Short Report: Battle of Cynoscephalae 197 B.C.

David G Terrell
October 12, 2009

Rome had a great deal of unpleasant experiences with the Greek states, leading up to the Battle of

Cynoscephalae in 1971, mostly with the small Adriatic city-states rather than Macedonia or the other

major powers on the peninsula. During the First Punic War, Rome set up a military base at Brindisium, on

the ―heel of the Italian boot‖. Naval forces deployed from there meant to control Carthaginian shipping;

but, the mission had the additional effect of interfering with Illyrian trade. Over the next sixteen years,

pirates from the Illyrian (north-west Hellenic) coast preyed on Roman commerce. After repeated

unsuccessful diplomatic efforts, Rome sent an army to the region in 230 and established a protectorate

over some coastal towns. In 220, a Greek named Demetrius fomented a rebellion in the area but was

defeated by Roman troops. Demetrius escaped to the Antigonid king, Philip V of Macedon, who provided

sanctuary. Therefore, at the moment Hannibal was verging on invading Italy, Rome was in conflict, albeit

a minor one, with one of the major Hellenic powers. The distraction was not welcome to the Roman

leadership, who did not allocate a large force to the area of operations in response.2

Philip, for his part, distrusted the Romans. He realized that the Roman forces established on the

Adriatic coast enjoyed the advantage of geography; and, also that his autocratic style had imbued a

number of his vassal city-states with a dissatisfaction that might cause them to ally themselves with

Rome. After the Roman defeat at Cannae, Philip made a mutual assistance pact with Hannibal. Philip

agreed to provide supplies and possibly troops but, at this point, the Punic fleet was nonexistent and the

Macedonian fleet was insufficient to force its way past Brindisium. 3

Rome responded to the existence of the Punic-Macedonian alliance with successful military

operations against Philip between 212 and 205 (the First Macedonian War), which ended with a

1
All dates are BC.
2
Richard A Gabriel, and Donald W Boose. The Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide to Great
Battles that Shaped the Development of War. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 324.
3
Ibid, 324-328.
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David G. Terrell

negotiated peace in Rome’s favor. Afterwards, Philip turned his attention south and west. He conspired

with the Seleucid king Antiochus III to assist in a joint attack upon Ptolemaic Egypt, perhaps in search of

finances to build up his forces. Philip’s harsh activities towards smaller states in the region during this

period caused the city-states of Pergamum in Asia Minor and the Island of Rhodes to formally plead for

Roman assistance. Though Philip had made no overt violation of his treaty with Rome, it is possible that

the Roman Senate became concerned that Philip might gain undue strength from the Macedonian-

Seleucid alliance.4

The consul for that year (200), P. Sulpicius Galba, asked for a declaration of war against Philip

but the Comita Centuriata initially declined. Not long after, Sulpicius, using the argument that Rome

would eventually fight Philip, either in Macedonia or in Italy, won approval from the comita for a

preemptive war. When contemplating the reason for the reversal, it is notable that almost coincident with

the Roman deliberations on war against the Macedonians, the Senate received another request for military

relief from a Greek city-state—this time, from Athens, who was being attack by several of Philip’s few

allies in Hellas. In response to these pleas, Rome sent Philip an ultimatum, demanding that he cease all

military actions against other Greek states—effectively, but perhaps unintentionally, extending its

patronage over Greece. Philip rejected the terms and the Second Macedonian War was on.5

The Romans entered upon this war somewhat gently, perhaps viewing this as a secondary theater

compared to the operations directed against Hannibal. The Senate authorized a relatively small land force

of about 30,000 troops, supported by a correspondingly sized naval flotilla. To supplement its efforts,

Rome fulfilled Philip’s fears by attempting to enlist Greek states in forming a coalition against Philip, but

4
Ibid, 324-328.
5
M. Cary, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine, (3rd Edition. New York:
Palgrave, 1975), 153. Gabriel, 324-5.
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David G. Terrell

almost all of them were as distrustful of Rome’s long-term reliability as a patron. Only Athens proved

agreeable to Rome’s overtures for active assistance.6

On the other side, Philip stood alone against Rome. Antiochus, with no formal obligation to help

Philip and having ambitions elsewhere, demurred; and, Philip, having so offended many of the Greek

states, found substantial support only in Thessaly, which was geographically positioned between the

Roman and Macedonian positions at the beginning of the war.7

Two to three years of indecisive activity followed the declaration of war. The Romans conducted

minor operations in Illyria, fighting skirmishes along the borders of Thessaly and Macedonia while

establishing a base for the two legions and auxiliaries sent to prosecute the war. The presence of this

Roman Army caused Philip to break off his support of Antiochus’ operations in Asia Minor and return

home to prepare a response. In 198, Roman offensive operations began when Titus Quinctius

Flamininus8, taking the entire Roman force under his command, moved south along the Adriatic pushing

Macedonian forces back towards Thessaly and threatening Philip’s lines of commerce and

communications with Carthage, setting the stage for the battle.9 (Polybius, 218)

Macedonian Forces

The general structure of Philip’s main forces were essentially the same as Alexander’s; a central

phalanx supported by cavalry. However, Philip’s phalanxes were different, in some particulars, from his

predecessor. While Alexander deployed the phalanx in varied depths (up to sixteen men deep), depending

on need, under the Antigonids, the basic unit of the phalanx grew to about 800 men usually arrayed in

6
Ibid, 154.
7
Ibid, 154.
8
Note that Livy refers to him as Quinctius while I will refer to him as Flamininus, as our main textbooks for this
course all do.
9
Livy. Titus Livius: The History of Rome. (http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/index.html (accessed October
12, 2009)), 33.4. Cary, 154-5. Christopher S Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80-81.
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David G. Terrell

files from sixteen to thirty-two men deep (and sometimes more). Its bulk and momentum were deemed

more important than its ability to maneuver. The weapons carried by the hoplites had changed, as well.

The sarissa of Alexander’s hoplites were about twelve to fourteen feet long and light enough to be held,

at the balance point, in one hand10. By the time of this battle, the sarissa had grown into an extremely

long, two-handed weapon and the length made any tactical turning movement nearly impossible, opening

the flank and rear to attack. Also, Philip did not rely on cavalry forces as Alexander had done. The

national army that served Alexander, motivated by patriotism, had been replaced with a mercenary force,

serving for the hope of land. Essentially, the Macedonian forces had devolved to the state they occupied

before Alexander and his father started reforming them—peasant farmers called at need to meet national

crises. These non-professional troops were less able to perform the demanding skills needed to fight on

horseback and deprived Philip of high-quality cavalry. At the same time, the lower-skilled, part-time

soldiers would have little chance to hone their swordsmanship, making them even poorer matches for the

Roman legionnaire.11

Movement to Contact

Once beginning offensive operations, Flamininus moved quickly to invade Macedonian territory,

seizing Thebes and moving into Thessaly. Intelligence of the Roman thrust reached Philip and,

mobilizing his forces, he moved to intercept and engage the Romans before they could enter Macedonia.

The two armies approached the town of Pherae and encamped on opposite sides of the town, eight to ten

miles apart. While both sides were intent on engaging the opposing force, neither side could effectively

locate the other. Both sides patrolled aggressively and several infantry and cavalry skirmishes occurred,

but neither commander took decisive action as a result. As the area around Pherae was hilly and wooded,

interspersed with farms, both sides broke contact and moved south towards Scotusa, another town having

10
Victor Davis Hanson, Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience. (Oxon: Routledge, 1991), 23. Michael M
Sage, Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. (New York: Routledge, 1996), 169.
11
Gabriel, 326-9.
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David G. Terrell

sufficient food stores to provision a large force; with each side hoping to arrive first, depriving the other

of the supplies. Both commanders failed to keep contact with their opponent and over the next several

days, both forces moved along parallel tracks, in ignorance of the other’s position and disposition.12

Livy and Polybius record that the weather of third day of movement dawned in heavy rain and

fog. Philip’s forces broke camp and began slowly moving towards Scotusa. After a short time, with the

Macedonian column becoming disorganized in the reduced visibility, Philip called a halt. He sent out a

scouting force to look for the Romans while deploying a large portion of his force to forage the

surrounding country for food and water.13

Unknown to each other, Philip and Flamininus were positioned with their forces in adjacent

valleys, following parallel lines of movement. The two forces were positioned on opposite sides of a

single ridgeline. 14

Flamininus was still encamped. He kept his forces within their fortified camp, due to the bad

weather and a concern about being ambushed, knowing that Philip’s army was near and that he lacked

intelligence about Philip’s location. To close that intelligence gap, he formed and dispatched a strong

reconnaissance force (ten troops of horse and 1,000 infantry) to search for the Macedonians.15

Moving up opposite sides of the ridge separating the two forces, the Macedonian and Roman

reconnaissance forces met in the fog and briefly skirmished. Reports of the action (probably exaggerated

by the fog) reached the two commanders, placing them in a difficult situation. Neither commander knew

12
Livy, 33.6. Gabriel, 333-5. Polybius, Friedrich Otto Hultsch, and Evelyn Shirley Shuckburgh. The Histories of
Polybius, Volume 2(. Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=RnJiAAAAMAAJ). Translated by Evelyn
Shirley Shuckburgh. New York: Macmillan & Co, 1889), 218-220.
13
Livy, 33.7.
Polybius 219-221.
14
Livy, 33.7-33.8,
Polybius 219.
15
Polybius, 220.
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David G. Terrell

the exact location or strength of the opposing force. Neither commander was willing to risk rout by being

attacked from the rear during a tactical withdrawal.16

Both commanders chose to accept the reconnaissance reports and assume that their forces were

about to be taken in the flank, over the crest of the ridge. Philip immediately formed the forces he had

available into a ready force. Philip issued orders for the foragers’ immediate recall, ordering them to form

for battle as soon as possible.17

First Phase

Philip ordered Athenagoras, the commander of his mercenaries, to take his national and native

cavalry to move quickly to the crest and hold it until he could bring up the infantry. Athenagoras did so,

driving back the Roman reconnaissance force—but mistaking the scouting force for the Roman main

body, he sent word back to Philip urging him to commit the main Macedonian force. Philip did so.18

Philip took personal command of the ready force and began leading them up the ridge in good

order, intending to seize the high ground before the Romans. He ordered the rest to follow as soon and

they could be gathered and assembled; and instructed their commander Nicanor to bring the force up on

his left as they did.19

Philip reached the crest of the hill and the site of the skirmish between the reconnaissance forces.

The fog had lifted enough for him to now observe the Roman force below. Flamininus had called his

16
Polybius, 220,
Gabriel, 333-5,
Livy, 33.7-33.8.
17
Gabriel 333-5.
Livy 33.8.
Polybius 220-221.
18
Livy, 33.7.
19
Polybius, 221-222.
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David G. Terrell

legions to arms after receiving word of the reconnaissance force making contact. The Romans were

formed in the valley and were moving up the slope towards the high ground.20

Livy tells us that Philip’s forces consisted of 16,000 phalangites (armed only with the extra-long

sarissa), 2,000 peltasts, 2,000 hoplite infantry, 1,500 Thracians (armed with throwing javelins) and less

than 2,000 horse. Flamininus had about 3,000 horse, including Greek allies, and approximately the same

number of infantry; though they were pilum- and gladius-equipped manipular infantry. Philip had about

two-thirds of his force on the ridge.21

Philip had the high ground but his left flanking force was still coming up the hill behind him, in

marching column. He was in danger of losing the initiative if Flamininus’ entire force reached the ridge.

His force could engage the Roman left, but the Roman right would be free for turn his shortened flank.

Philip chose to force the situation. He ordered the attack. The terrain was made for the phalanx; a level,

downhill slope. If Philip could break the Roman left quickly enough, and if Nicanor could have the left

flank formed before the Roman right reached the crest, he could defeat the Romans in detail. He ordered

his phalanxes to form at double depth and charged them into the Roman left.22

Flamininus, after recovering his reconnaissance troops, ordered his entire force to advance against

the charge, allowing the Macedonians to engage his left. The legions parted, somewhat as Alexander’s

tactics against elephants and scythed chariots, and engaged them from the flanks. Livy notes that some

Macedonian leader gave an order to drop the sarissas and fight with swords but, there is argument as to if

they were carrying swords. Even if they were, it is doubtful they would have been as skilled at sword

work as the Legions. 23

20
Livy 33.8.
Polybius, 222.
21
Livy, 33.4.
22
Livy, 33.8. Polybius 223-224.
23
Livy, 33.8-33.9. Polybius 222-224.
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David G. Terrell

Second Phase

As the legions and phalanxes were engaging on the Roman left, Nicanor was reaching the crest

with the remainder of Philip’s forces. For expedience, he had kept the force in column, rather than deploy

into battle order as he approached the ridge. He began to shift from column into line as the Roman force

advanced upon him, with elephants to their front. Nicanor ran out of time, and with his units shill

assuming their positions, he ordered an attack. The terrain before Nicanor was uneven, not as suited to

infantry as that in front of Philip. His infantry had to spread and fragment before making contact and the

Roman elephants began scattering the phalangites. After a volley of pila, the Roman infantry engaged the

Macedonians, soon breaking their morale. The Macedonian left turned and fled.24

On the opposite side of the battle, the Macedonian right had essentially pushed into the Romans

and Philip was fully engaged. A Roman tribune fighting on the right, seeing the enemy forces ahead of

him turning to flee, noticed the unprotected flank of Philip’s force. Exercising his own initiative, he

ordered twenty maniples of principies and triarii to halt, turn back and to the left, and engage the

unprotected flank of Philip’s force. The phalangites, unable to turn because of the overly long spears,

were extremely vulnerable to this attack and Philip’s force was essentially destroyed.25

Philip lost over half of his army, while Flaminius lost only several hundred. Philip escaped the

field but never threatened Rome again.26

Aftermath

After the loss, Philip accepted terms similar to those imposed on Carthage. Macedonia became a

subordinate ally of Rome. Philip could not conduct military operations outside Macedon without Roman

permission; had to pay reparations of 1,000 talents, half immediately and the rest over the next ten years;

24
Livy 33.8-33.9. Polybius 223-224.
25
Livy 33.8-33.9. Polybius 224-225.
26
Livy 33.10. Polybius, 225.
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David G. Terrell

acknowledge the independence of cities in Greece and Asia Minor, some of whom were under Seleucid

control; reduce Macedonian naval strength significantly; and return all prisoners without ransom.27

Sources

Polybius’ Histories, Book 28 and Livy’s Book 33 detail the Second Macedonian War.28

Livy’s account of the battle could be a translation of Polybius – with, perhaps, some

mistranslation. For example, Polybius tells us only that the Macedonian phalanx used the two handed

sarissa alone, a practice in line with other accounts of phalanx tactics and equipage, while Livy indicates

they dropped their pikes and used swords.29

Consequences

The second Macedonian war exemplifies the Roman reaction to those who violate the terms of

negotiated treaties. Philip’s intransigence and seeming collusion stimulated a Roman desire to reduce

Philip’s influence by making Greece a Roman protectorate.30

Philip, realizing that time and strength of numbers were against him moved a 25,000-man force

north, intending to force a pitched battle with the Romans. While moving towards open ground, his scouts

discovered the Roman army, in slightly higher strength, on the opposite side of a ridgeline (called

Cynoscephalae or ―Dogs’ heads‖, after its appearance), moving parallel to his own direction. Philip seized

the initiative by quickly moving his forces to the top of the ridge into a position overlooking the Roman

column. As soon as the first of his two divisions of phalanx heavy infantry was formed on the ridge,

Philip ordered it down the slope into an attack on the Romans. This attack routed the Roman left.
27
Adrian Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage. (London: Orion Books Ltd, 2006), 320. Cary, 155-6. Mackay,80-81.
Livy, 33.11-33.12.
28
http://books.google.com/books?id=RnJiAAAAMAAJ
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/Livy33.html
29
Goldsworthy, 22. Polybius, 244. Livy, 33.8.
30
Cary, 153. Marcel Le Glay, Jean-Louis Vosin, and Yann Le Bohec. A History of Rome. Translated by Antonia
Nevill. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2009, 94.
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David G. Terrell

However, the second Macedonian division, not having reached the ridgeline, was set upon by the Roman

right, before the phalanx had time to form and was equally disrupted. The victory was achieved when an

unnamed Roman Tribune, on the right, independently detached a small force and turned it upon the flank

of the attacking Macedonian right. The less-maneuverable pikemen were not able to face about to meet

this threat to their flank and died at the Roman’s swords.31

David Terrell
Herndon, VA

Cary, M, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd Edition. New
York: Palgrave, 1975.

Gabriel, Richard A, and Donald W Boose. The Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide
to Great Battles that Shaped the Development of War. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Fall of Carthage. London: Orion Books Ltd, 2006.

Hanson, Victor Davis. Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience. Oxon: Routledge, 1991.

Le Glay, Marcel, Jean-Louis Vosin, and Yann Le Bohec. A History of Rome. Translated by Antonia
Nevill. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

Livy. Titus Livius: The History of Rome. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/index.html (accessed

October 12, 2009).

Mackay, Christopher S. Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004.

Polybius, Friedrich Otto Hultsch, and Evelyn Shirley Shuckburgh. The Histories of Polybius, Volume 2.
Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=RnJiAAAAMAAJ). Translated by Evelyn Shirley
Shuckburgh. New York: Macmillan & Co, 1889.

Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. New York: Routledge, 1996.

© David G. Terrell, 2009-2010, except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For permission to reprint under terms outside the license, contact
davidterrell80@hotmail.com.

31
Cary, 155.
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David G. Terrell