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Richardson v. Ploughe, 10th Cir. (2014)
Richardson v. Ploughe, 10th Cir. (2014)
Clerk of Court
LEWIS RICHARDSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
PAM PLOUGHE, Warden, and JOHN
SUTHERS, Attorney General of the
State of Colorado,
No. 14-1126
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01828-REB)
(D. of Colo.)
Respondents - Appellees.
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
In 2004, Richardson was found guilty of numerous offenses largely related
to his persistent harassment of a former friend. Of particular relevance to the
request for a COA was his conviction for stalking under subsections of Colorado
Revised Statute 18-9-111 (2007) (the Colorado Stalking Statute) in effect at
the time of his prosecution. Those charges were based on Richardsons pro se
filing of thirteen harassing lawsuits against the victim.
After a direct appeal, a motion for sentence reconsideration, and efforts at
post-conviction relief in state court left Richardsons judgment and sentence
undisturbed, Richardson timely initiated federal habeas proceedings in July 2012,
raising numerous grounds for relief. On the first pass, the district court dismissed
many of these claims as procedurally defaulted because Richardson had not
exhausted those claims by sufficiently presenting them in state court. The district
court also dismissed other claims that presented pure issues of state law. After
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further briefing on the remaining claims, the district court denied habeas relief
and declined to grant a COA. Richardson then filed a motion to alter or amend
the judgment under Rule 59, which the district court denied on the merits.
Richardson now appeals. 1
II. Discussion
We interpret Richardsons filing as an appeal of two distinct district court
orders: (1) a February 4, 2014 order denying his request for a writ of habeas
corpus, and (2) a February 20, 2014 order denying his motion under Rule 59.
Properly construed, Richardsons challenge to the former is an application for a
COA and his challenge to the latter is a successive request for habeas relief. We
address each in sequence.
A. COA Application
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires a
petitioner to obtain a COA before he can appeal the denial of any final order in a
habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(B). A COA requires the
applicant to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). To meet this standard, Richardson must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).
Where a state court has decided a petitioners claims on the merits, we are
required to integrate AEDPAs deferential treatment of state court decisions . . .
into our consideration of the COA request. Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938
(10th Cir. 2004). To this end, Richardson must show that the state courts
adjudication of a given claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Phillips v. Workman, 604
F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir. 2010) (referring to standard under 28 U.S.C.
2254(d)(1), (2)).
Based on our review of the district courts decision, the record on appeal,
and Richardsons brief, we detect three arguments as to why we should grant a
COA and we address those arguments below. In making these arguments on
appeal, Richardson presents both contentions initially raised in the district court
and newly formulated theories. Since we will not consider arguments raised for
the first time on appeal, United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.
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2002), we have parsed his briefing and do not attend to arguments not first
addressed to the district court. 2
1. Overbreadth
Richardson first contends that the Colorado Stalking Statute, Colo. Rev.
Stat. 18-9-111(4) et seq. (2007), is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to
him. 3 Described broadly, he argues that filing a legal complaint with the
government, regardless of the filers vexatiousness, is protected under the First
Amendments right to petition. See Aplt. Br. at 8. This First Amendment
protection, Richardson tells us, is embedded in firmly established Supreme Court
precedent such that the Colorado Stalking Statute, and the state courts
interpretation of it, is unconstitutional. The Colorado Court of Appeals
considered and rejected this claim on direct appeal. People v. Richardson, 181
P.3d 340, 345 (Colo. App. 2007).
Much of Richardsons argument hinges on his distinction between the terms
vexatious and baseless (or frivolous) that he borrows from the Supreme
Courts antitrust jurisprudence. According to Richardson, vexatious lawsuits
In front of the district court, Richardson argued that the statute was also
overbroad and vague on its face, but he has abandoned those arguments by not
raising them in his application for a COA. See United States v. Springfield, 337
F.3d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003).
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discretionary appeals. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); see
also Colo. App. R. 49 (indicating that granting certiorari is discretionary). This
alone is enough to dispose of Richardsons request for a COA on his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims.
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, appears to have recognized a right
to counsel in seeking certiorari through the Colorado state courts. See People v.
Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 408 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). In this case, both the Colorado
Court of Appeals and the district court assumed that Richardson was entitled to
such a constitutional right. We disagree with this interpretation of the scope of
the right to counsel under the circumstances, but even assuming for the sake of
argument that Richardson had a right to counsel for a certiorari petition to the
Colorado Supreme Court, we reject his ineffective-assistance claim.
The scope of our review of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims during
2254 cases is doubly deferential. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
123 (2009). Not only do we defer to the state courts determination that
counsels performance was not deficient, but we also defer to the attorneys
decision in how to best represent a client. Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159,
1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawley v. Dinwiddie, 584 F.3d 916, 922 (10th
Cir. 2009)). We thus frame that question as whether there is any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied [the] deferential standard under Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788
(2011). If there is, the claim must fail.
Strickland governs ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and requires a
showing (1) that counsels representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, id. at 687. See also United States v. Cook,
45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Strickland to assess effectiveness of
appellate counsel).
We agree with both the state court and the district court that Richardson has
not shown that his direct-appeal counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective. To
demonstrate ineffectiveness in the failure to raise an issue during the appellate
process, Richardson must show that the issue was meritorious. Hawkins v.
Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). When it is meritless, then
counsels failure to raise it does not amount to constitutionally ineffective
assistance. Id. Richardson admits difficulty in articulating exactly what
argument concerning vexatiousness would have convinced the state high court
that a different result was warranted. And based on our review of the materials
related to this COA application, we do not think such an argument exists. 4
4
(...continued)
lacks merit. For the reasons expressed by the district court, this line of reasoning
cannot sustain Richardsons ineffective-assistance claim in this 2254
proceeding.
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has granted the required authorization. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th
Cir. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A).
As the district court fairly observed, Richardsons Rule 59 motion does
nothing more than rehash the arguments made in his habeas petition. Thus, in
essence, Richardsons motion is properly construed as an unauthorized successive
habeas petition. Although the district court should have dismissed the motion for
lack of jurisdiction rather than deny it on the merits, see Spitznas, 464 F.3d at
1217, we interpret Richardsons appeal of the denial of his motion to alter or
amend the judgment as an application to file a second or successive habeas
petition, id. at 1219. And having independently established that the claims from
Richardsons Rule 59 motion are materially indistinguishable from those in his
original habeas petition, AEDPA mandates that we dismiss. 28 U.S.C.
2244(b)(1) (A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed.).
III. Conclusion
Based on the reasons expressed above, we DENY Richardsons request for
a COA and DISMISS this appeal. We also VACATE the district courts order on
Richardsons Rule 59 motion because it constituted a second 2254 petition and
should have been transferred to this court. We therefore DENY Richardsons
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