RIGHTS OF A CONCEIVED CHILD

QUIMIGUING vs ICAO
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose
of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition
of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should
be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
GELUZ vs COURT OF APPEALS
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did
accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born
later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
The question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child,
justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in
this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article
135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the
first branch of the case that the defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above
referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the second
point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it
and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for
about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the
defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in
the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant.
The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues.

JURIDICAL PERSONS
LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE
The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in
his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting
in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.
DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCT, INC.
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662
is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been,
validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which
is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
MO YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held
to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien,
i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof.Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the
very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to
govern his native Sorsogon.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3)
Acts which correspond with the purpose.In the absence of clear and positive proof based on
these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or

residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate

abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.

REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
PT&T vs. NLRC
In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage followed by petitioner
PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it must
be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but
imperatively required.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
In religion clause parlance, the separate opinion holds that laws of general applicability
governing morals should have a secular purpose of directly or indirectly protecting the
interests of the state. If the strict application of these laws (which are the Civil Service Law
and the laws on marriage) would erode the secular purposes of the law (which the separate
opinion identifies as upholding the sanctity of marriage and the family), then in a benevolent
neutrality framework, an accommodation of the unconventional religious belief and practice
(which the separate opinion holds should be respected on the ground of freedom of belief)
that would promote the very same secular purpose of upholding the sanctity of marriage
and family through the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness that makes the union binding and
honorable before God and men, is required by the Free Exercise Clause.
GOITA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA
The Supreme Court, the this case, held that to grant support in an independent suit is
equivalent to grant divorce or separation as it necessitates a determination of the question
whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking.
EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
The petitioner maintains that the marriage between Vargas and him was in articulo mortis
and that they can forgo the formal requisites of marriage. However, the Court cannot sustain
this argument. It is provided in Article 6 of the Family Code that in case of a marriage in
articulo mortis, when a party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate,
it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party,
which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. The petitioner was unable to produce
any evidence to prove the fact of their marriage including a marriage certificate or
testimony of the solemnizing officer.
BALOGBOG vs. CA
The court ruled that a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure
to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be
presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held
competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three

children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by
Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. In this
case the Court ruled that Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain
the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in
order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
The court ruled that this is not a breach of promise to marry, as earlier stated, breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se, but to formally set a wedding and go
through all the preparations only to walk away from it is different. It is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which, defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with article 21 of the New Civil Code.
NAVARRO vs. DUMAGLOY
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his
local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
ARANAS vs. JUDGE OCCIANO
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
for violating the law on marriage.
LIM TANHU vs. RAMOLETE
The declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife
shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the
person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be
an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained.
Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory
reason for its non-production is first presented to the court.

VDA DE CHUA vs. CA

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She
could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate.
Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such
marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged
marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND CASTRO
The custodian of documents is authorized to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to
be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to
enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD
GARCIA vs. RECIO
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
In the case of Garcia vs Recio where petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging respondent was not legally capacitated to marry
her on January 12, 1994 because of his prior subsisting marriage to an Australian citizen.
Respondent claimed that he acquired an Australian citizenship in 1992 and had obtained a
divorce decree as proof of his legal capacity to marry petitioner in 1994. The divorce decree
has to be admitted in evidence with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and
52 of the Family Code in order to prove the divorce as a fact and prove its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it for our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. However,
compliance with the registration requirements is no longer binding to respondent for he has
acquired Australian Citizenship and therefore, he is no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws. Respondent submitted the divorce decree and was rendered admissible by the trial
court as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Autralia and accorded weight by the
judge.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA
In the case of Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera where petitioner married a German national and after
more than 3 years of marriage the German husband obtained a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage. After the decree of divorce was obtained the German husband
filed a case of adultery alleging that while they were still married the wife had an affair. It
was held that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons under the same

considerations and rationale. Being no longer the husband of petitioner, the private
respondent had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

In the case of Van Dorn vs Romillo where a divorce was granted by a US court between
petitioner and her American husband, and the husband filed a civil case in a trial court here
in the Philippines alleging that her business was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the husband be granted the right to manage the
business. It was held that there can be no question as to the validity of the divorce in any of
the States of the US. As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
the petitioner. He has no standing to sue as husband of the petitioner over their conjugal
assets. He is estopped by his own representation before his own country's court from
asserting that right to exercise control over their conjugal assets.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO
In the case of Republic vs Orbecido where respondents wife at the time of the marriage was
a Filipino citizen but later went to the United States and acquired an American citizenship.
Respondent learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried and pray that he
be granted the capacity to remarry too. It was held that Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM THE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

NINAL vs. BAYADOG
In the case of Ninal vs Bayadog where a man married the respondent after 1 year and 8
months of being a widower without securing a marriage license by instituting an affidavit
that he and the respondent had been cohabitating for 5 years. After the man died in a car
accident, the petitioner filed for the nullity of the marriage from the respondent on the
ground of lack of marriage license. It was held that the marriage was void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and
claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time the first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with the respondent, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Albeit, they had separated in fact, and thereafter started living with respondent
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
For the provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five

years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. The parties expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage with another man and woman. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were separated. A subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Even
though they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage.
COSCA vs. PALAYPON
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been
living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as
they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he
started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should
have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain
the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
MARIATEGUI vs. CA
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community
to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves
as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life
REPUBLIC vs. DAYOT
The law states that No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The reason for the law
is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have
lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. It is indubitably established that
Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.

The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.
The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

DOMINGO vs. CA
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in
good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the
said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab
initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion
that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them.
NINAL vs. BAYADOG
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND MOLINA
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the
marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be
more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some

marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting

personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must
be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and
their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as
counsels for the State.
LOUEL SANTOS vs. CA
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem.
CA vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting
and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse
and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the
spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining

psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

CHO vs. CHOA
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in
any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient
and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and
complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly
or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance
of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
ANTONIO vs. REYES
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage
as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of makebelieve that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological
liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
CHI MING TSOI vs. CA
The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
TE vs. TE
The petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and
allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. As for the respondent,
her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE

In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their
own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
WEIGEL vs. SEMPIO-DY
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because
it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no
need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias
marriage are regarded void under the law.
TERRE vs. TERRE
Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, before one may contract a subsequent marriage, a judicial declaration
for the same must be acquired first.
VALDES vs. RTC
The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5)
of Article 43,[13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice
PEOPLE vs. ARAGON
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellants
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

MERCADO vs. MERCADO

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
LUKBAN vs. REPUBLIC
A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a
special proceeding similar to the present, much less can the court determine the status of
petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of
the husband. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still
be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable.
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in
these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. CALLEJO
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of
proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or
not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before
and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.
VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since
death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the
Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion.

ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman
may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated
into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief
after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in
which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT
Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests. In this case, the court did not find any
proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything
about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.
AQUINO vs. DELIZO
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case
of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was
also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he
did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having
been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at
the time of their marriage. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to
say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
more general and apparent.
IMENEZ vs. CANIZARES
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to
defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known
fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and
likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed.
SIN vs. SIN
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification
briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the
petition. The records are evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case

thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendants confession.

LEGAL SEPARATION
LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO
Death of the Party Prior to Legal Separation Decree ceases the Action
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only
the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it
follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, because these rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
GANDIONCO vs. PEARANDA
Civil action not suspended in the case of concubinage
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one
"to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
Sufficiency of Single Voluntary Act of Marital Intercourse as Condonation
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions
quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the
supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were
committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The
act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with

him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together
they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband.
The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
PACETE vs. CARRIAGA
States interest in Marriage relations
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its
avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of
the parties to alone dictate.
MACADANGDANG vs. CA
Effect of A Partys death to a Decree of Legal Separation
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal
separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after
the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as
the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law
clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property.
Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final
decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106
of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of
legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the
share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
POTENCIANO vs. CA
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals
on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children

from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children
whom he loved.
CAMARA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract
of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement
of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental
home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as
a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling
for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done
from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her.
TY vs. CA
Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing
to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her
husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the
wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the
law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because
of breach of a marital obligation.
ILUSORIO vs. ILUSORIO-BILDNER
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case
of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of

loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must
be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

AGAPAY vs. PALANG
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase
price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage,[15] for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY

UY vs. CA
In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without
motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.[9] In such case, the
proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the
conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
DELA CRUZ vs. DELA CRUZ
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by
the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the
conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the
separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we
are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property.

PARTOSA-JO vs. CA
The CA dismissed the petition for separation of property filed by the petitioner-wife on the
ground that the separation of the parties was based on agreement and not because of
abandonment. The Supreme Court held the record shows that as early as 1942, the private
respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not
accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the
action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the
petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
BA FINANCE CORP vs. CA
This is a petition for attachment of conjugal property. There is no dispute that A & L
Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the
same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature (See Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 161, 165).
However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against
the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly
contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he
made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to
procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the
said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON vs. CA
The Conjugal Property could not be made answerable to the obligation contracted by the
wife absent the consent of the husband and the same did not redound to the benefit of the
family. Thus:
The respondent Court already found that the defendant husband did not give his consent;
neither did the obligation incurred by the defendant wife redound to the benefit of the
family. Hence, the conjugal partnership, as well as the defendant husband, cannot be held
liable. As originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife and her paraphernal
property can be held liable.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
SPOUSES LAPERAL vs. SPOUSES KATIGBAK
The presumption that all property acquired during the marriage form part of the conjugal
property is not conclusive but merely rebuttable, for the same law is un equivocal that it
exists only "unless it be proved that it (the property) belongs exclusively to the husband or
the wife." And, examining the records and evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case
where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven. In the case at bar,
it was shown that it was her mother Pura Villanueva that had bought property for her and
had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother; that is, buying properties
placing them directly in the names of her children;
VILLANUEVA VS. IAC
Whether Modesto succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his marriage to Victoria
Comorro is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a

matter of law. This is what Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered
as "the exclusive property of each spouse" is inter alia, "that which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own," or "that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title." Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took
place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his "exclusive
property" because acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title.
With regard to the improvements on said property, in the absence of proof and considering
that the property in which said improvement was made belongs to Modesto, the same
should be considered as his exclusive property.
BPI vs. POSADAS
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property,
and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a
life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in
these Islands or outside.

WONG vs. IAC

The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they
are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
support of the family.
AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not
an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the
conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.
CARLOS vs. ABELARDO
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served
as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather
a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part

of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES AND ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON

PROPERTY DURING MARRIAGE
MALLILIN vs. CASTILLO
Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired
by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are
not capacitated to marry each other.
DIO vs. DIO
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. In
this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
VALDES vs. RTC
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases.
FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORP
In this case, the petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was
incapacitated to marry her. Article 148 of the Family Code debilitates against the petitioners
claim since, according to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation
where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parents
prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of
their proportionate interest thereon. The petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject
property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
AGAPAY vs. PALANG
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, the Court
finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners

of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she
had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property.
TUMLOS V. FERNANDEZ
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of
the subject property was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract
to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the subject apartment building, the court found
no basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent Mario]. The said property is thus
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it
being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to
the contrary.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If
the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct
in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises.

FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION
DOCENA vs. LAPESURA
The petitioners argue that since they are spouses with joint or indivisible interest over the
alleged conjugal property subject of the original action which gave rise to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, the signing of the certificate of non-forum shopping by only one of
them would suffice, especially considering the long distance they had to travel just to sign
the said certificate.
As a general rule, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition or a
complaint filed in court must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of the
husband or wife alone is substantial compliance with this requirement in cases involving
community or conjugal property, even if both of the spouses are petitioners in the case.
Each of the spouses may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing
or non-filing by the other spouse of any action or claim similar to the petition which the
other spouse filed given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding
involving real property.
MARTINEZ vs. MARTINEZ
A complaint for ejectment was filed by the owner of a property against his brother and
sister-in-law. There was no allegation of a prior recourse to compromise; hence, a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed. The plaintiff

contended that there was an allegation of prior recourse to barangay conciliation; hence
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of an allegation of prior recourse to
compromise.
The phrase members of the family must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
HONTIVEROS vs. RTC
A suit filed by a woman against her sister and the latters husband will not involve earnest
efforts to compromise considering the inclusion of the husband who is not within the family
relations provided by law. The complaint or petition must be verified. If it is unverified, the
case should not be dismissed. The court should just merely require the party to have it
verified.
The scope and coverage of the term family relations is defined in Article 150, as follows:
(a) between husband and wife; (b) between parents and children; (c) among other
ascendants and descendants; and (d) among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. According to the Court, this enumeration is exclusive and defines the operation of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
MANALO vs. CA (G.R. No. 129242, 16 January 2001)
Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting, as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.
Before a suit can be filed by a person against another belonging to the same family as
provided for under Article 150, earnest efforts must first be made to settle the case
amicably. Otherwise, the suit is dismissible. Significantly, failure to exert earnest efforts in
these situations is specifically made a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(j), Rule
16 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. Commenting on the reasons for the inclusion of
Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code, the Civil Code Commission
said:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a
compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known
that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
The rule on earnest efforts also does not apply to special proceedings like a petition for the
settlement of estate guardianship and custody of children, and habeas corpus. The term
suit provided by law clearly implies only civil actions.

ALBANO vs. GAPUSAN

To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution
of the partnership. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses through extra-judicial dissolution of the
marital union.

FAMILY HOME
MODEQUILLO vs. BREVA
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as a family home at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of the obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
MANACOP vs CA
The Commonwealth property and the indebtedness occurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code and the petitioners family was no longer residing in the said property, which
does not make it a family home.
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
ANDAL vs. MACARAIG
The child is presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased and his wife, since he was
born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage of the spouses. The fact that
the wife has committed adultery cannot overcome this presumption of legitimacy. The
husbands tuberculosis is not an evidence of impotency nor does it prevent carnal
intercourse.
BENITEZ-BADUA vs. CA
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the child of a certain couple. Rather, they govern a situation where a
husband denies as his own a child of his wife. As such, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
CONCEPCION vs. CA
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiations of a child.
Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment
of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence
of the filiations of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiations is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the
status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established. In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the

certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasiconclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his
legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
LIYAO vs. LIYAO
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of
the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or
in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
[27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.[28] It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.[29]

PROOF OF FILIATIONS
ECETA vs.. ECETA
The filiations of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiations in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiations shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is
the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the
evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on
record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of
Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration,
it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's
testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first
or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her
response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as

she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September,
October and November, 1974.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought
within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny
the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
JISON vs. CA AND MONINA
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina was able to prove her
illegitimate filiation. For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under
Article 172 par. 2, a "high standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation
of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous
and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred
inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative
father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the
fact of intercourse, as she had already passed away. But the fact of Moninas birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother
CONDE vs. ABAYA
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life
of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an
exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the
discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the
father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

MARQIONO vs. IAC

SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be
transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative
father in an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the
former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent
himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the
case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the
time of death of their father.
ANGELES vs. TABILIRAN
As a lawyer and Judge respondent ought to know that despite his subsequent marriage to
Prisicilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate
since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent
and his first wife , Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is
Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Art 269: Only natural children
can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified bt any impediment to marry each other are
natural.
ADOPTION
TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL
Relationship by adoption does not extend to relatives of adopting parent or of adopted child.
In this case, the oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be
true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the
fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and
the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim, et al. (G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. The use of the word
"shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) serve all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known;
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still

considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child. We are
mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. We are not unmindful of the main
purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND BOBILES
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After
the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory. Non-joinder
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will
have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida
filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in
force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be
dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time.
Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually
joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony
in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not
be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of
the pleadings.

TAMARGO vs. CA
In the instant case, we do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses,
at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor
of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious
act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be
unfair and unconscionable. Under Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child
during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual
custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

SUPPORT
JAVIER vs. LUCERO
Under the new Civil Code, article 290 support also includes the education of the person to be
supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation
even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was granted to
Alfredo Javier Junior. Said the Court, "while it is true that plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior, who
was born on December 2, 1931, has reached the age of majority on December 2, 1952, yet,

under the last part of article 290 of the new Civil Code, support may be given him even
beyond the age of majority in order to enable him to complete his education, for some trade
or profession." Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier, and if
financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his education or
the completion thereof, would be unduly delayed. That is good reason for immediate
execution. Petitioner claims that according to the records Alfredo Javier Jr. "is no longer
studying". Yet probably he stopped going to school due to lack of means, since the petitioner
himself admits that his son is just a pre-law graduate.
GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA
The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.
DE ASIS vs. DE ASIS
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the
nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. While it is true
that in order to claim support, filiations or paternity must be first shown between the parties,
but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in
the Court and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Furthermore, the
defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the
subject of any compromise or waiver.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY
ESPIRITU vs. CA
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the
paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be
separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. The choice
of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered. In this case, Rosalind chose
to stay with his father and aunt. She was found suffering from emotional shock caused by
her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo
is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and
care which their mother is not in the position to extend.

SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

AMADORA vs. CA
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.

Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student as a general rule. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and
only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule because old schools of
arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the
apprentices.
In this case, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is also not liable because theres
no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he
waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their nonobservance. Also, the fact that he wasnt present cant be considered against him because
he wasnt required to report on that day as classes had already ceased.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO
It is only the teachers, in this case Aquino, and not the principal or head of an academic
school, in this case Soriano, who should be answerable for torts committed by their
students. Further, Aquino was clearly negligent when he left the minor Ylarde together with
his classmates in the pit dug by them fully knowing that the rock beside it could slide down
anytime and cause damage.
ST. MARY'S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
Under Art. 219 of the Family Code, those exercising special parental authority, in this case
petitioner, are principally and solidarily liable for the damages caused by minors in their
custody. However, for liability to arise, it must be shown that the negligent act or omission
was the proximate cause, in this case the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment
of the steering wheel, of the accident.

EFFECT AND SUSPENSION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was
still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. No retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child.
LIBI vs. IAC
The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise
all the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the
crime by means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have
not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing
from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of
parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary
and not subsidiary.

USE OF SURNAMES
LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC
A womans married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum and under art 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue using
the name and surname employed by her before the separation. It is doubtful whether rule
103 of the rules of Court, which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the
specific provisions of art 372 of the New Civil Code with regard to married women legally
separated from their husbands. Even however, applying rule 103, the fact of legal separation
alone is not sufficient ground to justify a change of name, because to hold otherwise would
be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of art 372.
LLANETA vs. AGRAVA
The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of this
Court, 3 that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of
name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose
surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.
The late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers,
Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition.
Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the
relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. And the State (represented by the Solicitor
General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm
for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching crossexamination, of Teresita and her witnesses.
Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would
have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation.
One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent
the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

ABSENCE
LUKBAN vs. REPUBLIC
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to
be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68)

CIVIL REGISTRY

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

407-413 Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH ( CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA). This condition
causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than
female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male,
such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.