James M.

McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief pg 12-13

As the pressures for and against the evacuation of Fort Sumter continued to
mount, Lincoln ordered the reinforcement of Fort Pickens so that if he ultimately
decided to abandon Sumter, at least one contested symbol of national sovereignty
would be maintained. This order miscarried and had to be sent again in April. But
Sumter was a far more Five of them, led by Seward, recommended withdrawal in
order to preserve the peace, calm passions, and provide time for Southern Unionism
to reassert itself. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase supported
reinforcement if it would not provoke wara rather fatuous recommendation under
the circumstances. Only Postmaster General Montgomery Blair unequivocally
opposed evacuation, because it would convince the rebels that the administration
lacks firmness and will. Instead of encouraging Southern Unionists it would
discourage them, strengthen the hold of Confederates on Southern opinion, and
cause foreign nations to recognize the Confederacy as a fait accompli. To give up
the fort meant giving up the Union.
Lincoln was inclined to think so too. But before deciding what to do, he
drafted a memorandum summarizing the pros and cons of evacuating Sumter. In
favor of withdrawal, wrote Lincoln in echo of General Scott, was the reality that the
Fort cannot now be re-inforced without a large armament, involving of course a
bloody conflict, while evacuation would remove a source of irritation to the
Southern people and deprive the secession movement of one of its most powerful
stimulants by confound[ing] . . . those enemies of the Union both at the North and
the South who have relied on the cry of Coercion as a means of keeping up the
excitement against the Republican Party. On the other hand, evacuation would
demoralize Lincolns own party and concede the legitimacy of the Confederacy.

McPherson, James M. Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief. New York:
Penguin, 2008. Print.