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Lozano vs Martinez Digest

Filed Under: Bouncing Check Law, BP 22, Non-imprisonment for Debt, Police Power

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check
Law). They moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions
were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment
due to debt?
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract?
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause?
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of
an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of
money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty
or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks
have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes
for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such

perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as


currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. The
effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community
at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest. 2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are
not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. 3. There is no
substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws
or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of
the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give
equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The
petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection
of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659


J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the
station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a
carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the
outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the
former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?


Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio: The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the
due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due
to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was
flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they be confined to its
interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts
proved and fact presumed. An examplesis a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled
without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains
and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which
prohibits slaughter of carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjects the original executive order, it cant be said that it
complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought
has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical
only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice
with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate
carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the right to be heard or his defense and
punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

CASE DIGEST
Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur
Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985
[which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance
of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with
the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is
invalid and/or unconstitutional.
Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the
Medical Act of 1959 defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute
created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify
under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The regulation of
the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice

medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

National Development Company and New Agrix vs.


Philippine Veterans Bank (192 SCRA 257)
Facts:
Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three
parcels of land.
Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company, then President
Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all
the mortgages and
liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process
claims against the
company to be administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim
against the company
before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba,
Laguna invoking
the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took
measures to
extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case in the
same court. These
cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the respondent on the ground of
unconstitutionality
of the decree; mainly violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation
of contracts, and
violation of the equal protection clause. Hence this petition.

Issue: (1) Is the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the
law since they abided by it by filing a claim with the Committee?
(2) Is PD 1717 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
On the issue of estoppel, the Court held that it could not apply in the present case
since when the respondent filed his claim, President Marcos was the supreme ruler

of the country and they could not question his acts even before the courts because
of his absolute power over all government institutions when he was the President.
The creation of New Agrix as mandated by the decree was also ruled as
unconstitutional since it violated the prohibition that the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress) shall not provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the government.
PD 1717 was held as unconstitutional on the other grounds that it was an invalid
exercise of police power, It had no lawful subject and no lawful method. It violated
due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are
property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause by
lumping together all secured and unsecured creditors. It also impaired the
obligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely private interests

Association of Small Landowners vs. Sec Juico et al


FACTS: These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian
Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law,
while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the
land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of
landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares.
They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be
forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have
shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian
reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228,
and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian
reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent
domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for
Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for
their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation
has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in
terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The

Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the
contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the
courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed
upon by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long
as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers
and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the
finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by
RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT,
so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private
respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid
object for expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone
company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment
of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both
telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil


349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for


the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an
extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery
and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not
necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that
theexpropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury
to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary
on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that
they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the
courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of
the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of
the necessity of the expropriation.

Held:

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent


domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the
purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation
or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the
right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to

EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr
1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the

Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be


constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation(San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that
the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the
just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in
a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the justness of the decreed compensation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLITO ANDAN


Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation
FACTS:
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school
dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure
of the grandmother of Andans wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in
the abdomen by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the
toilet until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the
fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete
block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to
form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched
Andans nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were
interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A
police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to
Andans house where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were
then brought back to the police station while waiting for the result of the investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police headquarters
for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation
room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk
privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to
tell the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door
of the room to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad
first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives,
Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated
Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. He provided an alibi
why he was at his fathers house at another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and
coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in
violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants confession before
the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has operational supervision and control over the
local police and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andans confession to the mayor was not made

in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all
and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as
a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellants
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if
she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A
peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and
reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found
to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence
the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?


HELD: Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused /
appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter
transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and
seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in
aid thereof

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146


SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette.
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25


June 2013
Facts:

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod

City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and
also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as
it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted
product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is


discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because
it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not
be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention


that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19


September 1994)
the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power
to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the
negative
Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all
11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge
believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the
reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed
the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case
thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the
President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is
sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on
matters he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the
newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also
an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who
were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the
right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice
on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet
been officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law.
It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the

circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper,
believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is
immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the
Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not
having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial
notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on
the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such
fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal
knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common
knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come
from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are
accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that
the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred
in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case
without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered
for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to
take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to
take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

Louis Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. No.

192935 December 7, 2010

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that,
in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled

to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs

power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or
by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform
to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RP vs Heirs of Saturnino Borbon


Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San
Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon
owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation
in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the
acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the
property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not
negotiated with them before entering the property and that the
entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered
no objection to NAPOCORs entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated
but for the entire property whose potential was greatly
diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing
that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the
property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for
public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents property; that
because the public purpose for which such property would be
used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation
should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to
return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the
instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of

the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just
and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of
the power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is the
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the
public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose. But the exercise of such right is
not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie
the Governments exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that
just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public.
However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage
or productivity for the benefit of the public. Public use has now
been held to be synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, and public convenience.
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be
maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The
effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which,
it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw,
as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise
of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public
purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the

private property owner would be denied due process of law, and


the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice,
fairness and equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the
land in question for public use. The fundamental basis then of all
actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of
eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment
that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily
fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot
be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some
public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the
appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example,
during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to
the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some
public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial
court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the
appeal, if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the
appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use, then it
would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court
to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily
stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public
use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the
definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result
in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator
due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the
proceedings subject to the conditions to be shortly mentioned
hereunder, and requires the return of the property to the
respondents. Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR
entered the property without the owners consent and without
paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it
deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The

Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities


to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or
her property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees
and plants without payment, and the installation of the
transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to
divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering
the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for
NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until
the time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual
return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay
just compensation to them because their property would not be
taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property,
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until
the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual
or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what
they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession
of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit
trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCORs construction of
the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the
appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an
action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin
shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.

Barangay Sindalan v. CA, G.R. No. G.R. No. 150640, 22 March 2007

Facts
Barangay Sindalan, pursuant to its resolution, filed a complaint for eminent domain
against the Sindayan spouses who were the registered owners of the parcel of land
subject of the expropriation. The barangay sought to convert a portion of spouses
Sindayans land into Barangay Sindalans feeder road. The spouses argued that the
expropriation of their property was improper because it was sought for a private
use. They alleged that the expropriation of their property, which was adjacent to
Davsan II Subdivision, would benefit only the homeowners of said subdivision. The
RTC ruled that the barangay had the lawful right to take the property of the
Sindayan spouses. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue
Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a
public purpose No, the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay
would benefit only the residents of a subdivision.

Held
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as
"whatever is beneficially employed for the community." The intended feeder road
sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the
other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, will be benefited by
the contemplated road to be constructed. While the number of people who use or
can use the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use
or purpose, the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of
respondents lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not
exercisable in common. Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are
all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to
acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of
compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an
abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt,
expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.

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