THE HART V FULLER DEBATE(1958)

The Hart-Fuller debate is an exchange between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart published in the Harvard Law
Review in 1958 on morality and law, which demonstrated the divide between the positivist and natural
law philosophy. Appearing in 1958 in the Harvard Law Review, Hart took the positivist view in arguing that
morality and law were separate. Fuller's reply argued for morality as the source of law's binding power.
Harts position
On the one hand Hart held that there is no necessary relationship between a legal system and the ideas of
justice or morality. A legal system can function effectively though it is neither just nor moral.
The Nazi regime would be a good example of this point. It discriminated against individuals on racial
grounds. In Harts view it was a legal system. The Nazis argued that racial distinctions were relevant and
reflected the morality of their society. It was, therefore entitled to discriminate and still claim it was treating
like cases alike.
Hart argues that the question of what is law must be separated from the question of whether it is moral or
just.

Where as Fuller (Natural Law theorist) maintains that law and morality cannot be so neatly distinguished and that
the post-war courts were entitled to hold Nazi rules not to be law. To call the Nazi system 'legal' and to call its
rules laws' was a false description of what they were. They were instruments of an arbitrary and tyrannical
regime.

Legal theorists can thus be divided into two schools of thought, those who adhere
to positivism and others who subscribe to the natural law theory. The positivists like
Hart and Austin, merely attempt to define what law is, not what it should be, or its
content. The natural law theorists, on the other hand, believe that rules or principles
can only legitimately be called law if they conform to an acceptable code of moral behaviour.

Limits of the command theory

As Hart points out, the command theory, while authoritative, makes the erroneous
assumption that all legal rules make commands or impose sanctions. There are many

laws, which, for example, merely confer rights and are not backed by sanctions.
Hart proceeds to link types of rules with the legal system. He identifies two main
sets of rules, primary rules and secondary rules. Primary rules are those which any
society needs in order to survive. They forbid the conduct most destructive to the
society, such as murder. Even simple societies contain these rules. Secondary rules are
those which confer power rather than impose duties. They are divided into three
types: rules of adjudication, rules of change and rules of recognition.
The first, rules of adjudication, are designed to allow the society to settle disputes
such as legal offences and their sentences. Rules of change are those which promote
other new rules. A developing society needs to respond to new situations and these
rules accommodate this imperative. Rules of recognition are those which demonstrate
the acceptance of the law by the society. They thus spell out which rules in the society
have legal force. For example, Hart says, the UK has a single rule of recognition: what
the Queen enacts is law. In like vein, we can say that our rule of recognition in the
Commonwealth Caribbean is the Constitution.
Dworkin rejects Harts theory on rules on the basis that law contains not just
rules, but a set of principles upon which these rules are based. These principles are the
guidelines which inform the law but do not propose a solution. One such principle is
that no one should benefit from their own wrong

The naturalists and the morality of law

We need also to consider carefully the question of the appropriate functions of law in
a society according to the naturalist school of thought. Should law, as the naturalists
would have us believe, seek to reflect morality? This question is particularly pertinent
The moralists believe that law should not only be moral in itself but should
contain rules which prohibit immoral behaviour. The law cannot divorce itself from
these moral values.
The belief that law should reflect morality has spurned some interesting cases. In
Shaw v DPP, for example, the House of Lords upheld a conviction of the offence of a
conspiracy to corrupt the publics morals when the defendant published a pornographic
book. The Court found that a fundamental purpose of the law was to conserve
not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State.66 Similarly,
in R v Gibson,67 a conviction was obtained for the common law offence of outraging
the public decency when the defendant artist exhibited earrings made from
freeze-dried foetuses.

These decisions have engendered much controversy and have been criticised by
those who believe that morality is a private concern and not the business of the law.
John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that the law should not impose its concept of
morality on individuals. Individuals should be free to choose their own conduct, as
long as they do not harm others.68

Natural law, morality and our pluralistic societies

Certainly, the morality theories present difficulty. In any society there will be conflicting
ideas of what is moral. This is particularly so in pluralistic societies such as ours.
Muslims, for example, allow men to have more than one wife, whereas Western
civilisation considers this immoral.69 We have seen already the conflict between the
UK and its territories over the issue of homosexuality, which those West Indian communities
found to be immoral.
In addition, a societys morals change over time. The much talked about issue of the
morality of the death penalty is one such example, although one cannot argue that
there is consensus on the issue.
Less controversial functions of law include public order, social control, social
cohesion, to promote change in the society, to define rights and duties and to balance
conflicting interests in the particular society.
Even if we can identify what law is and what it should be, this still leaves the question,
why do we obey law? Is it, as Austin thought, because of the sanctions behind
it, or is it, as Hart believed, because we accept it? Would we refrain from committing
murder if there were no sanctions? Perhaps law is obeyed because it is the most
convenient and fair way of organising any society? We may also obey law because we
believe that it is right or morally correct.
This last suggestion leads us to an interesting point. Is there an obligation to obey
rules emanating from the State which are immoral? There are several examples of
these: the Nazi laws of Germany; the apartheid laws of South Africa; and of course,
the slave laws which we discussed earlier. These were all legitimised by the relevant
Parliaments. But did those laws have moral authority? The people who obeyed such
laws may have believed that they were simply obeying the law

In Forsythe v DPP and the AG of Jamaica,73 for example, the appellant, a Rastafarian,
author and Professor at Harvard University, USA, unsuccessfully sought legal validation
for the utilisation of ganja as a sacrament of the Rastafarian faith. He argued
against the validity of legislation which outlawed ganja in this way:
That by defining all marijuana possession as criminal . . . must cause ordinary people
to loose [sic] respect for the law thereby. That a law is valuable not because it is the law
but because there is right in it and laws should be like clothes; the Laws should be

tailored to fit the people they are meant to serve.74

This was recognition not only that law should suit its society, but that it must be based
on the moral values of that society which, judging from the lack of success in this case,
is demonstrably subjective.
The intrinsic morality or immorality of law also leads us once again, to the discussion
of reparations for the slave trade. It is precisely the immoral nature of the laws.