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49) G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR Alias "KAWIT", Appellant
49) G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR Alias "KAWIT", Appellant
49) G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR Alias "KAWIT", Appellant
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evidence presented and that that the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
Likewise, that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application
of an ex-post facto law.
ISSUE:
WON appellant is guilty of the crime charged
HELD: YES
A)Probative value of the DNA evidence;
In admitting that integration of DNA Testing in the Philippine justice system is a
relatively new process, the Court based its ruling in a known U.S Doctrine
pronounced in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow. In this foreign case it was ruled
that "pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction
of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure."
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to
the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through Polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) testing and utilizing Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based
on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
B) Blood sample taken from the appellant as well as the DNA tests conducted were
not in violation of appellant's right to remain silent as well as the latter's right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
The Court in this respect reiterated that "The kernel of these rights are not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence." "Hence, a person
may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved."
"It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood
sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of
counsel."
C) Conducted DNA Test, not an application of a ex post facto law
"This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented."
The Court ruled that in rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is
more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where
only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the
victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant.
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejos house, where accused-appellant was residing,
at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring. 2. At around 2:00
oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the latters
house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisys school project. After
getting the book, they proceeded to accused-appellants residence. 3. From accusedappellants house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she
watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something
to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the compuerta. 4. At about 4:30
oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accusedappellant coming out of the compuerta, with his clothes, basketball shorts, and tshirt wet, although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he
looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even
greet them as was his custom to do so. 5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant
used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the
seashore. 6. A little before 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also
saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also
noticed that accused-appellants clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair. 7. By
5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was
told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosarios house. The
information proved to be false. 8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at
the part of the river near the compuerta. 9. During the initial investigation, accusedappellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an
aroma tree. 10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were
bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on Daisys clothes
were found positive of human blood type A. 11. Accused-appellant has blood type O.
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well as that of
accused-appellant.
Court concluded that motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or
personal delivery. Therefore, "even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed
submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode
used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery."
Furthermore the Court reemphasized that a facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party
and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
In further strengthening its conclusion the Court reiterated its prior pronouncement,
satating that "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined
under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.