Sam Nolan

Exploring the impact of the choice of electoral system on patterns of political

representation.

Introduction
Arend Lijphart described electoral systems as the most fundamental element of
representative democracy (Lijphart 1994 p.1). Electoral systems are the only
consistent method by which citizens in a democratic society are able to express their
political will by selecting the officials to make decisions on their behalf (Lijphart
1994). Therefore, the choice of electoral system is vital for a representative
democracy. This paper will examine three areas of representation; proportionality of
votes to seats, the party system, and societal representation, but will first establish
the numerous styles of electoral systems.

Electoral System Typology

Electoral systems can be generally categorised into three main areas; majoritarian
electoral systems, proportional electoral systems, and mixed electoral systems.
Within these three categories there is an almost endless number of sub-categories
and variations (Norris 1997). All three types are found throughout European
democracies (Gallagher et al 2011).

Majoritarian Electoral Systems

A study in the late 1990s found that out of the 150 countries that had a type of
electoral system, 83 used a version of a majoritarian system (Norris 1997). These
systems included plurality systems such as First-Past-The-Post (categorised in this
paper as a majoritarian system for straightforwardness), Second Ballot Runoff, and

Sam Nolan
the Alternative Vote. The First-Past-The-Post system means that candidates with
the most votes in single member constituencies are elected, either with a majority or
a simple plurality of votes. Second Ballot Runoff systems involve a second round of
voting with the two most popular candidates of the first round (if no candidate
receives over 50 percent of the vote in the first round); therefore the winning
candidate will be elected with majority support (Norris 1997).

The final majoritarian electoral system is the Alternative Vote (AV). AV requires voters
to rank candidates in order of preference and then the votes are counted in rounds,
considering the number of first preference votes. If no candidate achieves 50 percent
of first preference votes the candidate with the fewest first preference votes is
eliminated and their votes are distributed amongst the other candidates according to
second preferences. This continues until one candidate has achieved an absolute
majority: at least 50 percent of the votes (Norris 1997).

Proportional Electoral Systems

Proportional electoral systems, also referred to as Proportional Representation (PR),
can be further categorised as either semi-proportional system or the Party List
System. The most widely used semi-proportional systems is Standard Transferable
Vote (STV). STV employs multi-member constituencies, most often returning 4 or 5
representative. The electorate rank candidates in order of preference, and the total
number of votes is counted. This is then used to create a minimum quota of votes
each candidate needs to be elected. Then, like the Alternative Vote system, first
preference votes are counted and then distributed accordingly if no candidate

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reaches the quota. This process continues until all available seats in the
constituency are filled (Norris 1997).

The most proportional and widely used PR system is the Party List System. The
Party List System, often simply referred to as just the List System, likewise requires
multimember constituencies; these may be regional constituencies or there may be
just one constituency incorporating the entire country. As the name implies, voters
are presented with a list of parties and select their preferred choice, while political
parties draw up a list of potential candidates. Similarly to STV, a quota is then found
after considering the number of votes cast and the number of representatives to be
elected (Norris 1997).

The List System contains so many difference variations that it could be considered a
category in itself (Norris 1997). However, for the purposes of this paper, whereby the
technical details of each electoral system and their variants is not relevant, it will be
treated as simply one type of electoral system within the category of proportional
systems.

Mixed Systems
In addition to the majoritarian and proportional systems there are hybrid mixed
systems. Mixed systems commonly require a certain proportion of representatives to
be elected using a majoritarian system, while the others are elected by a proportional
system (Norris 1997).

The Proportionality of Votes to Seats

Sam Nolan
The first measurement of political representation is the proportionality of votes to
seats; or how the electorates vote truly impacts the outcome. The way voter
preferences are translated into seat share, and therefore policy preferences, is
perhaps the most fundamental aspect of electoral system design. The relationship
between vote share and seat share is possibly the simplest and clearest way to test
an electoral systems proportionality and level of representation (Lijphart 2012).

Examples of Disproportionality
The UK, which operates the First Past the Post system, has perhaps an infamous
reputation for disproportionality in the way vote preferences are translated in seat
share during general elections. The results of the 2015 election were considered to
be the most disproportionate election in UK history (Hawkins et al 2015); the winning
Conservative Party obtained 37 percent of votes but gained just over 50 percent of
the seat share. The Labour Party won 30 percent of the vote share and were
awarded five percent more in seats. The Scottish National Party won under five
percent of the vote share but won almost double the percentage of seats (Hawkins et
al 2015).

While a number of smaller parties were hugely disadvantage: The Liberal Democrats
obtained almost eight percent of the vote share but only around one percent of the
seats and The Green Party received almost four percent of the national vote share
but received 0.2 percent of seats. Perhaps the most disadvantaged was the UK
Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP received almost 13 percent of national vote share,
and if the UK had adopted a truly proportionally system for that election, then UKIP

Sam Nolan
would have yielded around 82 seats, however UKIP gained just one (Hawkins et al
2015).

This disparity is not unique to the UK; similar results occur in other countries that
employ majoritarian electoral systems. French legislative elections use the
majoritarian system of two-round runoffs. Much like the UK elections high levels of
disproportionality prevail; in 2012 the Socialist Party won just under 30 percent of the
first round votes but were awarded 48 percent of seats in the national assembly
(Hewlett 2012). The Union for a Popular Movement Party won 27 percent of votes
but obtained 33 percent of seats (Hewlett 2012).

The most disproportionately affected party were the National Front, which received
over 13 percent of national vote share but won only two seats, around 76 seats less
than it would have had the electoral system been proportional (Hewlett 2012).

Countries that employ proportional electoral systems, on the other hand, do not
suffer from the same difficulty. For example; in the 2012 general election in the
Netherlands, which uses the proportional Party List system, the seats were
distributed almost completely in line with vote share. For instance, the Peoples Party
for Freedom and Democracy won 26.6 percent of the votes and 27 percent of seats,
the Labour Party won 24.8 percent of the votes and 25 percent of the seats, and the
Party for Freedom won 10.1 percent of the votes and 10 percent of seats (De
Kiesraad [Dutch Electoral Council] 2012).

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Lijpharts (2012) research on the disproportionality of electoral systems has lead to
an average disproportionality score for 36 countries, of which 19 are European. The
disproportionality score is effectively calculated by finding the average difference
between the vote share and the seat share. According to Lijpharts research the
three least disproportionate European countries electoral systems are the
Netherlands (with a disproportionality score of 1.21%), Denmark (1.71%), and
Sweden (2.04%); all of which employ the proportional Party List System.

Moreover;

the

17

least

disproportionate

European

democracies

(with

disproportionality score of between 1.21% and 7.88%) either apply the Party List
System, or a hybrid system of Party List and Standard Transferable Vote or First
Past the Post; such as Malta, Germany, Italy, and Ireland.

The two most

disproportionate European democracies in Lijpharts study are the UK (11.7%) and

France (20.9%); with both employing majoritarian electoral systems.

Using Lijpharts data as a sample; the average disproportionality score of countries

that use a proportional electoral system is 3.5%, while the average score of countries
that use a majoritarian electoral system is 16.2%. Therefore; majoritarian systems
are on average four times more disproportionate than proportional systems (Lijphart
2012).

Implications of Disproportionality
To describe these results in a more conceptual way; in 2015 the Conservative Party
in the UK gained a majority of parliamentary seats and therefore had a mandate to
govern. However, around 63 percent of voters voted for another party, or put another

Sam Nolan
way: a majority of voters voted against the Conservative Party. Nonetheless the
Conservative Party had an adequate amount of support in a sufficient number of
seats to win a majority of seats, as under the First Past the Post system a party only
needs a plurality of votes in just over 50 percent of constituencies to form a
parliamentary majority.

If a party with concentrated support of a minority of voters is able to gain more seats
than a significantly more popular party which holds broad support across a country,
then that is intrinsically unfair and unrepresentative. This problem becomes even
more critical when one considers the impact the disproportionate distribution of seats
has on the wider and more momentous process of government formation and thus
public policy.

It could be argued that fundamentally the 37 percent of the electorate who voted for
the Conservative Party are having their policy preferences represented and
implemented, while the policy preferences of the 63 percent of voters who did not
vote for the Conservative Party have no impact on public policy. Therefore; electoral
disproportionality strikes at the heart of a democratic and representative society; the
connection between citizen preferences and public policy.

In a proportional system, however, where vote share is accurately translated in seat

share, a party must win majority support to form a majority of government, which is
rare. More often parties are required to form coalitions in order to achieve a sufficient
amount of support for a majority, and functioning, government. Therefore, it could be
argued that in an abstract sense; a government in a proportional system, coalition or

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otherwise, is able to implement public policy inline with the majority of voters policy
preferences.

Therefore, as shown, the choice of electoral system has a clear effect on patterns of
political representation. This was demonstrated, arguably most poignantly, by the
relationship between vote share and seat share. Majoritarian systems, such as that
of the UK and France fail to accurately translate voter preference into political
representation, in the form of seat share. While Proportional systems, like that of the
Netherlands, accurately and fairly reflect vote share into proportion of seats.

Impact on Party System

The ability of an electoral system to accurately translate the number of votes into the
number of seats for any particular party is a fundamental part of any electoral
system. This phenomenon has far-reaching implications; including the impact on the
number of parties, the general shape of the party system, and the political
representation issues that arise from that.

Duvergers Law and Hypothesis

In the field of electoral studies perhaps the most frequently cited are the works of
Maurice Duverger; who explored the relationship between plurality voting systems
and two-party systems, known as Duvergers Law (Benoit 2006). Duverger, though
not the first to do so, set out to consider the causes of strong two-party democratic
systems, as opposed to multi-party systems. After considering the impact of further
national factors, he concluded that the cause of two-party systems, such as that of
the United States, was the pluarality voting systems, such as First Past the Post.

Sam Nolan

As Duverger states (which came to be known as the law); the simple-majority

single-ballot system [First Past the Post] favours the two-party system. Of all the
hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly
perhaps to a true sociological law (Duverger 1959, p217). Following on from
Duvergers law came Duvergers hypothesis which theorised that just as
majoritarian systems result in two-party systems, proportional electoral systems
result in multi-party systems (Benoit 2006).

Duverger argues that the relationship between electoral system and number of
parties is formed out of two effects: the mechanical effect and the psychological
effect (Van Der Straeten et al 2010). The mechanical effect, as it implies, describes
the way in which electoral systems translate votes into seats. For example; under a
majoritarian system a small party with support of 10 percent of the population across
a country, but no concentrated support in one area, is unlikely to be awarded any
seats. While under a proportional system the party would win close to 10 percent of
parliamentary seats (Gallagher et al 2011).

The psychological effect is a direct consequence of the mechanical effect, whereby

the electorate is aware of the natural fairness, or unfairness, of the electoral system
and vote accordingly in order to not waste their vote; for example, not voting for
smaller or niche parties in a majoritarian system as the party has a low chance of
winning (Van Der Straeten et al 2010). The psychological effect has also been
described as strategic voting. Under a majoritarian system this problem is then
compounded after every election; as voters do not wish to squander their vote on

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parties that cannot win, the two party system is concreted and new small parties are
unable to make any electoral ground (Gallagher et al 2011).

Despite Duverger describing his findings as law, a concept rarely found and much
lambasted in the field of political science, his conclusions have since been tested.

Lijphart

(2012)

found

statistically

significant

correlation

between

the

disproportionality of an electoral system and the effective number of parliamentary

parties (ENPP) - a count of parties depending on their relative strength in relation to
their seat share in parliament. Lijphart found that as a democracys disproportionality
score increases, the ENPP score decreases; or put another way: as the difference
between the vote share and seat share rises, the number of parties decreases. This
is in line with Duvergers law. However as Lijphart concedes; the number of Effective
parties could also be caused by other factors, such as social cleavages.

On average democracies that employ a proportional system tend to have a higher

ENPP score. For example, Belgium, which uses the Party List system, has a
substantial number of political parties; 7.8 effective number of parties in parliament
(Gallagher et al 2011), in addition the UK, which uses the First Past the Post method,
has only 2.4 effective number of parties in parliament (Gallagher et al 2011). On
average proportional electoral systems in Europe have 4 effective parliamentary
parties, while majoritarian electoral systems have only 2.6 (Gallagher et al 2011).
Therefore, on average democracies with proportional systems have almost twice as
many effective parliamentary parties than democracies with majoritarian systems.

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Representative Effects of Duvergers Law
A fundamental principle of a representative democracy is a broad choice of
candidates for the electorate. For example; an election where only one party is
standing, or is able to win, would not be considered a true democratic election. An
election where only two parties, with very similar ideologies, have the possibility of
winning would also have its democratic credentials questioned. Therefore, in a truly
democratic and representative system all parties should have the same opportunity
to win seats and not be hindered the electoral system.

Furthermore; it could be assumed that voters, acting on rational instinct, would not
vote for a party that has little to no chance of winning the election, as voters naturally
strive for their vote to count and not be wasted. Thus, strategic voting forces the
electorate to possibly abandon how they wish to truly vote in order for their ballot to
not be wasted. Therefore, it could be suggested that strategic voting is unfair and
results in a system that is unrepresentative (Lijphart 1994).

The impact of the electoral system on a countrys party system, therefore, effects
political representation in two ways. Firstly, the choice of the electoral system
impacts the success of minor parties, ultimately limiting or widening voters choice of
parties, and the electoral system may decide whether the electorate should vote
strategically or not, further influencing how voters cast their ballot.

The Representation of Social Groups

The connection between electoral system and political representation arguably goes
beyond seat share proportionality and fairness to smaller parties, and extends to

Sam Nolan
further sociological representation. Matlands (2005) research examines the impact
of electoral system and the representation of women in parliaments. Matland argues
that the difference between levels of representation for women in proportional
systems and majoritarian systems is due to the number of representatives per district
(or district magnitude); either single member districts (SMDs), like most majoritarian
systems, or multi-member district (MMD), like all true proportional systems.

Matland argues that in SMDs, parties, acting gatekeepers to who may stand in
election, would be looking to maximise their chances of winning but may only select
one candidate. Therefore; parties, according to Matland, would be less willing to
select a female candidate as that would potentially lower their electoral chances,
though the rationality behind that is arguably outdated. In MMDs, however, parties
have the opportunity to select multiple candidates and thus have the ability to select
a mix of both men and women. Arguably a party in a MMD which only selects male
candidates is likely to alienate certain voters (Gallagher et al 2011).

Norris (2000) found a statistically significant relationship between electoral system

and percentage of female representation in a countrys legislature. Norris found that
on average the percentage of women in a legislature, elected by a majoritarian
voting system, was 10.8 percent. The percentage of female legislators in systems
with a mixed system was 15.1 percent, and proportional electoral systems resulted in
19.8 percent female representation on average. Therefore; democracies with
proportional electoral systems have, on average, twice as many women in
parliament than democracies with majoritarian electoral systems (Norris 2000).

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Obviously the case could be made that no electoral system has yet resulted in truly
fair female representation as even 19.8 percent of women in a legislature is still
significantly different to the true representation of women.

However; Gallagher et al (2011), presenting more recent data, submits that there is
little evidence to suggest any real relationship between percentage of parliamentary
seats held by women and the chosen electoral system. Surface evidence suggests
that if there is such a relationship, it is not consistent: for example, certain countries,
such as Greece, Ireland, and Malta, which use a proportional system, have less
women in parliament than certain countries that use a majoritarian system, such as
the UK (Gallagher et al 2011). It could therefore be fair to suggest that, at the very
least, electoral systems only partially explain representation of women in
parliaments.

Matland (2005) further extended the theory suggesting that parties in majoritarian
single member districts will select candidates that have the widest appeal amongst
the majority of the population; in plurality systems it would not be necessary to have
the support of even the majority, as thats the electoral systems requirement. While
parties in proportional multi-member districts are able to select multiple candidates
that individually appeal to various ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups; thus,
increasing the social representational makeup of the parliament.

Therefore, in a majoritarian single member district it would be electorally

disadvantageous for parties to select a candidate with only strong support of a
minority group which made up only 20 percent of the wider population, for example.

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While in a proportional multi-member district it could be potentially very
advantageous to select this candidate (Gallagher et al 2011).

However; as Gallagher et al (2011) states there has been little research in the
relationship between electoral system and ethnic representation in parliament,
though the theoretical argument still stands. Therefore; the choice of electoral
system, or more specifically the consequence of the electoral system (district
magnitude), affects political representation in more societal specific terms.

Conclusion
In summary, the choice of electoral system impacts political representation in three
aspects; seat distribution, fairness to smaller parties, and social representation.
Electoral disproportionality, or seat distribution, is perhaps the clearest way to
measure the ability of an electoral system ability to represent the electorate
preferences. As shown, majoritarian systems consistently disproportionately
translate vote share into seat share, rewarding larger parties, while proportional
systems persistently accurately translate votes into seats fairly.

Duvergers law, and further research surrounding it, which examine the relationship
between electoral system and party system show that majoritarian systems result in
less parties than proportional systems and force the electorate to vote strategically
rather than honestly. Finally, proportional electoral systems, unlike majoritarian
systems, affect societal representation by theoretically providing greater opportunity
for women and minority groups to be selected as candidates for elections.

Sam Nolan
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