mentions of European integration in the parties manifestos, as shown in figure 5.
This is partly why this paper uses both evidence from quantitative sources, such as
the Manifesto Project Database, and other qualitative sources in arguing the
hypotheses.
2011 was a further expression of the Irish conservative parties commitment to the
European Union. Fine Gael conveyed their commitment in no uncertain terms by
stating that Fine Gael fully supports greater EU co-operation and integration on
issues of mutual concern, particularly the current economic crisis 175. Fianna Fil held
similar sentiment without a single unfavourable mention of European integration 176.
173 Fianna Fil, 2007 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Next Steps
Forward for an Ireland that is Peaceful, Proud and Strong in Irish Election Manifesto
Archive, (2007), p.8
175 Fine Gael, 2011 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Lets Get Ireland
Working in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2011), p.45
43
44
Saliency of Europe
Source: Volkens, et al., The Manifesto Document Collection. Ma
The data in this graph is obtained from the Manifesto Project database. The figures include both % of positive and % n
It is important to note the saliency of European integration within the two parties;
where not only the position on Europe is accounted but also how much importance is
put on the issue within a party manifesto.
As noted in figure 5 the two conservative parties place similar importance on
European integration at each election. It is important to note that around the
negotiations and singing of the Maastricht Treaty, in the 1989 and 1992 election, the
issue of European integration is given greater prominence. Furthermore around the
time of the negotiations and implementations of the Nice Treaty, around the 2002
election, the issue of Europe is again given more importance 177. The issue of
European integration was given less weight in the 2007 and 2011 election
45
manifestos. One may note the difference between the two parties in the saliency of
the issue of European integration; however the biggest difference is only 2.8% 178.
Irish Neutrality
One element of the EU which has caused conflict within Irish politics is the issue of
neutrality for Ireland. Irish neutrality is enshrined in the Irish constitution and has
been upheld by political parties for many generations 179. Between the introduction of
the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the ideals of neutrality continued
to be supported by the major parties in relation to European integration. In 1987,
Fianna Fil argued that the party would uphold Ireland's position of neutrality 180, in
addition the party argued that although it seeked participation through consensus,
where possible, with our European Community partners, Ireland will follow its own
policies181. Additionally in 1987, Fine Gael argued that it would continue to uphold
Ireland's military neutrality, provision for which has been included at our insistence in
the Single European Act182.
179 Schwanberg, P., Irelands Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration
in European Studies, (2007), pp.28-39
182 Fine Gael, 1987 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: We've Done The
Groundwork Now Let's Build The Nation: Breaking out of the vicious circle in Irish
Election Manifesto Archive, (1987), pp.21-25
46
Irelands neutrality was tested when the EU began to develop its own mutual
defence programme under the Maastricht Treaty, which formally established the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 183. However Fianna Fil argued that
the party will maintain Ireland's stance on military neutrality, unless and until the Irish
people decide otherwise in a referendum184.
In 1997 Fianna Fil stated that they believed in the positive value of Irelands
honourable tradition of military neutrality 185 and claimed that the party opposed to
any plans to set up within the structure of the EU any organisation which aims to
boost research and development into weaponry, facilitate the international arms
industry, or place arms contracts186.
During negotiations surrounding the Nice Treaty, the Irish government made
significant revisions of the Treaty to ensure that Irish neutrality was respected. In
June 2002 the Irish government issued the Seville Declarations, announcing that;
the development of the Unions capacity to conduct humanitarian and crisis
management talks does not involve the establishment of a European army 187.
183 Schwanberg, Irelands Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration,

pp.28-39
184 Fianna Fil, 1992 Fianna Gael General Election Manifesto: The Six-Point Plan For National
Progress We Can Make It Happen. in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1992), p.12
187 Schwanberg, Irelands Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration,
p.35
47
This caused the Council to institute the triple lock system for Irish involvement in EU
defence policies; that meant that defence missions would have to be approved by
the Irish government, the Irish parliament and the United Nations before Ireland
would participate188. The Irish government claimed that Irelands traditional policy of
military neutrality is not affected by the Treaty of Nice or any previous EU Treaties 189.
However in 2011 Fine Gael argued for Ireland to reject its neutrality and to fully
support European mutual defence; party leader, Enda Kenny, argued for Ireland to
sign up to a new European security system 190. Fine Gael claimed in their 2011
manifesto that they believed that the Triple Lock must be modified to allow Ireland to
participate in peacekeeping missions191 and that the failure of the UN Security
Council to pass a resolution should not prevent us from taking part in EU
humanitarian and overseas missions192.
The issue of neutrality within Irish politics is an issue arguably rarely found in other
Western European nations. Fine Gaels actions in 2011 demonstrate how
188 European Commission, Ireland's influence on peace in Europe, (Aug. 2012),
<http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/ireland_in_the_eu/impact_of_ireland_on_eu/index_en.ht
m>, accessed 17/12/14
189 Office of the Taoiseach, Treaty of Nice and Seville Declarations 2002 in
Government Information Guide, 2002, p.11
190 Irish Echo, FG Govt. would end Irish neutrality, (Feb. 2011),
<http://www.irishecho.com.au/2011/02/16/kenny-to-push-for-eu-defence-role/7222>,
accessed 17/12/14
Working in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2011), pp.31-33
Working in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2011), pp.31-33
48
conservative parties with no historical connections to social cleavages are able to

adapt their policy on European integration in order to react in a pragmatic way, as
predicted in the second hypothesis.
Changing attitudes
Figure 4 demonstrates the changing attitude towards European integration within
Irish conservative parties. The points to note include; firstly the support for European
integration increased with both parties until 1992, then the parties both experienced
significant reduction in support for integration in 1997, after the implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, it is noticeable that support for European integration
never becomes negative, as in the number of favourable mentions of European
integration always outweighed the unfavourable mentions. Therefore it is suggestible
that neither party has ever been anti-European but merely became less
enthusiastically in favour of European integration since 1997. Thirdly it is of note that
the two parties consistently have a very similar position on European integration.
A final point to note is that the policy positions of the two Irish conservative parties
arguably reflect Downs theory on party competition. Downs theory implies that in
pursuit of the median voter, parties tend to converge to a similar position on an
issue193. Therefore, as predicted by the second hypothesis of this paper, Fianna Fil
and Fine Gael, with no connection to social cleavages, tend to adopt the same
position on European integration in order to attempt to maximise their vote share.
As the European Union became increasingly politically integrated, the Irish
conservative parties, with no connections to social-cleavages, remained continually
193 Grofman, B., Downs and Two-Party Convergence in Annual Review of Political
Science, (2004), pp.25-46
49
supportive of the EU. This is in line with the papers second hypothesis that only
conservative parties with strong connections to historical cleavages will be less
willing to change their attitude towards European integration, even if their attitudes
are electorally disadvantageous.
50
Conclusion
This paper set out to examine what causes Western European Conservative Parties
to change their attitude towards European integration. The answer to this question
was undertaken through two hypotheses.
The first hypothesis; as the EU becomes more politically integrated, Western
European conservative parties will become more Eurosceptic, was developed using
Lipset and Rokkans theory of social cleavages. It was argued that European
conservative parties with connections to the class-cleavage are made up of both
neo-liberal and nationalist factions. These factions develop a conservative ideal
point of European integration; usually at the point of full economic integration. It was
hypothesised that as Europe became increasingly politically integrated, and
therefore moves further away from the conservative ideal point, then it could be
assumed that the conservative parties would become increasingly anti-European.
In order to prove this hypothesis the UK Conservative Party, with strong connections
to the class cleavage, was first analysed. Throughout the post-war period, up until
the 1980s, The Conservative Party could be described as having a positive attitude
towards European integration. However as the European Community went beyond
economic integration and began to move towards political integration The
Conservative Party began to become increasingly Eurosceptic. This first became
apparent during the parliamentary rebellion on the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty, and continued throughout the 1990s and when in opposition in the 2000s,
with the party selecting Eurosceptic party leaders over pro-European candidates.
51
The pattern of increasing Euroscepticism persisted when The Conservative Party

entered government in 2010. The government vetoed a new European treaty and
eventually endorsed a referendum on the UKs EU membership.
This was in line with the first hypothesis; as the European Union became
increasingly politically integrated, The Conservative Party became increasingly
Eurosceptic.
The second hypothesis; conservative parties with strong connections to historical
cleavages will be less willing to change their attitude towards European integration,
even if their attitudes are electorally disadvantageous, was developed using Marks
and Wilsons research on the connection between social cleavages and attitudes
towards European integration. In order demonstrate this hypothesis the two
conservative parties in the Republic of Ireland, Fianna Fil and Fine Gael, were
discussed.
The two Irish conservative parties have arguably no strong connections to social
cleavages and have been consistent supporters of European integration; both
parties have supported every European referendum and have openly favoured
further economic and political integration.
Up against the rising popularity of
Eurosceptic parties, the two parties on occasion were less enthusiastically in favour
of European integration, as Downs theory would suggest.
The most significant factor that has drawn concern from the two parties in regards to
European integration is Irish neutrality. However, as mentioned, the party attitudes
towards neutrality were changed in order to more closely align with the European
Union. This demonstrated the ability of parties with no connections to social
cleavages to change their attitudes towards European integration in a pragmatic
52
way; a way in which conservative parties with connections to social cleavages

arguably fail to do.
This was in line with the papers second hypothesis; conservative parties with strong
connections to historical cleavages will be less willing to change their attitude
towards European integration, even if their attitudes are electorally disadvantageous.
As the British Conservative Party, with strong social cleavage connections, refused
to change their attitude away from the conservative ideal point even after losing
three elections to a pro-European party, the Irish conservative parties, with no social
cleavage connections, were able to adapt their policies in a pragmatic and electorally
successful way.
53
Bibliography
Almeida, D., The Impact of European Integration of Political Parties: Beyond the Permissive
Consensus, (Routledge, Oxon: 2012)
Baker, D., Gamble, A., Ludlam, S., The parliamentary siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative
divisions and British ratification in Parliamentary Affairs (1994)
BBC News, David Cameron and Nick Clegg pledge 'united' coalition,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8676607.stm>, accessed 24/03/15
BBC News, David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU, (Jan. 2013),
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282>, accessed 29/03/15
BBC News, Vote 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results>, accessed
28/02/15
Berrington, H., Hague, R., Europe, Thatcherism and traditionalism: Opinion, rebellion and the
Maastricht treaty in the backbench conservative party, 19921994 in West European Politics, (1998)
21:1
Byrne, K., OMalley, E., Politics with Hidden Bases: Unearthing the deep roots of party systems in
European Journal of Political Research, (2003)
Choe, Y., Social Cleavage and Party Support: A Comparison of Japan, South Korea and the United
Kingdom in Research Reports (2002)
Cowley, P., Stuart, M., How to measure todays rebellion, (Oct. 2011),
<http://nottspolitics.org/2011/10/24/how-to-measure-today%E2%80%99s-rebellion/>, accessed
28/03/15
Crowson, N., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 1945: At the heart of Europe?
(Routledge; New York, 2007)
Delors, J., The Maastricht Treaty IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (1994)
Dorey, P., Garnett, M., Denham, A., From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party, 1997-2010,
(Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2011)
Downs, A., An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy in Journal of Political Economy,
(Apr., 1957)
European Commission, Ireland's influence on peace in Europe, (Aug. 2012),
<http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/ireland_in_the_eu/impact_of_ireland_on_eu/index_en.htm>, accessed
17/12/14
Fianna Fil, 1987 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Programme for National Recovery in
Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1987)
Fianna Fil, 1992 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Six-Point Plan For National Progress
Fianna Fil, 1997 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Choice before Ireland in Irish
Election Manifesto Archive, (1997)
Fianna Fil, 2002 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2002)
Fianna Fil, 2007 Fianna Fil General Election Manifesto: The Next Steps Forward for an Ireland
that is Peaceful, Proud and Strong in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (2007)
Fine Gael, 1987 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: We've Done The Groundwork Now Let's
Build The Nation: Breaking out of the vicious circle in Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1987)
Fine Gael, 1992 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Let's Bring Out The Best In The Country in
Irish Election Manifesto Archive, (1992)
Fine Gael, 1997 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Securing and sharing our prosperity in Irish
Fine Gael, 2002 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Choosing the kind of Ireland we want in Irish
Fine Gael, 2011 Fine Gael General Election Manifesto: Lets Get Ireland Working in Irish Election
Manifesto Archive, (2011)
Fitzgerald, M., Protectionism and Liberalisation: Ireland and the Election, 1957-1966. (Burlington, Vt:
Ashgate Publishing Limited; 2001)
Gaffney, J., Political Parties and the European Union, (New York: Taylor & Francis, Inc.; 1996)
Gallagher, M., Electoral Support for Irish Political Parties, 1927-73, (SAGE Publications Ltd: 1976)
Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P., Representative Government in Modern Europe, (McGraw-Hill
Education, Berkshire: 2011)
Garvin, T., Evolution of Irish Nationalist politics, (Gill and Macmillan, Michigan: 1981)
Grofman, B., Downs and Two-Party Convergence in Annual Review of Political Science, (2004)
54
Haas, E., The Uniting Europe, (Stanford University Press: California, 1958)
Hayton, R., Reconstructing Conservatism? The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1997-2010,
(Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2012)
HC Deb 11 December 1991 vol 200 cc862
HC Deb 24 October 2011 col46
HL Deb 07 June 1993 vol 546 cc565
HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, (Cabinet Office, May 2010)
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., The Making of a Polity: The Struggle Over European Integration in
European Integration online Papers, (1997)
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Multi-level Governance and European Integration, (Lanham, Md: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001)
Irish Echo, FG Govt. would end Irish neutrality, (Feb. 2011),
<http://www.irishecho.com.au/2011/02/16/kenny-to-push-for-eu-defence-role/7222>, accessed
17/12/14
Irish Election Literature, 1992 Leaflet For The Fianna Fil National Collection And Vote Yes To The
Maastricht Referendum, (Aug. 2014) <http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com/2014/08/14/1992leaflet-for-the-fianna-fail-national-collection-and-vote-yes-to-the-maastricht-referendum/>, accessed
16/12/14
James, W., Single European Act in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007)
James, W., Treaty of Amsterdam in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007)
James, W., Treaty of Maastricht in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007)
James, W., Treaty of Nice in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007)
James, W., Treaty of Rome in Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2007)
Jeremy Hargreaves, The Liberal Democrats and Europe,
<http://www.jeremyhargreaves.org/europe/the-liberal-democrats-and-europe/>, accessed 24/03/15
Keen, R., Membership of UK Political Parties in House of Commons Library, (Jan. 2015), pp.6-9
Laffan, B., OMahony, J., Ireland and the European Union, (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2008)
Lipset, S., Rokkan, S., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: cross-national perspectives, (The Free
Press, New York: 1967)
Lourie, J., The Social Chapter: Research Paper 97/102 in House of Commons Library, (1997)
Marks, G., Wilson, C., The past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European
Integration in British Journal of Political Science, (July, 2000)
Mellows-Facer, A., General Election 2005: Research Paper 05/33 in House of Commons Library,
(2005), p.47
Muller, W., Strm, K., Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard
Decisions, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1999)
O'Duffy, B., Swapping the reins of the Emerald Tiger: The Irish general election of June 1997 in
West European Politics (1998)
Office of the Taoiseach, Treaty of Nice and Seville Declarations 2002 in Government Information
Guide, (2002)
Patterson, B., The Conservative Party and Europe, (John Harper Publishing; London, 2011)
Quinn, T., Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain, (Palgrave MacMillan; Hampshire, 2012)
Schwanberg, P., Irelands Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration in European Studies,
(2007)
Taggart, P., Szczerbiak, A., The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate
States in SEI Working Paper: Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper, (2002)
Thatcher, M., Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech") in Thatcher Archive: COI
transcript, (Sept. 1988)
The Conservative Party, For Real Change In Europe, Vote Conservative,
<https://www.conservatives.com/landing_pages/european_election.aspx>, accessed 28/03/15
The Conservative Party, 1992 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: The Best Future for
Britain, (Conservative Central Office, 1992)
The Conservative Party, 1997 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: You can only be sure
with the Conservatives, (Conservative Central Office, 1997)
The Conservative Party, 2001 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: Time for Common
Sense, (Conservative Central Office, 2001)
The Conservative Party, 2005 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto: Are you thinking what
were thinking? Its Time for Action, (Conservative Central Office, 2005)
The Conservative Party, Conservative party European Election Manifesto 2014, (Conservative
Central Office, 2014)
55
The European Union, Ireland, (March 2015), < http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/membercountries/ireland/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
The European Union, Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, (15/10/10),
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm>,
accessed 15/12/14
The European Union, United Kingdom, (March 2015), <http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/member-countries/unitedkingdom/index_en.htm>, accessed 27/03/15
The Guardian, David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift in Europe, (Dec.
2011), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty>, accessed
29/03/15
The Guardian, EU referendum Commons vote Monday 24 October 2011, (Oct. 2011),
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/eu-referendum-commons-vote-live-coverage#block18>, accessed 28/03/15
The Liberal Democrats, 2010 Liberal Democrats General Election Manifesto: Change that works for
you, Building a Fairer Britain
The Telegraph, EU referendum: David Cameron hit by biggest Conservative rebellion, (Oct. 2011),
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8847032/EU-referendum-David-Cameron-hitby-biggest-Conservative-rebellion.html>, accessed 28/03/15
UK Government, European Union Act 2011 in Explanatory Notes, (2011)
Urwin, D., The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, (Routledge, New
York: 1995)
Volkens, A. Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, S., Werner, A., The Manifesto Document Collection.
Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung
(WZB)
56

Sam Nolan Undergraduate Dissertation

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sam Nolan Undergraduate Dissertation

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: CAUSES OF

Theorising Party Attitudes towards European Integration............................................3

General Trends in Europe............................................................................................9

Case Study Selection..................................................................................................11

The British Conservative Party...................................................................................14

Irish Conservative Parties...........................................................................................30

Theorising Party Attitudes towards European Integration

an isolated situation, void of underlying influences where actors behave completely

10 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, pp.280285

15 Marks, Wilson, The past in the Present, p.433-459

Secondly the conservative ideal point would arguably be somewhere between no

23 Marks, Wilson, The past in the Present, p.433-459

General Trends in Europe

intergovernmental institutions, including the Council of Ministers, a European

Case Study Selection

42 Gallagher, Laver, Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, p.287

European Community in 1973, in addition neither country is a member of the

The British Conservative Party

52 Hooghe, et al. Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European

53 Hooghe, et al. Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European

enthusiastically supported the integration. Furthermore this stage of integration was

issue of Europe would arguably always be one of consensus within The

64 Berrington, H., Hague, R., Europe, Thatcherism and traditionalism: Opinion,

Source: Volkens, et al., The Manifesto Document Collection. Ma

Market78 and seek more cooperation between national governments on areas of

78 The Conservative Party, 1997 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto:

84 The Conservative Party, 1997 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto:

Conservatives restated their commitment of being in Europe, but not run by

87 The Conservative Party, 2001 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto:

90 Quinn, Electing and Ejecting Party Leaders in Britain, pp.103-107

96 The Conservative Party, 2005 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto:

Figure 3: Attitudes towards European Integration

Despite increases in pro-European sentiment in the Conservative manifesto in 2010,

In Government: Towards Hard Euroscepticism?

119 HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, (Cabinet

governments policy on the European Union. Therefore a suggestion could be made

language that stresses that it is too capitalist/socialist/neoliberal/bureaucratic,

133 Taggart, Szczerbiak, The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and

143 BBC News, Vote 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-ukresults>, accessed 28/02/15

Irish Conservative Parties

146 Gaffney, Political Parties and the European Union, pp.191-204

Source: Volkens, et al., The Manifesto Document Collection. Ma

183 Schwanberg, Irelands Neutrality and European Security Policy Integration,

conservative parties with no historical connections to social cleavages are able to

The pattern of increasing Euroscepticism persisted when The Conservative Party

Up against the rising popularity of

way; a way in which conservative parties with connections to social cleavages

You might also like