The Evolution of the Roman Army

David G. Terrell
December 22, 2009

The Roman Army provided homeland security and power projection to its patrons from 753 BC

to the end of the Western Empire in the 5th century AD. The Army evolved over these twelve centuries, as

did the culture that manned and equipped it. The Republican Army of the mid-Republic (3rd-2nd centuries

BC) grew out of a militia ethos. Roman Citizens—propertied men—served, providing their own

equipment, after being recruited for the duration of a war. These soldiers viewed their service not a career

but a duty owed to the gods and their fellows. This was the army Rome used to conquer Italy and

Carthage, becoming the dominant regional power. The Professional Army of the Empire (1st century BC

to early 3rd century AD) arose out of Rome’s expanded territory which meant fighting wars farther from

Rome for longer periods of time than a militia army could withstand. The men attracted to long service on

the borders of the Empire were now men of less economic standing—whose loyalty to Rome was

embodied in the immediate person of their General. This change in how the army was manned allowed a

single man to consolidate military power and its use destroyed the Republic in favor of Empire. The

Roman Army of Late Antiquity (3rd to 5th centuries AD), though still a professional fighting force, had

changed to meet increasing threats from external enemies and internal civil wars. New types of units and

equipment were fielded to cope with the changed strategic landscape.1

The Roman Army was faced with responding to a series of challenges on behalf of the Republic

and Empire and in responding to them, evolved. When examining the Roman Army’s responses and the

many cultural, economic, and military factors that contributed to the scope and character of those

responses, three particular factors suggest themselves to this author as most important:

 The adoption and improvement of sound military doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures,

and equipment regardless of their source.

1
Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003, 7-8.
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 The accepted influence of strong, intelligent military leaders.

 The effective learning of lessons gained though the painful experience of defeat and near loss

on the battlefield.

The Roman willingness to adopt good ideas regardless of source is well attested in history and

contributed to Rome’s ability to rebound from defeat and achieve battlefield superiority. For example,

early on, the Romans adopted hoplite tactics from the Etruscans, or possibly from Greek visitors to

Rome.2 The army drew sword designs (gladius and spatha) from the Spanish3, helmet designs from

Etruscan, Gallic and Boeotian sources4, the four-horned saddle probably from Gallic sources5, siege

tactics from the Greeks and Macedonians6, and developed a successful Navy from scratch in about five

years, while facing the Carthaginians (starting shipbuilding in 261BC and winning at Ecnomus in 256

BC).7

Not all Roman Generals were strong, intelligent leaders. However, the Romans possessed a

willingness to remove leaders who proved unsuccessful and to support those who delivered victory by

giving them a free hand to operate—even to the modification or abandonment of long-cherished practices.

This characteristic worked to minimize the damage done by the incompetent and maximize the benefit

Rome could derive from the services of a strong, intelligent battlefield commander. Examples of Rome’s

willingness to back a skilled leader include: Servius Tullius’ reorganizations of the military and recruiting

practices around 550 BC, creating the property-based class system of military service8; Caius Marius’ 107

2
Goldsworthy, 21.
M. Cary, and H H Scullard, A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine (3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave,
1975), 25.
3
Goldsworthy, 30, 133, 138.
4
Ibid, 30.
5
Ibid, 139-140.
6
Ibid, 186-197.
7
Ibid, 35-36.
Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (Translated by Raphael Bate. New York: Routledge), 2001, 29.
8
Goldsworthy, 24.
Le Bohec, 36.
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BC incorporation of the poor capite censi men into the legions, in contradiction to Servius’ earlier

precedent, breaking the link between property and military service when it was prudent9; Augustus’ (and

his successors) turning of the auxilia into a more regular, professional arm of the Army10; Marcus

Aurelius’ promotion of proficient members of the equestrian order to positions of high command formerly

reserved for those of Senatorial rank11; Septimius Severus’ creation of static provincial armies over

previous reliance on mobile legions12; and, Diocletian and Constantine’s creation of field armies drawn

from barbarian tribes when sufficient numbers of military-aged males were not forthcoming from Italy.13

The Roman Army was extraordinarily successful. However, there were defeats and, occasionally,

those defeats had significant adverse consequences for Rome. That the Romans were able to rebound

from these failures suggests they possessed an ability to learn and incorporate lessons learned from defeat

and near losses.14 This ability minimized the long-term effects of defeat on the battlefield and improved

Roman chances of “losing the battle” while “winning the war.” Some examples of this factor are: Rome’s

abandonment of phalanx based warfare after the 391 BC defeat at the Battle of the Allia and the

subsequent sack of Rome15 which led to army reforms by Camillus that provided the infantry with a

screen of slingers and javelin-throwers and the creation of the manipular legion16; the near-ritualized

construction of fortified camps and effective roads by legions on the march, after experiences learned

from the battle of Asculum17; the development of improved siegecraft methods and equipment after the

Cary, 52-53.
9
Goldsworthy, 46.
10
Ibid, 56.
Le Bohec, 184-186.
11
Goldsworthy, 202.
12
Ibid, 202.
Le Bohec, 38, 191-194.
13
Goldsworthy, 202, 208.
14
Cary, 84.
15
Ibid, 73.
16
Ibid, 84.
17
Goldsworthy 33, 171.
Cary, 102.
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Roman failure at the Siege of Lilybaeum in 250BC18; the creation and deployment of naval power after

failures in First Punic War19; and, Rome’s endorsement of the employment of Fabian tactics after the

Battle of Lake Trasimene (217 BC)20.

The Romans repeatedly evidenced these three factors during their military history. Rome’s

willingness to incorporate the successful doctrines and equipment of their friends and enemies; to give

free hand to military leaders of demonstrated ability; and, their resolve to rebound from military defeat

gave Rome its ability to adapt and overcome any enemy for over a millennium.

David Terrell
Herndon, VA

Bibliography

Cary, M, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd Edition. New
York: Palgrave, 1975.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2003.

Le Bohec, Yann. The Imperial Roman Army. Translated by Raphael Bate. New York: Routledge, 2001.

© David G. Terrell, 2009-2010, except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For permission to reprint under terms outside the license, contact
davidterrell80@hotmail.com.

18
Ibid, 119.
19
Ibid, 121.
20
Ibid, 127-8.