ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

I. INTRODUCTION/GENERAL CONSIDERATION

1. MALAGA vs. PENACHOS, 213 SCRA 516

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of
pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be
received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best
Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock
in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their
documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the
officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their noninclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December
12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the
bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project
pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure
project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and
closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF
was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of
PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter,
and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives.

This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).


It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it
was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a
priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second,
the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the
state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or
its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the
state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in
the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified
the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case
of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power
to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.

There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the
bidding and the award of the project.

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.

Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the
Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work

Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and
proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the
estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms
were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for
December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12,
1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

2. DELA LLANA vs ALBA, 112 SCRA 296

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a
judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the
judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law
would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way:Moreover, this Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it
was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to
be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it
would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but
only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any
intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought
to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that
in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of
removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute,
the former is to be preferred.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRARTIVE AGENCIES

1. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board (151 SCRA 516)
June 18, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Valentin Tio (doing business under the name OMI Enterprises) filed the
petition on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators affected.
It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. One of the rationale behind the enactment of the Decree is the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes
or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at
least 40% and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific,
amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450
Million annually in government revenues.
The Decree provided that the province shall collect a tax of 30% of the purchase
price or rental rate for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. It also provided authority to the
Regulatory Board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such
agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board.
Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Decree claiming that there is undue
delegation of power and authority given to the Board, and the tax imposed is harsh,
confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue delegation of power and authority?
RULING:
It cannot be successfully argued that the Decree contains an undue delegation of
legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the Decree of authority to the Board to "solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed
and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely
a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited
period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of
the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption
would not stigmatize the Decree as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the Decree to protect the movie industry,
the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. US v. Ang Tang Ho (43 Phil 1)

February 27, 1922
FACTS:
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions
of which provided that he Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue
and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purpose of the Act.
The Governor-General issued a proclamation, Executive Order No. 53, fixing the
price at which rice should be sold. Then a complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price to Pedro Trinidad, violating EO 53.
Respondent was tried and found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Act delegated legislative power to the Governor-General?
RULING:
The Act vested legislative power to the Governor-General.
The Legislature itself has not in any manner specified any basis for the Executive
Order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say
what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out
the purposes of the Act.
All Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or
any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act
no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules
and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at
any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there
would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime.
That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price.
Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the GovernorGeneral issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to
sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a
proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to
sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice
or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should
be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define
what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,"
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued.
In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a
crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the

defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it
undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is
unconstitutional and void.

3. Ynot v. IAC (148 SCRA 659)

March 20, 1987
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which provided that
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation
of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. Petitioner sued for recovery
before the RTC but the court sustained the confiscation. Petitioner appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which upheld the trial court decision.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there is a valid exercise of police power?
(2) Whether or not the manner of disposition of the confiscated property valid?
RULING:
(1)The police power was not validly exercised.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing
law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It
was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order
to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the
force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of the executive
order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been
made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
The measure was issued for the reason that present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs. We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of
the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional
beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps
to protect and preserve them.
The measure has the lawful subject (the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare), we cannot say that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal.
(2) The manner of the disposition of the property is invalid.
We also mark the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized

property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in
the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

4. Marcos v. Manglapus (177 SCRA 668)

September 15, 1989
FACTS:
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the nonviolent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was
declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.
The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover
of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos
loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii
with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer awakened the nation
to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind
loyalty of their followers in the country.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and
among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the
secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines?
RULING:
The President has the power to prevent the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does
but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power
under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of
and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with
the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President
became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The
1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers in here in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is
only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

5. Cario v. Commission on Human Rights (204 SCRA 483)

December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what
they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.
Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served
with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended and temporarily
replaced.
The respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The Commission scheduled a
"dialogue", and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance.
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was not certain whether Sec.
Cario received the subpoena which was served at his office, the Commission, with the
Chairman presiding, and Commissioners, proceeded to hear the case.
Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted
alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR
has no jurisdiction over the case. The CHR denied the motion to dismiss and required him to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall
proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter
affidavit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has adjudicatory powers over
cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights?
RULING:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of
said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is

necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any
department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of
its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.

6. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals (213 SCRA 292)

March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City,
filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop
the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the
Marilao River. The LLDA found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an
open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) and clearance from the LLDA as required.
After a public hearing conducted, the LLDA, acting on the complaint, found that the
water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the
quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than
coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. The LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan
Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held among
the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by LLDA, it issued another order reiterating the first cease and
desist order, and issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of
Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
The LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias
Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of
injunction.
The LLDA contends that as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory
and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, it
is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LLDA has the power to issue a cease and desist order?
RULING:
The LLDA has the power to issue a cease and desist order.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for
another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting
and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such
a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously
has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and
projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our
Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before
the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the
basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in
Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under
RA No. 4850, as amended.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government
of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other
relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the
LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make,
alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par. (d) explicitly
authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting
such authority need not necessarily be express.While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect
to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a
"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a
"toothless" paper agency.

7. Rizal Empire Insurance Corp. v. NLRC (150 SCRA 565)

May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee. On 1978, he was made a regular employee, having
been appointed as clerk-typist. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and
Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was
transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased. In 1980, he was
transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased plus cost of living
allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a salary increase plus allowances and other
benefits.
Respondent Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness
and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision, Labor Arbiter Ruiz reinstated him to his position
with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) but, in a Resolution the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had
been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is still within the jurisdiction of the Court to review?
RULING:
Record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22,
1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations
Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated
November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and
policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Under the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission
on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of
the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct

Quasi Legislative Power

1. MAURICIO CRUZ vs STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of

Animal Industry
Facts
Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle
imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act
No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases in the country.
Respondent Youngberg asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act
No. 3052 (Administrative Code) would automatically become effective and would prohibit the
respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioners failure to file another
complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by
the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia
for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective.
Issues
WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
WON the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers
Held
No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do
so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by
the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of
cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the
promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the
country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands
has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable
necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.
No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at
bar.
The power given to Stanton Younberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in Act DOES NOT constitute an unlawful delegation of
the legislative powers, but confers an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.

2. Araneta vs. Gatmaitan

Facts
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces
of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation
of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing
in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban
the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO
22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of
trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing
said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
Issues
1. WON the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80
2. WON the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of
legislative powers unduly delegated to the President
Held
Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from
all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can
exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80
restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law.
Yes. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl
nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as
he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President,
in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did
nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and
dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

3. People vs. Maceren

Facts
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint
that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of
Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current
which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice
of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal.
Hence this petition.
Issue
WON the regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law
and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act
No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are void of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

4. Bautista vs Juinio
Facts
The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis,
banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on weekends
and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners spouses Bautista also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein
respondents Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications
and Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission imposing penalties of
fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles
found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue
delegation of legislative power.Respondents denied the above allegations.
Issue
WON LOI 869 as implemented by MC No. 39 is violative of constitutional rights
Held
No. The disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. The governments
classification of vehicle and prohibition of use of certain types of vehicles on certain days CANNOT
be characterized as an affront to reason as to be violative of the equal protection clause. Thus due
process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may
invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
Power to ban the use of vehicles on certain days through the implementation of LOI 899 is validly
lodged in the President immediate solution which, for the President expressing a power validly
lodged in him, recommended itself. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the
impounding of a vehicle.

5. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)

Facts
The petitioner Ernesto Maceda pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its
Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The
Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex,
Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of
petroleum products. Maceda et. al submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.
Issue
WON the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion
Held
No. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex
parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it
permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has
jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing.
Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase
provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

6. Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc. vs. Secretary of Education

Culture and Sports
Facts
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a
report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The
report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the
Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the
report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by
the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high.
Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%.
Petitioner still opposed the increases.
Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department
Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued
without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was
issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not
given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the
power to increase school fees. Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that
students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing
before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order
constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.
Issue:
WON DECS has the power to prescribe school fees
Held:
Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe
school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees
and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function.

Legislative
When the rules and the rates laid down by the administrative agency are meant
to apply to ALL enterprises of a given kind throughout the country
Prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a essential to the validity
of its issuance

Adjudicative / Quasi- judicial function

When the rules and the rates imposed apply EXCLUSIVELY to a particular party
Prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates

Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS is in the exercise of its legislative function
The DO prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by ALL private schools in
the country for the SY 1987-1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of its issuance.

7. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corp.

G.R. No. 167274-75 July 21, 2008
Ponente: Tinga, J
Facts:
The respondent Fortune Tobacco is the manufacturer/producer of cigarettes.
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the cigarette brands were subject to ad valorem tax
pursuant to then Section 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended. However, on January
1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect whereby a shift from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to
the specific tax system was made and subjecting the aforesaid cigarette brands to specific
tax under [S]ection 142 thereof, now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997.

Section 145. Cigars and Cigarettes(C) Cigarettes packed by machine. There shall be levied, assessed and collected
on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below:
(1) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is
above Ten pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Twelve (P12.00) per
pack;
(2) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value added
tax) exceeds Six pesos and Fifty centavos (P6.50) but does not exceed Ten
pesos (P10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Eight Pesos (P8.00) per pack.
(3) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax)
is Five pesos (P5.00) but does not exceed Six Pesos and fifty centavos
(P6.50) per pack, the tax shall be Five pesos (P5.00) per pack;
(4) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-added tax) is
below Five pesos (P5.00) per pack, the tax shall be One peso (P1.00) per
pack;
The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and (4)
hereof, shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.
To implement the provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of excise tax on, among
others, cigars and cigarettes packed by machines by January 1, 2000, the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
issued Revenue Regulations No. 17-99, dated December 16, 1999, which provides the
increase on the applicable tax rates on cigar and cigarettes as follows:

SECTION ARTICLES

NEW
SPECIFIC
PRESENT SPECIFIC
TAX
RATE
TAX RATE PRIOR
EFFECTIVE JAN. 1,
TO JAN. 1, 2000
2000

145

P1.00/cigar

(A)
(B)Cigarettes
machine

packed

P1.12/cigar

by

(1)
Net
retail
price P12.00/pack
(excluding VAT and excise)
exceeds P10.00 per pack

P13.44/ pack

(2) Exceeds P10.00

pack

per P8.00/pack

P8.96/pack

(3)
Net
retail
price P5.00/pack
(excluding VAT and excise)

P5.60/pack

is P5.00 to P6.50 per pack

(4)
Net
Retail
Price P1.00/pack
(excluding VAT and excise)
is below P5.00 per pack

P1.12/pack

Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 likewise provides in the last paragraph of Section 1 thereof,
"(t)hat the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed by
machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower than the
excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000."
For the period covering January 1-31, 2000, petitioner allegedly paid specific taxes on all
brands manufactured and removed in the total amounts of P585,705,250.00.
On February 7, 2000, petitioner filed with respondents Appellate Division a claim for refund
or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000 in the
amount of P35,651,410.00
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of Fortune and ordered the tax refund.
Filed on behalf of the Commissioner, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks to
convince the Court that the literal interpretation given by the CTA and the Court of Appeals
of Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997 (Tax Code) would lead to a lower tax imposable on
1 January 2000 than that imposable during the transition period. Instead of an increase of
12% in the tax rate effective on 1 January 2000 as allegedly mandated by the Tax Code, the
appellate courts ruling would result in a significant decrease in the tax rate by as much as
66%.
Fortune Tobacco argues that the CTA and the Court of Appeals merely followed the letter of
the law when they ruled that the basis for the 12% increase in the tax rate should be the net
retail price of the cigarettes in the market as outlined in paragraph C, sub paragraphs (1)(4), Section 145 of the Tax Code. The Commissioner allegedly has gone beyond his
delegated rule-making power when he promulgated, enforced and implemented Revenue
Regulation No. 17-99, which effectively created a separate classification for cigarettes
based on the excise tax "actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000."
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulation[s] [No.] 1799 is in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act [No.] 8240, now
incorporated in Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997; and (2) Whether or not petitioner is
entitled to a refund of P35,651,410.00 as alleged overpaid excise tax for the month of
January 2000.

Ruling:
The S.C. ruled in favor of the respondent Fortune Tobacco Corp. and held that they
are entitled to the tax refund. Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 went further and added that
"[T]he new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed by machine,
distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower than the excise tax that is
actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000." Section 145 states that during the transition
period, i.e., within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of the Tax Code, the excise
tax from any brand of cigarettes shall not be lower than the tax due from each brand on 1
October 1996. This qualification, however, is conspicuously absent as regards the 12%
increase which is to be applied on cigars and cigarettes packed by machine, among others,
effective on 1 January 2000. Clearly and unmistakably, Section 145 mandates a new rate of
excise tax for cigarettes packed by machine due to the 12% increase effective on 1 January

2000 without regard to whether the revenue collection starting from this period may
turn out to be lower than that collected prior to this date.
By adding the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes effective
shall not be lower than the tax actually paid prior to 1 January 2000, Revenue Regulation
No. 17-99 effectively imposes a tax which is the higher amount between the ad valorem tax
being paid at the end of the three (3)-year transition period and the specific tax under
paragraph C, sub-paragraph (1)-(4), as increased by 12%a situation not supported by
the plain wording of Section 145 of the Tax Code.
Rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of
the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor
of the basic law.
The contention that the increase of 12% starting on 1 January 2000 does not apply
to the brands of cigarettes listed under Annex "D" is likewise unmeritorious, absurd even.
Paragraph 8, Section 145 of the Tax Code simply states that, "[T]he classification of each
brand of cigarettes based on its average net retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in
Annex D, shall remain in force until revised by Congress." This declaration certainly does
not lend itself to the interpretation given to it by the OSG.
The foregoing leads us to conclude that Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 is indeed
indefensibly flawed. The petition is denied.

8. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J
Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila. On October 10, 1977, respondent
Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
The Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as a
taxi. 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn
from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. There
shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi. Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region
having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration.
The petitioners contended that they were not caged upon to submit their position
papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the
questioned BOT Circular.
Issues:
Whether or not the Memorandum Circular issued by the respondent BOT is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The S.C. ruled in favor of the respondent BOT and held that the Memo was a
valid exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board
of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators
or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which
is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the
issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process.
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally
required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. It
is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience
shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return
on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public especially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been
met.

9. U.S. v. Panlilio
G.R. No. 9876
December 8, 1914
Ponente: Moreland, J
Facts:
All of the carabaos belonging to the above-named accused (Panlilio) having been
exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in
accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly
quarantined in a corral. The information stated that: Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and
without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still
in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were
then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of
the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove
them from one place to another for the purpose of working them.
Panlilio argued that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not
constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
Issues:
Whether or not Panlilio may be criminally charged for violating an Order of the
Director of Agriculture.
Ruling:
No. The S.C. ruled in favor of Panlilio and held that although Act No. 1760 which
authorized the Director of Agriculture to require that animals which are suffering from
dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine
at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread
of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau
of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a
violation of such orders.
A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c),
is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while
they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.

10. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor

G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006
Ponente: Tinga, J
Facts:
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the National Government Center (NGC). The respondents
were ex-officio members of the NGC. In 2003, Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as
the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003 was
enacted and the NGC was tasked to promulgates its IRR. Parcels of land along
Commonwealth Ave. were set aside to be disposed by the NGC to bona fide residents.
Section 3.2.c of the IRR stated that: Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on
the deadline set in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months
after approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
The petitioners contended that the penalty in the IRR for beneficiaries who fail to
execute a contract to sell in invalid and should be nullified because there is no such penalty
imposed by R.A. 9207.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 3.2.c of the IRR is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The S.C. ruled in favor of the respondents and held that where a rule or
regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is
in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas
covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban poor housing
is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may
be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill
in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the
terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement
the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their
determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special
knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary
who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the
Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The
Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of
said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable
about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This
condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.

11. Ople v. Torres

G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998
Ponente: Puno, J
Facts:
In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 for the ADOPTION OF A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM (NCIRS). The
petitioner Sen. Blas Ople contended that the NCIRS requires a legislative act and the
issuance of the A.O. was an usurpation of the legislative powers of Congress. The
respondents argued that the A.O. implemented the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Issues:
Whether or not A.O. 308 is valid.
Ruling:
No. The S.C. ruled in favor of Ople and held that A.O. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The S.C. rejected the argument that the A.O. implemented the legislative policy of
the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and
"embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws."
A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4
which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number
to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology". A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what
particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy
and guaranty the integrity of the information.

12. Public Schools District Supervisors Association (PSDSA) v. De Jesus

G.R. No. 157286
June 16, 2006
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act
2001," became a law on August 11, 2001. The respondent De Jesus, Secretary of the
Department of Education, issued the IRR which stated that school district supervisors would
primarily handle instructional and curricula supervision only and would NOT exercise
administrative supervision over school principals. PSDSA contended that the IRR expanded
the law and included provisions which were diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of
the subject law. The respondents argued that a perusal of Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155
shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities, and that the power to exercise
administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by any of those responsibilities.
Issues:
Whether or not the IRR issued by the DECS is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The S.C. ruled in favor of the respondents and held that a plain reading of the
law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over
the school heads. As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the
district supervisors were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and
public high schools.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
The supervisors wanted an increase in their duties so that their salary grade would
be increased from SG 19 to 21.

13. Cawad v. Abad

G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015
Ponente: Peralta, J
Facts:
The petitioners are members of the Philippine Public Health Association, Inc. The
respondent is the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management. Republic Act
(RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed
into law. Public health workers (PHWs) were granted allowances and benefits. Under the
Magna Carta, Sec. 21 PHWs were granted a Hazard Allowance of at least 25% of their
monthly basic salary and Sec. 23. granted Longevity Pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly
basic pay for every 5 years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered.
In 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances,
DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step
Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service.
Specifically, it provided that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay
under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.
The petitioners contended that that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
when they issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 and DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 which prescribe certain requirements on the grant of benefits
that are not otherwise required by RA No. 7305. Petitioners likewise criticize the DBM-CSC
Joint Circular insofar as it withheld the Step Increment due to length of service from those
who are already being granted Longevity Pay. As a result, petitioners claim that the subject
circulars are void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by administrative bodies.
The respondents refute petitioners allegations in stating that the assailed circulars were
issued within the scope of their authority, and are therefore valid and binding.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is valid.
2. Whether or not the DBM-CSC Joint Circular is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. The S.C. ruled that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is invalid insofar as it lowers
the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305
and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR. R.A. 7305 mandated an increase of at least
25% the IRR only prescribed an increase of 8-14% (depending on number of days of
actual exposure to hazards).
2. It is UNENFORCEABLE. The S.C. held that DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it
provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under
an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of
Service. A review of RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR reveals that the law does not
similarly impose such condition on the grant of longevity pay to PHWs in the
government service. As such, the DBM-CSC Joint Circular effectively created a new
imposition which was not otherwise stipulated in the law it sought to interpret. the
DBM-CSC Joint Circular remains unenforceable for the failure of respondents to
file the same with the UP Law Center ONAR.