Pottery, Horses, and Bows:

Technologies Critical to Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean Warfare

David G. Terrell
April 22, 2009

Over the course of centuries, land warfare in the Near Eastern and Mediterranean Ancient world

progressed through four dominant paradigms. The earliest form of warfare was manifestly chaotic and

characterized by groups of combatants fighting each other in fierce melee. Later, realizing there was

safety in numbers, the massing of trained, disciplined warriors, exemplified by the Mycenaean and

Macedonian phalanx, allowed the precise application of intense brute force in a bloody shoving match

along a single axis, overcoming any undisciplined mob to stand against it. Eventually; the phalanx was

overcome by nimble legionary forces capable of executing enveloping or flanking movements using

attached cavalry to apply a mobile mass at a decisive point. Finally, the legions were defeated by

swarming forces of fast, rapid-fire units conducting pulsed attacks from many directions. 1

Each successive paradigm (chaotic melee, brute force massing, nimble maneuver, and swarming

attack) supplemented rather than displaced the previous paradigm. 2 Each transition was facilitated by a

technological advance that made possible a significant improvement in one or more of the main

characteristics of military capability: lethality, mobility, survivability, sustainability and C3I (command,

control communications and intelligence).3 This essay will identify three principle technologies that

allowed the paradigm shifts and briefly discuss the capabilities, synergy and advantages each brought to

the battlefield.

Pottery. I suspect that the initial response to the threat of melee attack in the pre-Bronze Age era

was mobilizing your own military aged males (MAMs) to repel the threat. Unless a group was dedicated

to surviving through nomadic raiding, the diversion of MAMs from the procurement of food was a likely

1
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, (Santa Monica, California: RAND
Corporation, 2000), 7-23.
2
Arquilla, 7.
3
Manfred Engelhardt, "Transforming the German Bundeswehr-The Way Ahead." Chap. 5 in Transatlantic
Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, by Center for Transatlantic Relations, edited by Daniel S
Hamilton, 91-113, (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 2004), 110
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Terrell, David G.

drain on the group. This dilemma was solved by the development of pottery. The creation of durable,

airtight, non-porous containers allowed the long term preservation and storage of food. This technology

provided a group with two critical capabilities. First, pottery provided a means to create a food surplus,

thus allowing for a higher overall quantity of food, encouraging population growth and also freeing

personnel from food-related tasks for longer periods, allowing extended military activity. Second, it gave

groups a means of transporting this preserved food supply, thus extending the deployable range and

mission duration of the group’s military forces beyond the immediate environs of the homeland. Pottery,

therefore, directly and positively affected the lethality (through increased opportunity for training),

mobility and sustainability of the military forces of the time, allowing the phalanx to form and fight.4

Domesticated Horses. Over time, military thinkers came to realize that deployed phalanx forces

were very formidable on suitable ground but were vulnerable to flanking attacks and being confronted on

broken ground. Countering the phalanx depended on the ability to rapidly place forces on its flanks before

it could effectively wheel to face the threat. The domestication of equines, particularly horses, allowed the

creation of forces having much improved mobility over foot infantry. This cavalry, equipped with bows,

was very useful but the relative newness of the horseman and traditional military roles worked against the

independent use of horse archers as a separate arm. Nevertheless, these forces, positioned at the flanks of

a conventional phalanx or more flexible manipular legion, could rapidly move forward and around an

enemy to attack from unexpected directions or provide intelligence about enemy movements to a

battlefield commander. Horses also improved the speed and carrying capacity of logistic processes and

military communications.5 The increase in mobility and sustainability provided by the domestication of

horses eventually allowed maneuverable forces to overcome the power of massed brute force. 6

4
William J Hamblin, Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History. (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 18, 148, 271.
5
Hamblin, 131.
6
Hamblin, 131-132
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Terrell, David G.

Composite Bow. Though the composite bow was initially developed at an early date, for

centuries, its labor intensive manufacture limited its use to elite troops.7 Eventually, improvements in the

production of great numbers of high-quality composite bows and arrows provided light cavalry in late

antiquity with a long-ranged weapon having a higher rate of fire and more rounds per warrior than

infantry were afforded by their weapons. The composite bow, coupled with a large horse population

resulting from continued improvements in horse breeding and domestication, provided enough weapons

and mounts to allow the creation of very large cavalry forces. Additionally, the evolution of draft horse

breeds facilitated the continued development of faster, higher-capacity transport through better draft

animals made possible the fast and high-capacity resupply needed to support large cavalry forces in the

field.8 These large cavalry forces, using these combined technologies to improve their lethality and

mobility, were able to resort to swarming attacks (the “convergent attack of several semi-autonomous

units on a target”9) as a battlefield paradigm, as between the Scythians and Macedonians (329-327 BC)

and between the Parthians and Romans at Carrhae (53 BC).10

These three technologies, Pottery, Horse Domestication and the Composite Bow drove the

technological changes that allowed the civilizations of the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean to

improve their ways of warfare. Pottery allowed for the feeding of large military forces that could rout an

armed mob. The addition of domesticated horse allowed large forces to move father and faster than could

their enemies afoot and the simple massed formations fell. The composite bow, once readily available in

numbers, synergistically combined with the horse and logistics support gave forces so equipped the

elusiveness and longer range with which to strike less fluid forces with impunity.

7
Hamblin, 86, 95, 423.
8
Jon Coulston, "Central Asia from the Scythians to the Huns." Chap. 13 in The Ancient World at War: A Global
History, by Philip De Souza, 217-227, (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2008), 217.
Hamblin, 264.
Philip A G Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare:
Rome from the late Republic to the late Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 64, 288, 355, 411.
9
Sean J A Edwards, Military History of Swarming. Military Briefing, (Charlottesville: National Ground Intelligence
Center, 2003), 3.
10
Edwards, 6.
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Terrell, David G.

David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA

Works Cited
Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. Swarming and the Future of Conflict. Santa Monica, California:
RAND Corporation, 2000.

Coulston, Jon. "Central Asia from the Scythians to the Huns." Chap. 13 in The Ancient World at War: A
Global History, by Philip De Souza, 217-227. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2008.

Edwards, Sean J A. Military History of Swarming. Military Briefing, Charlottesville: National Ground
Intelligence Center, 2003, 37.

Engelhardt, Manfred. "Transforming the German Bundeswehr-The Way Ahead." Chap. 5 in Transatlantic
Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century, by Center for Transatlantic Relations, edited by
Daniel S Hamilton, 91-113. Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 2004.

Hamblin, William J. Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy Warriors at the Dawn of
History. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Sabin, Philip A G, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby. The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman
Warfare: Rome from the late Republic to the late Empire. Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.

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