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Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 10th Cir. (2016)
Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 10th Cir. (2016)
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 2, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
No. 14-4112
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed. Cameron and
Hollingshead were parking enforcement officers employed by the City. As parking
enforcement officers, their duties included issuing citations for local parking
ordinances and impounding vehicles. They did not, however, have the authority to
detain or arrest citizens.
On November 7, 2008, Schaffer parallel parked a red Dodge pickup truck in a
no-parking zone. Hollingshead and Cameron were on duty together at the time, and
duly issued her a parking ticket. When Schaffer returned to her truck, she found the
parking enforcement officers engaged in an altercation with another citizen, Lisa
Garmendia, whose car was also parked in the no-parking zone. Garmendia requested
that a police officer respond to her complaints. Schaffer intervened, and requested
Camerons badge number. After briefly contesting her ticket, Schaffer got in her
truck to leave.
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her truck struck the parking officers or their car, and contends that the parking
officers allegedly false testimony to the contrary led to her arrest and prosecution
without probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. Schaffer appeals that ruling only with respect to the City and the
parking enforcement officers.1
II.
DISCUSSION
Although Schaffers notice of appeal referred to the entire judgment, she now
informs the court that she has decided not to pursue her appeal against Officer
Stumm. (Aplt. Br. at 2 n.2.) Accordingly, we find she has waived any arguments
regarding her claims against Stumm. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 954 (10th
Cir. 1992) (stating the general rule that even issues designated for review are lost if they
are not actually argued in the partys brief).
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Amendment rights by providing false statements and testimony that resulted in her
arrest and prosecution. We need not reach that issue, however, because we conclude
that the parking enforcement officers were not acting under color of state law when
they reported the parking incident. Consequently, Schaffers Section 1983 claims
against the parking officers fail, and with them, her claims against the City.
A. Color of State Law
Whether a defendant acted under color of state law is a mixed question of fact
and law. How v. City of Baxter Springs, 217 F. Appx 787, 791 (10th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) (citing Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388, 392 (11th Cir. 1994)). Where, as
here, the underlying facts are undisputed, the standard of review is de novo. Van
Scoten v. C.I.R., 439 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). Schaffers two theories as to
why the parking enforcement officers acted under color of state law are discussed in
turn below.
1. Badge of authority
Schaffer first contends that the parking officers acted under color of state law
because the incident occurred while they were performing their duties as City employees.
Section 1983 was enacted to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if
such deterrence fails.2 Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)). The traditional definition of acting under
color of state law requires that the defendant in a 1983 action exercised power
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law. Id. (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)
(internal punctuation omitted).) However, the fact that a tort was committed by an
individual employed by the state does not, ipso facto, warrant attributing all of the
employees actions to the state. Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 493 (10th Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, before conduct may be fairly attributed to
the state because it constitutes action under color of state law, there must be a real
nexus between the employees use or misuse of their authority as a public employee, and
the violation allegedly committed by the defendant. Id. (quoting D.T. ex. rel. M.T., 894
F.2d at 1188).
Schaffer is unable to establish the requisite nexus between the parking
enforcement officers alleged unconstitutional conductnamely, lying in witness
statements and at the probable cause hearingand their authority to write parking tickets
and impound vehicles. After all, any citizen can report suspicious activity to the police
and repeat that testimony in court; in doing so, the parking enforcement officers exercised
no power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because [the parking
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982); How, 217 F. Appx at 791
(unpublished); Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th
Cir. 1995).
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officers were] clothed with the authority of state law.3 Id. at 492-93 (quoting West, 487
U.S. at 49).
The fact that the parking enforcement officers were on duty when they gave their
witness statements does not alone render those statements under color of state law. See
Haines, 82 F.2d at 1508 (finding that on-duty cops who staged a prank robbery did
not act under color of state law because they were not using their badges of
authority, i.e., their positions as policemen . . . to accomplish the . . . prank).
Neither does the fact that the incident arose from the parking officers previous
exercise of state authority to issue parking tickets satisfy the color of state law
requirement. See Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 866 (10th Cir. 2009) (Even when
state employees are performing the services for which the state pays them, they may
not be state actors while performing functions that the state has no right to control.);
How, 217 F. Appx at 794 (unpublished) ([T]he proper inquiry is . . . at the time of
the alleged constitutional violation. . . .).4 The record is devoid of any indication that
That Cameron was speaking directly to police dispatch at the time of the
incident does not change that conclusion. Cameron had called dispatch to deal with
an unrelated matter, and the call happened to continue recording as Schaffer drove by
and Cameron spontaneously reported the incident with Schaffer. Schaffer puts forth
no evidence showing Cameron would not otherwise have chosen to report the
incident.
4
The record does not show that the parking enforcement officers were either
trained or required to (1) diffuse disputes that arose during the course of their duties
or (2) report any resulting disruptive behavior to the police. Schaffer has advanced
no such argument before either this or the district court. Accordingly, we do not pass
on the issue. See United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 994 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004)
(Arguments not raised by the parties in their briefs are deemed waived.); Walker v.
Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating the general rule
that issues not raised to the district court will not be considered on appeal).
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their exercise of that authority extended to their witness statements and testimony.
See Jojola, 55 F.3d at 490, 494 (finding that a school janitor who sexually assaulted a
student did not act under color of state law because the complaint [was] devoid of any
allegation that [the janitor] enticed [the student] into the classroom through the use or
misuse of any state authority he may have possessed); How, 217 Fed. Appx at 793
and n.5 (unpublished) (finding a city clerk did not wear a badge of state authority
when she filed a criminal complaint against the plaintiff because [t]here is no
evidence in this case that [she] used her position as city clerk to gain an advantage in
the filing of her complaint). Consequently, the parking officers, although employed
by the City, acted in their private capacities when reporting and testifying against
Schaffer.
2. Joint action
Schaffer next contends that the parking officers engaged in joint action with
the police to arrest and prosecute her. Even a private party acts under color of state
law if that party is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.
Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). To
apply the joint action test, courts examine whether state officials and private parties
have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights. Id.
There are at least two ways to establish concerted action. Id. at 1454; see also Yanaki v.
Iomed, Inc., 415 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) (Holloway, J., dissenting). Under
the conspiracy approach, the public and private actors [must] share a common,
unconstitutional goal. Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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trespassing did not engage in joint action with the police, who ultimately booked the
plaintiff for a lesser offense, because [the officer] made the decision as to whether
[the plaintiff] should be charged with any offense, and [t]here is no suggestion in
the record . . . that [the officer and plaintiff] were somehow acting as a team)).
Schaffer failed to adduce evidence that the parking officers had any
involvement in her arrest and prosecution beyond furnishing information to law
enforcement officers. See Benavidez, 722 F.2d at 618. There is no indication that
the parking officers shared an unconstitutional goal with Officer Stumm or the
prosecutor, or that they exerted any influence over the decisions to arrest and charge
Schaffer. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1454. Rather, the record shows that Stumm made
the decision to arrest and book Schaffer only after conducting an independent
investigation: to wit, subsequent to obtaining the witness statements and crime lab
photographs, he located the offending truck at Schaffers home address and observed
handprints and marks on the truck consistent with the statements and photographs.
Consequently, the parking officers did not engage in joint action with the police
when they reported their encounter with Schaffer and testified against her. 5 See
Carey, 823 F.2d at 1404; Lee, 820 F.2d at 1115.
Because Schaffer fails to show that the parking officers acted under color of
state law as is required for liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983, summary judgment in favor
of the parking officers was proper.
B. Municipal Liability
A municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying
constitutional violation by any of its officers. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774,
782 (10th Cir. 1993). Schaffer asserts underlying violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which require state action. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1446. In this case,
the concepts of state action and under the color of state law are coterminous. How, 217
F. Appx at 791 (unpublished); see supra fn. 2. As such, this Courts finding that the
parking officers did not act under color of state law necessarily vitiates Schaffers claim
against the City.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courts grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
citizens arrest paperwork that allowed summons to be issued on-site), all of which
allowed the private security guard to substitute his judgment for that of the police.
Id.
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