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United States v. Johnny Lee Hansley, A/K/A Johnnie Lee Hansley, Glenn Hansley, Ray Bennett, Bobby Riley, Earl Jackson, 54 F.3d 709, 11th Cir. (1995)
United States v. Johnny Lee Hansley, A/K/A Johnnie Lee Hansley, Glenn Hansley, Ray Bennett, Bobby Riley, Earl Jackson, 54 F.3d 709, 11th Cir. (1995)
3d 709
In this appeal, we affirm the convictions and sentences of all appellants, except
Earl Jackson. As to Jackson, we affirm his conviction, but remand to the
district court for resentencing.
A jury convicted the appellants, Johnny Lee Hansley, Glenn Hansley, Bobby
Riley, Ray Bennett, and Earl Jackson for their involvement in a conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine.1 Hansley, Glenn Hansley, and Riley appeal their
convictions. Because all of their arguments are meritless, we affirm their
convictions without discussion.2 Hansley, Riley, Bennett, and Jackson appeal
their sentences. We affirm the sentences of Hansley, Riley, and Bennett; we,
however, vacate Jackson's sentence and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
3
Hansley led a conspiracy that imported crack cocaine from south Florida and
distributed it in Hazelhurst, Georgia. Riley and Jackson were the conspiracy's
sources for the crack cocaine in south Florida. Hansley usually sent a courier to
obtain the drugs.
Bennett and Glenn Hansley were also couriers. On one trip, authorities pulled
their car over and found them to be in possession of $15,000. Authorities also
pulled Bennett over on two other trips. On one trip they found $9,718; on the
other, they found $7,800.
On September 29, 1990, when Hansley attempted to travel to south Florida, law
enforcement authorities stopped him at the Jacksonville International Airport as
he was attempting to catch a flight to Miami. The authorities found Hansley in
possession of $13,000.
The conspiracy finally came to an end in March 1991, when law enforcement
officers executed a search warrant at Hansley's residence. The officers found,
among other things, large sums of cash, various incriminating documents, and a
Rossi .38 caliber revolver.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
9
On March 28, 1991, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against the
appellants. Count I charged all of the appellants with conspiring to distribute
crack cocaine from 1985 to 1991, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Count II
charged Hansley and Jackson with the substantive offense of possessing crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute on June 2, 1990, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
Sec. 841(a)(1). Count III charged Hansley and Bennett with the substantive
offense of possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute on November 9,
1990.
10
11
Trial commenced on September 9, 1991. One week later, the jury convicted the
appellants on all three counts. The United States Probation Office then
prepared a presentence report (PSR) for each appellant. The PSRs stated that
the appellants "had reasonably foreseeable knowledge [that] at least 5
kilograms of cocaine base" were involved in the conspiracy. As a result, the
PSRs set the appellants' base offense levels at forty, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec.
2D1.1(a)(3).3 Hansley's PSR also assessed him: (1) a two-level increase for
possessing a firearm during the commission of the offense; and (2) three
additional criminal history points because he committed the instant offenses
while serving probation and less than two years after he was released from
custody.
12
Hansley and Jackson filed objections to their base offense levels, arguing that
the five-kilogram total was incorrect. Hansley also objected to the two-level
increase and to the three additional criminal history points attributed to him.
The government filed a response to their objections.
13
The district court held a sentencing hearing on November 22, 1991. At the
The district court then sentenced Jackson to 400 months imprisonment based on
a total offense level of forty-two and a criminal history category of III. After
rejecting Hansley's other objections, the district court sentenced him to life
imprisonment based on a total offense level of forty-three and a criminal history
category of III.
16
Also at the hearing, Riley, who had not filed any substantive challenges to his
PSR, failed to make any objections when given the opportunity. Accordingly,
the district court sentenced him to 328 months imprisonment based on the
PSR's calculations of a total offense level of forty and a criminal history
category of I.
17
Finally, at the hearing, Bennett argued that his three prior felony drug
convictions were not sufficient to sustain a mandatory minimum term of life
imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) because his 1989 Georgia
conviction and his 1991 Florida conviction were not "spatially or temporally
distinct" from the instant federal charges. Furthermore, he argued that "the 81
and the 89 [Georgia] convictions were for simple possession of drugs." The
district court, however, found "it mandatory ... to enhance the sentence on both
counts as a result of the two prior Georgia convictions." Accordingly, the
district court sentenced Bennett to life imprisonment.
CONTENTIONS
18
Hansley, Jackson, and Riley contend that, when calculating their base offense
levels, the district court clearly erred in finding that the conspiracy involved
more than five kilograms of crack cocaine. Jackson and Riley further contend
that even if the conspiracy involved more than five kilograms of crack cocaine,
they are only personally responsible for a lesser quantity.
19
The government responds that the evidence at trial supported the district court's
finding that more than five kilograms of crack cocaine were involved in the
conspiracy. The government also argues that Hansley, who was the leader of
the conspiracy, is responsible for this entire quantity, and that Jackson, who
was a primary source of the drugs, was personally involved in over five
kilograms. Moreover, Jackson and Riley should have reasonably foreseen that
over five kilograms were involved. The government also asserts that Riley
waived this contention because he did not object at the time of sentencing.
20
Hansley also challenges his sentence on two other grounds. First, he claims that
the district court incorrectly applied a two-level increase for possessing a
firearm, arguing that he did not possess the firearm during the commission of
the conspiracy. The government contends that the firearm was found in his
residence, which was a center of drug activity. Second, Hansley argues that he
did not commit the instant offenses while on probation, nor did he commit them
within two years of being released from custody; therefore, the district court
erred in assessing him three additional criminal history points. The government
responds that the record clearly shows otherwise.
21
ISSUES
22
We discuss the following issues: (1) whether, in determining their base offense
levels, the district court clearly erred in attributing at least five kilograms of
crack cocaine to Hansley, Jackson, and Riley; (2) whether the district court
properly assessed a two-level increase and three additional criminal history
points to Hansley; and (3) whether Bennett's prior convictions support his
mandatory term of life imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
A. The Five-Kilogram Claims
23
The district court did not make individualized findings as to Hansley; it simply
stated that all of the conspirators could have reasonably foreseen that at least
five kilograms of crack cocaine were involved. Nevertheless, we may uphold
Hansley's sentence "if the record supports the amount of drugs attributed to"
him. Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499.
25
The record clearly demonstrates that Hansley was the leader of this conspiracy,
and that all of the crack cocaine involved should be attributed to him. Indeed,
Hansley does not dispute his leadership role, and appears to concede that he
should be held accountable for all of the crack cocaine. He, however, maintains
that the district court clearly erred in determining that the quantity of drugs
involved in the conspiracy totaled more than five kilograms.
26
The record shows, at the very least, twenty attempted trips from Hazelhurst to
south Florida for the purpose of purchasing drugs: fifteen for Sellers; one for
Bennett and Glenn Hansley; three more for Bennett; and one for Hansley. Also,
"the record reveal[s] sufficient circumstantial [and] direct evidence" to show
that each of these trips was an attempt to purchase approximately 272 grams of
crack cocaine. Butler, 41 F.3d at 1447.4 Thus, based on these figures, the
conspiracy involved an attempt to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine
base.5 Because this entire quantity is attributable to Hansley, the district court
did not clearly err in setting his base offense level at forty.
2. Jackson
27
Unlike Hansley, Jackson was not the leader of this conspiracy. As a result, he
argues that he is not responsible for all of the crack cocaine. Furthermore,
Jackson asserts that he was only personally involved in a small quantity, and he
could not have reasonably foreseen that more than five kilograms were
involved. At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not make any
individualized findings concerning the scope of Jackson's criminal activity in
the conspiracy.
28
"We have reviewed the record and conclude that, without individualized
findings, the conspiracy's entire output cannot be attributed to [Jackson]."
Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. While the record reveals that Jackson was one of
Hansley's sources in south Florida, and that he provided couriers with crack
cocaine on several occasions, it does not reveal on how many occasions he did
so, and whether he could have reasonably foreseen the conspiracy's entire
output. "[W]ithout individualized findings concerning the scope of [Jackson's]
involvement with the conspiracy, it cannot be determined that [he] should be
liable for some quantity less than all." Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. Likewise, if
Jackson is not liable for the entire output, individual findings need to be made
as to the quantity for which he is accountable.
29
Thus, we remand to the district court for further factual findings. We do not
suggest that Jackson could not have reasonably foreseen that more than five
kilograms of crack cocaine were involved, or that he himself was involved in
less than five kilograms. Rather, we simply find that we are unable to make
these determinations without individualized findings.
3. Riley
30
Like Jackson, Riley was not a leader of this conspiracy. Thus, Riley makes the
same arguments as Jackson: he could not have foreseen the conspiracy's output,
and he was only personally involved in a minimal amount of crack cocaine.
Unfortunately, Riley has waived this argument.
31
Unlike Hansley and Jackson, Riley did not file an objection to the PSR's
calculation of his base offense level. Then, at the sentencing hearing, the
district court offered Riley multiple chances to articulate this objection. He did
not do so. Nonetheless, Riley now argues that he has preserved this claim,
pointing to the following comment which his counsel made at the sentencing
hearing: "Your Honor, I'd like to make a brief statement on behalf of my
client.... [A]ny sentence given Bobby Riley should be based solely on any
involvement of which he was involved and convicted and not based on the farreaching and very detrimental negative effects of any drug trafficking
conspiracy."
32
We do not find that the above comment preserved this issue for appeal. "Where
the district court has offered the opportunity to object and a party is silent or
fails to state the grounds for objection, objections to the sentence will be
waived for purposes of appeal." United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 275, 112 L.Ed.2d 230 (1990),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th
Cir.1993) (en banc ). When the district court asked for objections, Riley failed
to present any. The above comment, which counsel made in the middle of a
general statement on Riley's behalf, does not constitute an objection. Thus,
Riley waived this contention.
33
This court, however, will "consider sentence objections raised for the first time
on appeal under the plain error doctrine to avoid 'manifest injustice.' " United
States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United
States v. Neely, 979 F.2d 1522, 1523 (11th Cir.1992)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
114 S.Ct. 734, 126 L.Ed.2d 698 (1994). The district court erred when it failed
to make individualized findings as to Riley's involvement in the conspiracy.
The issue, however, is whether this mistake constitutes plain error. Plain error
exists where the mistake is "so obvious that the failure to notice it would
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Newsome, 998 F.2d at 1581 (quoting United States v. Chaney,
662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). We cannot say that the district
court's failure to make individualized findings reaches this high standard of
egregious error. Thus, we refuse to entertain Riley's contention.
B. Hansley's Other Claims
34
Hansley argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)
(1), which provides for a two-level increase "[i]f a dangerous weapon
(including a firearm) was possessed." The district court applied this specific
offense characteristic because when officers executed the search warrant for
Hansley's residence, they found a firearm. At his sentencing hearing, Hansley
argued that "the firearm that was seized from his house [was not] related to the
commission of the offense." The government responded that the officers
executing the warrant found the gun in the house near several drug-related
items.
36
37
Likewise, in this case, the government showed that the agents found a firearm
and other drug-related items in Hansley's residence, where he engaged in
conspiratorial conversations. Furthermore, Hansley presented no evidence to
suggest that a connection between the firearm and his drug conspiracy was
clearly improbable. Thus, we find that the two-level increase, pursuant to
section 2D1.1(b)(1), was proper.
39
Hansley argues that the assessment of these last three points was erroneous
because he only began participating in this conspiracy in 1989; therefore, he
was no longer serving probation, and he had been out of custody for over two
years. Upon reviewing the record, however, we find that the district court did
not clearly err in finding that Hansley's conspiracy "started, at the very latest,
the early part of 1986." As a result, the district court properly assessed the three
additional points because Hansley committed the instant offense while serving
probation and within two years of his imprisonment.
C. Bennett's Claim
40
Bennett first argues that the district court should not have used the 1989
conviction to enhance his sentence because that conviction was related to an
overt act of the instant conspiracy. Thus, he contends that the 1989 conviction
is not distinct enough in time to be considered a prior, unrelated conviction.
"Because the question of whether prior convictions [are] related or unrelated for
purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A) involves a factual inquiry, we review the
district court's decision for clear error." United States v. Rice, 43 F.3d 601, 606
(11th Cir.1995).
43
In Rice, the defendant argued that his multiple prior convictions should be
considered a single prior conviction for purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)
because they were all part of one overall conspiracy. This court, however,
rejected his argument, holding that "the separate criminal acts for which [the
defendant] was convicted, whether or not part of an over-arching conspiracy ...,
are not 'related' convictions justifying lesser penalties under section 841(b)(1)
(A) because they are separate in time and locale and were acts requiring
separate planning and execution." Rice, 43 F.3d at 608. Thus, under Rice, the
threshold issue is whether a prior conviction is "separate in time and locale;"
the fact that prior convictions may have resulted from criminal conduct in
furtherance of one overall conspiracy is, for the most part, meaningless.
44
We recognize that Rice is slightly distinguishable from the facts of this case,
Bennett's Georgia conviction became final on March 20, 1989. He, however,
continued to engage in the Hansley conspiracy until his arrest on November 9,
1990. Ironically, like the defendant in Garcia, Bennett continued to engage in
drug-related, conspiratorial activity for over eighteen months. Although
Bennett's 1989 conviction may have resulted from criminal conduct taken in
furtherance of the Hansley conspiracy, he continued to engage in the conspiracy
for a significant period of time. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in
enhancing Bennett's sentence based on his 1989 conviction.
Bennett also argues that his two prior convictions were mere possession
offenses, and that Congress did not intend for such simple violations to stand as
a predicate for a mandatory term of life imprisonment under section 841(b)(1)
(A). Bennett's contention presents an issue of "[s]tatutory interpretation[,
which] is a question of law subject to de novo review." United States v. Harden,
37 F.3d 595, 600 (11th Cir.1994) (construing enhancement provision in section
841(b)(1)(A)).
47
In 1991, when the district court sentenced Bennett, the definition of a prior
"felony drug offense" appeared in section 841(b)(1)(A). The definition
provided:
48 term "felony drug offense" means an offense that is a felony under any provision
the
of this subchapter or any other Federal law that prohibits or restricts conduct relating
to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances or a felony under
any law of a State or a foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to
narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances.
49
21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) (1990). 7 The definition does not contain any
language excluding state felonies for simple possession. Thus, under the plain
language of the statute, it appears that a "felony drug offense" includes any
criminal conduct relating to narcotics, including simple possession, which a
state has proscribed as a felony.8
50
CONCLUSION
51
52
53
54
I concur with all of Judge Hatchett's well-reasoned opinion except that I would
vacate the sentence of Bobby Riley and remand for the district court to make
individual findings as to the quantity of crack cocaine for which Bobby Riley is
accountable.
Honorable George C. Young, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District
of Florida, sitting by designation
Glenn Hansley and Riley contend that the government presented insufficient
evidence to sustain their convictions. Hansley contends that the district court
erred in failing to suppress evidence seized from: (1) his person as a result of an
airport stop; and (2) his residence pursuant to a search warrant
In Butler (and Lawrence ), the district court accepted the findings in the PSR,
which calculated the total quantity of drugs attributable to each conspirator
based on the amount transacted on one random day. On appeal, this court
remanded for resentencing because no evidence showed that the day used "was
a reliable proxy for all of the other days in the conspiracy." Butler, 41 F.3d at
1447. Butler is distinguishable, however, because ample evidence in this record
supports the use of 272 grams as "a reliable proxy for all of the other [trips] in
the conspiracy." Butler, 41 F.3d at 1447. For example, officers arrested Sellers
while attempting to return 272 grams of crack cocaine to Hansley. He testified
that this was the amount he usually transported. Likewise, officers arrested
Bennett while attempting to return 278 grams of crack cocaine to Hansley.
Moreover, Sellers testified that he usually delivered around $9000 to obtain the
usual amount of 272 grams. The other couriers, who were pulled over, carried
in the vicinity of $9000 on their trips to purchase crack cocaine in south Florida
20 trips X .272 kg/trip = 5.44 kg. Although this figure is close to the fivekilogram threshold, we note that the record indicates that it is likely that more
than twenty trips were made. Furthermore, the record indicates that some trips,
such as one Sellers made, may have involved considerably more than 272
grams of crack cocaine
In 1994, Congress removed the definition of "felony drug offense" from section
841(b)(1)(A), and placed it in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802. Congress also altered the
definition slightly. Now, "[t]he term 'felony drug offense' means an offense that
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the
United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct
relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances." 21
U.S.C. Sec. 802(43)
8