FC Article 36-38 Not Complete

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758
February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability
for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of
this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent
marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN
THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF
THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE
CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD
BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his
first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence,
petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the
first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a
copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on
the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel,
and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which
in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions
relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage
was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full
faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on
October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show
that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely
no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are
Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to
Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October
7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first
and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void
ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no
cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a
second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special
bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article
5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence
of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time,
while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.
Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States
criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164435

September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be
reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in
lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized
by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 2021, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17,
2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs.
F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs.
D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila
(Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accuseds
bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August
2001.[3]
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their
marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license;
and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA
held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at
that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so,
the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The
CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were
celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring
petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos
psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.
However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied
reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among
which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.[5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE
FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right
after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on
the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which,
petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the
proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man
at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.[9]
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of
bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was
deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy
make any difference.[10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified
under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by
other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents x x x .
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription
began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of
proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise,
failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to
prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained
knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient
evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she
(petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any
corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her
previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the
attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their [agents], as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.[15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is,
therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal
Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within
the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.[16]
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision
correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed
by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should
be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly
imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been
declared by final judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by
reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the
penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed,
but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 149498
May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming
the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and
void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband
Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court
of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him
several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied
by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed
between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure
that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents
motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held
that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them
Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them
despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them.
Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a
family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the
other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of
Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines
laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and
sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to
fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that
the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the
present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot
be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State
cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband
may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147824

SUPREME COURT
Manila
August 2, 2007
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition."2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, are the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They
begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu
City.5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in
Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to
Bindoy, they resided at her parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to
build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their
children because he shouldered his sisters schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all
their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee
hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime.13 He also
failed to provide for their childrens well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted
with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted
while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in
the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported
them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for
the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other
businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a wasteful. At one time, he disposed without her
consent a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline
from their gas station free of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child
was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal
house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee
Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17
As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent
time in her store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963,
they decided to get married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their
marriage took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of
coconut land in favor of Rosa.20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his
alleged profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family
house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied
forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal
property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks
authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her return from the United
States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys businesses.23 He tried to
reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended
that their relationship was blissful.24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they
were there, their childrens tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For
his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately
returned to the Philippines.25
He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his
law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He
admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of
income.26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has
nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated
when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested
area.28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his
Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching
Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It
found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards
at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there
was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31
The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of
psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled
that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333,
premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18,
2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents,
immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment
of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in
respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff
(Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos
alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which supported their children
came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosas industry; second, Justo
gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from
the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election
and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law
and morality, Justos alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her
case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her
allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the
present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she
argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in
Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the
root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her
marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or
in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due
process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and
removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this
case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of
pleadings and documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I
Whether the factual findings of this Court in
A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows
that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are
true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justos alleged infidelity,
failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds
are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we
must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must
assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged
psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the
covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the
future.36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed
against her husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these
facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of such
seeming depravities in appellees character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our
Decision, the existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the
part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the
present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of
Justos depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas
prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings
in A.C. No. 5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found
to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to
prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two
will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive,
thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice
versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case
cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently
proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated
to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether
the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless
marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude
that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the
Guidelines set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held in
Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the
requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations
indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial
court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision,
applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was
brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the
Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of
Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a
dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines
"constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband.
The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to
remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the
psychological condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in
question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article XV of
the Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which
states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that
any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than
not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved
spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x
x.
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
marriage.
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to
reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main
grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which
includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and
abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However,
this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of
sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa
Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related
instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same
person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the
same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant.
However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified
signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the
same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to
obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank loan
documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of
the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other
persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy
this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child
after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in
their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there
is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part . In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four
(4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with
Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and
acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that
Justo took care of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have
taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of
irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties
due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior
business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and
lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects"
surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election;
he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should
not be annulled.
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her
many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he
could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a
manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this
Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American
and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while
embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a
conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his
sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court
commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165424

APRIL 16, 2008
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner
vs
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the January 26,
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and 19 years of
age, respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the wedding, they
continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship
nonetheless.
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped seeing respondent and went on
dates with other women. It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him to stop dating
other women as he was already a married man.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
essential marital obligations to respondent.[4] He claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the
City Hall of Manila was a joke and that the marriage certificate he signed was fake. He also pointed out that
he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife and never consummated the marriage.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential
marital obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and held that, taken in totality, the evidence for
petitioner failed to establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The same
was denied. Hence, this petition.
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that
petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from complying with his
essential marital obligations.
We deny the petition.
Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the
burden.
The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a psychological report written by Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein.
According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality disorder characterized as a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought about by a
dysfunctional family background. Petitioner's father was very abusive and domineering. Although petitioner
and his siblings were adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man, they lacked affirmation.
Because of this, petitioner grew up without self-confidence and very immature. He never really understood
what it meant to have a family, much less to be a husband. According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much
evident in petitioner's impulsive decision to get married despite having gone steady with respondent for only
six months.
Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were psychologically incapacitated to perform their
essential marital obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They also never
consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as they
were both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner's psychological incapacity was grave
and incurable.
In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological
report and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted sufficient cause for declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability.[6]
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not equate to psychological incapacity.[8] Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in petitioner's personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations,[9] had to be shown. In
this, petitioner failed.
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty getting along with
each other as they constantly fought over petty things.[10] However, there was no showing of the gravity and
incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere statement or
conclusion to that effect in the psychological report. The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner
and his expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner's alleged disorder was grave enough
and incurable to bring about his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife.
This, however, fails to move us considering that there may be instances when, for economic and practical
reasons, a married couple might have to live separately though the marital bond between them remains.[11]
In fact, both parties were college students when they got married and were obviously without the financial
means to live on their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise
to the conclusion that one of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that he and respondent continued the
relationship after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they started fighting constantly a year later that
he decided to file a petition to have the marriage annulled. It appears that petitioner just chose to give up on
the marriage too soon and too easily.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165424

JUNE 9, 2009
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner
vs
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners
petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the
January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. SantosHalili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never
lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly
a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women.
Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a
married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent
and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a
quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision
and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent
ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the
evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the
findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with
the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts
should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this
court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from selfdefeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a]
dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the
essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision.
I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death,
and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack
of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the
moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and
respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage.
During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem
also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make
most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident
in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.[9]
Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action
to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder,
petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive
attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the way petitioner
allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots[12] and, later, by
respondent who was as domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take respondents
domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted
to end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very
domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have
been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having
self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what
[it] meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already
existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable
and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with
diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[17]
Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe
mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and,
beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this
Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157649

SUPREME COURT
Manila
November 12, 2012
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence
must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing
prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with
respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New
Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in
college she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management course.
After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their
daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites
solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioners best friend to settle
the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college
course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics
instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the
one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their
childs educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college before he
started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first
sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household
expenses and their childs schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon. In
September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors.
Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby
affecting their sexual relationship.4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her
to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance coverage. She soon found out,
however, that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse,
she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of
the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00
belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa,
for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her
mother and her sister themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and
space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten
to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed
from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage
with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson,
and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6
holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she
issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and
responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget.
Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave all of herself
unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent
was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His
criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His
childhood experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial
(sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a husband and
father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true
remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and
incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing Dominics
psychological incapacity, viz:
Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity
as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage respondent had left all
the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs
with friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary
from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious
consideration is respondents propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous
evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondents personality disorder and it
was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents behavioral
equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of
his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondents childhood experiences of separation
and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes,
faulty parenting and influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the
wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted marriage
with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such
incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook,
disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way
by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a mockery and
brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics personality traits either
constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not
conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties separation had been their frequent
quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.11
Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioners expert witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents condition, assuming it is serious
enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioners expert witness
concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties marriage, the Court
refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact that the witness findings, admittedly, were concluded
only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview,
was already head strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored illfeelings against respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish Dominics psychological
affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the
pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA
observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his
dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of
psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not
necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity,
although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal
separation provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more
than six (6) years.16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had
presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and
Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more
than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos
(G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological
examination was not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and
warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she
admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert
witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual
psychiatric evaluation by petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that
the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving
testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify
the facts derived from petitioner about Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she
harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those
whom petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you
interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.

Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital
problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding
her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you
say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the petitioner,
Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samsons
findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly
given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominics
psychological incapacity.
The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."18 But
here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root
cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before
completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological
incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization
of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical experts
testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of
showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality
of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial
consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give
weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties
in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before
it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity22 is not
entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to
be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his
psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of
psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the
opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or
not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments
not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of their proceedings.23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and
to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a persons psychological affliction must be
grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of
marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to
exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions
indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel
remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity,
was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and
criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for
an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG
no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have
become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the
OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such
service within the same period.26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial
is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After
the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the
decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the
action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.1wphi1 Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties,
the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the
capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal
judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166357

SUPREME COURT
Manila
January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for
lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on
petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits,
when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations
of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a
result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations
that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always
with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated
this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did
not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was
not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to
prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo
that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one
instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men.
Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would
show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement
from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision
and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into
what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the
meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to
have the law "allow some resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has
been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity
that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis,
because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions
of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,"
and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, althoughits manifestations
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
marriage.
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence whatis
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours"
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every
"trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation
where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during
trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to
ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to
stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote
the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all
the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position
and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not
to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina
Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions
a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for
the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted
the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners testimony, as well as on her
interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be
unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all,
her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of
another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already
settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in
Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be
personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion
should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or

speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation.
The experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical
procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates
expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expected to
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of
Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and
dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondents
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her
since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may
appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her
own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears
that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having
significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted
on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several
scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism
and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be
considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect
that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial
Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or
less, could you please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is
self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a
job to partly assume the breadwinners role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took
care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective
duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died
prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that
he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and
affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed
this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of
experience or the lack of care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to
your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I
gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already
expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena
and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still
insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another.
There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a
mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion,
but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for
her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh
and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence
available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding
Father Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by
current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to
do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was
derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondents level of immaturity and irresponsibility
with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts
as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim
of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is
not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested
running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was
dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in
an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her
own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her
children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher
children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with
friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for
granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to
the marriage withher. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism
afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations
which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own
lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at
the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into
the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And
now you show that you dont accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you dont care about
them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her
and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the
top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you
mentioned?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation.
Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give
in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her
position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her
and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination
of the parties psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial
court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby
provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological
incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with
those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological
and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in
psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting
link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who
could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming
or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of
the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined
the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other
as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions
of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations
are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral
values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for
an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage
(lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry
out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat
the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and
another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without
too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge
of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit
into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this,
saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to
link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade.
This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she
fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that
would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her
family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by
Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim
of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents separation, do you remember any habit or activity or
practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I think we would get there
by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there?
She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a
very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal
and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr.
Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under
Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example,
and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental
to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the
effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to
that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who
had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper
of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were
together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so.
But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship
work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude
that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then . He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even
that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think
so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his
younger years he was often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted
to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner
to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment
and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways
during the marriage?
A : Sir, its difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological
capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband
to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature
and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because
she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of
either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already
accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the
law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also
to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still
recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This
was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of
the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital
duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1wphi1 It is not,
in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced
to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children,
simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he
has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit
that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner,
an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed
from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the
time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the
parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of
petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All
too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1
and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever sociopolitical influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment
itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well
as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that
the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in
turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against
marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for
reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations
of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

GLENN VIAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared
the marriage between Glenn Vias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Vias (Mary Grace) as null and
void.cralawred
Antecedents
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites
held in Lipa City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to
weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infants death was caused by Mary Graces heavy
drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a production
engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently
found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had
not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to
any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential
household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing
traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6c
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husbands needs. She was self-centered,
selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed indifference. She
eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas
employment in Dubai.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, he
consulted the latters friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to
be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of
insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as amply
aware of his marital roles and capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Graces personality through the data she had gathered from
Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle class
family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag
prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another
man.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couples fights.
Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and familyoriented.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social
traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenns relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust,
respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring
the nullity of the couples marriage.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in
proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within
her system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it has caused
her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of
empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted
her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in
[Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with
[Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show proper respect
for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and
would not pay close attention to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled
for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected
to her control. x x x She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even
got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Graces] personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the various
forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial
stage in the life of a person as this is the time when the individuals character and behavior are shaped.
[Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never impose any
restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to be the first to show concern [for] her. x x x She
has acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of
the laxity she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees
to it that she is the one always followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates people to
submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of
unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values were not
instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing
ill-advised things even if she is amply aware of the depravity of her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already in her system
even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage
with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana
Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn and
Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn,
who is conservative and preoccupied with his work. 15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the
psychological report dated December 29, 2008.cralawred
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary
Grace as null and void on account of the latters psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as
grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition.
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is
best that the legal bond between them be severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace]
who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her
husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned
[Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the insistence of [Glenn] that he would not
know the whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together,
[and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace]
was in a quandary on what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic marital
obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage
saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital
obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient authority
to speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient
data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary Grace] is
ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is
conclusive that this personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before the
marriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave, permanent and incurable. 17 (Underlining ours
and italics in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its
Order18 dated December 1, 2010.cralawred
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace
indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital
obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Graces disorder. Further, the
RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayags statements anent the gravity and
incurability of Mary Graces condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sans
details. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital
obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenns petition. Mary Grace may be
unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological
illness.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSGs appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons
below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological
condition must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and
irresponsible which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged
that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To
Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of psychological incapacity on her
part.
While it is true that [Glenns] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a
psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only on him and no
evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the psychological
incapacity of a person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the psychological
condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist
stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root
cause of the disorder nor did she make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she admitted
that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the information provided to her may be subjective
and self-serving.
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the spouses psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be
alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the
ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly
explained in the decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, has this to say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of
[Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be
is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration22 filed by Glenn.cralawred
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist
justifying the RTCs declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should be
judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. The RTC judge should painstakingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain
from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v.
Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared as a nullity. 25
However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be considered as decisive
evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be
respected.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for our
consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not
necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
Graces condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man.
She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition
before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary
Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latters acts and traits do not
necessarily
indicate
psychological
incapacity.
Rumbaua
v.
Rumbaua30
is
emphatic
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be
shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly
irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the
respondents act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring
and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in
later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the
part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by
said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to
2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an
impossibility. Mary Graces departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but
not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater
burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the
formers condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenns testimony is wanting in material details.
Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenns statements are hardly objective. Moreover,
Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Graces traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage.
Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Graces alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified
that, six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. 32 Glenn saw a loving[,]
caring and well[-]educated person33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayags assessment of Mary Graces condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded.
Rumbaua34 provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or
psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias,
her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards
in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism
of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctors probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves
around him; and who used love as adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him. x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondents narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but
conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is
an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondents condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondents psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
xxxx
A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the
parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain
how she came to the conclusion that respondents condition was grave and incurable. x x x
xxxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a
very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality
disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at
the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners
case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the
petitioner related to her. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence,
however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life
and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus,
the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided
and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground
exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the
respondents life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with
the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies,
his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention
also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondents
family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his
mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have
failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations
omitted and underlining ours)
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Graces status as the eldest among her
siblings,36 her fathers being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These,
however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couples marriage.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can
attest to the antecedence of a persons psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a
petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenns marital
woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary
Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenns spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated
August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cr

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 192718
February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,

vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November
20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin
(Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23,
Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this
judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA
reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the
Family Code."3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were thereafter
transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the
Family Code Act of 1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its
essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who
manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear
during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he
disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that
when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He
also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not
know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who
took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed
her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their
house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance
Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage
annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan
Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab
initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
(NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The
OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed
out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a
ground for legal separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The
decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly
noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of
establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellees undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court
compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its
unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6 stating
that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously
pointed out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of
its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION
OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE
LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To
bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of
discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in
marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she
failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting
and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was
not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a
sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not
sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of
establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect
which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were
only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the
decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations
due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took
place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably
show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondents Retraction
of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she
married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present
recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of
Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the
Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations
of the Appellants complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated.
The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in
the Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if
not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the
Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
The Courts Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and
render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x
x.
xxxx
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Roberts evidence failed to
establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.
Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz.
He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was
self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her
disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and
receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the
nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.11
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's
duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves,
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the
series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other
than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual
indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within
the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient
to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,13 the Court
ruled that the respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondents
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was
nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a
psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and
the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that
interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not
offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same
tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT
decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the
petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited
for Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the
woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and
after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes
basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in
mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the
confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground
provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent but NOT on the part of the man
Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It
went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In
the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled
that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be
considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court
of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance
of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for
reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this
Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his
marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of
his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a
domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was
according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was
aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally,
into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and
beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage
on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant
offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother),
Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly
made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial
Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before
said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
expounded as follows:
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of
which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that
judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
[2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment
of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a
part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his
marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and
having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims,
declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage
on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not
based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the
conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original;
Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Roberts reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was
based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological
nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law
(Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
xxxx
of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095
should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would
prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity?
Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating
from the bench.1wphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,20 interpretations given by the
NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not
controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and strengthening
the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have
validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it
was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and
convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this
decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such
proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such proceedings,
there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be considered
and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN,
dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner
Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is
valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela
Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he
was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn
over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and
void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is
illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void.
However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue
in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the
aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that
may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2
and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge
Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which
to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4
cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the
case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the
second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the
union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid
duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding
together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may
be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is
merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial
and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be
dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of
the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's
intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of
the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's
previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning. 8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court
had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue.
Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In
reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an
action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once
again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and
held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now
the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes
of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then
Art. 39, was discussed.
B.
Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages.
He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage
is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified
to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that,
even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean
Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the
declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is
valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because
the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and
suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final
judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a
subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof.
Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent
marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre.
19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral
conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant
while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the
same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according
to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is
placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly,
one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of
a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should
the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the
family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for
the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both
parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed.
And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy
could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by
one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to
enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art.
40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge
Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting
as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the
following:
Art. 43. xxx
xxx
xxx
(2)
The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3)
Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4)
The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5)
The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio
and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply
be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus,
petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7,
1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34
Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in
1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with
De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that
respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside
the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it
was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her.
He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor
on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the
parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago,
leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4,
1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that
his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage
and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the
time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never
secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one
can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and
Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions
betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the
judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual.
There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in
the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident
to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10,
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the
Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco
did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law
on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract
expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic
rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983,
while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had
given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed
he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November
1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to
him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker
despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to
give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-inlaw Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique.
Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to
her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for
her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no
information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209,
July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well
founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established
a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the
following allegations are made:
1.
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2.
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper
case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides
that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the following
crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable
the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the
Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or
is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2.
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3.
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4.
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to
state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the
Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that
he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the
fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or
well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.
Q
wife?
After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your
Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A
I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to look
for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London and
Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place in England, the port
where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to
visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're
going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London
and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty
(350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a
simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says
he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under
unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their
friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The
Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence.
But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted
as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine
(9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be
finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try
to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them
leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like
an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds
on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with
the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta
Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano
C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had
been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby
herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio
y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating that"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant case despite the fact that
the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her
first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted solely in favor of
oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now
assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the
conjugal partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land
to Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and
Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of
Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to
determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the
estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision
of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958.
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which
provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives
exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some
motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the
explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally
be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute
a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article
41[9], in relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds,
had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage
in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving
spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only
succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand,
nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews
and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to
succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its
judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except
insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are
likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED
that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own
children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 165842

NOVEMBER 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting
Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally
married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to
Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the
private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student,
while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to
another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with
her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even
brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April
22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were
able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she
asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes,
left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSOcertified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage
to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this
one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further
testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of
his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her
in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera
the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage
had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if
the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the
private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He
posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his
view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the
Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14]
the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves
the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against
the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to
the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully
marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as
the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v.
Court of Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED
to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had
been absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a
matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been
absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except
for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was
able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her
whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive
death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are
present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the
rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for
the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out
that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG
cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado
con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides
for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed
death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has
been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having
been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23]
Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello
Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not
been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first
marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court
of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27]
under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there
are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent
intention constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence,
and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a
second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the
essential elements of the crime.[29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an
intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification
from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have
been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a
legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in
the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists
from a consideration of the whole evidence.[34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity
of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant.
As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony
by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in
1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such
judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal
intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held
guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or
useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on
mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of
society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in
the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the
parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered
society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State.
On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect
of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society,
are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of
the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent
court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they
wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one
of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable,
not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit
second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among
the heirs:
(1)
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2)
A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3)
A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.[42]
However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally
be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute
a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article
41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to
contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of
actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot
become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such
a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it
should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The
Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even
be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper proceedings in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article
390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an
absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings
is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the
prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that
the supposition is not true.[53] A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1
and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of
the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but
even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second
marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B.
Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy
in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent
for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse
must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy
in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of
the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead,
the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.[58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things
are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with
possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The
judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the
Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in
some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.[60]
Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in
good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article
41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of
the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts
that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages
for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce
evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first,
there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article
2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party
has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not
have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer
to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other
respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the
following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for
abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon
the circumstances of each case.[71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured
her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and
his parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two
years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was
already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless deception,
the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of
a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a
man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage
with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she
did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,
[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra,
at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.,
117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579,
591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely
negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant
publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific
headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J.
Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery.
As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of
such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense,
he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of
his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17
N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was
divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for
deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or
innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be
a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and
act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held
to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am.
Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the
law by herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently
on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be
assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where
the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a
contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act
upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L.
R. 958.[76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

FC Article 36-38 Not Complete

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

FC Article 36-38 Not Complete

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FC Article 36-38 Not Complete

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164435

Republic of the Philippines

May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 147824

Republic of the Philippines

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

G.R. No. 165424

G.R. No. 165424

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as

G.R. No. 157649

Republic of the Philippines

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.

G.R. No. 166357

Republic of the Philippines

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or

G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

Ruling of the Court

Republic of the Philippines

February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,

Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

Republic of the Philippines

That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]

G.R. NO. 165842

You might also like