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Wave Analysis PDF
Wave Analysis PDF
Wave Analysis PDF
BRIDGE DECKS
Scott L. Douglass, Qin Jim Chen, and Joseph M. Olsen
Coastal Transportation Engineering Research & Education Center
Department of Civil Engineering
University of South Alabama
Mobile, AL 36688
Billy L. Edge
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX
Dan Brown
Dan Brown and Associates
300 Woodland Road
Sequatchie, TN 37374
June 2006
Prepared for
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Executive Summary
This report is a synthesis of existing knowledge related to wave forces on highway bridge decks.
Included are results of some original, focused research on the topic including a new,
recommended approach for estimating these forces. The Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) is funding this synthesis study and associated research into this topic area. This
synthesis study brought together a multidisciplinary team of coastal and geotechnical engineers
to assist in the investigation.
A number of coastal bridges have been damaged during hurricanes. Two fundamental
questions addressed by this report are:
1) What is the specific bridge damage mechanism during these storms?
2) How big are the wave forces on the bridge decks?
A review of the engineering literature finds limited guidance on methods for estimating wave
loads on bridge decks. The literature includes research from the transportation engineering
community as well as some research on related issues in the coastal and ocean engineering
community. Some of the methods from the coastal and ocean engineering literature can be
adapted to provide preliminary estimates of wave loads on highway bridge decks.
Part of this research includes on-going original laboratory tests of waves hitting scale models of
a simple-span bridge deck at a state-of-the-art wave basin at Texas A&M University.
Preliminary tests found that properly scaled waves can move bridge decks off their pile caps
when the still-water level is near the elevation of the bridge decks. The decks progressively
move in the downwave direction until they fall off the pile caps. It was also noted during these
laboratory experiments that the downwave width of U.S. bridge decks can interact with the wave
phase for some wave and water level conditions to cause spatially-varying loads (particularly
uplift) which impart a moment. These moments may be a critical aspect of bridge deck
response.
These laboratory conclusions; combined with post-storm inspections of the damaged prototype
bridges, numerical model hindcasts of the wave and surge conditions during the storms, and the
existing methods for estimating wave loads; provide an answer to the first fundamental question
concerning damage mechanism.
The damage is caused as the storm surge raises the water level to an elevation where larger
waves can strike the bridge superstructure. The individual waves produce both an uplift force
and a horizontal force on the deck. The magnitude of wave uplift force from individual waves
can exceed the weight of the simple span bridge decks. The total resultant wave force is able to
overcome any resistance provided by the (typically small) connections. The decks begin to
progressively slide, bump, or hop across the pile caps in the direction of wave propagation in
response to individual waves. This condition can occur before the storm surge elevation
exceeds the bridge deck elevation.
The buoyancy of the bridge decks is a secondary influence. This includes any additional
buoyancy produced by air pockets trapped under the bridge decks. The buoyancy contributes to
the total force on the individual bridge decks when the deck is submerged, i.e. when the storm
surge elevation exceeds the bridge decks. However, bridge decks that were elevated above the
storm surge still-water elevation were damaged in both Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina.
The study developed a new method for estimating wave loads on bridge decks. The study
recommends FHWA apply the new method as interim guidance in this area. The recommended
guidance is simple, can be applied conservatively, and is consistent with the existing coastal
engineering research literature. Wave loads are assumed to be proportional to a form of
hydrostatic pressure as measured from the crest of the largest waves in the sea-state.
The new method does a good job of explaining the damage to bridges in Hurricanes Katrina and
Ivan. Estimated wave loads are sufficient to overcome the weight and connection resistance for
the spans at lower elevations that failed (moved) at three bridges: the I-10 bridge across
Escambia Bay, Florida; the I-10 on ramp near Mobile, Alabama; and the U.S. 90 bridge across
Biloxi Bay, Mississippi. Estimated wave loads are not sufficient, however, to overcome the
weight and connection resistance for the spans at higher elevations that did not fail. This
interim guidance can be replaced or modified as research addresses some of the important
questions more appropriately than the existing literature.
The second fundamental question concerning the magnitude of wave-induced loads on bridge
decks can be addressed by considering the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay in Hurricane
Katrina as a test case. Using the new method presented in this report, the lower elevation deck
sections that failed were likely experiencing wave-induced horizontal and vertical loads of up to
230 kips and 440 kips, respectively, by 8:00 a.m. CDT on August 29, 2005. At that time in the
storm, the surge had risen to a mean level about one foot below the low-chord elevation of the
bridge spans (bottom of girders). The vertical load is an uplift load acting opposite the 340 kip
weight of the span. These estimated loads are maximum (slowly varying) loads at the crest of
the largest incoming waves in the sea state at that time. They would have been adequate to
begin to lift and move the spans off their pile caps in the downwave direction as was observed.
The peak of Hurricane Katrina at that bridge, however, was not until 10:30 a.m. CDT on August
29, 2005. The loads would have increased, had the decks remained in-place, to an estimated
950 kips and 1900 kips (horizontal and vertical) by then. It must be noted that the conditions for
which these extreme loads are predicted are the conditions for which the estimation method has
the most uncertainty. The conditions of total inundation of the bridge deck are beyond the range
of available laboratory data. The load estimates are more reliable for the 8:00 a.m. case, with
the lower loads, where the still-water level was near the elevation of the deck.
The magnitudes of the estimated wave loads, 200 to 2000 kips, are significant and present a
challenge to the bridge engineer. The typical force-time history associated with these wave
loads also presents a challenge. The slowly varying loads can be combined with higher
magnitude, much shorter duration impact loads that occur if a pocket of air is trapped between
an incoming wave and the bridge deck. The report (briefly) discusses serious implications of
strengthening the bridges to withstand these extreme wave loads, with particular emphasis on
the geotechnical engineering implications. Strengthening the bridge shifts the load to other
parts of the structure and the foundation.
Given the magnitudes of the estimated wave loads, the seriousness of the implications of them
for design, the significant uncertainty in the available methods for estimating the loads, and the
likelihood that the uncertainty can be reduced, further research is strongly recommended to
FHWA. This research should include quantitative laboratory force measurements for the crosssectional geometry typical of simple-span bridge decks used in U.S. highways across coastal
ii
waters. Three cases of relative inundation should be considered: one, the deck is much higher
than the storm surge such that only the crests of a very few waves in the storm sea state hit the
girders, two, the surge is just about even with the bridge deck elevation (this is the case where
the prototype damage has occurred), and three, the surge is so high that the bridge deck is
completely inundated.
The most significant need for project-specific design of a coastal bridge is the active
involvement of a qualified, experienced, coastal engineering specialist in a multidisciplinary
team of structural, geotechnical, and hydraulic engineers. Coastal engineering is a specialty
area of civil engineering that involves the unique design environment - waves, water levels, and
sand transport - experienced along the coast. As in any specialty area, specialized formal
training (in wave mechanics, sand transport and engineering solutions for the coastal
environment) and experience are required. The use of a coastal engineering consultant is highly
recommended for any design or retrofit of coastal bridges that may occasionally be subjected to
storm surge and waves.
iii
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... i
Table of Contents......................................................................................................................... iv
Preface......................................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1 Background and Purpose..........................................................................................1
Chapter 2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................5
2.1
El Ghamrys (1963) laboratory tests on uplift on docks ..................................................5
2.2
Wangs (1970) laboratory tests on pressure on horizontal plates ..................................6
2.3
Frenchs (1970) laboratory tests on wave uplift pressures .............................................6
2.4
Densons (1978, 1980) laboratory tests on highway bridge decks .................................7
2.5
Kaplans model for wave loads on elevated decks.........................................................8
2.6
Bea, et al. (1999) approach for decks on offshore platforms..........................................9
2.7
Overbeek & Klabbers (2001) experience with wave uplift design...................................9
2.8
McConnell, et al. (2004) laboratory results and method ...............................................10
2.9
Other ongoing studies ..................................................................................................12
2.10
Summary of literature review ....................................................................................12
Chapter 3 Case study: U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay, MS .................................................15
3.1
The U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay ...........................................................................15
3.2
Hurricane Katrinas surge and waves in Biloxi Bay ......................................................17
3.3
Damage to U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay from Katrina ...........................................22
3.4
Conclusions about the damage mechanisms ...............................................................27
3.5
Estimates of wave loads using available methods .......................................................27
Chapter 4 Laboratory experiments of waves on bridge decks .................................................29
4.1
Model setup ..................................................................................................................29
4.2
Model test conditions....................................................................................................29
4.3
Results of experiments .................................................................................................31
4.4
Planned experimental setup .........................................................................................31
4.5
Future experiments.......................................................................................................32
Chapter 5 Evaluation of Related Foundation issues................................................................35
Chapter 6 A Method For Estimating Wave Forces On Bridge Decks ......................................37
6.1
Recommended method and equations.........................................................................37
6.2
Example application Biloxi case study.......................................................................39
6.3
Technical justification for recommended approach ......................................................40
6.4
Wave impact loads.....................................................................................................42
6.5
Discussion of recommended approach ........................................................................43
6.6
Comparisons with recent damage: Ivan and Katrina ....................................................45
6.6.1
I-10 on ramp near Mobile, Alabama, in Katrina .....................................................45
6.6.2
I-10 bridge across Escambia Bay, Florida, in Ivan ................................................49
6.6.3
U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay, Mississippi, in Katrina.......................................51
iv
Preface
This research report was written under Contract No. DTFH61-03-C-00015, Task Order No. 3:
Wave Forces on Bridge Decks for the Federal Highway Administration by the Coastal
Transportation Engineering Research & Education Center at the University of South Alabama.
The Contracting Officers Technical Representatives for this work were J. Sterling Jones and
Joe Krolak.
Dan A. Brown and Robert Thompson of Dan Brown & Associates, consulting geotechnical
engineers, wrote Appendix B of this report. Billy Edge, Bauer Professor of Civil Engineering and
Head of the Ocean Engineering Program at Texas A&M University wrote chapter 4. Joseph M.
Olsen, Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of South Alabama wrote chapter 5. Qin
Jim Chen, Assistant Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of South Alabama wrote
section 3.2 and made other contributions to this report. Scott L. Douglass, Professor of Civil
Engineering and Director of the Coastal Transportation Engineering Research & Education
Center was the principal investigator for the research and the primary author of this report.
Assistance with this work from the following is gratefully acknowledged: Mississippi Department
of Transportation, Alabama Department of Transportation, and the Florida Department of
Transportation. A Wave Force Symposium organized by Dr. Kornel Kerenyi at the TurnerFairbank Highway Research Center December 5-7, 2005 provided many ideas for this work and
the participants in that workshop are acknowledged. Jason White, Justin Hardee, Matt Parrish,
Chris Bazor, Patrick Keith, Cardi Mobley, Caren Reid, Lauren McNeill, Joel Richards, Lixia
Wang, and Robert Foley of the University of South Alabama made contributions. Discussions
with William Allsop (HR Wallingford - UK), J. Richard Weggel (Drexel University), and David
Kriebel (United States Naval Academy) are appreciated.
vi
Figure 1.1 Location map of some of the highway bridges damaged by hurricanes in the last
40 years along the U.S. Gulf coast.
There has been speculation about the bridge failure mechanisms. Some of the initial
speculation focused on forces due to currents, buoyancy and waves. The Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) organized a symposium on wave loads on bridge decks December 5-7,
2005 at the Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center in McLean, Virginia. Numerous
engineers and researchers made related presentations including several estimates of wave
loads on these damaged bridge spans. The consensus of that meeting is that the failures were
1
Figure 1.2. Photograph of the damage to the U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay bridge caused by Hurricane
Katrina. The simple-span bridge decks have been moved off the pile caps to the left (sea is
to the right) except where they were at higher elevations on the approach to a ship channel
in the background. A drawbridge across the channel is open (up) in this photo. (This photo
was taken looking northeast from Biloxi 9/21/05)
There are two aspects of buoyancy that contributed to some of the damage:
1) The buoyant force due to water displacement by the structural volume when the bridge
was inundated by the storm surge.
2) The added buoyancy effect that could have occurred due to trapping of air under the
bridge decks between the girders and end diaphragms.
However, some of the damage likely occurred when the storm surge elevation was not high
enough to inundate the superstructure, but high enough that wave forces were imparting an
uplift and a lateral load.
Prior to these storms, there has been very little research on wave loads on elevated highway
bridges but some research on wave loads on other rigid, elevated decks such as ocean piers,
harbor wharves, and offshore oil rigs. Neither the FHWA nor the American Association of State
Transportation Engineers (AASHTO) has much guidance concerning wave loads on elevated
highway bridges.
This report is a synthesis of existing knowledge related to wave forces on bridge decks. It
reviews and interprets relevant research findings, practice, laboratory studies and other
information related to hydrodynamic wave forces on bridge decks and similar structures in
coastal environments. This report summarizes the existing state of knowledge as well as
appropriate research questions and makes recommendations about future related engineering
research and practice needs.
Two fundamental questions addressed by this report are:
1) What is the specific damage mechanism during these storms?
2) How big are wave forces on bridge decks?
This report also presents a new, specific method for estimating wave loads on highway bridges.
This is recommended as interim guidance until completing and incorporating additional research
into practice. This new method is simple, can be applied conservatively, and is consistent with
the existing coastal engineering research literature and evidence from recently damaged
bridges.
This report also presents the results of ongoing laboratory model experiments on wave attack
on bridge decks undertaken at Texas A&M University as part of this research effort. There is
also some discussion concerning the geotechnical engineering implications of structurally
strengthening bridges to absorb the types and magnitudes of the wave loads.
p = c ( max z deck )
(2.1)
where:
p
max
zdeck
=
=
=
=
=
There were also significant discrepancies between the results presented by Denson (1978) and
those presented by Denson (1980). The results from the wave basin tests with waves directly
(no oblique angle) approaching the bridge decks are significantly different than the results from
the wave flume tests. The 1980 results indicate significant higher wave loads. While Denson
(1980) does not directly state this apparent problem, he does mention that any differences are
likely due to the inclusion of structural diaphragms in his basin models that were not included in
his earlier flume tests. These diaphragms were aligned normal to the main direction of wave
approach for all non-oblique tests. It is possible that some of the differences were due to
differences in generated wave kinematics between the flume and the basin.
2.7 Overbeek & Klabbers (2001) experience with wave uplift design
Overbeek and Klabbers (2001), in a paper from the proceedings of the ASCE Ports 2001
Conference, report on the design and subsequent performance of two elevated dock decks in
the Caribbean that were exposed to storm waves. They used relatively simple, pressure-based
formulas for estimating design wave loads on elevated decks.
Overbeek and Klabbers (2001) used a practical design formulae procedure that assumed the
vertical, wave-induced loads consisted of a slowly-varying pressure and a short duration impact
pressure. The slowly-varying pressure is related to the difference between the elevation crest of
the maximum wave, max , and the elevation of the bottom of the deck, zdeck , as:
p = c ( max z deck )
(2.2)
where:
=
=
Essentially, this is very similar to Equation (2.1) and is equivalent to assuming that the waveinduced pressure on the underside of the horizontal deck is roughly equal to the hydrostatic
pressure under the wave crest, and, for the force calculation, there is no water on the top side of
the deck. This neglects dynamic effects but may be a reasonable first approximation and a
basis for an empirical method where the coefficient can vary. The peak impact pressure was
estimated using
p = c Hmax
(2.3)
where:
Hmax
=
=
=
This equation is Hirois formula (see Goda 2000) for horizontal wave loads imposed on vertical
walls. It is logical, and has been suggested, that uplift pressure on a horizontal deck near the
still water elevation can also be approximated this way (Goda 2000).
Overbeek and Klabbers (2001) report on the subsequent performance of two elevated docks. At
one dock, some connections designed to withstand the estimated vertical loads failed. The
authors, when considering the strength of the connections, speculated that the coefficient in the
impact pressure equation above should be at least c = 3. The second of these docks was
designed with wooden blowout panels between concrete slabs. When subjected to design
conditions, the dock was damaged even though the panels blew-out as designed. The concrete
slabs had bending tension cracks on the top of the deck in the center of the spans. The authors
suggest that these cracks indicate that the load levels which were imposed matched the design
loads.
10
related to the difference between the elevation of the crest of the maximum wave, max , and the
elevation of the bottom of the deck, zdeck , as:
p = ( max zdeck )
(2.4)
Note that Equation 2.3 is essentially the same equation (Equation 2.2) used by Overbeek and
Klabbers (2001). The McConnell, et al. (2004) basic wave force is this pressure times the area
of the deck.
Similarly, McConnell, et al. (2004) define a horizontal basic wave force that is in terms of the
pressure associated with the difference between the elevation of the crest of the maximum
wave, max , and the centroid of the projection of the deck onto the vertical plane, zv ,
p = ( max z v )
(2.5)
The horizontal basic wave force is this pressure times the area of the projection of the deck
into the vertical plane.
McConnell, et al. (2004) used an experimental setup that allowed measurement of loads on
individual portions of their typical deck. These included seaward and internal beams (that
extend down below the horizontal deck like highway bridge girders) as well as seaward and
internal deck sections. Because of their experimental setup, McConnell, et al. (2004) did not
have airtight joints for their deck that could trap air. During experiments, water was observed to
vertically shoot out of the gaps between their deck and beam sections (Allsop, 2006).
McConnell, et al. (2004) present empirical equations fit through their data and fit above their
data (envelope curves) for each of these four portions of the deck (seaward beam, seaward
deck, internal beam, and internal deck). Empirical equations are presented for each peak
component of the wave force-time history; upward vertical load, downward vertical load,
shoreward horizontal load, and seaward horizontal load. Thus, the procedure is to add the loads
11
from the individual portions (decks and beams) of an elevated deck together to obtain an
estimate of the total loads. Empirical equations are also given for the impact loads.
12
None of the available methods can be considered to adequately estimate loads for the case
where the bridge deck is completely submerged at significant depth below the still-water level.
Neither Wang (1970), French (1970), nor McConnell, et al. (2004) tested this situation and
Kaplan (1995) and Bea, et al. (1999) were specifically developed for relatively high decks typical
of the offshore industry.
Of these existing methods in the literature, McConnell, et al. (2004) is the most appropriate to
adapt to the highway bridge deck problem. The strengths of this method include that it is a very
empirical approach; it is tied to relatively simple concepts; it is similar to and a more
comprehensive approach than Wang (1970), French (1970), or Overbeek and Klabbers (2001),
and it is based on experiments in a laboratory with modern wave-generation capabilities. The
weaknesses of McConnells method for the highway bridge application include that it was not
based on a highway deck geometry, it has not been repeated by other investigators or at other
scales, it is perhaps overly complex in its separate treatment of internal and external beams and
decks, and it was not developed for decks at or below the still-water elevation. Wang (1970) and
French (1970) only considered the uplift loads on smooth decks and did not consider horizontal
loads.
The two existing approaches listed above from the offshore oil industry, Bea et al. (1999) and
Kaplan (1995), can be used to estimate loads on bridge decks with significant extensions and
adaptations. The strengths of these two approaches include their theoretical, physics-based
background and their implicit inclusion of the body of knowledge developed over the past five
decades of offshore rig design. Their weaknesses include the complexity of application, the
substantial difference in cross-section geometry (including the fact that most offshore platforms
have open-grid decks to reduce vertical loads), and that they were specifically developed and
tested for structures with very high clearance between the still-water elevation and the bottom of
the deck. There is another potential theoretical weakness in that the Morrison Equation
assumes that the structures are thin as compared to the wavelength which is much more
questionable for coastal bridges than it is for offshore platform decks.
A new method for estimating wave loads on bridge decks, one that is essentially a highwaybridge-specific simplification of McConnell, et al. (2004) and an extension of concepts of Wang
(1970), French (1970) and Overbeek and Klabbers (2001), is presented in Chapter 6 of this
report.
13
14
15
26'-0" (ROADWAY)
52'-0"
SLOPE
N.T.S.
2'-2"
6'-0"
6'-0"
6'-0"
33'-5"
6'-0"
6'-5"
Figure 3.1. Details of the typical span design on the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay,
Mississippi, that was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. This sketch shows one-half the total
width of the bridge.
The bridge location is partially sheltered from large waves by the shallowness of the water near
the bridge. The bridge is also partially sheltered by Biloxi on the west, Ocean Springs on the
east, and Deer Island to the south. Deer Island is a low, uninhabited island to the south and
west of the bridge (see Figure 3.2). The island has pine forest that can be seen in the
background of the photograph in Figure 3.3. On the far side of Deer Island is Mississippi Sound,
a broad, shallow bay that extends about 10 miles offshore to the Mississippi barrier island chain.
Those outer islands provide some wave sheltering, but, along with the shallowness of
Mississippi Sound, also allow for the tremendous storm surges that this coast can experience.
The tide range is small at the mouth of Biloxi Bay. Typical tide range is 1.75 feet with the MLLW
datum at -0.55 ft (NGVD) and the MHHW datum at +1.2 ft (NGVD) (based on NOAA/NOS tide
gage 8745557 at Gulfport, Mississippi for the 1983-2001 epoch).
16
Figure 3.2. Bathymetry from NOAA/NOS navigation chart 11372 (31st ed., Mar. 04) in the
vicinity of the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay. The U.S. 90 bridge is the southernmost
bridge. The others are the old, abandoned U.S. 90 and a railroad. Depths are given in feet
below MLLW datum.
17
Bent
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Lowchord
Elevation
at Bent
(ft)
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.2
10.2
10.3
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
11.0
11.2
11.3
Bent
Number
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
Lowchord
Elevation
at Bent
(ft)
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
11.9
12.0
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
12.5
12.6
12.7
12.8
12.9
13.0
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
13.8
13.9
14.0
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
Bent
Number
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
18
Lowchord
Elevation
at Bent
(ft)
14.6
14.7
14.8
14.9
15.0
15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
15.6
15.7
15.8
15.9
16.0
16.2
16.6
17.0
17.6
18.3
19.2
20.1
21.2
22.4
23.8
25.3
26.8
28.4
29.9
31.5
33.1
Bent
Number
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
Lowchord
Elevation
at Bent
(ft)
33.1
31.5
29.9
28.4
26.8
25.3
23.7
22.1
20.6
19.0
17.5
16.2
15.0
13.9
13.0
12.2
11.5
10.9
10.5
10.3
10.2
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
10.1
Figure 3.3. The Biloxi Bay bridge with the trees of Deer Island in the far background. This
photograph was taken looking south from a bluff immediately north of the bridge on the
Ocean Springs side with the eastern end of the destroyed bridge 1 in the middle.
Because all the tide and wave gages on the Mississippi coast malfunctioned at Katrinas
landfall, the goal of this portion of this study was to hindcast the detailed information on water
surges and storm waves in the area devastated by Katrina.
By coupling the ADCIRC (ADvanced CIRCulation) surge model and the SWAN (Simulation of
WAves in Nearshore areas) wave model, the study simulated the storm surge and wind waves
generated by Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi and Alabama coasts. The wind fields for both
surge and wave models were taken from the Hurricane Research Divisions surface wind
analysis data. An effective and reliable methodology for nesting and coupling the storm surge
and wave models was developed (Chen et al. 2005 and Chen, 2005).
The model results have been compared with field observations, including offshore buoy data of
surface waves, tide gage data and post-storm survey of high watermarks. Generally good
agreement is found (Chen et al., 2006). The combination of strong winds, shallow water depth
and the funneling effect of the coastal geometry resulted in the record surge elevations.
Figure 3.4 shows the computational mesh for the surge model of the northern Gulf Mexico. The
complex coastal geometry and abrupt changes in water depth in this region present a unique
technical challenge. The finite-element method in the storm surge model allows the study
1
Really two bridges: 1) the U.S. 90 bridge destroyed by Katrina, and 2) the older, abandoned U.S. 90
bridge that had been damaged by Camille.
19
investigators to resolve the barrier islands, estuaries, bayous, and ship channels with fine
resolution, while the nesting technique in the wave model enables the study to focus on the
areas near the collapsed bridges.
Figure 3.4. Computational mesh used for the storm surge modeling.
A flood map of the maximum surge predicted by the storm surge model is shown in Figure 3.5.
The highest surge reached 33 ft (10 m) above the mean sea level (MSL). This value agrees with
those reported in post-storm surveys. By coupling the storm surge model with the wind wave
model, we are able to predict the hurricane waves riding on the storm surge.
A local-scale domain with a spatial resolution of 328 ft (100 m) for Biloxi Bay, Mississippi is
nested within the regional-scale wave model for the northern Gulf of Mexico. The nesting
technique allowed the study to better resolve the topography and bathymetry around the bridge.
Figure 3.6 shows the spatial distribution of the maximum significant wave heights in Biloxi Bay
predicted by the unsteady, coupled surge-wave modeling system. The arrows represent the
corresponding mean wave directions. Wave heights varied from 8.2 ft to 9.8 ft (2.5 m to 3.0 m)
along the U.S. 90 Bridge across Biloxi Bay. The dashed line on Figure 3.6 indicates the bridge
location. Because of the smaller water depth on the flooded uplands, the wave heights were
reduced to less than 5 ft (1.5 m) by depth-limited wave breaking.
The temporal variations of the storm surge and wave heights predicted by the coupled modeling
system are shown in Figure 3.7. These estimates are model results at the location of the high
span of the bridge during landfall of Hurricane Katrina. First, the results illustrate that wave
heights increased as the water level rose. Second, it is seen that the peak of the storm waves
were slightly ahead of the peak of the water surge and did not decay as fast as the peak surge
did. This suggests that the bridge could have been exposed to large waves for a fairly long
period of time.
20
Figure 3.5. Maximum surge heights predicted by the storm surge model (ADCIRC) for
Hurricane Katrina along the U.S. Gulf coast.
Figure 3.6. Maximum significant wave heights generated during Hurricane Katrina in the
immediate vicinity of the U.S. 90 bridge over Biloxi Bay as estimated by SWAN. The dashed
line shows the bridge location. The colors refer to estimated significant wave heights for
each location and the arrows show the mean wave direction at the maximum height.
21
25
Surge
(ft above NGVD)
and
Wave Height
(ft)
15
10
0
12:00 1:00
AM
AM
2:00
AM
3:00
AM
4:00
AM
5:00
AM
6:00
AM
7:00
AM
8:00
AM
2:00
PM
3:00
PM
4:00
PM
Figure 3.7. Estimated storm surge and wave heights at the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay
during landfall of Hurricane Katrina. These estimates are hindcast data at the location of the
high-span of the bridge based on ADCIRC modeling of surge and SWAN modeling of waves.
The predicted surge and wave conditions near the bridge allowed the study to estimate the
wave forces on the bridge decks. The methodologies developed can be used to evaluate the
vulnerability of coastal bridges in hurricane-prone areas and improve the design of coastal
transportation infrastructure.
22
Figure 3.8. Photograph of U.S. 90 bridge over Biloxi Bay showing bridge deck spans that
were moved off the pile caps into shallow water on the northwest (landward) side of the
bridge during passage of Hurricane Katrina. Note that several of the spans are flipped over
and moved a significant distance north. Similar movement, including flipping, was observed
in the laboratory simulations undertaken as part of this study (see Chapter 4). Also note that
the corners of the concrete surfaces of the remaining pile cap bents (left side of photo, right
side of pile cap bents) are freshly damaged and rounded off. Many of the bearing pads have
been removed too. The bridge on the left is the U.S. 90 bridge and the piles to the right are
from an old, predecessor bridge. (This photo was taken 2/19/06 looking southwest from
Ocean Springs towards Biloxi).
23
Figure 3.9. Photograph of U.S. 90 bridge over Biloxi Bay showing high spans which were not
knocked off pile cap bents during Hurricane Katrina. (This photo was taken 2/19/06 looking
west from Ocean Springs.)
Figure 3.10. Photograph of U.S. 90 bridge over Biloxi Bay showing the westbound half-span
#100 that is still on pile caps but rotated and displaced to the landward side. The eastbound
half-span was knocked completely off. The spans at higher elevations, beginning with span
#99, were not knocked off the pile caps by the storm. (This photo was taken 2/19/06 looking
southwest from Ocean Springs towards Biloxi.)
24
Likewise at the other side of the high-span, detailed inspection of Figure 1.2 shows one set of
spans moved to the landward but still remained on the pile caps. This was span #85 (between
bent #85 and #86).
The damage suggests (e.g. see Figures 1.2 and 3.10) that there was a critical elevation for this
design during Katrina. Spans below that elevation were moved off the pile caps and spans
above that elevation were not. The critical span elevation for the bridge damage was an
average low-chord elevation of roughly 23 feet (NGVD). All span elevations in this paragraph
are average elevations of the bottom of the outer girder as calculated from Table 3.1. There
may have been damage at higher elevations that was not visible from the shore. On the east
side of the drawbridge, span #99 (elevation = 24.5 feet) stayed in place and span #100
(elevation = 22.9 feet) moved. On the west side, span #86 (elevation = 23.1 feet) stayed and
span #85 (elevation = 21.8 feet) moved. The corresponding critical elevation of the bottom of
the main horizontal deck, where most of the uplift surface area exists, was roughly 26 feet (3
feet above the low-chord).
These critical elevations for the Biloxi Bay bridge in Hurricane Katrina, about 23 feet for the lowchord and 26 feet for the bottom of the deck, compare with an estimated maximum surge
elevation, at 10:30 CDT August 29, 2005, at the bridge of = 21.5 feet above NGVD.
The bridges were damaged above the elevation of the still water level. Thus, the implication is
that the wave-induced loads due to wave crests hitting the decks were the damaging agent.
Buoyancy loads, including additional buoyancy due to trapped air under the deck, was likely
only of secondary importance since the spans were not submerged. This finding, damage to
spans with a low-chord elevation slightly above the still-water surge elevation, is consistent with
that at the I-10 bridge across Escambia Bay, Florida in Hurricane Ivan (2004).
Inspection of the damage to the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay after Hurricane Katrina
revealed two other, consistent observations. One, there was damage to the bearing pad
assemblies with the exception of the seaward side of the seaward-most bearing pads. Two,
there was more damage to the concrete surface of the pile caps on the landward side than on
the seaward side. Figure 3.11 shows the bearing pads remaining on the tops of the pile cap
under the eastbound (seaward) lanes. In particular, note the close-up insert of the seaward end
of one of the pile cap bents. There are two steel angles and two steel bolts extending vertically
from the seaward ends of the two (one for each girder end) bearing pads. The bearing pad was
a steel pad with 2 inch high angles bolted down at each end. The girders rested between the
vertical portion of the angles. There are no vertical portions of angles or bolts on the landward
side of the bearing pad. They were all broken off during Katrina. This is an indication that the
girders moved landward during Katrina due to wave forces. Figure 3.12 shows a close-up of a
single bearing pad taken looking the other direction from the other side of the bridge. It shows
the same thing, the seaward angle and bolt are intact but the landward one is broken off. The
angles were L-shaped steel 3x2xx4-long and the bolts were 1 diameter.
25
Figure 3.11. Photograph of bearing pads remaining on pile caps on the eastbound side of
the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay. The close-up insert photo shows two bearing pads with
steel angles and bolts remaining on the seaward side. Identical angles and bolts on the other
side of these bearing pads as well as on all the other internal bearing pads were sheared off.
This is an indication that the girders were moved to the right (northwest) by wave action
during the storm. (This photo was taken 2/19/06 looking southwest from Ocean Springs
towards Biloxi.)
Figure 3.12. A close-up example of the damage to a bearing pad assembly on the U.S. 90
bridge across Biloxi Bay caused by Hurricane Katrina. The right side of this photo is the
seaward end of a pile cap bent near the Biloxi side of the bridge. The steel bearing pads
were held with an angle and bolt at each end of the pad (plus the weight of the girder on the
pad). The bolts connected the pads to the concrete and the angles to the pad. The angle
and bolt on the landward side of this assembly are missing and presumed sheared off during
Katrina by the force of the lateral wave loads or the weight of the girder after it had been
lifted up onto the angle by the waves. Only the seaward-most angles and bolts remained on
any of these bearings. (This photo taken looking north-northeast from Biloxi 2/19/06)
26
Inspection of the damage also showed that the concrete at the seaward ends of the pile caps
was not damaged during Katrina (Figures 3.10 and 3.11). However, most of the landward ends
were damaged as can be seen by close inspection of the left side of Figure 3.8 or the right side
of Figure 3.10. The damage looks fresh and is essentially a rounding of the top corners that
likely occurred as the span girders slid over the end. This damage is consistent with the
scenario and mechanism described below.
Hs
T
d
=
=
=
=
6.2 feet
6s
16 feet
12 feet
The low-chord on the bridge deck was 13 feet NGVD. This elevation is for span #47 which was
selected as a representative span. The span weighed 340 kips. Appendix A presents the details
of the calculations for each method. The available methods estimate different loads.
Using the methodology outlined in McConnell, et al. (2004), maximum vertical uplift loads of 520
kips and maximum horizontal loads of 165 kips are estimated for this test case. This
methodology is the most directly applicable to the highway bridge problem.
Using an adaptation of Bea, et al. (1999), maximum vertical uplift loads are 320 kips due to
inertia and 130 kips due to drag are estimated. While inertia and drag will not be acting in
27
phase, they will be acting together at some phases. Phases of the loadings were not estimated
here. The uplift estimates are less than but similar in magnitude to those from McConnells
method. However, it should be noted that Bea, et al. (1999) did not focus on uplift loads since
open grates are usually used in offshore rigs. Maximum horizontal loads of 40 kips of drag, 420
kips of inertia, and 250 kips of impact are estimated for the case study. These maximum
horizontal loads are higher than those estimated using McConnells method.
The two Denson papers provide very different estimates of wave loads on the Biloxi bridge case
study. The procedure and empirical curves in Denson (1978) produce an estimate of horizontal
and vertical loads of 9 kips and 50 kips, respectively. The procedure and empirical curves of
Denson (1980) produce corresponding estimates of 150 kips and 710 kips, respectively. Neither
Denson approach is recommended but it is interesting that these values bracket the above
estimates for maximum uplift.
The order of magnitude of the above estimates may be correct. Kaplans method produces
results that are also in the same general order of magnitude as the above results for vertical
loads but may produce larger estimated horizontal loads (Sheppard, 2005). Given the
uncertainties in the applications of the methodologies to the highway bridge deck problem, none
of these methods from the existing literature can really be considered adequate for design (see
Section 2.10).
28
29
Figure 4.2. Wave action on laboratory test section (direction of wave motion is to the left and
the test section has been moved in that direction by the wave action).
30
Error!
31
One 6-Component (Fx, Fy, Fz, Mx, My, Mz) Load Cell
Plan View
Fz
6 Components
Load Cell
Fx
My
X
Oblique View
Figure 4.3. Planned layout for future experiments at Texas A&M on wave loads on bridge decks.
32
As noted above, the tests conducted at the Haynes Coastal Engineering Laboratory and the
future measurements planned are only valid for normally incident waves. To advance to the next
level of understanding, the following should be considered in future model studies:
33
34
35
used here, can be considered to adequately estimate loads for the case where the bridge deck
is completely submerged at significant depth below the still-water level (see section 2.10). The
submerged loads were estimated here only for the purposes of this analysis. DB&As conclusion
that the forces associated with the submerged scenario would exceed the pile moment
capacity by a factor greater than 2 implies that if the wave loads were overestimated by a
factor of 2 or more, there is the potential for foundation strength to be adequate. Essentially, the
wave loads are near enough to the critical level that more research on these loads is
appropriate.
Raising the bridge decks as a solution to potential foundation failure is supported by the rest of
this report and is the primary approach that has proven to work for fishing piers and other similar
structures. In addition to raising bridge heights, the foundation analysis suggests that
developing improved foundation systems and/or improvement of subsurface soils could be
undertaken as possible alternatives for new construction as well as remediation of existing
bridges that are at risk. Such development will likely involve not only the evaluation and
modification of existing technologies but also research on foundation systems for such large,
primarily lateral, loads.
It is evident that an effort needs to be undertaken to identify existing bridges that may be at risk
and only continue to function because they have not been subjected to the loads that a strong
hurricane may bring. The identification and evaluation of such bridges will require an analysis to
determine the possible maximum water levels during a hurricane and the resulting loads on the
structures. For those bridges determined to be at high risk, an assessment of the subsurface
conditions and foundation adequacy should be undertaken. On the basis of such an
assessment site-specific remedies can be designed to decrease the risk of failure of such
bridges.
36
Fv = c v va Fv*
(6.1)
and
Fh = [ 1 + c r ( N 1) ] c h va Fh*
(6.2)
where:
Fv
Fh
Fv*
Fh*
cv-va
ch-va
cr
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
Fv* = ( z v ) A v
(6.3)
where:
Av
zv
the area the bridge contributing to vertical uplift, i.e. the projection of the bridge
deck onto the horizontal plane
difference between the elevation of the crest of the maximum wave and the
elevation of the underside of the bridge deck (see Figure 6.1 for definition
sketch)
unit weight of water (64 lb/ft3 for saltwater)
37
Fh* = ( zh ) A h
(6.4)
where:
Ah
zh
=
=
the area of the projection of the bridge deck onto the vertical plane
difference between the elevation of the crest of the maximum wave and the
elevation of the centroid of Ah (see Figure 6.1 for definition sketch).
unit weight of water (64 lb/ft3 for saltwater)
When the wave crest elevation does not exceed the top of the bridge, a reduced area and
lowered centroid corresponding to the area below the wave crest elevation can be used in
Equation (6.4).
Figure 6.1. Definition sketch for zh , zv, Ah, Av, and max used in the equations in the
recommended, interim guidance for estimating wave loads on elevated bridge decks
The wave crest elevation used in zv and zh should be that corresponding to a very large wave
height estimated in the design sea state, max.
38
Given a design sea state with a significant wave height (Hs), this elevation can be estimated as:
(6.5)
as measured from the design storm surge elevation (see Figure 6.1).
The recommended value of each of the empirical coefficients cv-va and ch-va is given here as 1.
These recommended values are discussed in the next section and are not intended to be
conservative. Thus, they should be increased for conservative design values. Given the
uncertainties involved in the application of the available methods for estimating wave loads on
U.S. highway bridges, doubling these loads (i.e. factor-of-safety = 2) is recommended for
conservative design.
It can be assumed (for the purposes of this recommended guidance) that the two components
(horizontal and vertical) of the wave-induced loads given above act in phase. Thus, a maximum
resultant load can be resolved as usual from the two components. This resultant load can be
assumed to be acting through the centroid of the cross-section.
Figure 6.2 shows a schematic of an assumed, typical time-history of one component (either
vertical or horizontal) of wave-induced loads. Such loading is consistent with measured
laboratory loads reported in the literature (e.g. see Figure 2.1 of this report or El Ghamry, 1963).
One part (as shown in Figure 6.2) of the wave-induced force is a longer-duration slowly
varying force. This varying force changes magnitude and direction with the phase (crest or
trough) of the wave as the wave passes under or across the structure. The horizontal slowly
varying loads are in the landward direction (based on direction of wave propagation) for the
wave crest but can reverse to the seaward direction in the wave trough. Likewise, the vertical
slowly varying loads are directed up (i.e. lift) for part of the wave but can be downward for part
of the wave. This part of the wave-induced load has been called quasi-static, or simply wave
force by others in the coastal engineering literature. The duration of the varying load
corresponds with the period of the incident waves that is typically on the order of 3 to 15
seconds.
The other part of the wave-induced load (see Figure 6.2) is a very short-duration (maybe less
than 0.1 to 0.001 seconds long) impact force as the wave crest first begins to hit the deck. This
force is directed in the horizontal direction of wave propagation and in the upward vertical
direction. This impact force does not typically reverse direction. The impact force is often
associated with the trapping of a small pocket of air between the structure and the wave face.
The recommended approach outlined in the equations above is for the peak of the slowly
varying loads as shown in Figure 6.2. The above equations do not include the magnitude of
the peak of the impact load because they are often ignored by structural engineers due to their
extremely short duration relative to the response of the structure. However, if the design
engineer is concerned that any aspect of the design (connections, members, geotechnical) will
respond to these impact loads, then higher maximum loads that include impact loads can be
estimated as outlined in a separate Section 6.4 below.
this example, a specific span, span #47 (that between bent #47 and #48) of the westbound
(seaward) lanes has been selected as representative. This span is roughly in the middle of the
western side of the bridge as shown in Figure 1.2. The low-chord elevation of the span (bottom
of girders) was about +13 feet NGVD (Table 3.1) with the top of the bridge deck at +16.5 feet,
and the bottom of the deck at +16 feet. In this portion of the bay, the depth is fairly shallow and
it is assumed here that the bottom, mud-line elevation was about -4 feet NGVD.
The storm surge and wave hindcast modeling results presented above (see Figure 3.6) indicate
that at 8:00 a.m. CDT on August 29, 2005, the mean water level had risen to an elevation of
= 11.9 feet and there was a significant wave height at the bridge location of Hs = 6.2 feet. Thus,
the waves were beginning to hit the span by that time in the storm.
The wave loads on the deck at that time are estimated as follows using the above equations:
elevation of maximum wave crest =
+max = 11.9 + 1.3(6.2) = 19.96 ft,
zv = (elev max crest) - (elev bottom deck) = 19.96 - 16.0 = 3.96 ft
Fv = cv-va Fv*= cv-va (zv) Av = 1(64 lb/ft3)(3.96 ft)[(52)(33.4)ft2] = 440,000 lb
zh = (elev max crest) - (elev centroid of Ah) = 19.96 15.7 = 4.26 ft
Fh = [1+cr(N-1)] ch-va Fh*= [1+0.4(6-1)] (1)(64 lb/ft3)(4.26 ft)(286 ft2) = 230,000 lb
where Ah has been estimated as 286 ft2 with a centroid elevation of +15.7 (this value is obtained
by accounting for the design of the rail) and there are 6 girders based on engineering plans
obtained from Mississippi DOT for the Biloxi bridge.
So in summary, at 8:00 a.m. the wave-induced loads on this span are estimated as being
cyclical with maximum varying loads of 440 kips of vertical uplift and 230 kips of horizontal
landward force. It should be noted that these decks weighed about 340 kips and there was
essentially no resistance to uplift provided by any connections. Thus, the implication of these
calculations is that the uplift from some of the largest waves in the sea state at this time was
enough to exceed the weight of the bridge span at the same time it was experiencing large
lateral loads. Thus, these spans were probably beginning to get bumped, by individual large
waves, up and over on the pile caps at about this time in the storm. Such behavior is consistent
with the evidence. The storm surge (and wave heights) continued to increase to a peak mean
water level of about +21.5 feet at around 10:30 a.m.
40
Figure 6.2. Typical time-history of wave loads on bridge decks with a slowly varying load
with a duration related to the wave period and an impact load with a duration is that is
extremely short.
41
The specific recommended values of the empirical coefficients have been selected based on
inspection of existing laboratory results and investigation of the prototype damages in Hurricane
Katrina and Ivan. Existing literature based on laboratory data suggest that both could be set
equal to 1. Some of the existing literature would suggest higher values and some would suggest
lower values. Preliminary analysis from some of the damage in Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina
generally confirm these values.
The laboratory-based values are interpretations and simplifications of the small-scale laboratory
experimental results from McConnell, et al. (2004) for U.S. highway bridge geometry. The
vertical load, varying coefficient, cv-va = 1 is consistent with inspection of the small-scale data
shown in figure 5.18 of McConnell, et al. (2004). The horizontal, varying load coefficient, ch-va =
1, is consistent with inspection of figure 5.25 of McConnell, et al. (2004). These recommended
values of c = 1 are reasonably in the middle of the data scatter and are likely somewhat
conservative for low bridge decks and non-conservative for high bridge decks (and thus lower
loads). The value of cv-va = 1 also generally agrees with that suggested by French (1970), Wang
(1970), and Overbeek and Klabbers (2001). For example, Wang (1970) measured maximum
pressure at a point under a flat plate and found that the coefficient was between 1 and 2.
However, considering the size of bridge decks, it is reasonable that when averaged over the
entire uplift area, the value of 1 could be reasonable.
The interim guidance recommended above gives similar results as the other common, simple
approach that relates wave loads directly to the incident wave height (e.g. Overbeek and
Klabbers (2001) for slamming vertical loads, Goda (2000) for horizontal loads on rigid walls, El
Ghamry (1963) for uplift loads). The primary reason for this similarity is that these approaches
have some method for decreasing loadings with increasing deck elevation above the mean
water level. Such a decrease is inherent in the method recommended here.
Fv = {c v va + c v im } Fv*
(6.6)
and
Fh = { [ 1 + c r ( N 1) ] c h va + c h im } Fh*
(6.7)
where:
cv-im
ch-im
The recommendation for vertical impact coefficient, cv-im = 3, is selected consistent with
inspection of figure 5.29 of McConnell, et al. (2004). It also is generally consistent with the
prototype finding of Overbeek and Klabbers (2001) that their impact load coefficient was about 3
times higher than they originally assumed. The recommendation for horizontal impact
coefficient, ch-im = 6, selected above is based in part on inspection of Figure 5.33 of McConnell,
42
et al., in part on the similar coefficients found in the different method of Bea, et al. (1999), and in
part on the recognition that the shape of the seaward face of many U.S. bridge decks is
conducive to very high impact loads.
The two types of loads, impact and slowly varying will be additive but not necessarily in
phase, i.e. they wont both be at their peak at the same moment in time. However, given the
uncertainties inherent in this recommended interim guidance, adding the two together is
reasonable when the short-duration impact loads are deemed to be important. If the bridge
engineer determines that the bridge deck will respond to the higher, shorter duration impact
loads (i.e. bolts will fail or concrete will fail), then both coefficients should be used. The duration
of the impact and the magnitude of the peak impact force are inversely proportional for this
type of wave load (Weggel 1997).
43
Theoretically, one would expect the loads to decrease with level of submergence at some
depth.
If a more specific estimate of wave loads is needed, the methods outlined in McConnell, et al.
(2004), Kaplan (1995), or Bea, et al. (1999) can be adapted. However, it must be kept in mind
that these methods have been developed for deck geometries that are not typical of U.S.
highway bridges and only considered the case of non-submergence.
The assumed general characteristics of wave-induced loads shown in Figure 6.2 have been
measured by numerous small-scale laboratory investigators including El Ghamry (1963) and
McConnell, et al. (2004). The assumption is also consistent with the general approach for
estimating wave loads on offshore platform decks as discussed by Kaplan (1992), Kaplan, et al.
(1995), and Bea, et al. (1999).
Impact forces may ultimately prove to be the most critical because the seaward face of the outer
girder/deck/rail for U.S. highway bridges is concave directly toward the incoming wave crest.
Thus, it is likely that these shapes act as almost perfect wave-catchers that allow for a pocket
of air to be trapped in the corner. It has long been recognized in the coastal engineering
community that the trapping of a pocket of air by a wave can lead to tremendously high,
extremely short-duration forces. These Minikin-like impact forces are typically found on vertical
wall structures that have a rubble-mound foundation just seaward that trips the wave and allows
for the formation of an air pocket trapped between the wave and the structure. It is speculated
here that a similar phenomenon occurs on U.S. highway bridge decks. The typical highway deck
shape precludes the need for something to cause the wave to break in order for the air pocket
to form. For this reason, it is important that the bridge engineer give adequate consideration to
the likelihood of the impact loads as shown in Figure 6.2. Weggel (1997) presents an approach
to evaluating the relationship between the impact duration and force that may be of value.
Future research may determine that much of the momentum transferred as waves hit highway
bridge decks is transferred very rapidly, and thus at high loads, because of this impact.
The recommended interim approach is primarily for the case where storm surge elevation is
roughly near the bridge deck elevation. Analyses indicate that this was the critical case during
Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina. The selection of the empirical coefficients was based on
McConnell, et al. (2004) results for that situation.
However, there are two other situational cases for bridge decks. One, the deck is much higher
than the storm surge such that only the crests of a very few waves in the storm sea state hit the
girders. It is stated above that this recommended interim approach is not conservative for this
case (based on the lab work of McConnell, et al. 2004). Two, the surge is so high that the bridge
deck is completely inundated. This method is only very tentatively recommended for bridge
decks that become completely inundated to the point where the wave troughs do not expose
any of the bridge deck. McConnell, et al. (2004), which is a primary reference here, did not test
any structures that were submerged. While there will still be strong drag and inertial loads
during such conditions, there is little guidance in the literature that suggests appropriate
coefficients for bridge deck geometries.
44
The equation in the recommended interim guidance above for maximum wave crest elevation is
based on several assumptions:
1.
2.
H1 is an appropriate wave statistic for describing the maximum waves in a given seastate for this problem.
3.
The portion of the wave height above the storm surge elevation is 80%.
This approach implicitly assumes that the depth, including storm surge, is adequate for this
large of a wave to exist without breaking. The depth limitation for an individual maximum
wave is Hmax = (0.8)d , where d = depth.
45
Figure 6.3 The damage to the I-10 on ramp near Mobile, Alabama, caused by Hurricane
Katrina. The lower, simple-span portions of the ramp have been moved to the left (north) by
the waves during the storm. Five of the spans were moved with the second and third moving
the farthest (about 6 feet). The ramp in the foreground is not a simple-span and the spans in
the background were apparently at high enough elevations to avoid enough of the wave
loads for their connections to survive. The storm surge during Katrina was estimated at 12
feet here.
The moved spans had low-chord elevations at or below the peak of the storm surge. The sixth
simply-supported span up the ramp (span #14 using the Alabama DOT numbering), i.e. the first
one not damaged, had an elevation with about 1.4 feet of clearance between the low-chord
elevation and the surge elevation. Thus, it was being hit by waves at the peak of the storm. The
elevations and dimensions of the on-ramp spans have been obtained from engineering plans.
The ramps are sloping up as well as on a horizontal curve to the left with superelevation that
sets the south side higher. The five ramp spans that moved had top-of-deck elevations of
between 8.0 and 13.7 feet (NGVD) as measured at the center of the span. The corresponding
low-chord elevations at the mid-point of the south side of the spans was typically about 3.7
feet lower than the top-of-deck elevation.
The Mobile on-ramp spans had some small connection resistance to movement. The spans
were physically connected to the pile caps by angles and bolts on the outside girders. A failed
connection is shown in Figure 6.4.
46
Figure 6.4 Photo of an outside (north) girder under a span of the I-10 on-ramp near Mobile,
Alabama, that was moved off its pile cap when the entire span moved. The pile cap is in the
bottom left corner of the photo and the girder that is overhanging to the right was moved
from that pile cap. The broken concrete/bolt connection is shown. The angle on the right
attached to the pile cap was attached to the outside of the overhanging girder and another
(not shown) was attached to the inside. This photograph was the northeast corner of span
#11 (ALDOT numbering). (photo by J. White)
Figure 6.5 shows a connection with concrete failure but no subsequent movement. One of these
connections that survived is shown in Figure 6.6. There were eight sets of bolts in each span the inside and the outside of the girders in each corner of the span. Inspection indicates that the
bolts did not shear but rather the concrete broke. Using a typical value for the tensile strength of
concrete and estimating the failure area based on inspection, the total resistance to movement
for each span provided by the bolt system is approximated as 200 to 400 kips. As the spans
began to move, their resistance to further movement probably increased significantly because of
the horizontal curve. The individual spans were driven into each other because of their slight
pie-shape due to the curve. There was evidence of them jamming into each other and
crushing the edges of the concrete in compression.
47
Figure 6.5. Photo of the same type of connection typical of the I-10 on-ramp near Mobile that
shows failure of the concrete around bolts but without subsequent displacement in this
photograph at this location. The pile cap is at the bottom and the girder flange is to the upper
right. (photo by J. White).
The recommended methodology for estimating wave loads has been applied to each of the 6
spans in question (the five that moved plus the next one up that did not move). The results are
shown graphically in Figure 6.7. The resultant peak horizontal and vertical wave load have been
calculated by using the above equations and the resultant load has been calculated by
combining the weight with the vertical uplift load and taking the resultant of that net vertical load
and the horizontal load. The spans weigh 250 kips, are 50 feet long, 27.75 feet wide and have a
total height of about 6.2 feet (girder plus deck plus Jersey barrier) and have a total of four
girders. The elevations used in the analysis are the elevation of the bottom of the center of each
deck. Given the shape of the siderails (a Jersey barrier with a height of 2.67 feet above the
road surface, the depth of the girders (3 ft), and the thickness of the deck (7), the elevation of
the bottom of the center of each span is a reasonable approximation of the elevation of the
projection of the span into the vertical plane for calculating zh as well as zv.
The implication of Figure 6.7 is that the method for estimating wave loads recommended above
does a reasonably good job of explaining the damage at the on-ramp. Since the connection
resistance is between 200 and 400 kips, spans with loads below that level should have stayed
and those above should have moved. That is what happened. Spans #9 (lowest span) to #13
moved and span #14 did not.
48
Figure 6.6. Photo of connection between the pile cap and girder that did not fail on another
part of a different I-10 on-ramp near Mobile. The pile cap is at the bottom and the girder
flange is at the far left. (photo by J. White)
49
16.0
span #14
15.0
span #13
14.0
13.0
span #12
Elevation
12.0
span #11
11.0
10.0
span #10
9.0
span #9
8.0
7.0
6.0
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Figure 6.7. Reduction in estimated wave loads (on the I-10 on ramp near Mobile, Alabama,
at the peak of Hurricane Katrina) with elevation. The method recommended in this chapter
was used to estimate wave loads. The average elevation of six ramp spans are shown.
Spans # 9-13 broke their connections and moved. An estimate of the resistance provided by
the failed span connections is 200 to 400 kips. Thus, the method for estimating loads
appears to describe which spans failed fairly well.
The estimated peak surge elevation and significant wave height at the I-10 Escambia Bay
bridge were
= 10.7 feet (NAVD88) and Hs = 6.5 feet, respectively (Ocean Engineering
Associates, 2005). The bridge spans were simply supported spans with the deck cast integrally
with six girders. There were small bolt connections between the pile caps and the girders. The
top of the bridge decks for most of the spans was 16 feet and the low-chord elevation of the
girders was 11.5 feet (NGVD) (Renna and Sheppard, 2004). (Note: the difference between
survey datums is small and ignored for this analysis). Thus, the surge still-water level was
almost, but not quite at, the bottom of the girders and there was no reason to consider additional
buoyancy due to pockets of air trapped under the deck.
50
The new method for estimating wave loads on bridge decks outlined above estimates horizontal
and vertical loads of 190 kips and 380 kips respectively. The resultant load, accounting for the
220 kip span weight (Renna and Sheppard, 2004), is 250 kips. A reasonable estimate of the
resistance of the bolted connections is 200 to 400 kips. Thus, the estimated wave loads are just
about enough to break the resistance connection strength. This result agrees with the inspection
observations above, i.e. explains why the damage and movement was so sensitive to wave
height as shown in Figure 6.8. Slight reductions in wave heights near the shore or in the lee of
the other bridge would have been enough to reduce the loads to a level that the connections
could hold the deck.
Figure 6.8 Photograph of damage to I-10 bridge across Escambia Bay, Florida, due to
Hurricane Ivan. Note that the spans in center of the photograph have been moved to the left
and some have fallen off the pile caps. The spans in the foreground, which are at the same
elevation as the ones in the center, have not moved because the wave heights were slightly
lower. The spans in the background have not moved because they are elevated higher
above the waves. The spans on the westbound bridge (left side of photo) are less damaged
than the ones on the eastbound bridge because the eastbound bridge acted like a
breakwater and reduced the wave heights slightly. This photo was taken looking east from
Pensacola after the peak of the storm surge September 16, 2004. (Pensacola News Journal
photo).
51
Figure 1.2) should have been moved. However, the results are still reasonable. Given the
uncertainty including wave height estimates and connection strength estimates, the results are
good enough to provide some assurance that the method produces reasonable estimates for
design.
When applied to the low span used for the case study of the Biloxi bridge outlined in Chapter 3
of this report, the method estimates horizontal and vertical maximum loads as 220 kips and 440
kips, respectively at 8:00 a.m on August 29, 2004. The vertical uplift exceeds the weight of the
structure (340 kips). Inspection of the original engineering plans dated 1959 shows no
connections that would resist any vertical uplift. It is possible, but not known, that there was a
retrofit strengthening of these connections in the years since initial construction. There were
small steel angles that would have resisted lateral loads up to about 800 kips in the original
design. However, without any vertical resistance when wave uplift exceeded the weight, the
girders likely lifted up and onto or over the angles.
The new method can be applied to the higher elevation spans at the peak of the storm at 10:30
a.m. on August 29, 2004. The estimated surge elevation was 21.5 ft and the estimated
significant wave height was 9.1 ft (see Section 3.2 of this report). Application of the new method
for these conditions indicates that deck sections with an average bottom of deck elevation of
less than 30 ft should have experienced uplift loads greater than or equal to 340 kips (the weight
of the spans). Assuming that this is the critical condition for movement, i.e. there is no additional
resistance to movement once this condition is met, five more spans, should have moved. On the
west side, 2 more span sections, #98 and #99, should have moved. On the east side, three
more spans sections, #86, #87, and #88) should have moved. These higher spans may indeed
have been lifted slightly during the storm under individual wave loads. But, without enough force
to move the span vertically far enough to be lifted above the angles that restricted lateral
movement, they may have just stayed in place.
It may be valuable to consider what the wave loads would have been if the connections on all
the spans at Biloxi were strong enough to survive until the peak of the storm at 10:30 a.m. This
was the input condition for the foundation analysis described in Chapter 5. By 10:30 a.m. the
low spans on the bridge were completely inundated by the storm surge. The estimated
maximum wave-induced loads on span 47, if it had survived intact until that time, are 950 kips
(horizontal) and 1900 kips (vertical). The uplift at that time might have been partially increased
by the additional buoyancy of air trapped between the girders and the diaphragms on the
underside of the bridge. In any case, these extreme loads, approaching 2000 kips, may be
difficult for bridge engineers to accommodate and thus, they may have to be avoided by building
at higher elevations.
The uncertainty involved in the recommended method is greatest for these highest loads when
the deck is completely inundated. No laboratory tests of this inundation or submergence level
are available in the literature. More laboratory testing for this case is strongly recommended
prior to the use of this method (or any method in the literature) for the design of decks that are
expected to be this submerged. These case study load estimates are likely more reliable for the
8:00 a.m. case where the still-water level was near the elevation of the deck.
52
53
54
Chapter 8 Conclusions
The damage to U.S. highway bridges in recent hurricanes was primarily due to wave attack on
storm surge. The damage was caused as the storm surge raised the water level to an elevation
where larger waves could strike the bridge superstructure. Individual waves produce both an
uplift force and a horizontal force on the bridge decks. The magnitude of wave uplift force from
individual waves can exceed the weight of the simple span bridge decks. The total resultant
force is able to overcome any resistance provided by the, typically small, connections between
the pile caps and bridge decks. The decks begin to progressively slide, bump, or hop across
the pile caps in the direction of wave propagation.
The buoyancy of the bridge decks and any additional buoyancy provided by any air pockets
trapped under the bridge decks contribute to the total force on the individual bridge decks when
the deck is submerged, i.e. when the storm surge elevation exceeds the bridge decks. However,
bridge decks that were elevated above the storm surge still-water elevation were damaged in
both Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina.
This primary conclusion, that wave loads were the primary cause of damage, is based on poststorm inspections of the damaged bridges with numerical model hindcasts of the wave and
surge conditions during the storms, some exploratory laboratory tests conducted as part of this
study, and a review of the related coastal engineering literature.
The engineering literature contains relatively limited guidance on methods for estimating wave
loads on bridge decks. The literature includes research from the transportation engineering
community as well as some research on related issues in the coastal and ocean engineering
community. Some of the methods from the coastal and ocean engineering literature can be
adapted to provide preliminary estimates of wave loads on highway bridge decks. In particular,
the method recently developed by McConnell, et al. (2004), based on small-scale hydrodynamic
laboratory tests, is probably the most applicable to the U.S. highway bridge damage problem.
However, there are no available laboratory data, of acceptable quality, for the geometry that is
typical of highway bridge decks. This is particularly problematic since the typical bridge deck
geometry can be considered as almost a perfect wave-catcher in that overhanging decks
above concave girders allow for pockets of air to be trapped between the wave surface and the
structure.
The new method for estimating wave loads on bridge decks presented here is recommended to
FHWA as interim guidance. It is simple, can be applied conservatively, and is consistent with
the existing coastal engineering research literature (primarily McConnell, et al. 2004 and Wang
1970). The new method helps explain the damage to bridges in Hurricanes Katrina and Ivan.
Estimated wave loads are sufficient to overcome the weight and connection resistance for the
spans that moved but not sufficient for the spans at higher elevations that did not move at three
bridges: the I-10 Escambia Bay, Florida, bridge; the I-10 on ramp near Mobile, Alabama; and
U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay. This interim guidance can be replaced or modified as research
addresses some of the important questions more appropriately than the existing literature.
The magnitude of wave-induced loads on bridge decks can be addressed by considering the
U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay, Mississippi, in Hurricane Katrina as a test case using the
newly recommended method. The deck was likely experiencing wave-induced horizontal and
55
vertical loads of up to 230 kips and 440 kips, respectively, by 8:00 a.m. CDT on August 29,
2005. At that point in time in the storm, the storm surge had risen to a mean level about one foot
below the low-chord elevation of the bridge spans (bottom of girders). The vertical load is an
uplift load acting opposite the 340 kip weight of the span. These estimated loads are maximum
(slowly varying) loads at the crest of the largest incoming waves in the sea state at that time.
They would have been adequate to begin to lift and move the spans off their pile caps in the
downwave direction as was observed.
The peak of Hurricane Katrina, however, was not until 10:30 a.m. The loads would have
increased, had the decks remained in-place, to an estimated 950 kips and 1900 kips (horizontal
and vertical) by then. It must be noted that the conditions for which these extreme loads are
predicted are the conditions for which the estimation method has the most uncertainty. The
conditions of total inundation of the bridge deck are beyond the available range of laboratory
data. The load estimates are more reliable for the 8:00 a.m. case, with the lower loads, where
the still-water level was near the elevation of the deck.
The magnitudes of the estimated wave loads, 200 to 2000 kips, are significant and present a
challenge to the bridge engineer. The typical force-time history associated with these wave
loads also presents a challenge. The slowly varying loads can be combined with higher
magnitude, much shorter duration impact loads that occur if a pocket of air is trapped between
an incoming wave and the bridge deck. The implications of strengthening the bridges to
withstand these extreme wave loads and the directly related foundation issues are serious.
The easiest design solution is to avoid all wave loads by elevating the decks to a level where
wave crests are not a factor. This has been the preferred design approach. Given the existence
of many bridges at lower elevations that could possibly be retrofitted for more resistance, more
research on reducing the uncertainties of the magnitudes of wave loads is justified. New bridge
design will also benefit from a better understanding of wave loads since the recent damage did
not extend up to the top of the largest wave crests in the storm sea-state. Bridge decks elevated
just a few feet above the storm surge survived the wave attack. The inherent strength of the
bridges was able to tolerate some level of wave attack. Research into that critical level of wave
attack is appropriate.
Given the magnitudes of the estimated wave loads, the seriousness of the implications of them
for design, the significant uncertainty in the available methods for estimating the loads, and the
likelihood that the uncertainty can be reduced, further research is strongly recommended to
FHWA. This research should include quantitative laboratory force measurements for the crosssectional geometry typical of simple-span bridge decks used in U.S. highways across coastal
waters. Three cases of relative inundation should be considered: one, the deck is much higher
than the storm surge such that only the crests of a very few waves in the storm sea state hit the
girders, two, the surge is just about even with the bridge deck elevation (this is the case where
the prototype damage has occurred), and three, the surge is so high that the bridge deck is
completely inundated.
The most significant need related to project-specific applications of estimated wave-induced
loads on bridges for design is a multidisciplinary collaboration of hydraulic, structural and
geotechnical engineers. However, an additional and critical element of this team will include the
active involvement of a qualified, experienced, coastal engineering specialist.
Coastal engineering is a specialty area of civil engineering that involves the unique design
environment waves, water levels, and sand transport, experienced along the coast. As in any
56
specialty area, specialized formal training (in wave mechanics, sand transport and engineering
solutions for the coastal environment) and experience are required. The use of a coastal
engineering consultant is highly recommended for any design or retrofit of coastal bridges that
may occasionally be subjected to storm surge and waves.
57
58
References
Allsop, W. (2006) Personal communication.
American Petroleum Institute (2000) Recommended Practice for Planning, Designing and
Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms Working Stress Design, American Petroleum
Institute, 277 pp.
American Society of Civil Engineers (2006) Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other
Structures (ASCE Standard), ASCE/SEI-7-05, American Society of Civil Engineers, 376
pp.
ASCE TCLEE (2006) Performance of Transportation Systems During Hurricane Katrina, draft
report by the American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Council on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering, Reston, Virginia.
Bea, R. G., Xu, T., Stear, J., and Ramos, R. (1999) Wave Forces on Decks of Offshore
Platforms, Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, American
Society of Civil Engineers, May/June, vol. 125, no. 3, p. 136-144.
Bea, R.G., Iversen, R., and Xu, T. (2001) Wave-In-Deck Forces on Offshore Platforms, Journal
of Offshore Mechanics and Artic Engineering, Feb., vol. 123, p. 10-21.
Broughton, P. and Horn, E. (1987) Ekofisk Platform 2/4C: Reanalysis due to Subsidence,
Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineering. London, October, p. 949-979.
Chen, Q. (2005) How to determine surge and wave conditions near coastal bridges,
presentation at Wave Force Symposium organized by FHWA, Turner-Fairbank Highway
Research Center, McLean, Virginia, December 5, 2005.
Chen, Q., Zhao, H., Hu, K, and Douglass, S. L. (2005) Prediction of wind waves in a shallow
estuary. Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, American Society
of Civil Engineers, vol. 131, no. 4, p. 137-148.
Chen, Q., Wang, L., and Zhao, H. (2006) Simulation of storm surges and wind waves on the
Mississippi and Alabama coasts during Hurricane Katrina, presentation at AGU Ocean
Sciences Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 20-24.
Denson, K. H. (1978) Wave Forces on Causeway-Type Coastal Bridges, Water Resources
Research Institute, Mississippi State University, 42 pp.
Denson, K. H. (1980) Wave Forces on Causeway-Type Coastal Bridges: Effects of Angle of
Wave Incidence and Cross-Section Shape, Water Resources Research Institute,
Mississippi State University, 242 pp.
Douglass, S.L., Hughes, S.A., Rogers, S., and Chen, Q. (2004) The Impact of Hurricane Ivan
on the Coastal Roads of Florida and Alabama: A Preliminary Report, Coastal
Transportation Engineering Research & Education Center, University of South Alabama,
Mobile, Alabama, 19 pp.
59
60
Sheppard, D.M. (2005) Example Problem Solution using Kaplans Method, presentation at
Wave Force Symposium organized by FHWA, Turner-Fairbank Highway Research
Center, McLean, Virginia, December 7, 2005.
Tirindelli, M., Cuomo, G., Allsop, W., McConnell, K. (2002) "Exposed Jetties: Inconsistencies
and Gaps in Design Methods for Wave-Induced Forces." Proceedings of the
International Conference on Coastal Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers,
13 pp.
US Army (1984) Shore Protection Manual, Coastal Engineering Research Center, US Army
Engineers Waterways Experiment Station, 2 volumes, US Government Printing Office.
US Army Engineer District, Mobile (1981) Hurricane Frederic Post Disaster Report: 30 August 14 September 1979, February 1981.
Wang, H. (1970) Water Wave Pressure on Horizontal Plate, Journal of the Hydraulics Division,
American Society of Civil Engineers, vol. 96, no. HY10, p. 1997-2017.
Weggel. J.R. (1997) Breaking-Wave Loads on Vertical Walls Suspended Above Mean Sea
Level, discussion of paper by Chan, et al., Journal of Waterway, Port, Coastal and
Ocean Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, vol. 123, no 3, p. 143-146.
61
62
Appendix A
Example calculations of wave loads for the Biloxi case study
using adaptations of existing methods
This appendix presents details of applications and adaptations of the existing methods to
estimate wave loads on the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay. The case study is at 8:00 a.m.
CDT on August 29, 2005 and the assumed wave and surge conditions are:
Hs = 6.2 feet, T = 5 s, d = 16 ft, (
= 12 feet) and the low-chord on the bridge deck was 13 ft
NGVD.
The geometry of the bridge deck is as presented in Chapter 3. In the following calculations, the
notation of the original reference is used and it is assumed that the reader has access to those
references. The following calculations are for demonstration purposes only.
63
Fvqs
*
v
(max c l
Hs
0.82
(8.9 1)
6.2
0.61
= 0.71
Fvqs
*
v
(max c l
Hs
0.82
(8.9 4)
6.2
0.61
= 0.95
Fhqs
*
h
(max c l
Hs
0.45
(8.9 1
6.2
1.56
= 0.31
64
Fhqs
*
h
(max c l
Hs
0.72
(8.9 1
6.2
2.3
= 0.42
Fi = Cm ( Vol ) a
with a Cm = 3.5, and a maximum acceleration from linear wave theory.
For the horizontal direction, the maximum acceleration is:
a = g H / L = (32.2) (10.4)/(104) = 10.1 ft/s2
where H = 1.67 Hs = 1.67 (6.2) = 10.4 ft.
Wavelength is estimated as 104 ft using Ekerts approximation of linear wave theory for that
depth of 16 feet.
The maximum horizontal inertial load is:
Fi = 3.5 (2) [ (52)(3.5)(33.4) ] (10.1) = 430 kips.
65
Fd = Cd A p
u2
2
where Cd = 2.
For the horizontal loads this is:
Fd = (2) [ (6)(52) ] (2)(8.1)2 / 2 = 40 kips.
For the vertical loads this is:
Fd = (2) [ ( 33.4)(52)] (2)(6.1)2 / 2 = 130 kips.
Maximum velocities of 8.1 ft/s for the horizontal and 6.1 ft/s for the vertical are from linear wave
theory using:
umax = H g T / ( 2 L ) = (10.4)(32.2)(5) / [ 2 (104) ] = 8.1 ft/s.
and
wmax = [ H g T / ( 2 L ) ] { tanh( 2 d / L ) } =
= (10.4)(32.2)(5) / [ 2 (104) ] { tanh( 2 (16) / (104) ) } = 6.1.
Impact loads, called slamming loads by Bea, et al. (1999), are estimated as:
Fs = Cs A p
u2
,
2
where Cs= 6 and they are assumed to only act in the horizontal direction.
So, Fs= (6) (2) [ (6) (52) ] (8.1)2 = 250 kips.
66
67
So
Fz = (270)(64)(33.4)3(52 / 47.25) / 1000 = 710 kips.
68
Appendix B
Report of Foundation Evaluation to Extreme Event Loading
U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge
by
Dan Brown & Associates
Introduction
The purpose of this report is to support the research study of the response of highway bridges
to extreme event storm loading from waves and tidal surge by evaluating the geotechnical and
structural performance of the pile foundations. This study is intended to outline and address the
fundamental issues related to whether or not strengthening the super-structure of these bridges
might lead to geotechnical failures. Specifically:
1.
Evaluate the magnitude and type of proposed wave forces compared to other forces
such as vessel impact forces, wind loads, and current loads typically used in design to
determine if foundation integrity of a bridge might be jeopardized if the bridge deck were
secured to withstand wave forces. For site-specific geotechnical data, the old (the one
that fell down in Katrina) U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay is to be used as a test-case
location. Wave load estimates for that bridge and situation have been provided by Dr.
Scott Douglass in a memo dated March 1, 2006.
2.
Prepare a brief report summarizing the methods used to evaluate potential danger to the
foundation integrity if the bridge decks were tied secured with wave loads ultimately
absorbed by the foundation. Include an outline and description of research questions,
further analysis, and experiments needed to better address this fundamental question.
Loadings
The anticipated loadings from a Katrina-type storm surge occur as a sinusoidal time-dependent
cyclic load, with a period expected to be in the range of 4 to 6 seconds. This load includes a
coupled vertical and horizontal force on the deck and girders, which are expected to be in-phase.
The maximum loads for the U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge are estimated to occur when the bridge is
completely submerged and may be in the range of 950 kips horizontal and 1930 kips vertical.
Loads associated with waves hitting the bridge girders and deck (when not submerged by the
storm surge) are estimated at around 220 kips horizontal and 380 kips vertical. Also associated
with this wave loading is a higher spike in the load which is of very short duration (fraction of a
second), and is referred to as a slamming load.
In the experience of the writers, these maximum loads are actually quite similar in load and
duration to barge impact loads on a bridge of this size. However, the several hours duration of the
storm loading can lead to cyclic degradation in the soil response in a manner similar to storm
loadings of offshore platforms. This is an uncommon design condition for highway bridge
foundations. Even seismic loadings result in relatively few cycles of load compared to the
hundreds of load cycles over the several hour duration of a hurricane storm surge. The U.S. 90
69
Biloxi Bay Bridge clearly was not designed for lateral loads of anything approaching these
magnitudes.
Foundation Model for Analysis
An analytical model was used to evaluate the response of pile foundations to wave loads
applied to the pile group as a result of bridge deck secured to the bents. This model was based
on plans dated 1959 for the U.S. 90 bridge across Biloxi Bay constructed in the early 1960s
(and destroyed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005) as well as estimated wave loads described above.
The loads were considered as applied at the approximate centroid of the deck and girder
system, and therefore the horizontal component of the load was coupled with a 5 foot moment
arm to apply forces at the centroid of the pile cap.
The destroyed U.S. 90 bridge consisted of pre-cast concrete girders and a concrete deck
supported by driven pile bents. The typical span length was 52 feet. Several pile sizes were
used to construct the bents, depending on the location along the alignment. Pre-cast 20-inch
piles and pre-stressed concrete pile sizes of 24-inch, 30-inch, and 36-inch were used. Bents
utilizing 20-inch or 24-inch piles had 10 piles per bent, with the two outboard piles on either end
of the bent installed at a batter ranging from 1:6 to 1:12. Eight piles per bent were used for the
other two pile sizes, with the outboard pile on each end of the bent battered at 1:8. Every fifth
bent was built with all piles battered longitudinally with the bridge (along centerline). The
direction of batter was alternated every other pile.
The analytical model was constructed using Bents 44 and 45 of the 1959 bridge plans. These
bents were supported by 24-inch piles driven a minimum of 20 feet into firm material and a
minimum axial capacity of 60 tons. The single pile nonlinear response in shear and bending was
evaluated using the computer program LPILE (Version 5), based on structural detail drawings. A
range of behavior at the pile/cap connection was evaluated, ranging from a full moment
connection to one of partial fixity. There are numerous computer models for analysis of pile
groups with which the writers are well familiar; however, these models typically are used to
perform a pushover analysis and physical instability is usually associated with a failure to
achieve numerical convergence. For this study a simple group model of coupled translational
and rotational stiffness was developed using hand and spreadsheet calculations (and the results
of nonlinear single pile analyses in axial and transverse directions) so that the post-yield
behavior could be better evaluated.
The soil profile shown in Table 1 was developed using the boring data included in the 1959
project plans and borings performed in 2005 for design of the replacement bridge. Though the
depth to the mudline and the strata thicknesses vary somewhat along the bridge alignment, the
table below outlines the typical subsurface conditions.
Elevation (feet, MSL)
0 to 10
-10 to 30
-30 to 65
-65 to 100
-100 to 130
-130+
Soil
Bay Water
Very Soft Clay (c = 50 psf)
Stiff Clay (c = 2000 psf)
Sand ( = 35)
Stiff Clay (c = 2000 psf)
Sand ( = 38)
70
Based upon the writers experience along the Gulf Coast, the soil conditions used for the
evaluation of the U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge are similar in many respects to those at the U.S. 90
Bay St. Louis bridge site in Mississippi, the I-10 Twin Span bridge in Louisiana, the I-10
Escambia Bay Bridge in Florida, all of which were damaged by storm surges associated with
hurricanes. It is the opinion of the writers that these conditions represent a reasonably typical
condition for coastal bridges elsewhere in the Gulf coast and southern Atlantic coastal areas.
Analysis
The single pile model included three pile head conditions as simulated by the loads applied in
the computer model: a fixed head condition (Shear = Vx and Slope = 0), a post-yield hingedhead condition (Shear = Vx, Moment = -Mmax), and a partially fixed condition (Shear = Vx,
Moment = -Mx), where Vx is the applied shear (lateral) load at the pile head, Mx is the applied
moment at the pile head, and Mmax is the maximum moment for the pile section. Each of these
conditions was evaluated for a range of shear loads (and moments in the partially fixed case),
increasing the load until the pile moment capacity was exceeded. The results of these analyses
provide the basis to calculate a transverse single pile stiffness, kt for each case at or near failure
of the pile.
In addition to the range of pile-head restraint conditions, analyses were performed using a range
of soil properties, including: a) increased soil strength and stiffness associated with ratedependent damping, b) reduced soil strength and stiffness associated with cyclic degradation,
and c) more favorable soil conditions represented by a sand deposit below the soil surface
without the deep soft organic clay in the first 20 feet below the mudline. These variations
provide a form of sensitivity analysis for the possible range of soil conditions.
Axial stiffness, kax, was estimated using an axial load resistance of 200 kips per pile based on
the minimum design load of the piles, the dead load estimated from the design drawings, and
experience (which suggests that the axial capacity of these driven piles is likely somewhat
higher than the design values given the long time for soil setup). Plan notes indicate that the 24
inch width piles are to be driven to a capacity of 60 tons, presumably indicating that the piles
should achieve a resistance sufficient for a service load of 60 tons (120 kips) with a factor of
safety of at least 2. Thus, the ultimate resistance should be at least 240 kips, less the sustained
dead load on the structure.
The group response is related to the lateral and axial forces at the top of each pile of the group
as a function of pile stiffness (kt and kax) and the group displacement vector (x, y, ). The
equations of the total forces applied to the pile group (VT, PT, and MT) were then developed by
static equilibrium, combining the stiffness terms to create the group equilibrium equations of the
group force vector as a function of the group stiffness and the group displacement vector.
VT
PT
M
T
K xx
= K yx
K x
Group Force
Vector
xy
K yy
K x
K y
K
x
y
Group Displacement
Vector
71
The group displacement vector is solved by using the peak loads for the group and the
calculated stiffness terms. Once the group displacements were solved, the lateral and axial
forces in each pile could be solved and compared to the pile capacity.
Analytical Results
Analyses of a single 24 inch pile typical of the Biloxi Bridge subject to transverse shear indicate
the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The flexural capacity of the pile with a full moment connection at the pile top will be
exceeded at a transverse shear force of between 20 and 30 kips per pile. When the piletop condition is replaced by a plastic hinge at the yield moment value, the pile will
accommodate greater deflection but relatively insignificantly more shear force before a
subsurface yield in flexure occurs.
The flexural capacity is somewhat reduced for conditions of partial fixity at the pile top,
with maximum shear forces of around 20 kips per pile.
Cyclic degradation reduces the stiffness and capacity slightly, but including a ratedependent damping contribution approximately offsets this reduction. Both conditions
are likely within the range of general uncertainty associated with site-specific soil
conditions.
Replacement of the 20 feet of soft organic clay immediately below the mudline by a
more favorable soil profile consisting of sand can potentially increase the transverse
shear capacity to as much as 35 to 40 kips per pile.
Variations in transverse pile stiffness for different conditions are illustrated on Figure B-1.
25
20
15
10
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
72
50
Analyses of the response of the 24 inch, 10 pile group indicate the following:
3.
4.
16
90
14
80
12
70
Yield
10
60
50
40
30
4
20
2
2.
The primary mode of movement was horizontal translation, with very small rotational
movements until pile axial failure occurs.
The horizontal force on the pile bent results in transverse shear forces to the piles which
are approximately equally distributed to the piles in the row.
Many if not all of the piles will yield in flexure at around 30% to 40% of the peak load
associated with the maximum storm surge for the range of soft clay soil conditions
evaluated. See Figure B-2 for a typical plot of lateral force vs horizontal translation. If the
more favorable sand conditions were present, this value might be as high as 40% to
50% of the maximum loads described earlier. Note that these data suggest that the
foundation might survive the horizontal loads associated with the wave loadings (which
were about 23% of the maximum storm surge), although some damage would be
anticipated.
The coupled vertical, horizontal, and overturning forces on the pile groups may start to
overstress one or more of the batter piles at loads in the range of 40% to 50% of the
peak load associated with the maximum storm surge (Figure B-3). An overstress of a
single pile does not constitute a rotational failure of the group, since this response is
expected to be ductile and strain-hardening, and additional capacity is available from
other piles in the group. Thus, it is likely that bending failure of the piles would occur
before overturning due to axial geotechnical failure.
1.
Group
Piles 1 - 10
10
0
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0
100%
Figure B-2 Horizontal Force vs Translation, with Associated Individual Pile Shear Forces
73
16
1200
14
1000
12
800
10
600
400
200
-200
0
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Group
Pile 1
Pile 2
Piles 3 - 5
Piles 6 - 8
Pile 9
Pile 10
-400
100%
Figure B-3 Horizontal Force vs Translation, with Associated Individual Pile Axial Forces
74