Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Kant on Intuition
Author(s): Kirk Dallas Wilson
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 25, No. 100 (Jul., 1975), pp. 247-265
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
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247

KANT ON INTUITION
BY KIRR DALLAS WILSON

Kant's Logic1 begins by dividing objective representations into intuitions

and concepts:
All cognitions, that is, all [re]presentations consciously referred to an

object, are either intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular [re]-

presentation (repraesentatio singularis), the concept is a general (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflective [re]presentation (repraesentatio discursiva) (op. cit., ? 1).

But, as Frege has noted, this definition of 'intuition' contains no mention

of a connection with sensibility,2 a connection that dominates the treatment
of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic.3 What is more, in contrast

with the Logic definition of intuition in terms of singularity, the opening

sentence of the Transcendental Aesthetic reads,
In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge
may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate

relation to them. . . . (A19=B34).

Later in the Critique, however, 'intuition' is defined by both singularity and

immediacy: intuition, Kant says, "relates immediately to the object and is

[singular (einzeln)]" (A320=B377).
Two problems with Kant's notion of intuition emerge:
(1) How are the singularity and immediacy criteria for defining intuitive representations related?

(2) How is the connection between intuition and sensibility to be

established?

In the Prolegomena4 and in the Transcendental Expositions in B, Kant

treats the connection of intuition to sensibility as a consequence of a certain
theory of mathematical construction (see sec. V below); however, the relation
between singularity and immediacy as defining criteria of intuition is never,

as far as I know, made explicit by Kant.

In some recent articles Jaakko Hintikka has argued that the immediacy
criterion is just another formulation of the singularity criterion.5 Charles
Parsons has countered that the two criteria are different and, moreover, that
lImmanuel Kant: Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Library
of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis, 1974). Hereinafter, Logic; references to this work will
appear in the text.
2The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (New York, 1960), p. 19.
30f the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp-Smith (London, 1963). Here-

inafter, Critique; references will appear in the text.

4Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck, Library of Liberal

Arts (Indianapolis, 1950). Hereinafter, Prolegomena; references will appear in the text.
5Most notably in "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)", in The First
Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, ed. T. Penelhum and J. J.
Macintosh (Belmont, 1969), esp. p. 42. See also Hintikka's reply to Parsons, "Kantian
Intuitions", Inquiry, 15 (1972), pp. 341-5, esp. p. 342.

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248 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

the singularity criterion is broader than that of immediacy in characterizing

representations as intuitive.6 I shall argue that Kant's two criteria are

intensionally different but extensionally identical. In other words, although
each criterion identifies a different aspect of intuitive representations, any
representation that satisfies the one also satisfies the other. Against Hintikka, therefore, I shall argue that immediacy cannot be reduced to singularity, and against Parsons I shall argue that neither criterion is broader than
the other. The root difficulty in both Hintikka's and Parsons' positions lies
in their interpretation of Kantian intuitions as corresponding to singular
terms of the Predicate Calculus. Against this interpretation I shall defend
a reconstruction of Kant's singularity criterion in terms of mereological
primitives and of the immediacy criterion in terms of a suitable notion of
isomorphism.
I

Though much is said of the ambiguity between act and content in Kant's
notion of representation, Kant rarely used 'representation' to mean the act
of representing. While such acts are necessarily tied to our representations,
representations themselves are objects of consciousness (mental entities).
Our representations are the content of our acts of apprehending; they are
the what of what is apprehended. Accordingly, in this paper I shall use
'representation' in the content-sense.

Let us begin by noting a prima facie case for the intensional difference
but extensional identity of the singularity and immediacy criteria. Though
prima facie, this case prohibits one kind of reconstruction of Kant's notion
of intuition.

Concepts are said to be general representations because they represent

many objects by marks or characteristics that these objects have in common.

By implication, then, intuitions do not represent their objects by marks or

characteristics. But because Kant holds the transcendental thesis that

intuitions are connected with sensibility, which therefore places the study
of singular representations outside the scope of general logic and inside that
of aesthetic (A52=B76), Kant does not explain in the logic how intuitions
represent in virtue of their singularity. In formal logic Kant mentions the
singularity of intuitive representations as a contrast with the generality of
conceptual representations. Nevertheless, we shall find that it is possible
through the contrast with the generality of concepts to reconstruct the
singularity of representations with logical mechanisms (sec. III below). Thus
we obtain one of Kant's criteria for distinguishing kinds of representations
-singularity versus generality-as a distinction regarding the logical structure of a representation.

On the other hand, while singularity is mentioned at least seven times

as the defining feature of intuitions in the logic lectures during the critical
6"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", in Philosophy, Science, and Method, ed. Sidney
Morgenbesser, et al. (New York, 1969), p. 570.

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KANT ON INTUITION 249

period, the immediacy criterion is alluded to only twice.7 This imbalance is

quite understandable, since logic, according to Kant, abstracts from the
mode in which a representation relates to an object (A55==B79). Immediacy
versus mediacy, as modes of representation, constitute a critical distinction
between ways in which a representation is said to represent its object. The
critical character of this distinction emerges from the important letter to
Marcus Herz of February 1772 in which Kant first raised the critical question.

Although he later formulated the critical question in terms of the synthetic a priori character of judgments, Kant originally questioned "the
grounds of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the
object".8 Kant immediately added that "passive or sensuous representations
[i.e. intuitions] have an understandable relationship to objects", since they
are the immediate effects on the mind of the objects themselves. Even in
the mature critical philosophy there is some evidence that Kant tended to
identify the object represented by intuition with the cause of the intuition;9

it is easy to see in this argument the justification of intuition's immediate,

and critically unproblematic, relation to its object. The critical difficulty,
on the other hand, concerns "intellectual representations", for these depend
upon the "inner activity of the mind" and, therefore, cannot stand in immediate relation to their objects.10 This early formulation of the critical
problem is reflected in the Critique by the doctrine that concepts are predi-

cates of possible judgments (A69=B94) and, hence, require a mediating

representation in order to relate to objects. According to this doctrine, all
concepts contain other representations under themselves as the mediating
elements in their relation to objects (A69=B93-94).1 Thus, of the two criteria
7In Kants Vorlesungen: Vorlesungen iber Logik, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, hrsg.
von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 24 (Berlin, 1966).
References to intuition as singular representation occur in Logik Philippi, p. 451; Logik
Politz, pp. 565, 566; Logik Busolt, p. 653; Logik Dohna-Wundlacken, p. 754; and Wiener
Logik, pp. 904, 905. Intuition as immediate representation is assumed but not directly
stated in Logik Politz, p. 569, during a discussion of the impossibility of infimae species

(or lowest species). Immediacy is explicitly associated with intuition in Logik Dohna-

Wundlacken, p. 754; but by 1792 one might expect that aspects of the critical philosophy
would be creeping into the logic lectures. Further references to these notes will appear

in the text; the translations are mine.

8In Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago,
1967), p. 71.

9See Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New
York, 1962), p. 80.
'0Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, p. 72.
"1By repudiating the traditional doctrine of infimae species (see Logic, ? 11, Note;
and Logik Politz, p. 569), Kant proves that it is part of the logical theory of concepts
that all concepts contain other concepts under themselves, for this repudiation guarantees at least in principle that any concept can be a genus. What is critical about this
doctrine is that concepts are used as predicates in judgments when they are used to
provide a conceptualization of objects. However, Manley Thompson is mistaken when

he argues that the repudiation of the doctrine of infimae species entails that Kant would
have used the first-order scheme 'Fx' as the form of predication rather than the form

of classical logic 'S is P' ("Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology",

The Review of Metaphysics, XXVI (1972), pp. 325-326). The repudiation of the doctrine
of infimae species is only a necessary condition for Kant's critical use of concepts as
mediate representations in the critical philosophy.

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250 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

for classifying representations, the one concerns the logical structure of a

representation, the other its critical relation to its object.
The intensional difference between singularity and immediacy, therefore,
lies in the distinction between defining logical and critical (semantic) aspects

of a representation. Nevertheless, since concepts (general representations)

are associated with mediate representations in the critical philosophy, it is
natural to assume that singular representations stand in immediate relation
to their object. Hence we have the extensional identity of the two criteria.
Moreover, it follows that intuitions cannot be construed in terms equivalent to conceptual singularity. Intuitions qua singular concepts would be
in immediate (and unproblematic) relation to their objects insofar as they
are intuitions, but in mediate (and problematic) relations to these same
objects insofar as they are conceptual. These critical associations of singularity-immediacy and generality-mediacy contrast with Kant's pre-critical
position where intuitions were treated as singular concepts. In the Dissertation of 1770, the concepts of time and space are said to be singular and
intuitions.l2 This ambiguity occurs, for instance, when Kant says,
The concept of space contains in itself the very form of all sensual
intuition (Diss., ? 15 C).
This position should be compared with the precise statement at the conclusion of the Metaphysical Exposition of Space in the Critique: ". .. the
original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept"
(A25=B40).
Kant's rejection of conceptual singularity as a conception of intuition is
clearly indicated in the logic lecture notes. In the pre-critical Logik Blomberg

(1771), Kant divides concepts into singular and common (general) (? 260,
p. 257). The former take up the role of intuition by representing an object

immediately. However, after the critical question is raised, conceptual

representation is restricted to generality and the immediacy criterion, as we

have noted, is reduced in importance in the logic. In the Logik Philippi

(May, 1772), Kant draws the logical distinction between concepts and intuitions as it functions in the critical philosophy:

A concept is a general representation; representations which are not

general are not concepts. ... A singular representation is intuition
(p. 451).
II

While logic abstracts from the mode of representing an object, it nevertheless deals with objective representations, representations which purport

to represent an object, and excludes subjective representations such as

sensations and feelings. Compliance with the singularity criterion requires
that a representation purports to represent a single object. We might thus
120n the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world, trans. G. B. Kerferd,
in Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, trans. Kerferd

and D. E. Walford (New York, 1968); see esp. ?? 14 (subsections 2 and 3), and 15 (subsections B and C). Hereinafter, Diss.; references will appear in the text.

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KANT ON INTUITION 251

be tempted to agree with Hintikka that

Kant's notion of intuition is not very far from what we would call a

singular term. An intuition is for Kant a "representation"-we

would perhaps rather say a symbol-which refers to an individual

object or which is used as if it would refer to one.13
But problems confront such a reconstruction. Parsons is correct in pointing
out that definite descriptions are singular but that they designate by means
of conceptual representations.l4 Certainly our prima facie case in sec. I. is
against any identification of intuitions with definite descriptions, for this
identification would amount to conceiving of intuitions in terms of conceptual singularity.
Parsons takes the existence of definite descriptions to show, contra
Hintikka's reduction of immediacy to singularity, that there can be nonimmediate singular representations, and therefore that the singularity criterion is broader in picking out intuitive representations than is the immediacy criterion. Parsons maintains that
. . Kant never remarks, so far as I know, on the implications of
the possibility of non-immediate singular representations for the concept of intuition.15

But certainly such implications are in Kant. In the critical philosophy,

intuition is defined in terms of immediacy, and non-immediate singularity
would, again, be a case of intuitions as singular concepts. Parsons is led to
this curious position because he retains Hintikka's assumption that intuitions
correspond to singular terms of modern logic. Hence, for Parsons, there can

be singular representations (i.e., singular terms) containing mediate representations as parts.

But neither demonstratives nor proper names can function as formal
counterparts of Kantian intuitions for the same reason that definite descrip-

tions cannot-namely, their conceptuality. Manley Thompson, in his excellent discussion of this problem, notes that demonstratives "are conspicuously

representations of concepts'".16 Demonstratives such as 'this' and 'the . . .

here' are construed in Kantian logic as giving concepts a singular use in
judgments in order to enable one to use a (general) concept to refer to a
single object of that kind.17 Kant himself gives 'Diese Welt ist die beste' as
an example of a singular judgment.18 As far as I can determine, Kant employs demonstratives only in singular judgments, and it is absurd to claim
1""On Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 43. Hintikka's final phrase, "or which is used

as if it would refer to one", is meant to refer to the a priori intuitions of space and time.

14"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", p. 570.

15Ibid.

16"Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology", p. 329. I owe much

more than can be footnoted to Professor Thompson's acute article.
17See Logic, ? 1, Note 2: "It is mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts, a mistake based on a wrong division of concepts into general, particular, and
singular. Not the concepts themselves, only their use can be divided in this way."
18Kants Handschriftlicher Nachlass, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, hrsg. von der
K8niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 16 (Berlin, 1924), N 3173.

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252 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

that concepts which are given a singular use by demonstratives are miraculously converted into an intuition of an object.
Similarly, proper names cannot represent Kantian intuitions, for proper
names are eliminable in the Predicate Calculus in favour of general terms
(representations of concepts) and variables of quantification. Interpreting
intuitions as proper names would reduce intuitions in principle to conceptual
representations. That such a reduction would be misguided is seen from
the fact that one cannot make a judgment about Wilson by just possessing
the proper name 'Wilson'. An intuition of Wilson is still required. Indeed,
the use of proper names shares common features with the use of concepts,
features that distinguish proper names from intuitions. As with conceptual
representations, it makes sense to talk about the application, reapplication,
and misapplication of names. But since intuitions are means by which
objects are given (A50=B74), they are not applied to objects; therefore, they
cannot be reapplied or misapplied.19
Thus, no singular term of the Predicate Calculus conforms to Kant's use
of 'intuition'. In particular then, no singular term can conform to Kant's
singularity criterion.
III

The form of singular and general representations determines different

ways in which intuitions and concepts express part-whole relationships and
divisibility-today we might say that these representations express different

relations of membership. I shall consider concepts first. The form of concepts possesses two distinctive features: Allgemeinheit (= generality or universality), and the fact that this form must be generated by the mind itself

(Logic, ? 2, & ? 4, Note). In Logic, ?? 5-6, Kant argues that a representation

is made general by subordinating other representations to it through "logical

acts" (analytic judgments) of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. This

subordination produces a hierarchical ordering of concepts according to which

the subordinated concept, from which the higher concept is abstracted, is

contained under the higher concept. Those representations that are contained under a concept constitute the Umfang of that concept. Moreover,
the higher concept is said to be contained in the subordinated concepts
(Logic, ?? 7 & 9). In this way we generate a species-genus ordering of concepts (Logic, ? 10): the concept Philosopher is subordinated under the concept
Human which in turn is subordinated under Animal; conversely, the concept

Human is contained in the concept Philosopher, which differs from the

concept Human by some specific differentia, and Animal is contained in
Human, which also contains the differentia Rational.
Because the concepts subordinated under a higher concept may be called
"9The argument beginning with "Indeed, the use of proper names . . ." is Manley
Thompson's argument against construing Kantian intuitions as proper names; see
"Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology", pp. 327-8.

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KANT ON INTUITION 253

the members of the division of that concept (Logic ? 110), a theory of one
kind of part-whole relation results from the generality of concepts. According
to this theory the parts of a whole are subordinated to the whole, while the

whole is contained within the parts. The paradoxical character of the claim
that the whole can be contained within the parts may be removed by noting

that in dividing a concept one divides the extension (Umfang) of that concept. In discussing the nature of logical division, Kant tells us,
To dissect a concept and to divide it are two very different things.

In dissecting the concept I see what is contained in it (through

analysis); in dividing it I consider what is contained under it. Here

I divide the sphere [Umfang] of the concept, not the concept itself.

The division, far from dissecting the concept, rather adds to it through

its members, for they contain more within them than does the concept (Logic, ? 110, Note 1).
The members of a logical division are obtained by placing differentiae upon
a concept. Thus, in the sense that a logical division of a concept A results
in its species, all of which are A's, the whole is contained within the parts of

the division. The logical division of concepts is a regressus in indefinitum,

for the process of finding specific differentiae for a concept qua genus continues indefinitely in principle (Logic, ? 11; also Wiener Logik, p. 910). More-

over, this regression is merely a regulative principle of reason20 (A668===

B696); it is only a methodological procedure for investigating nature.
It is noteworthy that the subordination of part to whole is expressible

by the classical class-membership relation. Kant was aware of the settheoretic character of the conceptual part-whole relation, for in his lectures
he often defined the extension of a concept as a set:

The sphere [Sphaera] is the extension [Umfang] of a concept, and

concerns the set of things [Menge der Dinge] which are subordinated
under the concept (Wiener Logik, p. 911; also Dohna-Wundlacken
Logik, p. 755).
We have the following definition of the subordination relation:

A is a subordinated part of B =df. A e i(P is contained under B).

Further formalization of Kant's theory of concepts lies beyond the scope of

this paper. In particular, one cannot tell as yet whether Kant's theory
contains antinomies. However, it is likely that Kant avoids antinomies by
restricting the scope of his theory to species-genus concepts (gelehrte Begriffe)

thereby excluding antinomic concepts.

In contrast with concepts, intuitive representations are given with their
forms. While time, Kant contends, is the form of all human intuitions, it
will be convenient in this section and the next to confine our attention to

space, which is the form of intuitions representing things "outside" us.

Now since the form of concepts defines these representations as general, we
must assume that space defines intuitions as singular representations. In
20For further discussion of the preceding two features of the logical division of con-

cepts, see Jules Vuillemin, "Reflexionen fiber Kants Logik", Kant-Studien Band 52,
Heft 3 (1960-1), p. 316.

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254 KIRK DALLAS WLSON

this case, the theory of singularity will result in a part-whole relation that
is the converse of that which results from generality. Whereas for concepts

the parts are subordinated to the whole and the whole is contained within
the parts, it follows that the parts of an intuition are contained within the
whole and that the whole is greater than any individual part. Kant puts
forward this view in the third argument (in B) of the Metaphysical Exposition

of Space when he says,

. . if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one

and the same unique space (A25=B39).

Thus, in general, we may say that an intuition is a representation whose
parts are contained within its whole.
The part-whole relation associated with singularity, moreover, leads to a
different theory of division from that associated with generality. The division
of concepts occurs by limiting a concept by means of differentiae; however,

in the Metaphysical Exposition of Space Kant argues,

Space is essentially one; the manifold in it . . .depends solely on

[the introduction of] limitations [Einschrdnkungen] (A25=B39; the

insert is Kemp Smith's).

These limitations are boundaries placed within the whole of space. The
division of an intuition does not take place by noting specific differences
between one part of space and other, but through placing boundaries within
one and the same space. Vuillemin has pointed out two features of this
division (compare these with the corresponding features of the division of
conceptual representations): first, the division is a regressus in infinitum,
and secondly, this division represents a constitutive principle of intuitive
representations.21
Since the conceptual part-whole relation is a counterpart to a set-theoretic
notion of membership, it is natural to suggest that the singularity criterion
determines the structure of a representation according to a mereological
conception of the part-whole relation. Also called the calculus of individuals,
mereology22 is the study of the formal relations in which the parts of a
concrete whole, or of an individual, stand to the whole itself. Whitehead
saw that events possess a mereological structure: one event can be part of
another, "larger", event, or two events may overlap. Similarly, the parts of
physical objects stand in a mereological relation with the whole physical
object of which they are the parts, as, for example, a window is part of a
house. While a concrete whole may be called the (mereological) class of its
parts, it is obvious that this concept of class differs from that of classical
21"Reflexionen iiber Kants Logik", pp. 315-6.

22Mereology was first developed by S. Lesniewski. It was developed by Nelson

Goodman and H. S. Leonard in "The Calculus of Individuals and its Uses", The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, 5 (1940), pp. 45-55; see also Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appear-

ance (Indianapolis, 1966), ch. II, ? 4. A formalization of mereology by Alfred Tarski

appears in J. H. Woodger, Axiomatic Method in Biology (Cambridge, 1937), Appendix V.

For a brief discussion of mereology, see Guido Kiing, Ontology and the Logical Analysis
of Language (Dordrecht, 1967), ch. 8, esp. pp. 102-7.

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KANT ON INTUITION 255

set theory. There is no need to consider the variables of a system of mereological relations as ranging over different orders of objects, and there are
no antinomies in mereology.
It is easy to obtain from a mereological primitive, say that of overlap,23
the part-whole relation that characterizes singular representations. Here we
use variables to range over regions of space:
x is a part of y=df. (z) (z overlaps x >z overlaps y)
and, then,
x is a proper part of y=df. (x is a part of y) & N (y is a part of x).
The proper-part relation is the formal expression of the relation between the
parts of a space and the whole space. In terms of it we may formalize the
properties of the division of space; for instance, the regressus in infinitum
character of the division is represented by the axiom:
(x) (3y) (y is a proper part of x).
Since this axiom asserts the existence of some proper part, the division is
also represented as a constitutive feature of the part-whole relation. Moreover, unlike the classical class-membership relation, and therefore unlike
Kant's relation of subordination, the proper-part relation is transitive. (It
is, moreover, asymmetrical and irreflexive.)
We obtain discreteness, x is discrete from y, in terms of regions of space
having no parts in common in all spaces of which they are proper parts.
Ultimately, the plausibility of Kant's mereological view of space depends
upon originating definitions of on the right/left of, above/below, and behind/
in front of. Undoubtedly, the fact that these relations are to be defined,
for Kant, by mereological primitives lies at the basis of his treatment in
the Prolegomena of identical but non-congruent objects. Kant maintains
that

. . .the difference between similar and equal things which are not
congruent . . . cannot be made intelligible by any concept, but only

by the relation to the right and left hands which immediately refers

to intuition (Proleg., ? 13).

The difference between right and left is a difference in the arrangement of

parts of a representation; hence, it must be ascribed to the structure of an

intuitive representation rather than to concepts.

Kantian intuitions, therefore, are not to be compared with singular

terms but with patterns whose internal structure is expressible in terms of
the mereological relations in which spatio-temporal regions stand to one
another. Kant brings out the relational character of intuitions in a concluding section of the Transcendental Aesthetic added in B:
. . it is especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge that belongs to intuition . . . contains nothing but mere relations; namely, of locations in an intuition (extension), of change of
location (motion), and of laws according to which this change is
determined (moving forces) (B66-7).
23See Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, p. 49.

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256 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

Moreover, besides being the forms of intuitions, space and time are
obviously themselves intuitions, for they possess within themselves the same
mereological structure as do the representations of which they are the forms.

Kant calls space and time pure intuitions (A20=B34-5). Thus we obtain
Kant's doctrine of the dual character of space and time as both the forms
of intuitions and themselves intuitions (A20=B34-5; also B160).
Finally, let us note that a consequence of the constitutive character of
the divisibility of intuitive representations is that every intuition contains
in itself a manifold (A99). This thesis, in turn, implies that intuitions must
be synthesized in order to enter into experience. This view of singularity,
and of its contrast with the generality of concepts, is stated by Kant in a
long footnote in the Transcendental Deduction of B.
Space and time, and all their parts, are intuitions, and are, therefore,

with the manifold which they contain, singular representations (vide

the Transcendental Aesthetic). Consequently they are not mere concepts through which one and the same consciousness is found to be
contained in a number of representations. On the contrary, through
them many representations are found to be contained in one representation, and in the consciousness of that representation; and they
are thus composite. The unity of that consciousness is therefore
synthetic and yet is also original. The singularity of such intuitions
is found to have important consequences (B137 fn.; italics original).
IV

In its most sophisticated form, synthesis is the process whereby a mani-

fold is given a conceptual expression as part of a scientific theory. In the

Transcendental Deduction Kant argues that the categories are the forms
in which this synthesis must be articulated in order to generate scientific

knowledge. Clearly, Kant associates synthesis with the generation of a

unified conceptual scheme when he states
By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting
different representations together, and of grasping [begreifen, which
here should be more accurately and less metaphorically translated as
'conceiving'] what is manifold in them in one . . . knowledge (A77=
B103).
In both formulations of the Transcendental Deduction, synthesis appears as

the conceptual expression of a given manifold. In A Kant argues that

knowledge is possible only through the recognition of a manifold in a concept,

and in B he maintains that combination of a manifold by understanding is

the foundation of synthesis (B, ? 15). And Kant defines understanding as
the faculty for making judgments by bringing concepts into conformity
with the objective unity of apperception (B141). The function of the Transcendental Deductions is to ascertain what are the conditions of objective
unity with which the generation of a scientific conceptual scheme must
comply: these Kant maintains to be the categories.
To be sure, Kant defines synthesis as the generation of experience. But

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KANT ON INTUITION 257

here Kant is not using 'experience' to mean sensible perception of, say, my
desk as a spatio-temporal object characterized by sensible qualities. (Perception is merely intuition accompanied by consciousness.) For Kant, experience is empirical knowledge (A176=B218), and Kant identifies experience with "the sum of all knowledge wherein objects can be given to us"

(A237=B296). "Knowledge", says Kant, "is a whole in which representations stand compared and connected" (A97), and,
There is one single experience in which all perceptions are represented

as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection. . . (Al10; vide B161).

The unity of experience arises from the synthesis of the manifold of intuitions

and is possible only by ascribing representations to one consciousness (B,

? 16; vide A113).
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Kant argues in the Transcendental Deductions that the categories are the a priori forms of transcendental

unity by which intuitions are conceptually articulated in a necessary connection (see, e.g., A119). This argument is most clearly visible in B where
Kant argues in ? 20 that "All sensible intuitions*24 are subject to the categories" and then shows in ? 26 that the categories make possible the prescription of laws to nature for the combination of empirical intuitions (B159).

In this way the categories make possible the synthesis of observations and
experiments in the generation of scientific theory. Kant concludes the

Transcendental Deduction in B with the observation:

Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances*,

and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances (B163).
In A Kant expresses this same point by arguing that the categories are "the
laws of the synthetic unity of all appearances*" (A128). The construction of
scientific theory, therefore, does not rest upon the formation of a Humean-

type habit, but involves the conceptual expression in accordance with categories of what is presented in intuition.

According to Kant, furthermore, scientific theory is generated through

the synthesis of the manifold of pure, a priori intuitions (B160). These
manifolds contain only mereological relations reducible to those holding for
regions of space and time (A41=B58). Since the pure intuitions of space
and time are the media in which mathematical construction takes place
(see sec. V), Kant maintains in the "Axioms of Intuition" that appearances
are related to experience through the same synthesis whereby space and time

are determined in the first place (B203). The synthesis of pure intuitions is
given by pure mathematics (A165-6=B206). Pure mathematics, therefore,
is constitutive of scientific knowledge (A237=B295-6). In other words, our
intuitions must be conceptually articulated in terms of the structures of
pure mathematics. Certainly, the rise of modern physics has provided ample
verification of this Kantian thesis.

It is possible now to consider Kant's famous dictum, "Thoughts without

24The asterisk (*) here and elsewhere indicates words italicized by me, not by Kant.

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258 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51=B75).

That concepts must be given intuitions is no mystery; human beings must
apply their concepts to spatio-temporal objects whose spatio-temporal structure is presented by an intuition. But the problem of this passage is how
intuitions can be "blind" without concepts and yet be a species of objective
representations. An intuition is objective insofar as it presents the mereological structure of an appearance, but it is "blind" without further synthesis relating it to other appearances in one knowledge. Kant is quite clear

that "appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of

functions of the understanding" (A90=B122); though such appearances
"would be for us as good as nothing" (Alll). Intuition contains logically
and temporally prior to all experience principles which determine the relations of objects (A26=B42), but without synthesis these relations remain
unconnected with any knowledge, and therefore, "blind".
V

Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical

intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation,

as actual in space and time (B147).

To this classification of intuitions, as we shall see, we must add images
(Bilder). In this section I want to consider the types of intuitions in terms
of the proposed interpretation of the singularity criterion.

Empirical intuitions, says Kant, are those that are "in relation to the
object through sensation" (A20=B34). Any identification of empirical intuition with sensation is misguided. Sensations are mere subjective representations pertaining to the "subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility",

and, therefore, are not intuitions (A28=B44). Kant holds, rather, that

sensations enter into intuitions insofar as they admit of being ordered in

a spatio-temporal system of relations (A20=B34). Thus sensations are

merely the medium through which the mereological structure of an object
of empirical consciousness is represented. Kant aptly chose the word Anschauung, which comes from the verb anschauen, meaning 'to view' or 'to
show forth', for intuition. Intuitive representations "show forth" their
object by representing its mereological structure and, in the case of empirical

intuitions, its empirical properties (B69, fn.). Kemp Smith is probably

correct in observing that "Anschanung etymologically applies only to visual
sensation", and that "Kant extends it to cover sensations of all the senses".25

However, Kemp Smith fails to grasp the interesting philosophical problem

of identifying what sensations can be ordered under which forms of intuition.

Berkeley evidently thought that tactile sensations were capable of revealing

a spatial world ("outness"), that is, of falling within space.26 However,
25A Commentary To Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 79.
26An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, ?? 45-6; in Works on Vision: George
Berkeley, ed. C. M. Turbayne (Indianapolis, 1963).

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RANT ON INTUITION 259

aural sensations, it seems, are not isomorphic with a spatial world.27 Along
with sensations of taste and smell, these sensations stand only in temporal
relations. They cannot represent an outer world.
Kant maintains that only space is the form of outer intuition and that
time is just the form of inner sense. That space can be outer and yet in the
mind (insofar as it is a representation, A373) is paradoxical only if the
mereological structure of space is not understood. Certainly, interpreting
space as an entity or as a "container" which exists independently of that
which is in space renders Kant's view nonsensical. The paradoxical character
is removed when we realize that 'space' connotes only the notion that what
exists in the mind possesses a kind of part-whole relationship expressible
mereologically.28 These representations are outer because what is represented

in them is said to be apart, or discrete, from the knower's own mind.

Kant's mereological conception of space is the coherent working out of
Leibniz's view that space is "the order of co-existence" (see A374)-Leibniz,
however, like the early Kant, had failed to see the logical difference between

concepts and intuitions and had treated space as a singular concept.

On the other hand, time, whose single dimension of succession is mereologically representable and is therefore an intuition (A33=B50), is required
for the representation of motion and alteration (B48-9). Since time represents the manner in which representations of outer sense (the order of coexistence) are taken up into consciousness, time is the form of inner sense.
All our representations are ordered in time. But, it is to be noted, time does
not for this reason yield a mereological representation of the soul as an object
in the way that outer intuition yields a representation of an empirical object

(A23=B37).
We turn now to consider the pure intuitions, not in relation to empirical

intuitions, but in themselves. For Kant, the pure intuitions of space and
time are the media in which the construction of mathematical objects takes
place (Proleg. ? 10). It has been said that the interpretation of Kant's
notion of intuition "stands or falls on the interpretation of the role of intu-

itions in mathematics".29 This contention is unfortunate, because, as I shall

now argue, Kant himself was unclear about this role.
Much misunderstanding has resulted from identifying the construction
of a concept with a mental image.30 When speaking carefully, Kant maintains that mathematics has recourse to "the universal procedure of imagina27See P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959), ch. II, "Sounds". Also, and
especially, J. W. Swanson, "On a Problem of Nicod and Strawson", Philosophy &
Phenomenological Research, XXVIII (1967), pp. 222-9.
28For a discussion of the 17th-18th century background of this concept of space, see
Ivor Leclerc, "The Meaning of 'Space' in Kant", Proceedings of the Third International
Kant Congress (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 393-400.
29By Parsons, op. cit., p. 571.
30Hintikka maintains that such an identification, or at least the need for mental

images, is entailed by Kant's critical association of intuition with the form of sensibility

through transcendental exposition ("On Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 51.) This

contention is groundless (see discussion in the following paragraphs).

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260 KIRE DALLAS WILSON

tion for providing an image* for a concept" (A140=B179-80). Kant calls

this universal procedure a schema, and implies that it is found in intuition
(A665=B693). Pure schemata, rather than images, are the proper objects

of mathematical construction (A140-1-B180). I wish to suggest that a

schema is a model obtained by interpreting a mathematical concept in a
mereological system. Tarski has shown, in fact, that mereology provides
the logical foundations for a geometry of solids, a geometry that admits
only bodily figures.31 It is my contention that the geometry of solids is the

formal system that underlies Kant's theory of the pure schematism. (In
turn, this system itself is grounded in human cognition as the form of sensi-

bility through the transcendental exposition of space-see below.)

To construct a concept in intuition, that is, to provide a schema for a
mathematical concept, is, then, a formal procedure whereby the concept is
modelled in a mereological system sufficient for the geometry of solids. Kant

posits "certain universal conditions of construction" as determining the

object of a mathematical concept (A714=B742). These conditions are determined by the structure of space, but until space is understood mereologically,

we have no clear conception of how these conditions are ascertained. These

conditions are nothing other than the axioms of mereology (e.g., that the
part-of relation is transitive) and the special axioms required for the geometry

of solids. Moreover, we can be assured that the axiomatic system of threedimensional Euclidean geometry does have a model in the geometry of
solids32-in Kantian language, that geometrical concepts can be provided
with schemata in the pure intuition of space.

Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that Kant himself did not appreciate the wholly formal procedure for obtaining schemata for geometrical

concepts in the pure intuition of space. In the first place, Kant claims that
mathematical knowledge considers "the universal in the particular, or even
in the single instance" (A714=B742). Since intuitive representations are
patterns (see sec. III above), Kant describes geometrical method as involving
the representation of a configuration by the imagination in order that the
geometer may obtain a pure intuition. Kant apparently wishes to maintain
that a geometer requires a concrete model provided by imagination, not just

a model of the mathematical concept in a formal system. To be sure,

schemata are the means by which imagination can provide such images for
a mathematical concept, and Kant back-tracks from his characterization of
mathematical knowledge as considering the single instance and claims that
the geometer "pays attention" only to what "follows from the universal
conditions of the construction" in the figure itself (A716=B744; also Bxii).
In fact, Kant must back-track from a concrete model, for images themselves
are always inadequate to express the universality of a pure intuition (A140-1
31"Foundations of the Geometry of Solids", Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics
(Oxford, 1956), Essay II, pp. 24-9.
32Tarski, op. cit., p. 29.

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KANT ON INTUITION 261

=B180). Here Kant is struggling with the problem of how a pure intuition
can be obtained in human cognition. The problem is that there is no way
literally to have a pure intuition, a configuration of regions in space without

the admixture of anything empirical; therefore a concrete model must be

provided by imagination. But this pattern is inadequate to do the job of a
pure intuition. What Kant fails to see is that we can ascertain the structure
of a pure intuition by a formal procedure of representing a mathematical
concept in a mereological system.
Secondly, further evidence that Kant failed to appreciate the formal
character of the theory underlying the schematism occurs in his description
of the construction of a line. Kant writes,

I cannot represent to myself a line, however small, without drawing

it in thought, that is, generating from a point all its parts one after
another (A162-3=B203).
(As we have seen, one can also represent to oneself the formal structure of a

line in the geometry of solids.) But the problem of this passage lies in this:
In the geometry of solids, points, lines and surfaces must be treated as classes

of figures. (For a definition of 'point', see Tarski's discussion, mentioned

above.) One cannot picture a point without imagining a little dot, but that
is not a point in the pure intuition of space itself. Certainly, the regressus in

infinitum character of intuition implies that each figure, insofar as it is

constituted by regions of space, contains another figure as a proper part,
which is a characteristic axiom of the geometry of solids. Thus, the construction of a point by recourse to a pure schematism cannot be a simple
matter of imagining a point. If my argument is correct that a geometry of
solids underlies mathematical concepts for Kant, then recourse to the pure
schematism for a point, line, or surface cannot be had simply through
imagination.
In spite of these difficulties in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, the
argument of the Transcendental Expositions may still be salvaged. This
argument proceeds roughly as follows:
(1) Sensibility is the only possible way for human beings to acquire
intuitions. (Man does not possess an intuitive intellect, a peculiar
fact about human nature.)
(2) Pure intuitions contain the form of intuition (see sec. III above).
(3) Therefore, pure intuitions are possible only if the form they con-

tain is the form of human sensibility (Proleg. ? 9; also B41).

It would be incumbent upon Kant's opponent to produce another explanation of how pure intuition is grounded in human cognition. Now since
mathematics and mechanics are the a priori disciplines in which man investi-

gates the structure of pure intuition, space and time are the a priori forms
of sensibility (Proleg. ? 10, cf. B48-9). This account of pure intuition is
transcendental (A56=B80-1) and, therefore, in no way affects the actual
doing of mathematics. With transcendental exposition we establish some-

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262 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

thing about the ontological status of space, namely, that it is "in the mind"
(since sensibility pertains to what is in the mind); however, this status is of
no concern to the mathematician who proceeds with his constructions regard-

less of whether space is "in the mind" or a thing-in-itself. What is shown

is that the formal representation of the structure of pure intuition expresses

the form under which the human mind must have sensible intuition; that

is, the form under which something must be represented intuitively (A50==

B74-5).
I shall consider, finally, the intuitive character of images (Bilder). In
the historical tradition underlying Kant's use of 'intuition'33 as well as in
Kant himself, an association is made between image (Bild) and intuition.
We have already seen Kant's use of imagination as a means, although inadequate, of obtaining pure intuitions. Moreover, Kant makes this association explicitly when he says that

. . .not every intuitive representation of outer things involves the

existence of these things, for their representation can very well be a
product of the imagination [Einbildungskraft] (as in dreams and
delusions) (B278).
This association is natural on the proposed interpretation of the singularity
criterion, for mental images contain mereological relations in the same way
as empirical intuitions upon which imagination must draw in order to produce an image.
Moreover, from this interpretation of singularity, a neat interpretation
of the immediacy criterion follows.
VI

Hintikka argues that immediacy can be reduced to singularity. The

prima facie case against this reduction is that critical distinctions, such as
immediacy versus mediacy, cannot be reduced merely to logical distinctions
between types of representations. Hintikka's argument proceeds:34
(1) The alternative to immediacy is reference to objects by marks or
characteristics which may be shared by several objects.
(2) Reference to objects by such marks or characteristics is generality.

(3) Therefore, immediacy is reference to objects by particular (i.e.,

singular) representations.

(2) is true by definition, but the argument requires at least the assumption
that if a representation is not general, then it is singular.
Textual evidence, however, is insufficient to justify (1) and the additional
assumption. Hintikka offers as proof of (1) the Stufenleiter passage, a portion

of which was quoted at the beginning of this paper. Kant says, concerning
intuitions and concepts,
33See, for instance, the following passage from J. Chr. Adelung's Auszug aus dem
grammatisch-kritischen W6rterbuch: "... versteht man durch die anschauende Erkenntniss, eine jede Erkenntniss, die wir durch die Empfindung erlangen, oder da wir uns die

Sache selbst oder doch ihr Bild vorstellen . . ."; quoted by Hintikka, "On Kant's

Notion of Intuition", pp. 41-2.

34"0n Kant's Notion of Intuition", p. 42.

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KANT ON INTUITION 263

The former relates immediately to the object and is single [i.e.,

singular], the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature
which several things may have in common (A320=B377).
But this passage is merely a summary of Kant's representational vocabulary and should not be taken as supplying a premiss for an argument about
the relationships between the criteria for representations. The opposite of
immediate representation is mediate representation, not generality as Hintikka maintains in (1), and which, Kant argues, crosscuts with generality in
concepts in the same way that immediacy crosscuts with singularity in
intuitions. (See sec. I for the prima facie case for this argument, and sec.
VIII below.) But these relationships are the conclusions of Kant's theory
of representations. The opposite of immediacy is generality (reference to
objects by marks or characteristics) only if generality is already determined

to be mediate representation (that is, if concepts are predicates of possible

judgments). Clearly, however, the identification of generality with mediacy
is not true simply by definition. Hence, it makes little difference whether
we establish first the correlation of mediacy to generality in concepts or
establish the correlation of immediacy to singularity in intuitions: each
correlation is a corollary of the other. Thus, Hintikka's first premiss is
question-begging; it is true only if we assume that generality is mediate
representation.

Similarly, the extra assumption that if a representation is not general

it is singular can be accepted only if we assume that generality is mediacy;
otherwise it could be false if a representation is immediate (i.e. not general,
and thus fulfilling the antecedent) and it is not singular (as will be the case
when the representation is mediate).
Furthermore, premiss (1) is equivalent to saying that an immediate
representation does not refer to objects by marks or characteristics. The
premiss, thus, does not provide any sense of what we do mean by an immediate representation. Parsons suggests that immediacy
evidently means that the object of an intuition is in some way directly

present to the mind, as in perception . . 35

The phrase 'in some way' doesn't help, and 'as in perception' offers only an
analogy. Hintikka is undoubtedly correct in his Inquiry response to Parsons
that, interpreted literally, this definition is inconsistent with Kant's use of
'intuition' in the Prolegomena.36 Kant there maintains that in mathematics
we use intuitions prior to the perceptual presence of their objects, that "An
intuition is such a representation as would* immediately depend upon the
presence of the object" (Proleg. ? 8).
VII

In this section I shall define immediacy by examining the nature of

empirical intuitions. These intuitions present several important features.
35"Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", p. 569.
36"Kantian Intuitions", p. 343.

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264 KIRK DALLAS WILSON

First, by taking empirical intuitions as basic, we might be tempted to define

immediacy as the consciousness of the object as actually existing; but this

would be a mistake. Such a definition would be incompatible with what
Kant says about images (see the final quotation in sec. V), and would, moreover, render the point of the Second Postulate superfluous. This postulate
reads, "That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience,

that is, with sensation, is actual" (A218=B266). If empirical intuitions

involve by definition the consciousness of actual existence, it is cheating to
dignify this definition into a synthetic a priori principle. Secondly, we cannot define immediacy as epistemologically direct awareness of the object,
for Kant defines empirical intuitions as representations which stand in immediate relation to their object through sensations.
Our interpretation of singularity naturally suggests that a singular repre-

sentation is in immediate relation to its object because its structure is isomorphic with that of its object. But it is impossible to use the notion of
extensional isomorphism to explain the relation between intuitions and their

object. For extensional isomorphism, Goodman, for instance, requires us to

compare the ultimate factors in the extensions of different concepts.37 How-

ever, to try to establish such a relationship between intuitions and their

object would be to incur the ancient fallacy of diallelus, a fallacy that Kant
decries in a different, but related, context:

Now I can, however, compare the object with my cognition only by

cognizing it. My cognition thus shall confirm itself, which is yet far
from sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me and the

cognition in me, I can judge only whether my cognition of the object

agrees with my cognition of the object. Such a circle in explanation

was called by the ancients diallelus. And really it was this mistake
for which the logicians were always reproached by the sceptics, who
noted that with this explanation it was the same as if someone testified in court and appealed to a witness whom no one knows, but who
wants to gain credibility by maintaining that the one who called him
as a witness is an honest man. The charge was well founded indeed;
but the solution of the task in question is completely impossible for
anyone (Logic, "Introduction", Chapter VII, p. 55).
Similarly, we could determine whether an intuition is extensionally isomorphic with its object only by having an intuition of that object. Thus
we could determine only that our intuition is isomorphic with our intuition.

In this, we are again reminded that the immediacy-mediacy distinction is

critical and, therefore, lies outside the domain of purely logical explanation.
Since this distinction is critical, we might attempt to glean a definition
of immediacy from the doctrines of the Aesthetic. The relevant doctrine is
that of transcendental idealism, the thesis that appearances, the objects of
empirical intuitions, are just representations in the mind (A369; see also

A490-1=B518-9, A492=B520). Now one cannot distinguish within con-

37For a complete explanation of extensional isomorphism, the reader should see N.

Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, Chapter I, ? 3, esp. p. 14.

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KANT ON INTUITION 265

sciousness of an object its appearance from its intuition. I cannot distinguish

within my perception (intuition) of my desk a separate item which is my

desk. The implication of transcendental idealism is that we must identify
the appearance qua object of intuition with the intuition itself.38 Thus, we
can define immediacy as isomorphic identity between an intuition and its
object. Kant himself indicates this identity in the following brief comment,

. . . what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations

of our sensibility, the form of which is space (A30=B45)
(certainly, the "representations of our sensibility" are nothing other than
intuitions), and implies it when he states,

If. . . we . . do not proceed, as we ought*, to treat the empirical

intuition as itself mere appearance, in which nothing that belongs to
a thing in itself can be found, our transcendental distinction [between

appearances and things in themselves] is lost (A45=B62).

The object of intuition, then, is merely the intuition regarded as object.
What distinctions one does make regarding what, in the intuition, holds of
the object and what pertains only to the subjective relation of sensibility
are only empirical distinctions and do not reveal any object in itself "outside" the intuition (A45=B62; also A29-30=B45). (And what belongs
objectively to the intuitions is its mereological structure-A28==B44.)
VIII

I have said that because an intuition possesses a mereological structure,

Kant can say that an intuition is isomorphic with its object. It may be
objected that this argument only vindicates Hintikka's position that immediacy is only "a corollary" of singularity.39 However, by reducing immediacy to singularity, Hintikka wants to argue that immediacy has no
other meaning than that of singularity. In this he is mistaken. My procedure in the preceding section shows how Kant can base critical distinctions

upon given logical distinctions while yet maintaining a separate meaning to

the critical distinction (cf. Proleg. ? 9, fn. 4).

Only the relatively simple task remains of showing that the singularity
and immediacy criteria are extensionally identical. This identity follows because (i) if a representation is singular in the defined sense, it is isomorphic
with an empirical object, and (ii) if a representation is isomorphically identical

with an empirical object, it must be singular in Kant's mereological sense of

singularity.
Georgia State University
38The same point is made by Henry E. Allison, in "Kant's Concept of the Transcendental Object", Kant-Studien, Band 59, Heft 2 (1968), when he says, ". . . when we

distinguish between representations and their objects, we are not distinguishing between
two kinds of entities, one in the mind, and the other "out there", but between two ways

in which we can regard our representations . . ." (p. 179). Allison arrives at this interpretation not through transcendental idealism but through its opposite side, namely,
through an analysis of the transcendental object, the object which is represented by
appearances qua representations.
39Hintikka uses this formulation of his reduction of immediacy to singularity in his

Inquiry response to Parsons, "Kantian Intuitions".

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