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United States v. William Stearns, 11th Cir. (2010)
United States v. William Stearns, 11th Cir. (2010)
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-11452
JUNE 30, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM STEARNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 30, 2010)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Stearns appeals his convictions and 60-month sentences for health
care fraud and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1347, 1957. Stearns asserts (1) the
district court erred in allowing a deliberate ignorance jury instruction, (2) the
district court clearly erred in enhancing Stearns sentences based on his role in the
offense and (3) Stearns sentences were not reasonable. Stearns was an
independent chiropractor who formed Comprehensive Care Medical Group with
Steven Levine and Chris Topel. Stearns, Levine, and Topel submitted materially
false and misleading bills to insurance companies for procedures not covered by
insurance. Levine and Topel both entered into plea agreements with the
Government. After review, we affirm Stearns convictions and sentences.
I. JURY INSTRUCTION
Stearns asserts the district courts error was not harmless because (1) the
governments theory was that he had actual knowledge the billing practices were
fraudulent; (2) the evidence supporting actual knowledge was not overwhelming;
and (3) the Government presented no evidence showing conscious avoidance of the
truth.1
instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance because the evidence at trial supported
both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance.
II. ROLE IN THE OFFENSE
Stearns contends the district court clearly erred in imposing a two-level
enhancement for his managerial role in the offense because neither Levine nor
Topel received such an enhancement, even though their roles in the offense were
more serious than his. Stearns contends Levine and Topel (1) were involved in the
scheme for years before he became involved; (2) both profited more than he did;
and (3) were managing and directing others. Stearns also asserts the Government
failed to prove by a preponderance he was an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of any criminal activity.2
According to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c), a two-level enhancement is appropriate
where the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity. U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). A participant is a person who is
criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been
convicted. Id. n .1.
A defendants role as an organizer or leader is a factual finding that we review for clear
error. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005). The government must
prove the existence of an aggravating role by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993).
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The district court did not clearly err in enhancing Stearns sentence for his
role in the offense. Testimony at trial showed Stearns was directly in charge of
billing, directed the office manager to refer to the procedure by a false name and
independently directed the use of a surgical code for another non-surgical
procedure. The billing manager said she knew she had to stop using the correct
name because insurance companies would not cover it. The district court did not
clearly err in enhancing Stearnss sentences based on his role in the offense
because the record showed he supervised another participant.
III. REASONABLENESS
Stearns asserts his 60-month sentences were unreasonable when compared to
Levines and Topels sentences. Stearns claims his sentences should not have been
significantly longer than his codefendants because (1) he was neither the leader nor
organizer of the offense; and (2) he did not recruit anyone, was the last one to join
the scheme, participated in the criminal conduct for a much shorter period than
Topel and Levine, and received less money than his partners. Accordingly, he
argues the district court failed to give enough weight to the extreme disparity
between his sentences and those of his business partners.3
We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness. United
States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has clarified the
reasonableness standard means review of sentences for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
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