GR No.

217126-27
Morales vs CA & Binay, Jr
FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against
respondent Binay, Jr and other public offices who was accused of Plunder
and violated the RA 3019 otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices, in connection with the 5 phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati Parking Building.
Upon the recommendation of the Special Panel of Investigators, the
Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et.
al under preventive suspension.
Consequently, Binay, Jr. filed a petition before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.s petition applying the condonation doctrine that
means that Binay, Jr.s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO
and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine
RULING:
The Supreme Court abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the
CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so
based on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective
in nature.

In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was

a jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which
was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no
legal precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American
authorities.The SC stated what appears the sole basis forthe condonation
doctrine in Pascual, to wit: The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline
toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the
condonation doctrine, except that it seems to incline towards American
authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found
that there was really no established weight ofauthorities in the United
States (US). In fact, 17 States in the US have already abandoned the
condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on
to adopt the findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the
caveat that said cases are merely guides of interpretation.

The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the

notable cases that applied Pascual, which included cases issued under the
1987 Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if there
exists legislation to support Pascual such as 1987 Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code, Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea
that an elective local officials administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,and there is simply no
constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that
an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all.

By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this

defense oft-times used by elected officials to escape administrative liability.

GR NO. 78742

Asso. Of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform

FACTS:
Petitioners invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners
of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not
exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.
PD 316 which was promulgated in implementation of PD 27, provides
that no tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as
the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have
been determined. Thus, they petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus
to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the implementing rules and
regulations, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention.
Respondent argues that PD No 27 has ben amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention. Moreover, the issuance of implementing
rules by a separate department of the government involves the exercise
of discretion which cannot be controlled by through writ of mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not writ of mandamus cannot be issue to compel the
performance of discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the
government
RULING: That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie
to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action

GR No 93666

Gen. Milling Corp & Earl Cone vs Hon. Toress et, al.
FACTS:
Petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, possessed an alien
employment permit was the coach of the petitioner General Milling
Corporations basketball team.
Subsequently, the admission status from temporary visitor to pre-arranged
employee of petitioner Cone was approved.
Thereafter, the renewal of the alien employment permit of petitioner Cone
and his employment as full-pledged coach was granted by DOLE.
Respondent Basketball Coaches Asso. of the Phil. (BCAP) ordered the
cancellation of petitioners alien permit on the ground that there was no
showing that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do the
coaching job and hiring the petitioner Cone would redound to the national
interest. Thus, the Secretary of Labor cancelled petitioner Cones alien
employment permit.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when
he revoked petitioner Cone;
2. WON Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as
the Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if
the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
RULING:
1. NO. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment
of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of
Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom to employ is, of course,
limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit. the
Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine
the question of availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of
legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and authority and requiring proof
of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the
position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
2. NO. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules states that
Secretary of Labor may issue an employment permit to the applicant
based on his assesment as to whether or not the employment of the
applicant will redound to the national interest. On the other hand, Article
40 says: "the employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or
to the applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a

person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of
application to perform the services for which the alien is desired." The
permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the
authority granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the
issuing authority. Moreover, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a
statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed
must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted
by the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 8848

United States vs Hart et. al

FACTS:
Appelants, Hart, Miller and Natividad were found guilty of vagrancy under
the second paragraph of section 1 of Act No, 519 which punishes every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling housed,
or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of
support.
The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the
comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying
through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that
Hart and the other Defendants had visible means of support, it was
under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with.
The prosecution persisted that the phrase without visible means of
support was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act
No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.
ISSUE:
WON appelants should be charged of vagrancy under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the Vagrancy Act for frequenting saloons, dram shops,
or gambling houses
RULING:
NO. A person is not guilty of vacagrancy under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the Vagrancy Act for frequenting saloons, dram shops,
or gambling houses, unless it be shown that he is without visible means of
support.
The construction of a statute should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as
thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and
the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the
act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect
punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant
had, visible means of support and that the absence of such was necessary for
the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses,
defendants are acquitted.
No. L-4221 August 30, 1952
Montenegro vs Castaneda and Balo

Facts:

Maximo Montenegro was arrested by agents of Military Intelligence

Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for complicity with a
communistic organization in the commission of the acts of rebellion,
insurrection or sedition.
Maximos father submitted an application for a writ of habeas corpus
seeking the release of his own. Subsequently, Proclamation No. 210
was issued by the President, which suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

Issue:
1. W/N Proclamation No. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition, which
is not under the Constitution.
2. Is the prohibition of suspension in the bill of rights to be interpreted as
limiting Legislative powers only not executive measures under section
VII? Has article VII (sec. 10) pro tanto modified the bill of rights in the
same manner that a subsequent section of a statue modifies a previous
one?
RULING:
1. There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include sedition. Art. 7 only
provides invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger as grounds
for suspension. Sedition in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed as a
mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole.
2. The Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger,
while Art. 7, Section 10 expressly authorized the President to suspend
when there is imminent danger. In Hoag vs. Washington Oregon Corp. (it
was said:It is a familiar rule of construction that, where two provisions of a
written Constitution are repugnant to each other, that which is last in order
of time and in local position is to be preferred. So, even assuming the two
clauses discuss are repugnant, the latter must prevail.

GR NO. 94115
Aguinaldo vs Santos

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local
Government dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on the Ground
dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on the ground that the power of
the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local government official
under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
On January 17, 1988, the petitioner was elected as the Governor of the
province of Cagayan
A complaint was filed against petitioner for disloyalty to the republic and
culpable violation of the Constitution for the acts of the petitioner
committed during the coup.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary found petitioner guilty and ordered his
removal from office.
Consequently, petitioner ran again for the position of Governor of Cagayan
wherein he won by a landslide margin in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner can be removed from office on the acts done prior his
term
2. WON Secretary of Local Government has the power to suspend or
remove local government officials
RULING:
1. The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. (Lizares v.
Hechanova, et al., 17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v.
Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])
Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminalcases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is

anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the
legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17)
and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power
of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that
the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant found in
B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the
then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution,
Section 2.

GR No. 123169
Paras vs COMELEC
FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against petitioner Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners
opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be
instituted.
ISSUE:
WON the SK election is a local election under Section 74 of RA 7160
RULING:
NO. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general
intent. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of
office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of
the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An
interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute
should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation
of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . . ."
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
No. L-11959
Pascual vs Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San

Jose, Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and reelected in 1955. In October 6,
1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of that province filed with the
Provincial Board three administrative charges against the said appellant.
Charge III was for "Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation
of Judicial Functions.
Petitioner-appellant filed with the respondent-appellee, the Provincial
Board, a motion to dismiss the third charge above referred to, on the main
ground that the wrongful acts therein alleged had been committed during
his previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for
disciplining him during his second term.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner-appellant should be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his previous term
RULING:
No. Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where
the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not
extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for
the term for which the officer was elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other
terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must
be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.

Gr. No 79416
Bonifacio vs Dizon
FACTS:

The deceased Olimpio Bonifacio filed an ejectment case against private

respondent Pastora San Miguel from the formers two hectare agricultural
land and invoked that it was a personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of
R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR
Case No. 2160-B'68).
The Court granted Bonifacio the authority to eject defendant.
During the pendency of the appeal of the private respondent, Olimpio
Bonifacio died.
Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and
children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for the execution of
ejectment.
Respondent argued that the right of ejectment of an agricultural lessee is
personal to Olimpio Bonificaio, which necessarily died with him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent is
inherited by the compulsory heirs, thereby vesting to the latter, all the rights
conferred by the judgment to (sic) the decedent.
RULING:
YES. Under Section 36(1), ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. In so
providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and
personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the
members of his immediate family. Clearly then, the right of cultivation as a
ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landownerlessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise
conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate
family members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the
agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid
of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural
lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm
household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in "personal
cultivation."
Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee,
the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a

right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right
extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the
immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right
to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 not being a
purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was
transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are
entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68.

GR No. 113539
Halili vs CA, et.al
FACTS:

Private Respondent, Helen Meyers and David Rey Guzman are both
American citizens who are the heirs of Simeon de Guzman. Helen
executed a deed of quitclaim assigning, transferring and conveying to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land
which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Respondent David Rey Guzman the sold a parcel of lamd to Emiliano
Catalig.
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint
questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter
and Emiliano Cataniag and claiming ownership thereto based on their
right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners have the right to invoke right of redemption under Art. 1621 of
the Civil Code.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners have no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which
presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is
clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:
Art. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption
when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is
alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
Under this article, both lands that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption must be rural. If one
or both are urban, the right cannot be invoked.The purpose of this provision,
which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is to favor
agricultural development. The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not
agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right
of redemption under Art. 1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot
invoke it.

No. L-42050-66
People vs Purisima

FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Defendant with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one
essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of
the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of
P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of
public policy.
ISSUE:
1. WON Section 26 of Act No. 1780 and Manila Ordinance No. 3820 as
amended by Ordinance No. 3928 are repealed by PD 9(3)
2. W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities
RULING:
1. We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the
city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
2. The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative
measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others
in the preamble or whereas clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated
therein.
Moreover, the results or effects of a presidential decree must be within its
reason and intent. The acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no

relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. It follows

that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a
motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of
Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
"Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied." (U.S. v. American Tracking Association,
310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil.
725, 731)
"When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose." (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaia de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060)

GR No. 132231
Osmena and Garcia vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Emilio Osmena is a candidate for President of the Philippines,
while petitioner Pablo Garcia seeks for re-election as governor of Cebu. They
seek for the reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of RA No. 6646, the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to
the Commission on Elections. They contend that the ban on political advertising
is a grave disadvantage of the poor candidates by depriving them of a medium
which they can afford to pay while their more affluent rivals can always resort to
other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and
handbills.
ISSUE:
1. WON the term ad ban when used to describe 11(b) of RA No. 6646 is
misleading.
RULING:
The term political "ad ban," when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, is misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and
time in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a
regulation of the time and manner of advertising.
The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media
for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.

No. 2808

Barcelon vs Baker Jr. and John Thompson

FACTS:
This case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus which it alleged
that Barcelon is detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of
Batangas, in the Province of Batangas, and that the detention and
restraint of the said applicant is is wholly without legal authority and not
under or by virtue of any process issued by any court.
Respondents admit that they are detaining the body of the said Felix
Barcelon, but deny the right of the court to inquire into the reasons
therefor by virtue of the resolution issued by the Philippine Commission
and the executive order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas.
The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the Governor-General is hereby
authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said provinces
because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said
provinces were in open insurrection against the constituted authorities;
and the said bands, or parts of them, and some of their leaders, were still
in open resistance to the constituted authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the
facts upon which the legislative and executive branches of the Government acted
in providing for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
province of Cavite and Batangas?
RULING:
NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws
and regulations as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the
lives and property of the citizens of the State. It is the duty of the GovernorGeneral to take such steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of
enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the Government, or any officer
in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President or of the
Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with
such orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be
tied until the very object of the rebels or insurrectos or invaders has been
accomplished.
In this case, Congress had authority to provide that the President, or the
Governor-General, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion,

insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might require it. The conclusion
set forth in the said resolution and the said executive order, as to the fact that
there existed in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against
the constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of the
legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of
the facts.
That one branch of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands has
no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the
discretionary acts of another independent department of the Government.
The doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary
power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain
facts, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts has been recognized in this case. The authority to
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the
legislative and executive branches of the government and their decision is final
and conclusive upon the Judicial Department and upon all persons.

Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

No. L-61388

Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile
FACTS:
The fourteen detainees were under surveillance as identified to be
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in
subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora as
headquarters.
They were caught in flagrante delicto which results to their arrest.
Numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how
they would infiltrate the youth and student sector, a revolver with eight live
bullets, nineteen rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, P18,650.00 cash
believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for
distribution, were found and which were then seized.
Josefina Garcia-Padilla mother of the detained petitioner Sabino Padilla
filed a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus alleging that the petitioners
were unlawfully and illegally arrested since it was effected without any
warrant of arrest. The raiding team which made the arrest were only
armed with a search warrant.

ISSUE:
WON the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) observed the procedure
in the LOI that would validate the initial illegal arrest of detainees as well as their
continued detention.
RULING:
YES. LOI No. 1211, which provides the guidelines in the arrest and
detention of persons engaged in, or charged with, the crimes mentioned in
Proclamation No. 2045, charged with, the crimes mentioned contemplates of
three situations when an arrest can be made, to wit:
1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge;
2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head
of a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the person or persons to
be arrested would probably escape or commit further acts which would endanger
public order and safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall be immediately
referred to the city or provincial fiscal or to the municipal, city, circuit, or district
judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the evidence warrants,
shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, we a warrant of arrest;

3. The military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency

may apply to the President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a
Presidential Commitment Order under the following circumstances:
(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without
endangering public order and safety; or
(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under
arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and safety.
Petitioners appear to place entire reliance on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI No.
1211, ignoring paragraph 3 of LOI No. 1211. The reliance of petitioners on
paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the alleged necessity of judicial warrant
before a person may be arrested and detained is not well-founded. Neither is the
contention that paragraph 3 of LOI 1211 applies only when judicial process is not
possible. This is a narrow and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when viewed
in its entirety. Even in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible,
where, in the judgment of the President, a resort thereto would not be expedient
because it would endanger the public order or safety, a PCO is justified. So, too,
when release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger.

GR No. L-33964
Lansang and Alcala vs Garcia

FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party meeting in
1971 causing the death of 8 people, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by petitioner, who, having
been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the
authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their
detention.
Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the
existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid.

Additionally, petitioners contend that :

(a) that there is no rebellion;
(b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts;
(c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August
Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971;
(d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is
non-existent and unjustified; and
(e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak
to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen
requiring suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon
the courts and upon all other persons.
RULING:
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to
the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as

regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the
President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him,
namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure,
however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

272 US 52
Myers vs United States
FACTS:

The 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first, second,

and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers, a postmaster first
class, without seeking Senate approval.
ISSUE: Whether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive power of
removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate
RULING:
The majority explained that the power to remove executive officials rested with
the President, and Congress did not have authority to alter that authority. The
President does not need Senate approval to remove an appointed originally
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article II vest the President
with executive power, and did not merely give title to his office. The restrictions
on Presidential authority contained in the Constitution (including Senate approval
for appointments) are merely limitations on a broad, general grant of power and
are to be strictly construed. The power to remove an official is incident to the
power to appoint, inherent in the nature of executive authority and consistent with
the Presidents duty to see that the laws be faithfully executed. That same
rationale does not apply to the Senate authority to consent to appointments, as
their role is fulfilled upon confirmed the Presidents choice for an appointment.
Similarly, the authority of Congress to give the President power to appoint certain
officials does not suggest additional authority over appointees. The historical
record suggests that from the First Congress on, the power to remove was with
the President, until the Tenure of Office Act in 1867 (directed at President
Johnson). In looking at a particular construction of the Constitutions terms, the
Court will consider interpretations by the other branches, in particular those that
are long-standing. Presidents had long claimed the power to remove officials,
and Congress had long acquiesced until the Tenure of Office Act. Furthermore,
Presidential acceptance of legislation attempting to limit his authority can be
explained by the merits of the bill in other regards. Finally, the Court pointed out
that Marbury v. Madison was not authoritative on the question or Presidential
removal. The power to remove being necessary and traditional to the power to

appoint, the Court concluded that the President had the authority to remove
Meyers.
Dissent: Justice Holmes dissented, pointing out that Congress had near
complete control over the office in question here. Congress created the post,
designed the term in office, afforded the President authority to appoint, and the
authority to authorize funding. Justice Holmes concluded it would be odd if
Congress, having near complete control over the office, could not then prevent
the President from exercising removal power over that office. Justice
McReynolds dissented, and in a long opinion recounted the details of the
Constitutional Convention and contemporaneous writings. He emphasized the
grant of authority to the President, like that to the Supreme Court, was not
without limitation. He concluded that the absence of a removal power was
deliberate, and to conclude otherwise would expand the nature of the Presidency
far beyond its traditional reach. Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that Marbury
v. Madison decided the issue of Presidential authority over appointments,
concluding that the President is powerless to remove a civil officer appointed for
a definite term with the consent of the Senate. He concluded that at every
opportunity Congress had sought to limit removal of appointed officials, and the
absence of information from the Convention was not dispositive. Rather,
consistent with writings in the Federalist and the majority of historical analysis,
the power to consent to appointments inferred the power to consent to removals.
Accordingly, each dissenter would have ruled in favor of Meyers.
Conclusion: The Tenure of Office Act is unconstitutional as it seeks to limit the
power of the President to remove executive officials, the power to remove being
necessary to traditional executive authority and an incident to the power to
appoint. The President may remove executive officials without Congressional
approval, even where Senate approval was required for confirmation.