International Relations of the Asia-Pacic Volume 14 (2014) 117146

doi:10.1093/irap/lct018 Advance Access published on 8 December 2013

Han Dorussen* and Emil J. Kirchner

Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe
Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ Essex, UK
*E-mail: hdorus@essex.ac.uk
Received 12 September 2013; Accepted 16 October 2013

Abstract
Under what conditions do regional security organizations (RSOs) take up
a broader agenda or scope in security governance? Further, does broader
scope matter for regional security? These questions are addressed using a
quantitative comparative analysis of 25 RSOs over the period 19902009.
Similarity among members in their capacities and political systems are
identied as two central conditions for increased scope. In contrast,
hegemony is not a signicant factor. Institutionalization also seems to
matter: RSOs that have been around longer and encompass more
members are more successful in expanding their security agenda. There is
only weak empirical support for the idea that RSOs with a broader scope

The paper was further presented at the workshop Conict and Peace Research at the annual
Politicologenetmaal of the Dutch Society of Political Science (NKWP), Amsterdam, 31
May1 June 2012, and at the 2012 Annual Convention of the International Studies
Association, San Diego, the United States, 14 April 2012.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacic Vol. 14 No. 1
The author [2013]. Published by Oxford University Press in association with the
Japan Association of International Relations; all rights reserved.
For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

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Better a good neighbor than a

distant friend: the scope and
impact of regional security
organizations1

118 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

have a stronger pacifying effect on regional security. The implications of

these ndings are discussed in greater detail for Asian RSOs, which have
only limited scope and operate in comparatively high levels of insecurity.
However, except from the legacy of conict, variables identied in the
general models apply similarly to Asia.

Regionally based intergovernmental organizations have become more

prominent in response to the rapidly changing opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War period. Since 1990, a number of new regional
organizations have been founded for example, the Asian Regional
Forum (ARF) and existing organizations have widened and deepened
by extending their membership and mandate, further formalizing their
institutions and taking on new tasks, such as civilian and military peacekeeping. The European Union (EU) is the most striking example for these
developments, but they can also be observed for other regional organizations, e.g. the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African
Union (AU). In contrast, Asia has experienced a relatively weak and late
development of regional security organizations (Acharya, 2009; Webber,
2010).
The underlying rationale of new regionalism (Acharya, 2007; Acharya
and Johnston, 2007) emphasizes the importance of economic integration
and democratization for regional prosperity and peace. Regional security
organizations (RSOs) explicitly seek a prominent role in regional security
governance by broadening the economic agenda of customs unions and
economic communities or the narrow security guarantees offered by military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Kirchner
and Dominguez, 2011 p. 1). In effect, RSOs can be viewed as the main
institutions for constructing security communities (Deutch et al., 1957;
Adler and Barnett, 1998). Under what conditions RSOs indeed become
relevant institutions able to contribute to regional security remains,
however, a largely unanswered empirical question.
Accordingly, our central research questions are (i) under what conditions RSOs take up a broader agenda or scope in security governance and
(ii) whether a broader scope improves regional security? We aim to answer

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1 Introduction

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 119

Statistical analyses of regional security organizations are still extremely rare, whereas there
are some quantitative studies on the impact of regional economic organizations on regional
security; in particular by Bearce (2003), Bearce and Omori (2005) and Haftel (2007, 2012).
Haftel (2013) analyzes the extent to which regional economic organizations engage in security cooperation.

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these questions rst of all by means of a quantitative comparative analysis

of the scope and impact of 25 RSOs over the period 19902009.2 The statistical analysis is followed by a more in-depth case study of Asian RSOs.
East Asia is notable because relevant RSOs have only limited scope. Does
this mean that there is indeed an East Asian exceptionalism?
Based on the literature review, we identify similarity and concentration
(or hegemony) as the two central conditions for increased scope. The
empirical evidence, however, suggests only that RSOs with member states
that are more similar in their capacities and political systems are more likely
to have a broader scope. Our research further points at the importance of
institutional features; agencies (rather than arrangements) that have been
around longer and encompass more members have been more successful
in expanding their security agenda. Next, we include scope of RSOs into
basic models of interstate and intrastate conict. The importance of international organizations is one of the elements of the Liberal Peace, together
with democracy and economic interdependence (Russett and Oneal,
2001). Further, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) identify economic development, poverty, and population size as robust factors contributing to civil
wars (see also Fearon and Laitin, 2003). However, there is only limited
empirical support for the pacifying effect of RSOs on regional security.
The results of the statistical analysis are useful to reexamine whether
Asia is indeed an outlier. Is the scope of Asian RSOs limited because of
factors that are unique to Asia? Furthermore, are Asian RSOs unable to
play a pacifying role because of their limited scope? Among others,
Acharya (2009) has argued that great power interference, rivalry, and mistrust, involving the, China, and Japan and, to some extent, India, have led
to a unique trajectory for Asian RSOs. Focusing on our key dependent
variables (scope and regional security), Asia appears indeed to be an
outlier; Asian regional security organizations have limited scope and their
members experience relatively high levels of intrastate and interstate conict. However, we show that current explanations tend to focus too much
on the inhibiting role of (regional) superpowers. Instead, the key factors in
the general models, namely whether members have similar capabilities and

120 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

political systems as well as since how long regional organizations have

been developing their security mandate, seem to apply similarly both
within and outside Asia. Further, we nd that particularly in Asia the
legacy of conict appears to inhibit the development of a regional security
structure.

In their comparative case studies, Tavares (2009) and Kirchner and

Dominguez (2011) consider the characteristics of RSO members as well as
the scope of RSO activities to evaluate their impact on regional security.
Analytically, however, scope and impact are distinct, albeit related, issues. In
itself it is interesting to know when RSOs are able to establish themselves as
actors with a broad security mandate and operational capacity. Since not all
RSOs are similar, it is important to control for scope when analyzing their
impact, if any, on security. Moreover, the same factors that may make conict more likely in a particular region may also limit the scope of RSOs
(Buzan and Wver, 2003; Colaresi et al., 2007). Thus without proper controls, the pacifying effect of RSOs can also easily be overstated.

2.1 Hegemony and similarity as determinants of scope

Political leadership is often seen as crucial for creating and sustaining
international organizations. Hegemonic stability theory (Kindleberger,
1973; Krasner, 1976; McKeown, 1983) argues that periods of political stability and economic prosperity result from the ability and willingness of
powerful hegemonic states to regulate interactions in the international
system. Hegemons establish and sustain international organizations in
order to extend their political inuence and to legitimize their normsetting behavior.3 In terms of Olsons (1965) logic of collective action, a
hegemon has private incentives to provide security as a public good.
Classic examples are Great Britain holding the balance of power in the
19th century Concert of Europe, or the United States founding the United
Nations (UN) after the Second World War. A regional power may operate

Keohane (1984) argues that the institutions, norms and regulated behavior may well persist
after the hegemon has lost its dominant position.

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2 Scope and impact of regional security

organizations

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 121

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similarly at the sub-systemic level, for example, the importance of France

and Germany for the creation of the European Community.
International organizations also provide a framework for member states
to agree on appropriate burden sharing in the provision of security as a collective or public good (Sandler, 1992). On the basis of instruments and
functions of security governance, Kirchner and Sperling (2007) differentiate between protection, prevention, assurance and compellence, each category with its distinct joint production function (Hirschleifer, 1983).
Dorussen et al. (2009) argue that the contributions of member states to
assurance and prevention policies weigh equally, whereas the minimal contribution sets the collective level of protection, and the maximum contribution the collective level of compellence. It follows that free riding is most
likely for compellence policies and least likely for protection, and thus, the
importance of hegemony for security governance should be particularly
pronounced for compellence policies. Koremenos et al. (2001) similarly
conjecture that scope increases with the severity of distribution and enforcement problems. Applying Kirchner and Sperlings (2007) distinction
between assurance and compellence, Haftel (2013) nds that regional hegemony (Buzan and Wver, 2003) increases security cooperation, whereas
rivalry between major powers in the region (Colaresi et al., 2007) limits it.
Major powers can also impede the development of regional organizations. Since they are best able to protect their state sovereignty, they have
less need for international organizations (Gowa, 1989). They are also
likely to veto any external attempts to limit their freedom to act in defense
of perceived national interest. Major power support for RSOs is often conditional on their ability to determine collective policies and does not imply
any willingness to delegate sovereignty. Since hegemons face fewer enforcement problems, it follows from Koremenos et al. (2001) that hegemons
may also reduce the scope of RSOs. Major powers often end up limiting
the autonomy or freedom of action of regional organizations even when
they were instrumental in setting them up. In summary, hegemons may
prefer weakly institutionalized arrangements with limited scope. Colaresi
et al. (2007) argue moreover that a strategic rivalry involving the regional
hegemon will further undermine regional security cooperation.
As Acharya and Johnston (2007) observe, developing countries often
favor regional cooperation as a means to safeguard their state sovereignty.
Individually, these states consider themselves to be in a weak position relative to major powers or even international organizations such as the UN

122 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

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or the EU. Accordingly, similarity of capacity and interests should

promote the formation of regional organizations. Moreover, since similar
states individually will nd it more difcult to enforce adherence to collective agreement, they should be more willing to increase the scope of RSOs
(Koremenos et al., 2001).
As the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
illustrates, RSOs can be seen as opposing an emerging dominant power.
Moreover, neo-functionalism (Haas, 1964) holds that regular interaction
between policy-making elites to settle technical or economic issues leads
via sectoral/functional spillovers to the recognition of overlapping interests
and similarity of policy cultures and thus promotes further regional
cooperation, including areas of high security governance. The EU is the
classic example for the latter where security (apart from police matters)
only became part of its remit nearly forty years after the foundation of the
European Coal and Steel Community.
In engaging with regional security problems, shared local understanding of cultures and interests provides regional organizations with a comparative advantage over global organizations (e.g. UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa) or organizations operating outside their main area of
interest (e.g. NATOs International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan)
(Tavares, 2009, p. 4). Perceived shortcomings of the UN to effectively
address important security problems further stimulate regional cooperation (e.g. the International Conference in the African Great Lakes area or
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West
Africa). During the third wave of democratization, regional security cooperation has been of particular importance for newly democratized states
(Huntington, 1991); most notably, democratic institutions were a precondition for joining the European Community/Union and have contributed to
the consolidation of democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe.
Manseld and Pevehouse (2008) nd that membership in an international
organization can enhance the credibility of a political leaders commitment
to democratic reform. Accordingly, democratizing countries are more
likely to join international organizations. The compatibility and shared
norms of democracies are seen as conducive to peaceful international
interaction and functioning of RSOs. Donno (2010), however, also
observes that any RSO response to a awed election is less likely as a countrys geopolitical size and importance increases demonstrating that power
inequality can undermine RSO effectiveness (see also Haftel, 2013).

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 123

2.2 Security organizations and regional security

Russett and Oneal (2001) include international organizations as one of the
core elements of the Liberal Peace, together with democracy and economic
interdependence. International organizations provide forums for interaction between political leaders, allowing them to communicate their concerns and nd shared interests. International organizations can also mediate
directly to solve conicts and or provide mechanisms such as peacekeeping
or monitoring missions to help states implement agreements. Empirically,
however, the pacifying effect of international organizations is seen as the
weakest element of the Liberal Peace (Dorussen and Ward, 2008). Since
4

Historical institutionalism emphasizes the path dependencies and lock-in effects of existing
institutions that were built in the shadow of the Cold War (Katzenstein, 2005).

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In summary, the literature offers two opposing explanations for the creation of regional organizations and the expansion of security tasks or
their scope. Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes the importance of a
regionally dominant state or power inequality. Alternatively, similarity of
capacities and interests promotes regional cooperation in opposition to
external dominant states or threats. Similar political, in particular democratic, institutions are also seen as favorable for regional cooperation.
These explanations, moreover, only partially contradict each other, since it
is possible that a small group of large states leads integration (e.g. the signicance of Germany, France and the United Kingdom for European integration), or for states to share similar democratic institutions while
differing signicantly in their capabilities (e.g. cooperation between democratic states with signicant variation in population size and economic
prowess as in the Southern Common Market, Mercosur).
Finally, RSOs are bureaucratic organizations that may have a momentum of their own. RSOs representing a larger number of (richer) member
states are more likely to have the resources needed to develop new initiatives (Koremenos et al., 2001). A (semi-)independent secretariat is also
more likely to explore new areas of operations (Boehmer et al., 2004).
Organizations that have been in existence for longer periods are more
likely to initiate new policies in response to challenges.4 Finally, member
states are also more likely to turn to existing, successful organizations as
instruments for additional security governance tasks, e.g. the redenition
of NATOs role after the end of the Cold War.

124 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

We conrm that a large population and low per capita income increase
the risk of civil war, and this is consistent with many studies of civil war.
We have found other robust relationships: civil wars are more likely to
occur in countries with recent political instability and inconsistent
democratic institutions; countries with small militaries and rough
terrain; countries located in war-prone, undemocratic regions; and
countries with low rates of economic growth.
The typology developed by Kirchner and Sperling (2007) underscores the
broad set of challenges of security governance where other states often
play only a minor role as protagonists and, secondly, threats against the
state are often indirect rather than direct. The main functions of regional
security governance encompass institution building as well as conict resolution employing both persuasive and coercive instruments. The better
RSOs are able to engage with the complete set of security governance
5

Bearce (2003), Bearce and Omori (2005) and Haftel (2007, 2012) argue that regional economic organizations increase regional security. It is also important to recognize that the
boundaries between regional economic and security organizations can be blurred.

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international organizations differ markedly in their mandate, level of institutionalization (Boehmer et al., 2004) as well as membership characteristics
(Pevehouse and Russett, 2006), it may be illusionary to expect a uniform
effect. Thus, it is helpful to focus on regional security organizations and to
explicitly control for their actual, instead of stated, involvement in security
government. By denition regional security, organizations have regional
peace and security as their core mandate, making this the ultimate criterion
to judge their effectiveness.5
In the post-Cold War period, the most serious security threats for many
states resulted from state failure and civil wars. Following the withdrawal
of external support of the global superpowers, many states (some of them
newly established) faced serious internal challenges to their authority. The
spread of civil wars with associated ows of refugees and internally displaced people further increased regional instability. The presence of failed
states in a region providing safe-havens for terrorism, drug-trafcking
and internationally organized crime have also led to (regional) insecurity.
Hegre and Sambanis (2006, p. 531) identify economic development,
poverty and population size as robust factors contributing to civil wars:

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 125

tasks protection, prevention, assurance and compellence the better able

they should be to promote regional stability.

3 Comparative analysis of regional security

organizations

Haftel (2013) compiles a list of 34 REOs, of which we classify 15 as regional security organizations. Ten of these 15 RSOs are coded by Haftel as having assurance policies, whereas ve
(CSTO, ECCAS, EU, GCC and ECOWAS, see Table 1) include compellence.

We collected data for starting year of any particular period as well as averaging over the ve
year period (which had, however, no impact on our results). To avoid losing observations
because of lagging, we also collected information on conict for 198589. Finally, we only
counted years that countries/organizations were actually in existence.

Note that RSO membership as well as membership of the international system is not necessarily constant over the ve year periods. We adjusted the data accordingly. For some organizations, particularly those with many small island states, ofcial membership varies notably
from the membership size as measured in our data.

Jcome et al. (2005) was particularly useful for Latin American RSOs.

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It is not immediately obvious which international organizations qualify as

regional security organizations. Tavares (2009) identies a total of 35 RSOs
whereas Kirchner and Dominguez (2011) limit their attention to 10. The
boundaries between regional economic and regional security organizations
are also poorly demarcated. Haftel (2012) identies 25 regional economic
organizations (REOs) but 11 of them are also classied as RSOs by
Tavares.6 Since it is most comprehensive, we start with the list compiled by
Tavares (2009, pp. 1011) and also use his classication of RSOs as either
agencies or arrangements. Organizations that, upon further research, appear
to be exclusively concerned with economic or cultural matters were excluded
as well as completely inactive organizations. Table 1 provides a survey of the
25 RSOs included with information on their formation date (using the date
that the organization attained its security mandate). All data were coded for
ve-year periods: 19902004, 199599, 200004, and 200509, resulting in a
data set with a maximum of 87 observations.7
The main sources of information on RSOs are the comparative case
studies of Tavares (2009) and Kirchner and Dominguez (2011). Further
basic information on membership (whenever possible) was taken from the
Correlates of War IGO data (version 2.3; Pevehouse et al., 2004).8 We also
added information using the organizations websites, Wikipedia, as well as
further case studies.9

126 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

Table 1 Regional security organizations
Name

Since RSO
Agency/
Region
mandate arrangement

Scope
(mean)

ARF

Asian Regional Forum

1993 1993

Agency

Asia

0.25

ASEAN

Association of Southeast
Asian Nations

1967 1967

Agency

Asia

0.75

AU

African Union

2002 2002

Agency

Africa

CAN

Andean Community

1967 1967

Agency

America 2

CARICOM

Caribbean Community

1973 1973

Agency

America 3

CICA

Conference of Interaction and 1999 1999

Condence Building
Measures

Agency

Asia

CSTO

Collective Security Treaty

Organization

2002 2002

Agency

Former
SU

1.5

ECCAS

Economic Community of
Central African States

1985 1985

Agency

Africa

ECOWAS

Economic Community of
West African States

1975 1975

Agency

Africa

EU

European Union

1957 1957

Agency

Europe 4.75

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

1981 1981

Agency

Middle
East

GRIO

Rio Group

1986 1986

Arrangement America 0

GUAM

Organization for Democratic

and Economic Development

2001 2001

Agency

IC/GLR

International Conference of
the Great Lakes Region

2000 2000

Arrangement Africa

0.5

IGAD

Intergovernmental Authority
for Development

1986 1986

Agency

Africa

LAS

League of Arab States

1945 1945

Agency

Middle
East

Former
SU

MERCOSUR Mercado Comun del Sur

1991 1991

Agency

America 0.5

MRU

Mano River Union

1973 1973

Agency

Africa

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

1949 1949

Agency

Europe 2

OAS

Organization American States 1948 1948

Agency

America 5

OECS

Organization of East
Caribbean States

Agency

America 0

OSCE

Organization for Security and 1973 1995

Co-operation in Europe

Arrangement Europe 4.25

SADC

Southern African
Development Community

1992 1992

Agency

Africa

0.5

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation
Organization

1996 2001

Agency

Asia

0.67

UNASUR

Union of South American

Nations

2008 2008

Arrangement America 0

1981 1981

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Acronym

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 127

10 PWT 7 from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php, 20 November 2013, date

last accessed.
11 In his cross-sectional analysis, Haftel (2013) uses a dichotomy of hegemony where an REO
scores high on hegemony when half or more of all resources are held by one member. Seven
of the 15 organizations that are included in our list of RSOs have high hegemony. Using
Colaresi et al. (2007), Haftel (2013) identies 8 REOs with major rivalry, but only one of
them (CAN, see Table 1) is included in our list of RSOs.

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The main dependent variables are RSO scope and regional insecurity.
Scope was assessed using Kirchner and Sperlings (2007) classication of security governance. The scope of an RSO includes assurance if it elds civil
peacekeeping missions or engaged in mediation. Prevention was coded if an
RSO (or afliated regional development bank) was listed as providing multilateral aid where we mainly relied on Aiddata (www.aiddata.org, 20
November 2013, date last accessed). Protection is coded when we could nd
evidence for collaboration on police, justice and corruption matters; in particular, we found instances of collaboration to ght international cross-border
crime and border protection. Finally, three indicators are used to assess compellence. Heldt and Wallensteen (2007, pp. 4655) list non-UN peacekeeping
missions with a military component. The International Institute for Economics (http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.cfm,
20 November 2013, date last accessed) is the main source for (economic) sanctions. Finally, we coded if members were suspended from an RSO. All indicators were coded as dummy variables if a particular policy was present during
a particular period. The resulting scope variable is an eight-point scale (07),
but 6 is the actual maximum value (attained by the AU and the EU). Nearly
half of our observation score zero on scope with some organizations scoring
zero for all four periods, e.g. the Mano River Union and the RIO group.
Regional (in)security is measured using the Uppsala conict data (http://
www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/, 20 November 2013, date last accessed),
which include both interstate and intrastate conicts with more than 25 casualties annually. Regional insecurity aggregates all conict years for all RSO
member states where countries may have more than one civil war and, by construction, any interstate war between two RSO members is counted twice.
The Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2012)10 provide the data on economic development (in purchasing power parity), openness and population.
Hegemony is measured as the proportion of total GDP controlled by the
largest member of the RSO.11 Similarity in capacity is measured as the
standard deviation of total GDP. Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2012) and

128 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

4 Explaining the scope of regional security

organizations
Table 2 provides the results for the Poisson regression with scope as the
dependent variable and formation of the organization, hegemony, and
12 The grouping is based mainly on the geographical location of the majority of the member
states, but admittedly the global superpowers (in particular the USA) tend to be member of
RSOs commonly associated with different regions. The allocation of RSOs to specic regions
was compared with and largely follows Buzan and Wver (2003).

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Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/, 20 November 2013, date

last accessed) were used to assess level of democracy. The Polity data give
the average level of democracy (/autocracy) of the members of the RSO.
The standard deviation of the democracy and autocracy scores were used to
assess degree of political similarity of political system of the member states.
As an alternative to the Polity data, we also include the Freedom House
data. Acknowledging that the Freedom House data are not necessarily compatible over time, we only use their classication of political systems as free,
not free or partially free. The proportion of member-state years coded as
free, partially or not free measures similarity of political system. Further, we
identify the region where the RSO is mainly relevant (see Table 1).12
To avoid bias in the estimation of any effect of scope on security, it is
important to control for the main causes of (regional) insecurity. Following
existing literature on the Liberal Peace, we control for democracy, and trade
(by means of openness). Based on the civil wars literature, we include population and economic development. Several factors that are considered to support
regional stability directly could also do so indirectly via their effect on scope;
for example, hegemonic stability theory suggests that a hegemon has an incentive to provide regional stability directly as well as via creating and sustaining
international organizations. The democratic peace suggests that regions with
predominantly democratic states are more peaceful than those where democratic and autocratic states co-exist. However, democracies are also considered to
be more supportive of regional security cooperation. Including member-state
characteristics into the model is thus also important to avoid possible spurious
correlation between RSO scope and regional (in)security. The logit and
Poisson models are appropriate for limited dependent variables and, where
needed, control for temporal effects and over-dispersion of the error terms.

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 129

Table 2 Scope of activities of regional security organizations, 19902009, Poisson random
effects
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.017 (0.006)a

0.022 (0.006)a

0.018 (0.006)a

Number of member
states

0.053 (0.014)a

0.044 (0.012)a

0.067 (0.013)a

Agency

1.509 (0.425)a

1.070 (0.387)a

1.437 (0.455)a

0.983 (0.296)a

EU

0.663 (0.262)

1.010 (0.292)

Asian RSO

0.744 (0.520)

0.650 (0.510)

0.171 (0.455)

Hegemony

0.818 (0.526)

0.926 (0.552)c

0.590 (0.591)

Divergence capacity
(SD_Total GDP, ln)

0.111 (0.034)

0.109 (0.030)

0.129 (0.038)a

Polity2 (means)

0.056 (0.025)b

Divergence political
system (SD_Polity2)

0.101 (0.068)

0.082 (0.068)

Democracy (mean,
Polity2)

0.092 (0.046)b

Autocracy (mean,
Polity2)

0.269 (0.066)a

Partial free (proportion,

Freedom House)

2.247 (0.703)a

Free (proportion,
Freedom House)

0.882 (0.450)b

UCDP conict (lagged)

0.014 (0.012)

0.005 (0.010)

Constant

0.382 (0.678)

0.978 (0.661)

Observations
Wald 2
Pseudo R 2

0.018 (0.012)
1.011 (0.606)c

83

83

87

150.49a

159.82a

168.49a

0.37

0.40

0.39

Signicant at 1%, bsignicant at 5%, csignicant at 10%.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

similarity of capabilities, democracy, and conict as the main independent

variables. The models further control for the EU and Asian based RSOs.13
RSOs that have held a mandate in security governance for a longer
period, with a semi-independent secretariat, or that have a larger
13 The EU is generally recognized to have a special status; excluding the EU the main ndings
remain robust but using xtpoisson (random effects) rather than Poisson regression becomes
necessary.

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Years since RSO

formation

130 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

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membership are signicantly more likely to take on a large set of tasks.

These ndings are the most robust and strongly indicate the signicance of
autonomous development of regional organizations. The models further
conrm the special status of the EU.
Contrary to expectations from hegemonic stability theory, scope does not
increase if the share of capacities of the largest state increases. Divergence of
capacity among RSO members decreases scope (or conversely similarity of
capacity increases it). The relation between democracy and scope deserves
more attention. Model 1, using the average Polity score as well as the standard deviation of Polity score, nds that an RSO with on average more democratic members is more likely to have a broader scope. Model 2 suggests that
the effect of democracy is in effect nonlinear; RSOs with on average more
democratic as well as autocratic members are less likely to have a broader
scope. In both models, however, we nd no effect that similarity of political
system across members is signicant. Model 3 uses the Freedom House
scores and considers the proportion of RSO members that are free or partially free rather than not free. Increasing the proportion of free (rather than
not free) member states and, even more pronounced, partially free member
states increases scope. These ndings give strong empirical support to the
observation that, after the Cold War, democratizing states have attempted to
use RSOs to consolidate their transitions (Manseld and Pevehouse, 2008).
In summary: RSOs that are more similar in their capabilities and that have a
larger proportion of democratic (or democratizing) member states are more
likely to have a broader scope. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of previous
regional conict on RSO scope is insignicant. Possibly the effect of conict
is indeterminate: conict increases the need for effective RSOs but also
makes it more difcult for states to cooperate. Finally, the statistical analysis
conrms the status of EU as an outlier, but does not provide any immediate
support for the idea that the scope of Asian RSOs is exceptional. We discuss
Asian RSOs in more detail later.
Figure 1 gives the marginal effects of the independent variables (of
Model 3) on the scope of RSOs to illustrate their substantive impact. The
impact of membership size is particularly noteworthy. Further, Fig. 1 shows
that the substantive effect of Asian RSOs is low, just like their statistical
signicance. The remaining statistically signicant variables years since
RSO formation, similarity of capacity and political system and agency
have similar substantive impact that is, however, relatively small (about
one point on an eight-point scale).

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 131

Figure 2 Increase of regional conict, marginal effects.

5 The limited impact of regional security

organizations on security
Does a broader agenda help RSOs to effectively address regional security
concerns? The ndings of the previous section further suggest that it is
relevant to control for membership characteristics as well as how dangerous
the neighborhood is. Table 3 presents the main models for total conict,

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Figure 1 Scope of regional security organizations, marginal effects.

132 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

Table 3 Regional security organizations and conict, 19902009
(4) Sum
Conict (lagged, total)

(5) Increase

0.007 (0.007)

(6) Decline

0.088 (0.031)

0.110 (0.037)a

Size of membership

0.039 (0.012)

0.140 (0.052)

0.051 (0.043)

Asia

0.110 (0.494)

0.976 (1.182)

2.832 (1.333)b

GDP pc (ln, mean)

0.256 (0.154)

0.164 (0.346)

Openness (ln, mean)

1.064 (0.402)

1.795 (1.705)

3.340 (1.585)b

c
a

0.351 (0.358)

Openness (standard
deviation)

0.013 (0.007)

Population (ln, mean)

0.416 (0.173)b

0.057 (0.279)

0.544 (0.266)b

RSO scope

0.017 (0.050)

0.510 (0.253)b

0.093 (0.218)

RSO agency

0.215 (0.202)

0.657 (0.793)

0.049 (0.797)

Not free (proportion,

Freedom House)

1.235 (0.518)

1.900 (1.243)

1.317 (1.182)

Partial free (proportion,

Freedom House)

0.638 (0.558)

1.684 (2.232)

2.215 (1.953)

Constant

2.824 (2.457)

6.686 (7.569)

16.189 (7.060)b

xtpoisson
Observations

Wald 2
Pseudo R 2

87

logit

logit

87

87

13.22

16.98c

0.12

0.16

0.36
62.14a

Signicant at 1%, bSignicant at 5%, csignicant at 10%.

Number of RSOs = 25; robust standard errors in parentheses.

increase, and decrease of regional conict, respectively. Figure 2 presents

the marginal effects on the likelihood of increased conict (Model 5).
The rst important observation is that the overall t of the conict
models is fairly weak. Secondly, the standard explanations for conict are
only signicant in Model 4 (for total amount of regional conict). Here,
we nd that as expected wealth (measured as per capita GDP) decreases,
and population size increases the amount of regional conict (Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006). Larger regions (encompassing more members) are also
more prone to conict. Moreover, conrming the expectations of the Liberal
Peace, trade interdependence and democracy appear to be pacifying. If the
proportion of not free or partially free member states in the RSO increases,
the total amount of regional conict increases (with a signicant effect for

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The scope and impact of regional security organizations 133

6 Are regional security organizations in Asia

exceptional?
Explanations abound on why Asia has experienced a relatively low and
late development of regional security organizations.15 Prolonged interstate
14 Dorussen and Ward (2010) and Gartzke (2007) argue that trade openness is a more appropriate measure for trade interdependence that bilateral trade, since it includes both direct and indirect (via third parties) trade ows. This should apply particularly for any assessment of
regional interdependence.
15 Part of the late development are failed attempts by Asian regional organizations such as the
Indian-sponsored Asian Relations Organization, the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, the Japanese and Australian backed Asia Pacic Council, the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the MalaysiaPhilippinesIndonesia grouping

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the proportion of autocracies). Trade openness decreases the probability of

conict, whereas variation in trade openness increases it.14
Focusing on RSO characteristics, the ndings are disappointing. Both
scope and agency status are generally insignicant. RSOs with a semiindependent secretariat and a broader mandate are not more or less likely
to affect the amount of regional conict. Only in Model 5, there is some
evidence for the pacifying effect of scope: RSOs with a broader mandate
make it less likely that the amount of regional conict increases, which
suggests that RSOs may have a deterring effect. As shown in Fig. 2, the
substantive impact of membership size and previous conict is about half
a point (on a one point scale from zero to one), whereas the impact of
scope is a third of a point; specically for our empirical data, this means
that an increase in RSO scope by three points makes it
33% less likely
that the amount of conict in the region will increase.
Model 6 shows that the effect of scope on decline of conict is, however,
again insignicant. Overall, very few variables reach accepted levels of signicance in the Models 5 and 6. More conict in the previous period
makes it less likely that conict further increases and more likely that there
is a decrease of conict. This may reect war weariness or the overall
downward trend in conict between 1995 and 2010 (after a sharp increase
in the period around the end of the Cold War). Conict is more likely to increase in larger regions. As shown in Fig. 2, if RSOs have 25 more member
countries, the probability of having more (rather than less) conict
increases by 50%. Finally, Asian RSOs generally do not differ signicantly; the only exception is that conict appears less likely to decline in Asia.

134 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

(MAPHILINO). It was only in the mid-1960 that a more permanent regionally based organization came into being in the shape of ASEAN, and it took until the mid-1990s before
China and Japan were willing to join a regional organization, in the newly formed ARF. In
2001, China became a founding member of the Shanghai Five grouping in 1996, which was
renamed in 2001 to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). For further details on
why China and Japan changed their initial reluctance towards regional integration, see
Lanteigne (2005) and Chang-Gun Park (2006).

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and intrastate conicts in the region, the persistence of several autocratic

or conservative regimes, the absence of a shared liberal democratic culture,
and the relatively low degree of intra-Asia trade are among the main explanations provided for this phenomenon (Mattli, 1999, pp. 169170;
Chang-Fawn, 2009; Webber, 2010; Jones et al., 2013, p. 146). Similar characteristics have plagued security organizations in Africa without, however,
having inhibited organizational development, as witnessed by the relative
strength of the AU, ECOWAS, and the South African Development
Community. What sets developments in Asia apart from those in Africa
seems to be great power interference, rivalry, and mistrust, involving the
United States, China, and Japan and, to some extent, India (Acharya,
2009). Unlike in Europe, where the United States supported NATO and
the EU, in Asia, the United States focused on a construction of a
hub-and-spokes network of bilateral military alliances, in which their
treaties with Japan and South Korea were the centerpieces (Hemmer and
Katzenstein, 2002). This hub-and-spokes approach has enabled the
United States to play the role of an external balancer for half a century
and to offset the potentially destabilizing rivalries of the regions major
powers: Japan and China (Jones et al., 2013, p. 113).
The organization with the longest endurance in Asia is ASEAN,
founded at the time of the Vietnam War in 1967 by a group of
non-Communist South Asian states concerned to overcome their own
rivalries and conicts in the interests of national economic development
and to bolster their capacity to resist the threat of communist expansion in
their neighborhood (Webber, 2013, p. 97). The transnational challenges
arising after the end of the Cold War terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, maritime security, greater uncertainty
regarding the stance of the Great Powers in the region, and the fear of isolationism required ASEAN to reassess its existing security provisions.
This resulted in the formation of the ARF in 1996, which sought to create
the conditions for regional stability and to ensure a distribution of power

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 135

16 Examples comprise the proclaimed Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPHAN), the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the Southeast Asia-NuclearWeapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), the ASEAN Political and Security Community, and the
ASEAN Charter.

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among the three major Asian-Pacic states: China, Japan, and the United
States.
The ARF remains, however, based on ASEAN-style diplomacy; it relies
on noninterference in internal affairs, nonuse of force, pacic settlements
of disputes, consensus decision-making, and good neighborliness as
main principles of action. It has a strong preference for non-binding and
non-legalistic approaches and displays minimal institutionalization, thus
setting itself apart from European security structures (Webber, 2013,
p. 346). By seeking to promote lasting peace through condence-building
measures, the ARF is about identity-building and its members hope that
dialogue should lead to socialisation which, in turn, will lead to the dissipation of conicts of interests (Garofano, 1999, p. 78).
In common with other regional security organizations in Africa,
Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, Asian regional security organizations have put forward progressive ideas, aims, and measures to deal with
internal and external security threats.16 However, Asian RSOs remain slow
in implementing these stated aims and/or in delegating appropriate tasks
to central institutions. The created institutions are often little more than
consultative forums. Governments have seldom been willing to accept even
the most modest of constraints on their autonomy in policy-making as the
price of constructing institutions. There is hence a failure to agree on
clearly specied and enforceable obligations or on effective dispute settlements (Chang-Fawn, 2009, p. 235). Moreover, while the ARF has the advantage of regrouping most of the Asian states, its effectiveness is
diminished by the fact that it includes important outside actors, such as
the EU, Russia, and the United States, which impede its organizational effectiveness. Equally, the appearance of sub-groupings or extensions of
ASEAN in the shape of the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South
Korea), the East Asia Community, and the East Asia Summit (ASEAN
10, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand)
seems to foster greater competition rather than a strengthening of, for
example, the ARF, ASEAN, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

136 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

17 The average scope of RSO in Asia equals 0.4 whereas it is 1.7 for those outside Asia. Using
the t-test for a comparison of means, the null hypothesis that the scope of Asia RSOs equals
the scope of non-Asia RSOs can be rejected with P < 0.05.
18 Model 3 (in Table 2) is the basic underlying model to explain RSO scope, and the analysis
focuses on the interaction between Asian RSOs with date of security mandate, membership
size, agency, hegemony, divergence, and proportion of non-free and free states as dened by
Freedom House.

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Our data largely conrm this characterization of Asian RSOs. The

scope of activities of RSOs based in Asia is signicantly smaller than of
RSOs based outside Asia.17 Regional organizations attained their security
mandate signicantly later in Asia compared with other regions. The
member states of Asian RSOs have signicantly more varied political
systems with fewer democratic and more autocratic member states.
However, the distribution of capacities (hegemony and similarity) does not
differ signicantly between Asian and non-Asian RSOs. Table 4 compares
the effect of key independent variables on scope for Asia-based RSOs in
contrast to those based outside Asia.18 The marginal effects are illustrated
in Fig. 3. Comparing the effect for RSOs inside and outside Asia, the coefcients tend to be quite similar, which indicates that Asia does not structurally deviate. The nding that the coefcients for Asia are less often
signicant is unsurprising, given the relatively few observations for Asian
RSOs. Figure 3 clearly shows the large uncertainty in the estimates for the
impact of agency, hegemony, and similarity for Asian RSO. In contrast,
whereas years since RSO formation and the membership size have a positive impact on RSO scope outside of Asia, the impact is smaller and statistically insignicant for Asian RSOs. However, the most notable difference
is the effect of regional conict (Fig. 3); the coefcient for conict is only
signicant for Asia, indicating that the legacy of conict in Asia tends to
inhibit in particular the ability of Asian RSOs to increase their scope of
activities.
Seen from the perspective of ongoing conict between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir, the Afghanistan problem, and territorial disputes
in the East and South China Sea, Asian regional security organizations
would appear to have little impact on peace and stability in Asia. However,
beyond this prima facie evidence, the structural arrangement of the ARF
and the inclusion of the great powers appear indirectly to contribute to
peace and stability in the region. In particular, ASEAN has been seen as
having provided rapprochement of Vietnam and Laos and other ASEAN

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 137

Table 4 Scope of RSO activities, comparison of Asian and non-Asian RSOs, 19902009,
Poisson random effects
Scope
Asia

Non-Asia

0.012 (0.017)

0.017 (0.005)a

Size of membership

0.017 (0.035)

0.061 (0.012)a

Agency

1.263 (0.734)c

1.487 (0.450)a

Hegemony

0.410 (1.267)

0.474 (0.601)

Divergence (SD_Total GDP, ln)

0.102 (0.029)

0.086 (0.027)a

Non free (proportion, Freedom House)

0.725 (0.837)

1.655 (0.573)a

Free (proportion, Freedom House)

5.494 (3.189)c

0.707 (0.643)

UCDP conict (lagged)

0.036 (0.016)b

0.011 (0.012)

Signicant at 1%, bsignicant at 5%, csignicant at 10%.

Model 3 (Table 2) is underlying model, only coefcients reported are interactions with Asia
and Non-Asia regions; N = 87; robust standard errors in parentheses.

members (Chang-Fawn, 2009, p. 23) and as having been instrumental in

concluding the conict between Cambodia and Vietnam at the end of the
1980s (Ravenhill, 2009, p. 221).
Our data conrm the initial impression that conict is relatively more
common in the member states of Asian RSOs compared with those
outside Asia; we nd on average 25 conict years per ve-year period for
Asia RSOs compared with 10 conict years outside Asia.19 Asia is,
however, not distinct in the increase (or decrease) of conict since the
post-Cold War period. Table 5 compares the effect of key features scope,
membership size, and agency of Asia-based RSOs on regional security
with those based outside Asia. Comparing the effects of RSO features, the
coefcients are once more generally quite similar, indicating that Asia does
not structurally deviate. Interesting marginal effects are given in Fig. 4,
which rst of all shows that the impact of membership on probability of
increased conict and scope on decline of conict are nearly identical for
Asian and Non-Asian RSOs. The impact of scope on the probability of
increased conict is also largely the same for Asian and Non-Asian RSOs,
19 The null hypothesis that the sum of conict years for Asian RSOs is similar to non-Asian
RSO can be rejected with P < 0.01.

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Years since RSO formation

138 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

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Figure 3 Scope of regional security organizations, comparison of Asian and non-Asian

RSOs, marginal effects.

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 139

Table 5 Impact of RSO features on regional conict, comparison of Asian and non-Asian
RSOs, 19902009
Sum

Increase

Decline

Asia

Non-Asia

Asia

Non-Asia

Asia

Non-Asia

Scope

0.021
(0.117)

0.016
(0.053)

1.132
(1.523)

0.492
(0.265)c

0.737
(0.834)

0.120
(0.207)

Members

0.044
(0.024)c

0.034
(0.011)a

0.276
(0.102)a

0.131
(0.046)a

0.233
(0.080)a

0.024
(0.039)

Agency

0.228
(0.208)

0.072
(0.321)

0.957
(1.143)

0.532
(0.815)

0.418
(1.202)

0.245
(0.812)

Model

xtpoisson

logit

logit

Signicant at 1%, bsignicant at 5%; csignicant at 10%.

Models 4, 5, and 6 (Table 3) are underlying models, only coefcients reported are
interactions with Asia and Non-Asia regions; N = 87; number of RSOs = 25, (robust)
standard errors in parentheses.

although it is only (weakly) signicant outside Asia. The only notable observation applies to membership size; especially in Asia, more inclusive
regional security organizations are less likely to see a decline

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Figure 3 Continued.

140 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

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Figure 4 Conict and regional security organizations, comparison of Asian and non-Asian
RSOs marginal effects.

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 141

of conict indicating the persistence of certain conicts (e.g. Kashmir and

Afghanistan) during the post-Cold War period.

7 Conclusions and discussion

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Somewhat dependent on ones denitions, there are currently between 20

and 35 regional security organizations active. A signicant number of
these were formed (or fundamentally reorganized) in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but others have been active for most of the
post-Second World War period and have been recognized as a signicant
contributors to global security governance as shown for example in UN
Chapter VIII status. There are, however, very few attempts to use quantitative analysis to study the design and impact of RSOs.
Further, the scope of security governance has widened in the post-Cold
War period. Political (and scholarly) attention is no longer exclusively
focused on state sovereignty and interstate conict, but security governance
encompasses prevention, threats from non-state actors, human rights concerns, and even environmental risks. The ultimate concern is to identify
the conditions under which RSOs indeed become relevant institutions able
to contribute to regional security. Similarity of political system and capacity across member states increases RSO scope. Further, organizations
appear to follow their own organizational dynamics. Interestingly, there is
very little evidence that hegemony contributes to the expansion of collective security governance. Notably, the evidence to support the idea that
more independent RSOs with a broader agenda contribute signicantly to
regional peace is very weak. What may explain these, somewhat contradictory, ndings?
First of all, some general doubt exists regarding the signicance of
regional security organizations in terms of their contribution to regional
security. The effectiveness of the EU clearly politically the most developed RSO or NATO indubitably with the most military power is often
questioned. Consequently, it may be heroic to expect strong results for
such weakly institutionalized RSOs as the Mano River Union. Secondly,
although we include a relatively large number of RSOs with considerable
variation in mandate and scope, some (inevitable) selection bias remains.
Some conict-prone regions, such as South Asia and East Africa, are
underrepresented. Thirdly, the current research design focuses on intraregional conict (as dened by RSO membership) and thus excludes the

142 Han Dorussen and Emil J. Kirchner

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possibility that RSOs may promote security in the wider neighborhood.

Anal,andpossiblymostintriguing,possibilityisthatexistingstudiesonRSOs
tend to overestimate their impact because they link the security agenda of
the RSO directly to regional (in)security. In fact, there may well be some
common factors underlying both variables: regions with states that are
willing to support regional integration (or cooperation) are also more
likely to be peaceful. Our study provides some evidence for this conjecture.
The more detailed comparison of regional security organizations based
in and outside Asia addresses some of these issues. Despite the relative longevity of the ASEAN secretariat, no signicant delegation of powers to
either ASEAN or the ARF in the provision of security has occurred. This
is often attributed to the fundamental principle of no outside interference
guiding security cooperation in Asia. However, there are indications that
scope expansion has taken place and is continuing. It is argued that
ASEAN economic motivations, once clearly central, have now become
secondary to conict management and resolution (Amer, 1999; Forbes,
2003; Acharya, 2009). Moreover, it is suggested that the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (which China joined in 2003) has contributed to condence among states that were previously in conict with
one another, thereby generating a sense of community (and a consequent
willingness to cooperate) (Ravenhill, 2009, p. 220). Our analysis indeed
suggests that the limited scope of Asian RSOs is not exceptional; to the
contrary, most variables that are useful to explain RSO scope outside Asia
also apply to Asia. There is one important exception: our analysis suggests
that the legacy of conict in the region still limits the scope of activities
taken up by Asian RSOs.
A pivotal concern of Asian regional security structure seems to be to
entice China away from balance of power practices and to adopt communitarian practices (Adler and Greve, 2009, p. 76; Goh, 2007/2008, p. 139).
This type of reason implies the possibility of placing China in a golden
cage, or expecting China to develop a form of what Ikenberry calls institutional self-binding (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 238), whereby a greater power
adopts a structure of restraint towards its weaker neighbors in exchange
for the latters collective recognition of its own economic and security
interests and leadership. Jones et al. (2013) deviate from this view, arguing
that the balance of power remains critical for South East Asia security
relations with the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea. This
view chimes also with the suggestion that China sees US policies of

The scope and impact of regional security organizations 143

Acknowledgements
We thank Erik Gartzke, Ben Goldsmith, Koji Kagotani, Barry ONeill,
Arthur Stein, Atsushi Tago, Jeff Weber, and other participants of the East
Asian Security Workshop, 1819 April 2013, for their helpful comments.

Funding
The East Asian Security Workshop was funded by the Suntory
Foundation.

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