Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dcument 1
Dcument 1
Dcument 1
Fair
and free
elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless
the electoral
process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and
political rights and
freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective
of religion,
caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for
advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and
property of its
citizens.
While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their
commitment to
these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how
does one
create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and
participatory
governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of
many
rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as
an
instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others
selectively
employ some aspects of democracy to create a façade. Still others hold elections, establish
elected
legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and
the people
holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of
democracy is
created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and
substance of
democracy.
Professed Values and Operational Realities:
In Pakistan, the rulers, political parties and leaders and the civil society groups support
democracy at the
normative or conceptual level. The politically active circles demand representative governance
and
participatory decision making in the political and economic fields. They highlight fair and free
electoral
process, the rule of law, socio-economic justice and accountability of those exercising state
power as the
pre-requisites for a political system.
However, there are serious problems with these principles at the operational level in Pakistan.
Power
structure and style of governance often negated these principles. Most rulers, civilian and
military,
pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high
premium to
personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. .This
was coupled
with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-
economic system.
A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of
authoritarianism and
non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of Pakistani political
experience. The
redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells of authoritarian and military
rule, the
theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory governance has persisted in Pakistan.
None of the
two political trends has been able to overwhelm each other. If democracy could not function
on a
continuous basis, the authoritarian and military rule did not get accepted as a normal or
legitimate
political system. This engenders the hope that the over all commitment to democracy would
continue to
persist as one of the most cherished norms in the polity and a governance system that falters
on
democracy would not be able to cultivate voluntary popular support.
The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the
popular level.
A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the federal and
provincial
levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not bothered about the
interest and
welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political efficacy is reflected in the
declining
voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of voters maintain that their vote
does not
matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they express negative views about the
rulers as well
as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people have not given up on democracy. While
talking about
their ‘helplessness’ with reference to changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the
norms of
democracy and participatory governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They
are
therefore vulnerable to mobilization for realization of these norms and values.
The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution and
political
order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of the role of
the military3
bureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian governments, and authoritarian
and
narrow-based power management.
Pakistan’s political history can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant
style of
governance and political management:
1. Civilian political government: August 1947-October 1958
December 1971-July 1977
2. Direct Military Rule: October 1958-June 1962
March 1969-December1971
July 1977-December 1985
October 1999-November 2002
3. Selective use of Democracy by the Military (Post-military rule)
June 1962-March 1969
March 1985-November 1988
4. Military’s influence from the sidelines on policy making under civilian governments
December 1988-October 1999
5. Military’s direct involvement in power management after the end of military
rule; constitutional and legal role for the military
November 2002-till the writing of this article
Historical Overview:
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a
parliamentary
system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal
government
exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers did not pay much
attention to
democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the
survival of the
state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state
reinforced
authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition
process These
included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India
and
Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the
troubled relations
with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal
government in
Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil
servants and
military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah,
the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of
Pakistan.
This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions
and
fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local
stature and
did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it
difficult for the
political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of
the early
years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took
8 ½ years to
frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties,
leaders and
regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of
violation of
parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was
unable to
assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.
4
The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of
the political
leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass
power. He
manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of
governments.
Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a
combined
military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/President Iskander Mirza
(1955-1958);
they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the
rise of the
bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of
democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers
along with
the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and
domestic
affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the
tottering civilian
government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of
power by the
generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have
either ruled
the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to
June 1962,
when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but
the 1962
Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s centralized and
authoritarian rule
which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the
state media
projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His government’s
political
management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and
the regions
and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was
then East
Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s
1962
Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in
Pakistan’s
politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for
socioeconomic
equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action
in
East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December
1971).
Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up of the original Pakistan
and the
establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political
setback forced
General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader,
Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in
what was
left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to
July 5, 1977)
against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the
military debacle
of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s command
structure.
However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate
the
military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian
methods to deal
with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the
pretext that the
government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief
of the Army
Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition
parties
welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of
direct
military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and
conservative
Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his
government’s
partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic
resistance to the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge
the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government obtained international financial and
diplomatic support
which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and
militancy,
undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and
processes.
These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far
reaching changes in
the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued
centrality to
governance and political management
5
In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top
commanders
closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and
security
matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their
professional
and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for
Benazir
Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif
(November 1990-July
1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian
government and the
top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders
depended on
their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of
Nawaz
Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders
during the
fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the
sidelines and
viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and
constitutional role for
the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it
could not
give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide
ranging
commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care,
education,
and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments
for civil
construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its involvement in
governance, its role
in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.
The Musharraf Model:
General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff since October 1998, assumed power after his
top
commanders dislodged the elected civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on October 12, 1999.
He
designated himself as the Chief Executive and suspended the constitution to impose military
rule, avoiding
the use of the term of martial law.
General Pervez Musharraf carefully tailored the transition to constitutional and civilian rule in
2002. The
underlying consideration was his staying on as an effective President in the post-military rule
period and
the continuation of the policy measures adopted by his military regime. The transition process
was
deigned to share power with a section of the political leaders rather than transfer power to
civilian
political leaders.
He ensured his continuation in office before starting the transition process by holding a state
managed
uncontested referendum on April 30, 2002 to get him elected as President for five years. This
was followed
by the introduction of far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution to enhance his powers and
to give a
constitutional cover to the role of the top brass in policy making through the issuance of the
Legal
Framework Order (LFO) in August. Meanwhile a breakaway faction of the PML-Nawaz Sharif,
labeled as the
PML-Quaid-i-Azam, was co-opted for partnership. The PML-Q enjoyed state patronage which
enabled it to
emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly and it obtained a clear majority in
the Punjab
Provincial Assembly. The military regime’s major adversary, the PPP, came second in the
National
Assembly and obtained the largest number of seats (not an absolute majority) in the Sindh
Provincial
Assembly.
The Presidency and the intelligence agencies played an active role in creating the PML-Q led
coalitions at
the federal level and in Sindh and Balochistan. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had a majority to form
the
government. Thus, the National Assembly began to function on November 16 and General
Pervez
Musharraf took the oath as the elected President for five years. The provincial governments
were installed
in November-December and the Senate, upper house of the parliament, was elected in the last
week of
February 2003 and resumed functioning on March 12, 2003, which marked the full restoration
of the 1973
Constitution as amended by the LFO.
Pakistan thus returned to constitutional rule with elected parliament and provincial assemblies
as well as
elected governments at the federal and provincial levels. However, the political arrangements
were
dominated by the Presidency. President Pervez Musharraf not only exercised the enhanced
powers under
6
the LFO but he also continued as the Army Chief—an unusual combination in a democratic
polity-which
gave him an overriding clout in the polity.
The focal point of the post-2002 political order is President-Army Chief General Pervez
Musharraf who
functions as an effective ruler, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the Parliament. This
political
arrangement could be described as the Musharraf model of governance and political
management. The
effective powers are concentrated in President-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf and his
army/intelligence
affiliates who command the political system both at the federal and provincial levels. The
establishment of
the National Security Council in April 2004 which provides a legal cover to the expanded role of
the top
brass of the military further reinforces the position of the President and the brass of the
military.
The Musharraf model emphasizes the unity of command, centralization, management rather
than
participation and the guardianship of the political process by the military. The elected
government and the
parliament have to function within the space made available to them by the top commanders.
The
political clout of the civilian leaders depends on their ability to work in harmony with the top
generals.
The parliament and the provincial assemblies have not been able to acquire an autonomous
and assertive
role in the polity. The effective power at both federal and provincial levels is located outside
the
parliament and the provincial assemblies. Consequently, the seekers of state power and
resources focus on
the presidency and its Army/intelligence and bureaucratic affiliates. The assemblies have done
limited
legislative work and their functioning has been marred by bitter exchanges between the
government and
the opposition, violation of parliamentary norms, the quorum problem and boycotts by the
opposition
parties. The members complain about the frequent absence of the ministers from the two
houses of the
parliament and the inadequacy of the answers by the government to their questions. The
assemblies have
to make a real effort to fulfill even the constitutional requirement of the minimum working
days in a year.
The prime ministerial changes in June 2004 (Zafarullah Jamali to Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein)
and August
(Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein to Shaukat Aziz) demonstrated the weakness of the National
Assembly and the
ruling coalition led by the PML. The decision for these changes was made in the presidency and
the
National Assembly and the PML simply endorsed it. Jamali got his budget passed from the
parliament
which amounted to a vote of confidence for his government. Two days later, he had to quit
under pressure
from the Presidency. The PML accepted the change and his entire cabinet was reappointed
under the new
prime minister.
This system restricts the participatory opportunities for the mainstream political parties, i.e.
the PPP and
the PML-Nawaz, which are viewed as the major adversaries of the Musharraf dominated
political order.
The confrontation between the government and the opposition has increased over time. This
means that
the political process is not moving in the direction of consensus building and its support base
continues to
be narrow, limited to the co-opted section of the political elite.
The strains in the federal-provincial relations have increased because the provinces complain
about the
domineering role of the military dominated federal government. The federal government has
not resolved
many federal-provincial issues which have created a strong impression in the smaller provinces
that the
federal government was deliberately doing this to keep political and financial pressures on the
provinces.
Some of the major issues are the determination of the National Finance Commission
(NFC)Award on
distribution of revenues between the federal and provincial governments,, the construction of
dams for
storing water and power generation, the Greater Thal Canal issue, the share of the NWFP in
net profit of
hydel power generated in that province, the gas royalty for Balochistan, and the federal
government mega
development projects in Balochistan and the construction of new army cantonments in that
province. If
confrontation and bitterness persist in the political system and the competing political
interests do not
adopt accommodating disposition the sustainability of the present political system may not be
guaranteed.
Problems of Democracy
The major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times,
democracy and
participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.
7
Institutional Imbalance: Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of
independence
in August 1947. The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence
services, was
more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first
Interim
Constitution, 1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This
imbalance was
reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain.
First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after
independence. The
Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and
capacity for state
and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or semi-feudal
background, and
were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building the party as a viable
organization
capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also suffered from similar problems
of internal
disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were
unable to offer
a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests
within a
participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political
institutions or
processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.
Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by
hierarchy,
discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years of
independence led
the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s
security
problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the military’s
position in
the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated
a
substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The military’s position in
the polity
received additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances
in the mid-
1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by
Americans in
Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the military’s efficiency and strike power. Thus, the
degeneration
of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and
confidence of
the military.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of
the civilian
leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves
without the
support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and
the
military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they began to dominate
politics. In
October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political institutions and established its
direct rule, with
the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
The role of various civilian and military intelligence agencies expanded in the political domain
during the
military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985) when the military regime used the intelligence
agencies to
divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan
(1980-1989) and
the linkages between Pakistani intelligence agencies and their U.S. counterparts in the context
of the
Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistan’s intelligence
agencies. Some
of these agencies have been playing active political role since 1988, helping some political
parties and
groups while building pressure on others keeping in view the military’s political agenda. They
have
interfered in the national and provincial elections which has raised doubts about the credibility
of the
electoral process. Some of these agencies were active in politics during after the 2002 general
elections.
These were also instrumental to creating the ruling coalition at the federal level and in Sindh
and
Balochistan after the October 2002 elections. The active political role of the intelligence
agencies
weakens the autonomous growth of civilian political institutions and processes.
Political Consensus-building: The democratic process cannot become functional
without a
minimum consensus on the operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the
beginning point.
As the political process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and
political
advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the
polity. The
scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream
through the
democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political institutions
and processes
viable.
8
The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political
norms.
Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was
allowed to
fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of the
competing
interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy. Therefore, all
constitutions
turned controversial with the passage of time because they were violated by the power
wielders.
Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army
Chief which
made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be easily
set aside or
subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism and
participatory
governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in a partisan
manner by
employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building consensus.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national
issues has
hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The
dominant
elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing with
them. It is not
merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups manifest
intolerance and use
violence against those who question their views.
The steady growth of Islamic extremism and militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since
the early
1980s has stifled the free flow of ideas on the issues of national importance. It gave rise to
religious and
cultural intolerance and increased the level of civic violence. The rival extremist religious
groups did not
hesitate to use violence against each other. The major victims of these trends were social and
cultural
pluralism, political tolerance and accommodation of dissent. The participatory processes also
suffered as
the religious extremists gained strength in Pakistan. Such a political and cultural environment
is not
conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Political Parties and Leadership: Political harmony and democratic evolution
is facilitated
primarily by political parties and leaders. These are important instruments of interest
articulation and
aggregation and serve as vehicles of political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have
traditionally
been weak and unable to perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.
The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political
activities
under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor discipline
among the
members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of financial
resources. Political
parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and ideology.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a
national
movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological
confusion and a
crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not
present a better
alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League. Consequently,
the political
parties could not work for political consensus building and political stability and continuity.
Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake
dispassionate and
scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and
sloganeering
which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious,
scientific and
analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of the
parliament and
provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of quorum which
shows the
non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected houses in dealing with
the
national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and parliamentary secretaries are not
available in
the house to respond to the issues raised by the members.
The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either
floated by
the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these
enjoyed its
blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially the
setting up of
the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the establishment in party
politics.
Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League which was turned into the ruling
party in
1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy. He co-opted a faction of the Muslim
League which
ruled with his blessings after he restored civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General
Pervez Musharraf
9
has done the same by co-opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments
under its
leadership at the federal level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-
December 2002.
The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League
(pre-1971)
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political
eminence to the
establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the strong opposition
of the
military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won majorities in the 1970s
in the
Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of Pakistan. The military
transferred power
to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971. The PPP continues to face the
distrust of the
establishment.
The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally
been
ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited
experience of
working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which
undermines its role in
a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for pursuing a
limited
agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party because this
requires a viable
organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.
Islam and Politics: A predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani
political system
must have some relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise
nature of
relationship between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and
processes to be
set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to
establish a
puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the
Islamic
state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality,
socioeconomic
justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory
governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the
polity
rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. Another
debate
pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan: Did he
advocate an
ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links with Islam or a modern democratic
state that
viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics? Still another issue is how far the Two-
nation theory is
relevant to the post-independence period for shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as
a Muslim
state or an Islamic state?
General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative
interpretation of
the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made
several
administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by
the orthodox
and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious
extremism in
Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against
the notion of
participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and
political
rights as western implants in Pakistan.
The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military
regime of
Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing principle for
the
Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and punishments
introduced by General
Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA), a
conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in power. The rise of Islamic
orthodoxy has also
increased Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani
society.
The inconclusive debate on Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political
system adversely
affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject
democracy as a
western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to attain power and
then
implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of consensus on the precise
relationship between Islam and the Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and political system,
democratic
institutions and processes would not fully develop and become sustainable.
10
Military Rule and Constitutional and Political Engineering: The
repeated
assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in accordance
with its
political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic
institutions
and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire
supreme
legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the development of civilian institutions
and processes
and made it impossible for them to develop strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or
so, the
military returned the country to square one, promising to introduce a system designed to
respond to the
needs and aspiration of the people and reflected the operational political realities of the
country.
While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a
non-partisan
approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in
power and the
continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They engaged in
constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in 1962)) or by
making
drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests of the military
regime. Zia-ul-
Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the 1973 constitution in 1985 and
2002
respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process and to ensure that no political
party could
unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the military regime.
Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing
to play
politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their
continued stay
in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a section of the
political
elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim League. The strategy of
co-option
pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political
arrangements.
This strategy was adopted by the above named military rulers for replacing direct military rule
with new
political arrangements based on sharing of power between the top brass of the military and the
co-opted
political leadership. Another strategy adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding
of carefully
managed general elections to ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their
adversaries.
The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military
ethos of
hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective
consensus. These
institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and remained
closely
associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered in responding
to the
demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of democracy was
poor in the
post-military rule political arrangements.
Concluding Observations:
Democracy in Pakistan faced a host of difficulties which did not let the democratic principles,
institutions
and processes develop firm roots in the polity. Pakistan started with the parliamentary system
of
governance but the legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism, problems
encountered in the
setting up of the new state, the external security pressures and the fear of the collapse of the
state
adversely affected the prospects of democracy. Other factors that caused the problems for
democracy
included the crisis of leadership in the aftermath of the demise of Jinnah, failure of the Muslim
League to
transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party, fragmentation and
degeneration of the
political forces and the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite. Long before the first military
take over in
October 1958 the dominant elite were talking about the unsuitability of liberal democracy for
Pakistan.
Intermittent constitutional and political breakdown, the ascendancy of the military to power
and the
efforts of the top brass of the military to introduce a political system that protected their
professional and
corporate interests made it difficult to create participatory political institutions and processes
that could
command the voluntary support of the diversified political interests. The military elite
employed the
democratic principles in a selective manner and their policy of co-option of a section of the
political
leaders and exclusion of others accentuated polarization and jeopardized the prospects of
political
accommodation and consensus-building.
11
The experience suggests that democratic institutions and processes stabilize and mature if
their natural
evolution is not obstructed by partisan considerations. These must function in their true spirit
over time,
offering all citizens and groups an equal and fair opportunity to enter the political mainstream
and
compete for power and influence. This helps to build support for the political institutions and
facilitates
their sustainability. In Pakistan, periodic breakdown of the political order and repeated
military take-over
or attempts by the top brass to shape the political process to their political preferences did not
ensure
political continuity and the competing interest did not get equal opportunity to freely enter
the political
mainstream. .
Democracy and the autonomy of civilian institutions and processes has been the major casualty
of the
expanded role of the military. Whenever Pakistan returned to civilian and constitutional rule,
the quality
of democracy remained poor. It is a case of democracy deficit. The long term endurance of the
political
institutions and the prospects of democracy faces four major challenges in Pakistan: the non-
expansion of
participatory opportunities for those viewed as adversaries by the military dominated regime,
the poor
performance of the elected assemblies, failure to build consensus on the operational norms of
the political
system, and a drift towards confrontation, religious and cultural intolerance and extremism.
This does not mean that the people have given up on the primacy of the popular will,
participatory
governance, accountability of the rulers and governance for serving the people. The ideological
commitment to these principles persists which will continue to question the legitimacy of
nonparticipatory
and authoritarian governance and political management.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahmad, Manzooruddin (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press,
1980).
Burki, Shahid Javed, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (London: Macmillan, 1988).
Callard, Keith, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen, 1958).
Chaudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman, 1969).
Cohen, Stephen P. The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005).
-------------- , The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
Gauhar, Altaf, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang
http://www.fgu.edu.tw/~academic/up1/malayconference1/pape
rscollection.files/conferefncepapers/5-2.pdf
ISLAMIC CULTURE
Islamic culture is itself a contentious term. Muslims live in many different countries and
communities, and it can be difficult to isolate points of cultural unity among Muslims,
besides their adherence to the religion of Islam. Anthropologists and historians
nevertheless study Islam as an aspect of, and influence on, culture in the regions where
the religion is predominant.
The noted historian of Islam, Marshall Hodgson, noted the above difficulty of religious
versus secular academic usage of the words "Islamic" and "Muslim" in his three-volume
work, The Venture Of Islam. He proposed to resolve it by only using these terms for
purely religious phenomena, and invented the term "Islamicate" to denote all cultural
aspects of historically Muslim peoples. However, his distinction has not been widely
adopted, and confusion remains in common usage of these words.
PAKISTANI CULTURE
The society and culture of Pakistan (Urdu: ) ثقافت پاکستانcomprises numerous diverse
cultures and ethnic groups: the Punjabis, Kashmiri and Sindhis in the east; the tribal
cultures of the Baloch and Pashtun in the west; and the ancient Dardic and Tajik
communities in the north. These Pakistani cultures have been greatly influenced by many
of the surrounding countries' cultures, such as the Turkish, Persian, Afghan, and Indians
of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
In ancient times, Pakistan was a major cultural hub. Many cultural practices and great
monuments have been inherited from the time of the ancient rulers of the region. One of
the greatest cultural influences was that of the Persian Empire, of which Pakistan was a
part. In fact, the Pakistani satraps were at one time the richest and most productive of the
massive Persian Empire. Other key influences include the Afghan Empire, and later, the
short lived but influential Mughal Empire.
Pakistan has a cultural and ethnic background going back to the Indus Valley
Civilization, which existed from 2800–1800 B.C., and was remarkable for its ordered
cities, advanced sanitation, excellent roads, and uniquely structured society. Pakistan has
been invaded many times in the past, and has been occupied and settled by many
different peoples, each of whom have left their imprint on the current inhabitants of the
country. Some of the largest groups were the 'Aryans', Greeks, Scythians, Persians, White
Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Afghans, Buddhists and other Eurasian groups, up to and
including the British, who left in the late 1940s.
The region has formed a distinct cultural unit within the main cultural complex of South
Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia from the earliest times, and is analogous to
Turkey's position in Eurasia.[1] There are differences in culture among the different ethnic
groups in matters such as dress, food, and religion, especially where pre-Islamic customs
differ from Islamic practices. Their cultural origins also reveal influences from far afield,
including Tibet, Nepal, India and eastern Afghanistan. All groups show varying degrees
of influence from Persia, Turkestan and Hellenistic Greece. Pakistan was the first region
of South Asia to receive the full impact of Islam and has developed a distinct Islamic
identity, historically different from areas further west.[1]
Bahauddin Zakariya
Ancient sites in Pakistan include: Zorastrian Fire temples, Islamic centres, Sufi Shrines,
Buddhist temples, Hindu and Pagan temples and shrines, gardens, tombs, palaces,
monuments, and Mughal and Indo-Saracenic buildings. Sculpture is dominated by Greco-
Buddhist friezes, and crafts by ceramics, jewellery, silk goods and engraved woodwork
and metalwork.
Pakistani society is largely multilingual, multi-ethnic and multicultural. Though cultures
within the country differ to some extent, more similarities than differences can be found,
as most Pakistanis are mainly of Aryan heritage or have coexisted side by side along the
Indus River for several thousand years, or both. However, over 60 years of integration, a
distinctive "Pakistani" culture has sprung up, especially in the urban areas where many of
the diverse ethnic groups have coexisted and in many cases, intermarried. Education is
highly regarded by members of every socio-economic stratum, with the country now
having a literacy rate of 55%, up from 3% at the time of independence. Traditional family
values are highly respected and considered sacred, although urban families increasingly
form nuclear families, owing to socio-economic constraints imposed by the traditional
culture of the extended family.
The past few decades have seen emergence of a middle class in cities such as Karachi,
Lahore, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Quetta, Faisalabad, Sukkur, Peshawar, Sialkot,
Abbottabad and Multan. Rural areas of Pakistan are regarded as more conservative, and
are dominated by regional tribal customs dating back hundreds if not thousands of years.
Pakistan's political and social history provides an interesting case study of the dynamics
of conflict formation as well as opportunities for researchers and academicians in the
field of conflict resolution and conflict management. At the outset, Pakistan faces a
myriad of ethnic and religious conflicts. The social environment plays an important role
in shaping and reshaping as well as intensifying these conflicts. Included in the social
environment are the very low literacy rates, a feudal agro-based economy, imbalanced
economic development, the inequitable distribution of power and resources, and a
pseudo-federal system.
The key factor in understanding conflict formation is the state structure. The dilemma of
state building and nation building came naturally to the postcolonial state at the time of
independence. A viable and effective state structure, in terms of the bureaucracy and the
military, was necessary to sustain the new nation-state and its independence. However,
the state structure came to manifest itself much more strongly over government and civil
society, with the result that the military and political processes became synonymous with
each other. Starting with the military regime of Ayub Khan, Pakistan has seen overt
military rule in the 1980s during the time of Zia-ul-Haq and at present with Pervez
Musharraf in power. The predominance of the bureaucratic-military nexus has resulted in
an overcentralized state structure, a negation of democratic politics, a weak civil society,
and religious and ethnic conflicts.
The state structure and the conflicts it generates can be explained with respect to three
levels of analysis: the domestic, regional, and international. At the domestic level, the
main debate includes the religious issue, the ethnic issue, and the crisis of governability.
At the regional front, the enmity with India over the Kashmir issue provides an
interesting case study of the legitimacy of the ruling establishment. At the international
front, the relationship with the United States is the key variable for understanding the
debate on democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan.
At the domestic level, an overcentralized state structure has tended to augment both
religious and ethnic conflicts. As far as religion is concerned, Islam played an important
role in the movement for Pakistan. Islam provided the ideological foundation for the two-
nation theory, which claimed the distinctiveness of the Hindus and Muslims and called
for a separate nation-state for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. It is interesting to
note that soon after the Partition of 1947 the Islamic factor sailed into oblivion as the
state managers acquired a secular tone. Pakistan's state structure since partition has
remained secular, with Zia's period being the exception when the Islamic factor played an
instrumental role. During Zia's rule, religion was used to provide legitimacy to an
illegitimate government and also to mobilize Islamic parties in the jihad against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Zia's reliance on a Sunni version of Islam alienated the
minority Shia community and one finds the prevalence of the Shia-Sunni conflict in
Pakistan ever since. Moreover, with the success of the Iranian revolution, Pakistan
became an important playground for the Sunni Gulf states and the Irani Shia state to play
out their rivalries against each other through their support of Islamic parties in Pakistan.
On the other hand, the ethnic factor has played an important role in Pakistan's political
history. Pakistan, being a multiethnic state, needed to evolve an adequate system of
representation and a just and equitable distribution of power and resources in order to
maintain ethnic peace and harmony. However, the dominance of the state structure,
especially the bureaucracy and the military, by one or two ethnic groups, tended to
augment ethnic tensions and violence. The most important in the context of Pakistan has
been the Bengali ethnic movement, which led to the breakup of Pakistan and rise of a
new state, Bangladesh, in 1971. The Bengalis nurtured serious grievances from the
Pakistani state structure, as they were not given adequate representation at the state level.
Moreover, since a working parliamentary form of government was nonexistent in
Pakistan, the Bengalis found themselves alienated and exploited. These grievances led to
a movement that called for federal autonomy. Later on, through grave violence that was
inflicted on the Bengalis, a separate state emerged. The violence done to the Bengalis
called into question the ideology of the two-nation theory, as one witnessed Muslims
inflicting violence and oppression on Muslims themselves. After the secession of East
Pakistan and its reinvention as the country of Bangladesh, other ethnic movements came
to challenge the Pakistani establishment. These were the Baluch Movement in the 1970s,
the Sindhu Desh Movement in the 1980s, and the Muhajir Qaumi Movement in the
1990s. The state used its force to brutally suppress all three movements with no room for
accommodation and compromise. It seems as if there was no lesson learned from the
separation of East Pakistan.
At the regional front, the enmity with India provides the causality for the justification of
the state structure and huge defense budgets. The Kashmir issue, a legacy of the colonial
period, has come to haunt relations between India and Pakistan. Three wars and a mini-
war in Kargil have been fought between the two nations, but still the Kashmir issue
remains unresolved. Pakistan insists on a just and fair resolution of the Kashmir issue
through the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, but the issue itself has
become instrumental in legitimating the incumbent regimes, whether military or
nonmilitary. Although India and Pakistan are implementing and have implemented a
regime of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to settle bilateral issues, the
nonresolution of the issue points to the issue being a lifeline for the state structures of
both the countries. In the case of Pakistan, when the host of social problems continue to
plague the nation-state, the important question is to concentrate and solve the dispute first
or to solve the immense amount of ethnic, religious, and class conflicts within the
country. The state structure, however, sees the dispute in a traditional manner, which
emphasizes the buildup of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles
to combat India. This comes at a tremendous cost as the defense expenditure helps to
sustain an illiterate, malnourished, and underdeveloped society and a social environment
that causes conflicts of various types.
At the international front, the relationship of Pakistan with the United States has served to
perpetuate military rule and the strengthening of the state structure at the expense of
democratic institutions and a strong civil society. Pakistan's year of independence
coincided with the outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The United States, sensing a threat to its interests in the Middle East and South
Asia, immediately cultivated the friendship of Pakistan because of its geographical
proximity to the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The military and financial aid
provided to Pakistan by its foreign ally helped to sustain illegitimate and undemocratic
regimes in power. During the 1960s and the Afghanistan-USSR war in the 1980s, the
Pakistani military establishment played an important role in helping the United States to
procure its interests in the region. At present, history is repeating itself as an
undemocratic regime is being sustained as a result of the 11 September 2001 incident.
The present military regime—despite its undemocratic credentials—is following a liberal
line. Countrywide, local elections have been held with the aim of devolving power to the
common people and their representatives. Moreover, major constitutional changes have
taken place and general elections are scheduled in October 2002. More importantly, after
11 September, the military regime's main initiative has been with regard to the
eradication of the jihadi culture in Pakistan. This culture of Islamic fundamentalism was a
direct result of the Afghanistan war in the 1980s and its momentum grew with the rise of
the Taliban in 1994. President Musharraf has made it clear that jihadi groups will not be
tolerated and their linkages within the state structure of Pakistan will be rooted out.
The Pakistan of today stands at a critical juncture. First of all, there is a fear of fallout of
the Taliban in Pakistan. Second, the debt burden needs to be tackled for long-term
economic development in the country. Third, the state structure needs to be reformed to
guarantee adequate representation of all social groups within the society. Lastly, and most
importantly, problems of the common people need to be solved so that a benevolent and
peaceful social environment free of conflicts is established.
PAKISTAN IDENTITY
This paper will examine the relationship between Pakistan’s chequered democratic
history and the regionalist movements that have emerged. The relationship between
democracy and ethnic conflict is complicated and multifaceted. Democracy can
provide opportunities for ethno-national mobilisation and therefore exacerbate
demographic tensions between communities. Conversely it can provide the
opportunity for the expression and democratic resolution of tensions. Taking another
perspective, the absence of democracy may exacerbate ethnic tensions through the
reduced opportunity for the articulation of grievances. On the other hand it can
manage grievances through the accommodation of different communities within
non-elected institutions. There is no hard and fast rule, and the specifics of each
movement must be investigated. The relationship between democracy and ethnic
conflict is problematic in Pakistan. Pakistan has never been a consolidated
democracy; but there have been periods in Pakistan when the expression of
regionalist grievances has been possible. Even in these periods however, regionalist
parties have not performed well – Sindhi regionalist parties in particular. This is
staggering given the domination of the major institutions of state by Punjabis. In
addition, many of the major ethnic conflicts that Pakistan has experienced have been
during democratic interludes, for example, the secession of Bangladesh and 1973-8
war in Baluchistan. Therefore the paper’s aim is to problematise the relationship
between democracy and identity politics in Pakistan, through an understanding of
which groups have been co-opted, and more importantly, how and why.
Political parties
The two largest Muslim League blocks are the PML – Nawaz
Sharif (PML-N) and the PML - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) both of
which claim direct descent from the All-India Muslim League
that was the political organization instrumental in the
advocacy and creation of Pakistan. Both are centrist parties,
slightly to the right of the Pakistan People’s Party, and
favour generally conservative pro-business platform based
on economic privatisation and deregulation. PML-Q,
however, is a military-created party whose leaders have
primarily defected from PML-N after the 1999 coup and
when bureaucratic, military and corporate patronage
switched to the newly established PML-Q. The popular basis
of the PML-Q lies in the Punjab and consequently it lacks the
national appeal of the PPP or the PML-N. Further, as an
artificial political creation reliant on state patronage and
direction the party has “little sense of common identity or
purpose”. As the ‘King’s Party’, the PML-Q now holds power
in the National Assembly and Punjab’s Provincial Assembly.
It also holds power in alliance with the MQM in Sindh and
the MMA in Balochistan.
There are some one-person only PML wings within the
national parliament but their support is limited to the
charisma of that one leader and that one person is the only
representative within the National Assembly.
3. Compensation
Conclusions and
recommendations
While the idea of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ and a-
political ‘humanitarian space are central to relief operations,
the UN and the international community nonetheless feed
into a complex and changing political environment through
their very presence. Working closely with the military and
jihadi groups only make them political actors whose
resources, wittingly or not, can be used to further domestic
political agendas. This is especially the case as we move
from the rescue and relief operations into the
reconstruction/rehabilitation phases. The following are some
measures that can be used by international organisations
working in Pakistan to counter their existing, if apparently
inadvertent, political partisanship:
Stress local partnerships with secular NGOs and civil society groups,
rather than ideological or missionary groups.
Develop mechanisms to empower locals (residents) and district
governments’ and consult them in the decision-making process
about reconstruction and rehabilitation in the earthquake-
devastated areas.
Seek to ensure that elected federal and provincial legislative bodies,
rather than the military, oversee and scrutinise relief and
reconstruction operations.
International Organizations must shift their approach from being
‘embedded’ with the military to one that involves effective
partnership with the civil society.
Demand that the official relief and reconstruction agencies are duly
constituted by parliament and contain civilian and cross-party
representation.
Ensure that there is proper accountability for the earthquake relief
funds by stressing on the Pakistani government to appoint an
independent monitor to review how the funds are disbursed.
Democracy and participatory governance are popular political notions in today’s world. Fair and free
elections are the key pre-requisite of democracy. However, democracy lacks substance unless the electoral
process is coupled with the supremacy of the constitution, the rule of law, and civil and political rights and
freedoms for the people. The state must practice the principle of equal citizenship irrespective of religion,
caste, ethnicity and regional background. It must also ensure equality of opportunity to all for
advancement in social, economic and political domains and guarantee security of life and property of its
citizens.
While it easy for the rulers, political leaders and parties, and others to pronounce their commitment to
these principles, the real challenge lies in making them operational. The key question is how does one
create and sustain institutions and processes that reflect the spirit of democracy and participatory
governance? A large number of states are unable to fulfill these conditions. The commitment of many
rulers, leaders, and organizations to democracy is merely rhetorical or they view democracy as an
instrument to achieve power and then implement a partisan non-democratic agenda. Others selectively
employ some aspects of democracy to create a façade. Still others hold elections, establish elected
legislative bodies and install elected governments but do not empower these institutions and the people
holding key positions in them. Power is thus exercised by an elite group while a semblance of democracy is
created to legitimize its rule. These operational realities create the problem of quality and substance of
democracy.
Historical Overview:
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a parliamentary
system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and the federal government
exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers did not pay much attention to
democratization of the political system because their major concern was how to ensure the survival of the
state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of the collapse of the state reinforced
authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition process These
included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between India and
Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the troubled relations
with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up a federal government in
Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked experienced civil servants and
military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment of Pakistan.
This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions and
fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local stature and
did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics. This made it difficult for the
political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards the problems and issues of the early
years. They were unable to develop consensus on the operational norms of the polity and took 8 ½ years to
frame a constitution which did not enjoy the unqualified support of all the major parties, leaders and
regions. By the time the constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of
parliamentary norms was established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was unable to
assert its primacy. The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.
4
The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of the political
leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass power. He
manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of governments.
Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55) and a combined
military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor General/President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958);
they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the military for support. This contributed to the rise of the
bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani politics which further undermined the prospects of democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers along with
the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security issues and domestic
affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, overthrew the tottering civilian
government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The latter was knocked out of power by the
generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since then the top brass of the military have either ruled
the country directly or influenced governance and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to June 1962,
when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an end but the 1962
Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s centralized and authoritarian rule
which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian institutions and processes, although the state media
projected his rule as the beginning of a new era of participatory governance. His government’s political
management and economic policies accentuated economic disparities among the people and the regions
and caused much political and social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was then East
Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s 1962
Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in Pakistan’s
politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East Pakistan for socioeconomic
equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely brutal military action in
East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India (November-December 1971).
Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up of the original Pakistan and the
establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major military and political setback forced
General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the largest number of the National Assembly seats in what was
left of Pakistan, i.e. the present Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to July 5, 1977)
against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the military debacle
of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s command structure.
However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he began to cultivate the
military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed authoritarian methods to deal
with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-Bhutto agitation on the pretext that the
government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army
Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition parties
welcomed the military take over because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of direct
military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox and conservative
Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was helped by his government’s
partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing Afghan-Islamic resistance to the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state for the U.S. policy to dislodge the Soviet
Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government obtained international financial and diplomatic support
which contributed to sustaining his military rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and militancy,
undermining the prospects of social and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes.
These trends continued after he civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far reaching changes in
the 1973 Constitution and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued centrality to
governance and political management
5
In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top commanders
closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on political and security
matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines provided their professional
and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders. Therefore, governance for Benazir
Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July
1993, February 1997-October 1999) was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the
top brass of the military. The scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on
their ability to maintain cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of Nawaz
Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military commanders during the
fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing to stay on the sidelines and
viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated a direct and constitutional role for
the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional role to such an extent that it could not
give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide ranging
commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care, education,
and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial governments for civil
construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its involvement in governance, its role
in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.
Problems of Democracy
The major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times, democracy and
participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.
7
Institutional Imbalance: Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence
in August 1947. The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence services, was
more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first Interim
Constitution, 1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This imbalance was
reinforced by two inter-related trends in the political domain.
First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence. The
Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and capacity for state
and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or semi-feudal background, and
were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building the party as a viable organization
capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also suffered from similar problems of internal
disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were unable to offer
a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a
participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political institutions or
processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.
Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by hierarchy,
discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years of independence led
the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s security
problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped to strengthen the military’s position in
the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a strong defence posture and allocated a
substantial portion of the national budget to defence and security. The military’s position in the polity
received additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances in the mid-
1950s. This facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans in
Pakistan and the U.S. which increased the military’s efficiency and strike power. Thus, the degeneration
of the political machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and confidence of
the military.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the civilian
leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves without the
support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the bureaucracy and the
military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they began to dominate politics. In
October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political institutions and established its direct rule, with
the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
The role of various civilian and military intelligence agencies expanded in the political domain during the
military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1985) when the military regime used the intelligence agencies to
divide and fragment the political forces. The war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1980-1989) and
the linkages between Pakistani intelligence agencies and their U.S. counterparts in the context of the
Afghan war helped to put more material resources at the disposal of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some
of these agencies have been playing active political role since 1988, helping some political parties and
groups while building pressure on others keeping in view the military’s political agenda. They have
interfered in the national and provincial elections which has raised doubts about the credibility of the
electoral process. Some of these agencies were active in politics during after the 2002 general elections.
These were also instrumental to creating the ruling coalition at the federal level and in Sindh and
Balochistan after the October 2002 elections. The active political role of the intelligence agencies
weakens the autonomous growth of civilian political institutions and processes.
minimum consensus on the operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the beginning point.
As the political process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and political
advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the polity. The
scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream through the
democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political institutions and processes
viable.
8
The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political norms.
Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was allowed to
fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of the competing
interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy. Therefore, all constitutions
turned controversial with the passage of time because they were violated by the power wielders.
Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army Chief which
made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be easily set aside or
subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism and participatory
governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in a partisan manner by
employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building consensus.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues has
hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The dominant
elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing with them. It is not
merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups manifest intolerance and use
violence against those who question their views.
The steady growth of Islamic extremism and militancy and Islamic-sectarian movements since the early
1980s has stifled the free flow of ideas on the issues of national importance. It gave rise to religious and
cultural intolerance and increased the level of civic violence. The rival extremist religious groups did not
hesitate to use violence against each other. The major victims of these trends were social and cultural
pluralism, political tolerance and accommodation of dissent. The participatory processes also suffered as
the religious extremists gained strength in Pakistan. Such a political and cultural environment is not
conducive to growth of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Political Parties and Leadership: Political harmony and democratic evolution is facilitated
primarily by political parties and leaders. These are important instruments of interest articulation and
aggregation and serve as vehicles of political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have traditionally
been weak and unable to perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.
The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political activities
under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor discipline among the
members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of financial resources. Political
parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and ideology.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a national
movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological confusion and a
crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not present a better
alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League. Consequently, the political
parties could not work for political consensus building and political stability and continuity.
Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake dispassionate and
scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and sloganeering
which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious, scientific and
analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of the parliament and
provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of quorum which shows the
non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected houses in dealing with the
national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and parliamentary secretaries are not available in
the house to respond to the issues raised by the members.
The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either floated by
the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these enjoyed its
blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially the setting up of
the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the establishment in party politics.
Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League which was turned into the ruling party in
1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy. He co-opted a faction of the Muslim League which
ruled with his blessings after he restored civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General Pervez Musharraf
9
has done the same by co-opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments under its
leadership at the federal level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-December 2002.
The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League (pre-1971)
and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political eminence to the
establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the strong opposition of the
military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won majorities in the 1970s in the
Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of Pakistan. The military transferred power
to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971. The PPP continues to face the distrust of the
establishment.
The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally been
ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited experience of
working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which undermines its role in
a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for pursuing a limited
agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party because this requires a viable
organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.
Islam and Politics: A predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani political system
must have some relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise nature of
relationship between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be
set up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a
puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the Islamic
state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of equality,
socioeconomic
justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and participatory
governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical foundations of the polity
rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the modern times. Another debate
pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan: Did he advocate an
ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links with Islam or a modern democratic state that
viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics? Still another issue is how far the Two-nation theory is
relevant to the post-independence period for shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as a Muslim
state or an Islamic state?
General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative interpretation of
the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious groups. He made several
administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic principles as advocated by the orthodox
and conservative groups. This increased religious and cultural intolerance and religious extremism in
Pakistan. The official circles and the religious groups engaged in massive propaganda against the notion of
participatory governance, constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political
rights as western implants in Pakistan.
The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military regime of
Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing principle for the
Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and punishments introduced by General
Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the support of the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a
conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for staying in power. The rise of Islamic orthodoxy has also
increased Islamic-sectarian violence which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani society.
The inconclusive debate on Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political system adversely
affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups reject democracy as a
western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to attain power and then
implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of consensus on the precise
relationship between Islam and the Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and political system, democratic
institutions and processes would not fully develop and become sustainable.
10
Military Rule and Constitutional and Political Engineering: The repeated
assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in accordance with its
political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability of democratic institutions
and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or suspended it to acquire supreme
legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the development of civilian institutions and processes
and made it impossible for them to develop strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or so, the
military returned the country to square one, promising to introduce a system designed to respond to the
needs and aspiration of the people and reflected the operational political realities of the country.
While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a non-partisan
approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in power and the
continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They engaged in
constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in 1962)) or by making
drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests of the military regime. Zia-ul-
Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the 1973 constitution in 1985 and 2002
respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process and to ensure that no political party could
unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the military regime.
Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing to play
politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their continued stay
in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a section of the political
elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim League. The strategy of co-option
pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the military-initiated political arrangements.
This strategy was adopted by the above named military rulers for replacing direct military rule with new
political arrangements based on sharing of power between the top brass of the military and the co-opted
political leadership. Another strategy adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding of carefully
managed general elections to ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their adversaries.
The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military ethos of
hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective consensus. These
institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and remained closely
associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered in responding to the
demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of democracy was poor in the
post-military rule political arrangements.
Concluding Observations:
Democracy in Pakistan faced a host of difficulties which did not let the democratic principles, institutions
and processes develop firm roots in the polity. Pakistan started with the parliamentary system of
governance but the legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism, problems encountered in the
setting up of the new state, the external security pressures and the fear of the collapse of the state
adversely affected the prospects of democracy. Other factors that caused the problems for democracy
included the crisis of leadership in the aftermath of the demise of Jinnah, failure of the Muslim League to
transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party, fragmentation and degeneration of the
political forces and the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite. Long before the first military take over in
October 1958 the dominant elite were talking about the unsuitability of liberal democracy for Pakistan.
Intermittent constitutional and political breakdown, the ascendancy of the military to power and the
efforts of the top brass of the military to introduce a political system that protected their professional and
corporate interests made it difficult to create participatory political institutions and processes that could
command the voluntary support of the diversified political interests. The military elite employed the
democratic principles in a selective manner and their policy of co-option of a section of the political
leaders and exclusion of others accentuated polarization and jeopardized the prospects of political
accommodation and consensus-building.
11
The experience suggests that democratic institutions and processes stabilize and mature if their natural
evolution is not obstructed by partisan considerations. These must function in their true spirit over time,
offering all citizens and groups an equal and fair opportunity to enter the political mainstream and
compete for power and influence. This helps to build support for the political institutions and facilitates
their sustainability. In Pakistan, periodic breakdown of the political order and repeated military take-over
or attempts by the top brass to shape the political process to their political preferences did not ensure
political continuity and the competing interest did not get equal opportunity to freely enter the political
mainstream. .
Democracy and the autonomy of civilian institutions and processes has been the major casualty of the
expanded role of the military. Whenever Pakistan returned to civilian and constitutional rule, the quality
of democracy remained poor. It is a case of democracy deficit. The long term endurance of the political
institutions and the prospects of democracy faces four major challenges in Pakistan: the non-expansion of
participatory opportunities for those viewed as adversaries by the military dominated regime, the poor
performance of the elected assemblies, failure to build consensus on the operational norms of the political
system, and a drift towards confrontation, religious and cultural intolerance and extremism.
This does not mean that the people have given up on the primacy of the popular will, participatory
governance, accountability of the rulers and governance for serving the people. The ideological
commitment to these principles persists which will continue to question the legitimacy of nonparticipatory
and authoritarian governance and political management.