Paradoxes

Paradoxes
Situations that seems to defy intuition
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Contents
Articles
Introduction
Paradox
List of paradoxes
Paradoxical laughter
16
Decision theory
17
Abilene paradox
17
Chainstore paradox
19
Exchange paradox
22
Kavka's toxin puzzle
34
Necktie paradox
36
Economy
38
Allais paradox
38
Arrow's impossibility theorem
41
Bertrand paradox
52
Demographic-economic paradox
53
Dollar auction
56
DownsThomson paradox
57
Easterlin paradox
58
Ellsberg paradox
59
Green paradox
62
Icarus paradox
65
Jevons paradox
65
Leontief paradox
70
Lucas paradox
71
Metzler paradox
72
Paradox of thrift
73
Paradox of value
77
Productivity paradox
80
St. Petersburg paradox
85
Logic
All horses are the same color
92
92
Barbershop paradox
93
Carroll's paradox
96
Crocodile Dilemma
97
Drinker paradox
98
Infinite regress
101
Lottery paradox
102
Paradoxes of material implication
104
Raven paradox
107
Unexpected hanging paradox
119
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles
123
Mathematics
127
Accuracy paradox
127
Apportionment paradox
129
BanachTarski paradox
131
Berkson's paradox
139
Bertrand's box paradox
141
Bertrand paradox
146
Birthday problem
149
BorelKolmogorov paradox
163
Boy or Girl paradox
166
Burali-Forti paradox
172
Cantor's paradox
173
Coastline paradox
174
Cramer's paradox
178
Elevator paradox
179
False positive paradox
181
Gabriel's Horn
184
Galileo's paradox
187
Gambler's fallacy
188
Gdel's incompleteness theorems
195
Interesting number paradox
213
KleeneRosser paradox
214
Lindley's paradox
215
Low birth weight paradox
217
Missing square puzzle
219
Paradoxes of set theory
221
Parrondo's paradox
226
Russell's paradox
231
Simpson's paradox
237
Skolem's paradox
245
Smale's paradox
249
Thomson's lamp
251
Two envelopes problem
253
Von Neumann paradox
265
Miscellaneous
268
Bracketing paradox
268
Buridan's ass
269
Buttered cat paradox
272
Lombard's Paradox
273
Mere addition paradox
274
Navigation paradox
276
Paradox of the plankton
278
Temporal paradox
279
Tritone paradox
280
Voting paradox
282
Philosophy
283
Fitch's paradox of knowability
283
Grandfather paradox
286
Liberal paradox
291
Moore's paradox
295
Moravec's paradox
297
Newcomb's paradox
300
Omnipotence paradox
304
Paradox of hedonism
315
Paradox of nihilism
318
Paradox of tolerance
319
Predestination paradox
320
Zeno's paradoxes
322
Physics
329
Algol paradox
329
Archimedes paradox
329
Aristotle's wheel paradox
331
Bell's spaceship paradox
332
Bentley's paradox
338
Black hole information paradox
338
Braess's paradox
342
Cool tropics paradox
346
D'Alembert's paradox
348
Denny's paradox
357
Ehrenfest paradox
357
Elevator paradox
362
EPR paradox
363
Faint young Sun paradox
374
Fermi paradox
376
Feynman sprinkler
396
Gibbs paradox
399
Hardy's paradox
406
Heat death paradox
409
Irresistible force paradox
410
Ladder paradox
411
Loschmidt's paradox
420
Mpemba effect
422
Olbers' paradox
426
Ontological paradox
431
Painlev paradox
433
Physical paradox
434
Quantum pseudo-telepathy
439
Schrdinger's cat
442
Supplee's paradox
448
Tea leaf paradox
450
Twin paradox
452
Self-reference
462
Barber paradox
462
Berry paradox
465
Epimenides paradox
467
GrellingNelson paradox
470
Intentionally blank page
472
Liar paradox
475
Opposite Day
481
Paradox of the Court
482
Petronius
484
Quine's paradox
488
Richard's paradox
490
Self-reference
492
Socratic paradox
495
Yablo's paradox
497
Vagueness
498
Absence paradox
498
Bonini's paradox
498
Code-talker paradox
499
Ship of Theseus
500
References
Article Sources and Contributors
505
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
518
Article Licenses
License
522
Introduction
Paradox
For other uses, see Paradox (disambiguation).
A paradox is a statement that apparently contradicts itself and yet might be true. Most logical paradoxes are known
to be invalid arguments but are still valuable in promoting critical thinking.
Some paradoxes have revealed errors in definitions assumed to be rigorous, and have caused axioms of mathematics
and logic to be re-examined. One example is Russell's paradox, which questions whether a "list of all lists that do not
contain themselves" would include itself, and showed that attempts to found set theory on the identification of sets
with properties or predicates were flawed. Others, such as Curry's paradox, are not yet resolved.
Examples outside logic include the Ship of Theseus from philosophy (questioning whether a ship repaired over time
by replacing each of its wooden parts would remain the same ship). Paradoxes can also take the form of images or
other media. For example, M.C. Escher featured perspective-based paradoxes in many of his drawings, with walls
that are regarded as floors from other points of view, and staircases that appear to climb endlessly.
In common usage, the word "paradox" often refers to statements that are ironic or unexpected, such as "the paradox
that standing is more tiring than walking".
Logical paradox
See also: List of paradoxes
Common themes in paradoxes include self-reference, infinite regress, circular definitions, and confusion between
different levels of abstraction.
Patrick Hughes outlines three laws of the paradox:
Self-reference
An example is "This statement is false", a form of the liar paradox. The statement is referring to itself. Another
example of self-reference is the question of whether the barber shaves himself in the barber paradox. One more
example would be "Is the answer to this question 'No'?"
Contradiction
"This statement is false"; the statement cannot be false and true at the same time. Another example of
contradiction is if a man talking to a genie wishes that wishes couldn't come true. This contradicts itself
because if the genie grants his wish he did not grant his wish, and if he refuses to grant his wish then he did
indeed grant his wish, therefore making it impossible to either grant or not grant his wish because his wish
contradicts itself.
Vicious circularity, or infinite regress
"This statement is false"; if the statement is true, then the statement is false, thereby making the statement true.
Another example of vicious circularity is the following group of statements:
"The following sentence is true."
"The previous sentence is false."
"What happens when Pinocchio says, 'My nose will grow now'?"
Paradox
Other paradoxes involve false statements ("impossible is not a word in my vocabulary", a simple paradox) or
half-truths and the resulting biased assumptions. This form is common in howlers.
For example, consider a situation in which a father and his son are driving down the road. The car crashes into a tree
and the father is killed. The boy is rushed to the nearest hospital where he is prepared for emergency surgery. On
entering the surgery suite, the surgeon says, "I can't operate on this boy. He's my son."
The apparent paradox is caused by a hasty generalization, for if the surgeon is the boy's father, the statement cannot
be true. The paradox is resolved if it is revealed that the surgeon is a woman the boy's mother.
Paradoxes which are not based on a hidden error generally occur at the fringes of context or language, and require
extending the context or language in order to lose their paradoxical quality. Paradoxes that arise from apparently
intelligible uses of language are often of interest to logicians and philosophers. "This sentence is false" is an example
of the well-known liar paradox: it is a sentence which cannot be consistently interpreted as either true or false,
because if it is known to be false, then it is known that it must be true, and if it is known to be true, then it is known
that it must be false. Russell's paradox, which shows that the notion of the set of all those sets that do not contain
themselves leads to a contradiction, was instrumental in the development of modern logic and set theory.
Thought experiments can also yield interesting paradoxes. The grandfather paradox, for example, would arise if a
time traveller were to kill his own grandfather before his mother or father had been conceived, thereby preventing his
own birth. This is a specific example of the more general observation of the butterfly effect, or that a time-traveller's
interaction with the past however slight would entail making changes that would, in turn, change the future in
which the time-travel was yet to occur, and would thus change the circumstances of the time-travel itself.
Often a seemingly paradoxical conclusion arises from an inconsistent or inherently contradictory definition of the
initial premise. In the case of that apparent paradox of a time traveler killing his own grandfather it is the
inconsistency of defining the past to which he returns as being somehow different from the one which leads up to the
future from which he begins his trip but also insisting that he must have come to that past from the same future as the
one that it leads up to.
Quine's classification of paradoxes

W. V. Quine (1962) distinguished between three classes of paradoxes:
A veridical paradox produces a result that appears absurd but is demonstrated to be true nevertheless. Thus, the
paradox of Frederic's birthday in The Pirates of Penzance establishes the surprising fact that a
twenty-one-year-old would have had only five birthdays, if he had been born on a leap day. Likewise, Arrow's
impossibility theorem demonstrates difficulties in mapping voting results to the will of the people. The Monty
Hall paradox demonstrates that a decision which has an intuitive 50-50 chance in fact is heavily biased towards
making a decision which, given the intuitive conclusion, the player would be unlikely to make. In 20th century
science, Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel and Schrdinger's cat are famously vivid examples of a theory being
taken to a logical but paradoxical end.
A falsidical paradox establishes a result that not only appears false but actually is false, due to a fallacy in the
demonstration. The various invalid mathematical proofs (e.g., that 1 = 2) are classic examples, generally relying
on a hidden division by zero. Another example is the inductive form of the horse paradox, which falsely
generalizes from true specific statements.
A paradox that is in neither class may be an antinomy, which reaches a self-contradictory result by properly
applying accepted ways of reasoning. For example, the GrellingNelson paradox points out genuine problems in
our understanding of the ideas of truth and description.
A fourth kind has sometimes been described since Quine's work.
A paradox that is both true and false at the same time and in the same sense is called a dialetheia. In Western
logics it is often assumed, following Aristotle, that no dialetheia exist, but they are sometimes accepted in Eastern
Paradox
traditionsWikipedia:Avoid weasel words and in paraconsistent logics. It would be mere equivocation or a matter
of degree, for example, to both affirm and deny that "John is here" when John is halfway through the door but it is
self-contradictory to simultaneously affirm and deny the event in some sense.
Paradox in philosophy
A taste for paradox is central to the philosophies of Laozi, Heraclitus, Meister Eckhart, Hegel, Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, and G.K. Chesterton, among many others. Sren Kierkegaard, for example, writes, in the Philosophical
Fragments, that
But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker
without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a mediocre fellow. But the ultimate potentiation of
every passion is always to will its own downfall, and so it is also the ultimate passion of the
understanding to will the collision, although in one way or another the collision must become its
downfall. This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself
cannot think.
Paradox in medicine
A paradoxical reaction to a drug is the opposite of what one would expect, such as becoming agitated by a sedative
or sedated by a stimulant. Some are common and are used regularly in medicine, such as the use of stimulants such
as Adderall and Ritalin in the treatment of attention deficit disorder, while others are rare and can be dangerous as
they are not expected, such as severe agitation from a benzodiazepine.
References
External links
Cantini, Andrea (Winter 2012). "Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
paradoxes-contemporary-logic/). In Zalta, Edward N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Spade, Paul Vincent (Fall 2013). "Insolubles" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/insolubles). In Zalta, Edward
N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Paradoxes (http://www.dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophy_of_Logic/Paradoxes/) at DMOZ
"Zeno and the Paradox of Motion" (http://www.mathpages.com/rr/s3-07/3-07.htm) at MathPages.com.
"Logical Paradoxes" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/par-log) entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
List of paradoxes
List of paradoxes
This is a list of paradoxes, grouped thematically. The grouping is approximate, as paradoxes may fit into more than
one category. Because of varying definitions of the term paradox, some of the following are not considered to be
paradoxes by everyone. This list collects only scenarios that have been called a paradox by at least one source and
have their own article.
Although considered paradoxes, some of these are based on fallacious reasoning, or incomplete/faulty analysis.
Informally, the term is often used to describe a counter-intuitive result.
This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it [1].
Logic
Barbershop paradox: The supposition that if one of two simultaneous assumptions leads to a contradiction, the
other assumption is also disproved leads to paradoxical consequences. Not to be confused with the Barber
paradox.
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles: "Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down...", also
known as Carroll's paradox, not to be confused with the physical paradox of the same name.
Catch-22: A situation in which someone is in need of something that can only be had by not being in need of it.
Drinker paradox: In any pub there is a customer of whom it is true to say: if that customer drinks, everybody in
the pub drinks.
Paradox of entailment: Inconsistent premises always make an argument valid.
Lottery paradox: There is one winning ticket in a large lottery. It is reasonable to believe of a particular lottery
ticket that it is not the winning ticket, since the probability that it is the winner is so very small, but it is not
reasonable to believe that no lottery ticket will win.
Raven paradox (or Hempel's Ravens): Observing a green apple increases the likelihood of all ravens being black.
Ross's paradox: Disjunction introduction poses a problem for imperative inference by seemingly permitting
arbitrary imperatives to be inferred.
Unexpected hanging paradox: The day of the hanging will be a surprise, so it cannot happen at all, so it will be a
surprise. The surprise examination and Bottle Imp paradox use similar logic
Self-reference
These paradoxes have in common a contradiction arising from self-reference.
Barber paradox: A barber (who is a man) shaves all and only those men who do not shave themselves. Does he
shave himself? (Russell's popularization of his set theoretic paradox.)
Berry paradox: The phrase "the first number not nameable in under ten words" appears to name it in nine words.
Crocodile dilemma: If a crocodile steals a child and promises its return if the father can correctly guess exactly
what the crocodile will do, how should the crocodile respond in the case that the father correctly guesses that the
child will not be returned?
Paradox of the Court: A law student agrees to pay his teacher after winning his first case. The teacher then sues
the student (who has not yet won a case) for payment.
Curry's paradox: "If this sentence is true, then Santa Claus exists."
Epimenides paradox: A Cretan says: "All Cretans are liars". This paradox works in mainly the same way as the
Liar paradox.
Exception paradox: "If there is an exception to every rule, then every rule must have at least one exception; the
exception to this one being that it has no exception." "There's always an exception to the rule, except to the
exception of the rulewhich is, in of itself, an accepted exception of the rule." "In a world with no rules, there
List of paradoxes
should be at least one rule - a rule against rules."
GrellingNelson paradox: Is the word "heterological", meaning "not applicable to itself", a heterological word?
(Another close relative of Russell's paradox.)
KleeneRosser paradox: By formulating an equivalent to Richard's paradox, untyped lambda calculus is shown to
be inconsistent.
Liar paradox: "This sentence is false." This is the canonical self-referential paradox. Also "Is the answer to this
question no?", "I'm lying", and "Everything I say is a lie."
Card paradox: "The next statement is true. The previous statement is false." A variant of the liar paradox that
does not use self-reference.
The Pinocchio paradox: What would happen if Pinocchio said "My nose will be growing"?[2]
Quine's paradox: "'Yields a falsehood when appended to its own quotation' yields a falsehood when appended
to its own quotation." Shows that a sentence can be paradoxical even if it is not self-referring and does not use
demonstratives or indexicals.
Yablo's paradox: An ordered infinite sequence of sentences, each of which says that all following sentences are
false. Uses neither self-reference nor circular reference.
Opposite Day: "It is opposite day today." Therefore it is not opposite day, but if you say it is a normal day it
would be considered a normal day.
Petronius's paradox: "Moderation in all things, including moderation" (unsourced quotation sometimes attributed
to Petronius).
Richard's paradox: We appear to be able to use simple English to define a decimal expansion in a way that is
self-contradictory.
Russell's paradox: Does the set of all those sets that do not contain themselves contain itself?
Socratic paradox: "I know that I know nothing at all."
Vagueness
Ship of Theseus (a.k.a. George Washington's axe or Grandfather's old axe): It seems like you can replace any
component of a ship, and it is still the same ship. So you can replace them all, one at a time, and it is still the same
ship. However, you can then take all the original pieces, and assemble them into a ship. That, too, is the same ship
you began with.
Sorites paradox (also known as the paradox of the heap): If you remove a single grain of sand from a heap, you
still have a heap. Keep removing single grains, and the heap will disappear. Can a single grain of sand make the
difference between heap and non-heap?
Mathematics
See also: Category:Mathematics paradoxes and Paradoxes of set theory
All horses are the same color: A proof by induction that all horses have the same color.
Cramer's paradox: The number of points of intersection of two higher-order curves can be greater than the number
of arbitrary points needed to define one such curve.
Elevator paradox: Elevators can seem to be mostly going in one direction, as if they were being manufactured in
the middle of the building and being disassembled on the roof and basement.
Interesting number paradox: The first number that can be considered "dull" rather than "interesting" becomes
interesting because of that fact.
Nontransitive dice: You can have three dice, called A, B, and C, such that A is likely to win in a roll against B, B
is likely to win in a roll against C, and C is likely to win in a roll against A.
Potato paradox: If you let potatoes consisting of 99% water dry so that they are 98% water, they lose 50% of their
weight.
List of paradoxes
Statistics
See also: Category:Statistical paradoxes
Abelson's paradox: Effect size may not be indicative of practical meaning.
Accuracy paradox: Predictive models with a given level of accuracy may have greater predictive power than
models with higher accuracy.
Benford's law: Numbers starting with lower digits appear disproportionately often in seemingly random data sets.
Berkson's paradox: A complicating factor arising in statistical tests of proportions.
Freedman's paradox Describes a problem in model selection where predictor variables with no explanatory power
can appear artificially important.
Friendship paradox: For almost everyone, their friends have more friends than they do.
Inspection paradox: Why one will wait longer for a bus than one should.
Lindley's paradox: Tiny errors in the null hypothesis are magnified when large data sets are analyzed, leading to
false but highly statistically significant results.
Low birth weight paradox: Low birth weight and mothers who smoke contribute to a higher mortality rate. Babies
of smokers have lower average birth weight, but low birth weight babies born to smokers have a lower mortality
rate than other low birth weight babies. This is a special case of Simpson's paradox.
Simpson's paradox, or the YuleSimpson effect: A trend that appears in different groups of data disappears when
these groups are combined, and the reverse trend appears for the aggregate data.
Will Rogers phenomenon: The mathematical concept of an average, whether defined as the mean or median, leads
to apparently paradoxical resultsfor example, it is possible that moving an entry from an encyclopedia to a
dictionary would increase the average entry length on both books.
Probability
See also: Category:Probability theory paradoxes
Bertrand's box paradox: A paradox of conditional probability
closely related to the Boy or Girl paradox.
Bertrand's paradox: Different common-sense definitions of
randomness give quite different results.
Birthday paradox: What is the chance that two people in a room
have the same birthday?
Borel's paradox: Conditional probability density functions are not
invariant under coordinate transformations.
The Monty Hall problem: which door do you

choose?
Boy or Girl paradox: A two-child family has at least one boy. What is the probability that it has a girl?
False positive paradox: A test that is accurate the vast majority of the time could show you have a disease, but the
probability that you actually have it could still be tiny.
Grice's paradox: Shows that the exact meaning of statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more
complicated than may be obvious on casual examination.
Monty Hall problem: An unintuitive consequence of conditional probability.
Necktie paradox: A wager between two people seems to favour them both. Very similar in essence to the
Two-envelope paradox.
Proebsting's paradox: The Kelly criterion is an often optimal strategy for maximizing profit in the long run.
Proebsting's paradox apparently shows that the Kelly criterion can lead to ruin.
Sleeping Beauty problem: A probability problem that can be correctly answered as one half or one third
depending on how the question is approached.
List of paradoxes
Three cards problem: When pulling a random card, how do you determine the color of the underside?
Three Prisoners problem: A variation of the Monty Hall problem.
Two-envelope paradox: You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of which contains a positive sum of
money. One envelope contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep whatever
amount it contains. You pick one envelope at random but before you open it you are given the chance to take the
other envelope instead
Infinity and infinitesimals

Burali-Forti paradox: If the ordinal numbers formed a set, it would be an ordinal number that is smaller than
itself.
Cantor's paradox: There is no greatest cardinal number.
Galileo's paradox: Though most numbers are not squares, there are no more numbers than squares. (See also
Cantor's diagonal argument)
Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel: If a hotel with infinitely many rooms is full, it can still take in more guests.
Skolem's paradox: Countably infinite models of set theory contain uncountably infinite sets.
Zeno's paradoxes: "You will never reach point B from point A as you must always get half-way there, and half of
the half, and half of that half, and so on." (This is also a physical paradox.)
Supertasks may result in paradoxes such as
Benardete's paradox: Apparently, a man can be "forced to stay where he is by the mere unfulfilled intentions of
the gods".
RossLittlewood paradox: After alternatively adding and removing balls to a vase infinitely often, how many
balls remain?
Thomson's lamp: After flicking a lamp on and off infinitely often, is it on or off?
Geometry and topology

BanachTarski paradox: Cut a ball into a finite number of
pieces, re-assemble the pieces to get two balls, both of equal
size to the first. The von Neumann paradox is a
two-dimensional analogue.
Paradoxical set: A set that can be partitioned into two sets,
each of which is equivalent to the original.
The BanachTarski paradox: A ball can be

decomposed and reassembled into two balls the same
size as the original.
Coastline paradox: the perimeter of a landmass is in general

ill-defined.
Gabriel's Horn or Torricelli's trumpet: A simple object with finite volume but infinite surface area. Also, the
Mandelbrot set and various other fractals are covered by a finite area, but have an infinite perimeter (in fact, there
are no two distinct points on the boundary of the Mandelbrot set that can be reached from one another by moving
a finite distance along that boundary, which also implies that in a sense you go no further if you walk "the wrong
way" around the set to reach a nearby point). This can be represented by a Klein bottle.
Hausdorff paradox: There exists a countable subset C of the sphere S such that S\C is equidecomposable with two
copies of itself.
Missing square puzzle: Two similar-looking figures appear to have different areas while built from the same
pieces.
Nikodym set: A set contained in and with the same Lebesgue measure as the unit square, yet for every one of its
points there is a straight line intersecting the Nikodym set only in that point.
Smale's paradox: A sphere can, topologically, be turned inside out.
List of paradoxes
Decision theory
Abilene paradox: People can make decisions based not on what they actually want to do, but on what they think
that other people want to do, with the result that everybody decides to do something that nobody really wants to
do, but only what they thought that everybody else wanted to do.
Apportionment paradox: Some systems of apportioning representation can have unintuitive results due to
rounding
Alabama paradox: Increasing the total number of seats might shrink one block's seats.
New states paradox: Adding a new state or voting block might increase the number of votes of another.
Population paradox: A fast-growing state can lose votes to a slow-growing state.
Arrow's paradox: Given more than two choices, no system can have all the attributes of an ideal voting system at
once.
Buridan's ass: How can a rational choice be made between two outcomes of equal value?
Chainstore paradox: Even those who know better play the so-called chain store game in an irrational manner.
Decision-making paradox: Selecting the best decision-making method is a decision problem in itself.
Fenno's paradox: The belief that people generally disapprove of the United States Congress as a whole, but
support the Congressman from their own Congressional district.
Green paradox: Policies intending to reduce future CO2 emissions may lead to increased emissions in the present.
Hedgehog's dilemma (Lover's paradox): Despite goodwill, human intimacy cannot occur without substantial
mutual harm.
Inventor's paradox: It is easier to solve a more general problem that covers the specifics of the sought-after
solution.
Kavka's toxin puzzle: Can one intend to drink the non-deadly toxin, if the intention is the only thing needed to get
the reward?
Morton's fork: Choosing between unpalatable alternatives.
Navigation paradox: Increased navigational precision may result in increased collision risk.
Newcomb's paradox: How do you play a game against an omniscient opponent?
Paradox of tolerance: Should one tolerate intolerance if intolerance would destroy the possibility of tolerance?
Paradox of voting: Also known as the Downs paradox. For a rational, self-interested voter the costs of voting will
normally exceed the expected benefits, so why do people keep voting?
Parrondo's paradox: It is possible to play two losing games alternately to eventually win.
Prevention paradox: For one person to benefit, many people have to change their behavior even though they
receive no benefit, or even suffer, from the change.
Prisoner's dilemma: Two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so.
Relevance paradox: Sometimes relevant information is not sought out because its relevance only becomes clear
after the information is available.
Voting paradox: Also known as Condorcet's paradox and paradox of voting. A group of separately rational
individuals may have preferences that are irrational in the aggregate.
Willpower paradox: Those who kept their minds open were more goal-directed and more motivated than those
who declared their objective to themselves.
List of paradoxes
Physics
For more details on this topic, see Physical paradox.
Cool tropics paradox: A contradiction between modelled estimates
of tropical temperatures during warm, ice-free periods of the
Cretaceous and Eocene, and the lower temperatures that proxies
suggest were present.
The holographic principle: The amount of information that can be
stored in a given volume is not proportional to the volume but to the
area that bounds that volume.
Irresistible force paradox: What would happen if an unstoppable
force hit an immovable object?
Astrophysics
Algol paradox: In some binaries the partners seem to have different
ages, even though they're thought to have formed at the same time.
Robert Boyle's self-flowing flask fills itself in this

diagram, but perpetual motion machines cannot
exist.
Faint young Sun paradox: The apparent contradiction between observations of liquid water early in the Earth's
history and the astrophysical expectation that the output of the young sun would have been insufficient to melt ice
on earth.
The GZK paradox: High-energy cosmic rays have been observed that seem to violate the
Greisen-Zatsepin-Kuzmin limit, which is a consequence of special relativity.
Classical mechanics
Archer's paradox: An archer must, in order to hit his target, not aim directly at it, but slightly to the side.
Archimedes paradox (Hydrostatic paradox): A massive battleship can float in a few litres of water.
Aristotle's wheel paradox: Rolling joined concentric wheels seem to trace the same distance with their
circumferences, even though the circumferences are different.
Carroll's paradox: The angular momentum of a stick should be zero, but is not.
D'Alembert's paradox: Flow of an inviscid fluid produces no net force on a solid body.
Denny's paradox: Surface-dwelling arthropods (such as the water strider) should not be able to propel themselves
horizontally.
Elevator paradox: Even though hydrometers are used to measure fluid density, a hydrometer will not indicate
changes of fluid density caused by changing atmospheric pressure.
Feynman sprinkler: Which way does a sprinkler rotate when submerged in a tank and made to suck in the
surrounding fluid?
Painlev paradox: Rigid-body dynamics with contact and friction is inconsistent.
Tea leaf paradox: When a cup of tea is stirred, the leaves assemble in the center, even though centrifugal force
pushes them outward.
List of paradoxes
Cosmology
Bentley's paradox: In a Newtonian universe, gravitation should pull all matter into a single point.
Fermi paradox: If there are, as probability would suggest, many other sentient species in the Universe, then where
are they? Shouldn't their presence be obvious?
Heat death paradox: Since the universe is not infinitely old, it cannot be infinite in extent.
Olbers' paradox: Why is the night sky black if there is an infinity of stars?
Electromagnetism
Faraday paradox: An apparent violation of Faraday's law of electromagnetic induction.
Quantum mechanics
AharonovBohm effect: a charged particle is affected by an electromagnetic field even though it has no local
contact with that field
Bell's theorem: Why do measured quantum particles not satisfy mathematical probability theory?
Double-slit experiment: Matter and energy can act as a wave or as a particle depending on the experiment.
EinsteinPodolskyRosen paradox: Can far away events influence each other in quantum mechanics?
Extinction paradox: In the small wavelength limit, the total scattering cross section of an impenetrable sphere is
twice its geometrical cross-sectional area (which is the value obtained in classical mechanics).
Hardy's paradox: How can we make inferences about past events that we haven't observed while at the same time
acknowledge that the act of observing it affects the reality we are inferring to?
Klein paradox: When the potential of a potential barrier becomes similar to the mass of the impinging particle, it
becomes transparent.
The Mott problem: spherically symmetric wave functions, when observed, produce linear particle tracks.
Quantum LC circuit paradox: Energies stored on capacitance and inductance are not equal to the ground state
energy of the quantum oscillator.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Quantum pseudo-telepathy: Two players who can not communicate accomplish tasks that seemingly require
direct contact.
Quantum Zeno effect or Turing paradox: echoing the Zeno paradox, a quantum particle that is continuously
observed cannot change its state
Schrdinger's cat paradox: According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, a cat could be
simultaneously alive and dead, as long as we don't look.
Uncertainty principle: Attempts to determine position must disturb momentum, and vice versa.
Relativity
Bell's spaceship paradox: concerning relativity.
Black hole information paradox: Black holes violate a commonly assumed tenet of science that information
cannot be destroyed.
Ehrenfest paradox: On the kinematics of a rigid, rotating disk.
Ladder paradox: A classic relativity problem.
Mocanu's velocity composition paradox: a paradox in special relativity.
Supplee's paradox: the buoyancy of a relativistic object (such as a bullet) appears to change when the reference
frame is changed from one in which the bullet is at rest to one in which the fluid is at rest.
Trouton-Noble or Right-angle lever paradox: Does a torque arise in static systems when changing frames?
Twin paradox: The theory of relativity predicts that a person making a round trip will return younger than his or
her identical twin who stayed at home.
10
List of paradoxes
Thermodynamics
Gibbs paradox: In an ideal gas, is entropy an extensive variable?
Loschmidt's paradox: Why is there an inevitable increase in entropy when the laws of physics are invariant under
time reversal? The time reversal symmetry of physical laws appears to contradict the second law of
thermodynamics.
Maxwell's demon: The second law of thermodynamics seems to be violated by a cleverly operated trapdoor.
Mpemba effect: Hot water can, under certain conditions, freeze faster than cold water, even though it must pass
the lower temperature on the way to freezing.
Biology
Antarctic paradox: In some areas of the oceans, phytoplankton concentrations are low despite there apparently
being sufficient nutrients.
C-value enigma: Genome size does not correlate with organismal complexity. For example, some unicellular
organisms have genomes much larger than that of humans.
Cole's paradox: Even a tiny fecundity advantage of one additional offspring would favor the evolution of
semelparity.
French paradox: The observation that the French suffer a relatively low incidence of coronary heart disease,
despite having a diet relatively rich in saturated fats.
Glucose paradox: The large amount of glycogen in the liver cannot be explained by its small glucose absorption.
Gray's paradox: Despite their relatively small muscle mass, dolphins can swim at high speeds and obtain large
accelerations.
Hispanic paradox: The finding that Hispanics in the U.S. tend to have substantially better health than the average
population in spite of what their aggregate socio-economic indicators predict.
Lombard's paradox: When rising to stand from a sitting or squatting position, both the hamstrings and quadriceps
contract at the same time, despite their being antagonists to each other.
Meditation paradox: The amplitude of heart rate oscillations during meditation was significantly greater than in
the pre-meditation control state and also in three non-meditation control groups
Mexican paradox: Mexican children tend to have higher birth weights than can be expected from their
socio-economic status.
Obesity survival paradox: Although the negative health consequences of obesity in the general population are
well supported by the available evidence, health outcomes in certain subgroups seem to be improved at an
increased BMI.
Paradox of enrichment: Increasing the food available to an ecosystem may lead to instability, and even to
extinction.
Paradox of the pesticides: Applying pesticide to a pest may increase the pest's abundance.
Paradox of the plankton: Why are there so many different species of phytoplankton, even though competition for
the same resources tends to reduce the number of species?
Peto's paradox: Humans get cancer with high frequency, while larger mammals, like whales, do not. If cancer is
essentially a negative outcome lottery at the cell level, and larger organisms have more cells, and thus more
potentially cancerous cell divisions, one would expect larger organisms to be more predisposed to cancer.
Pulsus paradoxus: A pulsus paradoxus is a paradoxical decrease in systolic blood pressure during inspiration. It
can indicate certain medical conditions in which there is reduced venous return of blood to the heart, such as
cardiac tamponade or constrictive pericarditis. Also known as the Pulse Paradox.
Sherman paradox: An anomalous pattern of inheritance in the fragile X syndrome.
Temporal paradox (paleontology): When did the ancestors of birds live?
11
List of paradoxes
Chemistry
Faraday paradox (electrochemistry): Diluted nitric acid will corrode steel, while concentrated nitric acid doesn't.
Levinthal paradox: The length of time that it takes for a protein chain to find its folded state is many orders of
magnitude shorter than it would be if it freely searched all possible configurations.
SAR paradox: Exceptions to the principle that a small change in a molecule causes a small change in its chemical
behaviour are frequently profound.
Time
Bootstrap paradox: Can a time traveler send himself information with no outside source?
Polchinski's paradox: A billiard ball can be thrown into a wormhole in such a way that it would emerge in the past
and knock its incoming past self away from the wormhole entrance, creating a variant of the grandfather paradox.
Predestination paradox:[3] A man travels back in time to discover the cause of a famous fire. While in the building
where the fire started, he accidentally knocks over a kerosene lantern and causes a fire, the same fire that would
inspire him, years later, to travel back in time. The bootstrap paradox is closely tied to this, in which, as a result of
time travel, information or objects appear to have no beginning.
Temporal paradox: What happens when a time traveler does things in the past that prevent him from doing them
in the first place?
Grandfather paradox: You travel back in time and kill your grandfather before he conceives one of your
parents, which precludes your own conception and, therefore, you couldn't go back in time and kill your
grandfather.
Hitler's murder paradox: You travel back in time and kill a famous person in history before they become
famous; but if the person had never been famous then he could not have been targeted as a famous person.
Linguistics and Artificial Intelligence

Bracketing paradox: Is an "historical linguist" a linguist who is historical, or someone who studies "historical
linguistics"?
Code-talker paradox: How can a language both enable communication and block communication?
Moravec's paradox: Logical thought is hard for humans and easy for computers, but picking a screw from a box of
screws is an unsolved problem.
Movement paradox: In transformational linguistics, there are pairs of sentences in which the sentence without
movement is ungrammatical while the sentence with movement is not.
Philosophy
Paradox of analysis: It seems that no conceptual analysis can meet the requirements both of correctness and of
informativeness.
Buridan's bridge: Will Plato throw Socrates into the water or not?
Paradox of fiction: How can people experience strong emotions from purely fictional things?
Fitch's paradox: If all truths are knowable, then all truths must in fact be known.
Paradox of free will: If God knew how we will decide when he created us, how can there be free will?
Goodman's paradox: Why can induction be used to confirm that things are "green", but not to confirm that things
are "grue"?
Paradox of hedonism: When one pursues happiness itself, one is miserable; but, when one pursues something
else, one achieves happiness.
Hutton's Paradox: If asking oneself "Am I dreaming?" in a dream proves that one is, what does it prove in waking
life?
12
List of paradoxes
Liberal paradox: "Minimal Liberty" is incompatible with Pareto optimality.
Meno's paradox (Learner's paradox): A man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not
know.
Mere addition paradox, also known as Parfit's paradox: Is a large population living a barely tolerable life better
than a small, happy population?
Moore's paradox: "It's raining, but I don't believe that it is."
Newcomb's paradox: A paradoxical game between two players, one of whom can predict the actions of the other.
Paradox of nihilism: Several distinct paradoxes share this name.
Omnipotence paradox: Can an omnipotent being create a rock too heavy for itself to lift?
Preface paradox: The author of a book may be justified in believing that all his statements in the book are correct,
at the same time believing that at least one of them is incorrect.
Problem of evil (Epicurean paradox): The existence of evil seems to be incompatible with the existence of an
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God.
Rule-following paradox: Even though rules are intended to determine actions, "no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule".
When a white horse is not a horse: White horses are not horses because white and horse talk about different
things.
Zeno's paradoxes: "You will never reach point B from point A as you must always get half-way there, and half of
the half, and half of that half, and so on ..." (This is also a paradox of the infinite)
Mysticism
Tzimtzum: In Kabbalah, how to reconcile self-awareness of finite Creation with Infinite Divine source, as an
emanated causal chain would seemingly nullify existence. Luria's initial withdrawal of God in Hasidic
panentheism involves simultaneous illusionism of Creation (Upper Unity) and self-aware existence (Lower
Unity), God encompassing logical opposites.
Economics
See also: Category:Economics paradoxes
Allais paradox: A change in a possible outcome that is shared by different alternatives affects people's choices
among those alternatives, in contradiction with expected utility theory.
The Antitrust ParadoxWikipedia:Disputed statement: A book arguing that antitrust enforcement artificially raised
prices by protecting inefficient competitors from competition.
Arrow information paradox: To sell information you need to give it away before the sale.
Bertrand paradox: Two players reaching a state of Nash equilibrium both find themselves with no profits.
Braess's paradox: Adding extra capacity to a network can reduce overall performance.
Deaton paradox: Consumption varies surprisingly smoothly despite sharp variations in income.
Demographic-economic paradox: nations or subpopulations with higher GDP per capita are observed to have
fewer children, even though a richer population can support more children.
DownsThomson paradox: Increasing road capacity at the expense of investments in public transport can make
overall congestion on the road worse.
Easterlin paradox: For countries with income sufficient to meet basic needs, the reported level of happiness does
not correlate with national income per person.
Edgeworth paradox: With capacity constraints, there may not be an equilibrium.
Ellsberg paradox: People exhibit ambiguity aversion (as distinct from risk aversion), in contradiction with
expected utility theory.
13
List of paradoxes
European paradox: The perceived failure of European countries to translate scientific advances into marketable
innovations.
Gibson's paradox: Why were interest rates and prices correlated?
Giffen paradox: Increasing the price of bread makes poor people eat more of it.
Icarus paradox: Some businesses bring about their own downfall through their own successes.
Jevons paradox: Increases in efficiency lead to even larger increases in demand.
Leontief paradox: Some countries export labor-intensive commodities and import capital-intensive commodities,
in contradiction with HeckscherOhlin theory.
Lucas paradox: Capital is not flowing from developed countries to developing countries despite the fact that
developing countries have lower levels of capital per worker, and therefore higher returns to capital.
Mandeville's paradox: Actions that may be vicious to individuals may benefit society as a whole.
Mayfield's paradox: Keeping everyone out of an information system is impossible, but so is getting everybody in.
Metzler paradox: The imposition of a tariff on imports may reduce the relative internal price of that good.
Paradox of prosperity: Why do generations that significantly improve the economic climate seem to generally rear
a successor generation that consumes rather than produces?
Paradox of thrift: If everyone saves more money during times of recession, then aggregate demand will fall and
will in turn lower total savings in the population.
Paradox of toil: If everyone tries to work during times of recession, lower wages will reduce prices, leading to
more deflationary expectations, leading to further thrift, reducing demand and thereby reducing employment.
Paradox of value, also known as diamond-water paradox: Water is more useful than diamonds, yet is a lot
cheaper.
Productive failure: Providing less guidance and structure and thereby causing more failure is likely to promote
better learning.
Productivity paradox (also known as Solow computer paradox): Worker productivity may go down, despite
technological improvements.
Scitovsky paradox: Using the KaldorHicks criterion, an allocation A may be more efficient than allocation B,
while at the same time B is more efficient than A.
Service recovery paradox: Successfully fixing a problem with a defective product may lead to higher consumer
satisfaction than in the case where no problem occurred at all.
St. Petersburg paradox: People will only offer a modest fee for a reward of infinite expected value.
Paradox of Plenty: The Paradox of Plenty (resource curse) refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an
abundance of natural resources, specifically point-source non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels, tend to
have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources.
Tullock paradox: Bribing politicians costs less than one would expect, considering how much profit it can yield.
Perception
For more details on this topic, see Perceptual paradox.
Tritone paradox: An auditory illusion in which a sequentially played pair of Shepard tones is heard as ascending
by some people and as descending by others.
Blub paradox: Cognitive lock of some experienced programmers that prevents them from properly evaluating the
quality of programming languages which they do not know.[4]
14
List of paradoxes
Politics
Stabilityinstability paradox: When two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war
between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases.
History
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: We learn from history that we do not learn from history.Wikipedia:Citation
needed (paraphrased)
Psychology/Sociology
Gender paradox: Women conform more closely than men to sociolinguistics norms that are overtly prescribed,
but conform less than men when they are not.
Moral paradox: A situation in which moral imperatives clash without clear resolution.
Outcomes paradox: Schizophrenia patients in developing countries seem to fare better than their Western
counterparts.[5]
Status paradox: Several paradoxes involve the concept of medical or social status.
The Paradox of Anti-Semitism: A book arguing that the lack of external persecutions and antagonisms results in
the dissolution of Jewish identity, a theory that resonates in works of Dershowitz and Sartre.
Region-beta paradox: People can sometimes recover more quickly from more intense emotions or pain than from
less distressing experiences.
Self-absorption paradox: The contradictory association whereby higher levels of self-awareness are
simultaneously associated with higher levels of psychological distress and with psychological well-being.[6]
Stapp's ironical paradox: "The universal aptitude for ineptitude makes any human accomplishment an incredible
miracle."
Stockdale paradox: "You must never confuse faith that you will prevail in the endwhich you can never afford to
losewith the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be."
Ironic process theory: Ironic processing is the psychological process whereby an individual's deliberate attempts
to suppress or avoid certain thoughts (thought suppression) renders those thoughts more persistent.
Miscellaneous
Absence paradox: No one is ever "here".
Ant on a rubber rope: An ant crawling on a rubber rope can reach the end even when the rope stretches much
faster than the ant can crawl.
Bonini's paradox: Models or simulations that explain the workings of complex systems are seemingly impossible
to construct. As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable, for it to be
more understandable it must be less complete and therefore less accurate. When the model becomes accurate, it is
just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents.
Buttered cat paradox: Humorous example of a paradox from contradicting proverbs.
Intentionally blank page: Many documents contain pages on which the text "This page is intentionally left blank"
is printed, thereby making the page not blank.
Observer's paradox: The outcome of an event or experiment is influenced by the presence of the observer.
15
List of paradoxes
Notes
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=List_of_paradoxes& action=edit
[2] , an image of Pinocchio with a speech bubble "My nose will grow now!" has become a minor Internet phenomenon ( Google search (http:/ /
www. google. com/ search?q="pinocchio+ paradox"), Google image search (http:/ / www. google. com/ images?q="pinocchio+ paradox")). It
seems likely that this paradox has been independently conceived multiple times.
[3] See also Predestination paradoxes in popular culture
[4] Chapter 1, Introduction.
[5] Developing countries: The outcomes paradox Nature.com (http:/ / www. nature. com/ nature/ journal/ v508/ n7494_supp/ full/ 508S14a. html)
[6] Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). "Private self-consciousness and the Five-Factor Model of Personality: Distinguishing rumination
from reflection". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 284-304.
Paradoxical laughter
Paradoxical laughter is an exaggerated expression of humour which is unwarranted by external events. It may be
uncontrollable laughter which may be recognised as inappropriate by the person involved. It is associated with
altered mental states or mental illness, such as mania, hypomania or schizophrenia, and can have other causes.
Paradoxical laughter is indicative of an unstable mood, often caused by the pseudobulbar affect, which can quickly
change to anger and back again, on minor external cues.
This type of laughter can also occur at times when the fight-or-flight response may otherwise be evoked.
References
Frijda, Nico H. (1986). The Emotions (http://books.google.com/books?id=QkNuuVf-pBMC&pg=PA52&
lpg=PA52&dq="paradoxical+laughter"). Cambridge University Press. p.52. ISBN0-521-31600-6. Retrieved 14
November 2009.
Rutkowski, Anne-Franoise; Rijsman, John B.; Gergen, Mary (2004). "Paradoxical Laughter at a Victim as
Communication with a Non-victim" (http://dbiref.uvt.nl/iPort?request=full_record&db=wo&language=eng&
query=142993). International Review of Social Psychology 17 (4): 511. ISSN 0992-986X (http://www.
worldcat.org/issn/0992-986X). Retrieved 2009-11-14. ( French biobliographical record (http://cat.inist.fr/
?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16370783) with French translation of abstract)
16
17
Decision theory
Abilene paradox
In an Abilene paradox a group of people collectively decide on a course of action that is counter to the preferences
of many of the individuals in the group. It involves a common breakdown of group communication in which each
member mistakenly believes that their own preferences are counter to the group's and, therefore, does not raise
objections. A common phrase relating to the Abilene paradox is a desire to not "rock the boat".
Explanation
The term was introduced by management expert Jerry B. Harvey in his article The Abilene Paradox: The
Management of Agreement. The name of the phenomenon comes from an anecdote in the article which Harvey uses
to elucidate the paradox:
On a hot afternoon visiting in Coleman, Texas, the family is comfortably playing dominoes on a porch, until
the father-in-law suggests that they take a trip to Abilene [53 miles north] for dinner. The wife says, "Sounds
like a great idea." The husband, despite having reservations because the drive is long and hot, thinks that his
preferences must be out-of-step with the group and says, "Sounds good to me. I just hope your mother wants to
go." The mother-in-law then says, "Of course I want to go. I haven't been to Abilene in a long time."
The drive is hot, dusty, and long. When they arrive at the cafeteria, the food is as bad as the drive. They arrive
back home four hours later, exhausted.
One of them dishonestly says, "It was a great trip, wasn't it?" The mother-in-law says that, actually, she would
rather have stayed home, but went along since the other three were so enthusiastic. The husband says, "I wasn't
delighted to be doing what we were doing. I only went to satisfy the rest of you." The wife says, "I just went
along to keep you happy. I would have had to be crazy to want to go out in the heat like that." The
father-in-law then says that he only suggested it because he thought the others might be bored.
The group sits back, perplexed that they together decided to take a trip which none of them wanted. They each
would have preferred to sit comfortably, but did not admit to it when they still had time to enjoy the afternoon.
This anecdote was also made into a short film for management education.
Ronald Sims writes that the Abilene paradox is similar to groupthink, but differs in significant ways, including that
in groupthink individuals are not acting contrary to their conscious wishes and generally feel good about the
decisions the group has reached. According to Sims, in the Abilene paradox, the individuals acting contrary to their
own wishes are more likely to have negative feelings about the outcome. In Sims' view, groupthink is a
psychological phenomenon affecting clarity of thought, where in the Abilene paradox thought is unaffected.
Like groupthink theories, the Abilene paradox theory is used to illustrate that groups not only have problems
managing disagreements, but that agreements may also be a problem in a poorly functioning group.
Abilene paradox
Research
The phenomenon is explained by social psychology theories of social conformity and social influence which suggest
human beings are often very averse to acting contrary to the trend of a group. According to Harvey, the phenomenon
may occur when individuals experience action-anxiety stress concerning the group potentially expressing
negative attitudes towards them if they do not go along. This action-anxiety arises from what Harvey termed
"negative fantasies" unpleasant visualizations of what the group might say or do if individuals are honest about
their opinions when there is "real risk" of displeasure and negative consequences for not going along. The
individual may experience "separation anxiety", fearing exclusion from the group.
Applications of the theory

The theory is often used to help explain extremely poor group decisions, especially notions of the superiority of "rule
by committee." For example, Harvey himself cited the Watergate scandal as a potential instance of the Abilene
paradox in action. The Watergate scandal occurred in the United States in the 1970s when many high officials of the
administration of then President Richard Nixon, a Republican, colluded in the cover-up and perhaps the execution of
a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, D.C. Harvey quotes several people
indicted for the cover-up as indicating that they had personal qualms about the decision but feared to voice them. For
one instance, campaign aide Herbert Porter said that he "was not one to stand up in a meeting and say that this should
be stopped", a decision he then attributed to "the fear of the group pressure that would ensue, of not being a team
player".
A technique to help reduce the chance of making a poor decision mentioned in the study and/or training of
management, as well as practical guidance by consultants, is that when the time comes for a group to make a
decision, group members should ask each other, "Are we going to Abilene?" to determine whether their decision is
legitimately desired by the group's members.
References
Further reading
Harvey, Jerry B. (1988). The Abilene Paradox and Other Meditations on Management. Lexington, Mass:
Lexington Books. ISBN 0-669-19179-5
Harvey, Jerry B. (1996). The Abilene Paradox and Other Meditations on Management (paperback). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 0-7879-0277-2
Harvey, Jerry B. (1999). How Come Every Time I Get Stabbed in the Back, My Fingerprints Are on the Knife?.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. ISBN 0-7879-4787-3
External links
How to Identify Groupthink: an Introduction to the Abilene Paradox (http://mystrategicplan.com/resources/
how-to-identify-groupthink-an-introduction-to-the-abilene-paradox/)
How to Avoid Bad Decisions and Why Not to Go to Abilene (http://mystrategicplan.com/resources/
how-to-avoid-bad-decisions-and-why-not-to-go-to-abilene/)
Combat the Abilene Paradox by Identifying Groupthink (http://mystrategicplan.com/resources/
combat-the-abilene-paradox-by-promoting-individual-thought/)
18
Chainstore paradox
Chainstore paradox
Chainstore paradox (or "Chain-Store paradox") is a concept that purports to refute standard game theory reasoning.
The chain store game

A monopolist (Player A) has branches in 20 towns. He faces 20 potential competitors, one in each town, who will be
able to choose IN or OUT. They do so in sequential order and one at a time. If a potential competitor chooses OUT,
he receives a payoff of 1, while A receives a payoff of 5. If he chooses IN, he will receive a payoff of either 2 or 0,
depending on the response of Player A to his action. Player A, in response to a choice of IN, must choose one of two
pricing strategies, COOPERATIVE or AGGRESSIVE. If he chooses COOPERATIVE, both player A and the
competitor receive a payoff of 2, and if A chooses AGGRESSIVE, each player receives a payoff of 0.
These outcomes lead to two theories for the game, the induction (game theoretically correct version) and the
deterrence theory (weakly dominated theory):
Induction theory
Consider the decision to be made by the 20th and final competitor, of whether to choose IN or OUT. He knows that
if he chooses IN, Player A receives a higher payoff from choosing cooperate than aggressive, and being the last
period of the game, there are no longer any future competitors whom Player A needs to intimidate from the market.
Knowing this, the 20th competitor enters the market, and Player A will cooperate (receiving a payoff of 2 instead of
0).
The outcome in the final period is set in stone, so to speak. Now consider period 19, and the potential competitor's
decision. He knows that A will cooperate in the next period, regardless of what happens in period 19. Thus, if player
19 enters, an aggressive strategy will be unable to deter player 20 from entering. Player 19 knows this and chooses
IN. Player A chooses cooperate.
Of course, this process of backward induction holds all the way back to the first competitor. Each potential
competitor chooses IN, and Player A always cooperates. A receives a payoff of 40 (220) and each competitor
receives 2.
Deterrence theory
This theory states that Player A will be able to get payoff of higher than 40. Suppose Player A finds the induction
argument convincing. He will decide how many periods at the end to play such a strategy, say 3. In periods 1-17, he
will decide to always be aggressive against the choice of IN. If all of the potential competitors know this, it is
unlikely potential competitors 1-17 will bother the chain store, thus risking the safe payout of 1 ("A" will not
retaliate if they choose "OUT"). If a few do test the chain store early in the game, and see that they are greeted with
the aggressive strategy, the rest of the competitors are likely not to test any further. Assuming all 17 are deterred,
Player A receives 91 (175 + 23). Even if as many as 10 competitors enter and test Player A's will, Player A will
still receive a payoff of 41 (100+ 75 + 32), which is better than the induction (game theoretically correct) payoff.
19
Chainstore paradox
The chain store paradox

If Player A follows the game theory payoff matrix to achieve the optimal payoff, he or she will have a lower payoff
than with the "deterrence" strategy. This creates an apparent game theory paradox: game theory states that induction
strategy should be optimal, but it looks like "deterrence strategy" is optimal instead.
The "deterrence strategy" is not a Nash equilibrium: It relies on the non-credible threat of responding to IN with
AGGRESSIVE. A rational player will not carry out a non-credible threat, but the paradox is that it nevertheless
seems to benefit Player A to carry out the threat.
Selten's response
Reinhard Selten's response to this apparent paradox is to argue that the idea of "deterrence", while irrational by the
standards of Game Theory, is in fact an acceptable idea by the rationality that individuals actually employ. Selten
argues that individuals can make decisions of three levels: Routine, Imagination, and Reasoning.
Complete information?
If we stand by game theory, then the initial description given for the game theory payoff matrix in the chain store
game is not in fact the complete payoff matrix. The "deterrence strategy" is a valid strategy for Player A, but it is
missing in the initially presented payoff matrix. Game theory is based on the idea that each matrix is modeled with
the assumption of complete information: that "every player knows the payoffs and strategies available to other
players."
The initially presented payoff matrix is written for one payoff round instead of for all rounds in their entirety. As
described in the "deterrence strategy" section (but not in the induction section), Player A's competitors look at Player
A's actions in previous game rounds to determine what course of action to take - this information is missing from the
payoff matrix. In this case, backwards induction seems like it will fail, because each individual round payoff matrix
is dependent on the previous round. In fact, by doubling the size of the payoff matrix on each round (or, quadrupling
the amount of choices -- there are two choices and four possibilities per round), we can find the optimal strategy for
all players before the first round is played.
Selten's levels of decision making

The routine level
The individuals use their past experience of the results of decisions to guide their response to choices in the present.
"The underlying criteria of similarity between decision situations are crude and sometimes inadequate". (Selten)
The imagination level

The individual tries to visualize how the selection of different alternatives may influence the probable course of
future events. This level employs the routine level within the procedural decisions. This method is similar to a
computer simulation.
20
Chainstore paradox
The reasoning level

The individual makes a conscious effort to analyze the situation in a rational way, using both past experience and
logical thinking. This mode of decision uses simplified models whose assumptions are products of imagination, and
is the only method of reasoning permitted and expected by game theory.
Decision-making process
The predecision
One chooses which method (routine, imagination or reasoning) to use for the problem, and this decision itself is
made on the routine level.
The final decision

Depending on which level is selected, the individual begins the decision procedure. The individual then arrives at a
(possibly different) decision for each level available (if we have chosen imagination, we would arrive at a routine
decision and possible and imagination decision). Selten argues that individuals can always reach a routine decision,
but perhaps not the higher levels. Once the individuals have all their levels of decision, they can decide which
answer to use...the Final Decision. The final decision is made on the routine level and governs actual behavior.
The economy of decision effort

Decision effort is a scarce commodity, being both time consuming and mentally taxing. Reasoning is more costly
than Imagination, which, in turn is more costly than Routine. The highest level activated is not always the most
accurate since the individual may be able to reach a good decision on the routine level, but makes serious
computational mistakes on higher levels, especially Reasoning.
Selten finally argues that strategic decisions, like those made by the monopolist in the chainstore paradox, are
generally made on the level of Imagination, where deterrence is a reality, due to the complexity of Reasoning, and
the great inferiority of Routine (it does not allow the individual to see herself in the other player's position). Since
Imagination cannot be used to visualize more than a few stages of an extensive form game (like the Chain-store
game) individuals break down games into "the beginning" and "towards the end". Here, deterrence is a reality, since
it is reasonable "in the beginning", yet is not convincing "towards the end".
References
Selten, Reinhard (1978). "The chain store paradox". Theory and Decision 9 (2): 127159.
doi:10.1007/BF00131770 [1]. ISSN0040-5833 [2].
Further reading
Relation of Chain Store Paradox to Constitutional Politics in Canada [3]
References
[1] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1007%2FBF00131770
[2] http:/ / www. worldcat. org/ issn/ 0040-5833
[3] http:/ / jtp. sagepub. com/ cgi/ content/ abstract/ 11/ 1/ 5
21
Exchange paradox
Exchange paradox
The two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a brain teaser, puzzle, or paradox in logic,
probability, and recreational mathematics. It is of special interest in decision theory, and for the Bayesian
interpretation of probability theory. Historically, it arose as a variant of the necktie paradox.
The problem:
You have two indistinguishable envelopes that each contain money. One contains twice as much as the other.
You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. You pick at random, but before you open the
envelope, you are offered the chance to take the other envelope instead.
It can be argued that it is to your advantage to swap envelopes by showing that your expected return on swapping
exceeds the sum in your envelope. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that it is beneficial to continue to swap
envelopes indefinitely.
Example
Assume the amount in a selected envelope is $20. If the envelope happens to be the larger of the two envelopes
("larger" meaning the one with the larger amount of money), that would mean that the amount in the envelope is
twice the amount in the other envelope. So in this case the amount in the other envelope would be $10.
However if the selected envelope is the smaller of the two envelopes, that would mean that the amount in the other
envelope is twice the amount in the selected envelope. In this second scenario the amount in the other envelope
would be $40.
The probability of either of these scenarios is one half, since there is a 50% chance that the larger envelope was
selected and a 50% chance that the smaller envelope was selected. The expected value calculation for how much
money is in the other envelope would be the amount in the first scenario times the probability of the first scenario
plus the amount in the second scenario times the probability of the second scenario, which is $10 * 1/2 + $40 * 1/2.
The result of this calculation is that the expected value of money in the other envelope is $25. Since this is greater
than the selected envelope, it would appear to the person selecting the envelope's advantage to always switch
envelopes. However, this probability calculation is for the singular situation of being a gambler offered by the house
to double or half your money (as opposed to the balanced "double or nothing"). In the two envelopes problem the
person selecting the envelope is, by switching, also effectively the house giving the other person (the gambler) an
envelope with double or half the amount in their envelope. This is by default because the starting value of the
envelope one party receives is linked at double or half of the other party and is randomly chosen. What this means is
the person who selected the envelope is giving up an envelope with an expected value of $25 to receive an envelope
with an expected value of $25.
A large number of solutions have been proposed. The usual scenario is that one writer proposes a solution that solves
the problem as stated, but then another writer discovers that altering the problem slightly revives the paradox. In this
way, a family of closely related formulations of the problem have been created, which are discussed in the literature.
No proposed solution is widely accepted as correct. Despite this it is common for authors to claim that the solution to
the problem is easy, even elementary. However, when investigating these elementary solutions they often differ from
one author to the next. Since 1987 new papers have been published every year.[1]
22
Exchange paradox
Problem
Basic setup: You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of
which contains a positive sum of money. One envelope contains twice
as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep whatever
amount it contains. You pick one envelope at random but before you
open it you are given the chance to take the other envelope instead.
The switching argument: Now suppose you reason as follows:
1. I denote by A the amount in my selected envelope.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
Thus the other envelope contains 2A with probability 1/2 and A/2 with probability 1/2.
So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
This is greater than A, so I gain on average by swapping.

After the switch, I can denote that content by B and reason in exactly the same manner as above.
I will conclude that the most rational thing to do is to swap back again.
To be rational, I will thus end up swapping envelopes indefinitely.
As it seems more rational to open just any envelope than to swap indefinitely, we have a contradiction.
The puzzle: The puzzle is to find the flaw in the very compelling line of reasoning above.
Common resolution
A common way to resolve the paradox, both in popular literature and academic literature, is to observe that A stands
for different things at different places in the expected value calculation, step 7 above. In the first term A is the
smaller amount while in the second term A is the larger amount. To mix different instances of a variable in the same
formula like this is said to be illegitimate, so step 7 is incorrect, and this is the cause of the paradox.
According to this analysis, a correct argument runs on the following lines. By definition the amount in one envelope
is twice as much as in the other. Denoting the lower of the two amounts by X, we write the expected value
calculation as
Here X stands for the same thing in every term of the equation. We learn that 1.5X, is the average expected value in
either of the envelopes. Being less than 2X, the value in the greater envelope, there is no reason to swap the
envelopes.
23
Exchange paradox
24
Mathematical details
Let us rewrite the preceding calculations in a more detailed notation that explicitly distinguishes random from
not-random quantities (a different distinction from the usual in ordinary, deterministic mathematics between
variables and constants). This is a useful way to compare with the next, alternative, resolution. So far, we were
thinking of the two amounts of money in the two envelopes as fixed. The only randomness lies in which one goes
into which envelope. We called the smaller amount X, let us denote the larger amount by Y. Given the values x and y
of X and Y, where y = 2x and x > 0, the problem description tells us (whether or not x and y are known)
for all possible values x of the smaller amount X; there is a corresponding definition of the probability distribution of
B given X and Y. In our resolution of the paradox, we guessed that in Step 7 the writer was trying to compute the
expected value of B given X=x. Splitting the calculation over the two possibilities for which envelope contains the
smaller amount, it is certainly correct to write
At this point, the writer correctly substitutes the value 1/2 for both of the conditional probabilities on the right hand
side of this equation (Step 2). At the same time he correctly substitutes the random variable B inside the first
conditional expectation for 2A, when taking its expectation value given B > A and X = x, and he similarly correctly
substitutes the random variable B for A/2 when taking its expectation value given B < A and X = x (Steps 4 and 5).
He would then arrive at the completely correct equation
However he now proceeds, in the first of the two terms on the right hand side, to replace the expectation value of A
given that Envelope A contains the smaller amount and given that the amounts are x and 2x, by the random quantity
A itself. Similarly, in the second term on the right hand side he replaces the expectation value of A given now that
Envelope A contains the larger amount and given that the amounts are x and 2x, also by the random quantity A itself.
The correct substitutions would have been, of course, x and 2x respectively, leading to a correct conclusion
.
Naturally this coincides with the expectation value of A given X=x.
Indeed, in the two contexts in which the random variable A appears on the right hand side, it is standing for two
different things, since its distribution has been conditioned on different events. Obviously, A tends to be larger, when
we know that it is greater than B and when the two amounts are fixed, and it tends to be smaller, when we know that
it is smaller than B and the two amounts are fixed, cf. Schwitzgebel and Dever (2007, 2008). In fact, it is exactly
twice as large in the first situation as in the second situation.
The preceding resolution was first noted by Bruss in 1996. Falk gave a concise exposition in 2009.
Alternative interpretation
The first solution above does not explain what is wrong if the player is allowed to open the first envelope before
offered the option to switch. In this case, A stands for the value that then seen throughout all subsequent calculations.
The mathematical variable A stands for any particular amount he might see there (it is a mathematical variable, a
generic possible value of a random variable). The reasoning appears to show that whatever amount he would see
there, he would decide to switch. Hence, he does not need to look in the envelope at all: he knows that if he looks,
Exchange paradox
and goes through the calculations, they will tell him to switch, whatever he saw in the envelope.
In this case, at Steps 6, 7 and 8 of the reasoning, A is any fixed possible value of the amount of money in the first
envelope.
Thus, the proposed "common resolution" above breaks down, and another explanation is needed.
Panagiotis Tsikogiannopoulos (2014) proposed the following explanation to the paradox in his paper. Suppose that
both players see that the envelope of player A contains 100 euros and let's make a calculation using only numerical
values: Once we know the amount of 100 euros, we conclude that the other envelope can contain either 50 or 200
euros. Now there are two possible events for the two fixed amounts that the game can be played with:
Event 1: Amounts of 100 and 200 euros
We assume that both players have no prior beliefs for the total amount of money they are going to share, so Events 1
and 2 must be considered to have equal probabilities to occur. In every variation of two fixed amounts where the
players want to make their calculations based on the numerical value of the amount revealed to them, they will have
to weigh the return derived from each event with the average fixed amount by which the game is played in this
event. In the Event 1, player A will have a profit of 100 euros by exchanging his envelope while in the Event 2 will
have a loss of 50 euros. The average fixed amount in the Event 1 is 150 euros while in the Event 2 is 75 euros.
The formula of expected return in case of exchange for player A that summarizes the above remarks is the following:
So, the decision of the exchange or not of his envelope is indifferent. Below is an explanation of why the players will
have to weigh the return derived from each event with the average fixed amount:
In the Event 1, the player who will switch the amount of 100 euros with the amount of 200 euros will have a profit of
100 euros in a game that shares 300 euros in total. So we can say that this player played the game with a success
factor of 100 euros / 300 euros = +1/3. Similarly, the other player played the game with a success factor of -1/3. In
the Event 2, the player who will switch the amount of 50 euros with the amount of 100 euros will have a profit of 50
euros in a game that shares 150 euros in total. This player played the game with a success factor of +1/3 also and his
opponent with a success factor of -1/3 also. In reality, when a player sees that his envelope contains 100 euros, he
doesnt know whether he is in the game of the Event 1 or in the game of the Event 2. If he is in the Event 1 and
switches he will have a success factor of +1/3 and if he is in the Event 2 and switches he will have a success factor of
-1/3. As we mentioned above, these two events have equal probability of 1/2 to occur, so the total success factor of
player A considering both possible events is zero. This means that the decision of a player to switch or not switch his
envelope is indifferent, even when he makes his calculations based on the amount of money that is revealed to him.
This interpretation of the two envelopes problem appears in the first publications in which the paradox was
introduced, Gardner (1989) and Nalebuff (1989). It is common in the more mathematical literature on the problem.
The "common resolution" above depends on a particular interpretation of what the writer of the argument is trying to
calculate: namely, it assumes he is after the (unconditional) expectation value of what's in Envelope B. In the
mathematical literature on Two Envelopes Problem (and in particular, in the literature where it was first introduced
to the world), another interpretation is more common, involving the conditional expectation value (conditional on
what might be in Envelope A). To solve this and related interpretations or versions of the problem, most authors use
the Bayesian interpretation of probability.
25
Exchange paradox
Introduction to resolutions based on Bayesian probability theory

Here the ways the paradox can be resolved depend to a large degree on the assumptions that are made about the
things that are not made clear in the setup and the proposed argument for switching. The most usual assumption
about the way the envelopes are set up is that a sum of money is in one envelope, and twice that sum is in another
envelope. One of the two envelopes is randomly given to the player (envelope A). It is not made clear exactly how
the smaller of the two sums is determined, what values it could possibly take and, in particular, whether there is a
maximum sum it might contain. It is also not specified whether the player can look in Envelope A before deciding
whether or not to switch. A further ambiguity in the paradox is that it is not made clear in the proposed argument
whether the amount A in Envelope A is intended to be a constant, a random variable, or some other quantity.
If it assumed that there is a maximum sum that can be put in the first envelope, then a simple and mathematically
sound resolution is possible within the second interpretation. Step 6 in the proposed line of reasoning is not always
true, since if the player holds more than the maximum sum that can be put into the first envelope they must hold the
envelope containing the larger sum, and are thus certain to lose by switching. This may not occur often, but when it
does, the heavy loss the player incurs means that, on average, there is no advantage in switching. This resolves all
practical cases of the problem, whether or not the player looks in their envelope.
It can be envisaged, however, that the sums in the two envelopes are not limited. This requires a more careful
mathematical analysis, and also uncovers other possible interpretations of the problem. If, for example, the smaller
of the two sums of money is considered equally likely to be one of infinitely many positive integers, without upper
limitthe probability that it is any given number is always zero. This absurd situation exemplifies an improper prior,
and this is generally considered to resolve the paradox in this case.
It is possible to devise a distribution for the sums possible in the first envelope such that the maximum value is
unlimited, computation of the expectation of what is in B given what is in A seems to dictate you should switch, and
the distribution constitutes a proper prior. In these cases it can be shown that the expected sum in both envelopes is
infinite. There is no gain, on average, in swapping.
The first two resolutions we present correspond, technically speaking, first to A being a random variable, and
secondly to it being a possible value of a random variable (and the expectation being computed is a conditional
expectation). At the same time, in the first resolution the two original amounts of money seem to be thought of as
being fixed, while in the second they are also thought of as varying. Thus there are two main interpretations of the
problem, and two main resolutions.
Proposed resolutions to the alternative interpretation

Nalebuff (1989), Christensen and Utts (1992), Falk and Konold (1992), Blachman, Christensen and Utts (1996),
Nickerson and Falk (2006), pointed out that if the amounts of money in the two envelopes have any proper
probability distribution representing the player's prior beliefs about the amounts of money in the two envelopes, then
it is impossible that whatever the amount A=a in the first envelope might be, it would be equally likely, according to
these prior beliefs, that the second contains a/2 or 2a. Thus step 6 of the argument, which leads to always switching,
is a non-sequitur.
26
Exchange paradox
According to this interpretation, the writer is carrying out the following computation, where he is conditioning now
on the value of A, the amount in Envelope A, not on the pair amounts in the two envelopes X and Y:
Completely correctly, and according to Step 5, the two conditional expectation values are evaluated as
However in Step 6 the writer is invoking Steps 2 and 3 to get the two conditional probabilities, and effectively
replacing the two conditional probabilities of Envelope A containing the smaller and larger amount, respectively,
given the amount actually in that envelope, both by the unconditional probability 1/2: he makes the substitutions
But intuitively, we would expect that the larger the amount in A, the more likely it is the larger of the two, and
vice-versa. And it is a mathematical fact, as we will see in a moment, that it is impossible that both of these
conditional probabilities are equal to 1/2 for all possible values of a. In fact, for step 6 to be true, whatever a might
be, the smaller amount of money in the two envelopes must be equally likely to be between 1 and 2, as between 2
and 4, as between 4 and 8, ... ad infinitum. But there is no way to divide total probability 1 into an infinite number of
pieces that are not only all equal to one another, but also all larger than zero. Yet the smaller amount of money in
the two envelopes must have probability larger than zero to be in at least one of the just mentioned ranges.
To see this, suppose that the chance that the smaller of the two envelopes contains an amount between 2n and 2n+1 is
p(n), where n is any whole number, positive or negative, and for definiteness we include the lower limit but exclude
the upper in each interval. It follows that the conditional probability that the envelope in our hands contains the
smaller amount of money of the two, given that its contents are between 2n and 2n+1, is
If this is equal to 1/2, it follows by simple algebra that
or p(n)=p(n-1). This must be true for all n, an impossibility.
New variant
Though Bayesian probability theory can resolve the alternative interpretation of the paradox above, it turns out that
examples can be found of proper probability distributions, such that the expected value of the amount in the second
envelope given that in the first does exceed the amount in the first, whatever it might be. The first such example was
already given by Nalebuff (1989). See also Christensen and Utts (1992)
Denote again the amount of money in the first envelope by A and that in the second by B. We think of these as
random. Let X be the smaller of the two amounts and Y=2X be the larger. Notice that once we have fixed a
probability distribution for X then the joint probability distribution of A,B is fixed, since A,B = X,Y or Y,X each with
probability 1/2, independently of X,Y.
The bad step 6 in the "always switching" argument led us to the finding E(B|A=a)>a for all a, and hence to the
recommendation to switch, whether or not we know a. Now, it turns out that one can quite easily invent proper
probability distributions for X, the smaller of the two amounts of money, such that this bad conclusion is still true.
One example is analysed in more detail, in a moment.
It cannot be true that whatever a, given A=a, B is equally likely to be a/2 or 2a, but it can be true that whatever a,
given A=a, B is larger in expected value than a.
27
Exchange paradox
28
Suppose for example (Broome, 1995)[2] that the envelope with the smaller amount actually contains 2n dollars with
probability 2n/3n+1 where n = 0, 1, 2, These probabilities sum to 1, hence the distribution is a proper prior (for
subjectivists) and a completely decent probability law also for frequentists.
Imagine what might be in the first envelope. A sensible strategy would certainly be to swap when the first envelope
contains 1, as the other must then contain 2. Suppose on the other hand the first envelope contains 2. In that case
there are two possibilities: the envelope pair in front of us is either {1, 2} or {2, 4}. All other pairs are impossible.
The conditional probability that we are dealing with the {1, 2} pair, given that the first envelope contains 2, is
and consequently the probability it's the {2, 4} pair is 2/5, since these are the only two possibilities. In this
derivation,
is the probability that the envelope pair is the pair 1 and 2, and Envelope A happens to
contain 2;
is the probability that the envelope pair is the pair 2 and 4, and (again) Envelope A
happens to contain 2. Those are the only two ways that Envelope A can end up containing the amount 2.
It turns out that these proportions hold in general unless the first envelope contains 1. Denote by a the amount we
imagine finding in Envelope A, if we were to open that envelope, and suppose that a = 2n for some n 1. In that case
the other envelope contains a/2 with probability 3/5 and 2a with probability 2/5.
So either the first envelope contains 1, in which case the conditional expected amount in the other envelope is 2, or
the first envelope contains a > 1, and though the second envelope is more likely to be smaller than larger, its
conditionally expected amount is larger: the conditionally expected amount in Envelope B is
which is more than a. This means that the player who looks in Envelope A would decide to switch whatever he saw
there. Hence there is no need to look in Envelope A to make that decision.
This conclusion is just as clearly wrong as it was in the preceding interpretations of the Two Envelopes Problem. But
now the flaws noted above do not apply; the a in the expected value calculation is a constant and the conditional
probabilities in the formula are obtained from a specified and proper prior distribution.
Proposed resolutions
Some writers think that the new paradox can be defused.[3] Suppose
for all a. As remarked
before, this is possible for some probability distributions of X (the smaller amount of money in the two envelopes).
Averaging over a, it follows either that
, or alternatively that
. But A and
B have the same probability distribution, and hence the same expectation value, by symmetry (each envelope is
equally likely to be the smaller of the two). Thus both have infinite expectation values, and hence so must X too.
Thus if we switch for the second envelope because its conditional expected value is larger than what actually is in
the first, whatever that might be, we are exchanging an unknown amount of money whose expectation value is
infinite for another unknown amount of money with the same distribution and the same infinite expected value. The
average amount of money in both envelopes is infinite. Exchanging one for the other simply exchanges an average of
infinity with an average of infinity.
Probability theory therefore tells us why and when the paradox can occur and explains to us where the sequence of
apparently logical steps breaks down. In this situation, Steps 6 and Steps 7 of the standard Two Envelopes argument
can be replaced by correct calculations of the conditional probabilities that the other envelope contains half or twice
Exchange paradox
29
what's in A, and a correct calculation of the conditional expectation of what's in B given what's in A. Indeed, that
conditional expected value is larger than what's in A. But because the unconditional expected amount in A is infinite,
this does not provide a reason to switch, because it does not guarantee that on average you'll be better off after
switching. One only has this mathematical guarantee in the situation that the unconditional expectation value of
what's in A is finite. But then the reason for switching without looking in the envelope,
for all a, simply cannot
Many economists prefer to argue that in a real-life situation, the expectation of the amount of money in an envelope
cannot be infinity, for instance, because the total amount of money in the world is bounded; therefore any probability
distribution describing the real world would have to assign probability 0 to the amount being larger than the total
amount of money on the world. Therefore the expectation of the amount of money under this distribution cannot be
infinity. The resolution of the second paradox, for such writers, is that the postulated probability distributions cannot
arise in a real-life situation. These are similar arguments as used to explain the St. Petersburg Paradox.
Foundations of mathematical economics

In mathematical economics and the theory of utility, which explains economic behaviour in terms of expected utility,
there remains a problem to be resolved. In the real world we presumably would not indefinitely exchange one
envelope for the other (and probability theory, as just discussed, explains quite well why calculations of conditional
expectations might mislead us). Yet the expected utility based theory of economic behaviour assumes that people do
(or should) make economic decisions by maximizing expected utility, conditional on present knowledge. If the utility
function is unbounded above, then the theory can still predict infinite switching.
Fortunately for mathematical economics and the theory of utility, it is generally agreed that as an amount of money
increases, its utility to the owner increases less and less, and ultimately there is a finite upper bound to the utility of
all possible amounts of money. We can pretend that the amount of money in the whole world is as large as we like,
yet the utility that the owner of all that money experiences, while rising further and further, will never rise beyond a
certain point no matter how much is in his possession. For decision theory and utility theory, the two envelope
paradox illustrates that unbounded utility does not exist in the real world, so fortunately there is no need to build a
decision theory that allows unbounded utility, let alone utility of infinite expectation.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Controversy among philosophers

As mentioned above, any distribution producing this variant of the paradox must have an infinite mean. So before
the player opens an envelope the expected gain from switching is " ", which is not defined. In the words of
Chalmers this is "just another example of a familiar phenomenon, the strange behaviour of infinity". Chalmers
suggests that decision theory generally breaks down when confronted with games having a diverging expectation,
and compares it with the situation generated by the classical St. Petersburg paradox.
However, Clark and Shackel argue that this blaming it all on "the strange behaviour of infinity" does not resolve the
paradox at all; neither in the single case nor the averaged case. They provide a simple example of a pair of random
variables both having infinite mean but where it is clearly sensible to prefer one to the other, both conditionally and
on average. They argue that decision theory should be extended so as to allow infinite expectation values in some
situations.
Exchange paradox
Non-probabilistic variant
The logician Raymond Smullyan questioned if the paradox has anything to do with probabilities at all. He did this by
expressing the problem in a way that does not involve probabilities. The following plainly logical arguments lead to
conflicting conclusions:
1. Let the amount in the envelope chosen by the player be A. By swapping, the player may gain A or lose A/2. So the
potential gain is strictly greater than the potential loss.
2. Let the amounts in the envelopes be X and 2X. Now by swapping, the player may gain X or lose X. So the
potential gain is equal to the potential loss.
A number of solutions have been put forward. Careful analyses have been made by some logicians. Though solutions
differ, they all pinpoint semantic issues concerned with counterfactual reasoning. We want to compare the amount
that we would gain by switching if we would gain by switching, with the amount we would lose by switching if we
would indeed lose by switching. However, we cannot both gain and lose by switching at the same time. We are
asked to compare two incompatible situations. Only one of them can factually occur, the other is a counterfactual
situationsomehow imaginary. To compare them at all, we must somehow "align" the two situations, providing
some definite points in common.
James Chase (2002) argues that the second argument is correct because it does correspond to the way to align two
situations (one in which we gain, the other in which we lose), which is preferably indicated by the problem
description. Also Bernard Katz and Doris Olin (2007) argue this point of view. In the second argument, we consider
the amounts of money in the two envelopes as being fixed; what varies is which one is first given to the player.
Because that was an arbitrary and physical choice, the counterfactual world in which the player, counterfactually,
got the other envelope to the one he was actually (factually) given is a highly meaningful counterfactual world and
hence the comparison between gains and losses in the two worlds is meaningful. This comparison is uniquely
indicated by the problem description, in which two amounts of money are put in the two envelopes first, and only
after that is one chosen arbitrarily and given to the player. In the first argument, however, we consider the amount of
money in the envelope first given to the player as fixed and consider the situations where the second envelope
contains either half or twice that amount. This would only be a reasonable counterfactual world if in reality the
envelopes had been filled as follows: first, some amount of money is placed in the specific envelope that will be
given to the player; and secondly, by some arbitrary process, the other envelope is filled (arbitrarily or randomly)
either with double or with half of that amount of money.
Byeong-Uk Yi (2009), on the other hand, argues that comparing the amount you would gain if you would gain by
switching with the amount you would lose if you would lose by switching is a meaningless exercise from the outset.
According to his analysis, all three implications (switch, indifferent, do not switch) are incorrect. He analyses
Smullyan's arguments in detail, showing that intermediate steps are being taken, and pinpointing exactly where an
incorrect inference is made according to his formalization of counterfactual inference. An important difference with
Chase's analysis is that he does not take account of the part of the story where we are told that the envelope called
Envelope A is decided completely at random. Thus, Chase puts probability back into the problem description in
order to conclude that arguments 1 and 3 are incorrect, argument 2 is correct, while Yi keeps "two envelope problem
without probability" completely free of probability, and comes to the conclusion that there are no reasons to prefer
any action. This corresponds to the view of Albers et al., that without probability ingredient, there is no way to argue
that one action is better than another, anyway.
In perhaps the most recent paper on the subject, Bliss argues that the source of the paradox is that when one
mistakenly believes in the possibility of a larger payoff that does not, in actuality, exist, one is mistaken by a larger
margin than when one believes in the possibility of a smaller payoff that does not actually exist. If, for example, the
envelopes contained $5.00 and $10.00 respectively, a player who opened the $10.00 envelope would expect the
30
Exchange paradox
31
possibility of a $20.00 payout that simply does not exist. Were that player to open the $5.00 envelope instead, he
would believe in the possibility of a $2.50 payout, which constitutes a smaller deviation from the true value.
Albers, Kooi, and Schaafsma (2005) consider that without adding probability (or other) ingredients to the problem,
Smullyan's arguments do not give any reason to swap or not to swap, in any case. Thus there is no paradox. This
dismissive attitude is common among writers from probability and economics: Smullyan's paradox arises precisely
because he takes no account whatever of probability or utility.
Extensions to the problem

Since the two envelopes problem became popular, many authors have studied the problem in depth in the situation in
which the player has a prior probability distribution of the values in the two envelopes, and does look in Envelope A.
One of the most recent such publications is by McDonnell and Douglas (2009), who also consider some further
generalizations.
If a priori we know that the amount in the smaller envelope is a whole number of some currency units, then the
problem is determined, as far as probability theory is concerned, by the probability mass function
describing
our prior beliefs that the smaller amount is any number x = 1,2, ... ; the summation over all values of x being equal to
1. It follows that given the amount a in Envelope A, the amount in Envelope B is certainly 2a if a is an odd number.
However, if a is even, then the amount in Envelope B is 2a with probability
, and a/2
with probability
. If one would like to switch envelopes if the expectation value of
what is in the other is larger than what we have in ours, then a simple calculation shows that one should switch if
, keep to Envelope A if
.
If on the other hand the smaller amount of money can vary continuously, and we represent our prior beliefs about it
with a probability density
, thus a function that integrates to one when we integrate over x running from zero
to infinity, then given the amount a in Envelope A, the other envelope contains 2a with probability
, and a/2 with probability
. If again we decide to
switch or not according to the expectation value of what's in the other envelope, the criterion for switching now
becomes
.
The difference between the results for discrete and continuous variables may surprise many readers. Speaking
intuitively, this is explained as follows. Let h be a small quantity and imagine that the amount of money we see when
we look in Envelope A is rounded off in such a way that differences smaller than h are not noticeable, even though
actually it varies continuously. The probability that the smaller amount of money is in an interval around a of length
h, and Envelope A contains the smaller amount is approximately
. The probability that the larger
amount of money is in an interval around a of length h corresponds to the smaller amount being in an interval of
length h/2 around a/2. Hence the probability that the larger amount of money is in a small interval around a of length
h and Envelope A contains the larger amount is approximately
. Thus, given Envelope A
contains an amount about equal to a, the probability it is the smaller of the two is roughly
.
If the player only wants to end up with the larger amount of money, and does not care about expected amounts, then
in the discrete case he should switch if a is an odd number, or if a is even and
. In the continuous
case he should switch if
Some authors prefer to think of probability in a frequentist sense. If the player knows the probability distribution
used by the organizer to determine the smaller of the two values, then the analysis would proceed just as in the case
when p or f represents subjective prior beliefs. However, what if we take a frequentist point of view, but the player
does not know what probability distribution is used by the organiser to fix the amounts of money in any one
instance? Thinking of the arranger of the game and the player as two parties in a two person game, puts the problem
into the range of game theory. The arranger's strategy consists of a choice of a probability distribution of x, the
smaller of the two amounts. Allowing the player also to use randomness in making his decision, his strategy is
Exchange paradox
determined by his choosing a probability of switching
32
for each possible amount of money a he might see in
Envelope A. In this section we so far only discussed fixed strategies, that is strategies for which q only takes the
values 0 and 1, and we saw that the player is fine with a fixed strategy, if he knows the strategy of the organizer. In
the next section we will see that randomized strategies can be useful when the organizer's strategy is not known.
Randomized solutions
Suppose as in the previous section that the player is allowed to look in the first envelope before deciding whether to
switch or to stay. We'll think of the contents of the two envelopes as being two positive numbers, not necessarily two
amounts of money. The player is allowed either to keep the number in Envelope A, or to switch and take the number
in Envelope B. We'll drop the assumption that one number is exactly twice the other, we'll just suppose that they are
different and positive. On the other hand, instead of trying to maximize expectation values, we'll just try to maximize
the chance that we end up with the larger number.
In this section we ask the question, is it possible for the player to make his choice in such a way that he goes home
with the larger number with probability strictly greater than half, however the organizer has filled the two envelopes?
We are given no information at all about the two numbers in the two envelopes, except that they are different, and
strictly greater than zero. The numbers were written down on slips of paper by the organiser, put into the two
envelopes. The envelopes were then shuffled, the player picks one, calls it Envelope A, and opens it.
We are not told any joint probability distribution of the two numbers. We are not asking for a subjectivist solution.
We must think of the two numbers in the envelopes as chosen by the arranger of the game according to some
possibly random procedure, completely unknown to us, and fixed. Think of each envelope as simply containing a
positive number and such that the two numbers are not the same. The job of the player is to end up with the envelope
with the larger number. This variant of the problem, as well as its solution, is attributed by McDonnell and Abbott,
and by earlier authors, to information theorist Thomas M. Cover.
Counter-intuitive though it might seem, there is a way that the player can decide whether to switch or to stay so that
he has a larger chance than 1/2 of finishing with the bigger number, however the two numbers are chosen by the
arranger of the game. However, it is only possible with a so-called randomized algorithm: the player must be able to
generate his own random numbers. Suppose he is able to produce a random number, let's call it Z, such that the
probability that Z is larger than any particular quantity z is exp(-z). Note that exp(-z) starts off equal to 1 at z=0 and
decreases strictly and continuously as z increases, tending to zero as z tends to infinity. So the chance is 0 that Z is
exactly equal to any particular number, and there is a positive probability that Z lies between any two particular
different numbers. The player compares his Z with the number in Envelope A. If Z is smaller he keeps the envelope.
If Z is larger he switches to the other envelope.
Think of the two numbers in the envelopes as fixed (though of course unknown to the player). Think of the player's
random Z as a probe with which he decides whether the number in Envelope A is small or large. If it is small
compared to Z he switches, if it is large compared to Z he stays.
If both numbers are smaller than the player's Z, his strategy does not help him. He ends up with the Envelope B,
which is equally likely to be the larger or the smaller of the two. If both numbers are larger than Z his strategy does
not help him either, he ends up with the first Envelope A, which again is equally likely to be the larger or the smaller
of the two. However if Z happens to be in between the two numbers, then his strategy leads him correctly to keep
Envelope A if its contents are larger than those of B, but to switch to Envelope B if A has smaller contents than B.
Altogether, this means that he ends up with the envelope with the larger number with probability strictly larger than
1/2. To be precise, the probability that he ends with the "winning envelope" is 1/2 + P(Z falls between the two
numbers)/2.
In practice, the number Z we have described could be determined to the necessary degree of accuracy as follows.
Toss a fair coin many times, and convert the sequence of heads and tails into the binary representation of a number U
Exchange paradox
between 0 and 1: for instance, HTHHTH... becomes the binary representation of u=0.101101.. . In this way, we
generate a random number U, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Then define Z = ln (U) where "ln" stands for
natural logarithm, i.e., logarithm to base e. Note that we just need to toss the coin long enough to verify whether Z is
smaller or larger than the number a in the first envelopewe do not need to go on for ever. We only need to toss the
coin a finite (though random) number of times: at some point we can be sure that the outcomes of further coin tosses
would not change the outcome.
The particular probability law (the so-called standard exponential distribution) used to generate the random number
Z in this problem is not crucial. Any probability distribution over the positive real numbers that assigns positive
probability to any interval of positive length does the job.
This problem can be considered from the point of view of game theory, where we make the game a two-person
zero-sum game with outcomes win or lose, depending on whether the player ends up with the higher or lower
amount of money. The organiser chooses the joint distribution of the amounts of money in both envelopes, and the
player chooses the distribution of Z. The game does not have a "solution" (or saddle point) in the sense of game
theory. This is an infinite game and von Neumann's minimax theorem does not apply.
History of the paradox

The envelope paradox dates back at least to 1953, when Belgian mathematician Maurice Kraitchik proposed a puzzle
in his book Recreational Mathematics concerning two equally rich men who meet and compare their beautiful
neckties, presents from their wives, wondering which tie actually cost more money. It is also mentioned in a 1953
book on elementary mathematics and mathematical puzzles by the mathematician John Edensor Littlewood, who
credited it to the physicist Erwin Schroedinger. Martin Gardner popularized Kraitchik's puzzle in his 1982 book Aha!
Gotcha, in the form of a wallet game:
Two people, equally rich, meet to compare the contents of their wallets. Each is ignorant of the contents of the
two wallets. The game is as follows: whoever has the least money receives the contents of the wallet of the
other (in the case where the amounts are equal, nothing happens). One of the two men can reason: "I have the
amount A in my wallet. That's the maximum that I could lose. If I win (probability 0.5), the amount that I'll
have in my possession at the end of the game will be more than 2A. Therefore the game is favourable to me."
The other man can reason in exactly the same way. In fact, by symmetry, the game is fair. Where is the
mistake in the reasoning of each man?
In 1988 and 1989, Barry Nalebuff presented two different two-envelope problems, each with one envelope
containing twice what's in the other, and each with computation of the expectation value 5A/4. The first paper just
presents the two problems, the second paper discusses many solutions to both of them. The second of his two
problems nowadays the most common, and is presented in this article. According to this version, the two envelopes
are filled first, then one is chosen at random and called Envelope A. Martin Gardner independently mentioned this
same version in his 1989 book Penrose Tiles to Trapdoor Ciphers and the Return of Dr Matrix. Barry Nalebuff's
asymmetric variant, often known as the Ali Baba problem, has one envelope filled first, called Envelope A, and
given to Ali. Then a fair coin is tossed to decide whether Envelope B should contain half or twice that amount, and
only then given to Baba.
33
Exchange paradox
Notes and references

[1] A complete list of published and unpublished sources in chronological order can be found in the talk page.
[2] A famous example of a proper probability distribution of the amounts of money in the two envelopes, for which
UNIQ-math-0-e545348fab159bc7-QINU for all a.
[3] (letters to the editor, comment on Christensen and Utts (1992)

Kavka's toxin puzzle is a thought experiment about the possibility of forming an intention to perform an act which,
following from reason, is an action one would not actually perform. It was presented by moral and political
philosopher Gregory S. Kavka in "The Toxin Puzzle" (1983), and grew out of his work in deterrence theory and
mutual assured destruction. Kavka is also well known for his Paradox of Future Individuals, which addresses our
moral obligation to future persons to plan for the future now. His slave child example also displays the deontological
concept that holds humans as "beyond price", therefore they should never be used as a mere means, but rather as an
end.
The puzzle
Kavka's original version of the puzzle is the following:
An eccentric billionaire places before you a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill
for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects. The billionaire will pay you one
million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow
afternoon. He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the money will
already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it arrives, if you succeed. All you
have to do is. . . intend at midnight tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are perfectly free
to change your mind after receiving the money and not drink the toxin.
A possible interpretation: Can you intend to drink the toxin if you also intend to change your mind at a later time?
The paradox
The paradoxical nature can be stated in many ways, which may be useful for understanding analysis proposed by
philosophers:
In line with Newcomb's paradox, an omniscient pay-off mechanism makes a person's decision known to him
before he makes the decision, but it is also assumed that the person may change his decision afterwards, of free
will.
Similarly in line with Newcomb's paradox; Kavka's claim, that one cannot intend what one will not do, makes
pay-off mechanism an example of reverse causation.
Pay-off for decision to drink the poison is ambiguous.
There are two decisions for one event with different pay-offs.
Since the pain caused by the poison would be more than off-set by the money received, we can sketch the pay-off
table as follows.
34
35
Pay-offs (Initial analysis)

Intend Do not intend
Drink
90
Do not drink 100
10
0
According to Kavka: Drinking the poison is never to your advantage regardless of whether you are paid. A rational
person would know he would not drink the poison and thus could not intend to drink it.
Pay-offs (According to Kavka)

Intend
Drink
Do not intend
Impossible 10
Do not drink Impossible 0
David Gauthier argues once a person intends drinking the poison one cannot entertain ideas of not drinking it.
The rational outcome of your deliberation tomorrow morning is the action that will be part of your life
going as well as possible, subject to the constraint that it be compatible with your commitment-in this
case, compatible with the sincere intention that you form today to drink the toxin. And so the rational
action is to drink the toxin.
Pay-offs (According to Gauthier)

Intend
Drink
90
Do not intend
10
Do not drink Impossible 0
One of the central tenets of the puzzle is that for a reasonable person
There is reasonable grounds for that person to drink the toxin, since some reward may be obtained.
Having come to the above conclusion there is no reasonable grounds for that person to drink the toxin, since no
further reward may be obtained, and no reasonable person would partake in self-harm for no benefit.
Thus a reasonable person must intend to drink the toxin by the first argument, yet if that person intends to drink the
toxin, he is being irrational by the second argument.
References
Necktie paradox
36
Necktie paradox
The necktie paradox is a puzzle or paradox within the subjectivistic interpretation of probability theory. It is a
variation (and historically, the origin) of the two-envelope paradox.
Two men are each given a necktie by their respective wives as a Christmas present. Over drinks they start arguing
over who has the cheaper necktie. They agree to have a wager over it. They will consult their wives and find out
which necktie is more expensive. The terms of the bet are that the man with the more expensive necktie has to give it
to the other as the prize.
The first man reasons as follows: winning and losing are equally likely. If I lose, then I lose the value of my necktie.
But if I win, then I win more than the value of my necktie. Therefore the wager is to my advantage. The second man
can consider the wager in exactly the same way; thus, paradoxically, it seems both men have the advantage in the
bet. This is obviously not possible.
The paradox can be resolved by giving more careful consideration to what is lost in one scenario ("the value of my
necktie") and what is won in the other ("more than the value of my necktie"). If we assume for simplicity that the
only possible necktie prices are $20 and $30, and that a man has equal chances of having a $20 or $30 necktie, then
four outcomes (all equally likely) are possible:
Price of 1st man's tie Price of 2nd man's tie 1st man's gain/loss
$20
$20
$20
$30
gain $30
$30
$20
lose $30
$30
$30
We see that the first man has a 50% chance of a neutral outcome, a 25% chance of gaining a necktie worth $30, and
a 25% chance of losing a necktie worth $30. Turning to the losing and winning scenarios: if the man loses $30, then
it is true that he has lost the value of his necktie; and if he gains $30, then it is true that he has gained more than the
value of his necktie. The win and the loss are equally likely; but what we call the value of his necktie in the losing
scenario is the same amount as what we call more than the value of his necktie in the winning scenario.
Accordingly, neither man has the advantage in the wager.
In general, what goes wrong is that when the first man is imagining the scenario that his necktie is actually worth
less than the other, his beliefs as to its value have to be revised (downwards) relatively to what they are a priori,
without such additional information. Yet in the apparently logical reasoning leading him to take the wager, he is
behaving as if his necktie is worth the same when it is worth less than the other, as when it is worth more than the
other. Of course, the price his wife actually paid for it is fixed, and doesn't change if it is revealed which tie is worth
more. The point is that this price, whatever it was, is unknown to him. It is his beliefs about the price which could not
be the same if he was given further information as to which tie was worth more. And it is on the basis of his prior
beliefs about the prices that he has to make his decision whether or not to accept the wager.
On a technical note, if the prices of the ties could in principle be arbitrarily large, then it is possible to have beliefs
about their values, such that learning which was the larger would not cause any change to one's beliefs about the
value of one's own tie. However, if one is 100% certain that neither tie can be worth more than, say $100, then
knowing which is worth more changes one's expected value of both (one goes up, the other goes down).
This paradox is a rephrasing of the simplest case of the two envelopes problem, and the explanation of "what goes
wrong" is essentially the same.
Necktie paradox
References
Brown, Aaron C. "Neckties, wallets, and money for nothing." Journal of Recreational Mathematics 27.2 (1995):
116122.
Maurice Kraitchik, Mathematical Recreations, George Allen & Unwin, London 1943
37
38
Economy
Allais paradox
The Allais paradox is a choice problem designed by Maurice Allais to show an inconsistency of actual observed
choices with the predictions of expected utility theory.
Statement of the Problem

The Allais paradox arises when comparing participants' choices in two different experiments, each of which
consists of a choice between two gambles, A and B. The payoffs for each gamble in each experiment are as follows:
Experiment 1
Gamble 1A
Experiment 2
Gamble 1B
Gamble 2A
Gamble 2B
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance

$1 million 100%
$1 million 89%
Nothing
Nothing
$1 million 11%
1%
$5 million 10%
89%
Nothing
90%
$5 million 10%
Several studies involving hypothetical and small monetary payoffs, and recently involving health outcomes, have
supported the assertion that when presented with a choice between 1A and 1B, most people would choose 1A.
Likewise, when presented with a choice between 2A and 2B, most people would choose 2B. Allais further asserted
that it was reasonable to choose 1A alone or 2B alone.
However, that the same person (who chose 1A alone or 2B alone) would choose both 1A and 2B together is
inconsistent with expected utility theory. According to expected utility theory, the person should choose either 1A
and 2A or 1B and 2B.
The inconsistency stems from the fact that in expected utility theory, equal outcomes added to each of the two
choices should have no effect on the relative desirability of one gamble over the other; equal outcomes should
"cancel out". Each experiment gives the same outcome 89% of the time (starting from the top row and moving down,
both 1A and 1B give an outcome of $1 million, and both 2A and 2B give an outcome of nothing). If this 89%
common consequence is disregarded, then the gambles will be left offering the same choice.
It may help to re-write the payoffs. After disregarding the 89% chance of winning the same outcome then 1B
is left offering a 1% chance of winning nothing and a 10% chance of winning $5 million, while 2B is also left
offering a 1% chance of winning nothing and a 10% chance of winning $5 million. Hence, choice 1B and 2B can be
seen as the same choice. In the same manner, 1A and 2A should also now be seen as the same choice.
Allais paradox
39
Experiment 1
Gamble 1A
Experiment 2
Gamble 1B
Gamble 2A
Gamble 2B
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance

$1 million 89%
$1 million 89%
Nothing
89%
Nothing
89%
$1 million 11%
Nothing
$1 million 11%
Nothing
1%
1%
$5 million 10%
$5 million 10%
Allais presented his paradox as a counterexample to the independence axiom.

Independence means that if an agent is indifferent between simple lotteries
between
probability
mixed with an arbitrary simple lottery
with probability
and
and
, the agent is also indifferent

mixed with
with the same
. Violating this principle is known as the "common consequence" problem (or "common consequence"
effect). The idea of the common consequence problem is that as the prize offered by
increases,
and
become consolation prizes, and the agent will modify preferences between the two lotteries so as to minimize risk
and disappointment in case they do not win the higher prize offered by
.
Difficulties such as this gave rise to a number of alternatives to, and generalizations of, the theory, notably including
prospect theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, weighted utility (Chew), and rank-dependent
expected utility by John Quiggin. The point of these models was to allow a wider range of behavior than was
consistent with expected utility theory.
Also relevant here is the framing theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Identical items will result in
different choices if presented to agents differently (i.e. a surgery with a 70% survival rate vs. a 30% chance of death).
The main point Allais wished to make is that the independence axiom of expected utility theory may not be a valid
axiom. The independence axiom states that two identical outcomes within a gamble should be treated as irrelevant to
the analysis of the gamble as a whole. However, this overlooks the notion of complementarities, the fact your choice
in one part of a gamble may depend on the possible outcome in the other part of the gamble. In the above choice, 1B,
there is a 1% chance of getting nothing. However, this 1% chance of getting nothing also carries with it a great sense
of disappointment if you were to pick that gamble and lose, knowing you could have won with 100% certainty if you
had chosen 1A. This feeling of disappointment, however, is contingent on the outcome in the other portion of the
gamble (i.e. the feeling of certainty). Hence, Allais argues that it is not possible to evaluate portions of gambles or
choices independently of the other choices presented, as the independence axiom requires, and thus is a poor judge
of our rational action (1B cannot be valued independently of 1A as the independence or sure thing principle requires
of us). We don't act irrationally when choosing 1A and 2B; rather expected utility theory is not robust enough to
capture such "bounded rationality" choices that in this case arise because of complementarities.
Mathematical proof of inconsistency

Using the values above and a utility function U(W), where W is wealth, we can demonstrate exactly how the paradox
manifests.
Because the typical individual prefers 1A to 1B and 2B to 2A, we can conclude that the expected utilities of the
preferred is greater than the expected utilities of the second choices, or,
Experiment 1
Allais paradox
Experiment 2
We can rewrite the latter equation (Experiment 2) as
which contradicts the first bet (Experiment 1), which shows the player prefers the sure thing over the gamble.
References
Machina, Mark (1987). "Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved". The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 1 (1): 121154. doi: 10.1257/jep.1.1.121 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.1.1.121).
Allais, M. (1953). "Le comportement de lhomme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de
lcole Amricaine". Econometrica 21 (4): 503546. JSTOR 1907921 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1907921).
Chew Soo Hong; Mao, Jennifer; Nishimura, Naoko (2005). Preference for longshot: An Experimental Study of
Demand for Sweepstakes (http://cebr.ust.hk/conference/2ndconference/nishimura.htm).
Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk".
Econometrica 47 (2): 263291. JSTOR 1914185 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914185).
Oliver, Adam (2003). "A quantitative and qualitative test of the Allais paradox using health outcomes". Journal of
Economic Psychology 24 (1): 3548. doi: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00153-8 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0167-4870(02)00153-8).
Quiggin, J. (1993). Generalized Expected Utility Theory:The Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model.
Amsterdam: Kluwer-Nijhoff. review (http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/johnquiggin/Books/Machina.html)
40

In social choice theory, Arrows impossibility theorem, the General Possibility Theorem, or Arrows paradox,
states that, when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no rank order voting system can convert
the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting
a specific set of criteria. These criteria are called unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives. The theorem is often cited in discussions of election theory as it is further
interpreted by the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem.
The theorem is named after economist Kenneth Arrow, who demonstrated the theorem in his Ph.D. thesis and
popularized it in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values. The original paper was titled "A Difficulty in
the Concept of Social Welfare".[1]
In short, the theorem states that no rank-order voting system can be designed that satisfies these three "fairness"
criteria:
If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
If every voter's preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group's preference between X and Y
will also remain unchanged (even if voters' preferences between other pairs like X and Z, Y and Z, or Z and W
change).
There is no "dictator": no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group's preference.
Voting systems that use cardinal utility (which conveys more information than rank orders; see the subsection
discussing the cardinal utility approach to overcoming the negative conclusion) are not covered by the theorem.[2]
The theorem can also be sidestepped by weakening the notion of independence. Arrow rejected cardinal utility as a
meaningful tool for expressing social welfare,[3] and so focused his theorem on preference rankings.
The axiomatic approach Arrow adopted can treat all conceivable rules (that are based on preferences) within one
unified framework. In that sense, the approach is qualitatively different from the earlier one in voting theory, in
which rules were investigated one by one. One can therefore say that the contemporary paradigm of social choice
theory started from this theorem.[4] Introduction, page 10.</ref>
Statement of the theorem

The need to aggregate preferences occurs in many disciplines: in welfare economics, where one attempts to find an
economic outcome which would be acceptable and stable; in decision theory, where a person has to make a rational
choice based on several criteria; and most naturally in voting systems, which are mechanisms for extracting a
decision from a multitude of voters' preferences.
The framework for Arrow's theorem assumes that we need to extract a preference order on a given set of options
(outcomes). Each individual in the society (or equivalently, each decision criterion) gives a particular order of
preferences on the set of outcomes. We are searching for a ranked voting system, called a social welfare function
(preference aggregation rule), which transforms the set of preferences (profile of preferences) into a single global
societal preference order. The theorem considers the following properties, assumed to be reasonable requirements of
a fair voting method:
Non-dictatorship
The social welfare function should account for the wishes of multiple voters. It cannot simply mimic the
preferences of a single voter.
Unrestricted domain
(or universality) For any set of individual voter preferences, the social welfare function should yield a unique
and complete ranking of societal choices. Thus:
41

It must do so in a manner that results in a complete ranking of preferences for society.
It must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters' preferences are presented the same way.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
The social preference between x and y should depend only on the individual preferences between x and y
(Pairwise Independence). More generally, changes in individuals' rankings of irrelevant alternatives (ones
outside a certain subset) should have no impact on the societal ranking of the subset. (See Remarks below.)
Positive association of social and individual values
(or monotonicity) If any individual modifies his or her preference order by promoting a certain option, then
the societal preference order should respond only by promoting that same option or not changing, never by
placing it lower than before. An individual should not be able to hurt an option by ranking it higher.
Non-imposition
(or citizen sovereignty) Every possible societal preference order should be achievable by some set of
individual preference orders. This means that the social welfare function is surjective: It has an unrestricted
target space.
Arrow's theorem says that if the decision-making body has at least two members and at least three options to decide
among, then it is impossible to design a social welfare function that satisfies all these conditions at once.
A later (1963) version of Arrow's theorem can be obtained by replacing the monotonicity and non-imposition criteria
with:
Pareto efficiency
(or unanimity) If every individual prefers a certain option to another, then so must the resulting societal
preference order. This, again, is a demand that the social welfare function will be minimally sensitive to the
preference profile.
The later version of this theorem is strongerhas weaker conditionssince monotonicity, non-imposition, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply Pareto efficiency, whereas Pareto efficiency and independence
of irrelevant alternatives together do not imply monotonicity. (Incidentally, Pareto efficiency on its own implies
non-imposition.)
Remarks on IIA
The IIA condition can be justified for three reasons (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, page 794): (i)
normative (irrelevant alternatives should not matter), (ii) practical (use of minimal information), and (iii) strategic
(providing the right incentives for the truthful revelation of individual preferences). Though the strategic property
is conceptually different from IIA, it is closely related.
Arrow's death-of-a-candidate example (1963, page 26) suggests that the agenda (the set of feasible alternatives)
shrinks from, say, X = {a, b, c} to S = {a, b} because of the death of candidate c. This example is misleading
since it can give the reader an impression that IIA is a condition involving two agenda and one profile. The fact is
that IIA involves just one agendum ({x, y} in case of Pairwise Independence) but two profiles. If the condition is
applied to this confusing example, it requires this: Suppose an aggregation rule satisfying IIA chooses b from the
agenda {a, b} when the profile is given by (cab, cba), that is, individual 1 prefers c to a to b, 2 prefers c to b to a.
Then, it must still choose b from {a, b} if the profile were, say, (abc, bac) or (acb, bca) or (acb, cba) or (abc, cba).
42
43
Formal statement of the theorem

Let
be a set of outcomes,
orderings of
by
a number of voters or decision criteria. We shall denote the set of all full linear
A (strict) social welfare function (preference aggregation rule) is a function

aggregates voters' preferences into a single preference order on
.[5] The
-tuple
which
of voters'
preferences is called a preference profile. In its strongest and simplest form, Arrow's impossibility theorem states
that whenever the set
of possible alternatives has more than 2 elements, then the following three conditions
become incompatible:
unanimity, or Pareto efficiency
If alternative a is ranked above b for all orderings
, then a is ranked higher than b by
. (Note that unanimity implies non-imposition).

non-dictatorship
There is no individual i whose preferences always prevail. That is, there is no
such that
.
independence of irrelevant alternatives
For two preference profiles
and b have the same order in
as in
and
such that for all individuals i, alternatives a
as in
, alternatives a and b have the same order in

.
Informal proof
Based on two proofs[6][7] appearing in Economic Theory. For simplicity we have presented all rankings as if ties are
impossible. A complete proof taking possible ties into account is not essentially different from the one below, except
that one ought to say "not above" instead of "below" or "not below" instead of "above" in some cases. Full details are
given in the original articles.
We will prove that any social choice system respecting unrestricted domain, unanimity, and independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is a dictatorship. The key idea is to identify a pivotal voter whose ballot swings the
societal outcome. We then prove that this voter is a partial dictator (in a specific technical sense, described below).
Finally we conclude by showing that all of the partial dictators are the same person, hence this voter is a dictator.
Part One: There is a "pivotal" voter for B over A

Say there are three choices for society, call
them A, B, and C. Suppose first that
everyone prefers option B the least. That is,
everyone prefers every other option to B. By
unanimity, society must prefer every option
to B. Specifically, society prefers A and C
to B. Call this situation Profile 0.
On the other hand, if everyone preferred B
to everything else, then society would have
to prefer B to everything else by unanimity.
Now arrange all the voters in some arbitrary
but fixed order, and for each i let Profile i be
the same as Profile 0, but move B to the top
of the ballots for voters 1 through i. So
Profile 1 has B at the top of the ballot for
voter 1, but not for any of the others. Profile
2 has B at the top for voters 1 and 2, but no
others, and so on.
Since B eventually moves to the top of the
societal preference, there must be some
profile, number k, for which B moves above
A in the societal rank. We call the voter
Part One: Successively move B from the bottom to the top of voters' ballots. The
whose ballot change causes this to happen
voter whose change results in B being ranked over A is the pivotal voter for B over
A.
the pivotal voter for B over A. Note that
the pivotal voter for B over A is not, a
priori, the same as the pivotal voter for A over B. In Part Three of the proof we will show that these do turn out to be
the same.
Also note that by IIA the same argument applies if Profile 0 is any profile in which A is ranked above B by every
voter, and the pivotal voter for B over A will still be voter k. We will use this observation below.
Part Two: The pivotal voter for B over A is a dictator for B over C
In this part of the argument we refer to voter k, the pivotal voter for B over A, as Pivotal Voter for simplicity. We
will show that Pivotal Voter dictates society's decision for B over C. That is, we show that no matter how the rest of
society votes, if Pivotal Voter ranks B over C, then that is the societal outcome. Note again that the dictator for B
over C is not a priori the same as that for C over B. In Part Three of the proof we will see that these turn out to be
the same too.
In the following, we call voters 1 through k-1 "Segment One", and voters k+1 through N "Segment Two". To begin,
suppose that the ballots are as follows:
44
45
Every voter in Segment One ranks B

above C and C above A.
Pivotal Voter ranks A above B and B
above C.
Every voter in Segment Two ranks A
above B and B above C.
Part Two: Switching A and B on the ballot of voter k causes the same switch to the
societal outcome, by Part One of the argument. Making any or all of the indicated
switches to the other ballots has no effect on the outcome.
Then by the argument in Part One (and the

last observation in that part), the societal
outcome must rank A above B. This is
because, except for a repositioning of C, this profile is the same as Profile k-1 from Part One. Furthermore, by
unanimity the societal outcome must rank B above C. Therefore we know the outcome in this case completely.
Now suppose that Pivotal Voter moves B above A, but keeps C in the same position and imagine that any number
(or all!) of the other voters change their ballots to move C above B, without changing the position of A. Then aside
from a repositioning of C this is the same as Profile k from Part One and hence the societal outcome ranks B above
A. Furthermore, by IIA the societal outcome must rank A above C, as in the previous case. In particular, the
societal outcome ranks B above C, even though Pivotal Voter may have been the only voter to rank B above C. By
IIA this conclusion holds independently of how A is positioned on the ballots, so Pivotal Voter is a dictator for B
over C.
Part Three: There can be at most one dictator

In this part of the argument we refer back to the original ordering of
voters, and compare the positions of the different pivotal voters
(identified by applying Parts One and Two to the other pairs of
candidates). First, the pivotal voter for B over C must appear earlier (or
Part Three: Since voter k is the dictator for B over
at the same position) in the line than the dictator for B over C: As we
C, the pivotal voter for B over C must appear
consider the argument of Part One applied to B and C, successively
among the first k voters. That is, outside of
moving B to the top of voters' ballots, the pivot point where society
Segment Two. Likewise, the pivotal voter for C
over B must appear among voters k through N.
ranks B above C must come at or before we reach the dictator for B
That is, outside of Segment One.
over C. Likewise, reversing the roles of B and C, the pivotal voter for
C over B must at or later in line than the dictator for B over C. In short,
if kX/Y denotes the position of the pivotal voter for X over Y (for any two candidates X and Y), then we have shown
kB/C kB/A kC/B.
Now repeating the entire argument above with B and C switched, we also have
kC/B kB/C.
Therefore we have
kB/C = kB/A = kC/B
and the same argument for other pairs shows that all the pivotal voters (and hence all the dictators) occur at the same
position in the list of voters. This voter is the dictator for the whole election.
Interpretations of the theorem

Although Arrow's theorem is a mathematical result, it is often expressed in a non-mathematical way with a statement
such as "No voting method is fair," "Every ranked voting method is flawed," or "The only voting method that isn't
flawed is a dictatorship". These statements are simplifications of Arrow's result which are not universally considered
to be true. What Arrow's theorem does state is that a deterministic preferential voting mechanism - that is, one where
a preference order is the only information in a vote, and any possible set of votes gives a unique result - cannot
comply with all of the conditions given above simultaneously.
Various theorists have suggested weakening the IIA criterion as a way out of the paradox. Proponents of ranked
voting methods contend that the IIA is an unreasonably strong criterion. It is the one breached in most useful voting
systems. Advocates of this position point out that failure of the standard IIA criterion is trivially implied by the
possibility of cyclic preferences. If voters cast ballots as follows:
1 vote for A > B > C
1 vote for B > C > A
1 vote for C > A > B
then the pairwise majority preference of the group is that A wins over B, B wins over C, and C wins over A: these
yield rock-paper-scissors preferences for any pairwise comparison. In this circumstance, any aggregation rule that
satisfies the very basic majoritarian requirement that a candidate who receives a majority of votes must win the
election, will fail the IIA criterion, if social preference is required to be transitive (or acyclic). To see this, suppose
that such a rule satisfies IIA. Since majority preferences are respected, the society prefers A to B (two votes for A>B
and one for B>A), B to C, and C to A. Thus a cycle is generated, which contradicts the assumption that social
preference is transitive.
So, what Arrow's theorem really shows is that any majority-wins voting system is a non-trivial game, and that game
theory should be used to predict the outcome of most voting mechanisms.[8]), Section 7.2.</ref> This could be seen
as a discouraging result, because a game need not have efficient equilibria, e.g., a ballot could result in an alternative
nobody really wanted in the first place, yet everybody voted for.
Remark: Scalar rankings from a vector of attributes and the IIA property. The IIA property might not be
satisfied in human decision-making of realistic complexity because the scalar preference ranking is effectively
derived from the weightingnot usually explicitof a vector of attributes (one book dealing with the Arrow
theorem invites the reader to consider the related problem of creating a scalar measure for the track and field
decathlon evente.g. how does one make scoring 600 points in the discus event "commensurable" with scoring 600
points in the 1500m race) and this scalar ranking can depend sensitively on the weighting of different attributes,
with the tacit weighting itself affected by the context and contrast created by apparently "irrelevant" choices. Edward
MacNeal discusses this sensitivity problem with respect to the ranking of "most livable city" in the chapter
"Surveys" of his book MathSemantics: making numbers talk sense (1994).
Other possibilities
In an attempt to escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow's theorem, social choice theorists have investigated
various possibilities ("ways out"). These investigations can be divided into the following two:
those investigating functions whose domain, like that of Arrow's social welfare functions, consists of profiles of
preferences;
those investigating other kinds of rules.
46
Approaches investigating functions of preference profiles

This section includes approaches that deal with
aggregation rules (functions that map each preference profile into a social preference), and
other functions, such as functions that map each preference profile into an alternative.
Since these two approaches often overlap, we discuss them at the same time. What is characteristic of these
approaches is that they investigate various possibilities by eliminating or weakening or replacing one or more
conditions (criteria) that Arrow imposed.
Infinitely many individuals
Several theorists (e.g., Kirman and Sondermann, 1972) point out that when one drops the assumption that there are
only finitely many individuals, one can find aggregation rules that satisfy all of Arrow's other conditions.
However, such aggregation rules are practically of limited interest, since they are based on ultrafilters, highly
nonconstructive mathematical objects. In particular, Kirman and Sondermann argue that there is an "invisible
dictator" behind such a rule. Mihara (1997, 1999) shows that such a rule violates algorithmic computability.[9] These
results can be seen to establish the robustness of Arrow's theorem.[10] Chapter 6) for a concise discussion of social
choice for infinite societies.</ref>
Limiting the number of alternatives
When there are only two alternatives to choose from, May's theorem shows that only simple majority rule satisfies a
certain set of criteria (e.g., equal treatment of individuals and of alternatives; increased support for a winning
alternative should not make it into a losing one). On the other hand, when there are at least three alternatives,
Arrow's theorem points out the difficulty of collective decision making. Why is there such a sharp difference
between the case of less than three alternatives and that of at least three alternatives?
Nakamura's theorem (about the core of simple games) gives an answer more generally. It establishes that if the
number of alternatives is less than a certain integer called the Nakamura number, then the rule in question will
identify "best" alternatives without any problem; if the number of alternatives is greater or equal to the Nakamura
number, then the rule will not always work, since for some profile a voting paradox (a cycle such as alternative A
socially preferred to alternative B, B to C, and C to A) will arise. Since the Nakamura number of majority rule is 3
(except the case of four individuals), one can conclude from Nakamura's theorem that majority rule can deal with up
to two alternatives rationally. Some super-majority rules (such as those requiring 2/3 of the votes) can have a
Nakamura number greater than 3, but such rules violate other conditions given by Arrow.[11]
Remark. A common way "around" Arrow's paradox is limiting the alternative set to two alternatives. Thus,
whenever more than two alternatives should be put to the test, it seems very tempting to use a mechanism that pairs
them and votes by pairs. As tempting as this mechanism seems at first glance, it is generally far from satisfying even
Pareto efficiency, not to mention IIA. The specific order by which the pairs are decided strongly influences the
outcome. This is not necessarily a bad feature of the mechanism. Many sports use the tournament
mechanismessentially a pairing mechanismto choose a winner. This gives considerable opportunity for weaker
teams to win, thus adding interest and tension throughout the tournament. This means that the person controlling the
order by which the choices are paired (the agenda maker) has great control over the outcome. In any case, when
viewing the entire voting process as one game, Arrow's theorem still applies.
47

Domain restrictions
Another approach is relaxing the universality condition, which means restricting the domain of aggregation rules.
The best-known result along this line assumes "single peaked" preferences.
Duncan Black has shown that if there is only one dimension on which every individual has a "single-peaked"
preference, then all of Arrow's conditions are met by majority rule. Suppose that there is some predetermined linear
ordering of the alternative set. An individual's preference is single-peaked with respect to this ordering if he has
some special place that he likes best along that line, and his dislike for an alternative grows larger as the alternative
goes further away from that spot (i.e., the graph of his utility function has a single peak if alternatives are placed
according to the linear ordering on the horizontal axis). For example, if voters were voting on where to set the
volume for music, it would be reasonable to assume that each voter had their own ideal volume preference and that
as the volume got progressively too loud or too quiet they would be increasingly dissatisfied. If the domain is
restricted to profiles in which every individual has a single peaked preference with respect to the linear ordering,
then simple () aggregation rules, which includes majority rule, have an acyclic (defined below) social preference,
hence "best" alternatives.[12] In particular, when there are odd number of individuals, then the social preference
becomes transitive, and the socially "best" alternative is equal to the median of all the peaks of the individuals
(Black's median voter theorem). Under single-peaked preferences, the majority rule is in some respects the most
natural voting mechanism.
One can define the notion of "single-peaked" preferences on higher-dimensional sets of alternatives. However, one
can identify the "median" of the peaks only in exceptional cases. Instead, we typically have the destructive situation
suggested by McKelvey's Chaos Theorem (1976): for any x and y, one can find a sequence of alternatives such that x
is beaten by
by a majority,
by
,
,
by y.
Relaxing transitivity
By relaxing the transitivity of social preferences, we can find aggregation rules that satisfy Arrow's other conditions.
If we impose neutrality (equal treatment of alternatives) on such rules, however, there exists an individual who has a
"veto". So the possibility provided by this approach is also very limited.
First, suppose that a social preference is quasi-transitive (instead of transitive); this means that the strict preference
("better than") is transitive: if
and
, then
. Then, there do exist non-dictatorial
aggregation rules satisfying Arrow's conditions, but such rules are oligarchic (Gibbard, 1969). This means that there
exists a coalition L such that L is decisive (if every member in L prefers x to y, then the society prefers x to y), and
each member in L has a veto (if she prefers x to y, then the society cannot prefer y to x).
Second, suppose that a social preference is acyclic (instead of transitive): there does not exist alternatives
that form a cycle (
,
,
,
,
). Then, provided that there
are at least as many alternatives as individuals, an aggregation rule satisfying Arrow's other conditions is collegial
(Brown, 1975). This means that there are individuals who belong to the intersection ("collegium") of all decisive
coalitions. If there is someone who has a veto, then he belongs to the collegium. If the rule is assumed to be neutral,
then it does have someone who has a veto.
Finally, Brown's theorem left open the case of acyclic social preferences where the number of alternatives is less
than the number of individuals. One can give a definite answer for that case using the Nakamura number. See
#Limiting the number of alternatives.
48

Relaxing IIA
There are numerous examples of aggregation rules satisfying Arrow's conditions except IIA. The Borda rule is one
of them. These rules, however, are susceptible to strategic manipulation by individuals (Blair and Muller, 1983).
See also Interpretations of the theorem above.
Relaxing the Pareto criterion
Wilson (1972) shows that if an aggregation rule is non-imposed and non-null, then there is either a dictator or an
inverse dictator, provided that Arrow's conditions other than Pareto are also satisfied. Here, an inverse dictator is an
individual i such that whenever i prefers x to y, then the society prefers y to x.
Remark. Amartya Sen offered both relaxation of transitivity and removal of the Pareto principle. He demonstrated
another interesting impossibility result, known as the "impossibility of the Paretian Liberal". (See liberal paradox for
details). Sen went on to argue that this demonstrates the futility of demanding Pareto optimality in relation to voting
mechanisms.
Social choice instead of social preference
In social decision making, to rank all alternatives is not usually a goal. It often suffices to find some alternative. The
approach focusing on choosing an alternative investigates either social choice functions (functions that map each
preference profile into an alternative) or social choice rules (functions that map each preference profile into a subset
of alternatives).
As for social choice functions, the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem is well-known, which states that if a social choice
function whose range contains at least three alternatives is strategy-proof, then it is dictatorial.
As for social choice rules, we should assume there is a social preference behind them. That is, we should regard a
rule as choosing the maximal elements ("best" alternatives) of some social preference. The set of maximal elements
of a social preference is called the core. Conditions for existence of an alternative in the core have been investigated
in two approaches. The first approach assumes that preferences are at least acyclic (which is necessary and sufficient
for the preferences to have a maximal element on any finite subset). For this reason, it is closely related to #Relaxing
transitivity. The second approach drops the assumption of acyclic preferences. Kumabe and Mihara (2011) adopt this
approach. They make a more direct assumption that individual preferences have maximal elements, and examine
conditions for the social preference to have a maximal element. See Nakamura number for details of these two
approaches.
Rated voting systems and other approaches

Arrow's framework assumes that individual and social preferences are "orderings" (i.e., satisfy completeness and
transitivity) on the set of alternatives. This means that if the preferences are represented by a utility function, its
value is an ordinal utility in the sense that it is meaningful so far as the greater value indicates the better alternative.
For instance, having ordinal utilities of 4, 3, 2, 1 for alternatives a, b, c, d, respectively, is the same as having 1000,
100.01, 100, 0, which in turn is the same as having 99, 98, 1, .997. They all represent the ordering in which a is
preferred to b to c to d. The assumption of ordinal preferences, which precludes interpersonal comparisons of utility,
is an integral part of Arrow's theorem.
For various reasons, an approach based on cardinal utility, where the utility has a meaning beyond just giving a
ranking of alternatives, is not common in contemporary economics. However, once one adopts that approach, one
can take intensities of preferences into consideration, or one can compare (i) gains and losses of utility or (ii) levels
of utility, across different individuals. In particular, Harsanyi (1955) gives a justification of utilitarianism (which
evaluates alternatives in terms of the sum of individual utilities), originating from Jeremy Bentham. Hammond
(1976) gives a justification of the maximin principle (which evaluates alternatives in terms of the utility of the
worst-off individual), originating from John Rawls.
49
50
Not all voting methods use, as input, only an ordering of all candidates.[13] Methods which don't, often called "rated"
or "cardinal" (as opposed to "ranked", "ordinal", or "preferential") voting systems, can be viewed as using
information that only cardinal utility can convey. In that case, it is not surprising if some of them satisfy all of
Arrow's conditions that are reformulated.[14] Range voting is such a method.[15] Whether such a claim is correct
depends on how each condition is reformulated. [16] page 129). The notion requires that the social ranking of two
alternatives depend only on the levels of utility attained by individuals at the two alternatives. (More formally, a
social welfare functional is a function that maps each list
of utility functions into a social
preference.
satisfies IIA (for social welfare functionals) if for all lists

and
for all
, then
and for all alternatives
, if
.) Many cardinal voting methods
(including Range voting) satisfy the weakened version of IIA. </ref> Other rated voting systems which pass certain
generalizations of Arrow's criteria include Approval voting and Majority Judgment. Note that although Arrow's
theorem does not apply to such methods, the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem still does: no system is fully
strategy-free, so the informal dictum that "no voting system is perfect" still has a mathematical basis.
Finally, though not an approach investigating some kind of rules, there is a criticism by James M. Buchanan and
others. It argues that it is silly to think that there might be social preferences that are analogous to individual
preferences. Arrow (1963, Chapter 8) answers this sort of criticism seen in the early period, which come at least
partly from misunderstanding.
Notes
[1] Arrow, K.J., " A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare (http:/ / gatton. uky. edu/ Faculty/ hoytw/ 751/ articles/ arrow. pdf)", Journal of
Political Economy 58(4) (August, 1950), pp. 328346.
[2] Interview with Dr. Kenneth Arrow (http:/ / electology. org/ interview-with-dr-kenneth-arrow/ ): "CES: Now, you mention that your theorem
applies to preferential systems or ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: Yes CES: But the system that youre just referring to, Approval Voting, falls
within a class called cardinal systems. So not within ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: And as I said, that in effect implies more information.
[3] "Modern economic theory has insisted on the ordinal concept of utility; that is, only orderings can be observed, and therefore no measurement
of utility independent of these orderings has any significance. In the field of consumer's demand theory the ordinalist position turned out to
create no problems; cardinal utility had no explanatory power above and beyond ordinal. Leibniz' Principle of the Identity of the
Indiscernables demanded then the excision of cardinal utility from our thought patterns." Arrow (1967), as quoted on p.33 (http:/ / books.
google. com/ books?id=7ECXDjlCpB0C& pg=PA33) by .
[4] Suzumura, 2002,<ref name = handbook02>
[5] Note that by definition, a social welfare function as defined here satisfies the Unrestricted domain condition. Restricting the range to the
social preferences that are never indifferent between distinct outcomes is probably a very restrictive assumption, but the goal here is to give a
simple statement of the theorem. Even if the restriction is relaxed, the impossibility result will persist.
[6] Three Brief Proofs of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (http:/ / ideas. repec. org/ p/ cwl/ cwldpp/ 1123r3. html)
[7] Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A One-shot Proof of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (https:/ / sites. google. com/ site/ neilningyu/ publications/ doc/
preprint 3 - economic theory. pdf?attredirects=0)
[8] This does not mean various normative criteria will be satisfied if we use equilibrium concepts in game theory. Indeed, the mapping from
profiles to equilibrium outcomes defines a social choice rule, whose performance can be investigated by social choice theory. See
Austen-Smith and Banks (1999<ref name=austensmith-b99>
[9] Mihara's definition of a computable aggregation rule is based on computability of a simple game (see Rice's theorem).
[10] See Taylor (2005,<ref>
[11] Austen-Smith and Banks (1999,Arrow, K.J., " A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare (http:/ / gatton. uky. edu/ Faculty/ hoytw/ 751/
articles/ arrow. pdf)", Journal of Political Economy 58(4) (August, 1950), pp. 328346. Chapter 3) gives a detailed discussion of the approach
trying to limit the number of alternatives.
[12] Indeed, many different social welfare functions can meet Arrow's conditions under such restrictions of the domain. It has been proved,
however, that under any such restriction, if there exists any social welfare function that adheres to Arrow's criteria, then the majority rule will
adhere to Arrow's criteria. See Campbell, D. E.; Kelly, J. S. (2000). "A simple characterization of majority rule". Economic Theory 15 (3):
689700. doi: 10.1007/s001990050318 (http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s001990050318).
[13] It is sometimes asserted that such methods may trivially fail the universality criterion. However, it is more appropriate to consider that such
methods fail Arrow's definition of an aggregation rule (or that of a function whose domain consists of preference profiles), if preference
orderings cannot uniquely translate into a ballot.
[14] However, a modified version of Arrow's theorem may still apply to such methods (e.g., Brams and Fishburn, 2002, Interview with Dr.
Kenneth Arrow (http:/ / electology. org/ interview-with-dr-kenneth-arrow/ ): "CES: Now, you mention that your theorem applies to
preferential systems or ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: Yes CES: But the system that youre just referring to, Approval Voting, falls within a

class called cardinal systems. So not within ranking systems. Dr. Arrow: And as I said, that in effect implies more information. Chapter 4,
Theorem 4.2).
[15] New Scientist 12 April 2008 pages 30-33
[16] No voting method that nontrivially uses cardinal utility satisfies Arrow's IIA (in which preference profiles are replaced by lists of ballots or
lists of utilities). For this reason, a weakened notion of IIA is proposed (e.g., Sen, 1979,<ref name= sen79>
References
Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S. (2002) Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework, in Handbook of social
choice and welfare (ed. by Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen and Kotaro Suzumura), volume 1, pages 3594,
Elsevier. Surveys many of approaches discussed in #Approaches investigating functions of preference profiles.
The Mathematics of Behavior by Earl Hunt, Cambridge University Press, 2007. The chapter "Defining
Rationality: Personal and Group Decision Making" has a detailed discussion of the Arrow Theorem, with proof.
URL to CUP information on this book (http://www.cambridge.org/9780521850124)
Why flip a coin? : the art and science of good decisions by Harold W. Lewis, John Wiley, 1997. Gives explicit
examples of preference rankings and apparently anomalous results under different voting systems. States but does
not prove Arrow's theorem. ISBN 0-471-29645-7
Sen, A. K. (1979) Personal utilities and public judgements: or what's wrong with welfare economics? The
Economic Journal, 89, 537-558, arguing that Arrow's theorem was wrong because it did not incorporate
non-utility information and the utility information it did allow was impoverished http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2231867
Yu, Ning Neil (2012) A one-shot proof of Arrow's theorem. Economic Theory, volume 50, issue 2, pages
523-525, Springer. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00199-012-0693-3
External links
Three Brief Proofs of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (http://ideas.repec.org/p/cwl/cwldpp/1123r3.html)

A Pedagogical Proof of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsdecon/1999-25/)
Another Graphical Proof of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1183438)
A One-Shot Proof of Arrows Impossibility Theorem (http://www.springerlink.com/content/
v00202437u066604/)
Computer-aided Proofs of Arrow's and Other Impossibility Theorems (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0004370209000320/)
51
Bertrand paradox
Bertrand paradox
For other paradoxes by Joseph Bertrand, see Bertrand's paradox (disambiguation).
In economics and commerce, the Bertrand paradox named after its creator, Joseph Bertrand describes a
situation in which two players (firms) reach a state of Nash equilibrium where both firms charge a price equal to
marginal cost ("MC"). The paradox is that in models such as Cournot competition, an increase in the number of
firms is associated with a convergence of prices to marginal costs. In these alternative models of oligopoly a small
number of firms earn positive profits by charging prices above cost. Suppose two firms, A and B, sell a
homogeneous commodity, each with the same cost of production and distribution, so that customers choose the
product solely on the basis of price. It follows that demand is infinitely price-elastic. Neither A nor B will set a
higher price than the other because doing so would yield the entire market to their rival. If they set the same price,
the companies will share both the market and profits.
On the other hand, if either firm were to lower its price, even a little, it would gain the whole market and
substantially larger profits. Since both A and B know this, they will each try to undercut their competitor until the
product is selling at zero economic profit. This is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Recent work has shown that
there may be an additional mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with positive economic profits.
The Bertrand paradox rarely appears in practice because real products are almost always differentiated in some way
other than price (brand name, if nothing else); firms have limitations on their capacity to manufacture and distribute;
and two firms rarely have identical costs.
Bertrand's result is paradoxical because if the number of firms goes from one to two, the price decreases from the
monopoly price to the competitive price and stays at the same level as the number of firms increases further. This is
not very realistic, as in reality, markets featuring a small number of firms with market power typically charge a price
in excess of marginal cost. The empirical analysis shows that in most industries with two competitors, positive
profits are made. Solutions to the Paradox attempt to derive solutions that are more in line with solutions from the
Cournot model of competition, where two firms in a market earn positive profits that lie somewhere between the
perfectly competitive and monopoly levels.
Some reasons the Bertrand paradox do not strictly apply:
Capacity constraints. Sometimes firms do not have enough capacity to satisfy all demand. This was a point first
raised by Francis Edgeworth[1] and gave rise to the Bertrand-Edgeworth model.
Integer pricing. Prices higher than MC are ruled out because one firm can undercut another by an arbitrarily small
amount. If prices are discrete (for example have to take integer values) then one firm has to undercut the other by
at least one cent. This implies that the price one cent above MC is now an equilibrium: if the other firm sets the
price one cent above MC, the other firm can undercut it and capture the whole market, but this will earn it no
profit. It will prefer to share the market 50/50 with the other firm and earn strictly positive profits.
Product differentiation. If products of different firms are differentiated, then consumers may not switch
completely to the product with lower price.
Dynamic competition. Repeated interaction or repeated price competition can lead to the price above MC in
equilibrium.
More money for higher price. It follows from repeated interaction: If one company sets their price slightly higher,
then they will still get about the same amount of buys but more profit for each buy, so the other company will
raise their price, and so on (only in repeated games, otherwise the price dynamics are in the other direction).
Oligopoly. If the two companies can agree on a price, it is in their long-term interest to keep the agreement: the
revenue from cutting prices is less than twice the revenue from keeping the agreement, and lasts only until the
other firm cuts its own prices.
52
Bertrand paradox
References
[1] Edgeworth, Francis (1889) "The pure theory of monopoly"". Reprinted in
The demographic-economic paradox
is the inverse correlation found
between wealth and fertility within and
between nations. The higher the degree
of education and GDP per capita of a
human population, subpopulation or
social stratum, the fewer children are
born in any industrialized country. In a
1974 UN population conference in
Bucharest, Karan Singh, a former
minister of population in India,
illustrated this trend by stating
"Development
is
the
best
contraceptive."
The term "paradox" comes from the
notion that greater means would
necessitate the production of more
Graph of Total Fertility Rate vs. GDP per capita of the corresponding country, 2009. Only
countries with over 5 Million population were plotted, to reduce outliers. Sources: CIA
offspring as suggested by the
World Fact Book. For details, see List of countries and territories by fertility rate
influential Thomas Malthus. Roughly
speaking, nations or subpopulations
with higher GDP per capita are observed to have fewer children, even though a richer population can support more
children. Malthus held that in order to prevent widespread suffering, from famine for example, what he called "moral
restraint" (which included abstinence) was required. The demographic-economic paradox suggests that reproductive
restraint arises naturally as a consequence of economic progress.
It is hypothesized that the observed trend has come about as a response to increased life expectancy, reduced
childhood mortality, improved female literacy and independence, and urbanization that all result from increased
GDP per capita, consistent with the demographic transition model.
According to the UN, "[a]mong the 201 countries or areas with at least 90,000 inhabitants in 2013, 50 countries in
1990-1995 and 71 countries in 2005-2010 had below-replacement fertility. In 2005-2010, 27 countries had very low
fertility, below 1.5 children per woman, and all of these countries are located in Eastern Asia or Europe." [1]
53
Demographic transition
Before the 19th century demographic
transition of the western world, a minority
of children would survive to the age of 20,
and life expectancies were short even for
those who reached adulthood. For example,
in the 17th century in York, England 15% of
children were still alive at age 15 and only
10% of children survived to age 20.
Birth rates were correspondingly high,
resulting in slow population growth. The
second
agricultural
revolution
and
improvements in hygiene then brought
about dramatic reductions in mortality rates
in wealthy industrialized countries, initially
without affecting birth rates. In the 20th
century, birth rates of industrialized
countries began to fall, as societies became
United Nation's population summary and projections by location.
Note
the vertical axis is logarithmic and represents millions of people.
accustomed to the higher probability that
their children would survive them. Cultural
value changes were also contributors, as urbanization and female employment rose.
Since wealth is what drives this demographic transition, it follows that nations that lag behind in wealth also lag
behind in this demographic transition. The developing world's equivalent Green Revolution did not begin until the
mid-twentieth century. This creates the existing spread in fertility rates as a function of GDP per capita.
Religion
See also: Religious views on birth control
Another contributor to the demographic-economic paradox may be religion. Religious societies tend to have higher
birth rates than secular ones, and richer, more educated nations tend to advance secularization. This may help explain
the Israeli and Saudi Arabian exceptions, the two notable outliers in the graph of fertility versus GDP per capita at
the top of this article. The role of different religions in determining family size is complex. For example, the Catholic
countries of southern Europe traditionally had a much higher fertility rate than was the case in Protestant northern
Europe. However, economic growth in Spain, Italy, Poland etc., has been accompanied by a particularly sharp fall in
the fertility rate, to a level below that of the Protestant north. This suggests that the demographic-economic paradox
applies more strongly in Catholic countries, although Catholic fertility started to fall when the liberalizing reforms of
Vatican II were implemented. It remains to be seen if the fertility rate among (mostly Catholic) Hispanics in the U.S.
will follow a similar pattern.
United States
In his book America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It, Mark Steyn asserts that the United States has
higher fertility rates because of its greater economic freedom compared to other industrialized countries. However,
the countries with the highest assessed economic freedom, Hong Kong and Singapore, have significantly lower
birthrates than the United States. According to the Index of Economic Freedom, Hong Kong is the most
economically free country in the world. Hong Kong also has one of the world's lowest birth rates.
54
Fertility and population density

Studies have also suggested a correlation between population density and fertility rate. Hong Kong and Singapore
have the third and fourth-highest population densities in the world. This may account for their very low birth rates
despite high economic freedom. By contrast, the United States ranks 180 out of 241 countries and dependencies by
population density.
Consequences
Main articles: Sub-replacement fertility, Dependency ratio and Pensions crisis
A reduction in fertility can lead to an aging population which leads to a variety of problems, see for example the
Demographics of Japan.
A related concern is that high birth rates tend to place a greater burden of child rearing and education on populations
already struggling with poverty. Consequently, inequality lowers average education and hampers economic
growth.[2] Also, in countries with a high burden of this kind, a reduction in fertility can hamper economic growth as
well as the other way around.[3]
References
[1] http:/ / www. un. org/ en/ development/ desa/ population/ publications/ pdf/ fertility/ world-fertility-patterns-2013. pdf
[2] de la Croix, David and Matthias Doepcke: Inequality and growth: why differential fertility matters. American Economic Review 4 (2003)
10911113. (http:/ / www. econ. ucla. edu/ workingpapers/ wp803. pdf)
[3] UNFPA: Population and poverty. Achieving equity, equality and sustainability. Population and development series no. 8, 2003. (http:/ / www.
unfpa. org/ upload/ lib_pub_file/ 191_filename_PDS08. pdf)
External links
Macleod, Mairi (29 October 2013), Population paradox: Why richer people have fewer kids (http://www.
newscientist.com/article/mg22029401.000-population-paradox-why-richer-people-have-fewer-kids.html)
(2940), New Scientist
55
Dollar auction
Dollar auction
The dollar auction is a non-zero sum sequential game designed by economist Martin Shubik to illustrate a paradox
brought about by traditional rational choice theory in which players with perfect information in the game are
compelled to make an ultimately irrational decision based completely on a sequence of rational choices made
throughout the game.[1]
Setup
The setup involves an auctioneer who volunteers to auction-off a dollar bill with the following rule: the bill goes to
the winner; however, the two highest bidders must pay the highest amount they bid. The winner can get a dollar for
mere five cents, but only if no one else enters into the bidding war. The second-highest bidder is the biggest loser by
paying the top amount he/she bid without getting anything back. The game begins with one of the players bidding 5
cents (the minimum), hoping to make a 95 cent profit. He can be outbid by another player bidding 10 cents, as a 90
cent profit is still desirable. Similarly, another bidder may bid 15 cents, making an 85 cent profit. Meanwhile, the
second bidder may attempt to convert his loss of 10 cents into a gain of 80 cents by bidding 20 cents, and so on.
Every player has a choice of either paying for nothing or bidding five cents more on the dollar. Any bid beyond the
value of a dollar, is a loss for all bidders alike. Only the auctioneer gets to profit in the end.
This game can be "beaten" in a sense if all players are superrational. In this case, any of the n players shall bid for 5
cent if they succeed in some independent probability event with a 1/n chance. If it ends up that no bids are made this
way, the person holding the auction would either abort or restart the game. If the game continues, one player (the
quickest to bid, possibly) will be the highest bidder with 5 cent. Once that player has locked in his 5 cent bid, the
other players could bet 10 cents, but they would not because they recognize the inevitable standoff as a result of their
superrationality. Hence, the auctioneer loses 95 cents, and the lucky player wins that much, with no second bidder to
take from.
This game can also be "beaten" in a second way, provided that all the bidders are bidding in a rational, but not
necessarily superrational fashion. If the first bidder bids 95 cents, for a 5 cent profit, none of the other bidders will
follow it up with a bid, because there is nothing to gain. However, this will only work if it is the first bid, as if it is
not, the second highest bidder will be pushed towards bidding.
Notes
[1] Shubik: 1971. Page 109
References
Shubik, Martin (1971). "The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation"
(http://www.math.toronto.edu/mpugh/Teaching/Sci199_03/dollar_auction_1.pdf) (PDF file, direct
download 274 KB). Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (1): 109111. doi: 10.1177/002200277101500111 (http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200277101500111).
Poundstone, William (1993). "The Dollar Auction". Prisoner's Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory, and
the Puzzle of the Bomb. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-286162-X.
56
The DownsThomson paradox (named after Anthony Downs and J. M. Thomson), also referred to as the
PigouKnightDowns paradox (after Arthur Cecil Pigou and Frank Knight), states that the equilibrium speed of
car traffic on the road network is determined by the average door-to-door speed of equivalent journeys by (rail-based
or otherwise segregated) public transport.
It follows that increasing road capacity can make traffic congestion worse, when the shift from public transport
causes a disinvestment in that mode such that the operator reduces frequency of service or raises fares to cover costs.
This shifts additional passengers into cars. Ultimately the system may be eliminated and traffic congestion is worse
than before.
The general conclusion, if the paradox applies, is that expanding a road system as a remedy to congestion is not only
ineffective but often counterproductive. This is known as LewisMogridge Position and was extensively
documented by Martin Mogridge in the case-study of London on his book Travel in towns: jam yesterday, jam today
and jam tomorrow?
A 1968 article by Dietrich Braess pointed out the existence of this counter-intuitive occurrence on networks: the
Braess' paradox states that adding extra capacity to a network, when the moving entities selfishly choose their route,
can in some cases reduce overall performance.
There is a recent interest in the study of this phenomenon since the same may happen in computer networks as well
as traffic networks. Increasing the size of the network is characterized by behaviors of users similar to that of
travelers on transportation networks, who act independently and in a decentralized manner in choosing optimal
routes between origin and destination.
This is an extension of the induced demand theory and consistent with Downs (1992) theory of "triple convergence",
formulated to explain the difficulty of removing peak-hour congestion from highways. In response to a capacity
addition three immediate effects occur: drivers using alternative routes begin to use the expanded highway; those
previously traveling at off-peak times (either immediately before or after the peak) shift to the peak (rescheduling
behavior as defined previously); and public transport users shift to driving.
Restrictions on validity
According to Downs the link between average speeds on public transport and private transport "only applies to
regions in which the vast majority of peak-hour commuting is done on rapid transit systems with separate rights of
way. Central London is an example, since in 2001 around 85 percent of all morning peak-period commuters into that
area used public transit (including 77 percent on separate rights of way) and only 11 percent used private cars. When
peak-hour travel equilibrium has been reached between the subway system and the major commuting roads, then the
travel time required for any given trip is roughly equal on both modes."Wikipedia:Citation needed
57
References
On a Paradox of Traffic Planning, translated from the 1968 D. Braess paper from German to English by D.
Braess, A. Nagurney, and T. Wakolbinger (2005), Transportation Science 39/4, 446450.
Downs, Anthony, Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion, The Brookings Institution:
Washington, DC. 1992. ISBN 0-8157-1923-X
Mogridge, Martin J.H. Travel in towns: jam yesterday, jam today and jam tomorrow? Macmillan Press: London,
1990. ISBN 0-333-53204-X
Thomson, J. M. (1972), Methods of traffic limitation in urban areas. Working Paper 3, Paris, OECD.
Easterlin paradox
The Easterlin Paradox is a key concept in happiness economics. It is named for the economist and USC professor
Richard Easterlin, who discussed the factors contributing to happiness in a 1974 book chapter.[1] According to the
University of Kent, the paradox explains that, "high incomes do correlate with happiness, but long term, increased
income doesn't correlate with increased happiness".
Easterlin found that within a given country people with higher incomes were more likely to report being happy.
However, in international comparisons, the average reported level of happiness did not vary much with national
income per person, at least for countries with income sufficient to meet basic needs. Similarly, although income per
person rose steadily in the United States between 1946 and 1970, average reported happiness showed no long-term
trend and declined between 1960 and 1970. The difference in international and micro-level results fostered an
ongoing body of research.[2]
Recent research has utilised several measures of happiness, including biological measures, Wikipedia:Citation
needed showing similar patterns of results .Wikipedia:Citation needed This goes some way to answering the
problems of self-rated happiness Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Dates and numbers. The claim was later taken up by
Andrew Oswald of the University of Warwick in 1997,[3] driving media interest in the topic.
If true (see below), one possible implication for government policy is said to be that, once basic needs are met,
policy should focus not on economic growth or GDP, but rather on increasing life satisfaction or Gross national
happiness (GNH).
Controversy
In 2003 Ruut Veenhoven and Michael Hagerty published a new analysis based on including various sources of data,
and their conclusion was that there is no paradox and countries did indeed get happier with increasing income. In his
reply Easterlin maintained his position, suggesting that his critics were using inadequate data.
In 2008, economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, both of the University of Pennsylvania, published a paper
where they reassessed the Easterlin paradox using new time-series data. They conclude like Veenhoven et al. that,
contrary to Easterlin's claim, increases in absolute income are clearly linked to increased self-reported happiness, for
both individual people and whole countries. The statistical relationship demonstrated is between happiness and the
logarithm of absolute income, suggesting that happiness increases more slowly than income, but no "saturation
point" is ever reached. The study provides evidence absolute income, in addition to relative income, determine
happiness. That is in contrast to an extreme understanding of the hedonic treadmill theory where "keeping up with
the Joneses" is the only determinant of behavior.
In 2010 Easterlin published data reaffirming the paradox with data from a sample of 37 countries.[4] In a report
prepared for the United Nations in 2012 [5] Richard Layard, Andrew Clark and Claudia Senik point out that other
variables covary with wealth, including social trust, and that these, and not income, may drive much of the
58
Easterlin paradox
association of GDP per capita with well-being.
References
[1] Easterlin (1974). Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence. In Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds.,
Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, New York: Academic Press, Inc. pdf (http:/ / graphics8.
nytimes. com/ images/ 2008/ 04/ 16/ business/ Easterlin1974. pdf)
[2] Diane J. Macunovich and Richard A. Easterlin, 2008 [1987], "Easterlin hypothesis," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd
Edition. Abstract. (http:/ / www. dictionaryofeconomics. com/ article?id=pde2008_E000002& edition=current& q=)
Andrew E. Clark, Paul Frijters, and Michael A. Shields (2008). "Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin
Paradox and Other Puzzles," Journal of Economic Literature, 46(1), pp. 95-144. (http:/ / ibe. eller. arizona. edu/ docs/ 2010/ martinsson/
happiness_jel_2008. pdf)
[3] Oswald, A. (2006). "The Hippies Were Right all Along about Happiness". Financial Times - January 19, 2006. . pdf (http:/ / www2. warwick.
ac. uk/ fac/ soc/ economics/ staff/ faculty/ oswald/ fthappinessjan96. pdf)
[4] Alok Jha: 13 December 2010
[5] http:/ / earth. columbia. edu/ articles/ view/ 2960
External links
It's experts that make us miserable (http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2000672,00.html) Nick Cohen - The Guardian - January 28, 2007.
Andrew Oswald's Website (http://www.andrewoswald.com/).
Happiness Is Increasing in Many Countries -- But Why? (http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.
php?AnalysisID=1020) - Bruce Stokes - July 24, 2007.
Ellsberg paradox
The Ellsberg paradox is a paradox in decision theory in which people's choices violate the postulates of subjective
expected utility. It is generally taken to be evidence for ambiguity aversion. The paradox was popularized by Daniel
Ellsberg, although a version of it was noted considerably earlier by John Maynard Keynes.
The basic idea is that people overwhelmingly prefer taking on risk in situations where they know specific odds rather
than an alternate risk scenario in which the odds are completely ambiguousthey will always choose a known
probability of winning over an unknown probability of winning even if the known probability is low and the
unknown probability could be a guarantee of winning. That is, given a choice of risks to take (such as bets), people
"prefer the devil they know" rather than assuming a risk where odds are difficult or impossible to calculate.[1]
Ellsberg actually proposed two separate thought experiments, the proposed choices which contradict subjective
expected utility. The 2-color problem involves bets on two urns, both of which contain balls of two different colors.
The 3-color problem, described below, involves bets on a single urn, which contains balls of three different colors.
59
Ellsberg paradox
60
The 1 urn paradox

Suppose you have an urn containing 30 red balls and 60 other balls that are either black or yellow. You don't know
how many black or how many yellow balls there are, but that the total number of black balls plus the total number of
yellow equals 60. The balls are well mixed so that each individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. You are
now given a choice between two gambles:
Gamble A
Gamble B
You receive $100 if you draw a red ball You receive $100 if you draw a black ball
Also you are given the choice between these two gambles (about a different draw from the same urn):
Gamble C
Gamble D
You receive $100 if you draw a red or yellow ball You receive $100 if you draw a black or yellow ball
This situation poses both Knightian uncertainty how many of the non-red balls are yellow and how many are
black, which is not quantified and probability whether the ball is red or non-red, which is vs. .
Utility theory interpretation

Utility theory models the choice by assuming that in choosing between these gambles, people assume a probability
that the non-red balls are yellow versus black, and then compute the expected utility of the two gambles.
Since the prizes are exactly the same, it follows that you will prefer Gamble A to Gamble B if and only if you
believe that drawing a red ball is more likely than drawing a black ball (according to expected utility theory). Also,
there would be no clear preference between the choices if you thought that a red ball was as likely as a black ball.
Similarly it follows that you will prefer Gamble C to Gamble D if, and only if, you believe that drawing a red or
yellow ball is more likely than drawing a black or yellow ball. It might seem intuitive that, if drawing a red ball is
more likely than drawing a black ball, then drawing a red or yellow ball is also more likely than drawing a black or
yellow ball. So, supposing you prefer Gamble A to Gamble B, it follows that you will also prefer Gamble C to
Gamble D. And, supposing instead that you prefer Gamble B to Gamble A, it follows that you will also prefer
Gamble D to Gamble C.
When surveyed, however, most people strictly prefer Gamble A to Gamble B and Gamble D to Gamble C.
Therefore, some assumptions of the expected utility theory are violated.
Mathematical demonstration
Mathematically, your estimated probabilities of each color ball can be represented as: R, Y, and B. If you strictly
prefer Gamble A to Gamble B, by utility theory, it is presumed this preference is reflected by the expected utilities of
the two gambles: specifically, it must be the case that
where
is your utility function. If
(you strictly prefer $100 to nothing), this simplifies to:
If you also strictly prefer Gamble D to Gamble C, the following inequality is similarly obtained:
This simplifies to:
Ellsberg paradox
This contradiction indicates that your preferences are inconsistent with expected-utility theory.
Generality of the paradox

Note that the result holds regardless of your utility function. Indeed, the amount of the payoff is likewise irrelevant.
Whichever gamble you choose, the prize for winning it is the same, and the cost of losing it is the same (no cost), so
ultimately, there are only two outcomes: you receive a specific amount of money, or you receive nothing. Therefore
it is sufficient to assume that you prefer receiving some money to receiving nothing (and in fact, this assumption is
not necessary in the mathematical treatment above, it was assumed U($100) > U($0), but a contradiction can still
be obtained for U($100) < U($0) and for U($100) = U($0)).
In addition, the result holds regardless of your risk aversion. All the gambles involve risk. By choosing Gamble D,
you have a 1 in 3 chance of receiving nothing, and by choosing Gamble A, you have a 2 in 3 chance of receiving
nothing. If Gamble A was less risky than Gamble B, it would follow that Gamble C was less risky than Gamble D
(and vice versa), so, risk is not averted in this way.
However, because the exact chances of winning are known for Gambles A and D, and not known for Gambles B and
C, this can be taken as evidence for some sort of ambiguity aversion which cannot be accounted for in expected
utility theory. It has been demonstrated that this phenomenon occurs only when the choice set permits comparison of
the ambiguous proposition with a less vague proposition (but not when ambiguous propositions are evaluated in
isolation).
Possible explanations
There have been various attempts to provide decision-theoretic explanations of Ellsberg's observation. Since the
probabilistic information available to the decision-maker is incomplete, these attempts sometimes focus on
quantifying the non-probabilistic ambiguity which the decision-maker faces see Knightian uncertainty. That is,
these alternative approaches sometimes suppose that the agent formulates a subjective (though not necessarily
Bayesian) probability for possible outcomes.
One such attempt is based on info-gap decision theory. The agent is told precise probabilities of some outcomes,
though the practical meaning of the probability numbers is not entirely clear. For instance, in the gambles discussed
above, the probability of a red ball is 30/90, which is a precise number. Nonetheless, the agent may not distinguish,
intuitively, between this and, say, 30/91. No probability information whatsoever is provided regarding other
outcomes, so the agent has very unclear subjective impressions of these probabilities.
In light of the ambiguity in the probabilities of the outcomes, the agent is unable to evaluate a precise expected
utility. Consequently, a choice based on maximizing the expected utility is also impossible. The info-gap approach
supposes that the agent implicitly formulates info-gap models for the subjectively uncertain probabilities. The agent
then tries to satisfice the expected utility and to maximize the robustness against uncertainty in the imprecise
probabilities. This robust-satisficing approach can be developed explicitly to show that the choices of
decision-makers should display precisely the preference reversal which Ellsberg observed.
Another possible explanation is that this type of game triggers a deceit aversion mechanism. Many humans naturally
assume in real-world situations that if they are not told the probability of a certain event, it is to deceive them. People
make the same decisions in the experiment that they would about related but not identical real-life problems where
the experimenter would be likely to be a deceiver acting against the subject's interests. When faced with the choice
between a red ball and a black ball, the probability of 30/90 is compared to the lower part of the 0/90-60/90 range
(the probability of getting a black ball). The average person expects there to be fewer black balls than yellow balls
because in most real-world situations, it would be to the advantage of the experimenter to put fewer black balls in the
urn when offering such a gamble. On the other hand, when offered a choice between red and yellow balls and black
and yellow balls, people assume that there must be fewer than 30 yellow balls as would be necessary to deceive
them. When making the decision, it is quite possible that people simply forget to consider that the experimenter does
61
Ellsberg paradox
62
not have a chance to modify the contents of the urn in between the draws. In real-life situations, even if the urn is not
to be modified, people would be afraid of being deceived on that front as well.
A modification of utility theory to incorporate uncertainty as distinct from risk is Choquet expected utility, which
also proposes a solution to the paradox.
Alternative explanations
Other alternative explanations include the competence hypothesis and comparative ignorance hypothesis. These
theories attribute the source of the ambiguity aversion to the participant's pre-existing knowledge.
References
[1] EconPort discussion of the paradox (http:/ / www. econport. org/ econport/ request?page=man_ru_experiments_ellsberg)
Anand, Paul (1993). Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk. Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-823303-5.
Keynes, John Maynard (1921). A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan.
Schmeidler, D. (1989). "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity". Econometrica 57 (3):
571587. doi: 10.2307/1911053 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911053). JSTOR 1911053 (http://www.jstor.
org/stable/1911053).
Green paradox
Part of a series on
Environmental
economics
Concepts
Green accounting
Green economy
Green trading
Eco commerce
Green job
Environmental enterprise
Fiscal environmentalism
Environmental finance
Renewable energy
Policies
Sustainable tourism
Ecotax
Environmental tariff
Net metering
Environmental pricing reform
Pigovian tax
Dynamics
Renewable energy commercialization

Marginal abatement cost
Green paradox
Green politics
Pollution haven hypothesis
Green paradox
63
Carbon related
Low-carbon economy
Carbon neutral fuel
Carbon neutrality
Carbon pricing
Emissions trading
Carbon credit
Carbon offset
Carbon emission trading
Personal carbon trading
Carbon tax
Carbon finance
Feed-in tariff
Carbon diet
Food miles
2000-watt society
Carbon footprint
v
t
e [1]
The Green Paradox is a phrase coined by German economist Hans-Werner Sinn to describe the fact that an
environmental policy that becomes greener with the passage of time acts like an announced expropriation for the
owners of fossil fuel resources, inducing them to anticipate resource extraction and hence to accelerate global
warming.
Main line of reasoning

The Green Paradoxs line of reasoning starts by recognizing a fundamental, unavoidable fact: every carbon atom in
the gas, coal or oil extracted from the ground to be used as fuel ends up in the atmosphere, in particular if high
efficiency combustion processes ensure that no part of it ends up as soot. About a quarter of the emitted carbon will
stay in the atmosphere practically forever, contributing to the greenhouse effect that causes global warming.[2]
Apart from afforestation, only two things can mitigate the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere: either less
carbon is extracted from the ground, or it is injected back underground after harvesting its energy.
Environmental policy efforts, however, in particular European ones, go in neither of these two directions, aiming
instead at the promotion of alternative, CO2-free energy sources and a more efficient use of energy. In other words,
they only address the demand side of the carbon market, neglecting the supply side. Despite considerable investment,
the efforts to curtail demand have not reduced the aggregate amount of CO2 emitted globally, which continues to
increase unabated.[3]
The reason behind this, according to Sinn, is that green policies, by heralding a gradual tightening of policy over the
coming decades, exert a stronger downward pressure on future prices than on current ones, decreasing thus the rate
of capital appreciation of the fossil fuel deposits. The owners of these resources regard this development with
concern and react by increasing extraction volumes, converting the proceeds into investments in the capital markets,
which offer higher yields. That is the green paradox: environmental policy slated to become greener over time acts as
an announced expropriation that provokes owners to react by accelerating the rate of extraction of their fossil fuel
stocks,[4] thus accelerating climate change.
Countries that do not partake of the efforts to curb demand have a double advantage. They burn the carbon set free
by the green countries (leakage effect) and they also burn the additional carbon extracted as a reaction to the
Green paradox
announced and expected price cuts resulting from the gradual greening of environmental policies (green paradox).[5]
Sinn writes in his abstract that: "[Demand reduction strategies] simply depress the world price of carbon and induce
the environmental sinners to consume what the Kyoto countries have economized on. Even worse, if suppliers feel
threatened by a gradual greening of economic policies in the Kyoto countries that would damage their future prices,
they will extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global warming." [6]
Sinn emphasizes that a condition for the green paradox is that the resource be scarce in the sense that its price will
always be higher than the unit extraction and exploration costs combined. He points out that this condition is likely
to be satisfied as backstop technologies will at best offer a perfect substitute for electricity, but not for fossil fuels.
The prices of coal and crude oil are currently many times higher than the corresponding exploration and extraction
costs combined.
Practicable solutions
An effective climate policy must perforce focus on the hitherto neglected supply side of the carbon market in
addition to the demand side. The ways proposed as practicable by Sinn to do this include levying a withholding tax
on the capital gains on the financial investments of fossil fuel resource owners, or the establishment of a seamless
global emissions trading system that would effectively put a cap on worldwide fossil fuel consumption, thereby
achieving the desired reduction in carbon extraction rates.
Works on the subject

Hans-Werner Sinns ideas on the green paradox have been presented in detail in a number of scientific articles,[7][8]
his 2007 Thnen Lecture at the annual meeting of the German Economic Association (Verein fr Socialpolitik), his
2007 presidential address to the International Institute of Public Finance in Warwick, two working papers,[9][10] and
a German-language book, Das Grne Paradoxon (2008).[11] They build on his earlier studies on supply reactions of
the owners of natural resources to announced price changes.[12]

[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Green_economics_sidebar& action=edit
[2] D. Archer, Fate of Fossil Fuel CO2 in Geologic Time, Journal of Geophysical Research 110, 2005, p. 511; D. Archer and V. Brovkin,
Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of Anthropogenic CO2, Climate Change, mimeo, 2006; G. Hoos, R. Voss, K. Hasselmann, E. MeierReimer and F. Joos, A Nonlinear Impulse Response Model of the Coupled Carbon Cycle-Climate System (NICCS), Climate Dynamics 18,
2001, p. 189202.
[3] International Energy Agency (IEA), IEA Database, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2007. Accessible online at: www.sourceoecd.org
(http:/ / www. sourceoecd. org); Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Global CO2 Emissions: Increase Continued in 2007,
Bilthoven, June 13, 2008. Accessible online at: (http:/ / www. mnp. nl/ en/ publications/ 2008/ GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007. html)
[4] N.V. Long, Resource Extraction under the Uncertainty about Possible Nationalization, Journal of Economic Theory 10, 1975, p. 42 53. K.
A. Konrad, T. E. Olson and R. Schb, Resource Extraction and the Threat of Possible Expropriation: The Role of Swiss Bank Accounts,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26, 1994, p. 149162.
[5] S. Felder and T. F. Rutherford, Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The Consequences of International Trade in Oil and Basic
Materials, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25, 1993, p. 162176, and J.-M. Burniaux and J. Oliveira Martins, Carbon
Emission Leakages: A General Equilibrium View, OECD Working Paper No. 242, 2000.
[6] Sinn, H.W. (2008). Public policies against global warming, International Tax and Public Finance, 15, 4, 360-394. Accessible online at:
(http:/ / www. cesifo-group. de/ portal/ page/ portal/ ifoContent/ N/ rts/ rts-mitarbeiter/ IFOMITARBSINNCV/ CVSinnPDF/
CVSinnPDFrefjournals2007/ ITAX-hws-2008. pdf)
[7] Public Policies against Global Warming: A Supply Side Approach, International Tax and Public Finance 15, 2008, p. 360394.
[8] H.-W. Sinn, Das grne Paradoxon: Warum man das Angebot bei der Klimapolitik nicht vergessen darf, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
9, 2008, p. 109142.
[9] H.-W. Sinn, Public Policies against Global Warming, CESifo Working Paper No. 2087 (http:/ / www. cesifo-group. de/ portal/ page/ portal/
ifoHome/ b-publ/ b3publwp/ _wp_abstract?p_file_id=14563), August 2007
[10] H.-W. Sinn, Pareto Optimality in the Extraction of Fossil Fuels and the Greenhouse Effect: A Note, CESifo Working Paper No. 2083 (http:/
/ www. cesifo-group. de/ portal/ page/ portal/ ifoHome/ b-publ/ b3publwp/ _wp_abstract?p_file_id=14562), August 2007
64
Green paradox
65
[11] Das grne Paradoxon - Pldoyer fr eine illusionsfreie Klimapolitik (http:/ / www. cesifo-group. de/ link/ _publsinnparadoxon), Econ:
Berlin, 2008, 480 pages.
[12] H-W. Sinn, Absatzsteuern, lfrderung und das Allmendeproblem (Sales Taxes, Oil Extraction and the Common Pool Problem) (http:/ /
www. cesifo-group. de/ link/ Sinn_Abs_Oel_Allmend_1982. pdf), in: H. Siebert, ed., Reaktionen auf Energiepreisnderungen, Lang:
Frankfurt and Bern 1982, pp. 83-103; N.V. Long and H.-W. Sinn, Surprise Price Shifts, Tax Changes and the Supply Behaviour of Resource
Extracting Firms (http:/ / www. cesifo-group. de/ link/ Sinn_Surpr_Price_Shift_AEP_1985. pdf), Australian Economic Papers 24, 1985, pp.
278-289.
Icarus paradox
The Icarus paradox is a neologism coined by Danny Miller, and popularized by his 1990 book by the same name,
for the observed phenomenon of businesses that fail abruptly after a period of apparent success. In a 1992 article,
Miller noted that some businesses bring about their own downfall through their own successes, be this through
over-confidence, exaggeration, complacency. It refers to Icarus of Greek mythology who flew too close to the Sun
and melted his own wings. The book is a key source of insight in Escaping the Progress trap by Daniel O'Leary.
References
Jevons paradox
In economics, the Jevons paradox (/dvnz/; sometimes
Jevons effect) is the proposition that as technology
progresses, the increase in efficiency with which a resource
is used tends to increase (rather than decrease) the rate of
consumption of that resource. In 1865, the English economist
William Stanley Jevons observed that technological
improvements that increased the efficiency of coal-use led to
the increased consumption of coal in a wide range of
industries. He argued that, contrary to common intuition,
technological improvements could not be relied upon to
reduce fuel consumption.
Coal-burning factories in 19th-century Manchester, England.

Improved technology allowed coal to fuel the Industrial
Revolution, greatly increasing the consumption of coal.
The issue has been re-examined by modern economists

studying consumption rebound effects from improved energy
efficiency. In addition to reducing the amount needed for a given use, improved efficiency lowers the relative cost of
using a resource, which tends to increase the quantity of the resource demanded, potentially counteracting any
savings from increased efficiency. Additionally, increased efficiency accelerates economic growth, further increasing
the demand for resources. The Jevons paradox occurs when the effect from increased demand predominates, causing
resource use to increase.
The Jevons paradox has been used to argue that energy conservation may be futile, as increased efficiency may
increase fuel use. Nevertheless, increased efficiency can improve material living standards. Further, fuel use declines
if increased efficiency is coupled with a green tax or other conservation policies that keep the cost of use the same
(or higher). As the Jevons paradox applies only to technological improvements that increase fuel efficiency, policies
that impose conservation standards and increase costs do not display the paradox.
Jevons paradox
66
History
The Jevons paradox was first described by the English economist William
Stanley Jevons in his 1865 book The Coal Question. Jevons observed that
England's consumption of coal soared after James Watt introduced his coal-fired
steam engine, which greatly improved the efficiency of Thomas Newcomen's
earlier design. Watt's innovations made coal a more cost-effective power source,
leading to the increased use of the steam engine in a wide range of industries.
This in turn increased total coal consumption, even as the amount of coal
required for any particular application fell. Jevons argued that improvements in
fuel efficiency tend to increase, rather than decrease, fuel use: "It is a confusion
of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished
consumption. The very contrary is the truth."
William Stanley Jevons
At that time many in Britain worried that coal reserves were rapidly dwindling,
but some experts opined that improving technology would reduce coal
consumption. Jevons argued that this view was incorrect, as further increases in efficiency would tend to increase the
use of coal. Hence, improving technology would tend to increase, rather than reduce, the rate at which England's coal
deposits were being depleted.
Cause
Rebound effect
Main
article:
(conservation)
Rebound
effect
One way to understand the Jevons

paradox is to observe that an increase
in the efficiency with which a resource
(e.g., fuel) is used causes a decrease in
the price of that resource when
measured in terms of what it can
achieve (e.g., work). Generally
speaking, a decrease in the price of a
Elastic Demand for Work: A doubling of fuel efficiency more than doubles work
good or service will increase the
demanded, increasing the amount of fuel used. Jevons paradox occurs.
quantity demanded (see supply and
demand, demand curve). Thus with a lower price for work, more work will be "purchased" (indirectly, by buying
more fuel). The resulting increase in the demand for fuel is known as the rebound effect. This increase in demand
may or may not be large enough to offset the original drop in demand from the increased efficiency. The Jevons
paradox
occurs
when
the
Jevons paradox
67
rebound effect is greater than 100%,
exceeding the original efficiency gains.
This effect has been called 'backfire'.
Consider a simple case: a perfectly

competitive market where fuel is the
sole input used, and the only
determinant of the cost of work. If the
price of fuel remains constant but the
efficiency of its conversion into work
is doubled, the effective price of work
is halved and twice as much work can
be purchased for the same amount of
Inelastic Demand for Work:A doubling of fuel efficiency does not double work
demanded, the amount of fuel used decreases. Jevons paradox does not occur.
money. If the amount of work
purchased more than doubles (i.e.,
demand for work is elastic, the price elasticity is greater than 1), then the quantity of fuel used would increase, not
decrease. If however, the demand for work is inelastic (price elasticity is less than 1), the amount of work purchased
would less than double, and the quantity of fuel used would decrease.
A full analysis would also have to take into account the fact that products (work) use more than one type of input
(e.g., fuel, labour, machinery), and that other factors besides input cost (e.g., a non-competitive market structure)
may also affect the price of work. These factors would tend to decrease the effect of fuel efficiency on the price of
work, and hence reduce the rebound effect, making the Jevons paradox less likely to occur. Additionally, any change
in the demand for fuel would have an effect on the price of fuel, and also on the effective price of work.
KhazzoomBrookes postulate
Main article: KhazzoomBrookes postulate
In the 1980s, economists Daniel Khazzoom and Leonard Brookes revisited the Jevons paradox in the case of a
society's energy use. Brookes, then chief economist at the UK Atomic Energy Authority, argued that attempts to
reduce energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency would simply raise demand for energy in the economy
as a whole. Khazzoom focused on the narrower point that the potential for rebound was ignored in mandatory
performance standards for domestic appliances being set by the California Energy Commission.
In 1992, the economist Harry Saunders dubbed the hypothesis that improvements in energy efficiency work to
increase, rather than decrease, energy consumption the KhazzoomBrookes postulate. Saunders showed that the
KhazzoomBrookes postulate was consistent with neo-classical growth theory (the mainstream economic theory of
capital accumulation, technological progress and long-run economic growth) under a wide range of assumptions.[1]
According to Saunders, increased energy efficiency tends to increase energy consumption by two means. First,
increased energy efficiency makes the use of energy relatively cheaper, thus encouraging increased use (the direct
rebound effect). Second, increased energy efficiency leads to increased economic growth, which pulls up energy use
for the whole economy. At the microeconomic level (looking at an individual market), even with the rebound effect,
improvements in energy efficiency usually result in reduced energy consumption. That is, the rebound effect is
usually less than 100percent. However, at the macroeconomic level, more efficient (and hence comparatively
cheaper) energy leads to faster economic growth, which in turn increases energy use throughout the economy.
Saunders concludes that, taking into account both microeconomic and macroeconomic effects, technological
progress that improves energy efficiency will tend to increase overall energy use.
Jevons paradox
68
Energy conservation policy
Sustainable energy
Energy conservation
Cogeneration
Energy efficiency
Heat pump
Green building
Microgeneration
Passive solar
Renewable energy
Anaerobic digestion
Geothermal
Hydroelectricity
Solar
Tidal
Wind
Sustainable transport
Carbon-neutral fuel
Electric vehicle
Green vehicle
Plug-in hybrid
Sustainable development portal
Renewable energy portal

Environment portal
v
t
e [2]
Jevons warned that fuel efficiency gains tend to increase fuel use, but this does not imply that increased fuel
efficiency is worthless. Increased fuel efficiency enables greater production and a higher quality of material life. For
example, a more efficient steam engine allowed the cheaper transport of goods and people that contributed to the
Industrial Revolution. However, if the KhazzoomBrookes postulate is correct, increased fuel efficiency will not
reduce the rate of depletion of fossil fuels.
The Jevons paradox is sometimes used to argue that energy conservation efforts are futile, for example, that more
efficient use of oil will lead to increased demand, and will not slow the arrival or the effects of peak oil. This
argument is usually presented as a reason not to impose environmental policies, or to increase fuel efficiency (e.g. if
cars are more efficient, it will simply lead to more driving). Several points have been raised against this argument.
First, in the context of a mature market such as for oil in developed countries, the direct rebound effect is usually
small, and so increased fuel efficiency usually reduces resource use, other conditions remaining constant. Second,
even if increased efficiency does not reduce the total amount of fuel used, there remain other benefits associated with
Jevons paradox
improved efficiency. For example, increased fuel efficiency may mitigate the price increases, shortages and
disruptions in the global economy associated with peak oil. Third, environmental economists have pointed out that
fuel use will unambiguously decrease if increased efficiency is coupled with an intervention (e.g. a green tax) that
keeps the cost of fuel use the same or higher.
The Jevons paradox indicates that increased efficiency by itself is unlikely to reduce fuel use, and that sustainable
energy policy must rely on other types of government interventions. As the Jevons paradox applies only to
technological improvements that increase fuel efficiency, the imposition of conservation standards that
simultaneously increase costs does not cause an increase in fuel use. To ensure that efficiency-enhancing
technological improvements reduce fuel use, efficiency gains must be paired with government intervention that
reduces demand (e.g., green taxes, a cap and trade programme, or higher fuel taxes). The ecological economists
Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees have suggested that any cost savings from efficiency gains be "taxed away or
otherwise removed from further economic circulation. Preferably they should be captured for reinvestment in natural
capital rehabilitation."[] By mitigating the economic effects of government interventions designed to promote
ecologically sustainable activities, efficiency-improving technological progress may make the imposition of these
interventions more palatable, and more likely to be implemented.
References
[1] Saunders, Harry D., "The KhazzoomBrookes postulate and neoclassical growth." (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ discover/ 10. 2307/
41322471?uid=3738776& uid=2& uid=4& sid=21101524317221) The Energy Journal, October 1, 1992.
[2] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Sustainable_energy& action=edit
Further reading
Jevons, William Stanley (1866). The Coal Question (http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Jevons/
jvnCQ.html) (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan and Co.
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (5 July 2005). "3: The economics of energy efficiency"
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldsctech/21/2106.htm). Select Committee on
Science and Technology Second Report. Session 2005-06. House of Lords.
Herring, Horace (19 July 1999). "Does energy efficiency save energy? The debate and its consequences". Applied
Energy 63 (3): 209226. doi: 10.1016/S0306-2619(99)00030-6 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0306-2619(99)00030-6). ISSN 0306-2619 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0306-2619).
Owen, David (December 20, 2010). "Annals of Environmentalism: The Efficiency Dilemma" (http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/20/101220fa_fact_owen). The New Yorker. pp.78.
External links
Rocky Mountain Institute (May 1, 2008). "Beating the Energy Efficiency Paradox (Part I)" (http://www.
treehugger.com/files/2008/05/beating-energy-efficiency-paradox.php). TreeHugger.
69
Leontief paradox
Leontief paradox
Leontief's paradox in economics is that the country with the world's highest capital-per worker has a lower
capital/labor ratio in exports than in imports.
This econometric find was the result of Wassily W. Leontief's attempt to test the HeckscherOhlin theory
empirically. In 1954, Leontief found that the United Statesthe most capital-abundant country in the
worldexported labor-intensive commodities and imported capital-intensive commodities, in contradiction with
HeckscherOhlin theory ("HO theory").
Measurements
In 1971 Robert Baldwin showed that U.S. imports were 27% more capital-intensive than U.S. exports in the 1962
trade data, using a measure similar to Leontief's.
In 1980 Edward Leamer questioned Leontief's original methodology on real exchange rate grounds, but
acknowledged that the U.S. paradox still appears in the data (for years other than 1947).
A 1999 survey of the econometric literature by Elhanan Helpman concluded that the paradox persists, but some
studies in non-US trade were instead consistent with the HO theory.
In 2005 Kwok & Yu used an updated methodology to argue for a lower or zero paradox in U.S. trade statistics,
though the paradox is still derived in other developed nations.
Responses to the paradox

For many economists, Leontief's paradox undermined the validity of the HeckscherOhlin theorem (HO) theory,
which predicted that trade patterns would be based on countries' comparative advantage in certain factors of
production (such as capital and labor). Many economists have dismissed the H-O theory in favor of a more Ricardian
model where technological differences determine comparative advantage. These economists argue that the United
States has an advantage in highly skilled labor more so than capital. This can be seen as viewing "capital" more
broadly, to include human capital. Using this definition, the exports of the United States are very (human)
capital-intensive, and not particularly intensive in (unskilled) labor.
Some explanations for the paradox dismiss the importance of comparative advantage as a determinant of trade. For
instance, the Linder hypothesis states that demand plays a more important role than comparative advantage as a
determinant of tradewith the hypothesis that countries which share similar demands will be more likely to trade.
For instance, both the United States and Germany are developed countries with a significant demand for cars, so
both have large automotive industries. Rather than one country dominating the industry with a comparative
advantage, both countries trade different brands of cars between them. Similarly, New Trade Theory argues that
comparative advantages can develop separately from factor endowment variation (e.g., in industrial increasing
returns to scale).
References
70
Lucas paradox
Lucas paradox
In economics, the Lucas paradox or the Lucas puzzle is the observation that capital does not flow from developed
countries to developing countries despite the fact that developing countries have lower levels of capital per worker.
Classical economic theory predicts that capital should flow from rich countries to poor countries, due to the effect of
diminishing returns of capital. Poor countries have lower levels of capital per worker which explains, in part, why
they are poor. In poor countries, the scarcity of capital relative to labor should mean that the returns related to the
infusion of capital are higher than in developed countries. In response, savers in rich countries should look at poor
countries as profitable places in which to invest. In reality, things do not seem to work that way. Surprisingly little
capital flows from rich countries to poor countries. This puzzle, famously discussed in a paper by Robert Lucas in
1990, is often referred to as the "Lucas Paradox."
The theoretical explanations for the Lucas Paradox can be grouped into two categories.
1. The first group attributes the limited amount of capital received by poorer nations to differences in fundamentals
that affect the production structure of the economy, such as technological differences, missing factors of
production, government policies, and the institutional structure.
2. The second group of explanations focuses on international capital market imperfections, mainly sovereign risk
(risk of nationalization) and asymmetric information. Although the expected return on investment might be high
in many developing countries, it does not flow there because of the high level of uncertainty associated with those
expected returns.
Examples of the Lucas paradox: 20th century development of Third World

nations
Lucas seminal paper was a reaction to observed trends in international development efforts during the 20th century.
Regions characterized by poverty, such as India, China and Africa, have received particular attention with regard to
the underinvestment predicted by Lucas. African Nations, with their impoverished populace and rich natural
resources, has been upheld as exemplifying the type of nations that would, under neoclassical assumptions, be able
to offer extremely high returns to capital. The meager foreign capital African nations receive outside of the charity of
multinational corporations reveals the extent to which Lucas captured the realities of todays global capital flows.
Authors more recently have focused their explanations for the paradox on Lucas first category of explanation, the
difference in fundamentals of the production structure. Some have pointed to the quality of institutions as the key
determinant of capital inflows to poorer nations. As evidence for the central role played by institutional stability, it
has been shown that the amount of foreign direct investment a country receives is highly correlated to the strength of
infrastructure and the stability of government in that country.
Counterexample of the Lucas paradox: American economic development

Although Lucas original hypothesis has widely been accepted as descriptive of the modern period in history, the
paradox does not emerge as clearly before the 20th century. The colonial era, for instance, stands out as an age of
unimpeded capital flows. The system of imperialism produced economic conditions particularly amenable to the
movement of capital according to the assumptions of classical economics. Britain, for instance, was able to design,
impose, and control the quality of institutions in their colonies to capitalize on the high returns to capital in the new
world.
Jeffrey Williamson has explored in depth this reversal of the Lucas Paradox in the colonial context. Although not
emphasized by Lucas himself, Williamson maintains that unimpeded labor migration is one way that capital flows to
the citizens of developing nations. The empire structure was particularly important for facilitating low-cost
international migration, allowing wage rates to converge across the regions in the British Empire. For instance, in the
71
Lucas paradox
17th and 18th century, England incentivized its citizens to move to the labor-scarce America, endorsing a system of
indentured servitude to make overseas migration affordable.
While Britain enabled free capital flow from old to new world, the success of the American enterprise after the
American Revolution is a good example of the role of institutional and legal frameworks for facilitating a continued
flow of capital. The American Constitutions commitment to private property rights, rights of personal liberty; and
strong contract law enabled investment from Britain to America to continue even without the incentives of the
colonial relationship. In these ways, early American economic development, both pre and post-revolution, provides a
case study for the conditions under which the Lucas Paradox is reversed. Even after the average income level in
America exceeded that of Britain, the institutions exported under imperialism and the legal frameworks established
after independence enabled long term capital flows from Europe to America.
References
Metzler paradox
In economics, the Metzler paradox (named after the American economist Lloyd Metzler) is the theoretical
possibility that the imposition of a tariff on imports may reduce the relative internal price of that good. It was
proposed by Lloyd Metzler in 1949 upon examination of tariffs within the HeckscherOhlin model. The paradox has
roughly the same status as immiserizing growth and a transfer that makes the recipient worse off.[1]
The strange result could occur if the exporting country's offer curve is very inelastic. In this case, the tariff lowers the
duty-free cost of the price of the import by such a great degree that the effect of the improvement of the
tariff-imposing countries' terms of trade on relative prices exceeds the amount of the tariff. Such a tariff would not
protect the industry competing with the imported goods.
It is deemed to be unlikely in practice.[2]
References
[1] Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), p. 112
[2] Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), p. 113
Further reading
Krugman, Paul R.; Obstfeld, Maurice (2003). "Chapter 5: The Standard Trade Model". International Economics:
Theory and Policy (6th ed.). Boston: Addison-Wesley. p.112. ISBN0-321-11639-9.
72
Paradox of thrift
Paradox of thrift
The paradox of thrift (or paradox of saving) is a paradox of economics, popularized by John Maynard Keynes,
though it had been stated as early as 1714 in The Fable of the Bees,[1] and similar sentiments date to antiquity.[2] The
paradox states that if everyone tries to save more money during times of economic recession, then aggregate demand
will fall and will in turn lower total savings in the population because of the decrease in consumption and economic
growth. The paradox is, narrowly speaking, that total savings may fall even when individual savings attempt to rise,
and, broadly speaking, that increase in savings may be harmful to an economy.[3] Both the narrow and broad claims
are paradoxical within the assumption underlying the fallacy of composition, namely that what is true of the parts
must be true of the whole. The narrow claim transparently contradicts this assumption, and the broad one does so by
implication, because while individual thrift is generally averred to be good for the economy, the paradox of thrift
holds that collective thrift may be bad for the economy.
The paradox of thrift is a central component of Keynesian economics, and has formed part of mainstream economics
since the late 1940s, though it is criticized on a number of grounds.
Overview
The argument is that, in equilibrium, total income (and thus demand) must equal total output, and that total
investment must equal total saving. Assuming that saving rises faster as a function of income than the relationship
between investment and output, then an increase in the marginal propensity to save, other things being equal, will
move the equilibrium point at which income equals output and investment equals savings to lower values.
In this form it represents a prisoner's dilemma as saving is beneficial to each individual but deleterious to the general
population. This is a "paradox" because it runs contrary to intuition. Someone unaware of the paradox of thrift would
fall into a fallacy of composition and assume that what seems to be good for an individual within the economy will
be good for the entire population. However, exercising thrift may be good for an individual by enabling that
individual to save for a "rainy day", and yet not be good for the economy as a whole.
This paradox can be explained by analyzing the place, and impact, of increased savings in an economy. If a
population saves more money (that is the marginal propensity to save increases across all income levels), then total
revenues for companies will decline. This decrease in economic growth means fewer salary increases and perhaps
downsizing. Eventually the population's total savings will have remained the same or even declined because of lower
incomes and a weaker economy. This paradox is based on the proposition, put forth in Keynesian economics, that
many economic downturns are demand based. Hypothetically, if all people will save their money, savings will rise
but there is a tendency that the macroeconomic status will fall.Wikipedia:Citation needed
History
While the paradox of thrift was popularized by Keynes, and is often attributed to him, it was stated by a number of
others prior to Keynes, and the proposition that spending may help and saving may hurt an economy dates to
antiquity; similar sentiments occur in the Bible verse:
There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to
poverty.
Proverbs 11:24
which has found occasional use as an epigram in underconsumptionist writings.[4][5][6]
Keynes himself notes the appearance of the paradox in The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits
(1714) by Bernard Mandeville, the title itself hinting at the paradox, and Keynes citing the passage:
73
Paradox of thrift
As this prudent economy, which some people call Saving, is in private families the most certain method to
increase an estate, so some imagine that, whether a country be barren or fruitful, the same method if generally
pursued (which they think practicable) will have the same effect upon a whole nation, and that, for example,
the English might be much richer than they are, if they would be as frugal as some of their neighbours. This, I
think, is an error.
Keynes suggests Adam Smith was referring to this passage when he wrote "What is prudence in the conduct of every
private family can scarce be folly in that of a great Kingdom."
The problem of underconsumption and oversaving, as they saw it, was developed by underconsumptionist
economists of the 19th century, and the paradox of thrift in the strict sense that "collective attempts to save yield
lower overall savings" was explicitly stated by John M. Robertson in his 1892 book The Fallacy of Saving, writing:
Had the whole population been alike bent on saving, the total saved would positively have been much less,
inasmuch as (other tendencies remaining the same) industrial paralysis would have been reached sooner or
oftener, profits would be less, interest much lower, and earnings smaller and more precarious. This ... is no idle
paradox, but the strictest economic truth.
John M. Robertson, The Fallacy of Saving, p. 1312
Similar ideas were forwarded by William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings in the 1920s in The Dilemma of
Thrift.
Keynes distinguished between business activity/investment ("Enterprise") and savings ("Thrift") in his Treatise on
Money (1930):
...mere abstinence is not enough by itself to build cities or drain fens. ... If Enterprise is afoot, wealth
accumulates whatever may be happening to Thrift; and if Enterprise is asleep, wealth decays whatever
Thrift may be doing. Thus, Thrift may be the handmaiden of Enterprise. But equally she may not. And,
perhaps, even usually she is not.
and stated the paradox of thrift in The General Theory, 1936:
For although the amount of his own saving is unlikely to have any significant influence on his own income,
the reactions of the amount of his consumption on the incomes of others makes it impossible for all individuals
simultaneously to save any given sums. Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption will so
affect incomes that the attempt necessarily defeats itself. It is, of course, just as impossible for the community
as a whole to save less than the amount of current investment, since the attempt to do so will necessarily raise
incomes to a level at which the sums which individuals choose to save add up to a figure exactly equal to the
amount of investment.
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chapter 7, p. 84
The theory is referred to as the "paradox of thrift" in Samuelson's influential Economics of 1948, which popularized
the term.
74
Paradox of thrift
Related concepts
The paradox of thrift has been related to the debt deflation theory of economic crises, being called "the paradox of
debt"[7] people save not to increase savings, but rather to pay down debt. As well, a paradox of toil and a paradox
of flexibility have been proposed: A willingness to work more in a liquidity trap and wage flexibility after a debt
deflation shock may lead not only to lower wages, but lower employment.
During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve Vice Chair Janet Yellen discussed the "Paradox of deleveraging" described
by economist Hyman Minsky: "Once this massive credit crunch hit, it didnt take long before we were in a recession.
The recession, in turn, deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial
institutions surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a year. A
process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy. Consumers are pulling back
on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses are cancelling planned investments and
laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve
their chances of weathering the current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the
paradox of deleveraging, in which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firmsand indeed essential to
return the economy to a normal statenevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."[8]
Criticisms
Within mainstream economics, non-Keynesian economists, particularly neoclassical economists, criticize this theory
on three principal grounds.
The first criticism is that, following Say's law and the related circle of ideas, if demand slackens, prices will fall
(barring government intervention), and the resulting lower price will stimulate demand (though at lower profit or
cost possibly even lower wages). This criticism in turn has been questioned by Keynesian economists, who reject
Say's law and instead point to evidence of sticky prices as a reason why prices do not fall in recession; this remains a
debated point.
The second criticism is that savings represent loanable funds, particularly at banks, assuming the savings are held at
banks, rather than currency itself being held ("stashed under one's mattress"). Thus an accumulation of savings yields
an increase in potential lending, which will lower interest rates and stimulate borrowing. So a decline in consumer
spending is offset by an increase in lending, and subsequent investment and spending.
Two caveats are added to this criticism. Firstly, if savings are held as cash, rather than being loaned out (directly by
savers, or indirectly, as via bank deposits), then loanable funds do not increase, and thus a recession may be caused
but this is due to holding cash, not to saving per se.[9] Secondly, banks themselves may hold cash, rather than loaning
it out, which results in the growth of excess reserves funds on deposit but not loaned out. This is argued to occur in
liquidity trap situations, when interest rates are at a zero lower bound (or near it) and savings still exceed investment
demand. Within Keynesian economics, the desire to hold currency rather than loan it out is discussed under liquidity
preference.
Third, the paradox assumes a closed economy in which savings are not invested abroad (to fund exports of local
production abroad). Thus, while the paradox may hold at the global level, it need not hold at the local or national
level: if one nation increases savings, this can be offset by trading partners consuming a greater amount relative to
their own production, i.e., if the saving nation increases exports, and its partners increase imports. This criticism is
not very controversial, and is generally accepted by Keynesian economists as well,[10] who refer to it as "exporting
one's way out of a recession". They further note that this frequently occurs in concert with currency devaluation[11]
(hence increasing exports and decreasing imports), and cannot work as a solution to a global problem, because the
global economy is a closed system not every nation can increase net exports.
75
Paradox of thrift
Austrian School criticism

The paradox was criticized by the Austrian School economist Friedrich Hayek in a 1929 article, "The 'Paradox' of
Savings", questioning the paradox as proposed by Foster and Catchings.[12] Hayek, and later Austrian School
economists agree that if a population saves more money, total revenues for companies will
declineWikipedia:Citation needed, but they deny the assertion that lower revenues lead to lower economic growth,
understanding that the additional savings are used to create more capital to increase production. Once the new, more
productive structure of capital has reorganized inside of the current structure, the real costs of production is reduced
for most firms.Wikipedia:Citation needed
References and sources

References
[1] Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chapter 23. Notes on Merchantilism, the Usury Laws, Stamped Money
and Theories of Under-consumption (http:/ / www. marxists. org/ reference/ subject/ economics/ keynes/ general-theory/ ch23. htm)
[2] See history section for further discussion.
[3] These two formulations are given in Campbell R. McConnell (1960: 26162), emphasis added: "By attempting to increase its rate of saving,
society may create conditions under which the amount it can actually save is reduced. This phenomenon is called the paradox of
thrift....[T]hrift, which has always been held in high esteem in our economy, now becomes something of a social vice."
[4] English, Irish and Subversives Among the Dismal Scientists, Noel Thompson, Nigel Allington, 2010, p. 122 (http:/ / books. google. com/
books?id=4fjwxnH8VPcC& pg=PA122& dq="scattereth,+ and+ yet+ increaseth"):
"A suggestion that a more equal distribution of income might be a remedy for general stagnation and that excess saving can be harmful is
implicit in the quotation from the Old Testament on the Reply to Mr. Say [by John Cazenove (17881879)].
[5] A Reply to Mr. Says Letters to Mr. Malthus, by John Cazenove, uses the verse as an epigram.
[6] Studies in economics, William Smart, 1895, p. 249 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=YwUPAAAAQAAJ& pg=PA94)
[7] Paradox of thrift (http:/ / krugman. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2009/ 02/ 03/ paradox-of-thrift/ ), Paul Krugman
[8] Federal Reserve-Janet Yellen-A Minsky Meltdown-April 2009 (http:/ / www. frbsf. org/ news/ speeches/ 2009/ 0416. html)
[9] See section 9.9 and 9.11 http:/ / www. auburn. edu/ ~garriro/ cbm. htm
[10] The paradox of thrift for real (http:/ / krugman. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2009/ 07/ 07/ the-paradox-of-thrift-for-real/ ), Paul Krugman, July 7,
2009
[11] Devaluing History (http:/ / krugman. blogs. nytimes. com/ 2010/ 11/ 24/ devaluing-history/ ), Paul Krugman, November 24, 2010
[12] Hayek on the Paradox of Saving (http:/ / mises. org/ story/ 2804)
Sources
Samuelson, Paul& Nordhaus, William (2005). Economics (18th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
ISBN0-07-123932-4.
External links
The paradox of thrift explained (http://ingrimayne.saintjoe.edu/econ/Keynes/Paradox.html)
Criticisms
The Paradox of Thrift: RIP (http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-7.html), by Clifford F. Thies, The Cato
Journal, Volume 16, Number 1
Consumers don't cause recessions (http://mises.org/story/3194) by Robert P. Murphy (an Austrian School
critique of the paradox of thrift)
76
Paradox of value
77
Paradox of value
The paradox of value (also known as the diamondwater paradox)
is the apparent contradiction that, although water is on the whole more
useful, in terms of survival, than diamonds, diamonds command a
higher price in the market. The philosopher Adam Smith is often
considered to be the classic presenter of this paradox. Nicolaus
Copernicus, John Locke, John Law and others had previously tried to
explain the disparity.
Labor theory of value

Main article: Labor theory of value
Water diamonds.
In a passage of Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of

the Wealth of Nations, he discusses the concepts of value in use and value in exchange, and notices how they tend to
differ:
What are the rules which men naturally observe in exchanging them [goods] for money or for one another, I
shall now proceed to examine. These rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of
goods. The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility
of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that
object conveys. The one may be called "value in use;" the other, "value in exchange." The things which have
the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; on the contrary, those which have the
greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it
will purchase scarcely anything; scarcely anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary,
has scarcely any use-value; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.
Furthermore, he explained the value in exchange as being determined by labor:
The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and
trouble of acquiring it.
Hence, Smith denied a necessary relationship between price and utility. Price on this view was related to a factor of
production (namely, labor) and not to the point of view of the consumer.[1] The best practical example of this is
saffron - the most expensive spice - here much of its value derives from both the low yield from growing it and the
disproportionate amount of labor required to extract it. Proponents of the labor theory of value saw that as the
resolution of the paradox.
The labor theory of value has lost popularity in mainstream economics and has been replaced by the theory of
marginal utility.
Paradox of value
78
Marginalism
Main article: Marginalism
The theory of marginal utility, which is
based on the subjective theory of
value, says that the price at which an
object trades in the market is
determined neither by how much labor
was exerted in its production, as in the
labor theory of value, nor on how
useful it is on a whole (total utility).
Rather, its price is determined by its
marginal utility. The marginal utility of
a good is derived from its most
important use to a person. So, if
someone possesses a good, he will use
it to satisfy some need or want. Which
one? Naturally, the one that takes
highest-priority.
Eugen
von
Bhm-Bawerk illustrated this with the
example of a farmer having five sacks
of grain.
At low levels of consumption, water has a much higher marginal utility than diamonds
and thus is more valuable. People usually consume water at much higher levels than they
do diamonds and thus the marginal utility and price of water are lower than that of
diamonds.
With the first, he will make bread to survive. With the second, he will make more bread, in order to be strong enough
to work. With the next, he will feed his farm animals. The next is used to make whisky, and the last one he feeds to
the pigeons. If one of those bags is stolen, he will not reduce each of those activities by one-fifth; instead he will stop
feeding the pigeons.
So the value of the fifth bag of grain is equal to the satisfaction he gets from feeding the pigeons. If he sells that bag
and neglects the pigeons, his least productive use of the remaining grain is to make whisky, so the value of a fourth
bag of grain is the value of his whisky. Only if he loses four bags of grain will he start eating less; that is the most
productive use of his grain. The last bag of grain is worth his life.
In explaining the diamond-water paradox, marginalists explain that it is not the total usefulness of diamonds or water
that matters, but the usefulness of each unit of water or diamonds. It is true that the total utility of water to people is
tremendous, because they need it to survive. However, since water is in such large supply in the world, the marginal
utility of water is low. In other words, each additional unit of water that becomes available can be applied to less
urgent uses as more urgent uses for water are satisfied.
Therefore, any particular unit of water becomes worth less to people as the supply of water increases. On the other
hand, diamonds are in much lower supply. They are of such low supply that the usefulness of one diamond is greater
than the usefulness of one glass of water, which is in abundant supply. Thus, diamonds are worth more to people.
Therefore, those who want diamonds are willing to pay a higher price for one diamond than for one glass of water,
and sellers of diamonds ask a price for one diamond that is higher than for one glass of water.
Paradox of value
Efficiency model
The Chinese economist Tan Lidong addresses the question through relative Economic efficiency. noting water is in
such large supply in the world, but in the desert water-taking efficiency is very low, so the value of water is also
high. If someone can invent high efficiency equipment to get water in the desert, by then the water would be cheap.
He avers that value is determined by efficiency, as well as efficiency affected by tools, labor and resources.
He suggests we can calculate the exact value of the water or the diamond by using efficiency. He takes a historical
approach to value, that exchange ratios have been known for many products for a very long time, and established by
custom and practice. Technological change changes the efficiency of production, thus changing the relative values.[2]
Criticisms
George Stigler has argued that Smith's statement of the paradox is flawed, since it consisted of a comparison between
heterogeneous goods, and such comparison would have required using the concept of marginal utility of income.
And since this concept was not known in Smith's time, then the value in use and value in exchange judgement may
be meaningless:
The paradoxthat value in exchange may exceed or fall short of value in usewas, strictly speaking, a
meaningless statement, for Smith had no basis (i.e., no concept of marginal utility of income or marginal price
of utility) on which he could compare such heterogeneous quantities. On any reasonable interpretation,
moreover, Smith's statement that value in use could be less than value in exchange was clearly a moral
judgment, not shared by the possessors of diamonds. To avoid the incomparability of money and utility, one
may interpret Smith to mean that the ratio of values of two commodities is not equal to the ratio of their total
utilities. Or, alternatively, that the ratio of the prices of two commodities is not equal to the ratio of their total
utilities; but this also requires an illegitimate selection of units: The price of what quantity of diamonds is to be
compared with the price of one gallon of water?
George Stigler, The development of Utility Theory. I [3]
References
[1] Dhamee, Yousuf(1996?), Adam Smith and the division of labour (http:/ / www. victorianweb. org/ economics/ division. html) accessed
09/08/06
[2] Tan Lidong <The economics of happiness>, publishing house of China university of politics and law (January 2012) ISBN 9787562040675
[3] Stigler, George (1950). The development of Utility Theory. I. Journal of political economy 58(4), p 308.
79
The productivity paradox was analyzed and popularized in a widely cited article by Erik Brynjolfsson, which noted
the apparent contradiction between the remarkable advances in computer power and the relatively slow growth of
productivity at the level of the whole economy, individual firms and many specific applications. The concept is
sometimes referred to as the Solow computer paradox in reference to Robert Solow's 1987 quip, "You can see the
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics."[1] The paradox has been defined as the discrepancy
between measures of investment in information technology and measures of output at the national level.
It was widely believed that office automation was boosting labor productivity (or total factor productivity). However,
the growth accounts didn't seem to confirm the idea. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s there was a massive
slow-down in growth as the machines were becoming ubiquitous. (Other variables in country's economies were
changing simultaneously; growth accounting separates out the improvement in production output using the same
capital and labour resources as input by calculating growth in total factor productivity, AKA the "Solow residual".)
The productivity paradox has attracted a lot of attention because technology seems no longer to be able to create the
kind of productivity gains that occurred until the early 1970s. Some, such as economist Robert J. Gordon, are now
arguing that technology in general is subject to diminishing returns in its ability to increase economic growth.
Explanations
Different authors have explained the paradox in different ways. In his original article, Brynjolfsson (1993) identified
five possible explanations:
Mismeasurement: the gains are real, but our current measures miss them;
Redistribution: there are private gains, but they come at the expense of other firms and individuals, leaving little
net gain;
Time lags: the gains take a long time to show up; and
Mismanagement: there are no gains because of the unusual difficulties in managing IT or information itself.
Feedback effects: Lower labor requirements lead to fewer customers, negating any economies of scale achievable
with computers.
He stressed the first explanation, noting weaknesses with then-existing studies and measurement methods, and
pointing out that "a shortfall of evidence is not evidence of a shortfall."
Turban, et al. (2008), mention that understanding the paradox requires an understanding of the concept of
productivity. Pinsonneault et al. (1998) state that for untangling the paradox an understanding of how IT usage is
related to the nature of managerial work and the context in which it is deployed is required.
One hypothesis to explain the productivity paradox is that computers are productive, yet their productive gains are
realized only after a lag period, during which complementary capital investments must be developed to allow for the
use of computers to their full potential.[2]
Diminishing marginal returns from computers, the opposite of the time lag hypothesis, is that computers, in the form
of mainframes, were used in the most productive areas, like high volume transactions of banking, accounting and
airline reservations, over two decades before personal computers. Also, computers replaced a sophisticated system of
data processing that used unit record equipment. Therefore the important productivity opportunities were exhausted
before computers were everywhere. We were looking at the wrong time period.
Another hypothesis states that computers are simply not very productivity enhancing because they require time, a
scarce complementary human input.Wikipedia:Citation needed This theory holds that although computers perform a
variety of tasks, these tasks are not done in any particularly new or efficient manner, but rather they are only done
faster. Current data does not confirm the validity of either hypothesis. It could very well be that increases in
productivity due to computers are not captured in GDP measures, but rather in quality changes and new products.
80
Economists have done research in the productivity issue and concluded that there are three possible explanations for
the paradox. The explanations can be divided in three categories:
Data and analytical problems hide "productivity-revenues". The ratios for input and output are sometimes difficult
to measure, especially in the service sector.
Revenues gained by a company through productivity will be hard to notice because there might be losses in other
divisions/departments of the company. So it is again hard to measure the profits made only through investments in
productivity.
There is complexity in designing, administering and maintaining IT systems. IT projects, especially software
development, are notorious for cost overruns and schedule delays. Adding to cost are rapid obsolescence of
equipment and software, incompatible software and network platforms and issues with security such as data theft
and viruses. This causes constant spending for replacement. One time changes also occur, such as the Year 2000
problem and the changeover from Novell NetWare by many companies.
Other economists have made a more controversial charge against the utility of computers: that they pale into
insignificance as a source of productivity advantage when compared to the industrial revolution, electrification,
infrastructures (canals and waterways, railroads, highway system), Fordist mass production and the replacement of
human and animal power with machines. High productivity growth occurred from last decades of the 19th century
until the 1973, with a peak from 1929 to 1973, then declined to levels of the early 19th century. There was a rebound
in productivity after 2000. Much of the productivity from 1985 to 2000 came in the computer and related industries.
A number of explanations of this have been advanced, including:
The tendency at least initially of computer technology to be used for applications that have little impact on
overall productivity, e.g. word processing.
Inefficiencies arising from running manual paper-based and computer-based processes in parallel, requiring two
separate sets of activities and human effort to mediate between them usually considered a technology alignment
problem
Poor user interfaces that confuse users, prevent or slow access to time-saving facilities, are internally inconsistent
both with each other and with terms used in work processes a concern addressed in part by enterprise taxonomy
Extremely poor hardware and related boot image control standards that forced users into endless "fixes" as
operating systems and applications clashed addressed in part by single board computers and simpler more
automated re-install procedures, and the rise of software specifically to solve this problem, e.g. Norton Ghost
Technology-driven change driven by companies such as Microsoft which profit directly from more rapid
"upgrades"
An emphasis on presentation technology and even persuasion technology such as PowerPoint, at the direct
expense of core business processes and learning addressed in some companies including IBM and Sun
Microsystems by creating a PowerPoint-Free ZoneWikipedia:Citation needed
The blind assumption that introducing new technology must be good
The fact that computers handle office functions that, in most cases, are not related to the actual production of
goods and services.
Factories were automated decades before computers. Adding computer control to existing factories resulted in
only slight productivity gains in most cases.
A paper by Triplett (1999) reviews Solows paradox from seven other often given explanations. They are:
You dont see computers everywhere, in a meaningful economic sense
You only think you see computers everywhere
You may not see computers everywhere, but in the industrial sectors where you most see them, output is poorly
measured
Whether or not you see computer everywhere, some of what they do is not counted in economic statistics
You dont see computers in the productivity yet, but wait a bit and you will
81
82
You see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics because computers are not as productive as you
think
There is no paradox: some economists are counting innovations and new products on an arithmetic scale when
they should count on a logarithmic scale.
Effects of economic sector share changes

Gordon J. Bjork points out that manufacturing productivity gains continued, although at a decreasing rate than in
decades past; however, the cost reductions in manufacturing shank the sector size. The services and government
sectors, where productivity growth is very low, gained in share, dragging down the overall productivity number.
Because government services are priced at cost with no value added, government productivity growth is near zero as
an artifact of the way in which it is measured. Bjork also points out that manufacturing uses more capital per unit of
output than government or services.
Miscellaneous causes
Before computers: Data processing with unit record equipment
Main articles: Unit record equipment and Plugboard
Early IBM tabulating machine. Common

applications were accounts receivable, payroll
and billing.
When computers for general business applications

appeared in the 1950s, a sophisticated industry for data
processing existed in the form of unit record
equipment. These systems processed data on punched
cards by running the cards through tabulating
machines, the holes in the cards allowing electrical
contact to activate relays and solenoids to keep a count.
The flow of punched cards could be arranged in various
program-like sequences to allow sophisticated data
processing. Some unit record equipment was
programmable by wiring a plug board, with the plug
boards being removable allowing for quick replacement
with another pre-wired program.
In 1949 vacuum tube calculators were added to unit
record equipment. In 1955 the first completely
transistorized calculator with magnetic cores for
dynamic memory, the IBM 608, was introduced.
Control panel for an IBM 402 Accounting Machine
The first computers were an improvement over unit

record equipment, but not by a great amount. This was
partly due to low level software used, low performance
capability and failure of vacuum tubes and other
components. Also, the data input to early computers
used punched cards. Most of these hardware and
software shortcomings were solved by the late 1960s,
but punched cards did not become fully displaced until
the 1980s.
Analog process control

Computers did not revolutionize manufacturing because automation, in the form of control systems, had already
been in existence for decades, although computers did allow more sophisticated control, which led to improved
product quality and process optimization. Pre-computer control was known as analog control and computerized
control is called digital.
Parasitic losses of cashless transactions

Credit card transactions now represent a large percentage of low value transactions on which credit card companies
charge merchants. Most of such credit card transactions are more of a habit than an actual need for credit and to the
extent that such purchases represent convenience or lack of planning to carry cash on the part of consumers, these
transactions add a layer of unnecessary expense. However, debit or check card transactions are cheaper than
processing paper checks.
Online commerce
Despite high expectations for online retail sales, individual item and small quantity handling and transportation costs
may offset the savings of not having to maintain "bricks and mortar" stores.Wikipedia:Citation needed Online retail
sales has proven successful in specialty items, collectibles and higher priced goods. Some airline and hotel retailers
and aggregators have also witnessed great success.
Online commerce has been extremely successful in banking, airline, hotel, and rental car reservations, to name a few.
Restructured office
The personal computer restructured the office by reducing the secretarial and clerical staffs. Prior to computers,
secretaries transcribed Dictaphone recordings or live speech into shorthand, and typed the information, typically a
memo or letter. All filing was done with paper copies.
A new position in the office staff was the information technologist, or department. With networking came
information overload in the form of e-mail, with some office workers receiving several hundred each day, most of
which are not necessary information for the recipient.
Some hold that one of the main productivity boosts from information technology is still to come: large-scale
reductions in traditional offices as home offices become widespread, but this requires large and major changes in
work culture and remains to be proven.
Cost overruns of software projects

It is well known by software developers that projects typically run over budget and finish behind schedule.
Software development is typically for new applications that are unique. The project's analyst is responsible for
interviewing the stakeholders, individually and in group meetings, to gather the requirements and incorporate them
into a logical format for review by the stakeholders and developers. This sequence is repeated in successive
iterations, with partially completed screens available for review in the latter stages.
Unfortunately, stakeholders often have a vague idea of what the functionality should be, and tend to add a lot of
unnecessary features, resulting in schedule delays and cost overruns.
83
Qualifications
By the late 1990s there were some signs that productivity in the workplace been improved by the introduction of IT,
especially in the United States. In fact, Erik Brynjolfsson and his colleagues found a significant positive relationship
between IT investments and productivity, at least when these investments were made to complement organizational
changes.[3][4][5] A large share of the productivity gains outside the IT-equipment industry itself have been in retail,
wholesale and finance. A major advance was computerized stock market transaction processing, which replaced the
system that had been in place since the Civil War but by the last half of 1968 caused the U. S. stock market to close
most Wednesday afternoons processing.
Computers revolutionized accounting, billing, record keeping and many other office functions; however, early
computers used punched cards for data and programming input. Until the 1980s it was common to receive monthly
utility bills printed on a punched card that was returned with the customers payment.
In 1973 IBM introduced point of sale (POS) terminals in which electronic cash registers were networked to the store
mainframe computer. By the 1980s bar code readers were added. These technologies automated inventory
management. Wal-Mart Stores was an early adopter of POS.
Computers also greatly increased productivity of the communications sector, especially in areas like the elimination
of telephone operators. In engineering, computers replaced manual drafting with CAD and software was developed
for calculations used in electronic circuits, stress analysis, heat and material balances, etc.
Automated teller machines (ATMs) became popular in recent decades and self checkout at retailers appeared in the
1990s.
The Airline Reservations System and banking are areas where computers are practically essential. Modern military
systems also rely on computers.
References
[1] Robert Solow, "We'd better watch out", New York Times Book Review, July 12, 1987, page 36. See here (http:/ / www. standupeconomist.
com/ pdf/ misc/ solow-computer-productivity. pdf).
[2] David P.A., "The Dynamo and the Computer: A Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox", American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings, 1990, 35561
[3] E.Brynjolfsson and L.Hitt, "Beyond the Productivity Paradox: Computers are the Catalyst for Bigger Changes", CACM, August 1998
[4] E. Brynjolfsson, S. Yang, The Intangible Costs and Benefits of Computer Investments: Evidence from the Financial Markets, MIT Sloan
School of Management, December 1999
[5] Paolo Magrassi, A.Panarella, B.Hayward, The 'IT and Economy' Discussion: A Review, GartnerGroup, Stamford (CT), USA, June 2002 [1]
Further reading
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Lorin Hitt (June 2003). "Computing Productivity: Firm Level Evidence" (http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=290325). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4210-01.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Adam Saunders (2010). Wired for Innovation: How Information Technology is Reshaping
the Economy (http://digital.mit.edu/erik/Wired4innovation.html). MIT Press.
Greenwood, Jeremy (1997). The Third Industrial Revolution: Technology, Productivity and Income Inequality
(http://www.econ.rochester.edu/Faculty/GreenwoodPapers/third.pdf). AEI Press.
Landauer, Thomas K. (1995). The trouble with computers: Usefulness, usability and productivity. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press. ISBN0-262-62108-8.
Alian Pinsonneault & Suzanne Rivard (1998). "Information Technology and the Nature of Managerial Work:
From the Productivity paradox to the Icarus Paradox". MIS Quarterly 22 (3): 287311.
Triplett, Jack E. (1999). "The solow productivity paradox: what do computers do to productivity" (http://www.
csls.ca/journals/sisspp/v32n2_04.pdf). Canadian Journal of Economics 32 (2): 309334.
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Stratopoulos, Theophanis, and Bruce Dehning (2000). "Does successful investment in information technology
solve the productivity paradox?". Information & Management: 113.

The St. Petersburg lottery or St. Petersburg paradox[1] is a paradox related to probability and decision theory in
economics. It is based on a particular (theoretical) lottery game that leads to a random variable with infinite expected
value (i.e., infinite expected payoff) but nevertheless seems to be worth only a very small amount to the participants.
The St. Petersburg paradox is a situation where a naive decision criterion which takes only the expected value into
account predicts a course of action that presumably no actual person would be willing to take. Several resolutions are
possible.
The paradox is named from Daniel Bernoulli's presentation of the problem and his solution, published in 1738 in the
Commentaries of the Imperial Academy of Science of Saint Petersburg (Bernoulli 1738). However, the problem was
invented by Daniel's cousin Nicolas Bernoulli who first stated it in a letter to Pierre Raymond de Montmort on
September 9, 1713 (de Montmort 1713).
The paradox
A casino offers a game of chance for a single player in which a fair coin is tossed at each stage. The pot starts at 2
dollars and is doubled every time a head appears. The first time a tail appears, the game ends and the player wins
whatever is in the pot. Thus the player wins 2 dollars if a tail appears on the first toss, 4 dollars if a head appears on
the first toss and a tail on the second, 8 dollars if a head appears on the first two tosses and a tail on the third, 16
dollars if a head appears on the first three tosses and a tail on the fourth, and so on. In short, the player wins 2k
dollars, where k equals number of tosses. What would be a fair price to pay the casino for entering the game?
To answer this, we need to consider what would be the average payout: with probability 1/2, the player wins 2
dollars; with probability 1/4 the player wins 4 dollars; with probability 1/8 the player wins 8 dollars, and so on. The
expected value is thus
Assuming the game can continue as long as the coin toss results in heads and in particular that the casino has
unlimited resources, this sum grows without bound and so the expected win for repeated play is an infinite amount of
money. Considering nothing but the expectated value of the net change in one's monetary wealth, one should
therefore play the game at any price if offered the opportunity. Yet, in published descriptions of the game, many
people expressed disbelief in the result. Martin quotes Ian Hacking as saying "few of us would pay even $25 to enter
such a game" and says most commentators would agree. The paradox is the discrepancy between what people seem
willing to pay to enter the game and the infinite expected value.
85
Solutions of the paradox

Several approaches have been proposed for solving the paradox.
Expected utility theory

The classical resolution of the paradox involved the explicit introduction of a utility function, an expected utility
hypothesis, and the presumption of diminishing marginal utility of money.
In Daniel Bernoulli's own words:
The determination of the value of an item must not be based on the price, but rather on the utility it yields.
There is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to the pauper than to a rich man
though both gain the same amount.
A common utility model, suggested by Bernoulli himself, is the logarithmic function U(w)=ln(w) (known as log
utility [2]). It is a function of the gamblers total wealth w, and the concept of diminishing marginal utility of money
is built into it. The expected utility hypothesis posits that a utility function exists whose expected net change is a
good criterion for real people's behavior. For each possible event, the change in utility
ln(wealthaftertheevent)-ln(wealthbeforetheevent) will be weighted by the probability of that event occurring.
Let c be the cost charged to enter the game. The expected utility of the lottery now converges to a finite value:
This formula gives an implicit relationship between the gambler's wealth and how much he should be willing to pay
to play (specifically, any c that gives a positive expected utility). For example, with log utility a millionaire should
be willing to pay up to $10.94, a person with $1000 should pay up to $5.94, a person with $2 should pay up to $2,
and a person with $0.60 should borrow $0.87 and pay up to $1.47.
Before Daniel Bernoulli published, in 1728, another Swiss mathematician, Gabriel Cramer, had already found parts
of this idea (also motivated by the St. Petersburg Paradox) in stating that
the mathematicians estimate money in proportion to its quantity, and men of good sense in proportion to the
usage that they may make of it.
He demonstrated in a letter to Nicolas Bernoulli [3] that a square root function describing the diminishing marginal
benefit of gains can resolve the problem. However, unlike Daniel Bernoulli, he did not consider the total wealth of a
person, but only the gain by the lottery.
This solution by Cramer and Bernoulli, however, is not completely satisfying, since the lottery can easily be changed
in a way such that the paradox reappears. To this aim, we just need to change the game so that it gives the (even
larger) payoff
. Again, the game should be worth an infinite amount. More generally, one can find a lottery that
allows for a variant of the St. Petersburg paradox for every unbounded utility function, as was first pointed out by
Menger (Menger 1934).
Recently, expected utility theory has been extended to arrive at more behavioral decision models. In some of these
new theories, as in cumulative prospect theory, the St. Petersburg paradox again appears in certain cases, even when
the utility function is concave, but not if it is bounded (Rieger & Wang 2006).
Probability weighting
Nicolas Bernoulli himself proposed an alternative idea for solving the paradox. He conjectured that people will
neglect unlikely events (de Montmort 1713). Since in the St. Petersburg lottery only unlikely events yield the high
prizes that lead to an infinite expected value, this could resolve the paradox. The idea of probability weighting
resurfaced much later in the work on prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. However, their
experiments indicated that, very much to the contrary, people tend to overweight small probability events. Therefore
86

the proposed solution by Nicolas Bernoulli is nowadays not considered to be satisfactory.Wikipedia:Avoid weasel
words
Cumulative prospect theory is one popular generalization of expected utility theory that can predict many behavioral
regularities (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). However, the overweighting of small probability events introduced in
cumulative prospect theory may restore the St. Petersburg paradox. Cumulative prospect theory avoids the St.
Petersburg paradox only when the power coefficient of the utility function is lower than the power coefficient of the
probability weighting function (Blavatskyy 2005). Intuitively, the utility function must not simply be concave, but it
must be concave relative to the probability weighting function to avoid the St. Petersburg paradox.
Rejection of mathematical expectation

Various authors, including Jean le Rond d'Alembert and John Maynard Keynes, have rejected maximization of
expectation (even of utility) as a proper rule of conduct. Keynes, in particular, insisted that the relative risk of an
alternative could be sufficiently high to reject it even were its expectation enormous.
Answer by sampling
There is one mathematically correct answer with sampling by William Feller (obtained in 1937). Sufficient
knowledge of probability theory and statistics is necessary to fully understand Feller's answer. However, it can be
understood intuitively because it uses the technique "to play this game with a great number of people, and to then
calculate the expectation from the sample". According to this technique, if the expectation of a game diverges, the
assumption that the game can be played in infinite time is necessary and if the number of times of the game is
limited, the expectation converges to a much smaller value.
Finite St. Petersburg lotteries

The classical St. Petersburg lottery assumes that the casino has infinite resources. This assumption is unrealistic,
particularly in connection with the paradox, which involves the reactions of ordinary people to the lottery. Of course,
the resources of an actual casino (or any other potential backer of the lottery) are finite. More importantly, the
expected value of the lottery only grows logarithmically with the resources of the casino. As a result, the expected
value of the lottery, even when played against a casino with the largest resources realistically conceivable, is quite
modest. If the total resources (or total maximum jackpot) of the casino are W dollars, then L = 1 + floor(log2(W)) is
the maximum number of times the casino can play before it no longer covers the next bet. The expected value E of
the lottery then becomes:
The following table shows the expected value E of the game with various potential bankers and their bankroll W
(with the assumption that if you win more than the bankroll you will be paid what the bank has):
87
88
Banker
Bankroll
Expected value of lottery
Friendly game
$100
$4.28
Millionaire
$1,000,000
$10.95
Billionaire
$1,000,000,000
$15.93
Bill Gates (2008)
$67,000,000,000
U.S. GDP (2007)
$13.8 trillion
$22.78
World GDP (2007) $54.3 trillion
$23.77
Googolaire
$166.50
[4] $21.77
[5]
$10100
A rational person might not find the lottery worth even the modest amounts in the above table, suggesting that the
naive decision model of the expected return causes essentially the same problems as for the infinite lottery. Even so,
the possible discrepancy between theory and reality is far less dramatic.
The assumption of infinite resources can produce other apparent paradoxes in economics. In the martingale betting
system, a gambler betting on a tossed coin doubles his bet after every loss, so that an eventual win would cover all
losses; in practice, this requires the gambler's bankroll to be infinite. The gambler's ruin concept shows a gambler
playing a negative expected value game will eventually go broke, regardless of his betting system.
Recent discussions
Although this paradox is three centuries old, papers with new and fresh ideas on how to resolve it still pop up.
Samuelson
Samuelson resolves the paradox by arguing that, even if an entity had infinite resources, the game would never be
offered. If the lottery represents an infinite expected gain to the player, then it also represents an infinite expected
loss to the host. No one could be observed paying to play the game because it would never be offered. As Paul
Samuelson describes the argument:
Paul will never be willing to give as much as Peter will demand for such a contract; and hence the indicated
activity will take place at the equilibrium level of zero intensity. (Samuelson 1960)
Peters
Ole Peters thinks that the St. Petersburg paradox can be solved by using concepts and ideas from ergodic theory
(Peters 2011a). In statistical mechanics it is a central problem to understand whether time averages resulting from a
long observation of a single system are equivalent to expectation values. This is the case only for a very limited class
of systems that are called "ergodic" there. For non-ergodic systems there is no general reason why expectation values
should have any relevance.
Peters points out that computing the naive expected payout is mathematically equivalent to considering multiple
outcomes of the same lottery in parallel universes. This is irrelevant to the individual considering whether to buy a
ticket since he exists in only one universe and is unable to exchange resources with the others. It is therefore unclear
why expected wealth should be a quantity whose maximization should lead to a sound decision theory. Indeed, the
St. Petersburg paradox is only a paradox if one accepts the premise that rational actors seek to maximize their
expected wealth. The classical resolution is to apply a utility function to the wealth, which reflects the notion that the
"usefulness" of an amount of money depends on how much of it one already has, and then to maximise the
expectation of this. The choice of utility function is often framed in terms of the individual's risk preferences and
may vary between individuals: it therefore provides a somewhat arbitrary framework for the treatment of the
89
problem.
An alternative premise, which is less arbitrary and makes fewer assumptions, is that the performance over time of an
investment better characterises an investor's prospects and, therefore, better informs his investment decision. In this
case, the passage of time is incorporated by identifying as the quantity of interest the average rate of exponential
growth of the player's wealth in a single round of the lottery,
per round, where
is the
th (positive finite) payout and
standard St. Petersburg lottery,
and
is the (non-zero) probability of receiving it. In the

.
Although this is an expectation value of a growth rate, and may therefore be thought of in one sense as an average
over parallel universes, it is in fact equivalent to the time average growth rate that would be obtained if repeated
lotteries were played over time (Peters 2011a). While is identical to the rate of change of the expected logarithmic
utility, it has been obtained without making any assumptions about the player's risk preferences or behaviour, other
than that he is interested in the rate of growth of his wealth.
Under this paradigm, an individual with wealth
should buy a ticket at a price
provided
This strategy counsels against paying any amount of money for a ticket that admits the possibility of bankruptcy, i.e.
for any
, since this generates a negatively divergent logarithm in the sum for
all other terms in the sum and guarantee that
which can be shown to dominate
. If we assume the smallest payout is
, then the individual
will always be advised to decline the ticket at any price greater than
regardless of the payout structure of the lottery. The ticket price for which the expected growth rate falls to zero will
be less than
but may be greater than , indicating that borrowing money to purchase a ticket for more than
one's wealth can be a sound decision. This would be the case, for example, where the smallest payout exceeds the
player's current wealth, as it does in Menger's game.
It should also be noted in the above treatment that, contrary to Menger's analysis, no higher-paying lottery can
generate a paradox which the time resolution - or, equivalently, Bernoulli's or Laplace's logarithmic resolutions - fail
to resolve, since there is always a price at which the lottery should not be entered, even though for especially
favourable lotteries this may be greater than one's worth.
Further discussions
The St. Petersburg paradox and the theory of marginal utility have been highly disputed in the past. For a discussion
from the point of view of a philosopher, see (Martin 2004).
References and notes

Citations
[1] Conceptual foundations of risk theory. By Michael D. Weiss, United States. Dept. of Agriculture. Economic Research Service. p36 (http:/ /
books. google. com/ books?id=v33W8lKfOo0C& pg=PA36)
[2] http:/ / www. econterms. com/ glossary. cgi?query=log+ utility
[3] http:/ / www. cs. xu. edu/ math/ Sources/ Montmort/ stpetersburg. pdf#search=%22Nicolas%20Bernoulli%22
[4] The estimated net worth of Bill Gates is from Forbes.
[5] The GDP data are as estimated for 2007 by the International Monetary Fund, where one trillion dollars equals $1012 (one million times one
million dollars).
Works cited

Arrow, Kenneth J. (February 1974). "The use of unbounded utility functions in expected-utility maximization:
Response" (http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v88y1974i1p136-38.html) (PDF). Quarterly Journal of
Economics (The MIT Press) 88 (1): 136138. doi: 10.2307/1881800 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1881800).
JSTOR 1881800 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1881800). Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:88:y:1974:i:1:p:136-38.
Bernoulli, Daniel; Originally published in 1738; translated by Dr. Louise Sommer. (January 1954). "Exposition of
a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk" (http://www.math.fau.edu/richman/Ideas/daniel.htm).
Econometrica (The Econometric Society) 22 (1): 2236. doi: 10.2307/1909829 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
1909829). JSTOR 1909829 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909829). Retrieved 2006-05-30.
Blavatskyy, Pavlo (April 2005). "Back to the St. Petersburg Paradox?". Management Science 51 (4): 677678.
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0352 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0352).
de Montmort, Pierre Remond (1713). Essay d'analyse sur les jeux de hazard [Essays on the analysis of games of
chance] (Reprinted in 2006) (in (French)) (Second ed.). Providence, Rhode Island: American Mathematical
Society. ISBN978-0-8218-3781-8. as translated and posted at Pulskamp, Richard J. "Correspondence of Nicolas
Bernoulli concerning the St. Petersburg Game" (http://www.cs.xu.edu/math/Sources/Montmort/stpetersburg.
pdf) ( PDF(88KB)). Retrieved July 22, 2010.
Laplace, Pierre Simon (1814). Thorie analytique des probabilits [Analytical theory of probabilities] (in
(French)) (Second ed.). Paris: Ve. Courcier.
Martin, Robert (2004). "The St. Petersburg Paradox" (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/
paradox-stpetersburg/). In Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 ed.). Stanford,
California: Stanford University. ISSN 1095-5054 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/1095-5054). Retrieved
2006-05-30.
Menger, Karl (August 1934). "Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Wertlehre Betrachtungen im Anschlu an das
sogenannte Petersburger Spiel". Zeitschrift fr Nationalkonomie 5 (4): 459485. doi: 10.1007/BF01311578
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01311578). ISSN 0931-8658 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0931-8658).
(Paper) (Online).
Peters, Ole (October 2011b). "Menger 1934 revisited" (http://arxiv.org/pdf/1110.1578v1.pdf). Journal of
Economic Literature.
Peters, Ole (2011a). "The time resolution of the St Petersburg paradox" (http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/
content/369/1956/4913.full.pdf). Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369: 49134931. doi:
10.1098/rsta.2011.0065 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2011.0065).
Pianca, Paolo (September 2007). "The St. Petersburg Paradox: Historical Exposition, an Application to Growth
Stocks and Some Simulation Approaches" (http://www.dma.unive.it/quaderni/QD24-2007.pdf). Quaderni Di
Didattica, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice 24: 115.
Rieger, Marc Oliver; Wang, Mei (August 2006). "Cumulative prospect theory and the St. Petersburg paradox".
Economic Theory 28 (3): 665679. doi: 10.1007/s00199-005-0641-6 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s00199-005-0641-6). ISSN 0938-2259 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0938-2259). (Paper) (Online). (
Publicly accessible, older version. (http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp04-28.pdf))
Samuelson, Paul (January 1960). "The St. Petersburg Paradox as a Divergent Double Limit". International
Economic Review (Blackwell Publishing) 1 (1): 3137. doi: 10.2307/2525406 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
2525406). JSTOR 2525406 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2525406).
Samuelson, Paul (March 1977). "St. Petersburg Paradoxes: Defanged, Dissected, and Historically Described".
Journal of Economic Literature (American Economic Association) 15 (1): 2455. JSTOR 2722712 (http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2722712).
Todhunter, Isaac (1865). A history of the mathematical theory of probabilities. Macmillan & Co.
90

Tversky, Amos; Kahneman (1992). "Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty".
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 297323. doi: 10.1007/bf00122574 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
bf00122574).
Bibliography
Aumann, Robert J. (April 1977). "The St. Petersburg paradox: A discussion of some recent comments". Journal
of Economic Theory 14 (2): 443445. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90143-0 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
0022-0531(77)90143-0).
Durand, David (September 1957). "Growth Stocks and the Petersburg Paradox". The Journal of Finance
(American Finance Association) 12 (3): 348363. doi: 10.2307/2976852 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
Feller, William. An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications Volume I,II.
"Bernoulli and the St. Petersburg Paradox" (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/uncert/bernoulhyp.htm).
The History of Economic Thought. The New School for Social Research, New York. Retrieved 2006-05-30.
Haigh, John (1999). Taking Chances. Oxford,UK: Oxford University Press. p.330. ISBN0198526636.(Chapter
4)
External links
Online simulation of the St. Petersburg lottery (http://www.mathematik.com/Petersburg/Petersburg.html)
91
92
Logic
The horse paradox is a falsidical paradox that arises from flawed demonstrations, which purport to use
mathematical induction, of the statement All horses are the same color. There is no actual contradiction, as these
arguments have a crucial flaw that makes them incorrect. This example was used by Joel E. Cohen as an example of
the subtle errors that can occur in attempts to prove statements by induction.[1]
The argument
The argument is proof by induction. First we establish a base case for one horse (
horses have the same color, then
). We then prove that if
horses must also have the same color.
Base case: One horse

The case with just one horse is trivial. If there is only one horse in the "group", then clearly all horses in that group
have the same color.
Inductive step
Assume that
horses always are the same color. Let us consider a group consisting of
horses.
First, exclude the last horse and look only at the first horses; all these are the same color since horses always
are the same color. Likewise, exclude the first horse and look only at the last horses. These too, must also be of
the same color. Therefore, the first horse in the group is of the same color as the horses in the middle, who in turn are
of the same color as the last horse. Hence the first horse, middle horses, and last horse are all of the same color, and
we have proven that:
If
horses have the same color, then
horses will also have the same color.
We already saw in the base case that the rule ("all horses have the same color") was valid for
step showed that since the rule is valid for
rule is valid for
, it must also be valid for
. The inductive
, which in turn implies that the
and so on.
Thus in any group of horses, all horses must be the same color.
Explanation
The argument above makes the implicit assumption that the two subsets of horses to which the induction assumption
is applied have a common element. This is not true when the original set (prior to either removal) only contains two
horses.
Let the two horses be horse A and horse B. When horse A is removed, it is true that the remaining horses in the set
are the same color (only horse B remains). If horse B is removed instead, this leaves a different set containing only
horse A, which may or may not be the same color as horse B.
The problem in the argument is the assumption that because each of these two sets contains only one color of horses,
the original set also contained only one color of horses. Because there are no common elements (horses) in the two
sets, it is unknown whether the two horses share the same color. The proof forms a falsidical paradox; it seems to
show something manifestly false by valid reasoning, but in fact the reasoning is flawed.
References
[1] . Reprinted in A Random Walk in Science (R. L. Weber, ed.), Crane, Russak & Co., 1973.
References
Enumerative Combinatorics by George E. Martin, ISBN 0-387-95225-X
Barbershop paradox
This article is about a paradox in the theory of logical conditionals introduced by Lewis Carroll in "A Logical
Paradox [1]". For an unrelated paradox of self-reference with a similar name, attributed to Bertrand Russell, see
Barber paradox.
The Barbershop paradox was proposed by Lewis Carroll in a three-page essay titled "A Logical Paradox", which
appeared in the July 1894 issue of Mind. The name comes from the "ornamental" short story that Carroll uses to
illustrate the paradox (although it had appeared several times in more abstract terms in his writing and
correspondence before the story was published). Carroll claimed that it illustrated "a very real difficulty in the
Theory of Hypotheticals" in use at the time. Modern logicians would not regard it as a paradox but simply as a
logical error on the part of Carroll.
The paradox
Briefly, the story runs as follows: Uncle Joe and Uncle Jim are walking to the barber shop. There are three barbers
who live and work in the shopAllen, Brown, and Carrbut not all of them are always in the shop. Carr is a good
barber, and Uncle Jim is keen to be shaved by him. He knows that the shop is open, so at least one of them must be
in. He also knows that Allen is a very nervous man, so that he never leaves the shop without Brown going with him.
Uncle Joe insists that Carr is certain to be in, and then claims that he can prove it logically. Uncle Jim demands the
proof. Uncle Joe reasons as follows.
Suppose that Carr is out. If Carr is out, then if Allen is also out Brown would have to be in, since someone must be in
the shop for it to be open. However, we know that whenever Allen goes out he takes Brown with him, and thus we
know as a general rule that if Allen is out, Brown is out. So if Carr is out then the statements "if Allen is out then
Brown is in" and "if Allen is out then Brown is out" would both be true at the same time.
Uncle Joe notes that this seems paradoxical; the two "hypotheticals" seem "incompatible" with each other. So, by
contradiction, Carr must logically be in.
However, the correct conclusion to draw from the incompatibility of the two "hypotheticals" is that what is
hypothesised in them ( that Allen is out) must be false under our assumption that Carr is out. Then our logic simply
allows us to arrive at the conclusion "If Carr is out, then Allen must necessarily be in".
93
Barbershop paradox
94
Simplification
Carroll wrote this story to illustrate a controversy in the field of logic that was raging at the time .Wikipedia:Citation
needed His vocabulary and writing style can easily add to the confusion of the core issue for modern readers.
Notation
When reading the original it may help to keep the following in mind:
What Carroll called "hypotheticals" modern logicians call "logical conditionals".
Whereas Uncle Joe concludes his proof reductio ad absurdum, modern mathematicians would more commonly
claim "proof by contradiction".
What Carroll calls the protasis of a conditional is now known as the antecedent, and similarly the apodosis is now
called the consequent.
Symbols can be used to greatly simplify logical statements such as those inherent in this story:
Operator (Name) Colloquial
Symbolic
Negation
NOT
not X
Conjunction
AND
X and Y
XY
Disjunction
OR
X or Y
XY
Conditional
IF ... THEN if X then Y
XY
Note: X Y (also known as "Implication") can be read many ways in English, from "X is sufficient for Y" to "Y
follows from X." (See also Table of mathematical symbols.)
Restatement
To aid in restating Carroll's story more simply, we will take the following atomic statements:
A = Allen is in the shop
B = Brown is in
C = Carr is in
So, for instance (A B) represents "Allen is out and Brown is in"
Uncle Jim gives us our two axioms:
1. There is at least one barber in the shop now (A B C)
2. Allen never leaves the shop without Brown (A B)
Uncle Joe presents a proof:
Abbreviated English with logical markers
Mainly Symbolic
Suppose Carr is NOT in.
H0: C
Given NOT C, IF Allen is NOT in THEN Brown must be in, to satisfy Axiom 1(A1).
By H0 and A1, A B
But Axiom 2(A2) gives that it is universally true that IF Allen

is Not in THEN Brown is Not in (it's always true that if A then B)
By A2, A B
So far we have that NOT C yields both (Not A THEN B) AND (Not A THEN Not B). Thus C ( (A B) (A B) )
Uncle Joe claims that these are contradictory.
Therefore Carr must be in.
Uncle Joe basically makes the argument that (A B) and (A B) are contradictory, saying that the same
antecedent cannot result in two different consequents.
Barbershop paradox
95
This purported contradiction is the crux of Joe's "proof." Carroll presents this intuition-defying result as a paradox,
hoping that the contemporary ambiguity would be resolved.
Discussion
In modern logic theory this scenario is not a paradox. The law of implication reconciles what Uncle Joe claims are
incompatible hypotheticals. This law states that "if X then Y" is logically identical to "X is false or Y is true" (X
Y). For example, given the statement "if you press the button then the light comes on", it must be true at any given
moment that either you have not pressed the button, or the light is on.
In short, what obtains is not that C yields a contradiction, only that it necessitates A, because A is what actually
yields the contradiction.
In this scenario, that means Carr doesn't have to be in, but that if he isn't in, Allen has to be in.
Simplifying to Axiom 1
Applying the law of implication to the offending conditionals shows that rather than contradicting each other one
simply reiterates the fact that since the shop is open one or more of Allen, Brown or Carr is in and the other puts very
little restriction on who can or cannot be in shop.
To see this let's attack Jim's large "contradictory" result, mainly by applying the law of implication repeatedly. First
let's break down one of the two offending conditionals:
"If Allen is out, then Brown is out"
(A B)
"Allen is in or Brown is out"
(A B)
Substituting this into

"IF Carr is out, THEN If Allen is also out Then Brown is in AND If Allen is out Then Brown is
out."
C ( (A B) (A B)
)
Which yields, with continued application of the law of implication,

"IF Carr is out, THEN if Allen is also out, Brown is in AND either Allen is in OR Brown is out."
"IF Carr is out, THEN both of these are true: Allen is in OR Brown is in AND Allen is in OR Brown
is out."
"Carr is in OR both of these are true: Allen is in OR Brown is in AND Allen is in OR Brown is out."
C ( (A B) (A
B) )
C ( (A B) (A B) )
C ( (A B) (A B) )
And finally, (on the right we are distributing over the parentheses)
"Carr is in OR Either Allen is in OR Brown is in, AND Carr is in OR Either Allen is in OR Brown is
out."
C (A B) C (A
B)
"Inclusively, Carr is in OR Allen is in OR Brown is in, AND Inclusively, Carr is in OR Allen is in OR

Brown is out."
(C A B) (C A
B)
So the two statements which become true at once are: "One or more of Allen, Brown or Carr is in," which is simply
Axiom 1, and "Carr is in or Allen is in or Brown is out." Clearly one way that both of these statements can become
true at once is in the case where Allen is in (because Allen's house is the barber shop, and at some point Brown left
the shop).
Another way to describe how (X Y) (X Y) resolves this into a valid set of statements is to rephrase Jim's
statement that "If Allen is also out ..." into "If Carr is out and Allen is out then Brown is in" ( (C A) B).
Barbershop paradox
96
Showing conditionals compatible

The two conditionals are not logical opposites: to prove by contradiction Jim needed to show C (Z Z), where
Z happens to be a conditional.
The opposite of (A B) is (A B), which, using De Morgan's Law, resolves to (A B), which is not at all the
same thing as (A B), which is what A B reduces to.
This confusion about the "compatibility" of these two conditionals was foreseen by Carroll, who includes a mention
of it at the end of the story. He attempts to clarify the issue by arguing that the protasis and apodosis of the
implication "If Carr is in ..." are "incorrectly divided." However, application of the Law of Implication removes the
"If ..." entirely (reducing to disjunctions), so no protasis and apodosis exist and no counter-argument is needed.
Notes
[1] http:/ / fair-use. org/ mind/ 1894/ 07/ notes/ a-logical-paradox
Further reading
Russell, Bertrand (1903). "Chapter II. Symbolic Logic" (http://fair-use.org/bertrand-russell/
the-principles-of-mathematics/s.19#s19n1). The Principles of Mathematics. p. 19 n. 1. ISBN0-415-48741-2.
Russell suggests a truth-functional notion of logical conditionals, which (among other things) entails that a false
proposition will imply all propositions. In a note he mentions that his theory of implication would dissolve
Carroll's paradox, since it not only allows, but in fact requires that both "p implies q" and "p implies not-q" be
true, so long as p is not true.
Carroll's paradox
This article is about the physical paradox. For the Lewis Carroll dialogue, see What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.
In physics, Carroll's paradox arises when considering the motion of a falling rigid rod that is specially constrained.
Considered one way, the angular momentum stays constant; considered in a different way, it changes. It is named
after Michael M. Carroll who first published it in 1984.
Explanation
Consider two concentric circles of radius
uniform rigid heavy rod of length
and
as might be drawn on the face of a wall clock. Suppose a
is somehow constrained between these two circles so that one end
of the rod remains on the inner circle and the other remains on the outer circle. Motion of the rod along these circles,
acting as guides, is frictionless. The rod is held in the three o'clock position so that it is horizontal, then released.
Now consider the angular momentum about the centre of the rod:
1. After release, the rod falls. Being constrained, it must rotate as it moves. When it gets to a vertical six o'clock
position, it has lost potential energy and, because the motion is frictionless, will have gained kinetic energy. It
therefore possesses angular momentum.
2. The reaction force on the rod from either circular guide is frictionless, so it must be directed along the rod; there
can be no component of the reaction force perpendicular to the rod. Taking moments about the center of the rod,
there can be no moment acting on the rod, so its angular momentum remains constant. Because the rod starts with
zero angular momentum, it must continue to have zero angular momentum for all time.
An apparent resolution of this paradox is that the physical situation cannot occur. To maintain the rod in a radial
position the circles have to exert an infinite force. In real life it would not be possible to construct guides that do not
Carroll's paradox
exert a significant reaction force perpendicular to the rod. Victor Namias, however, disputed that infinite forces
occur, and argued that a finitely thick rod experiences torque about its center of mass even in the limit as it
approaches zero width.
References
Carroll, Michael M. (November 1984). "Singular constraints in rigid-body dynamics". American Journal of
Physics 52 (11): 10101012. Bibcode: 1984AmJPh..52.1010C (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1984AmJPh..
52.1010C). doi: 10.1119/1.13777 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.13777).
Namias, Victor (May 1986). "On an apparent paradox in the motion of a smoothly constrained rod". American
Journal of Physics 54 (5): 440445. Bibcode: 1986AmJPh..54..440N (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/
1986AmJPh..54..440N). doi: 10.1119/1.14610 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.14610).
Felszeghy, Stephen F. (1986). "On so-called singular constraints in rigid-body dynamics". American Journal of
Physics 54: 585586. Bibcode: 1986AmJPh..54..585F (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1986AmJPh..54..
585F). doi: 10.1119/1.14533 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.14533).
Crocodile Dilemma
The crocodile paradox is a paradox in logic in the same family of paradoxes as the liar paradox. The premise states
that a crocodile, who has stolen a child, promises the father that his son will be returned if and only if he can
correctly predict whether or not the crocodile will return the child.
The transaction is logically smooth but unpredictable if the father guesses that the child will be returned, but a
dilemma arises for the crocodile if he guesses that the child will not be returned. In the case that the crocodile
decides to keep the child, he violates his terms: the father's prediction has been validated, and the child should be
returned. However, in the case that the crocodile decides to give back the child, he still violates his terms, even if this
decision is based on the previous result: the father's prediction has been falsified, and the child should not be
returned. The question of what the crocodile should do is therefore paradoxical, and there is no justifiable solution.
The crocodile dilemma serves to expose some of the logical problems presented by metaknowledge. In this regard, it
is similar in construction to the unexpected hanging paradox, which Richard Montague(1960) used to demonstrate
that the following assumptions about knowledge are inconsistent when tested in combination:
(i) If is known to be true, then .
(ii) It is known that (i).
(iii) If implies , and is known to be true, then is also known to be true.
It also bears similarities to the liar paradox. Ancient Greek sources were the first to discuss the crocodile dilemma.
Notes
97
Drinker paradox
98
Drinker paradox
The drinker paradox (also known as drinker's principle or (the) drinking principle) is a theorem of classical
predicate logic, usually stated in natural language as: There is someone in the pub such that, if he is drinking,
everyone in the pub is drinking. The actual theorem is
where D is an arbitrary predicate and P is an arbitrary set. The paradox was popularised by the mathematical logician
Raymond Smullyan, who called it the "drinking principle" in his 1978 book What Is the Name of this Book?
Proofs of the paradox

The proof begins by recognizing it is true that either everyone in the pub is drinking, or at least one person in the pub
is not drinking. Consequently, there are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose everyone is drinking. For any particular person, it cannot be wrong to say that if that particular person is
drinking, then everyone in the pub is drinking because everyone is drinking. Because everyone is drinking,
then that one person must drink because when ' that person ' drinks ' everybody ' drinks, everybody includes that
person.
2. Suppose that at least one person is not drinking. For any particular nondrinking person, it still cannot be wrong to
say that if that particular person is drinking, then everyone in the pub is drinking because that person is, in
fact, not drinking. In this case the condition is false, so the statement is vacuously true due to the nature of
material implication in formal logic, which states that "If P, then Q" is always true if P (the condition or
antecedent) is false.
Either way, there is someone in the pub such that, if he is drinking, everyone in the pub is drinking. A slightly more
formal way of expressing the above is to say that if everybody drinks then anyone can be the witness for the validity
of the theorem. And if someone does not drink, then that particular non-drinking individual can be the witness to the
theorem's validity.
The proof above is essentially model-theoretic (can be formalized as such). A purely syntactic proof is possible and
can even be mechanized (in Otter for example), but only for an equisatisfiable rather than an equivalent negation of
the theorem.[1] Namely, the negation of the theorem is
which is equivalent with the prenex normal form
By Skolemization the above is equisatisfiable with
The resolution of the two clauses
and
results in an empty set of clauses (i.e. a contradiction),
thus proving the negation of the theorem is unsatisfiable. The resolution is slightly non-straightforward because it
involves a search based on Herbrand's theorem for ground instances that are propositionally unsatisfiable. The bound
variable x is first instantiated with a constant d (making use of the assumption that the domain is non-empty),
resulting in the Herbrand universe:
One can sketch the following natural deduction:
Drinker paradox
99
Or spelled out:
1. Instantiating x with d yields
2. x is then instantiated with f(d) yielding
Observe that
and
which implies
which implies
unify syntactically in their predicate arguments. An (automated) search
thus finishes in two steps:

1.
2.
The proof by resolution given here uses the law of excluded middle, the axiom of choice, and non-emptiness of the
domain as premises.
Discussion
This proof illustrates several properties of classical predicate logic that do not always agree with ordinary language.
Excluded middle
The above proof begins by saying that either everyone is drinking, or someone is not drinking. This uses the validity
of excluded middle for the statement
"everyone is drinking", which is always available in classical logic. If the
logic does not admit arbitrary excluded middlefor example if the logic is intuitionisticthen the truth of
must first be established, i.e.,
must be shown to be decidable.
Material versus indicative conditional

Most important to the paradox is that the conditional in classical (and intuitionistic) logic is the material conditional.
It has the property that
is true if B is true or if A is false (in classical logic, but not intuitionistic logic, this
is also a necessary condition).
So as it was applied here, the statement "if he is drinking, everyone is drinking" was taken to be correct in one case,
if everyone was drinking, and in the other case, if he was not drinking even though his drinking may not have had
anything to do with anyone else's drinking.
In natural language, on the other hand, typically "if...then..." is used as an indicative conditional.
Non-empty domain
It is not necessary to assume there was anyone in the pub. The assumption that the domain is non-empty is built into
the inference rules of classical predicate logic. We can deduce
from
, but of course if the domain
were empty (in this case, if there were nobody in the pub), the proposition
is not well-formed for any closed
expression .
Nevertheless, if we allow empty domains we still have something like the drinker paradox in the form of the
theorem:
Or in words:
If there is anyone in the pub at all, then there is someone such that, if he is drinking, then everyone in the pub
is drinking.
Drinker paradox
Temporal aspects
Although not discussed in formal terms by Smullyan, he hints that the verb "drinks" is also ambiguous by citing a
postcard written to him by two of his students, which contains the following dialogue (emphasis in original):
Logician / I know a fellow who is such that whenever he drinks, everyone does.
Student / I just don't understand. Do you mean, everyone on earth?
Logician / Yes, naturally.
Student / That sounds crazy! You mean as soon as he drinks, at just that moment, everyone does?
Logician / Of course.
Student / But that implies that at some time, everyone was drinking at once. Surely that never happened!
History and variations

Smullyan in his 1978 book attributes the naming of "The Drinking Principle" to his graduate students. He also
discusses variants (obtained by substituting D with other, more dramatic predicates):
"there is a woman on earth such that if she becomes sterile, the whole human race will die out." Smullyan writes
that this formulation emerged from a conversation he had with philosopher John Bacon.
A "dual" version of the Principle: "there is at least one person such that if anybody drinks, then he does."
As "Smullyan's Drinkers principle" or just "Drinkers' principle" it appears in H.P. Barendregt's "The quest for
correctness" (1996), accompanied by some machine proofs. Since then it has made regular appearance as an example
in publications about automated reasoning; it is sometimes used to contrast the expressiveness of proof assistants.[2]
References
[1] Marc Bezem , Dimitri Hendriks (2008) Clausification in Coq (http:/ / igitur-archive. library. uu. nl/ lg/ 2008-0402-200713/ preprint187. pdf)
[2] Freek Wiedijk. 2001. Mizar Light for HOL Light (http:/ / www. cs. ru. nl/ ~freek/ mizar/ miz. pdf). In Proceedings of the 14th International
Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs '01), Richard J. Boulton and Paul B. Jackson (Eds.). Springer-Verlag,
London, UK, 378-394.
100
Infinite regress
Infinite regress
For the Star Trek: Voyager episode, see Infinite Regress.
An infinite regress in a series of propositions arises if the truth of proposition P1 requires the support of proposition
P2, the truth of proposition P2 requires the support of proposition P3, ... , and the truth of proposition Pn-1 requires
the support of proposition Pn and n approaches infinity.
Distinction is made between infinite regresses that are "vicious" and those that are not.
Aristotle
Aristotle argued that knowing does not necessitate an infinite regress because some knowledge does not depend on
demonstration:
Some hold that, owing to the necessity of knowing the primary premises, there is no scientific knowledge.
Others think there is, but that all truths are demonstrable. Neither doctrine is either true or a necessary
deduction from the premises. The first school, assuming that there is no way of knowing other than by
demonstration, maintain that an infinite regress is involved, on the ground that if behind the prior stands no
primary, we could not know the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right, for one cannot traverse an
infinite series): if on the other hand they say the series terminates and there are primary premises, yet these
are unknowable because incapable of demonstration, which according to them is the only form of knowledge.
And since thus one cannot know the primary premises, knowledge of the conclusions which follow from them
is not pure scientific knowledge nor properly knowing at all, but rests on the mere supposition that the
premises are true. The other party agree with them as regards knowing, holding that it is only possible by
demonstration, but they see no difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated, on the ground that
demonstration may be circular and reciprocal.
Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate
premises is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must know the prior
premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truths, those
truths must be indemonstrable.) Such, then, is our doctrine, and in addition we maintain that besides scientific
knowledge there is its original source which enables us to recognize the definitions.
Aristotle,Posterior Analytics I.3 72b1-15
Consciousness
Infinite regress in consciousness is the formation of an infinite series of "inner observers" as we ask the question of
who is observing the output of the neural correlates of consciousness in the study of subjective consciousness.
Optics
Infinite regress in optics is the formation of an infinite series of receding images created in two parallel facing
mirrors. See optical feedback.
References
101
Lottery paradox
Lottery paradox
Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.'s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000-ticket lottery that has
exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept
that some ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely only if the probability of it occurring is greater than
0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since
the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won't win eitherindeed, it is rational to accept for any
individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won't win, accepting that
ticket 2 won't win, and so on until accepting that ticket 1000 won't win: that entails that it is rational to accept that no
ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no
ticket wins.
The lottery paradox was designed to demonstrate that three attractive principles governing rational acceptance lead
to contradiction, namely that
It is rational to accept a proposition that is very likely true,
It is irrational to accept a proposition that is known to be inconsistent, and is jointly inconsistent
If it is rational to accept a proposition A and it is rational to accept another proposition A', then it is rational to
accept A & A',
The paradox remains of continuing interest because it raises several issues at the foundations of knowledge
representation and uncertain reasoning: the relationships between fallibility, corrigible belief and logical
consequence; the roles that consistency, statistical evidence and probability play in belief fixation; the precise
normative force that logical and probabilistic consistency have on rational belief.
History
Although the first published statement of the lottery paradox appears in Kyburg's 1961 Probability and the Logic of
Rational Belief, the first formulation of the paradox appears in his "Probability and Randomness," a paper delivered
at the 1959 meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, and the 1960 International Congress for the History and
Philosophy of Science, but published in the journal Theoria in 1963. This paper is reprinted in Kyburg (1987).
Smullyan's variation
Raymond Smullyan presents the following variation on the lottery paradox: You are either inconsistent or conceited.
Since the human brain is finite, there are a finite number of propositions p
1p
n that you believe. But unless you are conceited, you know that you sometimes make mistakes, and that not
everything you believe is true. Therefore, if you are not conceited, you know that at least some of the p
i are false. Yet you believe each of the p
i individually. This is an inconsistency.(Smullyan 1978, p.206)
A short guide to the literature

The lottery paradox has become a central topic within epistemology, and the enormous literature surrounding this
puzzle threatens to obscure its original purpose. Kyburg proposed the thought experiment to get across a feature of
his innovative ideas on probability (Kyburg 1961, Kyburg and Teng 2001), which are built around taking the first
two principles above seriously and rejecting the last. For Kyburg, the lottery paradox isn't really a paradox: his
solution is to restrict aggregation.
102
Lottery paradox
Even so, for orthodox probabilists the second and third principles are primary, so the first principle is rejected. Here
too you'll see claims that there is really no paradox but an error: the solution is to reject the first principle, and with it
the idea of rational acceptance. For anyone with basic knowledge of probability, the first principle should be
rejected: for a very likely event, the rational belief about that event is just that it is very likely, not that it is true.
Most of the literature in epistemology approaches the puzzle from the orthodox point of view and grapples with the
particular consequences faced by doing so, which is why the lottery is associated with discussions of skepticism
(e.g., Klein 1981), and conditions for asserting knowledge claims (e.g., J. P. Hawthorne 2004). It is common to also
find proposed resolutions to the puzzle that turn on particular features of the lottery thought experiment (e.g., Pollock
1986), which then invites comparisons of the lottery to other epistemic paradoxes, such as David Makinson's preface
paradox, and to "lotteries" having a different structure. This strategy is addressed in (Kyburg 1997) and also in
(Wheeler 2007). An extensive bibliography is included in (Wheeler 2007).
Philosophical logicians and AI researchers have tended to be interested in reconciling weakened versions of the three
principles, and there are many ways to do this, including Jim Hawthorne and Luc Bovens's (1999) logic of belief,
Gregory Wheeler's (2006) use of 1-monotone capacities, Bryson Brown's (1999) application of preservationist
paraconsistent logics, Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson's (2006) appeal to cumulative non-monotonic logics,
Horacio Arlo-Costa's (2007) use of minimal model (classical) modal logics, and Joe Halpern's (2003) use of
first-order probability.
Finally, philosophers of science, decision scientists, and statisticians are inclined to see the lottery paradox as an
early example of the complications one faces in constructing principled methods for aggregating uncertain
information, which is now a discipline of its own, with a dedicated journal, Information Fusion, in addition to
continuous contributions to general area journals.
Selected References
Arlo-Costa, H (2005). "Non-Adjunctive Inference and Classical Modalities", The Journal of Philosophical Logic,
34, 581605.
Brown, B. (1999). "Adjunction and Aggregation", Nous, 33(2), 273283.
Douven and Williamson (2006). "Generalizing the Lottery Paradox", The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 57(4), pp. 755779.
Halpern, J. (2003). Reasoning about Uncertainty, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hawthorne, J. and Bovens, L. (1999). "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief", Mind, 108: 241264.
Hawthorne, J.P. (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries, New York: Oxford University Press.
Klein, P. (1981). Certainty: a Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Kyburg, H.E. (1961). Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Kyburg, H. E. (1983). Epistemology and Inference, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Kyburg, H. E. (1997). "The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference", Journal of Philosophy, 94(3),
109125.
Kyburg, H. E., and Teng, C-M. (2001). Uncertain Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (1996). "Elusive Knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 54967.
Makinson, D. (1965). "The Paradox of the Preface", Analysis, 25: 205207.
Pollock, J. (1986). "The Paradox of the Preface", Philosophy of Science, 53, pp. 346258.
Smullyan, Raymond (1978). What is the name of this book?. PrenticeHall. p.206. ISBN0-13-955088-7.
Wheeler, G. (2006). "Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption", Journal of Logic, Language,
and Information, 15(1-2): 4953.
Wheeler, G. (2007). "A Review of the Lottery Paradox", in William Harper and Gregory Wheeler (eds.)
Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., King's College Publications, pp. 131.
103
Lottery paradox
104
External links
Links to James Hawthorne's papers on the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals (and Lottery Logic) [1]
References
[1] http:/ / faculty-staff. ou. edu/ H/ James. A. Hawthorne-1/

The paradoxes of material implication are a group of formulas which are truths of classical logic, but which are
intuitively problematic. One of these paradoxes is the paradox of entailment.
The root of the paradoxes lies in a mismatch between the interpretation of the validity of logical implication in
natural language, and its formal interpretation in classical logic, dating back to George Boole's algebraic logic. In
classical logic, implication describes conditional if-then statements using a truth-functional interpretation, i.e. "p
implies q" is defined to be "it is not the case that p is true and q false". Also, "p implies q" is equivalent to "p is false
or q is true". For example, "if it is raining, then I will bring an umbrella", is equivalent to "it is not raining, or I will
bring an umbrella, or both". This truth-functional interpretation of implication is called material implication or
material conditional.
The paradoxes are logical statements which are true but whose truth is intuitively surprising to people who are not
familiar with them. If the terms 'p', 'q' and 'r' stand for arbitrary propositions then the main paradoxes are given
formally as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
, p and its negation imply q. This is the paradox of entailment.

, if p is true then it is implied by every q.
, if p is false then it implies every q. This is referred to as 'explosion'.
, either q or its negation is true, so their disjunction is implied by every p.
, if p, q and r are three arbitrary propositions, then either p implies q or q implies r. This is
because if q is true then p implies it, and if it is false then q implies any other statement. Since r can be p, it
follows that given two arbitrary propositions, one must imply the other, even if they are mutually contradictory.
For instance, "Nadia is in Barcelona implies Nadia is in Madrid, or Nadia is in Madrid implies Nadia is in
Barcelona." This truism sounds like nonsense in ordinary discourse.
6.
, if p does not imply q then p is true and q is false. NB if p were false then it would
imply q, so p is true. If q were also true then p would imply q, hence q is false. This paradox is particularly
surprising because it tells us that if one proposition does not imply another then the first is true and the second
false.
The paradoxes of material implication arise because of the truth-functional definition of material implication, which
is said to be true merely because the antecedent is false or the consequent is true. By this criterion, "If the moon is
made of green cheese, then the world is coming to an end," is true merely because the moon isn't made of green
cheese. By extension, any contradiction implies anything whatsoever, since a contradiction is never true. (All
paraconsistent logics must, by definition, reject (1) as false.) Also, any tautology is implied by anything whatsoever,
since a tautology is always true.
To sum up, although it is deceptively similar to what we mean by "logically follows" in ordinary usage, material
implication does not capture the meaning of "if... then".
Paradox of entailment
As the best known of the paradoxes, and most formally simple, the paradox of entailment makes the best
introduction.
In natural language, an instance of the paradox of entailment arises:
It is raining
And
It is not raining
Therefore
George Washington was made of rakes.
This arises from the principle of explosion, a law of classical logic stating that inconsistent premises always make an
argument valid; that is, inconsistent premises imply any conclusion at all. This seems paradoxical, as it suggests that
the above is a valid argument.
Understanding the paradox of entailment

Validity is defined in classical logic as follows:
An argument (consisting of premises and a conclusion) is valid if and only if there is no possible situation in
which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
For example a valid argument might run:
If it is raining, water exists (1st premise)
It is raining (2nd premise)
Water exists (Conclusion)
In this example there is no possible situation in which the premises are true while the conclusion is false. Since there
is no counterexample, the argument is valid.
But one could construct an argument in which the premises are inconsistent. This would satisfy the test for a valid
argument since there would be no possible situation in which all the premises are true and therefore no possible
situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
For example an argument with inconsistent premises might run:
Matter has mass (1st premise; true)
Matter does not have mass (2nd premise; false)
All numbers are equal to 12 (Conclusion)
As there is no possible situation where both premises could be true, then there is certainly no possible situation in
which the premises could be true while the conclusion was false. So the argument is valid whatever the conclusion
is; inconsistent premises imply all conclusions.
Explaining the paradox

The strangeness of the paradox of entailment comes from the fact that the definition of validity in classical logic does
not always agree with the use of the term in ordinary language. In everyday use validity suggests that the premises
are consistent. In classical logic, the additional notion of soundness is introduced. A sound argument is a valid
argument with all true premises. Hence a valid argument with an inconsistent set of premises can never be sound. A
suggested improvement to the notion of logical validity to eliminate this paradox is relevant logic.
105
Simplification
The classical paradox formulas are closely tied to the formula,
the principle of Simplification, which can be derived from the paradox formulas rather easily (e.g. from (1) by
Importation). In addition, there are serious problems with trying to use material implication as representing the
English "if ... then ...". For example, the following are valid inferences:
1.
2.
but mapping these back to English sentences using "if" gives paradoxes. The first might be read "If John is in
London then he is in England, and if he is in Paris then he is in France. Therefore, it is either true that (a) if John is in
London then he is in France, or (b) that if he is in Paris then he is in England." Using material implication, if John
really is in London, then (since he is not in Paris) (b) is true; whereas if he is in Paris, then (a) is true. Since he
cannot be in both places, the conclusion that at least one of (a) or (b) is true is valid.
But this does not match how "if ... then ..." is used in natural language: the most likely scenario in which one would
say "If John is in London then he is in England" is if one does not know where John is, but nonetheless knows that if
he is in London, he is in England. Under this interpretation, both premises are true, but both clauses of the
conclusion are false.
The second example can be read "If both switch A and switch B are closed, then the light is on. Therefore, it is either
true that if switch A is closed, the light is on, or that if switch B is closed, the light is on." Here, the most likely
natural-language interpretation of the "if ... then ..." statements would be "whenever switch A is closed, the light is
on", and "whenever switch B is closed, the light is on". Again, under this interpretation both clauses of the
conclusion may be false (for instance in a series circuit, with a light that only comes on when both switches are
closed).
References
Bennett, J. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.

Conditionals, ed. Frank Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1991.
Etchemendy, J. The Concept of Logical Consequence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990.
Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001), "Strict implication calculus" [1], Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer,
ISBN978-1-55608-010-4
Sanford, D. If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. New York: Routledge. 1989.
Priest, G. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
References
[1] http:/ / www. encyclopediaofmath. org/ index. php?title=p/ s090470
106
Raven paradox
Raven paradox
A black raven
Non-black
non-ravens
The raven paradox suggests that both of these images contribute evidence to the supposition that all ravens are black.
The raven paradox, also known as Hempel's paradox or Hempel's ravens, is a paradox arising from the question
of what constitutes evidence for a statement. Observing objects that are neither black nor ravens may formally
increase the likelihood that all ravens are black even though, intuitively, these observations are unrelated.
This problem was proposed by the logician Carl Gustav Hempel in the 1940s to illustrate a contradiction between
inductive logic and intuition. A related issue is the problem of induction and the gap between inductive and
deductive reasoning.[1]
The paradox
Hempel describes the paradox in terms of the hypothesis:[2][3]
(1) All ravens are black.
In strict logical terms, via contraposition, this statement is equivalent to:
(2) Everything that is not black is not a raven.
It should be clear that in all circumstances where (2) is true, (1) is also true; and likewise, in all circumstances where
(2) is false (i.e. if a world is imagined in which something that was not black, yet was a raven, existed), (1) is also
false. This establishes logical equivalence.
Given a general statement such as all ravens are black, a form of the same statement that refers to a specific
observable instance of the general class would typically be considered to constitute evidence for that general
statement. For example,
(3) Nevermore, my pet raven, is black.
is evidence supporting the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
The paradox arises when this same process is applied to statement (2). On sighting a green apple, one can observe:
(4) This green (and thus not black) thing is an apple (and thus not a raven).
By the same reasoning, this statement is evidence that (2) everything that is not black is not a raven. But since (as
above) this statement is logically equivalent to (1) all ravens are black, it follows that the sight of a green apple is
evidence supporting the notion that all ravens are black. This conclusion seems paradoxical, because it implies that
information has been gained about ravens by looking at an apple.
107
Raven paradox
Nicod's criterion says that only observations of ravens should affect one's view as to whether all ravens are black.
Observing more instances of black ravens should support the view, observing white or coloured ravens should
contradict it, and observations of non-ravens should not have any influence.[4]
Hempel's equivalence condition states that when a proposition, X, provides evidence in favor of another proposition
Y, then X also provides evidence in favor of any proposition which is logically equivalent to Y.[5]
With normal real world expectations, the set of ravens is finite. The set of non black things is either non finite or
beyond human enumeration. In order to confirm the statement 'All ravens are black.', it would be necessary to
observe all ravens. This is possible. In order to confirm the statement 'All non black things are non ravens.', it would
be necessary to examine all non black things. This is not possible. Observing a black raven could be considered a
finite amount of confirmatory evidence, but observing a non black non raven would be an infinitesimal amount of
evidence.
The paradox shows that Nicod's criterion and Hempel's equivalence condition are not mutually consistent. A
resolution to the paradox must reject at least one out of:
1. negative instances having no influence (!PC),
2. equivalence condition (EC), or,
3. validation by positive instances (NC).
A satisfactory resolution should also explain why there naively appears to be a paradox. Solutions which accept the
paradoxical conclusion can do this by presenting a proposition which we intuitively know to be false but which is
easily confused with (PC), while solutions which reject (EC) or (NC) should present a proposition which we
intuitively know to be true but which is easily confused with (EC) or (NC).
Accepting non-ravens as relevant

Although this conclusion of the paradox seems counter-intuitive, some approaches accept that observations of
(coloured) non-ravens can in fact constitute valid evidence in support for hypotheses about (the universal blackness
of) ravens.
Hempel's resolution
Hempel himself accepted the paradoxical conclusion, arguing that the reason the result appears paradoxical is
because we possess prior information without which the observation of a non-black non-raven would indeed provide
evidence that all ravens are black.
He illustrates this with the example of the generalization "All sodium salts burn yellow", and asks us to consider the
observation which occurs when somebody holds a piece of pure ice in a colorless flame which does not turn yellow:
This result would confirm the assertion, "Whatever does not burn yellow is not sodium salt", and
consequently, by virtue of the equivalence condition, it would confirm the original formulation. Why does this
impress us as paradoxical? The reason becomes clear when we compare the previous situation with the case of
an experiment where an object whose chemical constitution is as yet unknown to us is held into a flame and
fails to turn it yellow, and where subsequent analysis reveals it to contain no sodium salt. This outcome, we
should no doubt agree, is what was to be expected on the basis of the hypothesis ... thus the data here obtained
constitute confirming evidence for the hypothesis.
In the seemingly paradoxical cases of confirmation, we are often not actually judging the relation of the given
evidence, E alone to the hypothesis H ... we tacitly introduce a comparison of H with a body of evidence
which consists of E in conjunction with an additional amount of information which we happen to have at our
disposal; in our illustration, this information includes the knowledge (1) that the substance used in the
experiment is ice, and (2) that ice contains no sodium salt. If we assume this additional information as given,
108
Raven paradox
109
then, of course, the outcome of the experiment can add no strength to the hypothesis under consideration. But
if we are careful to avoid this tacit reference to additional knowledge ... the paradoxes vanish.
Standard Bayesian solution
One of the most popular proposed resolutions is to accept the conclusion that the observation of a green apple
provides evidence that all ravens are black but to argue that the amount of confirmation provided is very small, due
to the large discrepancy between the number of ravens and the number of non-black objects. According to this
resolution, the conclusion appears paradoxical because we intuitively estimate the amount of evidence provided by
the observation of a green apple to be zero, when it is in fact non-zero but extremely small.
I J Good's presentation of this argument in 1960[6] is perhaps the best known, and variations of the argument have
been popular ever since,[7] although it had been presented in 1958[8] and early forms of the argument appeared as
early as 1940.[9]
Good's argument involves calculating the weight of evidence provided by the observation of a black raven or a white
shoe in favor of the hypothesis that all the ravens in a collection of objects are black. The weight of evidence is the
logarithm of the Bayes factor, which in this case is simply the factor by which the odds of the hypothesis changes
when the observation is made. The argument goes as follows:
... suppose that there are
black, and that the
objects that might be seen at any moment, of which
objects each have probability
of being seen. Let
non-black ravens, and suppose that the hypotheses
are ravens and
are
be the hypothesis that there are
are initially equiprobable. Then, if we
happen to see a black raven, the Bayes factor in favour of
is
i.e. about 2 if the number of ravens in existence is known to be large. But the factor if we see a white shoe is
only
and this exceeds unity by only about
if
is large compared to
. Thus the weight of
evidence provided by the sight of a white shoe is positive, but is small if the number of ravens is known to be
small compared to the number of non-black objects.[10]
Many of the proponents of this resolution and variants of it have been advocates of Bayesian probability, and it is
now commonly called the Bayesian Solution, although, as Chihara[11] observes, "there is no such thing as the
Bayesian solution. There are many different 'solutions' that Bayesians have put forward using Bayesian techniques."
Noteworthy
approaches
using
Bayesian
techniques
include
Earman,[12] Eells,[13] Gibson,[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Hosiasson-Lindenbaum,
Howson and Urbach,
Mackie,
and Hintikka,[18] who claims that his approach is
"more Bayesian than the so-called 'Bayesian solution' of the same paradox." Bayesian approaches which make use of
Carnap's theory of inductive inference include Humburg,[19] Maher,[20] and Fitelson et al.[21] Vranas[22] introduced
the term "Standard Bayesian Solution" to avoid confusion.
Raven paradox
110
Carnap approach
Maher[23] accepts the paradoxical conclusion, and refines it:
A non-raven (of whatever color) confirms that all ravens are black because
(i) the information that this object is not a raven removes the possibility that this object is a
counterexample to the generalization, and
(ii) it reduces the probability that unobserved objects are ravens, thereby reducing the probability that
they are counterexamples to the generalization.
In order to reach (ii), he appeals to Carnap's theory of inductive probability, which is (from the Bayesian point of
view) a way of assigning prior probabilities which naturally implements induction. According to Carnap's theory, the
posterior probability,
, that an object, , will have a predicate, , after the evidence
has been
observed, is:
where
is the initial probability that
has the predicate
examined (according to the available evidence

have the predicate
If
, and
is the number of objects which have been
is the number of examined objects which turned out to
is a constant which measures resistance to generalization.
is close to zero,
have the predicate
);
will be very close to one after a single observation of an object which turned out to
, while if
is much larger than
will be very close to
regardless of
the fraction of observed objects which had the predicate .

Using this Carnapian approach, Maher identifies a proposition which we intuitively (and correctly) know to be false,
but which we easily confuse with the paradoxical conclusion. The proposition in question is the proposition that
observing non-ravens tells us about the color of ravens. While this is intuitively false and is also false according to
Carnap's theory of induction, observing non-ravens (according to that same theory) causes us to reduce our estimate
of the total number of ravens, and thereby reduces the estimated number of possible counterexamples to the rule that
all ravens are black.
Hence, from the Bayesian-Carnapian point of view, the observation of a non-raven does not tell us anything about
the color of ravens, but it tells us about the prevalence of ravens, and supports "All ravens are black" by reducing our
estimate of the number of ravens which might not be black.
Role of background knowledge
Much of the discussion of the paradox in general and the Bayesian approach in particular has centred on the
relevance of background knowledge. Surprisingly, Maher shows that, for a large class of possible configurations of
background knowledge, the observation of a non-black non-raven provides exactly the same amount of confirmation
as the observation of a black raven. The configurations of background knowledge which he considers are those
which are provided by a sample proposition, namely a proposition which is a conjunction of atomic propositions,
each of which ascribes a single predicate to a single individual, with no two atomic propositions involving the same
individual. Thus, a proposition of the form "A is a black raven and B is a white shoe" can be considered a sample
proposition by taking "black raven" and "white shoe" to be predicates.
Maher's proof appears to contradict the result of the Bayesian argument, which was that the observation of a
non-black non-raven provides much less evidence than the observation of a black raven. The reason is that the
background knowledge which Good and others use can not be expressed in the form of a sample proposition - in
particular, variants of the standard Bayesian approach often suppose (as Good did in the argument quoted above) that
the total numbers of ravens, non-black objects and/or the total number of objects, are known quantities. Maher
comments that, "The reason we think there are more non-black things than ravens is because that has been true of the
things we have observed to date. Evidence of this kind can be represented by a sample proposition. But ... given any
Raven paradox
111
sample proposition as background evidence, a non-black non-raven confirms A just as strongly as a black raven does
... Thus my analysis suggests that this response to the paradox [i.e. the Standard Bayesian one] cannot be correct."
Fitelson et al.[24] examined the conditions under which the observation of a non-black non-raven provides less
evidence than the observation of a black raven. They show that, if is an object selected at random,
is the
proposition that the object is black, and
is the proposition that the object is a raven, then the condition:
is sufficient for the observation of a non-black non-raven to provide less evidence than the observation of a black
raven. Here, a line over a proposition indicates the logical negation of that proposition.
This condition does not tell us how large the difference in the evidence provided is, but a later calculation in the
same paper shows that the weight of evidence provided by a black raven exceeds that provided by a non-black
non-raven by about
. This is equal to the amount of additional information (in bits, if the
base of the logarithm is 2) which is provided when a raven of unknown color is discovered to be black, given the
hypothesis that not all ravens are black.
Fitelson et al. explain that:
Under normal circumstances,
may be somewhere around 0.9 or 0.95; so
is
somewhere around 1.11 or 1.05. Thus, it may appear that a single instance of a black raven does not yield
much more support than would a non-black non-raven. However, under plausible conditions it can be shown
that a sequence of instances (i.e. of n black ravens, as compared to n non-black non-ravens) yields a ratio of
likelihood ratios on the order of
, which blows up significantly for large .
The authors point out that their analysis is completely consistent with the supposition that a non-black non-raven
provides an extremely small amount of evidence although they do not attempt to prove it; they merely calculate the
difference between the amount of evidence that a black raven provides and the amount of evidence that a non-black
non-raven provides.
Disputing the induction from positive instances

Some approaches for resolving the paradox focus on the inductive step. They dispute whether observation of a
particular instance (such as one black raven) is the kind of evidence that necessarily increases confidence in the
general hypothesis (such as that ravens are always black).
The red herring
Good gives an example of background knowledge with respect to which the observation of a black raven decreases
the probability that all ravens are black:
Suppose that we know we are in one or other of two worlds, and the hypothesis, H, under consideration is that
all the ravens in our world are black. We know in advance that in one world there are a hundred black ravens,
no non-black ravens, and a million other birds; and that in the other world there are a thousand black ravens,
one white raven, and a million other birds. A bird is selected equiprobably at random from all the birds in our
world. It turns out to be a black raven. This is strong evidence ... that we are in the second world, wherein not
all ravens are black.
Good concludes that the white shoe is a "red herring": Sometimes even a black raven can constitute evidence against
the hypothesis that all ravens are black, so the fact that the observation of a white shoe can support it is not surprising
and not worth attention. Nicod's criterion is false, according to Good, and so the paradoxical conclusion does not
follow.
Hempel rejected this as a solution to the paradox, insisting that the proposition 'c is a raven and is black' must be
considered "by itself and without reference to any other information", and pointing out that it "... was emphasized in
Raven paradox
section 5.2(b) of my article in Mind ... that the very appearance of paradoxicality in cases like that of the white shoe
results in part from a failure to observe this maxim."[25]
The question which then arises is whether the paradox is to be understood in the context of absolutely no background
information (as Hempel suggests), or in the context of the background information which we actually possess
regarding ravens and black objects, or with regard to all possible configurations of background information.
Good had shown that, for some configurations of background knowledge, Nicod's criterion is false (provided that we
are willing to equate "inductively support" with "increase the probability of" - see below). The possibility remained
that, with respect to our actual configuration of knowledge, which is very different from Good's example, Nicod's
criterion might still be true and so we could still reach the paradoxical conclusion. Hempel, on the other hand, insists
that it is our background knowledge itself which is the red herring, and that we should consider induction with
respect to a condition of perfect ignorance.
Good's baby
In his proposed resolution, Maher implicitly made use of the fact that the proposition "All ravens are black" is highly
probable when it is highly probable that there are no ravens. Good had used this fact before to respond to Hempel's
insistence that Nicod's criterion was to be understood to hold in the absence of background information:
...imagine an infinitely intelligent newborn baby having built-in neural circuits enabling him to deal with
formal logic, English syntax, and subjective probability. He might now argue, after defining a raven in detail,
that it is extremely unlikely that there are any ravens, and therefore it is extremely likely that all ravens are
black, that is, that
is true. 'On the other hand', he goes on to argue, 'if there are ravens, then there is a
reasonable chance that they are of a variety of colours. Therefore, if I were to discover that even a black raven
exists I would consider
to be less probable than it was initially.'
This, according to Good, is as close as one can reasonably expect to get to a condition of perfect ignorance, and it
appears that Nicod's condition is still false. Maher made Good's argument more precise by using Carnap's theory of
induction to formalize the notion that if there is one raven, then it is likely that there are many.[26]
Maher's argument considers a universe of exactly two objects, each of which is very unlikely to be a raven (a one in
a thousand chance) and reasonably unlikely to be black (a one in ten chance). Using Carnap's formula for induction,
he finds that the probability that all ravens are black decreases from 0.9985 to 0.8995 when it is discovered that one
of the two objects is a black raven.
Maher concludes that not only is the paradoxical conclusion true, but that Nicod's criterion is false in the absence of
background knowledge (except for the knowledge that the number of objects in the universe is two and that ravens
are less likely than black things).
Distinguished predicates
Quine[27] argued that the solution to the paradox lies in the recognition that certain predicates, which he called
natural kinds, have a distinguished status with respect to induction. This can be illustrated with Nelson Goodman's
example of the predicate grue. An object is grue if it is blue before (say) 2015 and green afterwards. Clearly, we
expect objects which were blue before 2015 to remain blue afterwards, but we do not expect the objects which were
found to be grue before 2015 to be blue after 2015, since after 2015 they would be green. Quine's explanation is that
"blue" is a natural kind; a privileged predicate which can be used for induction, while "grue" is not a natural kind and
using induction with it leads to error.
This suggests a resolution to the paradox - Nicod's criterion is true for natural kinds, such as "blue" and "black", but
is false for artificially contrived predicates, such as "grue" or "non-raven". The paradox arises, according to this
resolution, because we implicitly interpret Nicod's criterion as applying to all predicates when in fact it only applies
to natural kinds.
112
Raven paradox
Another approach which favours specific predicates over others was taken by Hintikka.[28] Hintikka was motivated
to find a Bayesian approach to the paradox which did not make use of knowledge about the relative frequencies of
ravens and black things. Arguments concerning relative frequencies, he contends, cannot always account for the
perceived irrelevance of evidence consisting of observations of objects of type A for the purposes of learning about
objects of type not-A.
His argument can be illustrated by rephrasing the paradox using predicates other than "raven" and "black". For
example, "All men are tall" is equivalent to "All short people are women", and so observing that a randomly selected
person is a short woman should provide evidence that all men are tall. Despite the fact that we lack background
knowledge to indicate that there are dramatically fewer men than short people, we still find ourselves inclined to
reject the conclusion. Hintikka's example is: "... a generalization like 'no material bodies are infinitely divisible'
seems to be completely unaffected by questions concerning immaterial entities, independently of what one thinks of
the relative frequencies of material and immaterial entities in one's universe of discourse."
His solution is to introduce an order into the set of predicates. When the logical system is equipped with this order, it
is possible to restrict the scope of a generalization such as "All ravens are black" so that it applies to ravens only and
not to non-black things, since the order privileges ravens over non-black things. As he puts it:
If we are justified in assuming that the scope of the generalization 'All ravens are black' can be restricted to
ravens, then this means that we have some outside information which we can rely on concerning the factual
situation. The paradox arises from the fact that this information, which colors our spontaneous view of the
situation, is not incorporated in the usual treatments of the inductive situation.
Rejections of Hempel's equivalence condition

Some approaches for the resolution of the paradox reject Hempel's equivalence condition. That is, they may not
consider evidence supporting the statement all non-black objects are non-ravens to necessarily support
logically-equivalent statements such as all ravens are black.
Selective confirmation
Scheffler and Goodman[29] took an approach to the paradox which incorporates Karl Popper's view that scientific
hypotheses are never really confirmed, only falsified.
The approach begins by noting that the observation of a black raven does not prove that "All ravens are black" but it
falsifies the contrary hypothesis, "No ravens are black". A non-black non-raven, on the other hand, is consistent with
both "All ravens are black" and with "No ravens are black". As the authors put it:
... the statement that all ravens are black is not merely satisfied by evidence of a black raven but is favored by
such evidence, since a black raven disconfirms the contrary statement that all ravens are not black, i.e. satisfies
its denial. A black raven, in other words, satisfies the hypothesis that all ravens are black rather than not: it
thus selectively confirms that all ravens are black.
Selective confirmation violates the equivalence condition since a black raven selectively confirms "All ravens are
black" but not "All non-black things are non-ravens".
113
Raven paradox
114
Probabilistic or non-probabilistic induction

Scheffler and Goodman's concept of selective confirmation is an example of an interpretation of "provides evidence
in favor of," which does not coincide with "increase the probability of". This must be a general feature of all
resolutions which reject the equivalence condition, since logically equivalent propositions must always have the
same probability.
It is impossible for the observation of a black raven to increase the probability of the proposition "All ravens are
black" without causing exactly the same change to the probability that "All non-black things are non-ravens". If an
observation inductively supports the former but not the latter, then "inductively support" must refer to something
other than changes in the probabilities of propositions. A possible loophole is to interpret "All" as "Nearly all" "Nearly all ravens are black" is not equivalent to "Nearly all non-black things are non-ravens", and these
propositions can have very different probabilities.
This raises the broader question of the relation of probability theory to inductive reasoning. Karl Popper argued that
probability theory alone cannot account for induction. His argument involves splitting a hypothesis,
, into a part
which is deductively entailed by the evidence,
First, consider the splitting:
where
and
, and another part. This can be done in two ways.
[30]
are probabilistically independent:
and so on. The condition
which is necessary for such a splitting of H and E to be possible is

probabilistically supported by
.
Popper's observation is that the part,
, while the part of
, of
, that is, that
which receives support from
which does not follow deductively from
is
actually follows deductively from
receives no support at all from
- that is,
.
Second, the splitting:[31]
separates
into
, which as Popper says, "is the logically strongest part of
) that follows [deductively] from
," and
, which, he says, "contains all of
He continues:
Does
, in this case, provide any support for the factor
needed to obtain
? The answer is: No. It never does. Indeed,
(or of the content of

that goes beyond
, which in the presence of

countersupports
."
is alone
unless either
or
(which are possibilities of no interest). ...
This result is completely devastating to the inductive interpretation of the calculus of probability. All
probabilistic support is purely deductive: that part of a hypothesis that is not deductively entailed by the
evidence is always strongly countersupported by the evidence ... There is such a thing as probabilistic support;
there might even be such a thing as inductive support (though we hardly think so). But the calculus of
probability reveals that probabilistic support cannot be inductive support.
The orthodox approach
The orthodox Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing considers how to decide whether to accept or reject a
hypothesis, rather than what probability to assign to the hypothesis. From this point of view, the hypothesis that "All
ravens are black" is not accepted gradually, as its probability increases towards one when more and more
observations are made, but is accepted in a single action as the result of evaluating the data which has already been
collected. As Neyman and Pearson put it:
Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or false, we may search for rules to govern
our behaviour with regard to them, in following which we insure that, in the long run of experience, we shall
not be too often wrong.[32]
Raven paradox
115
According to this approach, it is not necessary to assign any value to the probability of a hypothesis, although one
must certainly take into account the probability of the data given the hypothesis, or given a competing hypothesis,
when deciding whether to accept or to reject. The acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis carries with it the risk of
error.
This contrasts with the Bayesian approach, which requires that the hypothesis be assigned a prior probability, which
is revised in the light of the observed data to obtain the final probability of the hypothesis. Within the Bayesian
framework there is no risk of error since hypotheses are not accepted or rejected; instead they are assigned
probabilities.
An analysis of the paradox from the orthodox point of view has been performed, and leads to, among other insights,
a rejection of the equivalence condition:
It seems obvious that one cannot both accept the hypothesis that all P's are Q and also reject the contrapositive,
i.e. that all non-Q's are non-P. Yet it is easy to see that on the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing, a test of "All
P's are Q" is not necessarily a test of "All non-Q's are non-P" or vice versa. A test of "All P's are Q" requires
reference to some alternative statistical hypothesis of the form of all P's are Q,
, whereas a test
of "All non-Q's are non-P" requires reference to some statistical alternative of the form of all non-Q's are
non-P,
. But these two sets of possible alternatives are different ... Thus one could have a test of
without having a test of its contrapositive.[33]
Rejecting material implication
The following propositions all imply one another: "Every object is either black or not a raven", "Every Raven is
black", and "Every non-black object is a non-raven." They are therefore, by definition, logically equivalent.
However, the three propositions have different domains: the first proposition says something about "Every object",
while the second says something about "Every raven".
The first proposition is the only one whose domain of quantification is unrestricted ("all objects"), so this is the only
one which can be expressed in first order logic. It is logically equivalent to:
and also to
where
or
indicates the material conditional, according to which "If
then
" can be understood to mean "
".
It has been argued by several authors that material implication does not fully capture the meaning of "If
then
" (see the paradoxes of material implication). "For every object, , is either black or not a raven" is true when
there are no ravens. It is because of this that "All ravens are black" is regarded as true when there are no ravens.
Furthermore, the arguments which Good and Maher used to criticize Nicod's criterion (see Good's Baby, above)
relied on this fact - that "All ravens are black" is highly probable when it is highly probable that there are no ravens.
To say that all ravens are black in the absence of any ravens is an empty statement. It refers to nothing. All ravens
are white is equally relevant and true, if this statement is considered to have any truth or relevance.
Some approaches to the paradox have sought to find other ways of interpreting "If
then
" and "All
are
" which would eliminate the perceived equivalence between "All ravens are black" and "All non-black things are
non-ravens."
One such approach involves introducing a many-valued logic according to which "If
truth-value
, meaning "Indeterminate" or "Inappropriate" when
not automatically allowed: "If
then
" is not equivalent to "If
black" is not equivalent to "All non-black things are non-ravens".
[34]
is false.
then
then
" has the
In such a system, contraposition is

". Consequently, "All ravens are
Raven paradox
116
In this system, when contraposition occurs, the modality of the conditional involved changes from the indicative ("If
that piece of butter has been heated to 32 C then it has melted") to the counterfactual ("If that piece of butter had
been heated to 32 C then it would have melted"). According to this argument, this removes the alleged equivalence
which is necessary to conclude that yellow cows can inform us about ravens:
In proper grammatical usage, a contrapositive argument ought not to be stated entirely in the indicative. Thus:
From the fact that if this match is scratched it will light, it follows that if it does not light it was not
scratched.
is awkward. We should say:
From the fact that if this match is scratched it will light, it follows that if it were not to light it would not
have been scratched. ...
One might wonder what effect this interpretation of the Law of Contraposition has on Hempel's paradox of
confirmation. "If is a raven then is black" is equivalent to "If were not black then would not be a
raven". Therefore whatever confirms the latter should also, by the Equivalence Condition, confirm the former.
True, but yellow cows still cannot figure into the confirmation of "All ravens are black" because, in science,
confirmation is accomplished by prediction, and predictions are properly stated in the indicative mood. It is
senseless to ask what confirms a counterfactual.[35]
Differing results of accepting the hypotheses
Several commentators have observed that the propositions "All ravens are black" and "All non-black things are
non-ravens" suggest different procedures for testing the hypotheses. E.g. Good writes:[36]
As propositions the two statements are logically equivalent. But they have a different psychological effect on
the experimenter. If he is asked to test whether all ravens are black he will look for a raven and then decide
whether it is black. But if he is asked to test whether all non-black things are non-ravens he may look for a
non-black object and then decide whether it is a raven.
More recently, it has been suggested that "All ravens are black" and "All non-black things are non-ravens" can have
different effects when accepted.[37] The argument considers situations in which the total numbers or prevalences of
ravens and black objects are unknown, but estimated. When the hypothesis "All ravens are black" is accepted,
according to the argument, the estimated number of black objects increases, while the estimated number of ravens
does not change.
It can be illustrated by considering the situation of two people who have identical information regarding ravens and
black objects, and who have identical estimates of the numbers of ravens and black objects. For concreteness,
suppose that there are 100 objects overall, and, according to the information available to the people involved, each
object is just as likely to be a non-raven as it is to be a raven, and just as likely to be black as it is to be non-black:
and the propositions
are independent for different objects
and so on. Then the estimated number of
ravens is 50; the estimated number of black things is 50; the estimated number of black ravens is 25, and the
estimated number of non-black ravens (counterexamples to the hypotheses) is 25.
One of the people performs a statistical test (e.g. a Neyman-Pearson test or the comparison of the accumulated
weight of evidence to a threshold) of the hypothesis that "All ravens are black", while the other tests the hypothesis
that "All non-black objects are non-ravens". For simplicity, suppose that the evidence used for the test has nothing to
do with the collection of 100 objects dealt with here. If the first person accepts the hypothesis that "All ravens are
black" then, according to the argument, about 50 objects whose colors were previously in doubt (the ravens) are now
thought to be black, while nothing different is thought about the remaining objects (the non-ravens). Consequently,
he should estimate the number of black ravens at 50, the number of black non-ravens at 25 and the number of
Raven paradox
117
non-black non-ravens at 25. By specifying these changes, this argument explicitly restricts the domain of "All ravens
are black" to ravens.
On the other hand, if the second person accepts the hypothesis that "All non-black objects are non-ravens", then the
approximately 50 non-black objects about which it was uncertain whether each was a raven, will be thought to be
non-ravens. At the same time, nothing different will be thought about the approximately 50 remaining objects (the
black objects). Consequently, he should estimate the number of black ravens at 25, the number of black non-ravens
at 25 and the number of non-black non-ravens at 50. According to this argument, since the two people disagree about
their estimates after they have accepted the different hypotheses, accepting "All ravens are black" is not equivalent to
accepting "All non-black things are non-ravens"; accepting the former means estimating more things to be black,
while accepting the latter involves estimating more things to be non-ravens. Correspondingly, the argument goes, the
former requires as evidence ravens which turn out to be black and the latter requires non-black things which turn out
to be non-ravens.[38]
Existential presuppositions
A number of authors have argued that propositions of the form "All
which are
...
[39]
are
" presuppose that there are objects
[40]
This analysis has been applied to the raven paradox:
: "All ravens are black" and
: "All nonblack things are nonravens" are not strictly equivalent ... due
to their different existential presuppositions. Moreover, although
and
describe the same regularity -
the nonexistence of nonblack ravens - they have different logical forms. The two hypotheses have different
senses and incorporate different procedures for testing the regularity they describe.
A modified logic can take account of existential presuppositions using the presuppositional operator, '*'. For
example,
can denote "All ravens are black" while indicating that it is ravens and not non-black objects which are presupposed
to exist in this example.
... the logical form of each hypothesis distinguishes it with respect to its recommended type of supporting
evidence: the possibly true substitution instances of each hypothesis relate to different types of objects. The
fact that the two hypotheses incorporate different kinds of testing procedures is expressed in the formal
language by prefixing the operator '*' to a different predicate. The presuppositional operator thus serves as a
relevance operator as well. It is prefixed to the predicate ' is a raven' in
because the objects relevant to
the testing procedure incorporated in "All raven are black" include only ravens; it is prefixed to the predicate '
is nonblack', in
, because the objects relevant to the testing procedure incorporated in "All nonblack
things are nonravens" include only nonblack things. ... Using Fregean terms: whenever their presuppositions
hold, the two hypotheses have the same referent (truth-value), but different senses; that is, they express two
different ways to determine that truth-value.[41]
Raven paradox
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ hempel/

LINK (http:/ / www. philoscience. unibe. ch/ documents/ TexteHS10/ Hempel1945. pdf)
LINK (http:/ / www. collier. sts. vt. edu/ 5305/ hempel-II. pdf)
Nicod had proposed that, in relation to conditional hypotheses, instances of their antecedents that are also instances of their consequents
confirm them; instances of their antecedents that are not instances of their consequents disconfirm them; and non-instantiations of their
antecedents are neutral, neither confirming nor disconfirming. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/
hempel/ )
[5] LINK (http:/ / www. sts-biu. org/ images/ file/ Swinburne - paradoxes. pdf)
[6] Good, IJ (1960) The Paradox of Confirmation, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, No. 42, 145-149 JSTOR (http:/ /
links. jstor. org/ sici?sici=0007-0882(196008)11:42<145:TPOC>2. 0. CO;2-5)
[7] Fitelson, B and Hawthorne, J (2006) How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens, in Probability in Science,
Chicago: Open Court LINK (http:/ / fitelson. org/ ravens. pdf)
[8] Alexander, HG (1958) The Paradoxes of Confirmation, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 35, P. 227 JSTOR
(http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 685654?origin=JSTOR-pdf)
[9] JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ action/ showArticle?doi=10. 2307/ 2268173) LINK (http:/ / fitelson. org/ confirmation/ lindenbaum. pdf)
[10] Note: Good used "crow" instead of "raven", but "raven" has been used here throughout for consistency.
[11] Chihara, (1987) Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38, No. 4 LINK
(http:/ / bjps. oxfordjournals. org/ cgi/ reprint/ 38/ 4/ 551)
[12] Earman, 1992 Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[13] Eells, 1982 Rational Decision and Causality. New York: Cambridge University Press
[14] Gibson, 1969 On Ravens and Relevance and a Likelihood Solution of the Paradox of Confirmation, LINK (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/
686720)
[15] Hosiasson-Lindenbaum 1940
[16] Howson, Urbach, 1993 Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Open Court Publishing Company
[17] Mackie, 1963 The Paradox of Confirmation, Brit. J. Phil. Sci. Vol. 13, No. 52, p. 265 LINK (http:/ / bjps. oxfordjournals. org/ cgi/ content/
citation/ XIII/ 52/ 265)
[18] Hintikka J. 1969, Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation LINK (http:/ / books. google. com/
books?id=pWtPcRwuacAC& pg=PA24& lpg=PA24& ots=-1PKZt0Jbz& lr=& sig=EK2qqOZ6-cZR1P1ZKIsndgxttMs)
[19] Humburg 1986, The solution of Hempel's raven paradox in Rudolf Carnap's system of inductive logic, Erkenntnis, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp
[20] Maher 1999
[21] Fitelson 2006
[22] Vranas (2002) Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution LINK (http:/ / philsci-archive. pitt. edu/ archive/
00000688/ 00/ hempelacuna. doc)
[23] Maher, 1999
[24] Fitelson, 2006
[25] Hempel 1967, The White Shoe - No Red Herring, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 239 JSTOR (http:/ /
www. jstor. org/ stable/ 686596)
[26] LINK (http:/ / patrick. maher1. net/ pctl. pdf)
[27] Reprinted in:
[28] Hintikka, 1969
[29] Scheffler I, Goodman NJ, Selective Confirmation and the Ravens, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1972 JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor.
org/ stable/ 2024647)
[30] Popper, K. Realism and the Aim of Science, Routlege, 1992, p. 325
[31] Popper K, Miller D, (1983) A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability, Nature, Vol. 302, p. 687 LINK (http:/ / www. nature. com/
nature/ journal/ v302/ n5910/ abs/ 302687a0. html)
[32] JSTOR (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 91247) LINK (http:/ / www. stats. org. uk/ statistical-inference/ NeymanPearson1933. pdf)
[33] Giere, RN (1970) An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, p.354 JSTOR
(http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 186464)
[34] LINK (http:/ / projecteuclid. org/ DPubS/ Repository/ 1. 0/ Disseminate?view=body& id=pdf_1& handle=euclid. ndjfl/ 1093882546)
[35] Farrell (1979)
[36] Good (1960)
[37] LINK (http:/ / philsci-archive. pitt. edu/ archive/ 00003932/ 01/ judgment6. pdf)
[38] O'Flanagan (2008)
[39] Strawson PF (1952) Introduction to Logical Theory, methuan & Co. London, John Wiley & Sons, New York
[40] Cohen Y (1987) Ravens and Relevance, Erkenntnis LINK (http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ hnn2lutn1066xw47/ fulltext. pdf)
[41] Cohen (1987)
118
Raven paradox
References
Franceschi, P. The Doomsday Argument and Hempel's Problem (http://paulfranceschi.com/?p=9), English
translation of a paper initially published in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, 139-156, 1999,
under the title Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se dverse dans celle de Hempel
Hempel, C. G. A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation. (http://fitelson.org/confirmation/hempel_1943.
pdf) J. Symb. Logic 8, 122-143, 1943.
Hempel, C. G. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I) Mind 54, 1-26, 1945.
Hempel, C. G. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (II) Mind 54, 97-121, 1945.
Hempel, C. G. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. In Marguerite H. Foster and Michael L. Martin (http://
www.bu.edu/philo/faculty/martin.html), eds. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity. New York: Odyssey
Press, 1966. 145-183.
Whiteley, C. H. Hempel's Paradoxes of Confirmation. Mind 54, 156-158, 1945.
External links
"Hempels Ravens Paradox," PRIME (Platonic Realms Interactive Mathematics Encyclopedia). (http://www.
mathacademy.com/pr/prime/articles/paradox_raven/index.asp) Retrieved November 29, 2010.

The unexpected hanging paradox, hangman paradox, unexpected exam paradox, surprise test paradox or
prediction paradox is a paradox about a person's expectations about the timing of a future event (e.g. a prisoner's
hanging, or a school test) which he is told will occur at an unexpected time.
Despite significant academic interest, there is no consensus on its precise nature and consequently a final 'correct'
resolution has not yet been established.[1] One approach, offered by the logical school of thought, suggests that the
problem arises in a self-contradictory self-referencing statement at the heart of the judge's sentence. Another
approach, offered by the epistemological school of thought, suggests the unexpected hanging paradox is an example
of an epistemic paradox because it turns on our concept of knowledge.[2] Even though it is apparently simple, the
paradox's underlying complexities have even led to it being called a "significant problem" for philosophy.
Description of the paradox

The paradox has been described as follows:
A judge tells a condemned prisoner that he will be hanged at noon on one weekday in the following week but
that the execution will be a surprise to the prisoner. He will not know the day of the hanging until the
executioner knocks on his cell door at noon that day.
Having reflected on his sentence, the prisoner draws the conclusion that he will escape from the hanging. His
reasoning is in several parts. He begins by concluding that the "surprise hanging" can't be on Friday, as if he
hasn't been hanged by Thursday, there is only one day left - and so it won't be a surprise if he's hanged on
Friday. Since the judge's sentence stipulated that the hanging would be a surprise to him, he concludes it
cannot occur on Friday.
He then reasons that the surprise hanging cannot be on Thursday either, because Friday has already been
eliminated and if he hasn't been hanged by Wednesday night, the hanging must occur on Thursday, making a
Thursday hanging not a surprise either. By similar reasoning he concludes that the hanging can also not occur
on Wednesday, Tuesday or Monday. Joyfully he retires to his cell confident that the hanging will not occur at
all.
119

The next week, the executioner knocks on the prisoner's door at noon on Wednesday which, despite all the
above, was an utter surprise to him. Everything the judge said came true.
Other versions of the paradox replace the death sentence with a surprise fire drill, examination, pop quiz, or a lion
behind a door.
The informal nature of everyday language allows for multiple interpretations of the paradox. In the extreme case, a
prisoner who is paranoid might feel certain in his knowledge that the executioner will arrive at noon on Monday,
then certain that he will come on Tuesday and so forth, thus ensuring that every day he is not hanged really is a
"surprise" to him, but that the day of his hanging he was indeed expecting to be hanged. But even without adding this
element to the story, the vagueness of the account prohibits one from being objectively clear about which
formalization truly captures its essence. There has been considerable debate between the logical school, which uses
mathematical language, and the epistemological school, which employs concepts such as knowledge, belief and
memory, over which formulation is correct.
The logical school

Formulation of the judge's announcement into formal logic is made difficult by the vague meaning of the word
"surprise". An attempt at formulation might be:
The prisoner will be hanged next week and the date (of the hanging) will not be deducible in advance from the
assumption that the hanging will occur during the week (A).
Given this announcement the prisoner can deduce that the hanging will not occur on the last day of the week.
However, in order to reproduce the next stage of the argument, which eliminates the penultimate day of the week,
the prisoner must argue that his ability to deduce, from statement (A), that the hanging will not occur on the last day,
implies that a last-day hanging would not be surprising. But since the meaning of "surprising" has been restricted to
not deducible from the assumption that the hanging will occur during the week instead of not deducible from
statement (A), the argument is blocked.
This suggests that a better formulation would in fact be:
The prisoner will be hanged next week and its date will not be deducible in advance using this statement as an
axiom (B).
Some authorsWikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch#Unsupported attributions have claimed that the
self-referential nature of this statement is the source of the paradox. Fitch has shown that this statement can still be
expressed in formal logic. Using an equivalent form of the paradox which reduces the length of the week to just two
days, he proved that although self-reference is not illegitimate in all circumstances, it is in this case because the
statement is self-contradictory.
Objections
The first objection often raised to the logical school's approach is that it fails to explain how the judge's
announcement appears to be vindicated after the fact. If the judge's statement is self-contradictory, how does he
manage to be right all along? This objection rests on an understanding of the conclusion to be that the judge's
statement is self-contradictory and therefore the source of the paradox. However, the conclusion is more precisely
that in order for the prisoner to carry out his argument that the judge's sentence cannot be fulfilled, he must interpret
the judge's announcement as (B). A reasonable assumption would be that the judge did not intend (B) but that the
prisoner misinterprets his words to reach his paradoxical conclusion. The judge's sentence appears to be vindicated
afterwards but the statement which is actually shown to be true is that "the prisoner will be psychologically surprised
by the hanging". This statement in formal logic would not allow the prisoner's argument to be carried out.
A related objection is that the paradox only occurs because the judge tells the prisoner his sentence (rather than
keeping it secret) which suggests that the act of declaring the sentence is important. Some have argued that since
120

this action is missing from the logical school's approach, it must be an incomplete analysis. But the action is included
implicitly. The public utterance of the sentence and its context changes the judge's meaning to something like "there
will be a surprise hanging despite my having told you that there will be a surprise hanging". The logical school's
approach does implicitly take this into account.
The epistemological school

Various epistemological formulations have been proposed that show that the prisoner's tacit assumptions about what
he will know in the future, together with several plausible assumptions about knowledge, are inconsistent.
Chow (1998) provides a detailed analysis of a version of the paradox in which a surprise examination is to take place
on one of two days. Applying Chow's analysis to the case of the unexpected hanging (again with the week shortened
to two days for simplicity), we start with the observation that the judge's announcement seems to affirm three things:
S1: The hanging will occur on Monday or Tuesday.
S2: If the hanging occurs on Monday, then the prisoner will not know on Sunday evening that it will occur on
Monday.
S3: If the hanging occurs on Tuesday, then the prisoner will not know on Monday evening that it will occur on
Tuesday.
As a first step, the prisoner reasons that a scenario in which the hanging occurs on Tuesday is impossible because it
leads to a contradiction: on the one hand, by S3, the prisoner would not be able to predict the Tuesday hanging on
Monday evening; but on the other hand, by S1 and process of elimination, the prisoner would be able to predict the
Tuesday hanging on Monday evening.
Chow's analysis points to a subtle flaw in the prisoner's reasoning. What is impossible is not a Tuesday hanging.
Rather, what is impossible is a situation in which the hanging occurs on Tuesday despite the prisoner knowing on
Monday evening that the judge's assertions S1, S2, and S3 are all true.
The prisoner's reasoning, which gives rise to the paradox, is able to get off the ground because the prisoner tacitly
assumes that on Monday evening, he will (if he is still alive) know S1, S2, and S3 to be true. This assumption seems
unwarranted on several different grounds. It may be argued that the judge's pronouncement that something is true
can never be sufficient grounds for the prisoner knowing that it is true. Further, even if the prisoner knows something
to be true in the present moment, unknown psychological factors may erase this knowledge in the future. Finally,
Chow suggests that because the statement which the prisoner is supposed to "know" to be true is a statement about
his inability to "know" certain things, there is reason to believe that the unexpected hanging paradox is simply a
more intricate version of Moore's paradox. A suitable analogy can be reached by reducing the length of the week to
just one day. Then the judge's sentence becomes: You will be hanged tomorrow, but you do not know that.
References
[1] T. Y. Chow, "The surprise examination or unexpected hanging paradox," The American Mathematical Monthly Jan 1998 (http:/ / www-math.
mit. edu/ ~tchow/ unexpected. pdf)
[2] Stanford Encyclopedia discussion of hanging paradox together with other epistemic paradoxes (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/
epistemic-paradoxes/ )
Further reading
O'Connor, D. J. (1948). "Pragmatic Paradoxes". Mind 57: 358359. doi: 10.1093/mind/lvii.227.358 (http://dx.
doi.org/10.1093/mind/lvii.227.358). The first appearance of the paradox in print. The author claims that certain contingent
future tense statements cannot come true.
Scriven, M. (1951). "Paradoxical Announcements". Mind 60: 403407. The author critiques O'Connor and discovers the
paradox as we know it today.
121

Shaw, R. (1958). "The Unexpected Examination". Mind 67: 382384. doi: 10.1093/mind/lxvii.267.382 (http://
dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/lxvii.267.382). The author claims that the prisoner's premises are self-referring.
Wright, C. & Sudbury, A. (1977). "the Paradox of the Unexpected Examination". Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 55: 4158. doi: 10.1080/00048407712341031 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048407712341031).
The first complete formalization of the paradox, and a proposed solution to it.
Margalit, A. & Bar-Hillel, M. (1983). "Expecting the Unexpected". Philosophia 13: 337344. A history and
bibliography of writings on the paradox up to 1983.
Chihara, C. S. (1985). "Olin, Quine, and the Surprise Examination". Philosophical Studies 47: 1926. The author
claims that the prisoner assumes, falsely, that if he knows some proposition, then he also knows that he knows it.
Kirkham, R. (1991). "On Paradoxes and a Surprise Exam". Philosophia 21: 3151. doi: 10.1007/bf02381968
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02381968). The author defends and extends Wright and Sudbury's solution. He also updates the
history and bibliography of Margalit and Bar-Hillel up to 1991.
Chow, T. Y. (1998). "The surprise examination or unexpected hanging paradox" (http://www-math.mit.edu/

~tchow/unexpected.pdf). The American Mathematical Monthly.
Franceschi, P. (2005). "Une analyse dichotomique du paradoxe de l'examen surprise". Philosophiques 32 (2):
399421. doi: 10.7202/011875ar (http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/011875ar). English translation (http://www.
paulfranceschi.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=6:a-dichotomic-analysis-of-the-surprise-examination-paradox&catid=1:analytic-philosophy&Itemid=2).
Gardner, M. (1969). "The Paradox of the Unexpected Hanging". The Unexpected Hanging and Other *
Mathematical Diversions. Completely analyzes the paradox and introduces other situations with similar logic.
Quine, W. V. O. (1953). "On a So-called Paradox". Mind 62: 6566. doi: 10.1093/mind/lxii.245.65 (http://dx.
doi.org/10.1093/mind/lxii.245.65).
Sorensen, R. A. (1982). "Recalcitrant versions of the prediction paradox". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:
355362.
Kacser, Claude (1986). " On the unexpected hanging paradox (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.14658)".
American Journal of Physics 54 (4): 296.
Shapiro, Stuart C. (1998). " A Procedural Solution to the Unexpected Hanging and Sorites Paradoxes (http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2659782)". Mind 107: 751761. doi: 10.1093/mind/107.428.751 (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1093/mind/107.428.751).
External links
"The Surprise Examination Paradox and the Second Incompleteness Theorem" (http://www.ams.org/notices/
201011/rtx101101454p.pdf) by Shira Kritchman and Ran Raz, at ams.org
"The Surprise Examination Paradox: A review of two so-called solutions in dynamic epistemic logic" (http://
staff.science.uva.nl/~grossi/DyLoPro/StudentPapers/Final_Marcoci.pdf) by Alexandru Marcoci, at Faculty
of Science: University of Amsterdam
122

"What the Tortoise Said to Achilles", written by Lewis Carroll in 1895 for the philosophical journal Mind, is a
brief dialogue which problematises the foundations of logic. The title alludes to one of Zeno's paradoxes of motion,
in which Achilles could never overtake the tortoise in a race. In Carroll's dialogue, the tortoise challenges Achilles to
use the force of logic to make him accept the conclusion of a simple deductive argument. Ultimately, Achilles fails,
because the clever tortoise leads him into an infinite regression.
Summary of the dialogue

The discussion begins by considering the following logical argument:
A: "Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other" (Euclidean relation, a weakened form of the
transitive property)
B: "The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same"
Therefore Z: "The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other"
The Tortoise asks Achilles whether the conclusion logically follows from the premises, and Achilles grants that it
obviously does. The Tortoise then asks Achilles whether there might be a reader of Euclid who grants that the
argument is logically valid, as a sequence, while denying that A and B are true. Achilles accepts that such a reader
might exist, and that he would hold that if A and B are true, then Z must be true, while not yet accepting that A and B
are true. (A reader who denies the premises.)
The Tortoise then asks Achilles whether a second kind of reader might exist, who accepts that A and B are true, but
who does not yet accept the principle that if A and B are both true, then Z must be true. Achilles grants the Tortoise
that this second kind of reader might also exist. The Tortoise, then, asks Achilles to treat the Tortoise as a reader of
this second kind. Achilles must now logically compel the Tortoise to accept that Z must be true. (The tortoise is a
reader who denies the argument itself; the syllogism's conclusion, structure, or validity.)
After writing down A, B, and Z in his notebook, Achilles asks the Tortoise to accept the hypothetical:
C: "If A and B are true, Z must be true"
The Tortoise agrees to accept C, if Achilles will write down what it has to accept in his notebook, making the new
argument:
A: "Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other"
B: "The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same"
C: "If A and B are true, Z must be true"
Therefore Z: "The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other"
But now that the Tortoise accepts premise C, it still refuses to accept the expanded argument. When Achilles
demands that "If you accept A and B and C, you must accept Z," the Tortoise remarks that that's another hypothetical
proposition, and suggests even if it accepts C, it could still fail to conclude Z if it did not see the truth of:
D: "If A and B and C are true, Z must be true"
The Tortoise continues to accept each hypothetical premise once Achilles writes it down, but denies that the
conclusion necessarily follows, since each time it denies the hypothetical that if all the premises written down so far
are true, Z must be true:
"And at last we've got to the end of this ideal racecourse! Now that you accept A and B and C and D, of course
you accept Z."
"Do I?" said the Tortoise innocently. "Let's make that quite clear. I accept A and B and C and D. Suppose I still
refused to accept Z?"
123

"Then Logic would take you by the throat, and force you to do it!" Achilles triumphantly replied. "Logic
would tell you, 'You can't help yourself. Now that you've accepted A and B and C and D, you must accept Z!'
So you've no choice, you see."
"Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down," said the Tortoise. "So enter it in your
notebook, please. We will call it
(E) If A and B and C and D are true, Z must be true.
Until I've granted that, of course I needn't grant Z. So it's quite a necessary step, you see?"
"I see," said Achilles; and there was a touch of sadness in his tone.
Thus, the list of premises continues to grow without end, leaving the argument always in the form:
(1): "Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other"
(2): "The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to the same"
(3): (1) and (2) (Z)
(4): (1) and (2) and (3) (Z)
...
(n): (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) and ... and (n 1) (Z)
Therefore (Z): "The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other"
At each step, the Tortoise argues that even though he accepts all the premises that have been written down, there is
some further premise (that if all of (1)(n) are true, then (Z) must be true) that it still needs to accept before it is
compelled to accept that (Z) is true.
Explanation
Lewis Carroll was showing that there is a regress problem that arises from modus ponens deductions.
The regress problem arises because, in order to explain the logical principle, we have to propose a prior principle.
And, once we explain that principle, we have to introduce another principle to explain that principle. Thus, if the
causal chain is to continue, we are to fall into infinite regress. However, if we introduce a formal system where
modus ponens is simply an axiom, then we are to abide by it simply, because it is so. For example, in a chess game
there are particular rules, and the rules simply go without question. As players of the chess game, we are to simply
follow the rules. Likewise, if we are engaging in a formal system of logic, then we are to simply follow the rules
without question. Hence, introducing the formal system of logic stops the infinite regressionthat is, because the
regress would stop at the axioms or rules, per se, of the given game, system, etc. Though, it does also state that there
are problems with this as well, because, within the system, no proposition or variable carries with it any semantic
content. So, the moment you add to any proposition or variable semantic content, the problem arises again, because
the propositions and variables with semantic content run outside the system. Thus, if the solution is to be said to
work, then it is to be said to work solely within the given formal system, and not otherwise.
Some logicians (Kenneth Ross, Charles Wright) draw a firm distinction between the conditional connective (the
syntactic sign ""), and the implication relation (the formal object denoted by the double arrow symbol ""). These
logicians use the phrase not p or q for the conditional connective and the term implies for the implication relation.
Some explain the difference by saying that the conditional is the contemplated relation while the implication is the
asserted relation.Wikipedia:Citation needed In most fields of mathematics, it is treated as a variation in the usage of
the single sign "," not requiring two separate signs. Not all of those who use the sign "" for the conditional
connective regard it as a sign that denotes any kind of object, but treat it as a so-called syncategorematic sign, that is,
a sign with a purely syntactic function. For the sake of clarity and simplicity in the present introduction, it is
convenient to use the two-sign notation, but allow the sign "" to denote the boolean function that is associated with
124

the truth table of the material conditional.
These considerations result in the following scheme of notation.
The paradox ceases to exist the moment we replace informal logic with propositional logicWikipedia:Citation
needed. The Tortoise and Achilles don't agree on any definition of logical implication. In propositional logic the
logical implication is defined as follows:
P Q if and only if the proposition P Q is a tautology.
Hence de modus ponens [P (P Q)] Q, is a valid logical implication according to the definition of logical
implication just stated. There is no need to recurse since the logical implication can be translated into symbols, and
propositional operators such as . Demonstrating the logical implication simply translates into verifying that the
compound truth table is producing a tautology.
Discussion
Several philosophers have tried to resolve Carroll's paradox. Bertrand Russell discussed the paradox briefly in 38
of The Principles of Mathematics [1] (1903), distinguishing between implication (associated with the form "if p, then
q"), which he held to be a relation between unasserted propositions, and inference (associated with the form "p,
therefore q"), which he held to be a relation between asserted propositions; having made this distinction, Russell
could deny that the Tortoise's attempt to treat inferring Z from A and B is equivalent to, or dependent on, agreeing to
the hypothetical "If A and B are true, then Z is true."
The Wittgensteinian philosopher Peter Winch discussed the paradox in The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation
to Philosophy (1958), where he argued that the paradox showed that "the actual process of drawing an inference,
which is after all at the heart of logic, is something which cannot be represented as a logical formula ... Learning to
infer is not just a matter of being taught about explicit logical relations between propositions; it is learning to do
something" (p.57). Winch goes on to suggest that the moral of the dialogue is a particular case of a general lesson, to
the effect that the proper application of rules governing a form of human activity cannot itself be summed up with a
set of further rules, and so that "a form of human activity can never be summed up in a set of explicit precepts"
(p.53).
According to Penelope Maddy, Carroll's dialogue is apparently the first description of an obstacle to
Conventionalism about logical truth, then reworked in more sober philosophical terms by W. O. Quine.
References
[1] http:/ / fair-use. org/ bertrand-russell/ the-principles-of-mathematics/ s. 38
Where to find the article

Carol, Lewis (1995). "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles". Mind 104 (416): 691693. JSTOR 2254477 (http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2254477).
Hofstadter, Douglas. Gdel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. See the second dialogue, entitled "Two-Part
Invention." Dr. Hofstadter appropriated the characters of Achilles and the Tortoise for other, original, dialogues in
the book which alternate contrapuntally with prose chapters. Hofstadter's Tortoise is of the male sex, though the
Tortoise's sex is never specified by Carroll. The French translation of the book rendered the Tortoise's name as
"Madame Tortue."
A number of websites, including "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles" (http://www.lewiscarroll.org/achilles.
html) at the Lewis Carroll Society of North America (http://www.lewiscarroll.org), "What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles" (http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html) at Digital Text International (http://www.ditext.
125

com/), and "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles" (http://fair-use.org/mind/1895/04/
what-the-tortoise-said-to-achilles) at Fair Use Repository (http://fair-use.org).
126
127
Mathematics
Accuracy paradox
The accuracy paradox for predictive analytics states that predictive models with a given level of accuracy may have
greater predictive power than models with higher accuracy. It may be better to avoid the accuracy metric in favor of
other metrics such as precision and recall.
Accuracy is often the starting point for analyzing the quality of a predictive model, as well as an obvious criterion for
prediction. Accuracy measures the ratio of correct predictions to the total number of cases evaluated. It may seem
obvious that the ratio of correct predictions to cases should be a key metric. A predictive model may have high
accuracy, but be useless.
In an example predictive model for an insurance fraud application, all cases that are predicted as high-risk by the
model will be investigated. To evaluate the performance of the model, the insurance company has created a sample
data set of 10,000 claims. All 10,000 cases in the validation sample have been carefully checked and it is known
which cases are fraudulent. To analyze the quality of the model, the insurance uses the table of confusion. The
definition of accuracy, the table of confusion for model M1Fraud, and the calculation of accuracy for model M1Fraud is
shown below.
where
TN is the number of true negative cases
FP is the number of false positive cases
FN is the number of false negative cases
TP is the number of true positive cases
Formula 1: Definition of Accuracy
Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases 9,700
150
Positive Cases
100
50
Table 1: Table of Confusion for Fraud Model M1Fraud.
Formula 2: Accuracy for model M1Fraud

With an accuracy of 98.0% model M1Fraud appears to perform fairly well. The paradox lies in the fact that accuracy
can be easily improved to 98.5% by always predicting "no fraud". The table of confusion and the accuracy for this
trivial always predict negative model M2Fraud and the accuracy of this model are shown below.
Accuracy paradox
128
Predicted Negative Predicted Positive

Negative Cases 9,850
Positive Cases
150
Table 2: Table of Confusion for Fraud Model M2Fraud.
Formula 3: Accuracy for model M2Fraud

Model M2Fraudreduces the rate of inaccurate predictions from 2% to 1.5%. This is an apparent improvement of 25%.
The new model M2Fraud shows fewer incorrect predictions and markedly improved accuracy, as compared to the
original model M1Fraud, but is obviously useless.
The alternative model M2Fraud does not offer any value to the company for preventing fraud. The less accurate model
is more useful than the more accurate model.
Model improvements should not be measured in terms of accuracy gains. It may be going too far to say that accuracy
is irrelevant, but caution is advised when using accuracy in the evaluation of predictive models.
Bibliography
Zhu, Xingquan (2007), Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining: Challenges and Realities [1], IGI Global,
pp.118119, ISBN978-1-59904-252-7
doi:10.1117/12.785623 [2]
pp 86-87 of this Master's thesis [3]
References
[1] http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=zdJQAAAAMAAJ& q=data+ mining+ challenges+ and+ realities& dq=data+ mining+ challenges+ and+
realities
[2] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1117%2F12. 785623
[3] http:/ / www. utwente. nl/ ewi/ trese/ graduation_projects/ 2009/ Abma. pdf
An apportionment paradox exists when the rules for apportionment in a political system produce results which are
unexpected or seem to violate common sense.
To apportion is to divide into parts according to some rule, the rule typically being one of proportion. Certain
quantities, like milk, can be divided in any proportion whatsoever; others, such as horses, cannotonly whole
numbers will do. In the latter case, there is an inherent tension between our desire to obey the rule of proportion as
closely as possible and the constraint restricting the size of each portion to discrete values. This results, at times, in
unintuitive observations, or paradoxes.
Several paradoxes related to apportionment, also called fair division, have been identified. In some cases, simple
adjustments to an apportionment methodology can resolve observed paradoxes. Others, such as those relating to the
United States House of Representatives, call into question notions that mathematics alone can provide a single, fair
resolution.
History
The Alabama paradox was discovered in 1880, when it was found that increasing the total number of seats in the
House of Representatives would decrease Alabama's share from 8 to 7. There was more to come: when Oklahoma
became a state in 1907, a recomputation of apportionment showed that the number of seats due to other states would
be affected even though Oklahoma would be given a fair share of seats and the total number of seats increased by
that number.Wikipedia:Citation needed
The method for apportionment used during this period, originally put forth by Alexander Hamilton but not adopted
until 1852, was as follows (after meeting the requirements of the United States Constitution, wherein each state must
be allocated at least one seat in the House of Representatives, regardless of population):
First, the fair share of each state, i.e. the proportional share of seats that each state would get if fractional values
were allowed, is computed.
Next, the fair shares are rounded down to whole numbers, resulting in unallocated "leftover" seats. These seats are
allocated, one each, to the states whose fair share exceeds the rounded-down number by the highest
amount.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Impossibility result
In 1982 two mathematicians, Michel Balinski and Peyton Young, proved that any method of apportionment will
result in paradoxes whenever there are three or more parties (or states, regions, etc.). More precisely, their theorem
states that there is no apportionment system that has the following properties (as the example we take the division of
seats between parties in a system of proportional representation):
It follows the quota rule: Each of the parties gets one of the two numbers closest to its fair share of seats (if the
party's fair share is 7.34 seats, it gets either 7 or 8).
It does not have the Alabama paradox: If the total number of seats is increased, no party's number of seats
decreases.
It does not have the population paradox: If party A gets more votes and party B gets fewer votes, no seat will be
transferred from A to B.
129
130
Examples of paradoxes
Alabama paradox
The Alabama paradox was the first of the apportionment paradoxes to be discovered. The US House of
Representatives is constitutionally required to allocate seats based on population counts, which are required every 10
years. The size of the House is set by statute.
After the 1880 census, C. W. Seaton, chief clerk of the United States Census Bureau, computed apportionments for
all House sizes between 275 and 350, and discovered that Alabama would get 8 seats with a House size of 299 but
only 7 with a House size of 300. In general the term Alabama paradox refers to any apportionment scenario where
increasing the total number of items would decrease one of the shares. A similar exercise by the Census Bureau after
the 1900 census computed apportionments for all House sizes between 350 and 400: Colorado would have received
three seats in all cases, except with a House size of 357 in which case it would have received two.[1]
The following is a simplified example (following the largest remainder method) with three states and 10 seats and 11
seats.
With 10 seats
With 11 seats
State Population Fair share Seats Fair share Seats

A
4.286
4.714
4.286
4.714
1.429
1.571
Observe that state C's share decreases from 2 to 1 with the added seat.
This occurs because increasing the number of seats increases the fair share faster for the large states than for the
small states. In particular, large A and B had their fair share increase faster than small C. Therefore, the fractional
parts for A and B increased faster than those for C. In fact, they overtook C's fraction, causing C to lose its seat, since
the Hamilton method examines which states have the largest fraction.
New states paradox

Given a fixed number of total representatives (as determined by the United States House of Representatives), adding
a new state would in theory reduce the number of representatives for existing states, as under the United States
Constitution each state is entitled to at least one representative regardless of its population. However, because of how
the particular apportionment rules deal with rounding methods, it is possible for an existing state to get more
representatives than if the new state were not added.
Population paradox
The population paradox is a counterintuitive result of some procedures for apportionment. When two states have
populations increasing at different rates, a small state with rapid growth can lose a legislative seat to a big state with
slower growth.
The paradox arises because of rounding in the procedure for dividing the seats. See the apportionment rules for the
United States Congress for an example.
External links
The Constitution and Paradoxes [2]
Alabama Paradox [3]
New States Paradox [4]
Population Paradox [5]
Apportionment: Balinski and Young's Contribution [6]
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Cut-the-knot: The Constitution and Paradoxes (http:/ / www. cut-the-knot. org/ ctk/ Democracy. shtml)
http:/ / www. cut-the-knot. org/ ctk/ Democracy. shtml
http:/ / www. cut-the-knot. org/ ctk/ Democracy. shtml#alabama
http:/ / www. cut-the-knot. org/ ctk/ Democracy. shtml#new-states
http:/ / www. cut-the-knot. org/ ctk/ Democracy. shtml#population
http:/ / www. ams. org/ featurecolumn/ archive/ apportionII3. html
The BanachTarski paradox is a
theorem in set-theoretic geometry,
which states the following: Given a
solid ball in 3dimensional space, there
exists a decomposition of the ball into
Can a ball be decomposed into a finite number of point sets and reassembled into two
a finite number[1] of non-overlapping
balls identical to the original?
pieces (i.e., disjoint subsets), which
can then be put back together in a
different way to yield two identical copies of the original ball. Indeed, the reassembly process involves only moving
the pieces around and rotating them, without changing their shape. However, the pieces themselves are not "solids"
in the usual sense, but infinite scatterings of points.
A stronger form of the theorem implies that given any two "reasonable" solid objects (such as a small ball and a huge
ball), either one can be reassembled into the other. This is often stated informally as "a pea can be chopped up and
reassembled into the Sun" and called "pea and the Sun paradox".
The reason the BanachTarski theorem is called a paradox is that it contradicts basic geometric intuition. "Doubling
the ball" by dividing it into parts and moving them around by rotations and translations, without any stretching,
bending, or adding new points, seems to be impossible, since all these operations ought to, intuitively speaking,
preserve the volume, but they don't necessarily all do that, and the volume is doubled in the end.
Unlike with most theorems in geometry, the proof of this result depends in a critical way on the choice of axioms for
set theory. It can be proven only by using the axiom of choice,[2] which allows for the construction of nonmeasurable
sets, i.e., collections of points that do not have a volume in the ordinary sense and that for their construction would
require performing an uncountably infinite number of choices.
It was shown in 2005 that the pieces in the decomposition can be chosen in such a way that they can be moved
continuously into place without running into one another.
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Banach and Tarski publication

In a paper published in 1924, Stefan Banach and Alfred Tarski gave a construction of such a paradoxical
decomposition, based on earlier work by Giuseppe Vitali concerning the unit interval and on the paradoxical
decompositions of the sphere by Felix Hausdorff, and discussed a number of related questions concerning
decompositions of subsets of Euclidean spaces in various dimensions. They proved the following more general
statement, the strong form of the BanachTarski paradox:
Given any two bounded subsets A and B of an Euclidean space in at least three dimensions, both of which have
a nonempty interior, there are partitions of A and B into a finite number of disjoint subsets, A = A1 ... Ak,
B = B1 ... Bk, such that for each i between 1 and k, the sets Ai and Bi are congruent.
Now let A be the original ball and B be the union of two translated copies of the original ball. Then the proposition
means that you can divide the original ball A into a certain number of pieces and then rotate and translate these
pieces in such a way that the result is the whole set B, which contains two copies of A.
The strong form of the BanachTarski paradox is false in dimensions one and two, but Banach and Tarski showed
that an analogous statement remains true if countably many subsets are allowed. The difference between the
dimensions 1 and 2 on the one hand, and three and higher, on the other hand, is due to the richer structure of the
group E(n) of the Euclidean motions in the higher dimensions, which is solvable for n = 1, 2 and contains a free
group with two generators for n 3. John von Neumann studied the properties of the group of equivalences that
make a paradoxical decomposition possible and introduced the notion of amenable groups. He also found a form of
the paradox in the plane which uses area-preserving affine transformations in place of the usual congruences.
Tarski proved that amenable groups are precisely those for which no paradoxical decompositions exist.
Formal treatment
The BanachTarski paradox states that a ball in the ordinary Euclidean space can be doubled using only the
operations of partitioning into subsets, replacing a set with a congruent set, and reassembly. Its mathematical
structure is greatly elucidated by emphasizing the role played by the group of Euclidean motions and introducing the
notions of equidecomposable sets and paradoxical set. Suppose that G is a group acting on a set X. In the most
important special case, X is an n-dimensional Euclidean space, and G consists of all isometries of X, i.e. the
transformations of X into itself that preserve the distances, usually denoted E(n). Two geometric figures that can be
transformed into each other are called congruent, and this terminology will be extended to the general G-action. Two
subsets A and B of X are called G-equidecomposable, or equidecomposable with respect to G, if A and B can be
partitioned into the same finite number of respectively G-congruent pieces. This defines an equivalence relation
among all subsets of X. Formally, if
then we will say that A and B are G-equidecomposable using k pieces. If a set E has two disjoint subsets A and B
such that A and E, as well as B and E, are G-equidecomposable then E is called paradoxical.
Using this terminology, the BanachTarski paradox can be reformulated as follows:
A three-dimensional Euclidean ball is equidecomposable with two copies of itself.
In fact, there is a sharp result in this case, due to Robinson:[3] doubling the ball can be accomplished with five pieces,
and fewer than five pieces will not suffice.
The strong version of the paradox claims:
Any two bounded subsets of 3-dimensional Euclidean space with non-empty interiors are equidecomposable.
While apparently more general, this statement is derived in a simple way from the doubling of a ball by using a
generalization of the BernsteinSchroeder theorem due to Banach that implies that if A is equidecomposable with a
132
subset of B and B is equidecomposable with a subset of A, then A and B are equidecomposable.
The BanachTarski paradox can be put in context by pointing out that for two sets in the strong form of the paradox,
there is always a bijective function that can map the points in one shape into the other in a one-to-one fashion. In the
language of Georg Cantor's set theory, these two sets have equal cardinality. Thus, if one enlarges the group to allow
arbitrary bijections of X then all sets with non-empty interior become congruent. Likewise, we can make one ball
into a larger or smaller ball by stretching, in other words, by applying similarity transformations. Hence if the group
G is large enough, we may find G-equidecomposable sets whose "size" varies. Moreover, since a countable set can
be made into two copies of itself, one might expect that somehow, using countably many pieces could do the trick.
On the other hand, in the BanachTarski paradox the number of pieces is finite and the allowed equivalences are
Euclidean congruences, which preserve the volumes. Yet, somehow, they end up doubling the volume of the ball!
While this is certainly surprising, some of the pieces used in the paradoxical decomposition are non-measurable sets,
so the notion of volume (more precisely, Lebesgue measure) is not defined for them, and the partitioning cannot be
accomplished in a practical way. In fact, the BanachTarski paradox demonstrates that it is impossible to find a
finitely-additive measure (or a Banach measure) defined on all subsets of a Euclidean space of three (and greater)
dimensions that is invariant with respect to Euclidean motions and takes the value one on a unit cube. In his later
work, Tarski showed that, conversely, non-existence of paradoxical decompositions of this type implies the existence
of a finitely-additive invariant measure.
The heart of the proof of the "doubling the ball" form of the paradox presented below is the remarkable fact that by a
Euclidean isometry (and renaming of elements), one can divide a certain set (essentially, the surface of a unit sphere)
into four parts, then rotate one of them to become itself plus two of the other parts. This follows rather easily from a
F2-paradoxical decomposition of F2, the free group with two generators. Banach and Tarski's proof relied on an
analogous fact discovered by Hausdorff some years earlier: the surface of a unit sphere in space is a disjoint union of
three sets B, C, D and a countable set E such that, on the one hand, B, C, D are pairwise congruent, and, on the other
hand, B is congruent with the union of C and D. This is often called the Hausdorff paradox.
Connection with earlier work and the role of the axiom of choice
Banach and Tarski explicitly acknowledge Giuseppe Vitali's 1905 construction of the set bearing his name,
Hausdorff's paradox (1914), and an earlier (1923) paper of Banach as the precursors to their work. Vitali's and
Hausdorff's constructions depend on Zermelo's axiom of choice ("AC"), which is also crucial to the BanachTarski
paper, both for proving their paradox and for the proof of another result:
Two Euclidean polygons, one of which strictly contains the other, are not equidecomposable.
They remark:
Le rle que joue cet axiome dans nos raisonnements nous semble mriter l'attention
(The role this axiom plays in our reasoning seems to us to deserve attention)
and point out that while the second result fully agrees with our geometric intuition, its proof uses AC in an even
more substantial way than the proof of the paradox. Thus Banach and Tarski imply that AC should not be rejected
simply because it produces a paradoxical decomposition, for such an argument also undermines proofs of
geometrically intuitive statements.
However, in 1949 A.P. Morse showed that the statement about Euclidean polygons can be proved in ZF set theory
and thus does not require the axiom of choice. In 1964, Paul Cohen proved that the axiom of choice cannot be
proved from ZF. A weaker version of an axiom of choice is the axiom of dependent choice, DC. It has been shown
that
The BanachTarski paradox is not a theorem of ZF, nor of ZF+DC.[4]
Large amounts of mathematics use AC. As Stan Wagon points out at the end of his monograph, the BanachTarski
paradox has been more significant for its role in pure mathematics than for foundational questions: it motivated a
133
134
fruitful new direction for research, the amenability of groups, which has nothing to do with the foundational
questions.
In 1991, using then-recent results by Matthew Foreman and Friedrich Wehrung, Janusz Pawlikowski proved that the
BanachTarski paradox follows from ZF plus the HahnBanach theorem. The HahnBanach theorem doesn't rely
on the full axiom of choice but can be proved using a weaker version of AC called the ultrafilter lemma. So
Pawlikowski proved that the set theory needed to prove the BanachTarski paradox, while stronger than ZF, is
weaker than full ZFC.
A sketch of the proof

Here we sketch a proof which is similar but not identical to that given by Banach and Tarski. Essentially, the
paradoxical decomposition of the ball is achieved in four steps:
1. Find a paradoxical decomposition of the free group in two generators.
2. Find a group of rotations in 3-d space isomorphic to the free group in two generators.
3. Use the paradoxical decomposition of that group and the axiom of choice to produce a paradoxical decomposition
of the hollow unit sphere.
4. Extend this decomposition of the sphere to a decomposition of the solid unit ball.
We now discuss each of these steps in more detail.
Step 1
The free group with two generators a and b consists of all finite strings that can be formed from the four symbols a,
a1, b and b1 such that no a appears directly next to an a1 and no b appears directly next to a b1. Two such strings
can be concatenated and converted into a string of this type by repeatedly replacing the "forbidden" substrings with
the empty string. For instance: abab1a1 concatenated with abab1a yields abab1a1abab1a, which contains the
substring a1a, and so gets reduced to abaab1a. One can check that the set of those strings with this operation forms
a group with identity element the empty string e. We will call this group F2.
The group
can be "paradoxically decomposed" as
follows: let S(a) be the set of all non-forbidden strings

that start with a and define S(a1), S(b) and S(b1)
similarly. Clearly,
but also
and
The notation aS(a1) means take all the strings in
S(a1) and concatenate them on the left with a.
Make sure that you understand this last line, because it
is at the core of the proof. For example, there may be a
string
in the set
which, because of
The sets S(a1) and aS(a1) in the Cayley graph of F2
the rule that
must not appear next to
, reduces
to the string
. Similarly, it contains all the strings that start with
reduces to
). In this way,
(for example the string
contains all the strings that start with
and
which
We have cut our group F2 into four pieces (plus the singleton {e}), then "shifted" two of them by multiplying with a
or b, then "reassembled" two pieces to make one copy of
and the other two to make another copy of
. That is
135
exactly what we want to do to the ball.
Step 2
In order to find a free group of rotations of 3D space, i.e. that behaves just like (or "is isomorphic to") the free group
F2, we take two orthogonal axes, e.g. the x and z axes, and let A be a rotation of
x axis, and B be a rotation of
about the first,
about the z axis (there are many other suitable pairs of irrational multiples of , that
could be used here as well).[5]

The group of rotations generated by A and B will be called H. Let
on the z axis, of the form
.
It can be shown by induction that
. Analysing
and
maps the point
modulo 3 one show that
to
be an element of H which starts with a rotation
where
. The same argument repeated (by symmetry of the
problem) is valid for the opposite angle, as well as on the x axis. This shows that for any non trivial word
H,
then
. Therefore the group H is a free group, isomorphic to F2.
The two rotations behave just like the elements a and b in the group F2: we now have a paradoxical decomposition
of H.
This step cannot be performed in two dimensions since it involves rotations in three dimensions. If we take two
rotations about the same axis, the resulting group is commutative and doesn't have the property required in step 1.
An alternate arithmetic proof of the existence of free groups in some special orthogonal groups using integral
quaternions leads to paradoxical decompositions of the rotation group.[6]
Step 3
The unit sphere S2 is partitioned into orbits by the action of our group H: two points belong to the same orbit if and
only if there's a rotation in H which moves the first point into the second. (Note that the orbit of a point is a dense set
in S2.) We can use the axiom of choice to pick exactly one point from every orbit; collect these points into a set M.
Now (almost) every point in S2 can be reached in exactly one way by applying the proper rotation from H to the
proper element from M, and because of this, the paradoxical decomposition of H then yields a paradoxical
decomposition of S2 into four pieces A1, A2, A3, A4 as follows:
where we use the notation
and likewise for the other sets and define
(We didn't use the five "paradoxical" parts of F2 directly, as they would leave us with M as an extra piece after
doubling, owing to the presence of the singleton {e}!)
The (majority of the) sphere has now been divided into four sets (each one dense on the sphere), and when two of
these are rotated, we end up with double what we had before:
Step 4
Finally, connect every point on S2 with a ray to the origin; the paradoxical decomposition of S2 then yields a
paradoxical decomposition of the solid unit ball minus the point at the ball's centre (this center point needs a bit more
care, see below).
N.B. This sketch glosses over some details. One has to be careful about the set of points on the sphere which happen
to lie on the axis of some rotation in H. However, there are only countably many such points, and like the point at
the centre of the ball, it is possible to patch the proof to account for them all (see below).
Some details, fleshed out

In Step 3, we partitioned the sphere into orbits of our group H. To streamline the proof, we omitted the discussion of
points that are fixed by some rotation; since the paradoxical decomposition of F2 relies on shifting certain subsets,
the fact that some points are fixed might cause some trouble. Since any rotation of S2 (other than the null rotation)
has exactly two fixed points, and since H, which is isomorphic to F2, is countable, there are countably many points
of S2 that are fixed by some rotation in H, denote this set of fixed points D. Step 3 proves that S2 D admits a
paradoxical decomposition.
What remains to be shown is the Claim: S2 D is equidecomposable with S2.
Proof. Let be some line through the origin that does not intersect any point in D this is possible since D is
countable. Let J be the set of angles, , such that for some natural number n, and some P in D, r(n)P is also in D,
where r(n) is a rotation about of n. Then J is countable so there exists an angle not in J. Let be the rotation
about by , then acts on S2 with no fixed points in D, i.e., n(D) is disjoint from D, and for natural m<n, n(D) is
disjoint from m(D). Let E be the disjoint union of n(D) over n = 0,1,2,.... Then S2 = E (S2 E) ~ (E) (S2
E)=(E D)(S2E)=S2 D, where ~ denotes "is equidecomposable to".
For step 4, it has already been shown that the ball minus a point admits a paradoxical decomposition; it remains to be
shown that the ball minus a point is equidecomposable with the ball. Consider a circle within the ball, containing the
point at the centre of the ball. Using an argument like that used to prove the Claim, one can see that the full circle is
equidecomposable with the circle minus the point at the ball's centre. (Basically, a countable set of points on the
circle can be rotated to give itself plus one more point.) Note that this involves the rotation about a point other than
the origin, so the BanachTarski paradox involves isometries of Euclidean 3-space rather than just SO(3).
We are using the fact that if A ~ B and B ~ C, then A ~ C. The decomposition of A into C can be done using number
of pieces equal to the product of the numbers needed for taking A into B and for taking B into C.
The proof sketched above requires 2 4 2+8=24 pieces, a factor of 2 to remove fixed points, a factor 4 from
step 1, a factor 2 to recreate fixed points, and 8 for the center point of the second ball. But in step 1 when moving {e}
and all strings of the form an into S(a1), do this to all orbits except one. Move {e} of this last orbit to the center
point of the second ball. This brings the total down to 16+1 pieces. With more algebra one can also decompose
fixed orbits into 4 sets as in step 1. This gives 5 pieces and is the best possible.
Obtaining infinitely many balls from one

Using the BanachTarski paradox, it is possible to obtain k copies of a ball in the Euclidean n-space from one, for
any integers n 3 and k 1, i.e. a ball can be cut into k pieces so that each of them is equidecomposable to a ball of
the same size as the original. Using the fact that the free group F2 of rank 2 admits a free subgroup of countably
infinite rank, a similar proof yields that the unit sphere Sn1 can be partitioned into countably infinitely many pieces,
each of which is equidecomposable (with two pieces) to the Sn1 using rotations. By using analytic properties of the
rotation group SO(n), which is a connected analytic Lie group, one can further prove that the sphere Sn1 can be
partitioned into as many pieces as there are real numbers (that is,
pieces), so that each piece is
equidecomposable with two pieces to Sn1 using rotations. These results then extend to the unit ball deprived of the
136
origin. A 2010 article by Valeriy Churkin gives a new proof of the continuous version of the BanachTarski
paradox.[7]
The von Neumann paradox in the Euclidean plane

Main article: von Neumann paradox
In the Euclidean plane, two figures that are equidecomposable with respect to the group of Euclidean motions are
necessarily of the same area, therefore, a paradoxical decomposition of a square or disk of BanachTarski type that
uses only Euclidean congruences is impossible. A conceptual explanation of the distinction between the planar and
higher-dimensional cases was given by John von Neumann: unlike the group SO(3) of rotations in three dimensions,
the group E(2) of Euclidean motions of the plane is solvable, which implies the existence of a finitely-additive
measure on E(2) and R2 which is invariant under translations and rotations, and rules out paradoxical decompositions
of non-negligible sets. Von Neumann then posed the following question: can such a paradoxical decomposition be
constructed if one allowed a larger group of equivalences?
It is clear that if one permits similarities, any two squares in the plane become equivalent even without further
subdivision. This motivates restricting one's attention to the group SA2 of area-preserving affine transformations.
Since the area is preserved, any paradoxical decomposition of a square with respect to this group would be
counterintuitive for the same reasons as the BanachTarski decomposition of a ball. In fact, the group SA2 contains
as a subgroup the special linear group SL(2,R), which in its turn contains the free group F2 with two generators as a
subgroup. This makes it plausible that the proof of BanachTarski paradox can be imitated in the plane. The main
difficulty here lies in the fact that the unit square is not invariant under the action of the linear group SL(2, R), hence
one cannot simply transfer a paradoxical decomposition from the group to the square, as in the third step of the
above proof of the BanachTarski paradox. Moreover, the fixed points of the group present difficulties (for example,
the origin is fixed under all linear transformations). This is why von Neumann used the larger group SA2 including
the translations, and he constructed a paradoxical decomposition of the unit square with respect to the enlarged group
(in 1929). Applying the BanachTarski method, the paradox for the square can be strengthened as follows:
Any two bounded subsets of the Euclidean plane with non-empty interiors are equidecomposable with respect
to the area-preserving affine maps.
As von Neumann notes,[8]
"Infolgedessen gibt es bereits in der Ebene kein nichtnegatives additives Ma (wo das Einheitsquadrat das
Ma 1 hat), das gegenber allen Abbildungen von A2 invariant wre."
"In accordance with this, already in the plane there is no nonnegative additive measure (for which the unit
square has a measure of 1), which is invariant with respect to all transformations belonging to A2 [the group of
area-preserving affine transformations]."
To explain this a bit more, the question of whether a finitely additive measure exists, that is preserved under certain
transformations, depends on what transformations are allowed. The Banach measure of sets in the plane, which is
preserved by translations and rotations, is not preserved by non-isometric transformations even when they do
preserve the area of polygons. The points of the plane (other than the origin) can be divided into two dense sets
which we may call A and B. If the A points of a given polygon are transformed by a certain area-preserving
transformation and the B points by another, both sets can become subsets of the A points in two new polygons. The
new polygons have the same area as the old polygon, but the two transformed sets cannot have the same measure as
before (since they contain only part of the A points), and therefore there is no measure that "works".
The class of groups isolated by von Neumann in the course of study of BanachTarski phenomenon turned out to be
very important for many areas of mathematics: these are amenable groups, or groups with an invariant mean, and
include all finite and all solvable groups. Generally speaking, paradoxical decompositions arise when the group used
for equivalences in the definition of equidecomposability is not amenable.
137
Recent progress
2000. Von Neumann's paper left open the possibility of a paradoxical decomposition of the interior of the unit
square with respect to the linear group SL(2,R) (Wagon, Question 7.4). In 2000, Mikls Laczkovich proved that
such a decomposition exists. More precisely, let A be the family of all bounded subsets of the plane with
non-empty interior and at a positive distance from the origin, and B the family of all planar sets with the property
that a union of finitely many translates under some elements of SL(2, R) contains a punctured neighbourhood of
the origin. Then all sets in the family A are SL(2, R)-equidecomposable, and likewise for the sets in B. It follows
that both families consist of paradoxical sets.
2003. It had been known for a long time that the full plane was paradoxical with respect to SA2, and that the
minimal number of pieces would equal four provided that there exists a locally commutative free subgroup of
SA2. In 2003 Kenzi Sat constructed such a subgroup, confirming that four pieces suffice.
Notes
[1] Five pieces will suffice;
[2] Wagon, Corollary 13.3
[3] Robinson, R. M. (1947). "On the Decomposition of Spheres." Fund. Math. 34:246260. This article, based on an analysis of the Hausdorff
paradox, settled a question put forth by von Neumann in 1929.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
Wagon, Corollary 13.3

Wagon, p. 16.
INVARIANT MEASURES, EXPANDERS AND PROPERTY T MAXIME BERGERON
Full text in Russian is available from the Mathnet.ru page (http:/ / www. mathnet. ru/ php/ archive. phtml?wshow=paper& jrnid=al&
paperid=431& option_lang=eng).
[8] On p. 85.
References
Banach, Stefan; Tarski, Alfred (1924). "Sur la dcomposition des ensembles de points en parties respectivement
congruentes" (http://matwbn.icm.edu.pl/ksiazki/fm/fm6/fm6127.pdf) (PDF). Review at JFM (http://www.
emis.de/cgi-bin/JFM-item?50.0370.02). Fundamenta Mathematicae 6: 244277.
Churkin, V. A. (2010). "A continuous version of the HausdorffBanachTarski paradox". Algebra and Logic 49
(1): 9198. doi: 10.1007/s10469-010-9080-y (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10469-010-9080-y).
Edward Kasner & James Newman (1940) Mathematics and the Imagination, pp 2057, Simon & Schuster.
Kuro5hin. "Layman's Guide to the BanachTarski Paradox" (http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2003/5/23/
134430/275).
Stromberg, Karl (March 1979). "The BanachTarski paradox". The American Mathematical Monthly
(Mathematical Association of America) 86 (3): 151161. doi: 10.2307/2321514 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
Su, Francis E. "The BanachTarski Paradox" (http://www.math.hmc.edu/~su/papers.dir/banachtarski.pdf)
(PDF).
von Neumann, John (1929). "Zur allgemeinen Theorie des Masses" (http://matwbn.icm.edu.pl/ksiazki/fm/
fm13/fm1316.pdf) (PDF). Fundamenta Mathematicae 13: 73116.
Wagon, Stan (1994). The BanachTarski Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ISBN0-521-45704-1.
Wapner, Leonard M. (2005). The Pea and the Sun: A Mathematical Paradox (http://gen.lib.rus.ec/
get?md5=59f223482492f1644b1023fccd4968f1). Wellesley, Mass.: A.K. Peters. ISBN1-56881-213-2.
138
139
External links
The Banach-Tarski Paradox (http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/TheBanachTarskiParadox/) by Stan Wagon
(Macalester College), the Wolfram Demonstrations Project.
Irregular Webcomic! #2339 (http://www.irregularwebcomic.net/2339.html) by David Morgan-Mar provides a
non-technical explanation of the paradox. It includes a step-by-step demonstration of how to create two spheres
from one.
Berkson's paradox
Berkson's paradox also known as Berkson's bias or Berkson's fallacy is a result in conditional probability and
statistics which is counterintuitive for some people, and hence a veridical paradox. It is a complicating factor arising
in statistical tests of proportions. Specifically, it arises when there is an ascertainment bias inherent in a study design.
It is often described in the fields of medical statistics or biostatistics, as in the original description of the problem by
Joseph Berkson.
Statement
The result is that two independent events become conditionally dependent (negatively dependent) given that at least
one of them occurs. Symbolically:
if 0 < P(A) < 1 and 0 < P(B) < 1,
and P(A|B) = P(A), i.e. they are independent,
then P(A|B,C) < P(A|C) where C = AB (i.e. A or B).
In words, given two independent events, if you only consider outcomes where at least one occurs, then they become
negatively dependent.
Explanation
The cause is that the conditional probability of event A occurring, given that it or B occurs, is inflated: it is higher
than the unconditional probability, because we have excluded cases where neither occur.
P(A|AB) > P(A)
conditional probability inflated relative to unconditional
One can see this in tabular form as follows: the gray regions are the outcomes where at least one event occurs (and
~A means "not A").
~A
A&B
~A & B
~B A & ~B ~A & ~B
For instance, if one has a sample of 100, and both A and B occur independently half the time (So P(A) = P(B) = 1/2),
one obtains:
Berkson's paradox
140
A ~A
B
25 25
~B 25 25
So in 75 outcomes, either A or B occurs, of which 50 have A occurring, so

P(A|AB) = 50/75 = 2/3 > 1/2 = 50/100 = P(A).
Thus the probability of A is higher in the subset (of outcomes where it or B occurs), 2/3, than in the overall
population, 1/2.
Berkson's paradox arises because the conditional probability of A given B within this subset equals the conditional
probability in the overall population, but the unconditional probability within the subset is inflated relative to the
unconditional probability in the overall population, hence, within the subset, the presence of B decreases the
conditional probability of A (back to its overall unconditional probability):
P(A|B, AB) = P(A|B) = P(A)
P(A|AB) > P(A).
Examples
Berkson's original illustration involves a retrospective study examining a risk factor for a disease in a statistical
sample from a hospital in-patient population. If a control group is also ascertained from the in-patient population, a
difference in hospital admission rates for the control sample and case sample can result in a spurious negative
association between the disease and the risk factor. For example, a hospital patient without diabetes is more likely to
have cholecystis, since they must have had some non-diabetes reason to enter the hospital in the first place.
An example presented by Jordan Ellenberg: Suppose you will only date a man if his niceness plus his handsomeness
exceeds some threshold. Then nicer men do not have to be as handsome in order to qualify for your dating pool. So,
among the men that you date, you may observe that the nicer ones are less handsome on average (and vice-versa),
even if these traits are uncorrelated in the general population.
Note that this does not mean that men in your dating pool compare unfavorably with men in the population. On the
contrary, your selection criterion means that you have high standards. The average nice man that you date is actually
more handsome than the average man in the population (since even among nice men, you skip the ugliest portion of
the population). Berkson's negative correlation is an effect that arises within your dating pool: the rude men that you
date must have been even more handsome to qualify.
As a quantitative example, suppose a collector has 1000 postage stamps, of which 300 are pretty and 100 are rare,
with 30 being both pretty and rare. 10% of all her stamps are rare and 10% of her pretty stamps are rare, so prettiness
tells nothing about rarity. She puts the 370 stamps which are pretty or rare on display. Just over 27% of the stamps
on display are rare, but still only 10% of the pretty stamps are rare (and 100% of the 70 not-pretty stamps on display
are rare). If an observer only considers stamps on display, he will observe a spurious negative relationship between
prettiness and rarity as a result of the selection bias (that is, not-prettiness strongly indicates rarity in the display, but
not in the total collection).
Berkson's paradox
References
Berkson, Joseph (June 1946). "Limitations of the Application of Fourfold Table Analysis to Hospital Data".
Biometrics Bulletin 2 (3): 4753. doi:10.2307/3002000 [1]. JSTOR3002000 [2]. (The paper is frequently miscited
as Berkson, J. (1949) Biological Bulletin 2, 4753.)
External Links
Jordan Ellenberg, "Why are handsome men such jerks? [3]"
References
[1] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 2307%2F3002000
[2] http:/ / www. jstor. org/ stable/ 3002000
[3] http:/ / www. slate. com/ blogs/ how_not_to_be_wrong/ 2014/ 06/ 03/ berkson_s_fallacy_why_are_handsome_men_such_jerks. html

Bertrand's box paradox is a classic paradox of elementary probability theory. It was first posed by Joseph Bertrand
in his Calcul des probabilits, published in 1889.
There are three boxes:
1. a box containing two gold coins,
2. a box containing two silver coins,
3. a box containing one gold coin and one silver coin.
After choosing a box at random and withdrawing one coin at random, if that happens to be a gold coin, it may seem
that the probability that the remaining coin is gold is 12; in fact, the probability is actually 23. Two problems that are
very similar are the Monty Hall problem and the Three Prisoners problem.
These simple but slightly counterintuitive puzzles are used as a standard example in teaching probability theory.
Their solution illustrates some basic principles, including the Kolmogorov axioms.
Box version
There are three boxes, each with one drawer on each of two sides. Each drawer contains a coin. One box has a gold
coin on each side (GG), one a silver coin on each side (SS), and the other a gold coin on one side and a silver coin
on the other (GS). A box is chosen at random, a random drawer is opened, and a gold coin is found inside it. What is
the chance of the coin on the other side being gold?
The following reasoning appears to give a probability of 12:
Originally, all three boxes were equally likely to be chosen.

The chosen box cannot be box SS.
So it must be box GG or GS.
The two remaining possibilities are equally likely. So the probability that the box is GG, and the other coin is
also gold, is 12.
The flaw is in the last step. While those two cases were originally equally likely, the fact that you are certain to find a
gold coin if you had chosen the GG box, but are only 50% sure of finding a gold coin if you had chosen the GS box,
means they are no longer equally likely given that you have found a gold coin. Specifically:
The probability that GG would produce a gold coin is 1.
141

The probability that SS would produce a gold coin is 0.
The probability that GS would produce a gold coin is 12.
Initially GG, SS and GS are equally likely. Therefore by Bayes rule the conditional probability that the chosen box
is GG, given we have observed a gold coin, is:
The correct answer of 23 can also be obtained as follows:
Originally, all six coins were equally likely to be chosen.

The chosen coin cannot be from drawer S of box GS, or from either drawer of box SS.
So it must come from the G drawer of box GS, or either drawer of box GG.
The three remaining possibilities are equally likely, so the probability that the drawer is from box GG is 23.
Alternatively, one can simply note that the chosen box has two coins of the same type 23 of the time. So, regardless
of what kind of coin is in the chosen drawer, the box has two coins of that type 23 of the time. In other words, the
problem is equivalent to asking the question "What is the probability that I will pick a box with two coins of the
same color?".
Bertrand's point in constructing this example was to show that merely counting cases is not always proper. Instead,
one should sum the probabilities that the cases would produce the observed result; and the two methods are
equivalent only if this probability is either 1 or 0 in every case. This condition is correctly applied in the second
solution method, but not in the first.
The paradox as stated by Bertrand

It can be easier to understand the correct answer if you consider the paradox as Bertrand originally described it. After
a box has been chosen, but before a box is opened to let you observe a coin, the probability is 2/3 that the box has
two of the same kind of coin. If the probability of "observing a gold coin" in combination with "the box has two of
the same kind of coin" is 1/2, then the probability of "observing a silver coin" in combination with "the box has two
of the same kind of coin" must also be 1/2. And if the probability that the box has two like coins changes to 1/2 no
matter what kind of coin is shown, the probability would have to be 1/2 even if you hadn't observed a coin this way.
Since we know his probability is 2/3, not 1/2, we have an apparent paradox. It can be resolved only by recognizing
how the combination of "observing a gold coin" with each possible box can only affect the probability that the box
was GS or SS, but not GG.
Card version
Suppose there are three cards:
A black card that is black on both sides,
A white card that is white on both sides, and
A mixed card that is black on one side and white on the other.
All the cards are placed into a hat and one is pulled at random and placed on a table. The side facing up is black.
What are the odds that the other side is also black?
The answer is that the other side is black with probability 23. However, common intuition suggests a probability of
1
2 either because there are two cards with black on them that this card could be, or because there are 3 white and 3
black sides and many people forget to eliminate the possibility of the "white card" in this situation (i.e. the card they
flipped CANNOT be the "white card" because a black side was turned over).
In a survey of 53 Psychology freshmen taking an introductory probability course, 35 incorrectly responded 12; only
3 students correctly responded 23.[1]
142

Another presentation of the problem is to say : pick a random card out of the three, what are the odds that it has the
same color on the other side? Since only one card is mixed and two have the same color on their sides, it is easier to
understand that the probability is 23. Also note that saying that the color is black (or the coin is gold) instead of
white doesn't matter since it is symmetric: the answer is the same for white. So is the answer for the generic question
'same color on both sides'.
Preliminaries
To solve the problem, either formally or informally, one must assign probabilities to the events of drawing each of
the six faces of the three cards. These probabilities could conceivably be very different; perhaps the white card is
larger than the black card, or the black side of the mixed card is heavier than the white side. The statement of the
question does not explicitly address these concerns. The only constraints implied by the Kolmogorov axioms are that
the probabilities are all non-negative, and they sum to 1.
The custom in problems when one literally pulls objects from a hat is to assume that all the drawing probabilities are
equal. This forces the probability of drawing each side to be 16, and so the probability of drawing a given card is 13.
In particular, the probability of drawing the double-white card is 13, and the probability of drawing a different card is
2
3.
In question, however, one has already selected a card from the hat and it shows a black face. At first glance it
appears that there is a 50/50 chance (i.e. probability 12) that the other side of the card is black, since there are two
cards it might be: the black and the mixed. However, this reasoning fails to exploit all of the information; one knows
not only that the card on the table has at least one black face, but also that in the population it was selected from,
only 1 of the 3 black faces was on the mixed card.
An easy explanation is that to name the black sides as x, y and z where x and y are on the same card while z is on the
mixed card, then the probability is divided on the 3 black sides with 13 each. thus the probability that we chose either
x or y is the sum of their probabilities thus 23.
Solutions
Intuition
Intuition tells one that one is choosing a card at random. However, one is actually choosing a face at random. There
are 6 faces, of which 3 faces are white and 3 faces are black. Two of the 3 black faces belong to the same card. The
chance of choosing one of those 2 faces is 23. Therefore, the chance of flipping the card over and finding another
black face is also 23. Another way of thinking about it is that the problem is not about the chance that the other side
is black, it's about the chance that you drew the all black card. If you drew a black face, then it's twice as likely that
that face belongs to the black card than the mixed card.
Alternately, it can be seen as a bet not on a particular color, but a bet that the sides match. Betting on a particular
color regardless of the face shown, will always have a chance of 12. However, betting that the sides match is 23,
because 2 cards match and 1 does not.
Labels
One solution method is to label the card faces, for example numbers 1 through 6.[2] Label the faces of the black card
1 and 2; label the faces of the mixed card 3 (black) and 4 (white); and label the faces of the white card 5 and 6. The
observed black face could be 1, 2, or 3, all equally likely; if it is 1 or 2, the other side is black, and if it is 3, the other
side is white. The probability that the other side is black is 23. This probability can be derived in the following
manner: Let random variable B equal the a black face (i.e. the probability of a success since the black face is what
we are looking for). Using Kolmogrov's Axiom of all probabilities having to equal 1, we can conclude that the
probability of drawing a white face is 1-P(B). Since P(B)=P(1)+P(2) therefore P(B)=13+13=23. Likewise we can do
143

this P(white face)=1-23=13.
Bayes' theorem
Given that the shown face is black, the other face is black if and only if the card is the black card. If the black card is
drawn, a black face is shown with probability 1. The total probability of seeing a black face is 12; the total
probability of drawing the black card is 13. By Bayes' theorem, the conditional probability of having drawn the black
card, given that a black face is showing, is
It can be more intuitive to present this argument using Bayes' rule rather than Bayes' theorem[3]. Having seen a
black face we can rule out the white card. We are interested in the probability that the card is black given a black
face is showing. Initially it is equally likely that the card is black and that it is mixed: the prior odds are 1:1. Given
that it is black we are certain to see a black face, but given that it is mixed we are only 50% certain to see a black
face. The ratio of these probabilities, called the likelihood ratio or Bayes factor, is 2:1. Bayes' rule says "posterior
odds equals prior odds times likelihood ratio". Since the prior odds are 1:1 the posterior odds equals the likelihood
ratio, 2:1. It is now twice as likely that the card is black than that it is mixed.
Eliminating the white card
Although the incorrect solution reasons that the white card is eliminated, one can also use that information in a
correct solution. Modifying the previous method, given that the white card is not drawn, the probability of seeing a
black face is 34, and the probability of drawing the black card is 12. The conditional probability of having drawn the
black card, given that a black face is showing, is
Symmetry
The probability (without considering the individual colors) that the hidden color is the same as the displayed color is
clearly 23, as this holds if and only if the chosen card is black or white, which chooses 2 of the 3 cards. Symmetry
suggests that the probability is independent of the color chosen, so that the information about which color is shown
does not affect the odds that both sides have the same color.
This argument is correct and can be formalized as follows. By the law of total probability, the probability that the
hidden color is the same as the displayed color equals the weighted average of the probabilities that the hidden color
is the same as the displayed color, given that the displayed color is black or white respectively (the weights are the
probabilities of seeing black and white respectively). By symmetry, the two conditional probabilities that the colours
are the same given we see black and given we see white are the same. Since they moreover average out to 2/3 they
must both be equal to 2/3.
Experiment
Using specially constructed cards, the choice can be tested a number of times. By constructing a fraction with the
denominator being the number of times "B" is on top, and the numerator being the number of times both sides are
"B", the experimenter will probably find the ratio to be near 23.
Note the logical fact that the B/B card contributes significantly more (in fact twice) to the number of times "B" is on
top. With the card B/W there is always a 50% chance W being on top, thus in 50% of the cases card B/W is drawn,
the draw affects neither numerator nor denominator and effectively does not count (this is also true for all times
W/W is drawn, so that card might as well be removed from the set altogether). Conclusively, the cards B/B and B/W
are not of equal chances, because in the 50% of the cases B/W is drawn, this card is simply "disqualified".
144
Related problems
Boy or Girl paradox

Three Prisoners problem
Sleeping Beauty problem

1. ^ Bar-Hillel and Falk (page 119)
2. ^ Nickerson (page 158) advocates this solution as "less confusing" than other methods.
3. ^ Bar-Hillel and Falk (page 120) advocate using Bayes' Rule.
Bar-Hillel, Maya; Falk, Ruma (1982). "Some teasers concerning conditional probabilities". Cognition 11 (2):
10922. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(82)90021-X [4]. PMID7198956 [5].
Nickerson, Raymond (2004). Cognition and Chance: The psychology of probabilistic reasoning, Lawrence
Erlbaum. Ch. 5, "Some instructive problems: Three cards", pp.157160. ISBN 0-8058-4898-3
Michael Clark, Paradoxes from A to Z, p.16;
Howard Margolis, Wason, Monty Hall, and Adverse Defaults [6].
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Bertrand%27s_box_paradox#endnote_53

http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Bertrand%27s_box_paradox#endnote_Label16
http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Bertrand%27s_box_paradox#endnote_Bayes
http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016%2F0010-0277%2882%2990021-X
http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 7198956
http:/ / harrisschool. uchicago. edu/ About/ publications/ working-papers/ pdf/ wp_05_14. pdf
145
Bertrand paradox
146
Bertrand paradox
The Bertrand paradox is a problem within the classical interpretation of probability theory. Joseph Bertrand
introduced it in his work Calcul des probabilits (1889) as an example to show that probabilities may not be well
defined if the mechanism or method that produces the random variable is not clearly defined.
Bertrand's formulation of the problem

The Bertrand paradox goes as follows: Consider an equilateral triangle inscribed in a circle. Suppose a chord of the
circle is chosen at random. What is the probability that the chord is longer than a side of the triangle?
Bertrand gave three arguments, all apparently valid, yet yielding different results.
The "random endpoints" method: Choose two random points on the
circumference of the circle and draw the chord joining them. To
calculate the probability in question imagine the triangle rotated so its
vertex coincides with one of the chord endpoints. Observe that if the
other chord endpoint lies on the arc between the endpoints of the
triangle side opposite the first point, the chord is longer than a side of
the triangle. The length of the arc is one third of the circumference of
the circle, therefore the probability that a random chord is longer than a
side of the inscribed triangle is 1/3.
Random chords, selection method 1; red = longer

than triangle side, blue = shorter
The "random radius" method: Choose a radius of the circle, choose a

point on the radius and construct the chord through this point and
perpendicular to the radius. To calculate the probability in question
imagine the triangle rotated so a side is perpendicular to the radius. The
chord is longer than a side of the triangle if the chosen point is nearer
the center of the circle than the point where the side of the triangle
intersects the radius. The side of the triangle bisects the radius,
therefore the probability a random chord is longer than a side of the
inscribed triangle is 1/2.
Random chords, selection method 2
Bertrand paradox
147
The "random midpoint" method: Choose a point anywhere within the

circle and construct a chord with the chosen point as its midpoint. The
chord is longer than a side of the inscribed triangle if the chosen point
falls within a concentric circle of radius 1/2 the radius of the larger
circle. The area of the smaller circle is one fourth the area of the larger
circle, therefore the probability a random chord is longer than a side of
the inscribed triangle is 1/4.
The selection methods can also be visualized as follows. A chord is
uniquely identified by its midpoint. Each of the three selection methods
presented above yields a different distribution of midpoints. Methods 1
and 2 yield two different nonuniform distributions, while method 3
yields a uniform distribution. On the other hand, if one looks at the
images of the chords below, the chords of method 2 give the circle a
homogeneously shaded look, while method 1 and 3 do not.
Random chords, selection method 3
Midpoints of chords chosen at random,

method 1

method 2

method 3
Chords chosen at random, method 1
Other distributions can easily be imagined, many of which will yield a different proportion of chords which are
longer than a side of the inscribed triangle.
Bertrand paradox
Classical solution
The problem's classical solution thus hinges on the method by which a chord is chosen "at random". It turns out that
if, and only if, the method of random selection is specified, does the problem have a well-defined solution. There is
no unique selection method, so there cannot be a unique solution. The three solutions presented by Bertrand
correspond to different selection methods, and in the absence of further information there is no reason to prefer one
over another.
This and other paradoxes of the classical interpretation of probability justified more stringent formulations, including
frequentist probability and subjectivist Bayesian probability.
Jaynes' solution using the "maximum ignorance" principle

In his 1973 paper The Well-Posed Problem, Edwin Jaynes proposed a solution to Bertrand's paradox, based on the
principle of "maximum ignorance"that we should not use any information that is not given in the statement of the
problem. Jaynes pointed out that Bertrand's problem does not specify the position or size of the circle, and argued
that therefore any definite and objective solution must be "indifferent" to size and position. In other words: the
solution must be both scale and translation invariant.
To illustrate: assume that chords are laid at random onto a circle with a diameter of 2, for example by throwing
straws onto it from far away. Now another circle with a smaller diameter (e.g., 1.1) is laid into the larger circle. Then
the distribution of the chords on that smaller circle needs to be the same as on the larger circle. If the smaller circle is
moved around within the larger circle, the probability must not change either. It can be seen very easily that there
would be a change for method 3: the chord distribution on the small red circle looks qualitatively different from the
distribution on the large circle:
The same occurs for method 1, though it is harder to see in a graphical representation. Method 2 is the only one that
is both scale invariant and translation invariant; method 3 is just scale invariant, method 1 is neither.
However, Jaynes did not just use invariances to accept or reject given methods: this would leave the possibility that
there is another not yet described method that would meet his common-sense criteria. Jaynes used the integral
148
Bertrand paradox
equations describing the invariances to directly determine the probability distribution. In this problem, the integral
equations indeed have a unique solution, and it is precisely what was called "method 2" above, the random radius
method.
Physical experiments
"Method 2" is the only solution that fulfills the transformation invariants that are present in certain physical
systemssuch as in statistical mechanics and gas physicsas well as in Jaynes's proposed experiment of throwing
straws from a distance onto a small circle. Nevertheless, one can design other practical experiments that give
answers according to the other methods. For example, in order to arrive at the solution of "method 1", the random
endpoints method, one can affix a spinner to the center of the circle, and let the results of two independent spins
mark the endpoints of the chord. In order to arrive at the solution of "method 3", one could cover the circle with
molasses and mark the first point that a fly lands on as the midpoint of the chord. Several observers have designed
experiments in order to obtain the different solutions and verified the results empirically.
Notes
References
Clark M. (2002), Paradoxes from A to Z (Routledge).
Aerts D., Sassoli de Bianchi M. (2014), " Solving the hard problem of Bertrand's paradox (http://arxiv.org/abs/
1403.4139)".
Birthday problem
In probability theory, the birthday problem or birthday paradox[1] concerns the probability that, in a set of n
randomly chosen people, some pair of them will have the same birthday. By the pigeonhole principle, the probability
reaches 100% when the number of people reaches 367 (since there are 366 possible birthdays, including February
29). However, 99.9% probability is reached with just 70 people, and 50% probability with 23 people. These
conclusions include the assumption that each day of the year (except February 29) is equally probable for a birthday.
The history of the problem is obscure, but W. W. Rouse Ball indicated (without citation) that it was first discussed
by an"H. Davenport", almost certainly Harold Davenport.[2]
The mathematics behind this problem led to a well-known cryptographic attack called the birthday attack, which
uses this probabilistic model to reduce the complexity of cracking a hash function.
149
Birthday problem
Understanding the problem

The birthday problem is to find the
probability that, in a group of N people,
there is at least one pair of people who have
the same birthday. See "Same birthday as
you" further for an analysis of the case of
finding the probability of a given, fixed
person having the same birthday as any of
the remaining N - 1.
In the example given earlier, a list of 23
people, comparing the birthday of the first
person on the list to the others allows 22
A graph showing the computed probability of at least two people sharing a
chances for a matching birthday, the second
birthday amongst a certain number of people.
person on the list to the others allows 21
chances for a matching birthday (in fact the 'second' person also has total 22 chances of matching birthday with the
others but his/her chance of matching birthday with the 'first' person, one chance, has already been counted with the
first person's 22 chances and shall not be duplicated), third person has 20 chances, and so on. Hence total chances
are: 22+21+20+....+1 = 253, so comparing every person to all of the others allows 253 distinct chances
(combinations): in a group of 23 people there are
distinct possible combinations of pairing.
Presuming all birthdays are equally probable,[3] the probability of a given birthday for a person chosen from the
entire population at random is 1/365 (ignoring "leap day", February 29). Although the number of pairings in a group
of 23 people is not statistically equivalent to 253 pairs chosen independently, the birthday paradox becomes less
surprising if a group is thought of in terms of the number of possible pairs, rather than as the number of individuals.
Calculating the probability

The problem is to compute the approximate probability that in a room of n people, at least two have the same
birthday. For simplicity, disregard variations in the distribution, such as leap years, twins, seasonal or weekday
variations, and assume that the 365 possible birthdays are equally likely. Real-life birthday distributions are not
uniform since not all dates are equally likely.
If P(A) is the probability of at least two people in the room having the same birthday, it may be simpler to calculate
P(A'), the probability of there not being any two people having the same birthday. Then, because A and A' are the
only two possibilities and are also mutually exclusive, P(A)=1P(A').
In deference to widely published solutions concluding that 23 is the number of people necessary to have a P(A) that
is greater than 50%, the following calculation of P(A) will use 23 people as an example.
When events are independent of each other, the probability of all of the events occurring is equal to a product of the
probabilities of each of the events occurring. Therefore, if P(A') can be described as 23 independent events, P(A')
could be calculated as P(1)P(2)P(3)...P(23).
The 23 independent events correspond to the 23 people, and can be defined in order. Each event can be defined as
the corresponding person not sharing his/her birthday with any of the previously analyzed people. For Event 1, there
are no previously analyzed people. Therefore, the probability, P(1), that person number 1 does not share his/her
birthday with previously analyzed people is 1, or 100%. Ignoring leap years for this analysis, the probability of 1 can
also be written as 365/365, for reasons that will become clear below.
150
Birthday problem
151
For Event 2, the only previously analyzed people is Person 1. Assuming that birthdays are equally likely to happen
on each of the 365 days of the year, the probability, P(2), that Person 2 has a different birthday than Person 1 is
364/365. This is because, if Person 2 was born on any of the other 364 days of the year, Persons 1 and 2 will not
share the same birthday.
Similarly, if Person 3 is born on any of the 363 days of the year other than the birthdays of Persons 1 and 2, Person 3
will not share their birthday. This makes the probability P(3)=363/365.
This analysis continues until Person 23 is reached, whose probability of not sharing his/her birthday with people
analyzed before, P(23), is 343/365.
P(A') is equal to the product of these individual probabilities:
(1) P(A') = 365/365364/365363/365362/365...343/365
The terms of equation (1) can be collected to arrive at:
(2) P(A') = (1/365)23(365364363...343)
Evaluating equation (2) gives P(A') 0.492703
Therefore, P(A) 10.492703 =0.507297(50.7297%)
This process can be generalized to a group of n people, where p(n) is the probability of at least two of the n people
sharing a birthday. It is easier to first calculate the probability p(n) that all n birthdays are different. According to the
pigeonhole principle, p(n) is zero whenn>365. Whenn365:
where ' ! ' is the factorial operator,
is the binomial coefficient and
denotes permutation.
The equation expresses the fact that the first person has no one to share a birthday, the second person cannot have the
same birthday as the first (364/365), the third cannot have the same birthday as the first two (363/365), and in
general the nth birthday cannot be the same as any of the n1 preceding birthdays.
The event of at least two of the n persons having the same birthday is complementary to all n birthdays being
different. Therefore, its probability p(n) is
This probability surpasses 1/2 forn=23 (with value about50.7%). The following table shows the probability for
some other values of n (this table ignores the existence of leap years, as described above, as well as assumes each
birthday is equally likely):
Birthday problem
152
The probability that no two people share a birthday in a group of n people. Note
that the vertical scale is logarithmic (each step down is 1020 times less likely).
p(n)
2.7%
10
11.7%
20
41.1%
23
50.7%
30
70.6%
40
89.1%
50
97.0%
60
99.4%
70
99.9%
100 99.99997%
200 99.9999999999999999999999999998%
300 (100 (61080))%
350 (100 (310129))%
365 (100 (1.4510155))%
366 100%
Birthday problem
153
Abstract proof
Here we prove the same result as above, but with results about sets and functions to provide a simpler proof.
Firstly, define
to be a set of N people and let
Define the birthday function
be the set of dates in a year.
to be the map that sends a person to their birthdate. So everyone in
has
a unique birthday if and only if the birthday function is injective.

Now we consider how many functions, and how many injective functions, exist between
Since
and
, it follows that there are
possible functions, and
and
.
possible
injective functions (see Twelvefold way#case i).

Let A be the statement "Everybody in the set has a unique birthday" (so P(A') is what we are actually looking
for). By definition, P(A) is the fraction of injective functions out of all possible functions (i.e., the probability of the
birthday function being one that assigns only one person to each birthdate), which gives
.
Hence,
Approximations
The Taylor series expansion of the
exponential function (the constant e
2.718281828)
provides a first-order approximation for ex

for x 1:
To apply this approximation to the first

expression
derived
for
p(n),
set
. Thus,
Then, replace i with non-negative integers

for each term in the formula of p(n) until i =
n 1, for example, when i = 1,
Graphs showing the approximate probabilities of at least two people sharing a

birthday (red) and its complementary event (blue)
The first expression derived for p(n) can be approximated as
Birthday problem
154
A graph showing the accuracy of the approximation

(white)
Therefore,
An even coarser approximation is given by
which, as the graph illustrates, is still fairly accurate.

According to the approximation, the same approach can be applied to any number of "people" and "days". If rather
than 365 days there are d, if there are n persons, and if n d, then using the same approach as above we achieve the
result that if p(n, d) is the probability that at least two out of n people share the same birthday from a set of d
available days, then:
A simple exponentiation
The probability of any two people not having the same birthday is 364/365. In a room containing n people, there are
C(n,2)=n(n1)/2 pairs of people, i.e. C(n,2) events. The probability of no two people sharing the same birthday
can be approximated by assuming that these events are independent and hence by multiplying their probability
together. In short 364/365 can be multiplied by itself C(n,2) times, which gives us
Since this is the probability of no one having the same birthday, then the probability of someone sharing a birthday is
Birthday problem
Poisson approximation
Applying the Poisson approximation for the binomial on the group of 23 people,
The result is over 50% as previous descriptions.
Square approximation
A good rule of thumb which can be used for mental calculation is the relation
which can also be written as
which works well for probabilities less than or equal to 0.5.

For instance, to estimate the number of people required for a 0.5 chance of a shared birthday, we get
Which is not too far from the correct answer of 23.

This approximation scheme is especially easy to use for when working with exponents. For instance, suppose you
are building 32 bit hashes (
) and want the chance of a collision to be at most one in a million (
), how many documents could we have at the most?
which is close to the correct answer of 93.
Approximation of number of people

This can also be approximated using the following formula for the number of people necessary to have at least a
50% chance of matching:
This is a result of the good approximation that an event with 1 in k probability will have a 50% chance of occurring
at least once if it is repeated kln2 times.
Probability table
Main article: Birthday attack
155
Birthday problem
156
length of #bits hash space

Number of hashed elements such that {probability of at least one hash collision=p}
hex string
size
p = 1018 p = 1015 p = 1012 p = 109 p = 106 p = 0.1% p = 1% p = 25% p = 50% p = 75%
(2#bits)
8
32
4.3109
2.9
93
2.9103
9.3103
5.0104
7.7104
1.1105
16
64
1.81019
6.1
1.9102
6.1103
1.9105
6.1106
1.9108
6.1108
3.3109
5.1109
7.2109
32
128
3.41038
2.61010 8.21011 2.61013 8.21014 2.61016 8.31017 2.61018 1.41019 2.21019 3.11019
64
256
1.21077
4.81029 1.51031 4.81032 1.51034 4.81035 1.51037 4.81037 2.61038 4.01038 5.71038
(96)
128
(384) (3.910115) 8.91048 2.81050 8.91051 2.81053 8.91054 2.81056 8.91056 4.81057 7.41057 1.01058
512
1.310154
1.61068 5.21069 1.61071 5.21072 1.61074 5.21075 1.61076 8.81076 1.41077 1.91077
The white fields in this table show the number of hashes needed to achieve the given probability of collision
(column) given a hash space of a certain size in bits (row). Using the birthday analogy: the "hash space size"
resembles the "available days", the "probability of collision" resembles the "probability of shared birthday", and the
"required number of hashed elements" resembles the "required number of people in a group". One could of course
also use this chart to determine the minimum hash size required (given upper bounds on the hashes and probability
of error), or the probability of collision (for fixed number of hashes and probability of error).
For comparison, 1018 to 1015 is the uncorrectable bit error rate of a typical hard disk.[4] In theory, 128-bit hash
functions, such as MD5, should stay within that range until about 820 billion documents, even if its possible outputs
are many more.
An upper bound
The argument below is adapted from an argument of Paul Halmos.[5]
As stated above, the probability that no two birthdays coincide is
As in earlier paragraphs, interest lies in the smallest n such that p(n)>1/2; or equivalently, the smallest n such that
p(n)<1/2.
Using the inequality 1x<ex in the above expression we replace 1k/365 with ek/365. This yields
Therefore, the expression above is not only an approximation, but also an upper bound of p(n). The inequality
implies p(n)<1/2. Solving for n gives

Now, 730ln2 is approximately 505.997, which is barely below 506, the value of n2n attained when n=23.
Therefore, 23 people suffice. Solving n2n =2365ln2 for n gives, by the way, the approximate formula of
Frank H. Mathis cited above.
This derivation only shows that at most 23 people are needed to ensure a birthday match with even chance; it leaves
open the possibility that n is 22 or less could also work.
Birthday problem
157
Generalizations
The generalized birthday problem
Given a year with d days, the generalized birthday problem asks for the minimal number n(d) such that, in a set of
n(d) randomly chosen people, the probability of a birthday coincidence is at least 50%. In other words, n(d) is the
minimal integer n such that
The classical birthday problem thus corresponds to determining n(365). The first 99 values of n(d) are given here:
d
12 35 69 1016 1723 2432 3342 4354 5568 6982 8399
n(d)
10
11
12
A number of bounds and formulas for n(d) have been published. For any d1, the number n(d) satisfies
These bounds are optimal in the sense that the sequence

, while it has
gets arbitrarily close to
as its maximum, taken for d=43. The bounds are
sufficiently tight to give the exact value of n(d) in 99% of all cases, for example n(365)=23. In general, it follows
from these bounds that n(d) always equals either
or
where
denotes the ceiling
function. The formula
holds for 73% of all integers d. The formula
holds for almost all d, i.e., for a set of integers d with asymptotic density 1. The formula
holds for all d up to 1018, but it is conjectured that there are infinitely many counter-examples to this formula. The
formula
holds too for all d up to 1018, and it is conjectured that this formula holds for all d.
Cast as a collision problem

The birthday problem can be generalized as follows:Wikipedia:Citation needed given n random integers drawn from
a discrete uniform distribution with range [1,d], what is the probability p(n;d) that at least two numbers are the same?
(d=365 gives the usual birthday problem.)
The generic results can be derived using the same arguments given above.
Birthday problem
Conversely, if n(p;d) denotes the number of random integers drawn from [1,d] to obtain a probability p that at least
two numbers are the same, then
The birthday problem in this more generic sense applies to hash functions: the expected number of N-bit hashes that
can be generated before getting a collision is not 2N, but rather only 2N/2. This is exploited by birthday attacks on
cryptographic hash functions and is the reason why a small number of collisions in a hash table are, for all practical
purposes, inevitable.
The theory behind the birthday problem was used by Zoe Schnabel[6] under the name of capture-recapture statistics
to estimate the size of fish population in lakes.
Generalization to multiple types
The basic problem considers all trials to be of one "type". The birthday problem has been generalized to consider an
arbitrary number of types.[7] In the simplest extension there are two types of people, say m men and n women, and
the problem becomes characterizing the probability of a shared birthday between at least one man and one woman.
(Shared birthdays between, say, two women do not count.) The probability of no (i.e. zero) shared birthdays here is
where d=365 and S2 are Stirling numbers of the second kind. Consequently, the desired probability is 1p0.
This variation of the birthday problem is interesting because there is not a unique solution for the total number of
people m+n. For example, the usual 0.5 probability value is realized for both a 32-member group of 16 men and 16
women and a 49-member group of 43 women and 6 men.
Other birthday problems

Reverse problem
For a fixed probability p:
Find the greatest n for which the probability p(n) is smaller than the given p, or
Find the smallest n for which the probability p(n) is greater than the given p.
Taking the above formula for d=365 we have:
Sample calculations
158
Birthday problem
159
p(n)
p(n)
0.01 0.14178365 = 2.70864
2 0.00274
3 0.00820
0.05 0.32029365 = 6.11916
6 0.04046
7 0.05624
0.1
0.45904365 = 8.77002
8 0.07434
9 0.09462
0.2
0.66805365 = 12.76302
12 0.16702
13 0.19441
0.3
0.84460365 = 16.13607
16 0.28360
17 0.31501
0.5
1.17741365 = 22.49439
22 0.47570
23 0.50730
0.7
1.55176365 = 29.64625
29 0.68097
30 0.70632
0.8
1.79412365 = 34.27666
34 0.79532
35 0.81438
0.9
2.14597365 = 40.99862
40 0.89123
41 0.90315
0.95 2.44775365 = 46.76414
46 0.94825
47 0.95477
0.99 3.03485365 = 57.98081
57 0.99012
58 0.99166
Note: some values falling outside the bounds have been colored to show that the approximation is not always exact.
First match
A related question is, as people enter a room one at a time, which one is most likely to be the first to have the same
birthday as someone already in the room? That is, for what n is p(n)p(n1) maximum? The answer is 20if
there's a prize for first match, the best position in line is 20th.
Same birthday as you

Note that in the birthday problem, neither of
the two people is chosen in advance. By
way of contrast, the probability q(n) that
someone in a room of n other people has the
same birthday as a particular person (for
example, you), is given by
and for general d by

Comparing p(n) = probability of a birthday match with q(n) = probability of
matching your birthday
In the standard case of d = 365 substituting

n = 23 gives about 6.1%, which is less than 1 chance in 16. For a greater than 50% chance that one person in a
roomful of n people has the same birthday as you, n would need to be at least 253. Note that this number is
significantly higher than 365/2 = 182.5: the reason is that it is likely that there are some birthday matches among the
other people in the room.
It is not a coincidence that
; a similar approximate pattern can be found using a number of
possibilities different from 365, or a target probability different from 50%.
Birthday problem
160
Near matches
Another generalization is to ask what is the probability of finding at least one pair in a group of n people with
birthdays within k calendar days of each other's, if there are m equally likely birthdays.
[8]
The number of people required so that the probability that some pair will have a birthday separated by k days or
fewer will be higher than 50% is:
k # people required(i.e. n) when m=365
0
23
14
11
Thus in a group of just seven random people, it is more likely than not that two of them will have a birthday within a
week of each other.
Collision counting
The probability that the kth integer randomly chosen from [1,d] will repeat at least one previous choice equals
q(k1;d) above. The expected total number of times a selection will repeat a previous selection as n such integers
are chosen equalsWikipedia:Citation needed
Average number of people

In an alternative formulation of the birthday problem, one asks the average number of people required to find a pair
with the same birthday. If we consider the probability function Pr[n people have at least one shared birthday], this
average is determining the Mean of the distribution, as opposed to the customary formulation which determines the
Median. The problem is relevant to several hashing algorithms analyzed by Donald Knuth in his book The Art of
Computer Programming. It may be shown[9][10] that if one samples uniformly, with replacement, from a population
of size M, the number of trials required for the first repeated sampling of some individual has expected value
, where
The function
has been studied by Srinivasa Ramanujan and has asymptotic expansion:
Birthday problem
With M=365 days in a year, the average number of people required to find a pair with the same birthday is
, somewhat more than 23, the number required for a 50% chance. In the best case, two people
will suffice; at worst, the maximum possible number of M+1=366 people is needed; but on average, only 25
people are required.
An informal demonstration of the problem can be made from the list of Prime Ministers of Australia, of which there
have been 27, in which Paul Keating, the 24th Prime Minister, and Edmund Barton, the first Prime Minister, share
the same birthday, 18 January.
In the 2014 FIFA World Cup, each of the 32 squads had 23 players. An analysis of the official squad lists suggested
that 16 squads had pairs of players sharing birthdays, and of these 5 squads had two pairs: Argentina, France, Iran,
South Korea and Switzerland each had two pairs, and Australia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia,
Honduras, Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia, Spain and USA each with one pair.[11]
Partition problem
A related problem is the partition problem, a variant of the knapsack problem from operations research. Some
weights are put on a balance scale; each weight is an integer number of grams randomly chosen between one gram
and one million grams (one metric ton). The question is whether one can usually (that is, with probability close to 1)
transfer the weights between the left and right arms to balance the scale. (In case the sum of all the weights is an odd
number of grams, a discrepancy of one gram is allowed.) If there are only two or three weights, the answer is very
clearly no; although there are some combinations which work, the majority of randomly selected combinations of
three weights do not. If there are very many weights, the answer is clearly yes. The question is, how many are just
sufficient? That is, what is the number of weights such that it is equally likely for it to be possible to balance them as
it is to be impossible?
Some people's intuition is that the answer is above 100,000. Most people's intuition is that it is in the thousands or
tens of thousands, while others feel it should at least be in the hundreds. The correct answer is approximately 23.
The reason is that the correct comparison is to the number of partitions of the weights into left and right. There are
2N1 different partitions for N weights, and the left sum minus the right sum can be thought of as a new random
quantity for each partition. The distribution of the sum of weights is approximately Gaussian, with a peak at
1,000,000N and width
, so that when 2N1 is approximately equal to
the transition occurs.
2231 is about 4 million, while the width of the distribution is only 5 million.[12]
In fiction
Arthur C. Clarke's novel A Fall of Moondust, published in 1961, contains a section where the main characters,
trapped underground for an indefinite amount of time, are celebrating a birthday and find themselves discussing the
validity of the Birthday problem. As stated by a physicist passenger: "If you have a group of more than twenty-four
people, the odds are better than even that two of them have the same birthday." Eventually, out of 22 present, it is
revealed that two characters share the same birthday, May 23.
161
Birthday problem

[1] This is not a paradox in the sense of leading to a logical contradiction, but is called a paradox because the mathematical truth contradicts
nave intuition: an intuitive guess would suggest that the chance of two individuals sharing the same birthday in a group of 23 is much lower
than 50%, but the birthday problem demonstrates that this is not the case.
[2] W. W. Rouse Ball, 1960, Other Questions on Probability, in Mathematical Recreations and Essays, Macmillan', New York, p 45.
[3] In reality, birthdays are not evenly distributed throughout the year; there are more births per day in some seasons than in others, but for the
purposes of this problem the distribution is treated as uniform. In particular, many children are born in the summer, especially the months of
August and September (for the northern hemisphere) (http:/ / scienceworld. wolfram. com/ astronomy/ LeapDay. html), and in the U.S. it has
been noted that many children are conceived around the holidays of Christmas and New Year's Day. Also, because hospitals rarely schedule
C-sections and induced labor on the weekend, more Americans are born on Mondays and Tuesdays than on weekends; where many of the
people share a birth year (e.g. a class in a school), this creates a tendency toward particular dates. In Sweden 9.3% of the population is born in
March and 7.3% in November when a uniform distribution would give 8.3% Swedish statistics board (http:/ / www. scb. se/ statistik/ BE/
BE0101/ 2006A01a/ BE0101_2006A01a_SM_BE12SM0701. pdf). See also: These factors tend to increase the chance of identical birth dates,
since a denser subset has more possible pairs (in the extreme case when everyone was born on three days, there would obviously be many
identical birthdays). The problem of a non-uniform number of births occurring during each day of the year was first understood by Murray
Klamkin in 1967. A formal proof that the probability of two matching birthdays is least for a uniform distribution of birthdays was given by D.
Bloom (1973).
[4] Jim Gray, Catharine van Ingen. Empirical Measurements of Disk Failure Rates and Error Rates (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ cs/ 0701166)
[5] In his autobiography, Halmos criticized the form in which the birthday paradox is often presented, in terms of numerical computation. He
believed that it should be used as an example in the use of more abstract mathematical concepts. He wrote:
The reasoning is based on important tools that all students of mathematics should have ready access to.
The birthday problem used to be a splendid illustration of the advantages of pure thought over
mechanical manipulation; the inequalities can be obtained in a minute or two, whereas the
multiplications would take much longer, and be much more subject to error, whether the instrument is a
pencil or an old-fashioned desk computer. What calculators do not yield is understanding, or
mathematical facility, or a solid basis for more advanced, generalized theories.
[6] Z. E. Schnabel (1938) The Estimation of the Total Fish Population of a Lake, American Mathematical Monthly 45, 348352.
[7] M. C. Wendl (2003) Collision Probability Between Sets of Random Variables (http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016/ S0167-7152(03)00168-8),
Statistics and Probability Letters 64(3), 249254.
[8] M. Abramson and W. O. J. Moser (1970) More Birthday Surprises, American Mathematical Monthly 77, 856858
[9] D. E. Knuth; The Art of Computer Programming. Vol. 3, Sorting and Searching (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1973)
[10] P. Flajolet, P. J. Grabner, P. Kirschenhofer, H. Prodinger (1995), On Ramanujan's Q-Function, Journal of Computational and Applied
Mathematics 58, 103116
[11] http:/ / www. bbc. co. uk/ news/ magazine-27835311
[12] C. Borgs, J. Chayes, and B. Pittel (2001) Phase Transition and Finite Size Scaling in the Integer Partition Problem, Random Structures and
Algorithms 19(34), 247288.
Bibliography
M. Abramson and W. O. J. Moser (1970) More Birthday Surprises, American Mathematical Monthly 77,
856858.
D. Bloom (1973) A Birthday Problem, American Mathematical Monthly 80, 11411142.
John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell, and Gerald Thompson Introduction to Finite Mathematics . The first edition,
1957.
M. Klamkin and D. Newman (1967) Extensions of the Birthday Surprise, Journal of Combinatorial Theory 3,
279282.
E. H. McKinney (1966) Generalized Birthday Problem, American Mathematical Monthly 73, 385387.
Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Math on trial. How numbers get used and abused in the courtroom, Basic
Books, 2013. ISBN 978-0-465-03292-1. (Fifth chapter: "Math error number 5. The case of Diana Sylvester: cold
hit analysis").
162
Birthday problem
163
External links
Coincidences: the truth is out there (http://www.rsscse-edu.org.uk/tsj/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
matthews.pdf) Experimental test of the Birthday Paradox and other coincidences
http://www.efgh.com/math/birthday.htm
http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/BirthdayProblem.html
Weisstein, Eric W., "Birthday Problem" (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BirthdayProblem.html), MathWorld.
A humorous article explaining the paradox (http://www.damninteresting.com/?p=402)
SOCR EduMaterials activities birthday experiment (http://wiki.stat.ucla.edu/socr/index.php/
SOCR_EduMaterials_Activities_BirthdayExperiment)
Understanding the Birthday Problem (Better Explained) (http://betterexplained.com/articles/
understanding-the-birthday-paradox/)
Eurobirthdays 2012. A birthday problem. (http://www.matifutbol.com/en/eurobirthdays.html) A practical
football example of the birthday paradox.
Grime, James. "23: Birthday Probability" (http://www.numberphile.com/videos/23birthday.html).
Numberphile. Brady Haran.
In probability theory, the BorelKolmogorov paradox (sometimes known as Borel's paradox) is a paradox relating
to conditional probability with respect to an event of probability zero (also known as a null set). It is named after
mile Borel and Andrey Kolmogorov.
A great circle puzzle

Suppose that a random variable has a uniform distribution on a unit sphere. What is its conditional distribution on a
great circle? Because of the symmetry of the sphere, one might expect that the distribution is uniform and
independent of the choice of coordinates. However, two analyses give contradictory results. First, note that choosing
a point uniformly on the sphere is equivalent to choosing the longitude uniformly from [-,] and choosing the
latitude from [-/2,/2] with density
. Then we can look at two different great circles:
1. If the coordinates are chosen so that the great circle is an equator (latitude =0), the conditional density for
a longitude defined on the interval [,] is
2. If the great circle is a line of longitude with =0, the conditional density for on the interval [/2,/2] is
One distribution is uniform on the circle, the other is not. Yet both seem to be referring to the same great circle in
different coordinate systems.
Many quite futile arguments have raged - between otherwise competent probabilists - over which of these
results is 'correct'.
E.T. Jaynes
164
Explanation and implications

In case (1) above, the conditional probability that the longitude lies in a set E given that = 0 can be written P(
E | = 0). Elementary probability theory suggests this can be computed as P( E and =0)/P(=0), but that
expression is not well-defined since P(=0) = 0. Measure theory provides a way to define a conditional probability,
using the family of events Rab = { : a < < b} which are horizontal rings consisting of all points with latitude
between a and b.
The resolution of the paradox is to notice that in case (2), P( F | =0) is defined using the events Lab = { : a <
< b}, which are lunes (vertical wedges), consisting of all points whose longitude varies between a and b. So although
P( E | =0) and P( F | =0) each provide a probability distribution on a great circle, one of them is defined
using rings, and the other using lunes. Thus it is not surprising after all that P( E | =0) and P( F | =0) have
different distributions.
The concept of a conditional probability with regard to an isolated hypothesis whose probability equals 0 is
inadmissible. For we can obtain a probability distribution for [the latitude] on the meridian circle only if we
regard this circle as an element of the decomposition of the entire spherical surface onto meridian circles with
the given poles
Andrey Kolmogorov[1]
the term 'great circle' is ambiguous until we specify what limiting operation is to produce it. The intuitive
symmetry argument presupposes the equatorial limit; yet one eating slices of an orange might presuppose the
other.
E.T. Jaynes
Mathematical explication
To understand the problem we need to recognize that a distribution on a continuous random variable is described by
a density f only with respect to some measure . Both are important for the full description of the probability
distribution. Or, equivalently, we need to fully define the space on which we want to define f.
Let and denote two random variables taking values in 1 = [-/2,/2] respectively 2 = [-,]. An event
{=,=} gives a point on the sphere S(r) with radius r. We define the coordinate transform
for which we obtain the volume element
Furthermore, if either or is fixed, we get the volume elements
Let
denote the joint measure on
, which has a density
with respect to
and let
If we assume that the density
Hence,
other hand,
165
is uniform, then
has a uniform density with respect to

has a uniform density with respect to
but not with respect to the Lebesgue measure. On the

and the Lebesgue measure.
Notes
[1] Originally Kolmogorov (1933), translated in Kolmogorov (1956). Sourced from Pollard (2002)
References and further reading

Jaynes, E.T. (2003). "15.7 The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox". Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.
Cambridge University Press. pp.467470. ISBN0-521-59271-2. MR 1992316 (http://www.ams.org/
mathscinet-getitem?mr=1992316).
Fragmentary Edition (1994) (pp. 15141517) (http://omega.math.albany.edu:8008/ETJ-PS/cc15w.ps)
(PostScript format)
Kolmogorov, Andrey (1933). Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (in German). Berlin: Julius
Springer.
Translation: Kolmogorov, Andrey (1956). "Chapter V, 2. Explanation of a Borel Paradox" (http://www.
mathematik.com/Kolmogorov/0029.html). Foundations of the Theory of Probability (http://www.
mathematik.com/Kolmogorov/index.html) (2nd ed.). New York: Chelsea. pp.5051. ISBN0-8284-0023-7.
Pollard, David (2002). "Chapter 5. Conditioning, Example 17.". A User's Guide to Measure Theoretic
Probability. Cambridge University Press. pp.122123. ISBN0-521-00289-3. MR 1873379 (http://www.ams.
org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1873379).
Mosegaard, K., & Tarantola, A. (2002). 16 Probabilistic approach to inverse problems. International Geophysics,
81, 237-265.
Boy or Girl paradox
Boy or Girl paradox

The Boy or Girl paradox surrounds a well-known set of questions in probability theory which are also known as
The Two Child Problem, Mr. Smith's Children and the Mrs. Smith Problem. The initial formulation of the question
dates back to at least 1959, when Martin Gardner published one of the earliest variants of the paradox in Scientific
American. Titled The Two Children Problem, he phrased the paradox as follows:
Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is the probability that both children are girls?
Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them is a boy. What is the probability that both children are boys?
Gardner initially gave the answers 1/2 and 1/3, respectively; but later acknowledged that the second question was
ambiguous. Its answer could be 1/2, depending on how you found out that one child was a boy. The ambiguity,
depending on the exact wording and possible assumptions, was confirmed by Bar-Hillel and Falk, and Nickerson.
Other variants of this question, with varying degrees of ambiguity, have been recently popularized by Ask Marilyn in
Parade Magazine, John Tierney of The New York Times, and Leonard Mlodinow in Drunkard's Walk. One scientific
study showed that when identical information was conveyed, but with different partially ambiguous wordings that
emphasized different points, that the percentage of MBA students who answered 1/2 changed from 85% to 39%.
The paradox has frequently stimulated a great deal of controversy. Many people argued strongly for both sides with a
great deal of confidence, sometimes showing disdain for those who took the opposing view. The paradox stems from
whether the problem setup is similar for the two questions. The intuitive answer is 1/2. This answer is intuitive if the
question leads the reader to believe that there are two equally likely possibilities for the sex of the second child (i.e.,
boy and girl), and that the probability of these outcomes is absolute, not conditional.
Common assumptions
The two possible answers share a number of assumptions. First, it is assumed that the space of all possible events can
be easily enumerated, providing an extensional definition of outcomes: {BB, BG, GB, GG}. This notation indicates
that there are four possible combinations of children, labeling boys B and girls G, and using the first letter to
represent the older child. Second, it is assumed that these outcomes are equally probable. This implies the following
model, a Bernoulli process with
:
1. Each child is either male or female.
2. Each child has the same chance of being male as of being female.
3. The sex of each child is independent of the sex of the other.
In reality, this is a rather inaccurate model, since it ignores (amongst other factors) the fact that the ratio of boys to
girls is not exactly 50:50, the possibility of identical twins (who are always the same sex), and the possibility of an
intersex child. However, this problem is about probability and not biology. The mathematical outcome would be the
same if it were phrased in terms of a coin toss.
First question
Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is the probability that both children are girls?
Under the forementioned assumptions, in this problem, a random family is selected. In this sample space, there are
four equally probable events:
166
Boy or Girl paradox
167
Older child Younger child

Girl
Girl
Girl
Boy
Boy
Girl
Boy
Boy
Only two of these possible events meet the criteria specified in the question (e.g., GG, GB). Since both of the two
possibilities in the new sample space {GG, GB} are equally likely, and only one of the two, GG, includes two girls,
the probability that the younger child is also a girl is 1/2.
Second question
Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them is a boy. What is the probability that both children are boys?
This question is identical to question one, except that instead of specifying that the older child is a boy, it is specified
that at least one of them is a boy. In response to reader criticism of the question posed in 1959, Gardner agreed that a
precise formulation of the question is critical to getting different answers for question 1 and 2. Specifically, Gardner
argued that a "failure to specify the randomizing procedure" could lead readers to interpret the question in two
distinct ways:
From all families with two children, at least one of whom is a boy, a family is chosen at random. This would yield
the answer of 1/3.
From all families with two children, one child is selected at random, and the sex of that child is specified. This
would yield an answer of 1/2.
Grinstead and Snell argue that the question is ambiguous in much the same way Gardner did.
For example, if you see the children in the garden, you may see a boy. The other child may be hidden behind a tree.
In this case, the statement is equivalent to the second (the child that you can see is a boy). The first statement does
not match as one case is one boy, one girl. Then the girl may be visible. (The first statement says that it can be
either.)
While it is certainly true that every possible Mr. Smith has at least one boy - i.e., the condition is necessary - it is not
clear that every Mr. Smith with at least one boy is intended. That is, the problem statement does not say that having a
boy is a sufficient condition for Mr. Smith to be identified as having a boy this way.
Commenting on Gardner's version of the problem, Bar-Hillel and Falk note that "Mr. Smith, unlike the reader, is
presumably aware of the sex of both of his children when making this statement", i.e. that 'I have two children and at
least one of them is a boy.' If it is further assumed that Mr Smith would report this fact if it were true then the correct
answer is 1/3 as Gardner intended.
Analysis of the ambiguity

If it is assumed that this information was obtained by looking at both children to see if there is at least one boy, the
condition is both necessary and sufficient. Three of the four equally probable events for a two-child family in the
sample space above meet the condition:
Boy or Girl paradox
168
Older child Younger child

Girl
Girl
Girl
Boy
Boy
Girl
Boy
Boy
Thus, if it is assumed that both children were considered while looking for a boy, the answer to question 2 is 1/3.
However, if the family was first selected and then a random, true statement was made about the gender of one child
(whether or not both were considered), the correct way to calculate the conditional probability is not to count the
cases that match. Instead, one must add the probabilities that the condition will be satisfied in each case:
Older child Younger child P(this case) P("at least one boy" given this case) P(both this case, and "at least one boy")
Girl
Girl
1/4
Girl
Boy
1/4
1/2
1/8
Boy
Girl
1/4
1/2
1/8
Boy
Boy
1/4
1/4
The answer is found by adding the numbers in the last column wherever you would have counted that case:
(1/4)/(0+1/8+1/8+1/4)=1/2. Note that this is not necessarily the same as reporting the gender of a specific child,
although doing so will produce the same result by a different calculation. For instance, if the younger child is picked,
the calculation is (1/4)/(0+1/4+0+1/4)=1/2. In general, 1/2 is a better answer any time a Mr. Smith with a boy and a
girl could have been identified as having at least one girl.
Bayesian analysis
Following classical probability arguments, we consider a large urn containing two children. We assume equal
probability that either is a boy or a girl. The three discernible cases are thus: 1. both are girls (GG) with
probability P(GG) = 0.25, 2. both are boys (BB) with probability of P(BB) = 0.25, and 3. one of each (G.B)
with probability of P(G.B) = 0.50. These are the prior probabilities.
Now we add the additional assumption that "at least one is a boy" = B. Using Bayes' Theorem, we find
P(BB|B) = P(B|BB) P(BB) / P(B) = 1 1/4 / 3/4 = 1/3.
where P(A|B) means "probability of A given B". P(B|BB) = probability of at least one boy given both are boys = 1.
P(BB) = probability of both boys = 1/4 from the prior distribution. P(B) = probability of at least one being a boy,
which includes cases BB and G.B = 1/4 + 1/2 = 3/4.
Note that, although the natural assumption seems to be a probability of 1/2, so the derived value of 1/3 seems low,
the actual "normal" value for P(BB) is 1/4, so the 1/3 is actually a bit higher.
The paradox arises because the second assumption is somewhat artificial, and when describing the problem in an
actual setting things get a bit sticky. Just how do we know that "at least" one is a boy? One description of the
problem states that we look into a window, see only one child and it is a boy. This sounds like the same assumption.
However, this one is equivalent to "sampling" the distribution (i.e. removing one child from the urn, ascertaining that
it is a boy, then replacing). Let's call the statement "the sample is a boy" proposition "b". Now we have:
P(BB|b) = P(b|BB) P(BB) / P(b) = 1 1/4 / 1/2 = 1/2.
The difference here is the P(b), which is just the probability of drawing a boy from all possible cases (i.e. without the
"at least"), which is clearly 0.5.
Boy or Girl paradox

The Bayesian analysis generalizes easily to the case in which we relax the 50/50 population assumption. If we have
no information about the populations then we assume a "flat prior", i.e. P(GG) = P(BB) = P(G.B) = 1/3. In this case
the "at least" assumption produces the result P(BB|B) = 1/2, and the sampling assumption produces P(BB|b) = 2/3, a
result also derivable from the Rule of Succession.
Martingale analysis
Suppose you had wagered that Mr Smith had two boys, and received fair odds. You paid $1 and you will receive $4
if he has two boys. We think of your wager as investment that will increase in value as good news arrives. What
evidence would make you happier about your investment? Learning that at least one child out of two is a boy, or
learning that at least one child out of one is a boy?
The latter is a priori less likely, and therefore better news. That is why the two answers cannot be the same.
Now for the numbers. If we bet on one child and win, the value of your investment has doubled. It must double again
to get to $4, so the odds are 1 in 2.
On the other hand if we learn that at least one of two children is a boy, our investment increases as if we had
wagered on this question. Our one dollar is now worth $4/3 dollars. To get to $4 we still have to increase our wealth
threefold. So the answer is 1 in 3.
Variants of the question

Following the popularization of the paradox by Gardner it has been presented and discussed in various forms. The
first variant presented by Bar-Hillel & Falk is worded as follows:
Mr. Smith is the father of two. We meet him walking along the street with a young boy whom he proudly
introduces as his son. What is the probability that Mr. Smiths other child is also a boy?
Bar-Hillel & Falk use this variant to highlight the importance of considering the underlying assumptions. The
intuitive answer is 1/2 and, when making the most natural assumptions, this is correct. However, someone may argue
that ...before Mr. Smith identifies the boy as his son, we know only that he is either the father of two boys, BB, or of
two girls, GG, or of one of each in either birth order, i.e., BG or GB. Assuming again independence and
equiprobability, we begin with a probability of 1/4 that Smith is the father of two boys. Discovering that he has at
least one boy rules out the event GG. Since the remaining three events were equiprobable, we obtain a probability of
1/3 for BB.
The natural assumption is that Mr. Smith selected the child companion at random. If so, as combination BB has
twice the probability of either BG or GB of having resulted in the boy walking companion (and combination GG has
zero probability, ruling it out), the union of events BG and GB becomes equiprobable with event BB, and so the
chance that the other child is also a boy is 1/2. Bar-Hillel & Falk, however, suggest an alternative scenario. They
imagine a culture in which boys are invariably chosen over girls as walking companions. In this case, the
combinations of BB, BG and GB are assumed equally likely to have resulted in the boy walking companion, and
thus the probability that the other child is also a boy is 1/3.
In 1991, Marilyn vos Savant responded to a reader who asked her to answer a variant of the Boy or Girl paradox that
included beagles. In 1996, she published the question again in a different form. The 1991 and 1996 questions,
respectively were phrased:
A shopkeeper says she has two new baby beagles to show you, but she doesn't know whether they're male,
female, or a pair. You tell her that you want only a male, and she telephones the fellow who's giving them a bath.
"Is at least one a male?" she asks him. "Yes!" she informs you with a smile. What is the probability that the other
one is a male?
Say that a woman and a man (who are unrelated) each has two children. We know that at least one of the woman's
children is a boy and that the man's oldest child is a boy. Can you explain why the chances that the woman has
169
Boy or Girl paradox

two boys do not equal the chances that the man has two boys?
With regard to the second formulation Vos Savant gave the classic answer that the chances that the woman has two
boys are about 1/3 whereas the chances that the man has two boys are about 1/2. In response to reader response that
questioned her analysis vos Savant conducted a survey of readers with exactly two children, at least one of which is a
boy. Of 17,946 responses, 35.9% reported two boys.
Vos Savant's articles were discussed by Carlton and Stansfield in a 2005 article in The American Statistician. The
authors do not discuss the possible ambiguity in the question and conclude that her answer is correct from a
mathematical perspective, given the assumptions that the likelihood of a child being a boy or girl is equal, and that
the sex of the second child is independent of the first. With regard to her survey they say it "at least validates vos
Savants correct assertion that the chances posed in the original question, though similar-sounding, are different,
and that the first probability is certainly nearer to 1 in 3 than to 1 in 2."
Carlton and Stansfield go on to discuss the common assumptions in the Boy or Girl paradox. They demonstrate that
in reality male children are actually more likely than female children, and that the sex of the second child is not
independent of the sex of the first. The authors conclude that, although the assumptions of the question run counter
to observations, the paradox still has pedagogical value, since it "illustrates one of the more intriguing applications of
conditional probability." Of course, the actual probability values do not matter; the purpose of the paradox is to
demonstrate seemingly contradictory logic, not actual birth rates.
Information about the child

Suppose we were told not only that Mr. Smith has two children, and one of them is a boy, but also that the boy was
born on a Tuesday: does this change our previous analyses? Again, the answer depends on how this information
comes to us - what kind of selection process brought us this knowledge.
Following the tradition of the problem, let us suppose that out there in the population of two-child families, the sex
of the two children is independent of one another, equally likely boy or girl, and that each child is independently of
the other children born on any of the seven days of the week, each with equal probability 1/7. In that case, the chance
that a two child family consists of two boys, one (at least) born on a Tuesday, is equal to 1/4 (the probability of two
boys) times one minus 6/7 squared = 1 - 36/49 = 13/49 (one minus the probability that neither child is born on a
Tuesday). 1/4 times 13/49 equals 13/196.
The probability that a two child family consists of a boy and a girl, the boy born on a Tuesday, equals 2 (boy-girl or
girl-boy) times 1/4 (the two specified sexes) times 1/7 (the boy born on Tuesday) = 1/14. Therefore, among all two
child families with at least one boy born on a Tuesday, the fraction of families in which the other child is a girl is
1/14 divided by the sum of 1/14 plus 13/196 = 0.5185185.
It seems that we introduced quite irrelevant information, yet the probability of the sex of the other child has changed
dramatically from what it was before (the chance the other child was a girl was 2/3, when we didn't know that the
boy was born on Tuesday).
This is still a bit bigger than a half, but close! It is not difficult to check that as we specify more and more details
about the boy child (for instance: born on January 1), the chance that the other child is a girl approaches one half.
However, is it really plausible that our child family with at least one boy born on a Tuesday was delivered to us by
choosing just one of such families at random? It is much more easy to imagine the following scenario. We know Mr.
Smith has two children. We knock at his door and a boy comes and answers the door. We ask the boy on what day of
the week he was born. Let's assume that which of the two children answers the door is determined by chance! Then
the procedure was (1) pick a two-child family at random from all two-child families (2) pick one of the two children
at random, (3) see it's a boy and ask on what day he was born. The chance the other child is a girl is 1/2. This is a
very different procedure from (1) picking a two-child family at random from all families with two children, at least
one a boy, born on a Tuesday. The chance the family consists of a boy and a girl is 0.5185815...
170
Boy or Girl paradox

This variant of the boy and girl problem is discussed on many recent internet blogs and is the subject of a paper by
Ruma Falk, [1]. The moral of the story is that these probabilities don't just depend on the information we have in
front of us, but on how we came by that information.
Psychological investigation
From the position of statistical analysis the relevant question is often ambiguous and as such there is no correct
answer. However, this does not exhaust the boy or girl paradox for it is not necessarily the ambiguity that explains
how the intuitive probability is derived. A survey such as vos Savants suggests that the majority of people adopt an
understanding of Gardners problem that if they were consistent would lead them to the 1/3 probability answer but
overwhelmingly people intuitively arrive at the 1/2 probability answer. Ambiguity notwithstanding, this makes the
problem of interest to psychological researchers who seek to understand how humans estimate probability.
Fox & Levav (2004) used the problem (called the Mr. Smith problem, credited to Gardner, but not worded exactly
the same as Gardner's version) to test theories of how people estimate conditional probabilities. In this study, the
paradox was posed to participants in two ways:
"Mr. Smith says: 'I have two children and at least one of them is a boy.' Given this information, what is the
probability that the other child is a boy?"
"Mr. Smith says: 'I have two children and it is not the case that they are both girls.' Given this information, what is
the probability that both children are boys?"
The authors argue that the first formulation gives the reader the mistaken impression that there are two possible
outcomes for the "other child", whereas the second formulation gives the reader the impression that there are four
possible outcomes, of which one has been rejected (resulting in 1/3 being the probability of both children being boys,
as there are 3 remaining possible outcomes, only one of which is that both of the children are boys). The study found
that 85% of participants answered 1/2 for the first formulation, while only 39% responded that way to the second
formulation. The authors argued that the reason people respond differently to each question (along with other similar
problems, such as the Monty Hall Problem and the Bertrand's box paradox) is because of the use of naive heuristics
that fail to properly define the number of possible outcomes.
References
[1] http:/ / www. tandfonline. com/ doi/ abs/ 10. 1080/ 13546783. 2011. 613690
External links
Boy or Girl: Two Interpretations (http://mathforum.org/library/drmath/view/52186.html)

At Least One Girl (http://www.mathpages.com/home/kmath036.htm) at MathPages
A Problem With Two Bear Cubs (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/bears.shtml)
Lewis Carroll's Pillow Problem (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/carroll.shtml)
When intuition and math probably look wrong (http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/60598/title/
Math_Trek__When_intuition_and_math_probably_look_wrong)
The Boy or Girl Paradox: A Martingale Perspective (http://finmathblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/
the-boy-or-girl-paradox-martingale.html) at FinancialMathematics.com
171
172
In set theory, a field of mathematics, the Burali-Forti paradox demonstrates that navely constructing "the set of all
ordinal numbers" leads to a contradiction and therefore shows an antinomy in a system that allows its construction. It
is named after Cesare Burali-Forti, who in 1897 published a paper proving a theorem which, unknown to him,
contradicted a previously proved result. Bertrand Russell subsequently noticed the contradiction, and when he
published it, he stated that it had been suggested to him by Burali-Forti's paper, with the result that it came to be
known by Burali-Forti's name.[1]
Stated in terms of von Neumann ordinals

Let
be the "set" of all ordinals. Since
carries all properties of an ordinal number, it is an ordinal number itself.
We can therefore construct its successor

must be an element of
, since
and
, which is strictly greater than
. However, this ordinal number
contains all ordinal numbers. Finally, we arrive at

.
Stated more generally

The version of the paradox above is anachronistic, because it presupposes the definition of the ordinals due to John
von Neumann, under which each ordinal is the set of all preceding ordinals, which was not known at the time the
paradox was framed by Burali-Forti. Here is an account with fewer presuppositions: suppose that we associate with
each well-ordering an object called its "order type" in an unspecified way (the order types are the ordinal numbers).
The "order types" (ordinal numbers) themselves are well-ordered in a natural way, and this well-ordering must have
an order type . It is easily shown in nave set theory (and remains true in ZFC but not in New Foundations) that
the order type of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed is itself. So the order type of all ordinal numbers less
than is itself. But this means that , being the order type of a proper initial segment of the ordinals, is strictly
less than the order type of all the ordinals, but the latter is
itself by definition. This is a contradiction.
If we use the von Neumann definition, under which each ordinal is identified as the set of all preceding ordinals, the
paradox is unavoidable: the offending proposition that the order type of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed is
itself must be true. The collection of von Neumann ordinals, like the collection in the Russell paradox, cannot be
a set in any set theory with classical logic. But the collection of order types in New Foundations (defined as
equivalence classes of well-orderings under similarity) is actually a set, and the paradox is avoided because the order
type of the ordinals less than turns out not to be .
Resolution of the paradox

Modern axiomatic set theory such as ZF and ZFC circumvents this antinomy by simply not allowing construction of
sets with unrestricted comprehension terms like "all sets with the property ", as it was for example possible in
Gottlob Frege's axiom system. New Foundations uses a different solution.
References
[1] https:/ / www. cs. auckland. ac. nz/ ~chaitin/ lowell. html
Burali-Forti, Cesare (1897), "Una questione sui numeri transfiniti", Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di
Palermo 11: 154164, doi: 10.1007/BF03015911 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF03015911)
External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
paradoxes-contemporary-logic/)" -- by Andrea Cantini.
Cantor's paradox
In set theory, Cantor's paradox is derivable from the theorem that there is no greatest cardinal number, so that the
collection of "infinite sizes" is itself infinite. The difficulty is handled in axiomatic set theory by declaring that this
collection is not a set but a proper class; in von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory it follows from this and the
axiom of limitation of size that this proper class must be in bijection with the class of all sets. Thus, not only are
there infinitely many infinities, but this infinity is larger than any of the infinities it enumerates.
This paradox is named for Georg Cantor, who is often credited with first identifying it in 1899 (or between 1895 and
1897). Like a number of "paradoxes" it is not actually contradictory but merely indicative of a mistaken intuition, in
this case about the nature of infinity and the notion of a set. Put another way, it is paradoxical within the confines of
nave set theory and therefore demonstrates that a careless axiomatization of this theory is inconsistent.
Statements and proofs

In order to state the paradox it is necessary to understand that the cardinal numbers admit an ordering, so that one
can speak about one being greater or less than another. Then Cantor's paradox is:
Theorem: There is no greatest cardinal number.
This fact is a direct consequence of Cantor's theorem on the cardinality of the power set of a set.
Proof: Assume the contrary, and let C be the largest cardinal number. Then (in the von Neumann formulation
of cardinality) C is a set and therefore has a power set 2C which, by Cantor's theorem, has cardinality strictly
larger than that of C. Demonstrating a cardinality (namely that of 2C) larger than C, which was assumed to be
the greatest cardinal number, falsifies the definition of C. This contradiction establishes that such a cardinal
cannot exist.
Another consequence of Cantor's theorem is that the cardinal numbers constitute a proper class. That is, they cannot
all be collected together as elements of a single set. Here is a somewhat more general result.
Theorem: If S is any set then S cannot contain elements of all cardinalities. In fact, there is a strict upper
bound on the cardinalities of the elements of S.
Proof: Let S be a set, and let T be the union of the elements of S. Then every element of S is a subset of T, and
hence is of cardinality less than or equal to the cardinality of T. Cantor's theorem then implies that every
element of S is of cardinality strictly less than the cardinality of 2T.
Discussion and consequences

Since the cardinal numbers are well-ordered by indexing with the ordinal numbers (see Cardinal number, formal
definition), this also establishes that there is no greatest ordinal number; conversely, the latter statement implies
Cantor's paradox. By applying this indexing to the Burali-Forti paradox we obtain another proof that the cardinal
numbers are a proper class rather than a set, and (at least in ZFC or in von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory) it
follows from this that there is a bijection between the class of cardinals and the class of all sets. Since every set is a
subset of this latter class, and every cardinality is the cardinality of a set (by definition!) this intuitively means that
the "cardinality" of the collection of cardinals is greater than the cardinality of any set: it is more infinite than any
true infinity. This is the paradoxical nature of Cantor's "paradox".
173
Cantor's paradox
Historical note
While Cantor is usually credited with first identifying this property of cardinal sets, some mathematicians award this
distinction to Bertrand Russell, who defined a similar theorem in 1899 or 1901.
References
Anellis, I.H. (1991). Drucker, Thomas, ed. "The first Russell paradox," Perspectives on the History of
Mathematical Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Birkuser Boston. pp.3346.
Moore, G.H. and Garciadiego, A. (1981). "Burali-Forti's paradox: a reappraisal of its origins". Historia Math 8
(3): 319350. doi:10.1016/0315-0860(81)90070-7 [1].
External links
An Historical Account of Set-Theoretic Antinomies Caused by the Axiom of Abstraction [2]: report by Justin T.
Miller, Department of Mathematics, University of Arizona.
PlanetMath.org [3]: article.
References
[1] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016%2F0315-0860%2881%2990070-7
[2] http:/ / citeseer. ist. psu. edu/ 496807. html
[3] http:/ / planetmath. org/ encyclopedia/ CantorsParadox. html
Coastline paradox
174
Coastline paradox
An example of the coastline paradox. If the coastline of Great Britain is measured using units 100km (62mi) long,
then the length of the coastline is approximately 2,800km (1,700mi). With 50km (31mi) units, the total length is
approximately 3,400km (2,100mi), approximately 600km (370mi) longer.
The coastline paradox is the counterintuitive observation that the coastline of a landmass does not have a
well-defined length. This results from the fractal-like properties of coastlines. The first recorded observation of this
phenomenon was by Lewis Fry Richardson.
More concretely, the length of the coastline depends on the method used to measure it. Since a landmass has features
at all scales, from hundreds of kilometers in size to tiny fractions of a millimeter and below, there is no obvious size
of the smallest feature that should be measured around, and hence no single well-defined perimeter to the landmass.
Various approximations exist when specific assumptions are made about minimum feature size.
Mathematical aspects
The basic concept of length originates from Euclidean distance. In the familiar Euclidean geometry, a straight line
represents the shortest distance between two points; this line has only one length. The geodesic length on the surface
of a sphere, called the great circle length, is measured along the surface curve which exists in the plane containing
both end points of the path and the center of the sphere. The length of basic curves is more complicated but can also
be calculated. Measuring with rulers, one can approximate the length of a curve by adding the sum of the straight
lines which connect the points:
Using a few straight lines to approximate the length of a curve will produce a low estimate. Using shorter and shorter
lines will produce sums that approach the curve's true length. A precise value for this length can be established using
calculus, a branch of mathematics which enables calculation of infinitely small distances. The following animation
illustrates how a smooth curve can be meaningfully assigned a precise length:
175
Coastline paradox
However, not all curves can be measured in this way. A fractal is by definition a curve whose complexity changes
with measurement scale. Whereas approximations of a smooth curve get closer and closer to a single value as
measurement precision increases, the measured value of fractals may change wildly.
This Sierpiski curve, which repeats the same pattern on a smaller and smaller scale, continues to increase in length.
If understood to iterate within an infinitely subdivisible geometric space, its length approaches infinity. At the same
time, the area enclosed by the curve does converge to a precise figurejust as, analogously, the land mass of an
island can be calculated more easily than the length of its coastline.
The length of a "true fractal" always diverges to infinity.[1] However, this figure relies on the assumption that space
can be subdivided indefinitely. The truth value of this assumptionwhich underlies Euclidean geometry and serves
as a useful model in everyday measurementis a matter of philosophical speculation, and may or may not reflect the
changing realities of 'space' and 'distance' on the atomic level.
Coastlines differ from mathematical fractals because they are formed by numerous small events, which create
patterns only statistically.[2]
Practical
For practical considerations, an appropriate choice of minimum feature size is on the order of the units being used to
measure. If a coastline is measured in kilometers, then small variations much smaller than one kilometer are easily
ignored. To measure the coastline in centimeters, tiny variations the size of centimeters must be considered.
However, at scales on the order of centimeters various arbitrary and non-fractal assumptions must be made, such as
where an estuary joins the sea, or where in a broad tidal flat the coastline measurements ought to be taken. Using
different measurement methodologies for different units also destroys the usual certainty that units can be converted
by a simple multiplication.
Extreme cases of the coastline paradox include the fjord-heavy coastlines of Norway, Chile and the Pacific
Northwest of North America. From the southern tip of Vancouver Island northwards to the southern tip of the Alaska
176
Coastline paradox
Panhandle, the convolutions of the coastline of the Canadian province of British Columbia make it over 10% of the
entire Canadian coastline25,725km (15,985mi) out of 243,042km (151,019mi)Wikipedia:Please clarify over a
linear distance of only 965km (600mi), including the maze of islands of the Arctic archipelago.[3]
Notes
[1] Post & Eisen, p. 550.
[2] Heinz-Otto Peitgen, Hartmut Jrgens, Dietmar Saupe, Chaos and Fractals: New Frontiers of Science; Spring, 2004; p. 424 (http:/ / books.
google. com/ books?id=LDCkFOkD2IIC& lpg=PP1& pg=PA424).
[3] Sebert, L.M., and M. R. Munro. 1972. Dimensions and Areas of Maps of the National Topographic System of Canada. Technical Report
72-1. Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Surveys and Mapping Branch.
Bibliography
Post, David G., and Michael Eisen. " How Long is the Coastline of Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal
Systems (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=943509)". Journal of Legal Studies XXIX(1),
January 2000.
External links
" Coastlines (http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/Panorama/Nature/Coastlines/Coastlines.html)" at Fractal
Geometry (http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/) (ed. Michael Frame, Benoit Mandelbrot, and Nial Neger;
maintained for Math 190a at Yale University)
The Atlas of Canada Coastline and Shoreline (http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/learningresources/facts/
coastline.html)
NOAA GeoZone Blog on Digital Coast (http://www.csc.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/geozone/
how-much-length-do-you-really-need-ahhh-shoreline-length-that-is)
177
Cramer's paradox
Cramer's paradox
In mathematics, Cramer's paradox is the statement that the number of points of intersection of two higher-order
curves can be greater than the number of arbitrary points that are usually needed to define one such curve. It is
named after the Swiss mathematician Gabriel Cramer.
This paradox is the result of a naive understanding or a misapplication of two theorems:
Bzout's theorem (the number of points of intersection of two algebraic curves is equal to the product of their
degrees, provided that certain necessary conditions are met).
Cramer's theorem (a curve of degree n is determined by n(n+3)/2 points, again assuming that certain conditions
hold).
Observe that n3, n2 n(n+3)/2.
History
The paradox was first published by Maclaurin. Cramer and Euler corresponded on the paradox in letters of 1744 and
1745 and Euler explained the problem to Cramer.
It has become known as Cramer's paradox after featuring in his 1750 book Introduction l'analyse des lignes
courbes algbriques, although Cramer quoted Maclaurin as the source of the statement.
At about the same time, Euler published examples showing a cubic curve which was not uniquely defined by 9
points[1] and discussed the problem in his book Introductio in analysin infinitorum.
The result was publicized by James Stirling and explained by Julius Plcker.
No paradox for lines and nondegenerate conics

For first order curves (that is lines) the paradox does not occur. In general two lines L1 and L2 intersect at a single
point P unless the lines are of equal gradient. A single point is not sufficient to define a line (two are needed);
through the point P there pass not only the two given lines but an infinite number of other lines as well.
Similarly two nondegenerate conics intersect at most at 4 points, and 5 points are needed to define a nondegenerate
conic.
Cramer's example for cubic curves

In a letter to Euler, Cramer pointed out that the cubic curves y3-y=0 and x3-x=0 intersect in precisely 9 points (the
equations represent two sets of three parallel lines x=-1, x=0, x=+1; and y=-1, y=0, y=+1 respectively). Hence 9
points are not sufficient to uniquely determine a cubic curve.
References
[1] Euler, L. "Sur une contradiction apparente dans la doctrine des lignes courbes." Mmoires de l'Academie des Sciences de Berlin 4, 219-233,
1750
External links
Ed Sandifer "Cramers Paradox" (http://eulerarchive.maa.org/hedi/HEDI-2004-08.pdf)
Cramer's Paradox (http://www.mathpages.com/home/kmath207/kmath207.htm) at MathPages
178
Elevator paradox
Elevator paradox
This article refers to the elevator paradox for the transport device. For the elevator paradox for the
hydrometer, see elevator paradox (physics).
The elevator paradox is a paradox first noted by Marvin Stern and George Gamow, physicists who had offices on
different floors of a multi-story building. Gamow, who had an office near the bottom of the building noticed that the
first elevator to stop at his floor was most often going down, while Stern, who had an office near the top, noticed that
the first elevator to stop at his floor was most often going up.
At first sight, this created the impression that perhaps elevator cars were being manufactured in the middle of the
building and sent upwards to the roof and downwards to the basement to be dismantled. Clearly this was not the
case. But how could the observation be explained?
Modeling the elevator problem

Several attempts (beginning with Gamow
and Stern) were made to analyze the reason
for this phenomenon: the basic analysis is
simple, while detailed analysis is more
difficult than it would at first appear.
Simply, if one is on the top floor of a
building, all elevators will come from below
(none can come from above), and then
depart going down, while if one is on the
second from top floor, an elevator going to
the top floor will pass first on the way up,
and then shortly afterward on the way down
thus, while an equal number will pass
Near the top floor, elevators to the top come down shortly after they go up.
going up as going down, downwards
elevators will generally shortly follow upwards elevators (unless the elevator idles on the top floor), and thus the first
elevator observed will usually be going up. The first elevator observed will be going down only if one begins
observing in the short interval after an elevator has passed going up, while the rest of the time the first elevator
observed will be going up.
In more detail, the explanation is as follows: a single elevator spends most of its time in the larger section of the
building, and thus is more likely to approach from that direction when the prospective elevator user arrives. An
observer who remains by the elevator doors for hours or days, observing every elevator arrival, rather than only
observing the first elevator to arrive, would note an equal number of elevators traveling in each direction. This then
becomes a sampling problem the observer is sampling stochastically a non uniform interval.
To help visualize this, consider a thirty-story building, plus lobby, with only one slow elevator. The elevator is so
slow because it stops at every floor on the way up, and then on every floor on the way down. It takes a minute to
travel between floors and wait for passengers. Here is the arrival schedule for people unlucky enough to work in this
building; as depicted above, it forms a triangle wave:
179
Elevator paradox
180
Floor
Time on way up Time on way down
Lobby
8:00, 9:00, ...
n/a
1st floor
8:01, 9:01, ...
8:59, 9:59, ...
2nd floor
8:02, 9:02, ...
8:58, 9:58, ...
...
...
...
29th floor 8:29, 9:29, ...
8:31, 9:31, ...
30th floor n/a
8:30, 9:30, ...
If you were on the first floor and walked up randomly to the elevator, chances are the next elevator would be heading
down. The next elevator would be heading up only during the first two minutes at each hour, e.g., at 9:00 and 9:01.
The number of elevator stops going upwards and downwards are the same, but the odds that the next elevator is
going up is only 2 in 60.
A similar effect can be observed in railway stations where a station near the end of the line will likely have the next
train headed for the end of the line. Another visualization is to imagine sitting in bleachers near one end of an oval
racetrack: if you are waiting for a single car to pass in front of you, it will be more likely to pass on the straight-away
before entering the turn.
More than one elevator

Interestingly, if there is more than one elevator in a building, the bias decreases since there is a greater chance
that the intending passenger will arrive at the elevator lobby during the time that at least one elevator is below them;
with an infinite number of elevators, the probabilities would be equal.
In the example above, if there are 30 floors and 58 elevators, so at every minute there are 2 elevators on each floor,
one going up and one going down (save at the top and bottom), the bias is eliminated every minute, one elevator
arrives going up and another going down. This also occurs with 30 elevators spaced 2 minutes apart on odd floors
they alternate up/down arrivals, while on even floors they arrive simultaneously every two minutes.
Watching cars pass on an oval racetrack, one perceives little bias if the time between cars is small compared to the
time required for a car to return past the observer.
The real-world case

In a real building, there are complicated factors such as the tendency of elevators to be frequently required on the
ground or first floor, and to return there when idle. These factors tend to shift the frequency of observed arrivals, but
do not eliminate the paradox entirely. In particular, a user very near the top floor will perceive the paradox even
more strongly, as elevators are infrequently present or required above their floor.
There are other complications of a real building: such as lopsided demand where everyone wants to go down at the
end of the day; the way full elevators skip extra stops; or the effect of short trips where the elevator stays idle. These
complications make the paradox harder to visualize than the race track examples.
Elevator paradox
References
Martin Gardner, Knotted Doughnuts and Other Mathematical Entertainments, chapter 10. W H Freeman & Co.;
(October 1986). ISBN 0-7167-1799-9.
Martin Gardner, Aha! Gotcha, page 96. W H Freeman & Co.; 1982. ISBN 0-7167-1414-0
External links
A detailed treatment, part 1 (http://www.kwansei.ac.jp/hs/z90010/english/sugakuc/toukei/elevator/
elevator.htm) by Tokihiko Niwa
Part 2: the multi-elevator case (http://www.kwansei.ac.jp/hs/z90010/english/sugakuc/toukei/elevator2/
elevator2.htm)
MathWorld article (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ElevatorParadox.html) on the elevator paradox

The false positive paradox is a statistical result where false positive tests are more probable than true positive tests,
occurring when the overall population has a low incidence of a condition and the incidence rate is lower than the
false positive rate. The probability of a positive test result is determined not only by the accuracy of the test but by
the characteristics of the sampled population. When the incidence, the proportion of those who have a given
condition, is lower than the test's false positive rate, even tests that have a very low chance of giving a false positive
in an individual case will give more false than true positives overall.[1] So, in a society with very few infected
peoplefewer proportionately than the test gives false positivesthere will actually be more who test positive for a
disease incorrectly and don't have it than those who test positive accurately and do. The paradox has surprised many.
It is especially counter-intuitive when interpreting a positive result in a test on a low-incidence population after
having dealt with positive results drawn from a high-incidence population. If the false positive rate of the test is
higher than the proportion of the new population with the condition, then a test administrator whose experience has
been drawn from testing in a high-incidence population may conclude from experience that a positive test result
usually indicates a positive subject, when in fact a false positive is far more likely to have occurred.
Not adjusting to the scarcity of the condition in the new population, and concluding that a positive test result
probably indicates a positive subject, even though population incidence is below the false positive rate is a "base rate
fallacy".
Example
High-incidence population
181
182
Number
of people
Infected
Uninfected
Total
Test
positive
400
(true positive)
30
(false positive)
430
Test
0
570
negative (false negative) (true negative)
570
Total
400
600
1000
Imagine running an HIV test on population A of 1000 persons, in which 40% are infected. The test has a false
positive rate of 5% (0.05) and no false negative rate. The expected outcome of the 1000 tests on population A would
be:
Infected and test indicates disease (true positive)
1000 40/100 = 400 people would receive a true positive
Uninfected and test indicates disease (false positive)
1000 100 40/100 0.05 = 30 people would receive a false positive
The remaining 570 tests are correctly negative.
So, in population A, a person receiving a positive test could be over 93% confident (400/30 + 400) that it correctly
indicates infection.
Low-incidence population
Number
of people
Infected
Uninfected
Total
Test
positive
20
(true positive)
49
(false positive)
69
Test
0
931
negative (false negative) (true negative)
931
Total
20
980
1000
Now consider the same test applied to population B, in which only 2% is infected. The expected outcome of 1000
tests on population B would be:
Infected and test indicates disease (true positive)
1000 2/100 = 20 people would receive a true positive
Uninfected and test indicates disease (false positive)
1000 100 2/100 0.05 = 49 people would receive a false positive
The remaining 931 tests are correctly negative.
In population B, only 20 of the 69 total people with a positive test result are actually infected. So, the probability of
actually being infected after one is told that one is infected is only 29% (20/20 + 49) for a test that otherwise appears
to be "95% accurate".
A tester with experience of group A might find it a paradox that in group B, a result that had usually correctly
indicated infection is now usually a false positive. The confusion of the posterior probability of infection with the
prior probability of receiving a false positive is a natural error after receiving a life-threatening test result.
183
Discussion
Cory Doctorow discusses this paradox in his book Little Brother.
If you ever decide to do something as stupid as build an automatic terrorism detector, here's a math
lesson you need to learn first. It's called "the paradox of the false positive," and it's a doozy.
Number
(rounded)
Has
Super-AIDS
Does not have

Super-AIDS
Total
Test
positive
1
(true positive)
10,000
(false positive)
10,001
Test
negative
0
989,999
(false negative) (true negative)
989,999
Total
999,999
1,000,000
Say you have a new disease, called Super-AIDS. Only one in a million people gets Super-AIDS. You
develop a test for Super-AIDS that's 99 percent accurate. I mean, 99 percent of the time, it gives the
correct result -- true if the subject is infected, and false if the subject is healthy. You give the test to a
million people. One in a million people have Super-AIDS. One in a hundred people that you test will
generate a "false positive" -- the test will say he has Super-AIDS even though he doesn't. That's what
"99 percent accurate" means: one percent wrong. What's one percent of one million? 1,000,000/100 =
10,000 One in a million people has Super-AIDS. If you test a million random people, you'll probably
only find one case of real Super-AIDS. But your test won't identify one person as having Super-AIDS. It
will identify 10,000 people as having it. Your 99 percent accurate test will perform with 99.99 percent
inaccuracy. That's the paradox of the false positive. When you try to find something really rare, your
test's accuracy has to match the rarity of the thing you're looking for. If you're trying to point at a single
pixel on your screen, a sharp pencil is a good pointer: the pencil-tip is a lot smaller (more accurate) than
the pixels. But a pencil-tip is no good at pointing at a single atom in your screen. For that, you need a
pointer -- a test -- that's one atom wide or less at the tip.
Number
(rounded)
Is a
terrorist
Is not a
terrorist
Total
Test
positive
10
(true positive)
200,000
(false positive)
200,010
Test
negative
0
19,799,990 19,799,990
(false negative) (true negative)
Total
10
19,999,990
20,000,000
This is the paradox of the false positive, and here's how it applies to terrorism: Terrorists are really rare.
In a city of twenty million like New York, there might be one or two terrorists. Maybe ten of them at the
outside. 10/20,000,000 = 0.00005 percent. One twenty-thousandth of a percent. That's pretty rare all
right. Now, say you've got some software that can sift through all the bank-records, or toll-pass records,
or public transit records, or phone-call records in the city and catch terrorists 99 percent of the time. In a
pool of twenty million people, a 99 percent accurate test will identify two hundred thousand people as
being terrorists. But only ten of them are terrorists. To catch ten bad guys, you have to haul in and
investigate two hundred thousand innocent people. Guess what? Terrorism tests aren't anywhere close to
99 percent accurate. More like 60 percent accurate. Even 40 percent accurate, sometimes.
184
References
[1] - Citing:
External links
The false positive paradox explained visually (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8VZqxcu0I0) (video)
Gabriel's Horn
Gabriel's Horn (also called Torricelli's trumpet) is a geometric
figure which has infinite surface area but finite volume. The name
refers to the tradition identifying the Archangel Gabriel as the angel
who blows the horn to announce Judgment Day, associating the divine,
or infinite, with the finite. The properties of this figure were first
studied by Italian physicist and mathematician Evangelista Torricelli in
the 17th century.
3D illustration of Gabriel's Horn.
Mathematical definition
Gabriel's horn is formed by taking the graph of
the domain
, with
(thus avoiding the asymptote at x = 0) and rotating
it in three dimensions about the x-axis. The discovery was made using
Cavalieri's principle before the invention of calculus, but today
calculus can be used to calculate the volume and surface area of the
horn between x = 1 and x = a, where a > 1. Using integration (see Solid
of revolution and Surface of revolution for details), it is possible to find
the volume
and the surface area
Graph of
can be as large as required, but it can be seen from the equation that the volume of the part of the horn between
and
will never exceed ; however, it will get closer and closer to as becomes larger.
Mathematically, the volume approaches
as
approaches infinity. Using the limit notation of calculus:
As for the area, the above shows that the area is

the natural logarithm of
area. That is to say;
times the natural logarithm of
. There is no upper bound for
as it approaches infinity. That means, in this case, that the horn has an infinite surface
Gabriel's Horn
185
Apparent paradox
When the properties of Gabriel's Horn were discovered, the fact that the rotation of an infinitely large section of the
x-y plane about the x-axis generates an object of finite volume was considered paradoxical.
Actually, the section lying in the x-y plane is the only one which has an infinite area, while any other, parallel to it,
has a finite area. The volume, being calculated from the 'weighted sum' of sections, is finite.
The more obvious approach is to treat the horn as a stack of disks with diminishing radii. As their shape is identical,
one is tempted to calculate just the sum of radii which produces the harmonic series that goes to infinity. A more
careful consideration shows that one should calculate the sum of their squares. Every disk has a radius r=1/x and an
area .r2 or /x2. The series 1/x is divergent but for any real >0, 1/x1+ converges.
The apparent paradox formed part of a great dispute over the nature of infinity involving many of the key thinkers of
the time including Thomas Hobbes, John Wallis and Galileo Galilei.
Painter's Paradox
Since the Horn has finite volume but infinite surface area, it seems that it could be filled with a finite quantity of
paint, and yet that paint would not be sufficient to coat its inner surface an apparent paradox. In fact, in a
theoretical mathematical sense, a finite amount of paint can coat an infinite area, provided the thickness of the coat
becomes vanishingly small "quickly enough" to compensate for the ever-expanding area, which in this case is forced
to happen to an inner-surface coat as the horn narrows. However, to coat the outer surface of the horn with a constant
thickness of paint, no matter how thin, would require an infinite amount of paint.
Of course, in reality, paint is not infinitely divisible, and at some point the horn would become too narrow for even
one molecule to pass.
Converse
The converse phenomenon of Gabriel's horn a surface of revolution which has a finite surface area but an infinite
volume cannot occur:
Theorem:
Let
Write
be a continuously differentiable function.

for the solid of revolution of the graph
If the surface area of
about the
-axis.
is finite, then so is the volume.
Proof:
Since the lateral surface area
Therefore, there exists a
is finite, note the limit superior:
such that the supremum
is finite.
Hence,
must be finite since
is bounded on the interval
is a continuous function, which implies that
Gabriel's Horn
186
Finally, note that the volume:
Therefore:
if the area
is finite, then the volume
must also be finite.
Further reading
Gabriel's Other Possessions, Melvin Royer, doi:10.1080/10511970.2010.517601 [1]
Gabriel's Wedding Cake, Julian F. Fleron, http://people.emich.edu/aross15/math121/misc/
gabriels-horn-ma044.pdf
A Paradoxical Paint Pail, Mark Lynch, http://www.maa.org/programs/faculty-and-departments/
classroom-capsules-and-notes/a-paradoxical-paint-pail
Supersolids: Solids Having Finite Volume and Infinite Surfaces, William P. Love, JSTOR27966098 [2]
References
[1] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080%2F10511970. 2010. 517601
External links
Information and diagrams about Gabriel's Horn (http://curvebank.calstatela.edu/torricelli/torricelli.htm)

Torricelli's Trumpet at PlanetMath (http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/TorricellisTrumpet.html)
Weisstein, Eric W., "Gabriel's Horn" (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GabrielsHorn.html), MathWorld.
"Gabriel's Horn" (http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/GabrielsHorn/) by John Snyder, the Wolfram
Demonstrations Project, 2007.
Gabriel's Horn: An Understanding of a Solid with Finite Volume and Infinite Surface Area (http://www.
palmbeachstate.edu/honors/Documents/jeansergejoseph.pdf) by Jean S. Joseph.
Galileo's paradox
187
Galileo's paradox
Galileo's paradox is a demonstration of one of the surprising properties of infinite sets. In his final scientific work,
Two New Sciences, Galileo Galilei made apparently contradictory statements about the positive integers. First, some
numbers are squares, while others are not; therefore, all the numbers, including both squares and non-squares, must
be more numerous than just the squares. And yet, for every square there is exactly one positive number that is its
square root, and for every number there is exactly one square; hence, there cannot be more of one than of the other.
This is an early use, though not the first, of the idea of one-to-one correspondence in the context of infinite sets.
Galileo concluded that the ideas of less, equal, and greater apply to finite sets, but not to infinite sets. In the
nineteenth century, using the same methods, Cantor showed that this restriction is not necessary. It is possible to
define comparisons amongst infinite sets in a meaningful way (by which definition the two sets he considers,
integers and squares, have "the same size"), and that by this definition some infinite sets are strictly larger than
others.
Galileo also worked on Zeno's paradoxes in order to open the way for his mathematical theory of motion.[1]
Galileo on infinite sets

The relevant section of Two New Sciences is excerpted below:
Simplicio: Here a difficulty presents itself which appears to me insoluble. Since it is clear that we may
have one line greater than another, each containing an infinite number of points, we are forced to admit
that, within one and the same class, we may have something greater than infinity, because the infinity of
points in the long line is greater than the infinity of points in the short line. This assigning to an infinite
quantity a value greater than infinity is quite beyond my comprehension.
Salviati: This is one of the difficulties which arise when we attempt, with our finite minds, to discuss the
infinite, assigning to it those properties which we give to the finite and limited; but this I think is wrong,
for we cannot speak of infinite quantities as being the one greater or less than or equal to another. To
prove this I have in mind an argument which, for the sake of clearness, I shall put in the form of
questions to Simplicio who raised this difficulty.
I take it for granted that you know which of the numbers are squares and which are not.
Simplicio: I am quite aware that a squared number is one which results from the multiplication of
another number by itself; thus 4, 9, etc., are squared numbers which come from multiplying 2, 3, etc., by
themselves.
Salviati: Very well; and you also know that just as the products are called squares so the factors are
called sides or roots; while on the other hand those numbers which do not consist of two equal factors
are not squares. Therefore if I assert that all numbers, including both squares and non-squares, are more
than the squares alone, I shall speak the truth, shall I not?
Simplicio: Most certainly.
Salviati: If I should ask further how many squares there are one might reply truly that there are as many
as the corresponding number of roots, since every square has its own root and every root its own square,
while no square has more than one root and no root more than one square.
Simplicio: Precisely so.
Salviati: But if I inquire how many roots there are, it cannot be denied that there are as many as the
numbers because every number is the root of some square. This being granted, we must say that there
are as many squares as there are numbers because they are just as numerous as their roots, and all the
numbers are roots. Yet at the outset we said that there are many more numbers than squares, since the
Galileo's paradox
188
larger portion of them are not squares. Not only so, but the proportionate number of squares diminishes
as we pass to larger numbers, Thus up to 100 we have 10 squares, that is, the squares constitute 1/10 part
of all the numbers; up to 10000, we find only 1/100 part to be squares; and up to a million only 1/1000
part; on the other hand in an infinite number, if one could conceive of such a thing, he would be forced
to admit that there are as many squares as there are numbers taken all together.
Sagredo: What then must one conclude under these circumstances?
Salviati: So far as I see we can only infer that the totality of all numbers is infinite, that the number of
squares is infinite, and that the number of their roots is infinite; neither is the number of squares less
than the totality of all the numbers, nor the latter greater than the former; and finally the attributes
"equal," "greater," and "less," are not applicable to infinite, but only to finite, quantities. When therefore
Simplicio introduces several lines of different lengths and asks me how it is possible that the longer ones
do not contain more points than the shorter, I answer him that one line does not contain more or less or
just as many points as another, but that each line contains an infinite number.
Galileo, Two New Sciences
References
[1] Alfred Renyi, Dialogs on Mathematics, Holden-Day, San Francisco, 1967.
External links
Philosophical Method and Galileo's Paradox of Infinity (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004276/),
Matthew W. Parker, in the PhilSci Archive
Gambler's fallacy
The gambler's fallacy, also known as the Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances, is the
mistaken belief that if something happens more frequently than normal during some period, then it will happen less
frequently in the future, or that if something happens less frequently than normal during some period, then it will
happen more frequently in the future (presumably as a means of balancing nature). In situations where what is being
observed is truly random (i.e. independent trials of a random process), this belief, though appealing to the human
mind, is false. This fallacy can arise in many practical situations although it is most strongly associated with
gambling where such mistakes are common among players.
The use of the term Monte Carlo fallacy originates from the most famous example of this phenomenon, which
occurred in a Monte Carlo Casino in 1913.[1]
Gambler's fallacy
189
An example: coin-tossing
The gambler's fallacy can be illustrated by considering the repeated toss of a fair coin.
With a fair coin, the outcomes in different tosses are statistically independent and the
probability of getting heads on a single toss is exactly 12 (one in two). It follows that the
probability of getting two heads in two tosses is 14 (one in four) and the probability of
getting three heads in three tosses is 18 (one in eight). In general, if we let Ai be the event
that toss i of a fair coin comes up heads, then we have,
.
Now suppose that we have just tossed four heads in a row, so that if the next coin toss
were also to come up heads, it would complete a run of five successive heads. Since the
probability of a run of five successive heads is only 132 (one in thirty-two), a person
subject to the gambler's fallacy might believe that this next flip was less likely to be
heads than to be tails. However, this is not correct, and is a manifestation of the
gambler's fallacy; the event of 5 heads in a row and the event of "first 4 heads, then a
tails" are equally likely, each having probability 132. Given that the first four rolls turn
up heads, the probability that the next toss is a head is in fact,
.
While a run of five heads is only 132 = 0.03125, it is only that before the coin is first
tossed. After the first four tosses the results are no longer unknown, so their probabilities
are 1. Reasoning that it is more likely that the next toss will be a tail than a head due to
the past tosses, that a run of luck in the past somehow influences the odds in the future, is
the fallacy.
Simulation of coin tosses:

Each frame, a coin is
flipped which is red on one
side and blue on the other.
The result of each flip is
added as a colored dot in
the corresponding column.
As the pie chart shows, the
proportion of red versus
blue approaches 50-50 (the
Law of Large Numbers).
But the difference between
red and blue does not
systematically decrease to
zero.
Explaining why the probability is 1/2 for a fair coin

We can see from the above that, if one flips a fair coin 21 times, then the probability of 21 heads is 1 in 2,097,152.
However, the probability of flipping a head after having already flipped 20 heads in a row is simply 12. This is an
application of Bayes' theorem.
This can also be seen without knowing that 20 heads have occurred for certain (without applying of Bayes' theorem).
Consider the following two probabilities, assuming a fair coin:
probability of 20 heads, then 1 tail = 0.520 0.5 = 0.521
probability of 20 heads, then 1 head = 0.520 0.5 = 0.521
The probability of getting 20 heads then 1 tail, and the probability of getting 20 heads then another head are both 1 in
2,097,152. Therefore, it is equally likely to flip 21 heads as it is to flip 20 heads and then 1 tail when flipping a fair
coin 21 times. Furthermore, these two probabilities are equally as likely as any other 21-flip combinations that can
be obtained (there are 2,097,152 total); all 21-flip combinations will have probabilities equal to 0.521, or 1 in
2,097,152. From these observations, there is no reason to assume at any point that a change of luck is warranted
based on prior trials (flips), because every outcome observed will always have been as likely as the other outcomes
that were not observed for that particular trial, given a fair coin. Therefore, just as Bayes' theorem shows, the result
of each trial comes down to the base probability of the fair coin: 12.
Gambler's fallacy
Other examples
There is another way to emphasize the fallacy. As already mentioned, the fallacy is built on the notion that previous
failures indicate an increased probability of success on subsequent attempts. This is, in fact, the inverse of what
actually happens, even on a fair chance of a successful event, given a set number of iterations. Assume a fair
16-sided die, where a win is defined as rolling a 1. Assume a player is given 16 rolls to obtain at least one win
(1Pr(rolling no 1's in 16 rolls)). The low winning odds are just to make the change in probability more noticeable.
The probability of having at least one win in the 16 rolls is:
However, assume now that the first roll was a loss (93.75% chance of that, 1516). The player now only has 15 rolls
left and, according to the fallacy, should have a higher chance of winning since one loss has occurred. His chances of
having at least one win are now:
Simply by losing one toss the player's probability of winning dropped by 2 percentage points. By the time this
reaches 5 losses (11 rolls left), his probability of winning on one of the remaining rolls will have dropped to ~50%.
The player's odds for at least one win in those 16 rolls has not increased given a series of losses; his odds have
decreased because he has fewer iterations left to win. In other words, the previous losses in no way contribute to the
odds of the remaining attempts, but there are fewer remaining attempts to gain a win, which results in a lower
probability of obtaining it.
The player becomes more likely to lose in a set number of iterations as he fails to win, and eventually his probability
of winning will again equal the probability of winning a single toss, when only one toss is left: 6.25% in this
instance.
Some lottery players will choose the same numbers every time, or intentionally change their numbers, but both are
equally likely to win any individual lottery draw. Copying the numbers that won the previous lottery draw gives an
equal probability, although a rational gambler might attempt to predict other players' choices and then deliberately
avoid these numbers. Low numbers (below 31 and especially below 12) are popular because people play birthdays as
their so-called lucky numbers; hence a win in which these numbers are over-represented is more likely to result in a
shared payout.
A joke told among mathematicians demonstrates the nature of the fallacy. When flying on an aircraft, a man decides
to always bring a bomb with him. "The chances of an aircraft having a bomb on it are very small," he reasons, "and
certainly the chances of having two are almost none!" A similar example is in the book The World According to
Garp when the hero Garp decides to buy a house a moment after a small plane crashes into it, reasoning that the
chances of another plane hitting the house have just dropped to zero.
Reverse fallacy
The reversal can also be a fallacy in which a gambler may instead decide, after a consistent tendency towards tails,
that tails are more likely out of some mystical preconception that fate has thus far allowed for consistent results of
tails. Believing the odds to favor tails, the gambler sees no reason to change to heads. Again, the fallacy is the belief
that the "universe" somehow carries a memory of past results which tend to favor or disfavor future outcomes.
However, it is not necessarily a fallacy as a consistent observed tendency towards one outcome may rationally be
taken as evidence that the coin is not fair.
Ian Hacking's unrelated inverse gambler's fallacy describes a situation where a gambler entering a room and seeing a
person rolling a double-six on a pair of dice may erroneously conclude that the person must have been rolling the
dice for quite a while, as they would be unlikely to get a double-six on their first attempt.
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Gambler's fallacy
Caveats
In most illustrations of the gambler's fallacy and the reversed gambler's fallacy, the trial (e.g. flipping a coin) is
assumed to be fair. In practice, this assumption may not hold.
For example, if one flips a fair coin 21 times, then the probability of 21 heads is 1 in 2,097,152 (above). If the coin is
fair, then the probability of the next flip being heads is 1/2. However, because the odds of flipping 21 heads in a row
is so slim, it may well be that the coin is somehow biased towards landing on heads, or that it is being controlled by
hidden magnets, or similar.[2] In this case, the smart bet is "heads" because the Bayesian inference from the empirical
evidence 21 "heads" in a row suggests that the coin is likely to be biased toward "heads", contradicting the
general assumption that the coin is fair.
The opening scene of the play Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead by Tom Stoppard discusses these issues as
one man continually flips heads and the other considers various possible explanations.
Childbirth
Instances of the gamblers fallacy being applied to childbirth can be traced all the way back to 1796, in Pierre-Simon
Laplaces A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Laplace wrote of the ways in which men calculated their
probability of having sons: "I have seen men, ardently desirous of having a son, who could learn only with anxiety of
the births of boys in the month when they expected to become fathers. Imagining that the ratio of these births to
those of girls ought to be the same at the end of each month, they judged that the boys already born would render
more probable the births next of girls." In short, the expectant fathers feared that if more sons were born in the
surrounding community, then they themselves would be more likely to have a daughter.[3]
Some expectant parents believe that, after having multiple children of the same sex, they are "due" to have a child of
the opposite sex. While the TriversWillard hypothesis predicts that birth sex is dependent on living conditions (i.e.
more male children are born in "good" living conditions, while more female children are born in poorer living
conditions), the probability of having a child of either gender is still generally regarded as near 50%.
Monte Carlo Casino

The most famous example of the gamblers fallacy occurred in a game of roulette at the Monte Carlo Casino on
August 18, 1913,[4] when the ball fell in black 26 times in a row. This was an extremely uncommon occurrence,
although no more nor less common than any of the other 67,108,863 sequences of 26 red or black. Gamblers lost
millions of francs betting against black, reasoning incorrectly that the streak was causing an "imbalance" in the
randomness of the wheel, and that it had to be followed by a long streak of red.
Non-examples of the fallacy

There are many scenarios where the gambler's fallacy might superficially seem to apply, when it actually does not.
When the probability of different events is not independent, the probability of future events can change based on the
outcome of past events (see statistical permutation). Formally, the system is said to have memory. An example of this
is cards drawn without replacement. For example, if an ace is drawn from a deck and not reinserted, the next draw is
less likely to be an ace and more likely to be of another rank. The odds for drawing another ace, assuming that it was
the first card drawn and that there are no jokers, have decreased from 452 (7.69%) to 351 (5.88%), while the odds for
each other rank have increased from 452 (7.69%) to 451 (7.84%). This type of effect is what allows card counting
systems to work (for example in the game of blackjack).
The reversed gambler's fallacy may appear to apply in the story of Joseph Jagger, who hired clerks to record the
results of roulette wheels in Monte Carlo. He discovered that one wheel favored nine particular numbers, and was
able to win large sums of money by betting on them until the casino started rebalancing the roulette wheels daily. In
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Gambler's fallacy
this situation, the observation of the wheel's behavior provided information about the physical properties of the
wheel rather than its "probability" in some abstract sense, a concept which is the basis of both the gambler's fallacy
and its reversal. Even a biased wheel's past results will not affect future results, but the results can provide
information about what sort of results the wheel tends to produce. However, if it is known for certain that the wheel
is completely fair, then past results provide no information about future ones.
The outcome of future events can be affected if external factors are allowed to change the probability of the events
(e.g., changes in the rules of a game affecting a sports team's performance levels). Additionally, an inexperienced
player's success may decrease after opposing teams discover his weaknesses and exploit them. The player must then
attempt to compensate and randomize his strategy. Such analysis is part of game theory.
Non-example: unknown probability of event

When the probabilities of repeated events are not known, outcomes may not be equally probable. In the case of coin
tossing, as a run of heads gets longer and longer, the likelihood that the coin is biased towards heads increases. If one
flips a coin 21 times in a row and obtains 21 heads, one might rationally conclude a high probability of bias towards
heads, and hence conclude that future flips of this coin are also highly likely to be heads. In fact, Bayesian inference
can be used to show that when the long-run proportion of different outcomes are unknown but exchangeable
(meaning that the random process from which they are generated may be biased but is equally likely to be biased in
any direction) and that previous observations demonstrate the likely direction of the bias, the outcome which has
occurred the most in the observed data is the most likely to occur again.[5]
Psychology behind the fallacy

Origins
Gambler's fallacy arises out of a belief in a "law of small numbers", or the erroneous belief that small samples must
be representative of the larger population. According to the fallacy, "streaks" must eventually even out in order to be
representative.[6] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first proposed that the gambler's fallacy is a cognitive bias
produced by a psychological heuristic called the representativeness heuristic, which states that people evaluate the
probability of a certain event by assessing how similar it is to events they have experienced before, and how similar
the events surrounding those two processes are. According to this view, "after observing a long run of red on the
roulette wheel, for example, most people erroneously believe that black will result in a more representative sequence
than the occurrence of an additional red",[7] so people expect that a short run of random outcomes should share
properties of a longer run, specifically in that deviations from average should balance out. When people are asked to
make up a random-looking sequence of coin tosses, they tend to make sequences where the proportion of heads to
tails stays closer to 0.5 in any short segment than would be predicted by chance (insensitivity to sample size);
Kahneman and Tversky interpret this to mean that people believe short sequences of random events should be
representative of longer ones.[8] The representativeness heuristic is also cited behind the related phenomenon of the
clustering illusion, according to which people see streaks of random events as being non-random when such streaks
are actually much more likely to occur in small samples than people expect.
The gambler's fallacy can also be attributed to the mistaken belief that gambling (or even chance itself) is a fair
process that can correct itself in the event of streaks, otherwise known as the just-world hypothesis.[9] Other
researchers believe that individuals with an internal locus of controli.e., people who believe that the gambling
outcomes are the result of their own skillare more susceptible to the gambler's fallacy because they reject the idea
that chance could overcome skill or talent.[10]
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Gambler's fallacy
Variations of the gambler's fallacy

Some researchers believe that there are actually two types of gambler's fallacy: TypeI and TypeII. TypeI is the
"classic" gambler's fallacy, when individuals believe that a certain outcome is "due" after a long streak of another
outcome. TypeII gambler's fallacy, as defined by Gideon Keren and Charles Lewis, occurs when a gambler
underestimates how many observations are needed to detect a favorable outcome (such as watching a roulette wheel
for a length of time and then betting on the numbers that appear most often). Detecting a bias that will lead to a
favorable outcome takes an impractically large amount of time and is very difficult, if not impossible, to do;
therefore people fall prey to the TypeII gambler's fallacy.[11] The two types are different in that TypeI wrongly
assumes that gambling conditions are fair and perfect, while TypeII assumes that the conditions are biased, and that
this bias can be detected after a certain amount of time.
Another variety, known as the retrospective gambler's fallacy, occurs when individuals judge that a seemingly rare
event must come from a longer sequence than a more common event does. For example, people believe that an
imaginary sequence of die rolls is more than three times as long when a set of three 6's is observed as opposed to
when there are only two 6's. This effect can be observed in isolated instances, or even sequentially. A real world
example is that when a teenager becomes pregnant after having unprotected sex, people assume that she has been
engaging in unprotected sex for longer than someone who has been engaging in unprotected sex and is not
pregnant.[12]
Relationship to hot-hand fallacy

Another psychological perspective states that gambler's fallacy can be seen as the counterpart to basketball's
hot-hand fallacy, in which people tend to predict the same outcome of the last event (positive recency)that a high
scorer will continue to score. In gambler's fallacy, however, people predict the opposite outcome of the last event
(negative recency)that, for example, since the roulette wheel has landed on black the last six times, it is due to land
on red the next. Ayton and Fischer have theorized that people display positive recency for the hot-hand fallacy
because the fallacy deals with human performance, and that people do not believe that an inanimate object can
become "hot." Human performance is not perceived as "random," and people are more likely to continue streaks
when they believe that the process generating the results is nonrandom. Usually, when a person exhibits the
gambler's fallacy, they are more likely to exhibit the hot-hand fallacy as well, suggesting that one construct is
responsible for the two fallacies.
The difference between the two fallacies is also represented in economic decision-making. A study by Huber,
Kirchler, and Stockl (2010) examined how the hot hand and the gambler's fallacy are exhibited in the financial
market. The researchers gave their participants a choice: they could either bet on the outcome of a series of coin
tosses, use an "expert" opinion to sway their decision, or choose a risk-free alternative instead for a smaller financial
reward. Participants turned to the "expert" opinion to make their decision 24% of the time based on their past
experience of success, which exemplifies the hot-hand. If the expert was correct, 78% of the participants chose the
expert's opinion again, as opposed to 57% doing so when the expert was wrong. The participants also exhibited the
gambler's fallacy, with their selection of either heads or tails decreasing after noticing a streak of that outcome. This
experiment helped bolster Ayton and Fischer's theory that people put more faith in human performance than they do
in seemingly random processes.
Neurophysiology
While the representativeness heuristic and other cognitive biases are the most commonly cited cause of the gambler's
fallacy, research suggests that there may be a neurological component to it as well. Functional magnetic resonance
imaging has revealed that, after losing a bet or gamble ("riskloss"), the frontoparietal network of the brain is
activated, resulting in more risk-taking behavior. In contrast, there is decreased activity in the amygdala, caudate,
and ventral striatum after a riskloss. Activation in the amygdala is negatively correlated with gambler's fallacythe
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Gambler's fallacy
more activity exhibited in the amygdala, the less likely an individual is to fall prey to the gambler's fallacy. These
results suggest that gambler's fallacy relies more on the prefrontal cortex (responsible for executive, goal-directed
processes) and less on the brain areas that control affective decision-making.
The desire to continue gambling or betting is controlled by the striatum, which supports a choice-outcome
contingency learning method. The striatum processes the errors in prediction and the behavior changes accordingly.
After a win, the positive behavior is reinforced and after a loss, the behavior is conditioned to be avoided. In
individuals exhibiting the gambler's fallacy, this choice-outcome contingency method is impaired, and they continue
to make risks after a series of losses.
Possible solutions
The gambler's fallacy is a deep-seated cognitive bias and therefore very difficult to eliminate. For the most part,
educating individuals about the nature of randomness has not proven effective in reducing or eliminating any
manifestation of the gambler's fallacy. Participants in an early study by Beach and Swensson (1967) were shown a
shuffled deck of index cards with shapes on them, and were told to guess which shape would come next in a
sequence. The experimental group of participants was informed about the nature and existence of the gambler's
fallacy, and were explicitly instructed not to rely on "run dependency" to make their guesses. The control group was
not given this information. Even so, the response styles of the two groups were similar, indicating that the
experimental group still based their choices on the length of the run sequence. Clearly, instructing individuals about
randomness is not sufficient in lessening the gambler's fallacy.
It does appear, however, that an individual's susceptibility to the gambler's fallacy decreases with age. Fischbein and
Schnarch (1997) administered a questionnaire to five groups: students in grades 5, 7, 9, 11, and college students
specializing in teaching mathematics. None of the participants had received any prior education regarding
probability. The question was, "Ronni flipped a coin three times and in all cases heads came up. Ronni intends to flip
the coin again. What is the chance of getting heads the fourth time?" The results indicated that as the older the
students got, the less likely they were to answer with "smaller than the chance of getting tails", which would indicate
a negative recency effect. 35% of the 5th graders, 35% of the 7th graders, and 20% of the 9th graders exhibited the
negative recency effect. Only 10% of the 11th graders answered this way, however, and none of the college students
did. Fischbein and Schnarch therefore theorized that an individual's tendency to rely on the representativeness
heuristic and other cognitive biases can be overcome with age.
Another possible solution that could be seen as more proactive comes from Roney and Trick, Gestalt psychologists
who suggest that the fallacy may be eliminated as a result of grouping. When a future event (ex: a coin toss) is
described as part of a sequence, no matter how arbitrarily, a person will automatically consider the event as it relates
to the past events, resulting in the gambler's fallacy. When a person considers every event as independent, however,
the fallacy can be greatly reduced.
In their experiment, Roney and Trick told participants that they were betting on either two blocks of six coin tosses,
or on two blocks of seven coin tosses. The fourth, fifth, and sixth tosses all had the same outcome, either three heads
or three tails. The seventh toss was grouped with either the end of one block, or the beginning of the next block.
Participants exhibited the strongest gambler's fallacy when the seventh trial was part of the first block, directly after
the sequence of three heads or tails. Additionally, the researchers pointed out how insidious the fallacy can bethe
participants that did not show the gambler's fallacy showed less confidence in their bets and bet fewer times than the
participants who picked "with" the gambler's fallacy. However, when the seventh trial was grouped with the second
block (and was therefore perceived as not being part of a streak), the gambler's fallacy did not occur.
Roney and Trick argue that a solution to gambler's fallacy could be, instead of teaching individuals about the nature
of randomness, training people to treat each event as if it is a beginning and not a continuation of previous events.
This would prevent people from gambling when they are losing in the vain hope that their chances of winning are
due to increase.
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Gambler's fallacy
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Blog - "Fallacy Files" (http:/ / www. fallacyfiles. org/ gamblers. html) What happened at Monte Carlo in 1913.
Martin Gardner, Entertaining Mathematical Puzzles, Dover Publications, 69-70.
Barron, G. and Leider, S. (2010). The role of experience in the gambler's fallacy. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 117-129.
"Roulette", in The Universal Book of Mathematics: From Abracadabra to Zeno's Paradoxes, by David Darling (John Wiley & Sons, 2004)
p278
[5] O'Neill, B. and Puza, B.D. (2004) Dice have no memories but I do: A defence of the reverse gambler's belief. (http:/ / cbe. anu. edu. au/
research/ papers/ pdf/ STAT0004WP. pdf). Reprinted in abridged form as O'Neill, B. and Puza, B.D. (2005) In defence of the reverse
gambler's belief. The Mathematical Scientist 30(1), pp. 1316.
[6] Burns, B. D. and Corpus, B. (2004). Randomness and inductions from streaks: "Gambler's fallacy" versus "hot hand". Psychonomic Bulletin
and Review. 11, 179-184
[7] Tversky & Kahneman, 1974.
[8] Tversky & Kahneman, 1971.
[9] Rogers, P. (1998). "The cognitive psychology of lottery gambling: A theoretical review". Journal of Gambling Studies, 14, 111-134
[10] Sundali, J. and Croson, R. (2006). "Biases in casino betting: The hot hand and the gambler's fallacy". Judgment and Decision Making, 1,
1-12.
[11] Keren, G. and Lewis, C. (1994). "The two fallacies of gamblers: TypeI and TypeII". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 60, 75-89.
[12] Oppenheimer, D. M. and Monin, B. (2009). "The retrospective gambler's fallacy: Unlikely events, constructing the past, and multiple
universes". Judgment and Decision Making, 4, 326-334.

Gdel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all
but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic. The theorems, proven by Kurt Gdel in 1931, are
important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The two results are widely, but not
universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all
mathematics is impossible, giving a negative answer to Hilbert's second problem.
The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an
"effective procedure" (e.g., a computer program, but it could be any sort of algorithm) is capable of proving all truths
about the relations of the natural numbers (arithmetic). For any such system, there will always be statements about
the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. The second incompleteness theorem, an
extension of the first, shows that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.
Background
Because statements of a formal theory are written in symbolic form, it is possible to verify mechanically that a
formal proof from a finite set of axioms is valid. This task, known as automatic proof verification, is closely related
to automated theorem proving. The difference is that instead of constructing a new proof, the proof verifier simply
checks that a provided formal proof (or, in instructions that can be followed to create a formal proof) is correct. This
process is not merely hypothetical; systems such as Isabelle or Coq are used today to formalize proofs and then
check their validity.
Many theories of interest include an infinite set of axioms, however. To verify a formal proof when the set of axioms
is infinite, it must be possible to determine whether a statement that is claimed to be an axiom is actually an axiom.
This issue arises in first order theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, because the principle of mathematical
induction is expressed as an infinite set of axioms (an axiom schema).
A formal theory is said to be effectively generated if its set of axioms is a recursively enumerable set. This means
that there is a computer program that, in principle, could enumerate all the axioms of the theory without listing any
statements that are not axioms. This is equivalent to the existence of a program that enumerates all the theorems of
the theory without enumerating any statements that are not theorems. Examples of effectively generated theories
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with infinite sets of axioms include Peano arithmetic and ZermeloFraenkel set theory.
In choosing a set of axioms, one goal is to be able to prove as many correct results as possible, without proving any
incorrect results. A set of axioms is complete if, for any statement in the axioms' language, either that statement or its
negation is provable from the axioms. A set of axioms is (simply) consistent if there is no statement such that both
the statement and its negation are provable from the axioms. In the standard system of first-order logic, an
inconsistent set of axioms will prove every statement in its language (this is sometimes called the principle of
explosion), and is thus automatically complete. A set of axioms that is both complete and consistent, however,
proves a maximal set of non-contradictory theorems. Gdel's incompleteness theorems show that in certain cases it is
not possible to obtain an effectively generated, complete, consistent theory.
First incompleteness theorem

Gdel's first incompleteness theorem first appeared as "Theorem VI" in Gdel's 1931 paper On Formally
Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I.
The formal theorem is written in highly technical language. It may be paraphrased in English as:
Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and
complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic
arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967,
p.250).
The true but unprovable statement referred to by the theorem is often referred to as "the Gdel sentence" for the
theory. The proof constructs a specific Gdel sentence for each consistent effectively generated theory, but there are
infinitely many statements in the language of the theory that share the property of being true but unprovable. For
example, the conjunction of the Gdel sentence and any logically valid sentence will have this property.
For each consistent formal theory T having the required small amount of number theory, the corresponding Gdel
sentence G asserts: "G cannot be proved within the theoryT". This interpretation of G leads to the following
informal analysis. If G were provable under the axioms and rules of inference of T, then T would have a theorem, G,
which effectively contradicts itself, and thus the theory T would be inconsistent. This means that if the theory T is
consistent then G cannot be proved within it, and so the theory T is incomplete. Moreover, the claim G makes about
its own unprovability is correct. In this sense G is not only unprovable but true, and provability-within-the-theory-T
is not the same as truth. This informal analysis can be formalized to make a rigorous proof of the incompleteness
theorem, as described in the section "Proof sketch for the first theorem" below. The formal proof reveals exactly the
hypotheses required for the theory T in order for the self-contradictory nature of G to lead to a genuine contradiction.
Each effectively generated theory has its own Gdel statement. It is possible to define a larger theory T that contains
the whole of T, plus G as an additional axiom. This will not result in a complete theory, because Gdel's theorem
will also apply to T, and thus T cannot be complete. In this case, G is indeed a theorem in T, because it is an axiom.
Since G states only that it is not provable in T, no contradiction is presented by its provability in T. However,
because the incompleteness theorem applies to T: there will be a new Gdel statement G for T, showing that T is
also incomplete. G will differ from G in that G will refer to T, rather thanT.
To prove the first incompleteness theorem, Gdel represented statements by numbers. Then the theory at hand,
which is assumed to prove certain facts about numbers, also proves facts about its own statements, provided that it is
effectively generated. Questions about the provability of statements are represented as questions about the properties
of numbers, which would be decidable by the theory if it were complete. In these terms, the Gdel sentence states
that no natural number exists with a certain, strange property. A number with this property would encode a proof of
the inconsistency of the theory. If there were such a number then the theory would be inconsistent, contrary to the
consistency hypothesis. So, under the assumption that the theory is consistent, there is no such number.
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Meaning of the first incompleteness theorem

Gdel's first incompleteness theorem shows that any consistent effective formal system that includes enough of the
theory of the natural numbers is incomplete: there are true statements expressible in its language that are unprovable
within the system. Thus no formal system (satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem) that aims to characterize the
natural numbers can actually do so, as there will be true number-theoretical statements which that system cannot
prove. This fact is sometimes thought to have severe consequences for the program of logicism proposed by Gottlob
Frege and Bertrand Russell, which aimed to define the natural numbers in terms of logic (Hellman 1981,
p.451468). Bob Hale and Crispin Wright argue that it is not a problem for logicism because the incompleteness
theorems apply equally to first order logic as they do to arithmetic. They argue that only those who believe that the
natural numbers are to be defined in terms of first order logic have this problem.
The existence of an incomplete formal system is, in itself, not particularly surprising. A system may be incomplete
simply because not all the necessary axioms have been discovered. For example, Euclidean geometry without the
parallel postulate is incomplete; it is not possible to prove or disprove the parallel postulate from the remaining
axioms.
Gdel's theorem shows that, in theories that include a small portion of number theory, a complete and consistent
finite list of axioms can never be created, nor even an infinite list that can be enumerated by a computer program.
Each time a new statement is added as an axiom, there are other true statements that still cannot be proved, even with
the new axiom. If an axiom is ever added that makes the system complete, it does so at the cost of making the system
inconsistent.
There are complete and consistent lists of axioms for arithmetic that cannot be enumerated by a computer program.
For example, one might take all true statements about the natural numbers to be axioms (and no false statements),
which gives the theory known as "true arithmetic". The difficulty is that there is no mechanical way to decide, given
a statement about the natural numbers, whether it is an axiom of this theory, and thus there is no effective way to
verify a formal proof in this theory.
Many logicians believe that Gdel's incompleteness theorems struck a fatal blow to David Hilbert's second problem,
which asked for a finitary consistency proof for mathematics. The second incompleteness theorem, in particular, is
often viewed as making the problem impossible. Not all mathematicians agree with this analysis, however, and the
status of Hilbert's second problem is not yet decided (see "Modern viewpoints on the status of the problem").
Relation to the liar paradox

The liar paradox is the sentence "This sentence is false." An analysis of the liar sentence shows that it cannot be true
(for then, as it asserts, it is false), nor can it be false (for then, it is true). A Gdel sentence G for a theory T makes a
similar assertion to the liar sentence, but with truth replaced by provability: G says "G is not provable in the theory
T." The analysis of the truth and provability of G is a formalized version of the analysis of the truth of the liar
sentence.
It is not possible to replace "not provable" with "false" in a Gdel sentence because the predicate "Q is the Gdel
number of a false formula" cannot be represented as a formula of arithmetic. This result, known as Tarski's
undefinability theorem, was discovered independently by Gdel (when he was working on the proof of the
incompleteness theorem) and by Alfred Tarski.
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Extensions of Gdel's original result

Gdel demonstrated the incompleteness of the theory of Principia Mathematica, a particular theory of arithmetic, but
a parallel demonstration could be given for any effective theory of a certain expressiveness. Gdel commented on
this fact in the introduction to his paper, but restricted the proof to one system for concreteness. In modern
statements of the theorem, it is common to state the effectiveness and expressiveness conditions as hypotheses for
the incompleteness theorem, so that it is not limited to any particular formal theory. The terminology used to state
these conditions was not yet developed in 1931 when Gdel published his results.
Gdel's original statement and proof of the incompleteness theorem requires the assumption that the theory is not just
consistent but -consistent. A theory is -consistent if it is not -inconsistent, and is -inconsistent if there is a
predicate P such that for every specific natural number m the theory proves ~P(m), and yet the theory also proves
that there exists a natural number n such that P(n). That is, the theory says that a number with property P exists while
denying that it has any specific value. The -consistency of a theory implies its consistency, but consistency does
not imply -consistency. J. Barkley Rosser (1936) strengthened the incompleteness theorem by finding a variation
of the proof (Rosser's trick) that only requires the theory to be consistent, rather than -consistent. This is mostly of
technical interest, since all true formal theories of arithmetic (theories whose axioms are all true statements about
natural numbers) are -consistent, and thus Gdel's theorem as originally stated applies to them. The stronger
version of the incompleteness theorem that only assumes consistency, rather than -consistency, is now commonly
known as Gdel's incompleteness theorem and as the GdelRosser theorem.
Second incompleteness theorem

Gdel's second incompleteness theorem first appeared as "Theorem XI" in Gdel's 1931 paper On Formally
Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I.
Like with the first incompleteness theorem, Gdel wrote this theorem in highly technical formal mathematics. It may
be paraphrased in English as:
For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about
formal provability, if T includes a statement of its own consistency then T is inconsistent.
This strengthens the first incompleteness theorem, because the statement constructed in the first incompleteness
theorem does not directly express the consistency of the theory. The proof of the second incompleteness theorem is
obtained by formalizing the proof of the first incompleteness theorem within the theory itself.
A technical subtlety in the second incompleteness theorem is how to express the consistency of T as a formula in the
language of T. There are many ways to do this, and not all of them lead to the same result. In particular, different
formalizations of the claim that T is consistent may be inequivalent in T, and some may even be provable. For
example, first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) can prove that the largest consistent subset of PA is consistent. But since
PA is consistent, the largest consistent subset of PA is just PA, so in this sense PA "proves that it is consistent".
What PA does not prove is that the largest consistent subset of PA is, in fact, the whole of PA. (The term "largest
consistent subset of PA" is technically ambiguous, but what is meant here is the largest consistent initial segment of
the axioms of PA ordered according to specific criteria; i.e., by "Gdel numbers", the numbers encoding the axioms
as per the scheme used by Gdel mentioned above).
For Peano arithmetic, or any familiar explicitly axiomatized theory T, it is possible to canonically define a formula
Con(T) expressing the consistency of T; this formula expresses the property that "there does not exist a natural
number coding a sequence of formulas, such that each formula is either of the axioms of T, a logical axiom, or an
immediate consequence of preceding formulas according to the rules of inference of first-order logic, and such that
the last formula is a contradiction".
The formalization of Con(T) depends on two factors: formalizing the notion of a sentence being derivable from a set
of sentences and formalizing the notion of being an axiom of T. Formalizing derivability can be done in canonical
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fashion: given an arithmetical formula A(x) defining a set of axioms, one can canonically form a predicate ProvA(P)
which expresses that a sentence P is provable from the set of axioms defined by A(x).
In addition, the standard proof of the second incompleteness theorem assumes that ProvA(P) satisfies that
HilbertBernays provability conditions. Letting #(P) represent the Gdel number of a formula P, the derivability
conditions say:
1. If T proves P, then T proves ProvA(#(P)).
2. T proves 1.; that is, T proves that if T proves P, then T proves ProvA(#(P)). In other words, T proves that
ProvA(#(P)) implies ProvA(#(ProvA(#(P)))).
3. T proves that if T proves that (P Q) and T proves P then T proves Q. In other words, T proves that ProvA(#(P
Q)) and ProvA(#(P)) imply ProvA(#(Q)).
Implications for consistency proofs

Gdel's second incompleteness theorem also implies that a theory T1 satisfying the technical conditions outlined
above cannot prove the consistency of any theory T2 which proves the consistency of T1. This is because such a
theory T1 can prove that if T2 proves the consistency of T1, then T1 is in fact consistent. For the claim that T1 is
consistent has form "for all numbers n, n has the decidable property of not being a code for a proof of contradiction
in T1". If T1 were in fact inconsistent, then T2 would prove for some n that n is the code of a contradiction in T1. But
if T2 also proved that T1 is consistent (that is, that there is no such n), then it would itself be inconsistent. This
reasoning can be formalized in T1 to show that if T2 is consistent, then T1 is consistent. Since, by second
incompleteness theorem, T1 does not prove its consistency, it cannot prove the consistency of T2 either.
This corollary of the second incompleteness theorem shows that there is no hope of proving, for example, the
consistency of Peano arithmetic using any finitistic means that can be formalized in a theory the consistency of
which is provable in Peano arithmetic. For example, the theory of primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), which is
widely accepted as an accurate formalization of finitistic mathematics, is provably consistent in PA. Thus PRA
cannot prove the consistency of PA. This fact is generally seen to imply that Hilbert's program, which aimed to
justify the use of "ideal" (infinitistic) mathematical principles in the proofs of "real" (finitistic) mathematical
statements by giving a finitistic proof that the ideal principles are consistent, cannot be carried out.Wikipedia:Please
clarify
The corollary also indicates the epistemological relevance of the second incompleteness theorem. It would actually
provide no interesting information if a theory T proved its consistency. This is because inconsistent theories prove
everything, including their consistency. Thus a consistency proof of T in T would give us no clue as to whether T
really is consistent; no doubts about the consistency of T would be resolved by such a consistency proof. The interest
in consistency proofs lies in the possibility of proving the consistency of a theory T in some theory T which is in
some sense less doubtful than T itself, for example weaker than T. For many naturally occurring theories T and T,
such as T = ZermeloFraenkel set theory and T = primitive recursive arithmetic, the consistency of T is provable in
T, and thus T can't prove the consistency of T by the above corollary of the second incompleteness theorem.
The second incompleteness theorem does not rule out consistency proofs altogether, only consistency proofs that
could be formalized in the theory that is proved consistent. For example, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of
Peano arithmetic (PA) in a different theory which includes an axiom asserting that the ordinal called 0 is
wellfounded; see Gentzen's consistency proof. Gentzen's theorem spurred the development of ordinal analysis in
proof theory.
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Examples of undecidable statements

See also: List of statements undecidable in ZFC
There are two distinct senses of the word "undecidable" in mathematics and computer science. The first of these is
the proof-theoretic sense used in relation to Gdel's theorems, that of a statement being neither provable nor
refutable in a specified deductive system. The second sense, which will not be discussed here, is used in relation to
computability theory and applies not to statements but to decision problems, which are countably infinite sets of
questions each requiring a yes or no answer. Such a problem is said to be undecidable if there is no computable
function that correctly answers every question in the problem set (see undecidable problem).
Because of the two meanings of the word undecidable, the term independent is sometimes used instead of
undecidable for the "neither provable nor refutable" sense. The usage of "independent" is also ambiguous, however.
SomeWikipedia:Manual of Style/Words to watch#Unsupported attributions use it to mean just "not provable",
leaving open whether an independent statement might be refuted.
Undecidability of a statement in a particular deductive system does not, in and of itself, address the question of
whether the truth value of the statement is well-defined, or whether it can be determined by other means.
Undecidability only implies that the particular deductive system being considered does not prove the truth or falsity
of the statement. Whether there exist so-called "absolutely undecidable" statements, whose truth value can never be
known or is ill-specified, is a controversial point in the philosophy of mathematics.
The combined work of Gdel and Paul Cohen has given two concrete examples of undecidable statements (in the
first sense of the term): The continuum hypothesis can neither be proved nor refuted in ZFC (the standard
axiomatization of set theory), and the axiom of choice can neither be proved nor refuted in ZF (which is all the ZFC
axioms except the axiom of choice). These results do not require the incompleteness theorem. Gdel proved in 1940
that neither of these statements could be disproved in ZF or ZFC set theory. In the 1960s, Cohen proved that neither
is provable from ZF, and the continuum hypothesis cannot be proven from ZFC.
In 1973, the Whitehead problem in group theory was shown to be undecidable, in the first sense of the term, in
standard set theory.
Gregory Chaitin produced undecidable statements in algorithmic information theory and proved another
incompleteness theorem in that setting. Chaitin's incompleteness theorem states that for any theory that can represent
enough arithmetic, there is an upper bound c such that no specific number can be proven in that theory to have
Kolmogorov complexity greater than c. While Gdel's theorem is related to the liar paradox, Chaitin's result is
related to Berry's paradox.
Undecidable statements provable in larger systems

These are natural mathematical equivalents of the Gdel "true but undecidable" sentence. They can be proved in a
larger system which is generally accepted as a valid form of reasoning, but are undecidable in a more limited system
such as Peano Arithmetic.
In 1977, Paris and Harrington proved that the Paris-Harrington principle, a version of the Ramsey theorem, is
undecidable in the first-order axiomatization of arithmetic called Peano arithmetic, but can be proven in the larger
system of second-order arithmetic. Kirby and Paris later showed Goodstein's theorem, a statement about sequences
of natural numbers somewhat simpler than the Paris-Harrington principle, to be undecidable in Peano arithmetic.
Kruskal's tree theorem, which has applications in computer science, is also undecidable from Peano arithmetic but
provable in set theory. In fact Kruskal's tree theorem (or its finite form) is undecidable in a much stronger system
codifying the principles acceptable based on a philosophy of mathematics called predicativism. The related but more
general graph minor theorem (2003) has consequences for computational complexity theory.
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Limitations of Gdel's theorems

The conclusions of Gdel's theorems are only proven for the formal theories that satisfy the necessary hypotheses.
Not all axiom systems satisfy these hypotheses, even when these systems have models that include the natural
numbers as a subset. For example, there are first-order axiomatizations of Euclidean geometry, of real closed fields,
and of arithmetic in which multiplication is not provably total; none of these meet the hypotheses of Gdel's
theorems. The key fact is that these axiomatizations are not expressive enough to define the set of natural numbers or
develop basic properties of the natural numbers. Regarding the third example, Dan Willard (2001) has studied many
weak systems of arithmetic which do not satisfy the hypotheses of the second incompleteness theorem, and which
are consistent and capable of proving their own consistency (see self-verifying theories).
Gdel's theorems only apply to effectively generated (that is, recursively enumerable) theories. If all true statements
about natural numbers are taken as axioms for a theory, then this theory is a consistent, complete extension of Peano
arithmetic (called true arithmetic) for which none of Gdel's theorems apply in a meaningful way, because this
theory is not recursively enumerable.
The second incompleteness theorem only shows that the consistency of certain theories cannot be proved from the
axioms of those theories themselves. It does not show that the consistency cannot be proved from other (consistent)
axioms. For example, the consistency of the Peano arithmetic can be proved in ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZFC),
or in theories of arithmetic augmented with transfinite induction, as in Gentzen's consistency proof.
Relationship with computability

The incompleteness theorem is closely related to several results about undecidable sets in recursion theory.
Stephen Cole Kleene (1943) presented a proof of Gdel's incompleteness theorem using basic results of
computability theory. One such result shows that the halting problem is undecidable: there is no computer program
that can correctly determine, given a program P as input, whether P eventually halts when run with a particular given
input. Kleene showed that the existence of a complete effective theory of arithmetic with certain consistency
properties would force the halting problem to be decidable, a contradiction. This method of proof has also been
presented by Shoenfield (1967, p.132); Charlesworth (1980); and Hopcroft and Ullman (1979).
Franzn (2005, p.73) explains how Matiyasevich's solution to Hilbert's 10th problem can be used to obtain a proof
to Gdel's first incompleteness theorem. Matiyasevich proved that there is no algorithm that, given a multivariate
polynomial p(x1, x2,...,xk) with integer coefficients, determines whether there is an integer solution to the equation p
= 0. Because polynomials with integer coefficients, and integers themselves, are directly expressible in the language
of arithmetic, if a multivariate integer polynomial equation p = 0 does have a solution in the integers then any
sufficiently strong theory of arithmetic T will prove this. Moreover, if the theory T is -consistent, then it will never
prove that a particular polynomial equation has a solution when in fact there is no solution in the integers. Thus, if T
were complete and -consistent, it would be possible to determine algorithmically whether a polynomial equation
has a solution by merely enumerating proofs of T until either "p has a solution" or "p has no solution" is found, in
contradiction to Matiyasevich's theorem. Moreover, for each consistent effectively generated theory T, it is possible
to effectively generate a multivariate polynomial p over the integers such that the equation p = 0 has no solutions
over the integers, but the lack of solutions cannot be proved in T (Davis 2006:416, Jones 1980).
Smorynski (1977, p.842) shows how the existence of recursively inseparable sets can be used to prove the first
incompleteness theorem. This proof is often extended to show that systems such as Peano arithmetic are essentially
undecidable (see Kleene 1967, p.274).
Chaitin's incompleteness theorem gives a different method of producing independent sentences, based on
Kolmogorov complexity. Like the proof presented by Kleene that was mentioned above, Chaitin's theorem only
applies to theories with the additional property that all their axioms are true in the standard model of the natural
numbers. Gdel's incompleteness theorem is distinguished by its applicability to consistent theories that nonetheless
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include statements that are false in the standard model; these theories are known as -inconsistent.
Proof sketch for the first theorem

Main article: Proof sketch for Gdel's first incompleteness theorem
The proof by contradiction has three essential parts. To begin, choose a formal system that meets the proposed
criteria:
1. Statements in the system can be represented by natural numbers (known as Gdel numbers). The significance of
this is that properties of statementssuch as their truth and falsehoodwill be equivalent to determining whether
their Gdel numbers have certain properties, and that properties of the statements can therefore be demonstrated
by examining their Gdel numbers. This part culminates in the construction of a formula expressing the idea that
"statement S is provable in the system" (which can be applied to any statement "S" in the system).
2. In the formal system it is possible to construct a number whose matching statement, when interpreted, is
self-referential and essentially says that it (i.e. the statement itself) is unprovable. This is done using a technique
called "diagonalization" (so-called because of its origins as Cantor's diagonal argument).
3. Within the formal system this statement permits a demonstration that it is neither provable nor disprovable in the
system, and therefore the system cannot in fact be -consistent. Hence the original assumption that the proposed
system met the criteria is false.
Arithmetization of syntax
The main problem in fleshing out the proof described above is that it seems at first that to construct a statement p
that is equivalent to "p cannot be proved", p would somehow have to contain a reference to p, which could easily
give rise to an infinite regress. Gdel's ingenious technique is to show that statements can be matched with numbers
(often called the arithmetization of syntax) in such a way that "proving a statement" can be replaced with "testing
whether a number has a given property". This allows a self-referential formula to be constructed in a way that avoids
any infinite regress of definitions. The same technique was later used by Alan Turing in his work on the
Entscheidungsproblem.
In simple terms, a method can be devised so that every formula or statement that can be formulated in the system
gets a unique number, called its Gdel number, in such a way that it is possible to mechanically convert back and
forth between formulas and Gdel numbers. The numbers involved might be very long indeed (in terms of number of
digits), but this is not a barrier; all that matters is that such numbers can be constructed. A simple example is the way
in which English is stored as a sequence of numbers in computers using ASCII or Unicode:
The word HELLO is represented by 72-69-76-76-79 using decimal ASCII, ie the number 7269767679.
The logical statement x=y => y=x is represented by 120-061-121-032-061-062-032-121-061-120 using
octal ASCII, ie the number 120061121032061062032121061120.
In principle, proving a statement true or false can be shown to be equivalent to proving that the number matching the
statement does or doesn't have a given property. Because the formal system is strong enough to support reasoning
about numbers in general, it can support reasoning about numbers which represent formulae and statements as well.
Crucially, because the system can support reasoning about properties of numbers, the results are equivalent to
reasoning about provability of their equivalent statements.
202
Construction of a statement about "provability"

Having shown that in principle the system can indirectly make statements about provability, by analyzing properties
of those numbers representing statements it is now possible to show how to create a statement that actually does this.
A formula F(x) that contains exactly one free variable x is called a statement form or class-sign. As soon as x is
replaced by a specific number, the statement form turns into a bona fide statement, and it is then either provable in
the system, or not. For certain formulas one can show that for every natural number n, F(n) is true if and only if it
can be proven (the precise requirement in the original proof is weaker, but for the proof sketch this will suffice). In
particular, this is true for every specific arithmetic operation between a finite number of natural numbers, such as
"23=6".
Statement forms themselves are not statements and therefore cannot be proved or disproved. But every statement
form F(x) can be assigned a Gdel number denoted by G(F). The choice of the free variable used in the form F(x) is
not relevant to the assignment of the Gdel number G(F).
Now comes the trick: The notion of provability itself can also be encoded by Gdel numbers, in the following way.
Since a proof is a list of statements which obey certain rules, the Gdel number of a proof can be defined. Now, for
every statement p, one may ask whether a number x is the Gdel number of its proof. The relation between the Gdel
number of p and x, the potential Gdel number of its proof, is an arithmetical relation between two numbers.
Therefore there is a statement form Bew(y) that uses this arithmetical relation to state that a Gdel number of a proof
of y exists:
Bew(y) = x ( y is the Gdel number of a formula and x is the Gdel number of a proof of the formula
encoded by y).
The name Bew is short for beweisbar, the German word for "provable"; this name was originally used by Gdel to
denote the provability formula just described. Note that "Bew(y)" is merely an abbreviation that represents a
particular, very long, formula in the original language of T; the string "Bew" itself is not claimed to be part of this
language.
An important feature of the formula Bew(y) is that if a statement p is provable in the system then Bew(G(p)) is also
provable. This is because any proof of p would have a corresponding Gdel number, the existence of which causes
Bew(G(p)) to be satisfied.
Diagonalization
The next step in the proof is to obtain a statement that says it is unprovable. Although Gdel constructed this
statement directly, the existence of at least one such statement follows from the diagonal lemma, which says that for
any sufficiently strong formal system and any statement form F there is a statement p such that the system proves
p F(G(p)).
By letting F be the negation of Bew(x), we obtain the theorem
p ~Bew(G(p))
and the p defined by this roughly states that its own Gdel number is the Gdel number of an unprovable formula.
The statement p is not literally equal to ~Bew(G(p)); rather, p states that if a certain calculation is performed, the
resulting Gdel number will be that of an unprovable statement. But when this calculation is performed, the resulting
Gdel number turns out to be the Gdel number of p itself. This is similar to the following sentence in English:
", when preceded by itself in quotes, is unprovable.", when preceded by itself in quotes, is unprovable.
This sentence does not directly refer to itself, but when the stated transformation is made the original sentence is
obtained as a result, and thus this sentence asserts its own unprovability. The proof of the diagonal lemma employs a
similar method.
Now, assume that the axiomatic system is -consistent, and let p be the statement obtained in the previous section.
203

If p were provable, then Bew(G(p)) would be provable, as argued above. But p asserts the negation of Bew(G(p)).
Thus the system would be inconsistent, proving both a statement and its negation. This contradiction shows that p
cannot be provable.
If the negation of p were provable, then Bew(G(p)) would be provable (because p was constructed to be equivalent
to the negation of Bew(G(p))). However, for each specific number x, x cannot be the Gdel number of the proof of p,
because p is not provable (from the previous paragraph). Thus on one hand the system proves there is a number with
a certain property (that it is the Gdel number of the proof of p), but on the other hand, for every specific number x,
we can prove that it does not have this property. This is impossible in an -consistent system. Thus the negation of p
is not provable.
Thus the statement p is undecidable in our axiomatic system: it can neither be proved nor disproved within the
system.
In fact, to show that p is not provable only requires the assumption that the system is consistent. The stronger
assumption of -consistency is required to show that the negation of p is not provable. Thus, if p is constructed for a
particular system:
If the system is -consistent, it can prove neither p nor its negation, and so p is undecidable.
If the system is consistent, it may have the same situation, or it may prove the negation of p. In the later case, we
have a statement ("not p") which is false but provable, and the system is not -consistent.
If one tries to "add the missing axioms" to avoid the incompleteness of the system, then one has to add either p or
"not p" as axioms. But then the definition of "being a Gdel number of a proof" of a statement changes. which means
that the formula Bew(x) is now different. Thus when we apply the diagonal lemma to this new Bew, we obtain a new
statement p, different from the previous one, which will be undecidable in the new system if it is -consistent.
Proof via Berry's paradox

George Boolos (1989) sketches an alternative proof of the first incompleteness theorem that uses Berry's paradox
rather than the liar paradox to construct a true but unprovable formula. A similar proof method was independently
discovered by Saul Kripke (Boolos 1998, p.383). Boolos's proof proceeds by constructing, for any computably
enumerable set S of true sentences of arithmetic, another sentence which is true but not contained in S. This gives the
first incompleteness theorem as a corollary. According to Boolos, this proof is interesting because it provides a
"different sort of reason" for the incompleteness of effective, consistent theories of arithmetic (Boolos 1998, p.388).
Formalized proofs
Formalized proofs of versions of the incompleteness theorem have been developed by Natarajan Shankar in 1986
using Nqthm (Shankar 1994) and by Russell O'Connor in 2003 using Coq (O'Connor 2005).
Proof sketch for the second theorem

The main difficulty in proving the second incompleteness theorem is to show that various facts about provability
used in the proof of the first incompleteness theorem can be formalized within the system using a formal predicate
for provability. Once this is done, the second incompleteness theorem follows by formalizing the entire proof of the
first incompleteness theorem within the system itself.
Let p stand for the undecidable sentence constructed above, and assume that the consistency of the system can be
proven from within the system itself. The demonstration above shows that if the system is consistent, then p is not
provable. The proof of this implication can be formalized within the system, and therefore the statement "p is not
provable", or "not P(p)" can be proven in the system.
But this last statement is equivalent to p itself (and this equivalence can be proven in the system), so p can be proven
in the system. This contradiction shows that the system must be inconsistent.
204
Discussion and implications

The incompleteness results affect the philosophy of mathematics, particularly versions of formalism, which use a
single system formal logic to define their principles. One can paraphrase the first theorem as saying the following:
An all-encompassing axiomatic system can never be found that is able to prove all mathematical truths, but no
falsehoods.
On the other hand, from a strict formalist perspective this paraphrase would be considered meaningless because it
presupposes that mathematical "truth" and "falsehood" are well-defined in an absolute sense, rather than relative to
each formal system.
The following rephrasing of the second theorem is even more unsettling to the foundations of mathematics:
If an axiomatic system can be proven to be consistent from within itself, then it is inconsistent.
Therefore, to establish the consistency of a system S, one needs to use some other system T, but a proof in T is not
completely convincing unless T's consistency has already been established without using S.
Theories such as Peano arithmetic, for which any computably enumerable consistent extension is incomplete, are
called essentially undecidable or essentially incomplete.
Minds and machines

Main article: Mechanism (philosophy) Gdelian arguments
Authors including the philosopher J. R. Lucas and physicist Roger Penrose have debated what, if anything, Gdel's
incompleteness theorems imply about human intelligence. Much of the debate centers on whether the human mind is
equivalent to a Turing machine, or by the ChurchTuring thesis, any finite machine at all. If it is, and if the machine
is consistent, then Gdel's incompleteness theorems would apply to it.
Hilary Putnam (1960) suggested that while Gdel's theorems cannot be applied to humans, since they make mistakes
and are therefore inconsistent, it may be applied to the human faculty of science or mathematics in general.
Assuming that it is consistent, either its consistency cannot be proved or it cannot be represented by a Turing
machine.
Avi Wigderson (2010) has proposed that the concept of mathematical "knowability" should be based on
computational complexity rather than logical decidability. He writes that "when knowability is interpreted by modern
standards, namely via computational complexity, the Gdel phenomena are very much with us."
Paraconsistent logic
Although Gdel's theorems are usually studied in the context of classical logic, they also have a role in the study of
paraconsistent logic and of inherently contradictory statements (dialetheia). Graham Priest (1984, 2006) argues that
replacing the notion of formal proof in Gdel's theorem with the usual notion of informal proof can be used to show
that naive mathematics is inconsistent, and uses this as evidence for dialetheism. The cause of this inconsistency is
the inclusion of a truth predicate for a theory within the language of the theory (Priest 2006:47). Stewart Shapiro
(2002) gives a more mixed appraisal of the applications of Gdel's theorems to dialetheism. Carl Hewitt (2008) has
proposed that (inconsistent) paraconsistent logics that prove their own Gdel sentences may have applications in
software engineering.
205
Appeals to the incompleteness theorems in other fields

Appeals and analogies are sometimes made to the incompleteness theorems in support of arguments that go beyond
mathematics and logic. Several authors have commented negatively on such extensions and interpretations, including
Torkel Franzn (2005); Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont (1999); and Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom (2006).
Bricmont and Stangroom (2006, p.10), for example, quote from Rebecca Goldstein's comments on the disparity
between Gdel's avowed Platonism and the anti-realist uses to which his ideas are sometimes put. Sokal and
Bricmont (1999, p.187) criticize Rgis Debray's invocation of the theorem in the context of sociology; Debray has
defended this use as metaphorical (ibid.).
Role of self-reference
Torkel Franzn (2005, p.46) observes:
Gdel's proof of the first incompleteness theorem and Rosser's strengthened version have given many
the impression that the theorem can only be proved by constructing self-referential statements [...] or
even that only strange self-referential statements are known to be undecidable in elementary arithmetic.
To counteract such impressions, we need only introduce a different kind of proof of the first
incompleteness theorem.
He then proposes the proofs based on computability, or on information theory, as described earlier in this article, as
examples of proofs that should "counteract such impressions".
History
After Gdel published his proof of the completeness theorem as his doctoral thesis in 1929, he turned to a second
problem for his habilitation. His original goal was to obtain a positive solution to Hilbert's second problem (Dawson
1997, p.63). At the time, theories of the natural numbers and real numbers similar to second-order arithmetic were
known as "analysis", while theories of the natural numbers alone were known as "arithmetic".
Gdel was not the only person working on the consistency problem. Ackermann had published a flawed consistency
proof for analysis in 1925, in which he attempted to use the method of -substitution originally developed by Hilbert.
Later that year, von Neumann was able to correct the proof for a theory of arithmetic without any axioms of
induction. By 1928, Ackermann had communicated a modified proof to Bernays; this modified proof led Hilbert to
announce his belief in 1929 that the consistency of arithmetic had been demonstrated and that a consistency proof of
analysis would likely soon follow. After the publication of the incompleteness theorems showed that Ackermann's
modified proof must be erroneous, von Neumann produced a concrete example showing that its main technique was
unsound (Zach 2006, p.418, Zach 2003, p.33).
In the course of his research, Gdel discovered that although a sentence which asserts its own falsehood leads to
paradox, a sentence that asserts its own non-provability does not. In particular, Gdel was aware of the result now
called Tarski's indefinability theorem, although he never published it. Gdel announced his first incompleteness
theorem to Carnap, Feigel and Waismann on August 26, 1930; all four would attend a key conference in Knigsberg
the following week.
Announcement
The 1930 Knigsberg conference was a joint meeting of three academic societies, with many of the key logicians of
the time in attendance. Carnap, Heyting, and von Neumann delivered one-hour addresses on the mathematical
philosophies of logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, respectively (Dawson 1996, p.69). The conference also
included Hilbert's retirement address, as he was leaving his position at the University of Gttingen. Hilbert used the
speech to argue his belief that all mathematical problems can be solved. He ended his address by saying,
206

For the mathematician there is no Ignorabimus, and, in my opinion, not at all for natural science either. ... The
true reason why [no one] has succeeded in finding an unsolvable problem is, in my opinion, that there is no
unsolvable problem. In contrast to the foolish Ignoramibus, our credo avers: We must know. We shall know!
This speech quickly became known as a summary of Hilbert's beliefs on mathematics (its final six words, "Wir
mssen wissen. Wir werden wissen!", were used as Hilbert's epitaph in 1943). Although Gdel was likely in
attendance for Hilbert's address, the two never met face to face (Dawson 1996, p.72).
Gdel announced his first incompleteness theorem at a roundtable discussion session on the third day of the
conference. The announcement drew little attention apart from that of von Neumann, who pulled Gdel aside for
conversation. Later that year, working independently with knowledge of the first incompleteness theorem, von
Neumann obtained a proof of the second incompleteness theorem, which he announced to Gdel in a letter dated
November 20, 1930 (Dawson 1996, p.70). Gdel had independently obtained the second incompleteness theorem
and included it in his submitted manuscript, which was received by Monatshefte fr Mathematik on November 17,
1930.
Gdel's paper was published in the Monatshefte in 1931 under the title ber formal unentscheidbare Stze der
Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I (On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica
and Related Systems I). As the title implies, Gdel originally planned to publish a second part of the paper; it was
never written.
Generalization and acceptance

Gdel gave a series of lectures on his theorems at Princeton in 19331934 to an audience that included Church,
Kleene, and Rosser. By this time, Gdel had grasped that the key property his theorems required is that the theory
must be effective (at the time, the term "general recursive" was used). Rosser proved in 1936 that the hypothesis of
-consistency, which was an integral part of Gdel's original proof, could be replaced by simple consistency, if the
Gdel sentence was changed in an appropriate way. These developments left the incompleteness theorems in
essentially their modern form.
Gentzen published his consistency proof for first-order arithmetic in 1936. Hilbert accepted this proof as "finitary"
although (as Gdel's theorem had already shown) it cannot be formalized within the system of arithmetic that is
being proved consistent.
The impact of the incompleteness theorems on Hilbert's program was quickly realized. Bernays included a full proof
of the incompleteness theorems in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik (1939), along with additional
results of Ackermann on the -substitution method and Gentzen's consistency proof of arithmetic. This was the first
full published proof of the second incompleteness theorem.
Criticisms
Finsler
Paul Finsler (1926) used a version of Richard's paradox to construct an expression that was false but unprovable in a
particular, informal framework he had developed. Gdel was unaware of this paper when he proved the
incompleteness theorems (Collected Works Vol. IV., p.9). Finsler wrote to Gdel in 1931 to inform him about this
paper, which Finsler felt had priority for an incompleteness theorem. Finsler's methods did not rely on formalized
provability, and had only a superficial resemblance to Gdel's work (van Heijenoort 1967:328). Gdel read the paper
but found it deeply flawed, and his response to Finsler laid out concerns about the lack of formalization
(Dawson:89). Finsler continued to argue for his philosophy of mathematics, which eschewed formalization, for the
remainder of his career.
207

Zermelo
In September 1931, Ernst Zermelo wrote Gdel to announce what he described as an "essential gap" in Gdel's
argument (Dawson:76). In October, Gdel replied with a 10-page letter (Dawson:76, Grattan-Guinness:512-513).
But Zermelo did not relent and published his criticisms in print with "a rather scathing paragraph on his young
competitor" (Grattan-Guinness:513). Gdel decided that to pursue the matter further was pointless, and Carnap
agreed (Dawson:77). Much of Zermelo's subsequent work was related to logics stronger than first-order logic, with
which he hoped to show both the consistency and categoricity of mathematical theories.
Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote several passages about the incompleteness theorems that were published posthumously
in his 1953 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Gdel was a member of the Vienna Circle during the
period in which Wittgenstein's early ideal language philosophy and Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus dominated the
circle's thinking. Writings in Gdel's Nachlass express the belief that Wittgenstein deliberately misread his ideas.
Multiple commentators have read Wittgenstein as misunderstanding Gdel (Rodych 2003), although Juliet Floyd and
Hilary Putnam (2000), as well as Graham Priest (2004) have provided textual readings arguing that most
commentary misunderstands Wittgenstein. On their release, Bernays, Dummett, and Kreisel wrote separate reviews
on Wittgenstein's remarks, all of which were extremely negative (Berto 2009:208). The unanimity of this criticism
caused Wittgenstein's remarks on the incompleteness theorems to have little impact on the logic community. In
1972, Gdel, stated: "Has Wittgenstein lost his mind? Does he mean it seriously?" (Wang 1996:197) And wrote to
Karl Menger that Wittgenstein's comments demonstrate a willful misunderstanding of the incompleteness theorems
writing:
"It is clear from the passages you cite that Wittgenstein did "not" understand [the first incompleteness
theorem] (or pretended not to understand it). He interpreted it as a kind of logical paradox, while in fact is just
the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within an absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics
(finitary number theory or combinatorics)." (Wang 1996:197)
Since the publication of Wittgenstein's Nachlass in 2000, a series of papers in philosophy have sought to evaluate
whether the original criticism of Wittgenstein's remarks was justified. Floyd and Putnam (2000) argue that
Wittgenstein had a more complete understanding of the incompleteness theorem than was previously assumed. They
are particularly concerned with the interpretation of a Gdel sentence for an -inconsistent theory as actually saying
"I am not provable", since the theory has no models in which the provability predicate corresponds to actual
provability. Rodych (2003) argues that their interpretation of Wittgenstein is not historically justified, while Bays
(2004) argues against Floyd and Putnam's philosophical analysis of the provability predicate. Berto (2009) explores
the relationship between Wittgenstein's writing and theories of paraconsistent logic.
Notes
[1] The word "true" is used disquotationally here: the Gdel sentence is true in this sense because it "asserts its own unprovability and it is indeed
unprovable" (Smoryski 1977 p. 825; also see Franzn 2005 pp. 2833). It is also possible to read "GT is true" in the formal sense that
primitive recursive arithmetic proves the implication Con(T)GT, where Con(T) is a canonical sentence asserting the consistency of T
(Smoryski 1977 p. 840, Kikuchi and Tanaka 1994 p. 403). However, the arithmetic statement in question is false in some nonstandard
models of arithmetic.
References
Articles by Gdel
1931, ber formal unentscheidbare Stze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I. Monatshefte fr
Mathematik und Physik 38: 173-98.
208

1931, ber formal unentscheidbare Stze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I. and On formally
undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I in Solomon Feferman, ed., 1986. Kurt
Gdel Collected works, Vol. I. Oxford University Press: 144-195. The original German with a facing English
translation, preceded by a very illuminating introductory note by Kleene.
Hirzel, Martin, 2000, On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems I.
(http://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf). A modern translation by
Hirzel.
1951, Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their implications in Solomon Feferman, ed.,
1995. Kurt Gdel Collected works, Vol. III. Oxford University Press: 304-23.
Translations, during his lifetime, of Gdel's paper into English

None of the following agree in all translated words and in typography. The typography is a serious matter, because
Gdel expressly wished to emphasize "those metamathematical notions that had been defined in their usual sense
before . . ."(van Heijenoort 1967:595). Three translations exist. Of the first John Dawson states that: "The Meltzer
translation was seriously deficient and received a devastating review in the Journal of Symbolic Logic; "Gdel also
complained about Braithwaite's commentary (Dawson 1997:216). "Fortunately, the Meltzer translation was soon
supplanted by a better one prepared by Elliott Mendelson for Martin Davis's anthology The Undecidable . . . he
found the translation "not quite so good" as he had expected . . . [but because of time constraints he] agreed to its
publication" (ibid). (In a footnote Dawson states that "he would regret his compliance, for the published volume was
marred throughout by sloppy typography and numerous misprints" (ibid)). Dawson states that "The translation that
Gdel favored was that by Jean van Heijenoort"(ibid). For the serious student another version exists as a set of
lecture notes recorded by Stephen Kleene and J. B. Rosser "during lectures given by Gdel at to the Institute for
Advanced Study during the spring of 1934" (cf commentary by Davis 1965:39 and beginning on p.41); this version
is titled "On Undecidable Propositions of Formal Mathematical Systems". In their order of publication:
B. Meltzer (translation) and R. B. Braithwaite (Introduction), 1962. On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica and Related Systems, Dover Publications, New York (Dover edition 1992), ISBN
0-486-66980-7 (pbk.) This contains a useful translation of Gdel's German abbreviations on pp.3334. As noted
above, typography, translation and commentary is suspect. Unfortunately, this translation was reprinted with all
its suspect content by
Stephen Hawking editor, 2005. God Created the Integers: The Mathematical Breakthroughs That Changed
History, Running Press, Philadelphia, ISBN 0-7624-1922-9. Gdel's paper appears starting on p. 1097, with
Hawking's commentary starting on p. 1089.
Martin Davis editor, 1965. The Undecidable: Basic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, Unsolvable problems
and Computable Functions, Raven Press, New York, no ISBN. Gdel's paper begins on page 5, preceded by one
page of commentary.
Jean van Heijenoort editor, 1967, 3rd edition 1967. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879-1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., ISBN 0-674-32449-8 (pbk). van Heijenoort did the
translation. He states that "Professor Gdel approved the translation, which in many places was accommodated to
his wishes."(p.595). Gdel's paper begins on p.595; van Heijenoort's commentary begins on p.592.
Martin Davis editor, 1965, ibid. "On Undecidable Propositions of Formal Mathematical Systems." A copy with
Gdel's corrections of errata and Gdel's added notes begins on page 41, preceded by two pages of Davis's
commentary. Until Davis included this in his volume this lecture existed only as mimeographed notes.
209

Citation
Articles by others
George Boolos, 1989, "A New Proof of the Gdel Incompleteness Theorem", Notices of the American
Mathematical Society v. 36, pp.388390 and p.676, reprinted in Boolos, 1998, Logic, Logic, and Logic, Harvard
Univ. Press. ISBN 0-674-53766-1
Arthur Charlesworth, 1980, "A Proof of Godel's Theorem in Terms of Computer Programs," Mathematics
Magazine, v. 54 n. 3, pp.109121. JStor (http://links.jstor.org/
sici?sici=0025-570X(198105)54:3<109:APOGTI>2.0.CO;2-1&size=LARGE&origin=JSTOR-enlargePage)
Martin Davis, " The Incompleteness Theorem (http://www.ams.org/notices/200604/fea-davis.pdf)", in
Notices of the AMS vol. 53 no. 4 (April 2006), p.414.
Jean van Heijenoort, 1963. "Gdel's Theorem" in Edwards, Paul, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3.
Macmillan: 348-57.
Geoffrey Hellman, How to Gdel a Frege-Russell: Gdel's Incompleteness Theorems and Logicism. Nos, Vol.
15, No. 4, Special Issue on Philosophy of Mathematics. (Nov., 1981), pp.451468.
David Hilbert, 1900, " Mathematical Problems. (http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/hilbert/problems.
html#prob2)" English translation of a lecture delivered before the International Congress of Mathematicians at
Paris, containing Hilbert's statement of his Second Problem.
Kikuchi, Makoto; Tanaka, Kazuyuki (1994), "On formalization of model-theoretic proofs of Gdel's theorems",
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (3): 403412, doi: 10.1305/ndjfl/1040511346 (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1305/ndjfl/1040511346), ISSN 0029-4527 (http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0029-4527), MR 1326122 (http:/
/www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1326122)
Stephen Cole Kleene, 1943, "Recursive predicates and quantifiers," reprinted from Transactions of the American
Mathematical Society, v. 53 n. 1, pp.4173 in Martin Davis 1965, The Undecidable (loc. cit.) pp.255287.
John Barkley Rosser, 1936, "Extensions of some theorems of Gdel and Church," reprinted from the Journal of
Symbolic Logic vol. 1 (1936) pp.8791, in Martin Davis 1965, The Undecidable (loc. cit.) pp.230235.
John Barkley Rosser, 1939, "An Informal Exposition of proofs of Gdel's Theorem and Church's Theorem",
Reprinted from the Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4 (1939) pp.5360, in Martin Davis 1965, The Undecidable
(loc. cit.) pp.223230
C. Smoryski, "The incompleteness theorems", in J. Barwise, ed., Handbook of Mathematical Logic,
North-Holland 1982 ISBN 978-0-444-86388-1, pp.821866.
Dan E. Willard (2001), " Self-Verifying Axiom Systems, the Incompleteness Theorem and Related Reflection
Principles (http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.jsl/
1183746459)", Journal of Symbolic Logic, v. 66 n. 2, pp.536596. doi: 10.2307/2695030 (http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/2695030)
Zach, Richard (2003), "The Practice of Finitism: Epsilon Calculus and Consistency Proofs in Hilbert's Program"
(http://www.ucalgary.ca/~rzach/static/conprf.pdf), Synthese (Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag) 137 (1):
211259, doi: 10.1023/A:1026247421383 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026247421383), ISSN 0039-7857
(http://www.worldcat.org/issn/0039-7857)
Richard Zach, 2005, "Paper on the incompleteness theorems" in Grattan-Guinness, I., ed., Landmark Writings in
Western Mathematics. Elsevier: 917-25.
210
Books about the theorems

Francesco Berto. There's Something about Gdel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem John
Wiley and Sons. 2010.
Domeisen, Norbert, 1990. Logik der Antinomien. Bern: Peter Lang. 142 S. 1990. ISBN 3-261-04214-1.
Zentralblatt MATH (http://www.zentralblatt-math.org/zbmath/search/?q=an:0724.03003)
Torkel Franzn, 2005. Gdel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to its Use and Abuse. A.K. Peters. ISBN
1-56881-238-8 MR 2007d:03001 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2007d:03001)
Douglas Hofstadter, 1979. Gdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Vintage Books. ISBN 0-465-02685-0.
1999 reprint: ISBN 0-465-02656-7. MR 80j:03009 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=80j:03009)
Douglas Hofstadter, 2007. I Am a Strange Loop. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-03078-1. ISBN 0-465-03078-5.
MR 2008g:00004 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2008g:00004)
Stanley Jaki, OSB, 2005. The drama of the quantities. Real View Books. (http://www.realviewbooks.com/)
Per Lindstrm, 1997, Aspects of Incompleteness (http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&
verb=Display&handle=euclid.lnl/1235416274), Lecture Notes in Logic v. 10.
J.R. Lucas, FBA, 1970. The Freedom of the Will. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.
Ernest Nagel, James Roy Newman, Douglas Hofstadter, 2002 (1958). Gdel's Proof, revised ed. ISBN
0-8147-5816-9. MR 2002i:03001 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2002i:03001)
Rudy Rucker, 1995 (1982). Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinite. Princeton Univ.
Press. MR 84d:03012 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=84d:03012)
Smith, Peter, 2007. An Introduction to Gdel's Theorems. (http://www.godelbook.net/) Cambridge University
Press. MathSciNet (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet/search/publdoc.html?arg3=&co4=AND&co5=AND&
co6=AND&co7=AND&dr=all&pg4=AUCN&pg5=AUCN&pg6=PC&pg7=ALLF&pg8=ET&s4=Smith,
Peter&s5=&s6=&s7=&s8=All&yearRangeFirst=&yearRangeSecond=&yrop=eq&r=2&mx-pid=2384958)
N. Shankar, 1994. Metamathematics, Machines and Gdel's Proof, Volume 38 of Cambridge tracts in theoretical
computer science. ISBN 0-521-58533-3
Raymond Smullyan, 1991. Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. Oxford Univ. Press.
, 1994. Diagonalization and Self-Reference. Oxford Univ. Press. MR 96c:03001 (http://www.ams.org/
mathscinet-getitem?mr=96c:03001)
Hao Wang, 1997. A Logical Journey: From Gdel to Philosophy. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-23189-1 MR
97m:01090 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=97m:01090)
Miscellaneous references
Francesco Berto. "The Gdel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons" Philosophia Mathematica (III) 17. 2009.
John W. Dawson, Jr., 1997. Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt Gdel, A. K. Peters, Wellesley Mass,
ISBN 1-56881-256-6.
Goldstein, Rebecca, 2005, Incompleteness: the Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gdel, W. W. Norton & Company.
ISBN 0-393-05169-2
Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam, 2000, "A Note on Wittgenstein's 'Notorious Paragraph' About the Gdel
Theorem", Journal of Philosophy v. 97 n. 11, pp.624632.
Carl Hewitt, 2008, "Large-scale Organizational Computing requires Unstratified Reflection and Strong
Paraconsistency", Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems III, Springer-Verlag.
David Hilbert and Paul Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik, Springer-Verlag.
John Hopcroft and Jeffrey Ullman 1979, Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages, and Computation,
Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-02988-X
James P. Jones, Undecidable Diophantine Equations (http://www.ams.org/bull/1980-03-02/
S0273-0979-1980-14832-6/S0273-0979-1980-14832-6.pdf), Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society v. 3
n. 2, 1980, pp.859862.
211

Stephen Cole Kleene, 1967, Mathematical Logic. Reprinted by Dover, 2002. ISBN 0-486-42533-9
Russell O'Connor, 2005, " Essential Incompleteness of Arithmetic Verified by Coq (http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/
0505034)", Lecture Notes in Computer Science v. 3603, pp.245260.
Graham Priest, 2006, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, Oxford University Press, ISBN
0-19-926329-9
Graham Priest, 2004, Wittgenstein's Remarks on Gdel's Theorem in Max Klbel, ed., Wittgenstein's lasting
significance, Psychology Press, pp.207227.
Graham Priest, 1984, "Logic of Paradox Revisited", Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 13,` n. 2, pp.153179
Hilary Putnam, 1960, Minds and Machines in Sidney Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind: A Symposium. New York
University Press. Reprinted in Anderson, A. R., ed., 1964. Minds and Machines. Prentice-Hall: 77.
Rautenberg, Wolfgang (2010), A Concise Introduction to Mathematical Logic (http://www.springerlink.com/
content/978-1-4419-1220-6/) (3rd ed.), New York: Springer Science+Business Media, doi:
10.1007/978-1-4419-1221-3 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1221-3), ISBN978-1-4419-1220-6.
Victor Rodych, 2003, "Misunderstanding Gdel: New Arguments about Wittgenstein and New Remarks by
Wittgenstein", Dialectica v. 57 n. 3, pp.279313. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00272.x (http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2003.tb00272.x)
Stewart Shapiro, 2002, "Incompleteness and Inconsistency", Mind, v. 111, pp 81732. doi:
10.1093/mind/111.444.817 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.444.817)
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, 1999, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science,
Picador. ISBN 0-312-20407-8
Joseph R. Shoenfield (1967), Mathematical Logic. Reprinted by A.K. Peters for the Association for Symbolic
Logic, 2001. ISBN 978-1-56881-135-2
Jeremy Stangroom and Ophelia Benson, Why Truth Matters, Continuum. ISBN 0-8264-9528-1
George Tourlakis, Lectures in Logic and Set Theory, Volume 1, Mathematical Logic, Cambridge University Press,
2003. ISBN 978-0-521-75373-9
Wigderson, Avi (2010), "The Gdel Phenomena in Mathematics: A Modern View" (http://www.math.ias.edu/
~avi/BOOKS/Godel_Widgerson_Text.pdf), Kurt Gdel and the Foundations of Mathematics: Horizons of
Truth, Cambridge University Press
Hao Wang, 1996, A Logical Journey: From Gdel to Philosophy, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, ISBN
0-262-23189-1.
Richard Zach, 2006, "Hilbert's program then and now" (http://www.ucalgary.ca/~rzach/static/hptn.pdf), in
Philosophy of Logic, Dale Jacquette (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, v. 5., Elsevier, pp.411447.
External links
Godel's Incompleteness Theorems (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00dshx3) on In Our Time at the
BBC. ( listen now (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b00dshx3/
In_Our_Time_Godel's_Incompleteness_Theorems))
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Kurt Gdel (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/)" by Juliette
Kennedy.
MacTutor biographies:
Kurt Gdel. (http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Godel.html)
Gerhard Gentzen. (http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Gentzen.html)
What is Mathematics:Gdel's Theorem and Around (http://podnieks.id.lv/gt.html) by Karlis Podnieks. An
online free book.
World's shortest explanation of Gdel's theorem (http://blog.plover.com/math/Gdl-Smullyan.html) using a
printing machine as an example.
212

October 2011 RadioLab episode (http://www.radiolab.org/2011/oct/04/break-cycle/) about/including
Gdel's Incompleteness theorem
Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001), "Gdel incompleteness theorem" (http://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.
php?title=p/g044530), Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer, ISBN978-1-55608-010-4

The interesting number paradox is a semi-humorous paradox which arises from the attempt to classify natural
numbers as "interesting" or "dull". The paradox states that all natural numbers are interesting. The "proof" is by
contradiction: if there exists a non-empty set of uninteresting numbers, there would be a smallest uninteresting
number but the smallest uninteresting number is itself interesting because it is the smallest uninteresting number,
producing a contradiction.
Paradoxical nature
Attempting to classify all numbers this way leads to a paradox or an antinomy of definition. Any hypothetical
partition of natural numbers into interesting and dull sets seems to fail. Since the definition of interesting is usually a
subjective, intuitive notion of "interesting", it should be understood as a half-humorous application of self-reference
in order to obtain a paradox.
The paradox is alleviated if "interesting" is instead defined objectively: for example, the smallest integer that does
not appear in an entry of the On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences and was originally found to be 11630 on 12
June 2009. The number fitting this definition later became 12407 from November 2009 until at least November
2011, then 13794 as of April 2012, until it appeared in sequence OEIS:A218631 as of 3 November 2012. Since
November 2013, that number was 14228, at least until 14 April 2014. Depending on the sources used for the list of
interesting numbers, a variety of other numbers can be characterized as uninteresting in the same way. This might be
better described as "not known to be interesting".
However, as there are many significant results in mathematics that make use of self-reference (such as Gdel's
Incompleteness Theorem), the paradox illustrates some of the power of self-reference, and thus touches on serious
issues in many fields of study.
This version of the paradox applies only to well-ordered sets with a natural order, such as the natural numbers; the
argument would not apply to the real numbers.
One proposed resolution of the paradox asserts that only the first uninteresting number is made interesting by that
fact. For example, if 39 and 41 were the first two uninteresting numbers, then 39 would become interesting as a
result, but 41 would not since it is not the first uninteresting number.[1] However, this resolution is invalid, since the
paradox is proved by contradiction: assuming that there is any uninteresting number, we arrive to the fact that that
same number is interesting, hence no number can be uninteresting; its aim is not in particular to identify the
interesting or uninteresting numbers, but to speculate whether any number can in fact exhibit such properties.
An obvious weakness in the proof is that what qualifies as "interesting" is not defined. However, assuming this
predicate is defined with a finite, definite list of "interesting properties of positive integers", and is defined
self-referentially to include the smallest number not in such a list, a paradox arises. The Berry paradox is closely
related, since it arises from a similar self-referential definition. As the paradox lies in the definition of "interesting",
it applies only to persons with particular opinions on numbers: if one's view is that all numbers are boring, and one
finds uninteresting the observation that 0 is the smallest boring number, there is no paradox.
213
Notes
[1] Clark, M., 2007, Paradoxes from A to Z, Routledge, ISBN 0-521-46168-5.
Further reading
Gardner, Martin (1959). Mathematical Puzzles and Diversions. ISBN0-226-28253-8.
Gleick, James (2010). The Information (chapter 12). New York: Pantheon Books. ISBN978-0-307-37957-3.
External links
Most Boring Day in History (http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-11-26/uk/
28233422_1_search-true-knowledge-20th-century)
A list of "special properties" for each of the first 10000 natural numbers (http://www2.stetson.edu/~efriedma/
numbers.html)
KleeneRosser paradox
In mathematics, the KleeneRosser paradox is a paradox that shows that certain systems of formal logic are
inconsistent, in particular the version of Curry's combinatory logic introduced in 1930, and Church's original lambda
calculus, introduced in 19321933, both originally intended as systems of formal logic. The paradox was exhibited
by Stephen Kleene and J. B. Rosser in 1935.
The paradox
Kleene and Rosser were able to show that both systems are able to characterize and enumerate their provably total,
definable number-theoretic functions, which enabled them to construct a term that essentially replicates the Richard
paradox in formal language.
Curry later managed to identify the crucial ingredients of the calculi that allowed the construction of this paradox,
and used this to construct a much simpler paradox, now known as Curry's paradox.
References
Andrea Cantini, "The inconsistency of certain formal logics [1]", in the Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic entry
of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007).
Kleene, S. C. & Rosser, J. B. (1935). "The inconsistency of certain formal logics". Annals of Mathematics 36 (3):
630636. doi:10.2307/1968646 [2].
References
[1] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ paradoxes-contemporary-logic/ #IncCerForLog
[2] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 2307%2F1968646
214
Lindley's paradox
215
Lindley's paradox
Lindley's paradox is a counterintuitive situation in statistics in which the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to a
hypothesis testing problem give different results for certain choices of the prior distribution. The problem of the
disagreement between the two approaches was discussed in Harold Jeffreys' 1939 textbook; it became known as
Lindley's paradox after Dennis Lindley called the disagreement a paradox in a 1957 paper.
Although referred to as a paradox, the differing results from the Bayesian and Frequentist approaches can be
explained as using them to answer fundamentally different questions, rather than actual disagreement between the
two methods.

Consider the result
distribution
of some experiment, with two possible explanations, hypotheses
and
, and some prior
representing uncertainty as to which hypothesis is more accurate before taking into account
Lindley's paradox occurs when

1. The result
is "significant" by a frequentist test of
5% level, and
2. The posterior probability of
than
given
, indicating sufficient evidence to reject
is high, indicating strong evidence that
, say, at the
is in better agreement with
These results can occur at the same time when
is very specific,
more diffuse, and the prior distribution does
not strongly favor one or the other, as seen below.
Numerical example
We can illustrate Lindley's paradox with a numerical example. Imagine a certain city where 49,581 boys and 48,870
girls have been born over a certain time period. The observed proportion of male births is thus 49,581/98,451
0.5036. We assume the number of male births is a binomial variable with parameter . We are interested in testing
whether
is 0.5 or some other value. That is, our null hypothesis is
and the alternative is
Frequentist approach
The frequentist approach to testing
least as large as
assuming
approximation
for
the
is to compute a p-value, the probability of observing a fraction of boys at

is true. Because the number of births is very large, we can use a normal
fraction
of
male
births
with
and
, to compute
We would have been equally surprised if we had seen 49,581 female births, i.e.
would usually perform a two-sided test, for which the p-value would be
cases, the p-value is lower than the significance level of 5%, so the frequentist approach rejects
with the observed data.
, so a frequentist
. In both
as disagreeing
Lindley's paradox
216
Bayesian approach
Assuming no reason to favor one hypothesis over the other, the Bayesian approach would be to assign prior
probabilities
, and then to compute the posterior probability of
using Bayes'
theorem,
After observing
boys out of
births, we can compute the posterior probability of each
hypothesis using the probability mass function for a binomial variable,
where
is the Beta function.
From these values, we find the posterior probability of
, which strongly favors
over
The two approachesthe Bayesian and the frequentistappear to be in conflict, and this is the "paradox".
The lack of an actual paradox

The apparent disagreement between the two approaches is caused by a combination of factors. First, the frequentist
approach above tests
without reference to
. The Bayesian approach evaluates
as an alternative to
,
and finds the first to be in better agreement with the observations. This is because the latter hypothesis is much more
diffuse, as can be anywhere in
, which results in it having a very low posterior probability. To understand
why, it is helpful to consider the two hypotheses as generators of the observations:
Under
, we choose
, and ask how likely it is to see 49,581 boys in 98,451 births.
Under
, we choose randomly from anywhere within 0 to 1, and ask the same question.
Most of the possible values for
under
are very poorly supported by the observations. In essence, the apparent
disagreement between the methods is not a disagreement at all, but rather two different statements about how the
hypotheses relate to the data:
The Frequentist finds that
The Bayesian finds that
is a poor explanation for the observation.

is a far better explanation for the observation than
The ratio of the sex of newborns is improbably 50/50 male/female, according the frequentist test. Yet 50/50 is a
better approximation than most, but not all, other ratios. The hypothesis
would have fit the observation
much better than almost all other ratios, including
For example, this choice of hypotheses and prior probabilities implies the statement: "if
then the prior probability of
being exactly 0.5 is 0.50/0.51
, it is easy to see why the Bayesian approach favors

value of
lies
> 0.49 and
< 0.51,
98%." Given such a strong preference for
in the face of
, even though the observed
away from 0.5. The deviation of over 2 sigma from
is considered significant in the
frequentist approach, but its significance is overruled by the prior in the Bayesian approach.
Looking at it another way, we can see that the prior distribution is essentially flat with a delta function at
Clearly this is dubious. In fact if you were to picture real numbers as being continuous, then it would be more logical
to assume that it would impossible for any given number to be exactly the parameter value, i.e., we should assume
P(theta = 0.5) = 0.
A more realistic distribution for
. For example, if we replace
posterior probability of
in the alternative hypothesis produces a less surprising result for the posterior of
with
, i.e., the maximum likelihood estimate for
would be only 0.07 compared to 0.93 for
, the
(Of course, one cannot actually use the
Lindley's paradox
217
MLE as part of a prior distribution).
Reconciling the Bayesian and Frequentist approaches

If one uses an uninformative prior and tests a hypothesis more similar to that in the Frequentist approach, the
paradox disappears.
For example, if we calculate the posterior distribution
, using a uniform prior distribution on
(i.e.,
), we find
If we use this to check the probability that a newborn is more likely to be a boy than a girl, i.e.,
, we find
In other words, it is very likely that the proportion of male births is above 0.5.
Neither analysis gives an estimate of the effect size, directly, but both could be used to determine, for instance, if the
fraction of boy births is likely to be above some particular threshold.
Notes
References
Shafer, Glenn (1982). "Lindley's paradox". Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (378): 325334.
doi: 10.2307/2287244 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2287244). JSTOR 2287244 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/
2287244). MR 664677 (http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=664677).

The low birth-weight paradox is an apparently paradoxical observation relating to the birth weights and mortality
rate of children born to tobacco smoking mothers. Low birth-weight children born to smoking mothers have a lower
infant mortality rate than the low birth weight children of non-smokers. It is an example of Simpson's paradox.
History
Traditionally, babies weighing less than a certain amount (which varies between countries) have been classified as
having low birth weight. In a given population, low birth weight babies have a significantly higher mortality rate
than others; thus, populations with a higher rate of low birth weights typically also have higher rates of child
mortality than other populations.
Based on prior research, the children of smoking mothers are more likely to be of low birth weight than children of
non-smoking mothers. Thus, by extension the child mortality rate should be higher among children of smoking
mothers. So it is a surprising real-world observation that low birth weight babies of smoking mothers have a lower
child mortality than low birth weight babies of non-smokers.
Explanation
At first sight these findings seemed to suggest that, at least for some babies, having a smoking mother might be
beneficial to one's health. However the paradox can be explained statistically by uncovering a lurking variable
between smoking and the two key variables: birth weight and risk of mortality. Both variables are acted on
independently by smoking and other adverse conditions birth weight is lowered and the risk of mortality
increases. However, each condition does not necessarily affect both variables to the same extent.
The birth weight distribution for children of smoking mothers is shifted to lower weights by their mothers' actions.
Therefore, otherwise healthy babies (who would weigh more if it were not for the fact their mother smoked) are born
underweight. However, they still have a lower mortality rate than children who have other, more severe, medical
reasons why they are born underweight.
In short, smoking may be harmful in that it contributes to low birth weight, but other causes of low birth
weight are generally more harmful.
Evidence
If one corrects and adjusts for the confounding by smoking, via stratification or multivariable regression modelling
to statistically control for smoking, one finds that the association between birth weight and mortality may be
attenuated towards the null. Nevertheless, most epidemiologic studies of birth weight and mortality have controlled
for maternal smoking, and the adjusted results, although attenuated after adjusting for smoking, still indicated a
significant association.
Additional support for the hypothesis that birth weight and mortality can be acted on independently came from the
analysis of birth data from Colorado: compared with the birth weight distribution in the US as a whole, the
distribution curve in Colorado is also shifted to lower weights. The overall child mortality of Colorado children is the
same as that for US children however, and if one corrects for the lower weights as above, one finds that babies of a
given (corrected) weight are just as likely to die, whether they are from Colorado or not. The likely explanation here
is that the higher altitude of Colorado affects birth weight, but not mortality.
References
Wilcox, Allen (2001). "On the importance and the unimportance of birthweight [1]". International Journal
of Epidemiology. 30:12331241.
Wilcox, Allen (2006). "The Perils of Birth Weight A Lesson from Directed Acyclic Graphs [2]". American
Journal of Epidemiology. 164(11):11211123.
External links
The Analysis of Birthweight [3], by Allen Wilcox
References
[1] http:/ / eb. niehs. nih. gov/ bwt/ V0M3QDQU. pdf
[2] http:/ / aje. oxfordjournals. org/ cgi/ content/ abstract/ 164/ 11/ 1121
[3] http:/ / eb. niehs. nih. gov/ bwt/ index. htm
218
219

The missing square puzzle is an optical
illusion used in mathematics classes to help
students reason about geometrical figures
(or rather to teach them to not reason using
figures, but only using the textual
description thereof and the axioms of
geometry. A figure is not a proof!). It
depicts two arrangements made of similar
shapes in slightly different configurations.
Each apparently forms a 135 right-angled
triangle, but one has a 11 hole in it.
Missing square puzzle animation
Solution
The key to the puzzle is the fact that neither of the 135
"triangles" is truly a triangle, because what appears to be the
hypotenuse is bent. In other words, the "hypotenuse" does not
maintain a consistent slope, even though it may appear that way to
the human eye. A true 135 triangle cannot be created from the
given component parts. The four figures (the yellow, red, blue and
green shapes) total 32 units of area. The apparent triangles formed
from the figures are 13 units wide and 5 units tall, so it appears
that the area should be
units. However, the
blue triangle has a ratio of 5:2 (=2.5:1), while the red triangle has
the ratio 8:3 (2.667:1), so the apparent combined hypotenuse in
The missing square shown in the lower triangle, where
each figure is actually bent. So with the bent hypotenuse, the first
both triangles are in a perfect grid
figure actually occupies a combined 32 units, while the second
figure occupies 33, including the "missing" square. The amount of
bending is approximately 1/28th of a unit (1.245364267), which is difficult to see on the diagram of this puzzle.
Note the grid point where the red and blue triangles in the lower image meet (5 squares to the right and two units up
from the lower left corner of the combined figure), and compare it to the same point on the other figure; the edge is
slightly under the mark in the upper image, but goes through it in the lower. Overlaying the hypotenuses from both
figures results in a very thin parallelogram with an area of exactly one grid squarethe same area "missing" from
the second figure.
220
Principle
According to Martin Gardner, this particular puzzle was invented by a New York City amateur magician, Paul
Curry, in 1953. However, the principle of a dissection paradox has been known since the start of the 16th century.
The integer dimensions of the parts of the puzzle (2, 3, 5, 8, 13) are successive Fibonacci numbers. Many other
geometric dissection puzzles are based on a few simple properties of the Fibonacci sequence.
Missing square puzzle dimensions
Similar puzzles
Sam Loyd's paradoxical dissection. In the "larger" rearrangement,
the gaps between the figures have a combined unit square more
area than their square gaps counterparts, creating an illusion that
the figures there take up more space than those in the square
figure. In the "smaller" rearrangement, each quadrilateral needs to
overlap the triangle by an area of half a unit for its top/bottom
edge to align with a grid line.
Sam Loyd's paradoxical dissection
Mitsunobu Matsuyama's "Paradox" uses four congruent quadrilaterals and a

small square, which form a larger square. When the quadrilaterals are rotated
about their centers they fill the space of the small square, although the total
area of the figure seems unchanged. The apparent paradox is explained by the
fact that the side of the new large square is a little smaller than the original
one. If a is the side of the large square and is the angle between two
opposing sides in each quadrilateral, then the quotient between the two areas
is given by sec2 1. For = 5, this is approximately 1.00765, which
corresponds to a difference of about 0.8%.
A variant of Mitsunobu Matsuyama's
"Paradox"
References
External links
A printable Missing Square variant (http://www.archimedes-lab.org/workshop13skulls.html) with a video
demonstration.
Curry's Paradox: How Is It Possible? (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/Curriculum/Fallacies/CurryParadox.
shtml) at cut-the-knot
Triangles and Paradoxes (http://www.archimedes-lab.org/page3b.html) at archimedes-lab.org
The Triangle Problem or What's Wrong with the Obvious Truth (http://www.marktaw.com/blog/
TheTriangleProblem.html)
Jigsaw Paradox (http://www.mathematik.uni-bielefeld.de/~sillke/PUZZLES/jigsaw-paradox.html)
The Eleven Holes Puzzle (http://www.slideshare.net/sualeh/the-eleven-holes-puzzle)
Very nice animated Excel workbook of the Missing Square Puzzle (http://www.excelhero.com/blog/2010/09/
excel-optical-illusions-week-30.html)
A video explaining Curry's Paradox and Area (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFw0878Ig-A&
feature=related) by James Tanton

This article contains a discussion of paradoxes of set theory. As with most mathematical paradoxes, they generally
reveal surprising and counter-intuitive mathematical results, rather than actual logical contradictions within modern
axiomatic set theory.
Basics
Cardinal numbers
Set theory as conceived by Georg Cantor assumes the existence of infinite sets. As this assumption cannot be proved
from first principles it has been introduced into axiomatic set theory by the axiom of infinity, which asserts the
existence of the set N of natural numbers. Every infinite set which can be enumerated by natural numbers is the same
size (cardinality) as N, and is said to be countable. Examples of countably infinite sets are the natural numbers, the
even numbers, the prime numbers, and also all the rational numbers, i.e., the fractions. These sets have in common
the cardinal number |N| =
(aleph-nought), a number greater than every natural number.
Cardinal numbers can be defined as follows. Define two sets to have the same size by: there exists a bijection
between the two sets (a one-to-one correspondence between the elements). Then a cardinal number is, by definition,
a class consisting of all sets of the same size. To have the same size is an equivalence relation, and the cardinal
numbers are the equivalence classes.
Ordinal numbers
Besides the cardinality, which describes the size of a set, ordered sets also form a subject of set theory. The axiom of
choice guarantees that every set can be well-ordered, which means that a total order can be imposed on its elements
such that every nonempty subset has a first element with respect to that order. The order of a well-ordered set is
described by an ordinal number. For instance, 3 is the ordinal number of the set {0, 1, 2} with the usual order 0 < 1 <
2; and is the ordinal number of the set of all natural numbers ordered the usual way. Neglecting the order, we are
left with the cardinal number |N|=||=
.
221

Ordinal numbers can be defined with the same method used for cardinal numbers. Define two well-ordered sets to
have the same order type by: there exists a bijection between the two sets respecting the order: smaller elements are
mapped to smaller elements. Then an ordinal number is, by definition, a class consisting of all well-ordered sets of
the same order type. To have the same order type is an equivalence relation on the class of well-ordered sets, and the
ordinal numbers are the equivalence classes.
Two sets of the same order type have the same cardinality. The converse is not true in general for infinite sets: it is
possible to impose different well-orderings on the set of natural numbers that give rise to different ordinal numbers.
There is a natural ordering on the ordinals, which is itself a well-ordering. Given any ordinal , one can consider the
set of all ordinals less than . This set turns out to have ordinal number . This observation is used for a different
way of introducing the ordinals, in which an ordinal is equated with the set of all smaller ordinals. This form of
ordinal number is thus a canonical representative of the earlier form of equivalence class.
Power sets
By forming all subsets of a set S (all possible choices of its elements), we obtain the power set P(S). Georg Cantor
proved that the power set is always larger than the set, i.e., |P(S)| > |S|. A special case of Cantor's theorem proves that
the set of all real numbers R cannot be enumerated by natural numbers. R is uncountable: |R| > |N|.
Paradoxes of the infinite set

Instead of relying on ambiguous descriptions such as "that which cannot be enlarged" or "increasing without bound",
set theory provides definitions for the term infinite set to give an unambiguous meaning to phrases such as "the set of
all natural numbers is infinite". Just as for finite sets, the theory makes further definitions which allow us to
consistently compare two infinite sets as regards whether one set is "larger than", "smaller than", or "the same size
as" the other. But not every intuition regarding the size of finite sets applies to the size of infinite sets, leading to
various apparently paradoxical results regarding enumeration, size, measure and order.
Paradoxes of enumeration
Before set theory was introduced, the notion of the size of a set had been problematic. It had been discussed by
Galileo Galilei and Bernard Bolzano, among others. Are there as many natural numbers as squares of natural
numbers when measured by the method of enumeration?
The answer is yes, because for every natural number n there is a square number n2, and likewise the other way
around.
The answer is no, because the squares are a proper subset of the naturals: every square is a natural number but
there are natural numbers, like 2, which are not squares of natural numbers.
By defining the notion of the size of a set in terms of its cardinality, the issue can be settled. Since there is a bijection
between the two sets involved, this follows in fact directly from the definition of the cardinality of a set.
See Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel for more on paradoxes of enumeration.
Je le vois, mais je ne crois pas

"I see it but I don't believe," Cantor wrote to Richard Dedekind after proving that the set of points of a square has the
same cardinality as that of the points on just an edge of the square: the cardinality of the continuum.
This demonstrates that the "size" of sets as defined by cardinality alone is not the only useful way of comparing sets.
Measure theory provides a more nuanced theory of size that conforms to our intuition that length and area are
incompatible measures of size.
The evidence strongly suggests that Cantor was quite confident in the result itself and that his comment to Dedekind
refers instead to his then-still-lingering concerns about the validity of his proof of it.[1] Nevertheless, Cantor's remark
222

would also serve nicely to express the surprise that so many mathematicians after him have experienced on first
encountering a result that's so counterintuitive.
Paradoxes of well-ordering
In 1904 Ernst Zermelo proved by means of the axiom of choice (which was introduced for this reason) that every set
can be well-ordered. In 1963 Paul J. Cohen showed that using the axiom of choice is essential to well-ordering the
real numbers; no weaker assumption suffices.
However, the ability to well order any set allows certain constructions to be performed that have been called
paradoxical. One example is the BanachTarski paradox, a theorem widely considered to be nonintuitive. It states
that it is possible to decompose a ball of a fixed radius into a finite number of pieces and then move and reassemble
those pieces by ordinary translations and rotations (with no scaling) to obtain two copies from the one original copy.
The construction of these pieces requires the axiom of choice; the pieces are not simple regions of the ball, but
complicated subsets.
Paradoxes of the Supertask

Main article: supertask
In set theory, an infinite set is not considered to be created by some mathematical process such as "adding one
element" that is then carried out "an infinite number of times". Instead, a particular infinite set (such as the set of all
natural numbers) is said to already exist, "by fiat", as an assumption or an axiom. Given this infinite set, other
infinite sets are then proven to exist as well, as a logical consequence. But it is still a natural philosophical question
to contemplate some physical action that actually completes after an infinite number of discrete steps; and the
interpretation of this question using set theory gives rise to the paradoxes of the supertask.
The diary of Tristram Shandy

Tristram Shandy, the hero of a novel by Laurence Sterne, writes his autobiography so conscientiously that it takes
him one year to lay down the events of one day. If he is mortal he can never terminate; but if he lived forever then no
part of his diary would remain unwritten, for to each day of his life a year devoted to that day's description would
correspond.
The Ross-Littlewood paradox

Main article: RossLittlewood paradox
An increased version of this type of paradox shifts the infinitely remote finish to a finite time. Fill a huge reservoir
with balls enumerated by numbers 1 to 10 and take off ball number 1. Then add the balls enumerated by numbers 11
to 20 and take off number 2. Continue to add balls enumerated by numbers 10n - 9 to 10n and to remove ball number
n for all natural numbers n = 3, 4, 5, .... Let the first transaction last half an hour, let the second transaction last
quarter an hour, and so on, so that all transactions are finished after one hour. Obviously the set of balls in the
reservoir increases without bound. Nevertheless, after one hour the reservoir is empty because for every ball the time
of removal is known.
The paradox is further increased by the significance of the removal sequence. If the balls are not removed in the
sequence 1, 2, 3, ... but in the sequence 1, 11, 21, ... after one hour infinitely many balls populate the reservoir,
although the same amount of material as before has been moved.
223
Paradoxes of proof and definability

For all its usefulness in resolving questions regarding infinite sets, naive set theory has some fatal flaws. In
particular, it is prey to logical paradoxes such as those exposed by Russell's paradox. The discovery of these
paradoxes revealed that not all sets which can be described in the language of naive set theory can actually be said to
exist without creating a contradiction. The 20th century saw a resolution to these paradoxes in the development of
the various axiomatizations of set theories such as ZFC and NBG in common use today. However, the gap between
the very formalized and symbolic language of these theories and our typical informal use of mathematical language
results in various paradoxical situations, as well as the philosophical question of exactly what it is that such formal
systems actually propose to be talking about.
Early paradoxes: the set of all sets

Main article: Russell's paradox
In 1897 the Italian mathematician Cesare Burali-Forti discovered that there is no set containing all ordinal numbers.
As every ordinal number is defined by a set of smaller ordinal numbers, the well-ordered set of all ordinal
numbers (if it exists) fits the definition and is itself an ordinal. On the other hand, no ordinal number can contain
itself, so cannot be an ordinal. Therefore, the set of all ordinal numbers cannot exist.
By the end of the 19th century Cantor was aware of the non-existence of the set of all cardinal numbers and the set of
all ordinal numbers. In letters to David Hilbert and Richard Dedekind he wrote about inconsistent sets, the elements
of which cannot be thought of as being all together, and he used this result to prove that every consistent set has a
cardinal number.
After all this, the version of the "set of all sets" paradox conceived by Bertrand Russell in 1903 led to a serious crisis
in set theory. Russell recognized that the statement x = x is true for every set, and thus the set of all sets is defined by
{x | x = x}. In 1906 he constructed several paradox sets, the most famous of which is the set of all sets which do not
contain themselves. Russell himself explained this abstract idea by means of some very concrete pictures. One
example, known as the Barber paradox, states: The male barber who shaves all and only men who don't shave
themselves has to shave himself only if he does not shave himself.
There are close similarities between Russell's paradox in set theory and the GrellingNelson paradox, which
demonstrates a paradox in natural language.
Paradoxes by change of language

Knig's paradox
In 1905, the Hungarian mathematician Julius Knig published a paradox based on the fact that there are only
countably many finite definitions. If we imagine the real numbers as a well-ordered set, those real numbers which
can be finitely defined form a subset. Hence in this well-order there should be a first real number that is not finitely
definable. This is paradoxical, because this real number has just been finitely defined by the last sentence. This leads
to a contradiction in naive set theory.
This paradox is avoided in axiomatic set theory. Although it is possible to represent a proposition about a set as a set,
by a system of codes known as Gdel numbers, there is no formula
in the language of set theory which
holds exactly when a is a code for a finite description of a set and this description is a true description of the set x.
This result is known as Tarski's indefinability theorem; it applies to a wide class of formal systems including all
commonly studied axiomatizations of set theory.
224

Richard's paradox
Main article: Richard's paradox
In the same year the French mathematician Jules Richard used a variant of Cantor's diagonal method to obtain
another contradiction in naive set theory. Consider the set A of all finite agglomerations of words. The set E of all
finite definitions of real numbers is a subset of A. As A is countable, so is E. Let p be the nth decimal of the nth real
number defined by the set E; we form a number N having zero for the integral part and p + 1 for the nth decimal if p
is not equal either to 8 or 9, and unity if p is equal to 8 or 9. This number N is not defined by the set E because it
differs from any finitely defined real number, namely from the nth number by the nth digit. But N has been defined
by a finite number of words in this paragraph. It should therefore be in the set E. That is a contradiction.
As with Knig's paradox, this paradox cannot be formalized in axiomatic set theory because it requires the ability to
tell whether a description applies to a particular set (or, equivalently, to tell whether a formula is actually the
definition of a single set).
Paradox of Lwenheim and Skolem

Main article: Skolem's paradox
Based upon work of the German mathematician Leopold Lwenheim (1915) the Norwegian logician Thoralf Skolem
showed in 1922 that every consistent theory of first-order predicate calculus, such as set theory, has an at most
countable model. However, Cantor's theorem proves that there are uncountable sets. The root of this seeming
paradox is that the countability or noncountability of a set is not always absolute, but can depend on the model in
which the cardinality is measured. It is possible for a set to be uncountable in one model of set theory but countable
in a larger model (because the bijections that establish countability are in the larger model but not the smaller one).
Notes
[1] F. Q. Gouva, "Was Cantor Surprised?" (http:/ / www. maa. org/ pubs/ AMM-March11_Cantor. pdf), American Mathematical Monthly, 118,
March 2011, 198209.
References
G. Cantor: Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und philosophischen Inhalts, E. Zermelo (Ed.), Olms,
Hildesheim 1966.
H. Meschkowski, W. Nilson: Georg Cantor - Briefe, Springer, Berlin 1991.
A. Fraenkel: Einleitung in die Mengenlehre, Springer, Berlin 1923.
A. A. Fraenkel, A. Levy: Abstract Set Theory, North Holland, Amsterdam 1976.
F. Hausdorff: Grundzge der Mengenlehre, Chelsea, New York 1965.
B. Russell: The principles of mathematics I, Cambridge 1903.
B. Russell: On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and order types, Proc. London Math. Soc. (2)
4 (1907) 29-53.
P. J. Cohen: Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis, Benjamin, New York 1966.
S. Wagon: The Banach-Tarski-Paradox, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985.
A. N. Whitehead, B. Russell: Principia Mathematica I, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1910, p.64.
E. Zermelo: Neuer Beweis fr die Mglichkeit einer Wohlordnung, Math. Ann. 65 (1908) p.107-128.
225
External links
(http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=umhistmath;cc=umhistmath;rgn=full
text;idno=AAT3201.0001.001;didno=AAT3201.0001.001;view=pdf;seq=00000086)PDF
(http://dz-srv1.sub.uni-goettingen.de/sub/digbib/loader?ht=VIEW&did=D38183&p=125)
Definability paradoxes (http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/richardsparadox.html) by Timothy Gowers
Parrondo's paradox
Parrondo's paradox, a paradox in game theory, has been described as: A combination of losing strategies becomes
a winning strategy. It is named after its creator, Juan Parrondo, who discovered the paradox in 1996. A more
explanatory description is:
There exist pairs of games, each with a higher probability of losing than winning, for which it is possible to
construct a winning strategy by playing the games alternately.
Parrondo devised the paradox in connection with his analysis of the Brownian ratchet, a thought experiment about a
machine that can purportedly extract energy from random heat motions popularized by physicist Richard Feynman.
However, the paradox disappears when rigorously analyzed.
Illustrative examples
The saw-tooth example
Consider an example in which there are two points A and B having the
same altitude, as shown in Figure 1. In the first case, we have a flat
profile connecting them. Here, if we leave some round marbles in the
middle that move back and forth in a random fashion, they will roll
around randomly but towards both ends with an equal probability. Now
Figure 1
consider the second case where we have a saw-tooth-like region
between them. Here also, the marbles will roll towards either ends with
equal probability (if there were a tendency to move in one direction, marbles in a ring of this shape would tend to
spontaneously extract thermal energy to revolve, violating the second law of thermodynamics). Now if we tilt the
whole profile towards the right, as shown in Figure 2, it is quite clear that both these cases will become biased
towards B.
Now consider the game in which we alternate the two profiles while judiciously choosing the time between
alternating from one profile to the other.
When we leave a few marbles on the first profile at point E, they
distribute themselves on the plane showing preferential movements
towards point B. However, if we apply the second profile when some
of the marbles have crossed the point C, but none have crossed point
D, we will end up having most marbles back at point E (where we
Figure 2
started from initially) but some also in the valley towards point A
given sufficient time for the marbles to roll to the valley. Then we
again apply the first profile and repeat the steps (points C, D and E now shifted one step to refer to the final valley
closest to A). If no marbles cross point C before the first marble crosses point D, we must apply the second profile
shortly before the first marble crosses point D, to start over.
226
Parrondo's paradox
227
It easily follows that eventually we will have marbles at point A, but none at point B. Hence for a problem defined
with having marbles at point A being a win and having marbles at point B a loss, we clearly win by playing two
losing games.
The coin-tossing example

A second example of Parrondo's paradox is drawn from the field of gambling. Consider playing two games, Game A
and Game B with the following rules. For convenience, define
to be our capital at time t, immediately before we
play a game.
1. Winning a game earns us $1 and losing requires us to surrender $1. It follows that
step t and
if we lose at step t.
2. In Game A, we toss a biased coin, Coin 1, with probability of winning
clearly a losing game in the long run.
3. In Game B, we first determine if our capital is a multiple of some integer
2, with probability of winning
probability of winning
if we win at
. If
, this is
. If it is, we toss a biased coin, Coin
. If it is not, we toss another biased coin, Coin 3, with

. The role of modulo
provides the periodicity as in the ratchet
teeth.
It is clear that by playing Game A, we will almost surely lose in the long run. Harmer and Abbott[1] show via
simulation that if
and
Game B is an almost surely losing game as well. In fact, Game B is a
Markov chain, and an analysis of its state transition matrix (again with M=3) shows that the steady state probability
of using coin 2 is 0.3836, and that of using coin 3 is 0.6164.[2] As coin 2 is selected nearly 40% of the time, it has a
disproportionate influence on the payoff from Game B, and results in it being a losing game.
However, when these two losing games are played in some alternating sequence - e.g. two games of A followed by
two games of B (AABBAABB...), the combination of the two games is, paradoxically, a winning game. Not all
alternating sequences of A and B result in winning games. For example, one game of A followed by one game of B
(ABABAB...) is a losing game, while one game of A followed by two games of B (ABBABB...) is a winning game.
This coin-tossing example has become the canonical illustration of Parrondo's paradox two games, both losing
when played individually, become a winning game when played in a particular alternating sequence. The apparent
paradox has been explained using a number of sophisticated approaches, including Markov chains,[3] flashing
ratchets,[4] Simulated Annealing[5] and information theory.[6] One way to explain the apparent paradox is as follows:
While Game B is a losing game under the probability distribution that results for
played individually (
modulo
is the remainder when
is divided by
modulo
when it is
), it can be a winning game
under other distributions, as there is at least one state in which its expectation is positive.
As the distribution of outcomes of Game B depend on the player's capital, the two games cannot be independent.
If they were, playing them in any sequence would lose as well.
The role of
now comes into sharp focus. It serves solely to induce a dependence between Games A and B, so
that a player is more likely to enter states in which Game B has a positive expectation, allowing it to overcome the
losses from Game A. With this understanding, the paradox resolves itself: The individual games are losing only
under a distribution that differs from that which is actually encountered when playing the compound game. In
summary, Parrondo's paradox is an example of how dependence can wreak havoc with probabilistic computations
made under a naive assumption of independence. A more detailed exposition of this point, along with several related
examples, can be found in Philips and Feldman.[7]
Parrondo's paradox
A simplified example
For a simpler example of how and why the paradox works, again consider two games Game A and Game B, this
time with the following rules:
1. In Game A, you simply lose $1 every time you play.
2. In Game B, you count how much money you have left. If it is an even number, you win $3. Otherwise you lose
$5.
Say you begin with $100 in your pocket. If you start playing Game A exclusively, you will obviously lose all your
money in 100 rounds. Similarly, if you decide to play Game B exclusively, you will also lose all your money in 100
rounds.
However, consider playing the games alternatively, starting with Game B, followed by A, then by B, and so on
(BABABA...). It should be easy to see that you will steadily earn a total of $2 for every two games.
Thus, even though each game is a losing proposition if played alone, because the results of Game B are affected by
Game A, the sequence in which the games are played can affect how often Game B earns you money, and
subsequently the result is different from the case where either game is played by itself.
Application
Parrondo's paradox is used extensively in game theory, and its application in engineering, population dynamics,[8]
financial risk, etc., are also being looked into as demonstrated by the reading lists below. Parrondo's games are of
little practical use such as for investing in stock markets[9] as the original games require the payoff from at least one
of the interacting games to depend on the player's capital. However, the games need not be restricted to their original
form and work continues in generalizing the phenomenon. Similarities to volatility pumping and the two-envelope
problem[10] have been pointed out. Simple finance textbook models of security returns have been used to prove that
individual investments with negative median long-term returns may be easily combined into diversified portfolios
with positive median long-term returns.[11] Similarly, a model that is often used to illustrate optimal betting rules has
been used to prove that splitting bets between multiple games can turn a negative median long-term return into a
positive one.[12]
Name
In the early literature on Parrondo's paradox, it was debated whether the word 'paradox' is an appropriate description
given that the Parrondo effect can be understood in mathematical terms. The 'paradoxical' effect can be
mathematically explained in terms of a convex linear combination.
However, Derek Abbott, a leading Parrondo's paradox researcher provides the following answer regarding the use of
the word 'paradox' in this context:
Is Parrondo's paradox really a "paradox"? This question is sometimes asked by mathematicians, whereas
physicists usually don't worry about such things. The first thing to point out is that "Parrondo's paradox"
is just a name, just like the "Braess paradox" or "Simpson's paradox." Secondly, as is the case with most
of these named paradoxes they are all really apparent paradoxes. People drop the word "apparent" in
these cases as it is a mouthful, and it is obvious anyway. So no one claims these are paradoxes in the
strict sense. In the wide sense, a paradox is simply something that is counterintuitive. Parrondo's games
certainly are counterintuitiveat least until you have intensively studied them for a few months. The
truth is we still keep finding new surprising things to delight us, as we research these games. I have had
one mathematician complain that the games always were obvious to him and hence we should not use
the word "paradox." He is either a genius or never really understood it in the first place. In either case, it
is not worth arguing with people like that.Wikipedia:Quotations
228
Parrondo's paradox
Parrondo's paradox does not seem that paradoxical if one notes that it is actually a combination of three simple
games: two of which have losing probabilities and one of which has a high probability of winning. To suggest that
one can create a winning strategy with three such games is neither counterintuitive nor paradoxical.
Further reading
John Allen Paulos, A Mathematician Plays the Stock Market [13], Basic Books, 2004, ISBN 0-465-05481-1.
Neil F. Johnson, Paul Jefferies, Pak Ming Hui, Financial Market Complexity [14], Oxford University Press, 2003,
ISBN 0-19-852665-2.
Ning Zhong and Jiming Liu, Intelligent Agent Technology: Research and Development, [15] World Scientific,
2001, ISBN 981-02-4706-0.
Elka Korutcheva and Rodolfo Cuerno, Advances in Condensed Matter and Statistical Physics [16], Nova
Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1-59033-899-5.
Maria Carla Galavotti, Roberto Scazzieri, and Patrick Suppes, Reasoning, Rationality, and Probability [17],
Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2008, ISBN 1-57586-557-2.
Derek Abbott and Laszlo B. Kish, Unsolved Problems of Noise and Fluctuations [18], American Institute of
Physics, 2000, ISBN 1-56396-826-6.
Visarath In, Patrick Longhini, and Antonio Palacios, Applications of Nonlinear Dynamics: Model and Design of
Complex Systems [19], Springer, 2009, ISBN 3-540-85631-5.
Marc Moore, Constance van Eeden, Sorana Froda, and Christian Lger, Mathematical Statistics and Applications:
Festschrift for Constance van Eeden [20], IMS, 2003, ISBN 0-940600-57-9.
Ehrhard Behrends, Fnf Minuten Mathematik: 100 Beitrge der Mathematik-Kolumne der Zeitung Die Welt [21],
Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-8348-0082-1.
Lutz Schimansky-Geier, Noise in Complex Systems and Stochastic Dynamics [22], SPIE, 2003, ISBN
0-8194-4974-1.
Susan Shannon, Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science [23], Nova Science Publishers, 2005, ISBN
1-59454-411-5.
Eric W. Weisstein, CRC Concise Encyclopedia of Mathematics [24], CRC Press, 2003, ISBN 1-58488-347-2.
David Reguera, Jos M. G. Vilar, and Jos-Miguel Rub, Statistical Mechanics of Biocomplexity [25], Springer,
1999, ISBN 3-540-66245-6.
Sergey M. Bezrukov, Unsolved Problems of Noise and Fluctuations [26], Springer, 2003, ISBN 0-7354-0127-6.
Julian Chela-Flores, Tobias C. Owen, and F. Raulin, First Steps in the Origin of Life in the Universe [27],
Springer, 2001, ISBN 1-4020-0077-4.
Tnu Puu and Irina Sushko, Business Cycle Dynamics: Models and Tools [28], Springer, 2006, ISBN
3-540-32167-5.
Andrzej S. Nowak and Krzysztof Szajowski, Advances in Dynamic Games: Applications to Economics, Finance,
Optimization, and Stochastic Control [29], Birkhuser, 2005, ISBN 0-8176-4362-1.
Cristel Chandre, Xavier Leoncini, and George M. Zaslavsky, Chaos, Complexity and Transport: Theory and
Applications [30], World Scientific, 2008, ISBN 981-281-879-0.
Richard A. Epstein, The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic (Second edition), Academic Press, 2009, ISBN
0-12-374940-9.
Clifford A. Pickover, The Math Book, [31] Sterling, 2009, ISBN 1-4027-5796-4.
229
Parrondo's paradox
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
G. P. Harmer and D. Abbott, "Losing strategies can win by Parrondo's paradox", Nature 402 (1999), 864
D. Minor, "Parrondo's Paradox - Hope for Losers!", The College Mathematics Journal 34(1) (2003) 15-20
G. P. Harmer and D. Abbott, "Parrondo's paradox", Statistical Science 14 (1999) 206-213
G. P. Harmer, D. Abbott, P. G. Taylor, and J. M. R. Parrondo, in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Unsolved Problems of Noise and Fluctuations, D.
Abbott, and L. B. Kish, eds., American Institute of Physics, 2000
[5] G. P. Harmer, D. Abbott, and P. G. Taylor, The Paradox of Parrondo's games, Proc. Royal Society of London A 456 (2000), 1-13
[6] G. P. Harmer, D. Abbott, P. G. Taylor, C. E. M. Pearce and J. M. R. Parrondo, Information entropy and Parrondo's discrete-time ratchet, in
Proc. Stochastic and Chaotic Dynamics in the Lakes, Ambleside, U.K., P. V. E. McClintock, ed., American Institute of Physics, 2000
[7] Thomas K. Philips and Andrew B. Feldman, Parrondo's Paradox is not Paradoxical (http:/ / papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers.
cfm?abstract_id=581521), Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Working Papers, August 2004
[8] V. A. A. Jansen and J. Yoshimura "Populations can persist in an environment consisting of sink habitats only". Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences USA, 95(1998), 3696-3698 .
[9] R. Iyengar and R. Kohli, "Why Parrondo's paradox is irrelevant for utility theory, stock buying, and the emergence of life," Complexity, 9(1),
pp. 23-27, 2004
[10] Winning While Losing: New Strategy Solves'Two-Envelope' Paradox (http:/ / www. physorg. com/ pdf169811689. pdf) at Physorg.com
[11] M. Stutzer, The Paradox of Diversification, The Journal of Investing, Vol. 19, No.1, 2010.
[12] M. Stutzer, "A Simple Parrondo Paradox", Mathematical Scientist, V.35, 2010.
[13] http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=FUGI7KDTkTUC
[14] http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=8jfV6nntNPkC& pg=PA74& dq=parrondo*
[15] http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=eZ6YCz5NamsC& pg=PA150
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[31]
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http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=ZuMQAQAAIAAJ& q=parrondo*
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=ePoaAQAAIAAJ
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=FidKZcUqdIQC& pg=PA307
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http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=liNP2CpsU8EC& pg=PA10
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=WgJTAAAAMAAJ& q=parrondo*
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http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=UDk8QARabpwC& pg=PA2152& dq=parrondo*
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=0oMp60wubKIC& pg=PA95
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=soGS-YcwvxsC& pg=PA82
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=q8JwN_1p78UC& pg=PA17& dq=parrondo*
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=cTfwjzihuiIC& pg=PA148& dq=parrondo*
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=l5W20mVBeT4C& pg=PA650& dq=parrondo*
http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=md092lhGSOQC& pg=PA107& dq=parrondo*
http:/ / sprott. physics. wisc. edu/ pickover/ math-book. html
External links
J. M. R. Parrondo, Parrondo's paradoxical games (http://seneca.fis.ucm.es/parr/GAMES/index.htm)
Google Scholar profiling of Parrondo's paradox (http://scholar.google.com.au/citations?hl=en&
user=aeNdbrUAAAAJ)
Nature news article on Parrondo's paradox (http://www.nature.com/news/1999/991223/full/news991223-13.
html)
Alternate game play ratchets up winnings: It's the law (http://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/Groups/
parrondo/articles/sandiego.html)
Official Parrondo's paradox page (http://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/Groups/parrondo)
Parrondo's Paradox - A Simulation (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/ctk/Parrondo.shtml)
The Wizard of Odds on Parrondo's Paradox (http://wizardofodds.com/askthewizard/149)
Parrondo's Paradox at Wolfram (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ParrondosParadox.html)
Online Parrondo simulator (http://hampshire.edu/lspector/parrondo/parrondo.html)
Parrondo's paradox at Maplesoft (http://www.maplesoft.com/applications/view.aspx?SID=1761)
Donald Catlin on Parrondo's paradox (http://catlin.casinocitytimes.com/article/parrondos-paradox-46851)
230
Parrondo's paradox
231
Parrondo's paradox and poker (http://emergentfool.com/2008/02/16/parrondos-paradox-and-poker/)

Parrondo's paradox and epistemology (http://www.fil.lu.se/HommageaWlodek/site/papper/
StjernbergFredrik.pdf)
A Parrondo's paradox resource (http://pagesperso-orange.fr/jean-paul.davalan/proba/parr/index-en.html)
Optimal adaptive strategies and Parrondo (http://www.molgen.mpg.de/~rahmann/parrondo/parrondo.shtml)
Behrends on Parrondo (http://www.math.uni-potsdam.de/~roelly/WorkshopCDFAPotsdam09/Behrends.pdf)
God doesn't shoot craps (http://www.goddoesntshootcraps.com/paradox.html)
Parrondo's paradox in chemistry (http://www.fasebj.org/cgi/content/meeting_abstract/23/
1_MeetingAbstracts/514.1)
Parrondo's paradox in genetics (http://www.genetics.org/cgi/content/full/176/3/1923)
Parrondo effect in quantum mechanics (http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03784371/2003/
00000324/00000001/art01909)
Financial diversification and Parrondo (http://leeds.colorado.edu/uploadedFiles/Centers_of_Excellence/
Burridge_Center/Working_Papers/ParadoxOfDiversification.pdf)
Russell's paradox
Part of a series on
Bertrand Russell
Russell in 1916
Views on philosophy
Views on society
Russell's paradox
Russell's teapot
Theory of Descriptions
Logical atomism
v
t
e [1]
In the foundations of mathematics, Russell's paradox (also known as Russell's antinomy), discovered by Bertrand
Russell in 1901, showed that the naive set theory created by Georg Cantor leads to a contradiction. The same
Russell's paradox
232
paradox had been discovered a year before by Ernst Zermelo but he did not publish the idea, which remained known
only to Hilbert, Husserl and other members of the University of Gttingen.
According to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of
themselves. If R is not a member of itself, then its definition dictates that it must contain itself, and if it contains
itself, then it contradicts its own definition as the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. This
contradiction is Russell's paradox. Symbolically:
In 1908, two ways of avoiding the paradox were proposed, Russell's type theory and the Zermelo set theory, the first
constructed axiomatic set theory. Zermelo's axioms went well beyond Frege's axioms of extensionality and unlimited
set abstraction, and evolved into the now-canonical ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZF).[2]
Informal presentation
Let us call a set "abnormal" if it is a member of itself, and "normal" otherwise. For example, take the set of all
squares in the plane. That set is not itself a square, and therefore is not a member of the set of all squares. So it is
"normal". On the other hand, if we take the complementary set that contains all non-squares, that set is itself not a
square and so should be one of its own members. It is "abnormal".
Now we consider the set of all normal sets, R. Determining whether R is normal or abnormal is impossible: if R were
a normal set, it would be contained in the set of normal sets (itself), and therefore be abnormal; and if R were
abnormal, it would not be contained in the set of all normal sets (itself), and therefore be normal. This leads to the
conclusion that R is neither normal nor abnormal: Russell's paradox.
Formal presentation
Define Naive Set Theory (NST) as the theory of predicate logic with a binary predicate
schema of unrestricted comprehension:
for any formula P with only the variable x free. Substitute
for
and the following axiom
. Then by existential instantiation
(reusing the symbol y) and universal instantiation we have

a contradiction. Therefore NST is inconsistent.
Set-theoretic responses
In 1908, Ernst Zermelo proposed an axiomatization of set theory that avoided the paradoxes of naive set theory by
replacing arbitrary set comprehension with weaker existence axioms, such as his axiom of separation
(Aussonderung). Modifications to this axiomatic theory proposed in the 1920s by Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf
Skolem, and by Zermelo himself resulted in the axiomatic set theory called ZFC. This theory became widely
accepted once Zermelo's axiom of choice ceased to be controversial, and ZFC has remained the canonical axiomatic
set theory down to the present day.
ZFC does not assume that, for every property, there is a set of all things satisfying that property. Rather, it asserts
that given any set X, any subset of X definable using first-order logic exists. The object R discussed above cannot be
constructed in this fashion, and is therefore not a ZFC set. In some extensions of ZFC, objects like R are called
proper classes. ZFC is silent about types, although some argue that Zermelo's axioms tacitly presuppose a
background type theory.
In ZFC, given a set A, it is possible to define a set B that consists of exactly the sets in A that are not members of
themselves. B cannot be in A by the same reasoning in Russell's Paradox. This variation of Russell's paradox shows
Russell's paradox
that no set contains everything.
Through the work of Zermelo and others, especially John von Neumann, the structure of what some see as the
"natural" objects described by ZFC eventually became clear; they are the elements of the von Neumann universe, V,
built up from the empty set by transfinitely iterating the power set operation. It is thus now possible again to reason
about sets in a non-axiomatic fashion without running afoul of Russell's paradox, namely by reasoning about the
elements of V. Whether it is appropriate to think of sets in this way is a point of contention among the rival points of
view on the philosophy of mathematics.
Other resolutions to Russell's paradox, more in the spirit of type theory, include the axiomatic set theories New
Foundations and Scott-Potter set theory.
History
Russell discovered the paradox in May or June 1901. By his own account in his 1919 Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy, he "attempted to discover some flaw in Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal".[3] In a 1902
letter,[4] he announced the discovery to Gottlob Frege of the paradox in Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift and framed the
problem in terms of both logic and set theory, and in particular in terms of Frege's definition of function; in the
following, p.17 refers to a page in the original Begriffsschrift, and page 23 refers to the same page in van Heijenoort
1967:
There is just one point where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 above]) that a
function too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems
doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that
cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows.
Therefore we must conclude that w is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those
classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under
certain circumstances a definable collection [Menge] does not form a totality.[5]
Russell would go on to cover it at length in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics, where he repeated his first
encounter with the paradox:[6]
Before taking leave of fundamental questions, it is necessary to examine more in detail the singular
contradiction, already mentioned, with regard to predicates not predicable of themselves. ... I may
mention that I was led to it in the endeavour to reconcile Cantor's proof...."
Russell wrote to Frege about the paradox just as Frege was preparing the second volume of his Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik.[7] Frege responded to Russell very quickly; his letter dated 22 June 1902 appeared, with van Heijenoort's
commentary in Heijenoort 1967:126127. Frege then wrote an appendix admitting to the paradox,[8] and proposed a
solution that Russell would endorse in his Principles of Mathematics,[9] but was later considered by some to be
unsatisfactory.[10] For his part, Russell had his work at the printers and he added an appendix on the doctrine of
types.[11]
Ernst Zermelo in his (1908) A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering (published at the same time he
published "the first axiomatic set theory")[12] laid claim to prior discovery of the antinomy in Cantor's naive set
theory. He states: "And yet, even the elementary form that Russell9 gave to the set-theoretic antinomies could have
persuaded them [J. Knig, Jourdain, F. Bernstein] that the solution of these difficulties is not to be sought in the
surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable restriction of the notion of set".[13] Footnote 9 is where he stakes his
claim:
9
1903, pp. 366368. I had, however, discovered this antinomy myself, independently of Russell, and
had communicated it prior to 1903 to Professor Hilbert among others.[14]
A written account of Zermelo's actual argument was discovered in the Nachlass of Edmund Husserl.[15]
233
Russell's paradox
234
It is also known that unpublished discussions of set theoretical paradoxes took place in the mathematical community
at the turn of the century. van Heijenoort in his commentary before Russell's 1902 Letter to Frege states that
Zermelo "had discovered the paradox independently of Russell and communicated it to Hilbert, among others, prior
to its publication by Russell".[16]
In 1923, Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed to "dispose" of Russell's paradox as follows:
The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the
prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be
its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F and
the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form O(f(x)) and the outer
one has the form Y(O(fx)). Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself
signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write '(do) : F(Ou) . Ou = Fu'.
That disposes of Russell's paradox. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.333)
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote their three-volume Principia Mathematica hoping to achieve what Frege
had been unable to do. They sought to banish the paradoxes of naive set theory by employing a theory of types they
devised for this purpose. While they succeeded in grounding arithmetic in a fashion, it is not at all evident that they
did so by purely logical means. While Principia Mathematica avoided the known paradoxes and allows the
derivation of a great deal of mathematics, its system gave rise to new problems.
In any event, Kurt Gdel in 193031 proved that while the logic of much of Principia Mathematica, now known as
first-order logic, is complete, Peano arithmetic is necessarily incomplete if it is consistent. This is very widely
though not universally regarded as having shown the logicist program of Frege to be impossible to complete.
In 2001 A Centenary International Conference celebrating the first hundred years of Russell's paradox was held in
Munich and its proceedings have been published.
Applied versions
There are some versions of this paradox that are closer to real-life situations and may be easier to understand for
non-logicians. For example, the barber paradox supposes a barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves
and only men who do not shave themselves. When one thinks about whether the barber should shave himself or not,
the paradox begins to emerge.
As another example, consider five lists of encyclopedia entries within the same encyclopedia:
List of articles about
people:
List of articles starting with the letter

L:

places:

Japan:
List of all lists that do not contain

themselves:
Ptolemy VII of
Egypt
Hermann Hesse
Don Nix
Don Knotts
Nikola Tesla
Sherlock Holmes
Emperor Knin
L
L!VE TV
L&H
Leivonmki
...
Leivonmki
Katase River
Enoshima
Emperor Showa
Katase River
Enoshima
...
List of articles starting with the

letter K
letter L (itself; OK)
letter M
List of articles about Japan

List of articles about places
List of articles about people

letter K
letter M
...
List of all lists that do not

contain themselves?
...
If the "List of all lists that do not contain themselves" contains itself, then it does not belong to itself and should be
removed. However, if it does not list itself, then it should be added to itself.
Russell's paradox
While appealing, these layman's versions of the paradox share a drawback: an easy refutation of the barber paradox
seems to be that such a barber does not exist, or at least does not shave (a variant of which is that the barber is a
woman). The whole point of Russell's paradox is that the answer "such a set does not exist" means the definition of
the notion of set within a given theory is unsatisfactory. Note the difference between the statements "such a set does
not exist" and "it is an empty set". It is like the difference between saying, "There is no bucket", and saying, "The
bucket is empty".
A notable exception to the above may be the GrellingNelson paradox, in which words and meaning are the
elements of the scenario rather than people and hair-cutting. Though it is easy to refute the barber's paradox by
saying that such a barber does not (and cannot) exist, it is impossible to say something similar about a meaningfully
defined word.
One way that the paradox has been dramatised is as follows:
Suppose that every public library has to compile a catalogue of all its books. Since the catalogue is itself one
of the library's books, some librarians include it in the catalogue for completeness; while others leave it out as
it being one of the library's books is self-evident.
Now imagine that all these catalogues are sent to the national library. Some of them include themselves in
their listings, others do not. The national librarian compiles two master catalogues one of all the catalogues
that list themselves, and one of all those that don't.
The question is: should these catalogues list themselves? The 'Catalogue of all catalogues that list themselves'
is no problem. If the librarian doesn't include it in its own listing, it is still a true catalog of those catalogues
that do include themselves. If he does include it, it remains a true catalogue of those that list themselves.
However, just as the librarian cannot go wrong with the first master catalogue, he is doomed to fail with the
second. When it comes to the 'Catalogue of all catalogues that don't list themselves', the librarian cannot
include it in its own listing, because then it would include itself. But in that case, it should belong to the other
catalogue, that of catalogues that do include themselves. However, if the librarian leaves it out, the catalogue is
incomplete. Either way, it can never be a true catalogue of catalogues that do not list themselves.
Applications and related topics

Russell-like paradoxes
As illustrated above for the Barber paradox, Russell's paradox is not hard to extend. Take:
A transitive verb <V>, that can be applied to its substantive form.
Form the sentence:
The <V>er that <V>s all (and only those) who don't <V> themselves,
Sometimes the "all" is replaced by "all <V>ers".
An example would be "paint":
The painter that paints all (and only those) that don't paint themselves.
or "elect"
The elector (representative), that elects all that don't elect themselves.
Paradoxes that fall in this scheme include:
The barber with "shave".
The original Russell's paradox with "contain": The container (Set) that contains all (containers) that don't contain
themselves.
The GrellingNelson paradox with "describer": The describer (word) that describes all words, that don't describe
themselves.
235
Russell's paradox
Richard's paradox with "denote": The denoter (number) that denotes all denoters (numbers) that don't denote
themselves. (In this paradox, all descriptions of numbers get an assigned number. The term "that denotes all
denoters (numbers) that don't denote themselves" is here called Richardian.)
Related paradoxes
The liar paradox and Epimenides paradox, whose origins are ancient
The KleeneRosser paradox, showing that the original lambda calculus is inconsistent, by means of a
self-negating statement
Curry's paradox (named after Haskell Curry), which does not require negation
The smallest uninteresting integer paradox
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Bertrand_Russell& action=edit

Set theory paradoxes (http:/ / www. suitcaseofdreams. net/ Set_theory_Paradox. htm), by Tetyana Butler, 2006, Suitcase of Dreams
Russell 1920:136
. Also van Heijenoort 1967:124125
[5] Remarkably, this letter was unpublished until van Heijenoort 1967 it appears with van Heijenoort's commentary at van Heijenoort
1967:124125.
[6] Russell 1903:101
[7] cf van Heijenoort's commentary before Frege's Letter to Russell in van Heijenoort 1967:126.
[8] van Heijenoort's commentary, cf van Heijenoort 1967:126 ; Frege starts his analysis by this exceptionally honest comment : "Hardly anything
more unfortunate can befall a scientific writer than to have one of the foundations of his edifice shaken after the work is finished. This was the
position I was placed in by a letter of Mr Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was nearing its completion" (Appendix of
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. II, in The Frege Reader, p.279, translation by Michael Beaney
[9] cf van Heijenoort's commentary, cf van Heijenoort 1967:126. The added text reads as follows: " Note. The second volume of Gg., which
appeared too late to be noticed in the Appendix, contains an interesting discussion of the contradiction (pp. 253265), suggesting that the
solution is to be found by denying that two propositional functions that determine equal classes must be equivalent. As it seems very likely
that this is the true solution, the reader is strongly recommended to examine Frege's argument on the point" (Russell 1903:522); The
abbreviation Gg. stands for Frege's Grundgezetze der Arithmetik. Begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet. Vol. I. Jena, 1893. Vol. II. 1903.
[10] Livio states that "While Frege did make some desperate attempts to remedy his axiom system, he was unsuccessful. The conclusion
appeared to be disastrous...." Livio 2009:188. But van Heijenoort in his commentary before Frege's (1902) Letter to Russell describes Frege's
proposed "way out" in some detail the matter has to do with the " 'transformation of the generalization of an equality into an equality of
courses-of-values. For Frege a function is something incomplete, 'unsaturated' "; this seems to contradict the contemporary notion of a
"function in extension"; see Frege's wording at page 128: "Incidentally, it seems to me that the expession 'a predicate is predicated of itself' is
not exact. ...Therefore I would prefer to say that 'a concept is predicated of its own extension' [etc]". But he waffles at the end of his suggestion
that a function-as-concept-in-extension can be written as predicated of its function. van Heijenoort cites Quine: "For a late and thorough study
of Frege's "way out", see Quine 1955": "On Frege's way out", Mind 64, 145159; reprinted in Quine 1955b: Appendix. Completeness of
quantification theory. Loewenheim's theorem, enclosed as a pamphlet with part of the third printing (1955) of Quine 1950 and incorporated in
the revised edition (1959), 253260" (cf REFERENCES in van Heijenoort 1967:649)
[11] Russell mentions this fact to Frege, cf van Heijenoort's commentary before Frege's (1902) Letter to Russell in van Heijenoort 1967:126
[12] van Heijenoort's commentary before Zermelo (1908a) Investigations in the foundations of set theory I in van Heijenoort 1967:199
[13] van Heijenoort 1967:190191. In the section before this he objects strenuously to the notion of impredicativity as defined by Poincar (and
soon to be taken by Russell, too, in his 1908 Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types cf van Heijenoort 1967:150182).
[14] Ernst Zermelo (1908) A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering in van Heijenoort 1967:183198. Livio 2009:191 reports that
Zermelo "discovered Russell's paradox independently as early as 1900"; Livio in turn cites Ewald 1996 and van Heijenoort 1967 (cf Livio
2009:268).
[15] B. Rang and W. Thomas, "Zermelo's discovery of the 'Russell Paradox'", Historia Mathematica, v. 8 n. 1, 1981, pp. 1522.
[16] van Heijenoort 1967:124
236
Russell's paradox
237
References
Potter, Michael (15 January 2004), Set Theory and its Philosophy, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press),
ISBN978-0-19-926973-0
van Heijenoort, Jean (1967, third printing 1976), From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879-1931, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, ISBN0-674-32449-8
Livio, Mario (6 January 2009), Is God a Mathematician?, New York: Simon & Schuster,
ISBN978-0-7432-9405-8
External links
Weisstein, Eric W., "Russell's Antinomy" (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RussellsAntinomy.html),
MathWorld.
Russell's Paradox (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/selfreference/russell.shtml) at Cut-the-Knot
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Russell's Paradox (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-paradox/)"
by A. D. Irvine.
Simpson's paradox
In probability and statistics, Simpson's paradox, or the
YuleSimpson effect, is a paradox in which a trend that appears in
different groups of data disappears when these groups are combined,
and the reverse trend appears for the aggregate data. This result is often
encountered in social-science and medical-science statistics, and is
particularly confounding when frequency data are unduly given causal
interpretations.[1] Simpson's Paradox disappears when causal relations
are brought into consideration. Many statisticians believe that the
mainstream public should be informed of the counter-intuitive results
in statistics such as Simpson's paradox.[2][3]
Simpson's paradox for continuous data: a positive

trend appears for two separate groups (blue and
red), a negative trend (black, dashed) appears
when the data are combined.
Edward H. Simpson first described this phenomenon in a technical

paper in 1951, but the statisticians Karl Pearson, et al., in 1899, and
Udny Yule, in 1903, had mentioned similar effects earlier. The name Simpson's paradox was introduced by Colin R.
Blyth in 1972. Since Edward Simpson did not actually discover this statistical paradox (an instance of Stigler's law
of eponymy), some writers, instead, have used the impersonal names reversal paradox and amalgamation paradox
in referring to what is now called Simpson's Paradox and the YuleSimpson effect.
Examples
Kidney stone treatment
This is a real-life example from a medical study comparing the success rates of two treatments for kidney stones.
The table below shows the success rates and numbers of treatments for treatments involving both small and large
kidney stones, where Treatment A includes all open surgical procedures and Treatment B is percutaneous
nephrolithotomy (which involves only a small puncture). The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of success
cases over the total size of the group. (For example, 93% equals 81 divided by 87.)
Simpson's paradox
238
Treatment A
Treatment B
Small Stones
Group 1
93% (81/87)
Group 2
87% (234/270)
Large Stones
Group 3
73% (192/263)
Group 4
69% (55/80)
Both
78% (273/350) 83% (289/350)
The paradoxical conclusion is that treatment A is more effective when used on small stones, and also when used on
large stones, yet treatment B is more effective when considering both sizes at the same time. In this example the
"lurking" variable (or confounding variable) of the stone size was not previously known to be important until its
effects were included.
Which treatment is considered better is determined by an inequality between two ratios (successes/total). The
reversal of the inequality between the ratios, which creates Simpson's paradox, happens because two effects occur
together:
1. The sizes of the groups, which are combined when the lurking variable is ignored, are very different. Doctors
tend to give the severe cases (large stones) the better treatment (A), and the milder cases (small stones) the
inferior treatment (B). Therefore, the totals are dominated by groups 3 and 2, and not by the two much smaller
groups 1 and 4.
2. The lurking variable has a large effect on the ratios, i.e. the success rate is more strongly influenced by the
severity of the case than by the choice of treatment. Therefore, the group of patients with large stones using
treatment A (group 3) does worse than the group with small stones, even if the latter used the inferior treatment B
(group 2).
Based on these effects, the paradoxical result can be rephrased more intuitively as follows: Treatment A, when
applied to a patient population consisting mainly of patients with large stones, is less successful than Treatment B
applied to a patient population consisting mainly of patients with small stones.
Berkeley gender bias case

One of the best-known real-life examples of Simpson's paradox occurred when the University of California,
Berkeley was sued for bias against women who had applied for admission to graduate schools there. The admission
figures for the fall of 1973 showed that men applying were more likely than women to be admitted, and the
difference was so large that it was unlikely to be due to chance.[4]
Applicants Admitted
Men
8442
44%
Women 4321
35%
But when examining the individual departments, it appeared that no department was significantly biased against
women. In fact, most departments had a "small but statistically significant bias in favor of women." The data from
the six largest departments are listed below.
Simpson's paradox
239
Department
Men
Women
Applicants Admitted Applicants Admitted

A
825
62%
108
82%
560
63%
25
68%
325
37%
593
34%
417
33%
375
35%
191
28%
393
24%
373
6%
341
7%
The research paper by Bickel et al. concluded that women tended to apply to competitive departments with low rates
of admission even among qualified applicants (such as in the English Department), whereas men tended to apply to
less-competitive departments with high rates of admission among the qualified applicants (such as in engineering
and chemistry). The conditions under which the admissions' frequency data from specific departments constitute a
proper defense against charges of discrimination are formulated in the book Causality by Pearl.

Main article: Low birth-weight paradox
The low birth weight paradox is an apparently paradoxical observation relating to the birth weights and mortality of
children born to tobacco smoking mothers. As a usual practice, babies weighing less than a certain amount (which
varies between different countries) have been classified as having low birth weight. In a given population, babies
with low birth weights have had a significantly higher infant mortality rate than others. Normal birth weight infants
of smokers have about the same mortality rate as normal birth weight infants of non-smokers, and low birth weight
infants of smokers have a much lower mortality rate than low birth weight infants of non-smokers, but infants of
smokers overall have a much higher mortality rate than infants of non-smokers. This is because many more infants
of smokers are low birth weight, and low birth weight babies have a much higher mortality rate than normal birth
weight babies.
Batting averages
A common example of Simpson's Paradox involves the batting averages of players in professional baseball. It is
possible for one player to hit for a higher batting average than another player during a given year, and to do so again
during the next year, but to have a lower batting average when the two years are combined. This phenomenon can
occur when there are large differences in the number of at-bats between the years. (The same situation applies to
calculating batting averages for the first half of the baseball season, and during the second half, and then combining
all of the data for the season's batting average.)
A real-life example is provided by Ken Ross[5] and involves the batting average of two baseball players, Derek Jeter
and David Justice, during the baseball years 1995 and 1996:[6]
Simpson's paradox
240
1995
Derek Jeter
12/48
1996
Combined
.250 183/582 .314 195/630 .310
David Justice 104/411 .253 45/140
.321 149/551 .270
In both 1995 and 1996, Justice had a higher batting average (in bold type) than Jeter did. However, when the two
baseball seasons are combined, Jeter shows a higher batting average than Justice. According to Ross, this
phenomenon would be observed about once per year among the possible pairs of interesting baseball players. In this
particular case, the Simpson's Paradox can still be observed if the year 1997 is also taken into account:
1995
Derek Jeter
12/48
1996
1997
Combined
.250 183/582 .314 190/654 .291 385/1284 .300
David Justice 104/411 .253 45/140
.321 163/495 .329 312/1046 .298
The Jeter and Justice example of Simpson's paradox was referred to in the "Conspiracy Theory" episode of the
television series Numb3rs, though a chart shown omitted some of the data, and listed the 1996 averages as
1995.Wikipedia:Citation needed
If weighting is used this phenomenon disappears. The table below has been normalized for the largest totals so that
the same things are compared.
1995
Derek Jeter
12/48*411
1996
Combined
102.75/411 .250 183/582*582 183/582 .314 285.75/993 .288
David Justice 104/411*411 104/411
.253 45/140*582
187/582 .321 291/993
.293
Correlation between variables

Simpsons Paradox can also arise in correlations, in which two variables appear to have (say) a positive correlation
towards one another, when in fact they have a negative correlation, the reversal having been brought about by a
lurking confounder. Berman et al. [7] give an example from economics, where a dataset suggests overall demand is
positively correlated with price (that is, higher prices lead to more demand), in contradiction of expectation. Analysis
reveals time to be the confounding variable: plotting both price and demand against time reveals the expected
negative correlation over various periods, which then reverses to become positive if the influence of time is ignored
by simply plotting demand against price.
Simpson's paradox
241
Description
Suppose two people, Lisa and Bart, each edit document
articles for two weeks. In the first week, Lisa improves
0 of the 3 articles she edited, and Bart improves 1 of
the 7 articles he edited. In the second week, Lisa
improves 5 of 7 articles she edited, while Bart improves
all 3 of the articles he edited.
Illustration of Simpson's Paradox; The first graph (on the top)

represents Lisa's contribution, the second one Bart's. The blue bars
represent the first week, the red bars the second week; the triangles
indicate the combined percentage of good contributions (weighted
average). While Bart's bars both show a higher rate of success than
Lisa's, Lisa's combined rate is higher because basically she improved
a greater ratio relative to the quantity edited.
Week 1 Week 2 Total

Lisa
0/3
5/7
5/10
Bart
1/7
3/3
4/10
Both times Bart improved a higher percentage of articles than Lisa, but the actual number of articles each edited (the
bottom number of their ratios, also known as the sample size) were not the same for both of them either week. When
the totals for the two weeks are added together, Bart and Lisa's work can be judged from an equal sample size, i.e.
the same number of articles edited by each. Looked at in this more accurate manner, Lisa's ratio is higher and,
therefore, so is her percentage. Also when the two tests are combined using a weighted average, overall, Lisa has
improved a much higher percentage than Bart because the quality modifier had a significantly higher percentage.
Therefore, like other paradoxes, it only appears to be a paradox because of incorrect assumptions, incomplete or
misguided information, or a lack of understanding a particular concept.
Week 1 quantity Week 2 quantity Total quantity and weighted quality
Lisa
0%
71.4%
50%
Bart
14.2%
100%
40%
This imagined paradox is caused when the percentage is provided but not the ratio. In this example, if only the
14.2% in the first week for Bart was provided but not the ratio (1:7), it would distort the information causing the
imagined paradox. Even though Bart's percentage is higher for the first and second week, when two weeks of articles
is combined, overall Lisa had improved a greater proportion, 50% of the 10 total articles. Lisa's proportional total of
articles improved exceeds Bart's total.
Here are some notations:
In the first week
Lisa improved 0% of the articles she edited.

Bart had a 14.2% success rate during that time.
Simpson's paradox
242
Success is associated with Bart.

In the second week
Lisa managed 71.4% in her busy life.

Bart achieved a 100% success rate.
Success is associated with Bart.
On both occasions Bart's edits were more successful than Lisa's. But if we combine the two sets, we see that Lisa and
Bart both edited 10 articles, and:
Lisa improved 5 articles.
Bart improved only 4.

Success is now associated with Lisa.
Bart is better for each set but worse overall.

The paradox stems from the intuition that Bart could not possibly be a better editor on each set but worse overall.
Pearl proved how this is possible, when "better editor" is taken in the counterfactual sense: "Were Bart to edit all
items in a set he would do better than Lisa would, on those same items". Clearly, frequency data cannot support this
sense of "better editor," because it does not tell us how Bart would perform on items edited by Lisa, and vice versa.
In the back of our mind, though, we assume that the articles were assigned at random to Bart and Lisa, an
assumption which (for a large sample) would support the counterfactual interpretation of "better editor." However,
under random assignment conditions, the data given in this example are unlikely, which accounts for our surprise
when confronting the rate reversal.
The arithmetical basis of the paradox is uncontroversial. If
must be greater than
and
we feel that
. However if different weights are used to form the overall score for each person then
this feeling may be disappointed. Here the first test is weighted
for Lisa and
for Bart while the weights are
reversed on the second test.
Lisa is a better editor on average, as her overall success rate is higher. But it is possible to have told the story in a
way which would make it appear obvious that Bart is more diligent.
Simpson's paradox shows us an extreme example of the importance of including data about possible confounding
variables when attempting to calculate causal relations. Precise criteria for selecting a set of "confounding variables,"
(i.e., variables that yield correct causal relationships if included in the analysis), is given in Pearl using causal graphs.
While Simpson's paradox often refers to the analysis of count tables, as shown in this example, it also occurs with
continuous data:[8] for example, if one fits separated regression lines through two sets of data, the two regression
lines may show a positive trend, while a regression line fitted through all data together will show a negative trend, as
shown on the first picture.
Simpson's paradox
243
Vector interpretation
Simpson's paradox can also be illustrated using the 2-dimensional
vector space. A success rate of
can be represented by a vector
, with a slope of
. If two rates
and
are combined, as in the examples given above, the result can be

represented by the sum of the vectors
and
, which
according to the parallelogram rule is the vector

with slope
Simpson's paradox says that even if a vector

has a smaller slope than another vector
smaller slope than
(in blue in the figure)

(in red), and
has a
, the sum of the two vectors
Vector interpretation of Simpson's paradox
(indicated by "+" in the figure) can still have a larger slope than the
sum of the two vectors
, as shown in the example.
Implications for decision making

The practical significance of Simpson's paradox surfaces in decision making situations where it poses the following
dilemma: Which data should we consult in choosing an action, the aggregated or the partitioned? In the Kidney
Stone example above, it is clear that if one is diagnosed with "Small Stones" or "Large Stones" the data for the
respective subpopulation should be consulted and Treatment A would be preferred to Treatment B. But what if a
patient is not diagnosed, and the size of the stone is not known; would it be appropriate to consult the aggregated
data and administer Treatment B? This would stand contrary to common sense; a treatment that is preferred both
under one condition and under its negation should also be preferred when the condition is unknown.
On the other hand, if the partitioned data is to be preferred a priori, what prevents one from partitioning the data into
arbitrary sub-categories (say based on eye color or post-treatment pain) artificially constructed to yield wrong
choices of treatments? Pearl shows that, indeed, in many cases it is the aggregated, not the partitioned data that gives
the correct choice of action. Worse yet, given the same table, one should sometimes follow the partitioned and
sometimes the aggregated data, depending on the story behind the data; with each story dictating its own choice.
Pearl considers this to be the real paradox behind Simpson's reversal.
As to why and how a story, not data, should dictate choices, the answer is that it is the story which encodes the
causal relationships among the variables. Once we extract these relationships and represent them in a graph called a
causal Bayesian network we can test algorithmically whether a given partition, representing confounding variables,
gives the correct answer. The test, called "back-door," requires that we check whether the nodes corresponding to the
confounding variables intercept certain paths in the graph. This reduces Simpson's Paradox to an exercise in graph
theory.
Psychology
Psychological interest in Simpson's paradox seeks to explain why people deem sign reversal to be impossible at first.
The question is where people get this strong intuition from, and how it is encoded in the mind. Simpson's paradox
demonstrates that this intuition cannot be supported by probability calculus alone, and thus led philosophers to
speculate that it is supported by an innate causal logic that guides people in reasoning about actions and their
consequences. Savage's sure-thing principle is an example of what such logic may entail. A qualified version of
Savage's sure thing principle can indeed be derived from Pearl's do-calculus and reads: "An action A that increases
the probability of an event B in each subpopulation Ci of C must also increase the probability of B in the population
Simpson's paradox
as a whole, provided that the action does not change the distribution of the subpopulations." This suggests that
knowledge about actions and consequences is stored in a form resembling Causal Bayesian Networks.
Probability
A study by Pavlides and Perlman suggests that in a randomly selected 2 2 2 table, Simpson's paradox will occur
with a probability of approximately 1/60.
Related concepts
Ecological fallacy (and ecological correlation)
Modifiable areal unit problem
Prosecutor's fallacy
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Judea Pearl. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge University Press (2000, 2nd edition 2009). ISBN 0-521-77362-8.
Robert L. Wardrop (February 1995). "Simpson's Paradox and the Hot Hand in Basketball". The American Statistician, 49 (1): pp. 2428.
Alan Agresti (2002). "Categorical Data Analysis" (Second edition). John Wiley and Sons ISBN 0-471-36093-7
David Freedman, Robert Pisani and Roger Curves. Statistics (3rd edition). W.W. Norton, 1998. ISBN 0-393-97083-3.
[5] Ken Ross. "A Mathematician at the Ballpark: Odds and Probabilities for Baseball Fans (Paperback)" Pi Press, 2004. ISBN 0-13-147990-3.
1213
[6] Statistics available from http:/ / www. baseball-reference. com/ : Data for Derek Jeter (http:/ / www. baseball-reference. com/ j/ jeterde01.
shtml), Data for David Justice (http:/ / www. baseball-reference. com/ j/ justida01. shtml).
[7] http:/ / www. significancemagazine. org/ details/ webexclusive/ 2671151/ Simpsons-Paradox-A-Cautionary-Tale-in-Advanced-Analytics.
html Berman, S. DalleMule, L. Greene, M, Lucker, J Simpsons Paradox: A Cautionary Tale in Advanced Analytics Significance magazine
online
[8] John Fox (1997). "Applied Regression Analysis, Linear Models, and Related Methods". Sage Publications. ISBN 0-8039-4540-X. 136137
Bibliography
Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Math on trial. How numbers get used and abused in the courtroom, Basic
Books, 2013. ISBN 978-0-465-03292-1. (Sixth chapter: "Math error number 6: Simpson's paradox. The Berkeley
sex bias case: discrimination detection").
External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Simpson's Paradox (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
paradox-simpson/)" by Gary Malinas.
Earliest known uses of some of the words of mathematics: S (http://jeff560.tripod.com/s.html)
For a brief history of the origins of the paradox see the entries "Simpson's Paradox" and "Spurious Correlation"
Pearl, Judea, " "The Art and Science of Cause and Effect. (http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/LECTURE/lecture_sec1.
htm)" A slide show and tutorial lecture.
Pearl, Judea, "Simpson's Paradox: An Anatomy" (http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/R264.pdf) (PDF)
Simpson's Paradox Visualized (http://vudlab.com/simpsons/) - an interactive demonstration of Simpson's
paradox.
Short articles by Alexander Bogomolny at cut-the-knot:
" Mediant Fractions. (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/blue/Mediant.shtml)"
" Simpson's Paradox. (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/Curriculum/Algebra/SimpsonParadox.shtml)"
The Wall Street Journal column "The Numbers Guy" (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125970744553071829.

html) for December 2, 2009 dealt with recent instances of Simpson's paradox in the news. Notably a Simpson's
paradox in the comparison of unemployment rates of the 2009 recession with the 1983 recession. by Cari Tuna
244
Simpson's paradox
(substituting for regular columnist Carl Bialik)
Skolem's paradox
In mathematical logic and philosophy, Skolem's paradox is a seeming contradiction that arises from the downward
LwenheimSkolem theorem. Thoralf Skolem (1922) was the first to discuss the seemingly contradictory aspects of
the theorem, and to discover the relativity of set-theoretic notions now known as non-absoluteness. Although it is not
an actual antinomy like Russell's paradox, the result is typically called a paradox, and was described as a
"paradoxical state of affairs" by Skolem (1922: p.295).
Skolem's paradox is that every countable axiomatisation of set theory in first-order logic, if it is consistent, has a
model that is countable. This appears contradictory because it is possible to prove, from those same axioms, a
sentence that intuitively says (or that precisely says in the standard model of the theory) that there exist sets that are
not countable. Thus the seeming contradiction is that a model that is itself countable, and which therefore contains
only countable sets, satisfies the first order sentence that intuitively states "there are uncountable sets".
A mathematical explanation of the paradox, showing that it is not a contradiction in mathematics, was given by
Skolem (1922). Skolem's work was harshly received by Ernst Zermelo, who argued against the limitations of
first-order logic, but the result quickly came to be accepted by the mathematical community.
The philosophical implications of Skolem's paradox have received much study. One line of inquiry questions
whether it is accurate to claim that any first-order sentence actually states "there are uncountable sets". This line of
thought can be extended to question whether any set is uncountable in an absolute sense. More recently, the paper
"Models and Reality" by Hilary Putnam, and responses to it, led to renewed interest in the philosophical aspects of
Skolem's result.
Background
One of the earliest results in set theory, published by Georg Cantor in 1874, was the existence of uncountable sets,
such as the powerset of the natural numbers, the set of real numbers, and the Cantor set. An infinite set X is
countable if there is a function that gives a one-to-one correspondence between X and the natural numbers, and is
uncountable if there is no such correspondence function. When Zermelo proposed his axioms for set theory in 1908,
he proved Cantor's theorem from them to demonstrate their strength.
Lwenheim (1915) and Skolem (1920, 1923) proved the LwenheimSkolem theorem. The downward form of this
theorem shows that if a countable first-order axiomatisation is satisfied by any infinite structure, then the same
axioms are satisfied by some countable structure. In particular, this implies that if the first order versions of
Zermelo's axioms of set theory are satisfiable, they are satisfiable in some countable model. The same is true of any
consistent first order axiomatisation of set theory.
The paradoxical result and its mathematical implications

Skolem (1922) pointed out the seeming contradiction between the LwenheimSkolem theorem on the one hand,
which implies that there is a countable model of Zermelo's axioms, and Cantor's theorem on the other hand, which
states that uncountable sets exist, and which is provable from Zermelo's axioms. "So far as I know," Skolem writes,
"no one has called attention to this peculiar and apparently paradoxical state of affairs. By virtue of the axioms we
can prove the existence of higher cardinalities... How can it be, then, that the entire domain B [a countable model of
Zermelo's axioms] can already be enumerated by means of the finite positive integers?" (Skolem 1922, p.295,
translation by Bauer-Mengelberg)
245
Skolem's paradox
More specifically, let B be a countable model of Zermelo's axioms. Then there is some set u in B such that B satisfies
the first-order formula saying that u is uncountable. For example, u could be taken as the set of real numbers in B.
Now, because B is countable, there are only countably many elements c such that c u according to B, because there
are only countably many elements c in B to begin with. Thus it appears that u should be countable. This is Skolem's
paradox.
Skolem went on to explain why there was no contradiction. In the context of a specific model of set theory, the term
"set" does not refer to an arbitrary set, but only to a set that is actually included in the model. The definition of
countability requires that a certain one-to-one correspondence, which is itself a set, must exist. Thus it is possible to
recognize that a particular set u is countable, but not countable in a particular model of set theory, because there is no
set in the model that gives a one-to-one correspondence between u and the natural numbers in that model.
Skolem used the term "relative" to describe this state of affairs, where the same set is included in two models of set
theory, is countable in one model, and is not countable in the other model. He described this as the "most important"
result in his paper. Contemporary set theorists describe concepts that do not depend on the choice of a transitive
model as absolute. From their point of view, Skolem's paradox simply shows that countability is not an absolute
property in first order logic. (Kunen 1980 p.141; Enderton 2001 p.152; Burgess 1977 p.406).
Skolem described his work as a critique of (first-order) set theory, intended to illustrate its weakness as a
foundational system:
"I believed that it was so clear that axiomatization in terms of sets was not a satisfactory ultimate foundation of
mathematics that mathematicians would, for the most part, not be very much concerned with it. But in recent
times I have seen to my surprise that so many mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory provide the
ideal foundation for mathematics; therefore it seemed to me that the time had come for a critique."
(Ebbinghaus and van Dalen, 2000, p. 147)
Reception by the mathematical community

A central goal of early research into set theory was to find a first order axiomatisation for set theory which was
categorical, meaning that the axioms would have exactly one model, consisting of all sets. Skolem's result showed
this is not possible, creating doubts about the use of set theory as a foundation of mathematics. It took some time for
the theory of first-order logic to be developed enough for mathematicians to understand the cause of Skolem's result;
no resolution of the paradox was widely accepted during the 1920s. Fraenkel (1928) still described the result as an
antinomy:
"Neither have the books yet been closed on the antinomy, nor has agreement on its significance and possible
solution yet been reached." (van Dalen and Ebbinghaus, 2000, p. 147).
In 1925, von Neumann presented a novel axiomatization of set theory, which developed into NBG set theory. Very
much aware of Skolem's 1922 paper, von Neumann investigated countable models of his axioms in detail. In his
concluding remarks, Von Neumann comments that there is no categorical axiomatization of set theory, or any other
theory with an infinite model. Speaking of the impact of Skolem's paradox, he wrote,
"At present we can do no more than note that we have one more reason here to entertain reservations about set
theory and that for the time being no way of rehabilitating this theory is known."(Ebbinghaus and van Dalen,
2000, p. 148)
Zermelo at first considered the Skolem paradox a hoax (van Dalen and Ebbinghaus, 2000, p.148 ff.), and spoke
against it starting in 1929. Skolem's result applies only to what is now called first-order logic, but Zermelo argued
against the finitary metamathematics that underlie first-order logic (Kanamori 2004, p.519 ff.). Zermelo argued that
his axioms should instead be studied in second-order logic, a setting in which Skolem's result does not apply.
Zermelo published a second-order axiomatization in 1930 and proved several categoricity results in that context.
Zermelo's further work on the foundations of set theory after Skolem's paper led to his discovery of the cumulative
246
Skolem's paradox
hierarchy and formalization of infinitary logic (van Dalen and Ebbinghaus, 2000, note 11).
Fraenkel et al. (1973, pp.303304) explain why Skolem's result was so surprising to set theorists in the 1920s.
Gdel's completeness theorem and the compactness theorem were not proved until 1929. These theorems illuminated
the way that first-order logic behaves and established its finitary nature, although Gdel's original proof of the
completeness theorem was complicated. Leon Henkin's alternative proof of the completeness theorem, which is now
a standard technique for constructing countable models of a consistent first-order theory, was not presented until
1947. Thus, in 1922, the particular properties of first-order logic that permit Skolem's paradox to go through were
not yet understood. It is now known that Skolem's paradox is unique to first-order logic; if set theory is formalized
using higher-order logic with full semantics then it does not have any countable models.
Current mathematical opinion

Current mathematical logicians do not view Skolem's paradox as any sort of fatal flaw in set theory. Kleene (1967,
p.324) describes the result as "not a paradox in the sense of outright contradiction, but rather a kind of anomaly".
After surveying Skolem's argument that the result is not contradictory, Kleene concludes "there is no absolute notion
of countability." Hunter (1971, p.208) describes the contradiction as "hardly even a paradox". Fraenkel et al. (1973,
p.304) explain that contemporary mathematicians are no more bothered by the lack of categoricity of first-order
theories than they are bothered by the conclusion of Gdel's incompleteness theorem that no consistent, effective,
and sufficiently strong set of first-order axioms is complete.
Countable models of ZF have become common tools in the study of set theory. Forcing, for example, is often
explained in terms of countable models. The fact that these countable models of ZF still satisfy the theorem that
there are uncountable sets is not considered a pathology; van Heijenoort (1967) describes it as "a novel and
unexpected feature of formal systems." (van Heijenoort 1967, p.290)
Although mathematicians no longer consider Skolem's result paradoxical, the result is often discussed by
philosophers. In the setting of philosophy, a merely mathematical resolution of the paradox may be less than
satisfactory.
References
Barwise, Jon (1977), "An introduction to first-order logic", in Barwise, Jon, ed. (1982), Handbook of
Mathematical Logic, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Amsterdam: North-Holland,
ISBN978-0-444-86388-1
Crossley, J.N.; Ash, C.J.; Brickhill, C.J.; Stillwell, J.C.; Williams, N.H. (1972), What is mathematical logic?,
London-Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN0-19-888087-1, Zbl0251.02001 [1]
Van Dalen, Dirk and Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus, "Zermelo and the Skolem Paradox", The Bulletin of Symbolic
Logic Volume 6, Number 2, June 2000.
Dragalin, A.G. (2001), "S/s085750" [2], in Hazewinkel, Michiel, Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer,
ISBN978-1-55608-010-4
Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Azriel Levy, Dirk van Dalen (1973), Foundations of Set Theory,
North-Holland.
Henkin, L. (1950), "Completeness in the theory of types", Journal of Symbolic Logic (The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, Vol. 15, No. 2) 15 (2): 8191, doi:10.2307/2266967 [3], JSTOR2266967 [4].
Kanamori, Akihiro (2004), "Zermelo and set theory" [5], The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4): 487553,
doi:10.2178/bsl/1102083759 [6], ISSN1079-8986 [7], MR2136635 [8]
Stephen Cole Kleene, (1952, 1971 with emendations, 1991 10th printing), Introduction to Metamathematics,
North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam NY. ISBN 0-444-10088-1. cf pages 420-432: 75. Axiom
systems, Skolem's paradox, the natural number sequence.
Stephen Cole Kleene, (1967). Mathematical Logic.
247
Skolem's paradox
Kunen, Kenneth (1980), Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs, Amsterdam: North-Holland,
ISBN978-0-444-85401-8
(1915), "ber Mglichkeiten im Relativkalkl", Mathematische Annalen 76 (4): 447470,
doi:10.1007/BF01458217 [9], ISSN0025-5831 [10]
Moore, A.W., "Set Theory, Skolem's Paradox and the Tractatus", Analysis 1985: 45.
Hilary Putnam, "Models and Reality", The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp.464482
Rautenberg, Wolfgang (2010), A Concise Introduction to Mathematical Logic [11] (3rd ed.), New York: Springer
Science+Business Media, doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1221-3 [12], ISBN978-1-4419-1220-6
Skolem, Thoralf (1922). "Axiomatized set theory". Reprinted in From Frege to Gdel, van Heijenoort, 1967, in
English translation by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg, pp.291301.
External links
Bays's Ph.D. thesis on the paradox [13]
Vaughan Pratt's celebration of his academic ancestor Skolem's 120th birthday [14]
Extract from Moore's discussion of the paradox(broken link) [15]
References
[1] http:/ / www. zentralblatt-math. org/ zmath/ en/ search/ ?format=complete& q=an:0251. 02001
[2] http:/ / www. encyclopediaofmath. org/ index. php?title=S/ s085750
[3] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 2307%2F2266967
[5] http:/ / www. math. ucla. edu/ ~asl/ bsl/ 1004-toc. htm
[6] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 2178%2Fbsl%2F1102083759
[8] http:/ / www. ams. org/ mathscinet-getitem?mr=2136635
[9] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1007%2FBF01458217
[11] http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ 978-1-4419-1220-6/
[12] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1007%2F978-1-4419-1221-3
[13] http:/ / www. nd. edu/ ~tbays/ papers/ pthesis. pdf
[14] http:/ / boole. stanford. edu/ skolem
[15] http:/ / www. webcitation. org/ query?url=http:/ / uk. geocities. com/ frege%40btinternet. com/ cantor/ skolem_moore. htm&
date=2009-10-25+ 04:16:47
248
Smale's paradox
249
Smale's paradox
In differential topology, Smale's paradox states that it is possible to
turn a sphere inside out in a three-dimensional space with possible
self-intersections but without creating any crease, a process more
commonly and historically called sphere eversion (eversion means "to
turn inside out"). This is surprising, to those who understand regular
homotopy, and is hence deemed a veridical paradox. (The concept
'Smale's Paradox' generally does not appear in the traditional
mathematical literature.) More precisely, let
be the standard embedding; then there is a regular homotopy of

immersions
A Morin surface seen from "above"
such that 0= and 1=.
History
This 'paradox' was discovered by Stephen Smale(1958). It is difficult to visualize a particular example of such a
turning, although some digital animations have been produced that make it somewhat easier. The first example was
exhibited through the efforts of several mathematicians, including Arnold S. Shapiro and Bernard Morin who was
blind. On the other hand, it is much easier to prove that such a "turning" exists and that is what Smale did.
Smale's graduate adviser Raoul Bott at first told Smale that the result was obviously wrong (Levy 1995). His
reasoning was that the degree of the Gauss map must be preserved in such "turning"in particular it follows that
there is no such turning of S1in R2. But the degree of the Gauss map for the embeddings f, f in R3 are both equal to
1, and do not have opposite sign as one might incorrectly guess. The degree of the Gauss map of all immersions of a
2-sphere in R3 is 1; so there is no obstacle. The term "veridical paradox" applies perhaps more appropriately at this
level: until Smale's work, there is no documented attempt to argue that 2-sphere eversion was, or was not, possible,
and accordingly, subsequent attempts at explicit eversion, or to argue that it was impossible, are in hindsight.
Accordingly, there never was an historical paradox associated with Smale's actual sphere eversion, merely an
appreciation of the conceptual visualization subtleties by those confronting the idea for the first time.
See h-principle for further generalizations.
Proof
Smale's original proof was indirect: he identified (regular homotopy) classes of immersions of spheres which can be
unwound to produce an explicit regular homotopy, but this is not easy to do.
There are several ways of producing explicit examples and beautiful mathematical visualization:
Half-way models: these consist of very special homotopies. This is the original method, first done by Shapiro and
Phillips via Boy's surface, later refined by many others. The original half-way model homotopies were
constructed by hand, and worked topologically but weren't minimal. The movie created by Nelson Max, over a
seven-year period, and based on Charles Pugh's chicken-wire models (subsequently stolen from the Mathematics
Department at Berkeley), was a computer-graphics 'tour de force' for its time, and set the bench-mark for
computer animation for many years. A more recent and definitive graphics refinement (1980s) is minimax
eversions, which is a variational method, and consist of special homotopies (they are shortest paths with respect to
Smale's paradox
Willmore energy). In turn, understanding behavior of Willmore energy requires understanding solutions of
fourth-order partial differential equations, and so the visually beautiful and evocative images belie some very
deep mathematics beyond Smale's original abstract proof.
Thurston's corrugations: this is a topological method and generic; it takes a homotopy and perturbs it so that it
becomes a regular homotopy. This is illustrated in the computer-graphics animation 'Outside In', easily found by
searching YouTube.
Aitchison's 'holiverse' (2010): this uses a combination of topological and geometric methods, and is specific to the
actual regular homotopy between a standardly embedded 2-sphere, and the embedding with reversed orientation.
This provides conceptual understanding for the process, revealed as arising from the concrete structure of the
3-dimensional projective plane and the underlying geometry of the Hopf fibration. Understanding details of these
mathematical concepts is not required to conceptually appreciate the concrete eversion that arises, which in
essence only requires understanding a specific embedded circle drawn on a torus in 3-space. George Francis
suggested the name "holiverse", derived from the word "holistic", since (after some thought) the complete
eversion can be conceptually grasped from beginning to end, without the visual aids provided by animation. In
spirit, this is closer to the ideas originally suggested by Shapiro, and in practice provides a concrete proof of
eversion not requiring the abstraction underlying Smale's proof. This is partially illustrated in a Povray
computer-graphics animation, again easily found by searching YouTube.
References
Iain R. Aitchison (2010) The `Holiverse': holistic eversion of the 2-sphere in R^3 [1], preprint. arXiv:1008.0916.
John B. Etnyre (2004) Review of "h-principles and flexibility in geometry", MR1982875 [2].
Francis, George K. (2007), A topological picturebook, Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag,
ISBN978-0-387-34542-0, MR2265679 [3]
George K. Francis & Bernard Morin (1980) "Arnold Shapiro's Eversion of the Sphere", Mathematical
Intelligencer 2(4):2003.
Levy, Silvio (1995), "A brief history of sphere eversions" [4], Making waves, Wellesley, MA: A K Peters Ltd.,
ISBN978-1-56881-049-2, MR1357900 [5]
Max Nelson (1977) "Turning a Sphere Inside Out", International Film Bureau, Chicago, (video).
Anthony Phillips (May 1966) "Turning a surface inside out", Scientific American, pp.112120.
Smale, Stephen (1958), "A classification of immersions of the two-sphere", Transactions of the American
Mathematical Society 90: 281290, ISSN0002-9947 [6], JSTOR1993205 [7], MR0104227 [8]
External links
Outside In [9], full video (short clip here [10])

[11] Above video hosted on youtube.com
A History of Sphere Eversions [12]
"Turning a Sphere Inside Out" [13]
Software for visualizing sphere eversion [14]
Mathematics visualization: topology. The holiverse sphere eversion (Povray animation) [15]
250
Smale's paradox
251
References
[1] http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ 1008. 0916
[4] http:/ / www. geom. uiuc. edu/ docs/ outreach/ oi/ history. html
[9] http:/ / video. google. com/ videoplay?docid=-6626464599825291409
[10] http:/ / www. th. physik. uni-bonn. de/ th/ People/ netah/ cy/ movies/ sphere. mpg
[11] http:/ / www. youtube. com/ watch?v=wO61D9x6lNY
[12] http:/ / torus. math. uiuc. edu/ jms/ Papers/ isama/ color/ opt2. htm
[13] http:/ / www. cs. berkeley. edu/ ~sequin/ SCULPTS/ SnowSculpt04/ eversion. html
[14] http:/ / www. dgp. utoronto. ca/ ~mjmcguff/ eversion/
[15] http:/ / www. youtube. com/ watch?v=876a_0WAoCU/
Thomson's lamp
Thomson's lamp is a philosophical puzzle that is a variation on Zeno's paradoxes. It was devised in 1954 by British
philosopher James F. Thomson, who also coined the term supertask.
Time State
0.000
On
1.000
Off
1.500
On
1.750
Off
1.875
On
...
...
2.000
Consider a lamp with a toggle switch. Flicking the switch once turns the lamp on. Another flick will turn the lamp
off. Now suppose that there is a being able to perform the following task: starting a timer, he turns the lamp on. At
the end of one minute, he turns it off. At the end of another half minute, he turns it on again. At the end of another
quarter of a minute, he turns it off. At the next eighth of a minute, he turns it on again, and he continues thus, flicking
the switch each time after waiting exactly one-half the time he waited before flicking it previously. The sum of this
infinite series of time intervals is exactly two minutes.
The following questions are then considered:
Is the lamp switch on or off after exactly two minutes?
Would the final state be different if the lamp had started out being on, instead of off?
Thomson wasn't interested in actually answering these questions, because he believed these questions had no
answers. This is because Thomson used this thought experiment to argue against the possibility of supertasks, which
is the completion of an infinite number of tasks. To be specific, Thomson argued that if supertasks are possible, then
the scenario of having flicked the lamp on and off infinitely many times should be possible too (at least logically,
even if not necessarily physically). But, Thomson reasoned, the possibility of the completion of the supertask of
flicking a lamp on and off infinitely many times creates a contradiction. The lamp is either on or off at the 2-minute
mark. If the lamp is on, then there must have been some last time, right before the 2-minute mark, at which it was
flicked on. But, such an action must have been followed by a flicking off action since, after all, every action of
Thomson's lamp
252
flicking the lamp on before the 2-minute mark is followed by one at which it is flicked off between that time and the
2-minute mark. So, the lamp cannot be on. Analogously, one can also reason that the lamp cannot be off at the
2-minute mark. So, the lamp cannot be either on or off. So, we have a contradiction. By reductio ad absurdum, the
assumption that supertasks are possible must therefore be rejected: supertasks are logically impossible.
Discussion
The status of the lamp and the switch is known for all times strictly less than two minutes. However the question
does not state how the sequence finishes, and so the status of the switch at exactly two minutes is indeterminate.
Though acceptance of this indeterminacy is resolution enough for some, problems do continue to present themselves
under the intuitive assumption that one should be able to determine the status of the lamp and the switch at any time,
given full knowledge of all previous statuses and actions taken.
Mathematical series analogy

The question is similar to determining the value of Grandi's series, i.e. the limit as n tends to infinity of
For even values of n, the above finite series sums to 1; for odd values, it sums to -1. In other words, as n takes the
values of each of the non-negative integers 0, 1, 2, 3, ... in turn, the series generates the sequence {1, -1, 1, -1, ...},
representing the changing state of the lamp. The sequence does not converge as n tends to infinity, so neither does
the infinite series.
Another way of illustrating this problem is to let the series look like this:
The series can be rearranged as:
The unending series in the brackets is exactly the same as the original series S. This means S = 1 - S which implies S
= . In fact, this manipulation can be rigorously justified: there are generalized definitions for the sums of series that
do assign Grandi's series the value . On the other hand, according to other definitions for the sum of a series this
series has no defined sum (the limit does not exist).
One of Thomson's objectives in his original 1954 paper is to differentiate supertasks from their series analogies. He
writes of the lamp and Grandi's series,
"Then the question whether the lamp is on or off is the question: What is the sum of the infinite divergent
sequence
+1, 1, +1, ?
"Now mathematicians do say that this sequence has a sum; they say that its sum is 12. And this answer does
not help us, since we attach no sense here to saying that the lamp is half-on. I take this to mean that there is no
established method for deciding what is done when a super-task is done. We cannot be expected to pick up
this idea, just because we have the idea of a task or tasks having been performed and because we are
acquainted with transfinite numbers."[1]
Later, he claims that even the divergence of a series does not provide information about its supertask: "The
impossibility of a super-task does not depend at all on whether some vaguely-felt-to-be-associated arithmetical
sequence is convergent or divergent."[2]
Thomson's lamp
Notes
[1] Thomson p.6. For the mathematics and its history he cites Hardy and Waismann's books, for which see History of Grandi's series.
[2] Thomson p.7
References
Allen, Benjamin William (2008). Zeno, Aristotle, the Racetrack and the Achilles: A Historical and Philosophical
Investigation (http://books.google.com/books?id=LQEnRFmeOu4C&pg=PA209). New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. pp.209210. ISBN9781109058437.
Benacerraf, Paul (1962). "Tasks, Super-Tasks, and the Modern Eleatics". The Journal of Philosophy 59 (24):
765784. JSTOR 2023500 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023500).
Huggett, Nick (2010). Everywhere and Everywhen : Adventures in Physics and Philosophy: Adventures in
Physics and Philosophy (http://books.google.com/books?id=PV98odlvq4kC&pg=PA22). Oxford University
Press. pp.2223. ISBN9780199702114.
Thomson, James F. (October 1954). "Tasks and Super-Tasks". Analysis (Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 1) 15 (1): 113.
doi: 10.2307/3326643 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3326643). JSTOR 3326643 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/
3326643).

The two envelopes problem, also known as the exchange paradox, is a brain teaser, puzzle, or paradox in logic,
probability, and recreational mathematics. It is of special interest in decision theory, and for the Bayesian
interpretation of probability theory. Historically, it arose as a variant of the necktie paradox.
The problem:
You have two indistinguishable envelopes that each contain money. One contains twice as much as the other.
You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. You pick at random, but before you open the
envelope, you are offered the chance to take the other envelope instead.
It can be argued that it is to your advantage to swap envelopes by showing that your expected return on swapping
exceeds the sum in your envelope. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that it is beneficial to continue to swap
envelopes indefinitely.
Example
Assume the amount in a selected envelope is $20. If the envelope happens to be the larger of the two envelopes
("larger" meaning the one with the larger amount of money), that would mean that the amount in the envelope is
twice the amount in the other envelope. So in this case the amount in the other envelope would be $10.
However if the selected envelope is the smaller of the two envelopes, that would mean that the amount in the other
envelope is twice the amount in the selected envelope. In this second scenario the amount in the other envelope
would be $40.
The probability of either of these scenarios is one half, since there is a 50% chance that the larger envelope was
selected and a 50% chance that the smaller envelope was selected. The expected value calculation for how much
money is in the other envelope would be the amount in the first scenario times the probability of the first scenario
plus the amount in the second scenario times the probability of the second scenario, which is $10 * 1/2 + $40 * 1/2.
The result of this calculation is that the expected value of money in the other envelope is $25. Since this is greater
than the selected envelope, it would appear to the person selecting the envelope's advantage to always switch
envelopes. However, this probability calculation is for the singular situation of being a gambler offered by the house
to double or half your money (as opposed to the balanced "double or nothing"). In the two envelopes problem the
253

person selecting the envelope is, by switching, also effectively the house giving the other person (the gambler) an
envelope with double or half the amount in their envelope. This is by default because the starting value of the
envelope one party receives is linked at double or half of the other party and is randomly chosen. What this means is
the person who selected the envelope is giving up an envelope with an expected value of $25 to receive an envelope
with an expected value of $25.
A large number of solutions have been proposed. The usual scenario is that one writer proposes a solution that solves
the problem as stated, but then another writer discovers that altering the problem slightly revives the paradox. In this
way, a family of closely related formulations of the problem have been created, which are discussed in the literature.
No proposed solution is widely accepted as correct. Despite this it is common for authors to claim that the solution to
the problem is easy, even elementary. However, when investigating these elementary solutions they often differ from
one author to the next. Since 1987 new papers have been published every year.[1]
Problem
Basic setup: You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of
which contains a positive sum of money. One envelope contains twice
as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep whatever
amount it contains. You pick one envelope at random but before you
open it you are given the chance to take the other envelope instead.
The switching argument: Now suppose you reason as follows:
1. I denote by A the amount in my selected envelope.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
Thus the other envelope contains 2A with probability 1/2 and A/2 with probability 1/2.
So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
This is greater than A, so I gain on average by swapping.

After the switch, I can denote that content by B and reason in exactly the same manner as above.
I will conclude that the most rational thing to do is to swap back again.
To be rational, I will thus end up swapping envelopes indefinitely.
As it seems more rational to open just any envelope than to swap indefinitely, we have a contradiction.
The puzzle: The puzzle is to find the flaw in the very compelling line of reasoning above.
254
255
Common resolution
A common way to resolve the paradox, both in popular literature and academic literature, is to observe that A stands
for different things at different places in the expected value calculation, step 7 above. In the first term A is the
smaller amount while in the second term A is the larger amount. To mix different instances of a variable in the same
formula like this is said to be illegitimate, so step 7 is incorrect, and this is the cause of the paradox.
According to this analysis, a correct argument runs on the following lines. By definition the amount in one envelope
is twice as much as in the other. Denoting the lower of the two amounts by X, we write the expected value
calculation as
Here X stands for the same thing in every term of the equation. We learn that 1.5X, is the average expected value in
either of the envelopes. Being less than 2X, the value in the greater envelope, there is no reason to swap the
envelopes.
Let us rewrite the preceding calculations in a more detailed notation that explicitly distinguishes random from
not-random quantities (a different distinction from the usual in ordinary, deterministic mathematics between
variables and constants). This is a useful way to compare with the next, alternative, resolution. So far, we were
thinking of the two amounts of money in the two envelopes as fixed. The only randomness lies in which one goes
into which envelope. We called the smaller amount X, let us denote the larger amount by Y. Given the values x and y
of X and Y, where y = 2x and x > 0, the problem description tells us (whether or not x and y are known)
for all possible values x of the smaller amount X; there is a corresponding definition of the probability distribution of
B given X and Y. In our resolution of the paradox, we guessed that in Step 7 the writer was trying to compute the
expected value of B given X=x. Splitting the calculation over the two possibilities for which envelope contains the
smaller amount, it is certainly correct to write
At this point, the writer correctly substitutes the value 1/2 for both of the conditional probabilities on the right hand
side of this equation (Step 2). At the same time he correctly substitutes the random variable B inside the first
conditional expectation for 2A, when taking its expectation value given B > A and X = x, and he similarly correctly
substitutes the random variable B for A/2 when taking its expectation value given B < A and X = x (Steps 4 and 5).
He would then arrive at the completely correct equation
However he now proceeds, in the first of the two terms on the right hand side, to replace the expectation value of A
given that Envelope A contains the smaller amount and given that the amounts are x and 2x, by the random quantity
A itself. Similarly, in the second term on the right hand side he replaces the expectation value of A given now that
Envelope A contains the larger amount and given that the amounts are x and 2x, also by the random quantity A itself.
The correct substitutions would have been, of course, x and 2x respectively, leading to a correct conclusion
.

Naturally this coincides with the expectation value of A given X=x.
Indeed, in the two contexts in which the random variable A appears on the right hand side, it is standing for two
different things, since its distribution has been conditioned on different events. Obviously, A tends to be larger, when
we know that it is greater than B and when the two amounts are fixed, and it tends to be smaller, when we know that
it is smaller than B and the two amounts are fixed, cf. Schwitzgebel and Dever (2007, 2008). In fact, it is exactly
twice as large in the first situation as in the second situation.
The preceding resolution was first noted by Bruss in 1996. Falk gave a concise exposition in 2009.
Alternative interpretation
The first solution above does not explain what is wrong if the player is allowed to open the first envelope before
offered the option to switch. In this case, A stands for the value that then seen throughout all subsequent calculations.
The mathematical variable A stands for any particular amount he might see there (it is a mathematical variable, a
generic possible value of a random variable). The reasoning appears to show that whatever amount he would see
there, he would decide to switch. Hence, he does not need to look in the envelope at all: he knows that if he looks,
and goes through the calculations, they will tell him to switch, whatever he saw in the envelope.
In this case, at Steps 6, 7 and 8 of the reasoning, A is any fixed possible value of the amount of money in the first
envelope.
Thus, the proposed "common resolution" above breaks down, and another explanation is needed.
Panagiotis Tsikogiannopoulos (2014) proposed the following explanation to the paradox in his paper. Suppose that
both players see that the envelope of player A contains 100 euros and let's make a calculation using only numerical
values: Once we know the amount of 100 euros, we conclude that the other envelope can contain either 50 or 200
euros. Now there are two possible events for the two fixed amounts that the game can be played with:
We assume that both players have no prior beliefs for the total amount of money they are going to share, so Events 1
and 2 must be considered to have equal probabilities to occur. In every variation of two fixed amounts where the
players want to make their calculations based on the numerical value of the amount revealed to them, they will have
to weigh the return derived from each event with the average fixed amount by which the game is played in this
event. In the Event 1, player A will have a profit of 100 euros by exchanging his envelope while in the Event 2 will
have a loss of 50 euros. The average fixed amount in the Event 1 is 150 euros while in the Event 2 is 75 euros.
The formula of expected return in case of exchange for player A that summarizes the above remarks is the following:
So, the decision of the exchange or not of his envelope is indifferent. Below is an explanation of why the players will
have to weigh the return derived from each event with the average fixed amount:
In the Event 1, the player who will switch the amount of 100 euros with the amount of 200 euros will have a profit of
100 euros in a game that shares 300 euros in total. So we can say that this player played the game with a success
factor of 100 euros / 300 euros = +1/3. Similarly, the other player played the game with a success factor of -1/3. In
the Event 2, the player who will switch the amount of 50 euros with the amount of 100 euros will have a profit of 50
euros in a game that shares 150 euros in total. This player played the game with a success factor of +1/3 also and his
opponent with a success factor of -1/3 also. In reality, when a player sees that his envelope contains 100 euros, he
doesnt know whether he is in the game of the Event 1 or in the game of the Event 2. If he is in the Event 1 and
switches he will have a success factor of +1/3 and if he is in the Event 2 and switches he will have a success factor of
-1/3. As we mentioned above, these two events have equal probability of 1/2 to occur, so the total success factor of
player A considering both possible events is zero. This means that the decision of a player to switch or not switch his
256

envelope is indifferent, even when he makes his calculations based on the amount of money that is revealed to him.
This interpretation of the two envelopes problem appears in the first publications in which the paradox was
introduced, Gardner (1989) and Nalebuff (1989). It is common in the more mathematical literature on the problem.
The "common resolution" above depends on a particular interpretation of what the writer of the argument is trying to
calculate: namely, it assumes he is after the (unconditional) expectation value of what's in Envelope B. In the
mathematical literature on Two Envelopes Problem (and in particular, in the literature where it was first introduced
to the world), another interpretation is more common, involving the conditional expectation value (conditional on
what might be in Envelope A). To solve this and related interpretations or versions of the problem, most authors use
the Bayesian interpretation of probability.
Introduction to resolutions based on Bayesian probability theory

Here the ways the paradox can be resolved depend to a large degree on the assumptions that are made about the
things that are not made clear in the setup and the proposed argument for switching. The most usual assumption
about the way the envelopes are set up is that a sum of money is in one envelope, and twice that sum is in another
envelope. One of the two envelopes is randomly given to the player (envelope A). It is not made clear exactly how
the smaller of the two sums is determined, what values it could possibly take and, in particular, whether there is a
maximum sum it might contain. It is also not specified whether the player can look in Envelope A before deciding
whether or not to switch. A further ambiguity in the paradox is that it is not made clear in the proposed argument
whether the amount A in Envelope A is intended to be a constant, a random variable, or some other quantity.
If it assumed that there is a maximum sum that can be put in the first envelope, then a simple and mathematically
sound resolution is possible within the second interpretation. Step 6 in the proposed line of reasoning is not always
true, since if the player holds more than the maximum sum that can be put into the first envelope they must hold the
envelope containing the larger sum, and are thus certain to lose by switching. This may not occur often, but when it
does, the heavy loss the player incurs means that, on average, there is no advantage in switching. This resolves all
practical cases of the problem, whether or not the player looks in their envelope.
It can be envisaged, however, that the sums in the two envelopes are not limited. This requires a more careful
mathematical analysis, and also uncovers other possible interpretations of the problem. If, for example, the smaller
of the two sums of money is considered equally likely to be one of infinitely many positive integers, without upper
limitthe probability that it is any given number is always zero. This absurd situation exemplifies an improper prior,
and this is generally considered to resolve the paradox in this case.
It is possible to devise a distribution for the sums possible in the first envelope such that the maximum value is
unlimited, computation of the expectation of what is in B given what is in A seems to dictate you should switch, and
the distribution constitutes a proper prior. In these cases it can be shown that the expected sum in both envelopes is
infinite. There is no gain, on average, in swapping.
The first two resolutions we present correspond, technically speaking, first to A being a random variable, and
secondly to it being a possible value of a random variable (and the expectation being computed is a conditional
expectation). At the same time, in the first resolution the two original amounts of money seem to be thought of as
being fixed, while in the second they are also thought of as varying. Thus there are two main interpretations of the
problem, and two main resolutions.
257
Proposed resolutions to the alternative interpretation

Nalebuff (1989), Christensen and Utts (1992), Falk and Konold (1992), Blachman, Christensen and Utts (1996),
Nickerson and Falk (2006), pointed out that if the amounts of money in the two envelopes have any proper
probability distribution representing the player's prior beliefs about the amounts of money in the two envelopes, then
it is impossible that whatever the amount A=a in the first envelope might be, it would be equally likely, according to
these prior beliefs, that the second contains a/2 or 2a. Thus step 6 of the argument, which leads to always switching,
is a non-sequitur.
According to this interpretation, the writer is carrying out the following computation, where he is conditioning now
on the value of A, the amount in Envelope A, not on the pair amounts in the two envelopes X and Y:
Completely correctly, and according to Step 5, the two conditional expectation values are evaluated as
However in Step 6 the writer is invoking Steps 2 and 3 to get the two conditional probabilities, and effectively
replacing the two conditional probabilities of Envelope A containing the smaller and larger amount, respectively,
given the amount actually in that envelope, both by the unconditional probability 1/2: he makes the substitutions
But intuitively, we would expect that the larger the amount in A, the more likely it is the larger of the two, and
vice-versa. And it is a mathematical fact, as we will see in a moment, that it is impossible that both of these
conditional probabilities are equal to 1/2 for all possible values of a. In fact, for step 6 to be true, whatever a might
be, the smaller amount of money in the two envelopes must be equally likely to be between 1 and 2, as between 2
and 4, as between 4 and 8, ... ad infinitum. But there is no way to divide total probability 1 into an infinite number of
pieces that are not only all equal to one another, but also all larger than zero. Yet the smaller amount of money in
the two envelopes must have probability larger than zero to be in at least one of the just mentioned ranges.
To see this, suppose that the chance that the smaller of the two envelopes contains an amount between 2n and 2n+1 is
p(n), where n is any whole number, positive or negative, and for definiteness we include the lower limit but exclude
the upper in each interval. It follows that the conditional probability that the envelope in our hands contains the
smaller amount of money of the two, given that its contents are between 2n and 2n+1, is
If this is equal to 1/2, it follows by simple algebra that
or p(n)=p(n-1). This must be true for all n, an impossibility.
258
259
New variant
Though Bayesian probability theory can resolve the alternative interpretation of the paradox above, it turns out that
examples can be found of proper probability distributions, such that the expected value of the amount in the second
envelope given that in the first does exceed the amount in the first, whatever it might be. The first such example was
already given by Nalebuff (1989). See also Christensen and Utts (1992)
Denote again the amount of money in the first envelope by A and that in the second by B. We think of these as
random. Let X be the smaller of the two amounts and Y=2X be the larger. Notice that once we have fixed a
probability distribution for X then the joint probability distribution of A,B is fixed, since A,B = X,Y or Y,X each with
probability 1/2, independently of X,Y.
The bad step 6 in the "always switching" argument led us to the finding E(B|A=a)>a for all a, and hence to the
recommendation to switch, whether or not we know a. Now, it turns out that one can quite easily invent proper
probability distributions for X, the smaller of the two amounts of money, such that this bad conclusion is still true.
One example is analysed in more detail, in a moment.
It cannot be true that whatever a, given A=a, B is equally likely to be a/2 or 2a, but it can be true that whatever a,
given A=a, B is larger in expected value than a.
Suppose for example (Broome, 1995)[2] that the envelope with the smaller amount actually contains 2n dollars with
probability 2n/3n+1 where n = 0, 1, 2, These probabilities sum to 1, hence the distribution is a proper prior (for
subjectivists) and a completely decent probability law also for frequentists.
Imagine what might be in the first envelope. A sensible strategy would certainly be to swap when the first envelope
contains 1, as the other must then contain 2. Suppose on the other hand the first envelope contains 2. In that case
there are two possibilities: the envelope pair in front of us is either {1, 2} or {2, 4}. All other pairs are impossible.
The conditional probability that we are dealing with the {1, 2} pair, given that the first envelope contains 2, is
and consequently the probability it's the {2, 4} pair is 2/5, since these are the only two possibilities. In this
derivation,
is the probability that the envelope pair is the pair 1 and 2, and Envelope A happens to
contain 2;
is the probability that the envelope pair is the pair 2 and 4, and (again) Envelope A
happens to contain 2. Those are the only two ways that Envelope A can end up containing the amount 2.
It turns out that these proportions hold in general unless the first envelope contains 1. Denote by a the amount we
imagine finding in Envelope A, if we were to open that envelope, and suppose that a = 2n for some n 1. In that case
the other envelope contains a/2 with probability 3/5 and 2a with probability 2/5.
So either the first envelope contains 1, in which case the conditional expected amount in the other envelope is 2, or
the first envelope contains a > 1, and though the second envelope is more likely to be smaller than larger, its
conditionally expected amount is larger: the conditionally expected amount in Envelope B is
which is more than a. This means that the player who looks in Envelope A would decide to switch whatever he saw
there. Hence there is no need to look in Envelope A to make that decision.
This conclusion is just as clearly wrong as it was in the preceding interpretations of the Two Envelopes Problem. But
now the flaws noted above do not apply; the a in the expected value calculation is a constant and the conditional
probabilities in the formula are obtained from a specified and proper prior distribution.
260
Some writers think that the new paradox can be defused.[3] Suppose
for all a. As remarked
before, this is possible for some probability distributions of X (the smaller amount of money in the two envelopes).
Averaging over a, it follows either that
, or alternatively that
. But A and
B have the same probability distribution, and hence the same expectation value, by symmetry (each envelope is
equally likely to be the smaller of the two). Thus both have infinite expectation values, and hence so must X too.
Thus if we switch for the second envelope because its conditional expected value is larger than what actually is in
the first, whatever that might be, we are exchanging an unknown amount of money whose expectation value is
infinite for another unknown amount of money with the same distribution and the same infinite expected value. The
average amount of money in both envelopes is infinite. Exchanging one for the other simply exchanges an average of
infinity with an average of infinity.
Probability theory therefore tells us why and when the paradox can occur and explains to us where the sequence of
apparently logical steps breaks down. In this situation, Steps 6 and Steps 7 of the standard Two Envelopes argument
can be replaced by correct calculations of the conditional probabilities that the other envelope contains half or twice
what's in A, and a correct calculation of the conditional expectation of what's in B given what's in A. Indeed, that
conditional expected value is larger than what's in A. But because the unconditional expected amount in A is infinite,
this does not provide a reason to switch, because it does not guarantee that on average you'll be better off after
switching. One only has this mathematical guarantee in the situation that the unconditional expectation value of
what's in A is finite. But then the reason for switching without looking in the envelope,
for all
a, simply cannot arise.
Many economists prefer to argue that in a real-life situation, the expectation of the amount of money in an envelope
cannot be infinity, for instance, because the total amount of money in the world is bounded; therefore any probability
distribution describing the real world would have to assign probability 0 to the amount being larger than the total
amount of money on the world. Therefore the expectation of the amount of money under this distribution cannot be
infinity. The resolution of the second paradox, for such writers, is that the postulated probability distributions cannot
arise in a real-life situation. These are similar arguments as used to explain the St. Petersburg Paradox.
Foundations of mathematical economics

In mathematical economics and the theory of utility, which explains economic behaviour in terms of expected utility,
there remains a problem to be resolved. In the real world we presumably would not indefinitely exchange one
envelope for the other (and probability theory, as just discussed, explains quite well why calculations of conditional
expectations might mislead us). Yet the expected utility based theory of economic behaviour assumes that people do
(or should) make economic decisions by maximizing expected utility, conditional on present knowledge. If the utility
function is unbounded above, then the theory can still predict infinite switching.
Fortunately for mathematical economics and the theory of utility, it is generally agreed that as an amount of money
increases, its utility to the owner increases less and less, and ultimately there is a finite upper bound to the utility of
all possible amounts of money. We can pretend that the amount of money in the whole world is as large as we like,
yet the utility that the owner of all that money experiences, while rising further and further, will never rise beyond a
certain point no matter how much is in his possession. For decision theory and utility theory, the two envelope
paradox illustrates that unbounded utility does not exist in the real world, so fortunately there is no need to build a
decision theory that allows unbounded utility, let alone utility of infinite expectation.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Controversy among philosophers

As mentioned above, any distribution producing this variant of the paradox must have an infinite mean. So before
the player opens an envelope the expected gain from switching is " ", which is not defined. In the words of
Chalmers this is "just another example of a familiar phenomenon, the strange behaviour of infinity". Chalmers
suggests that decision theory generally breaks down when confronted with games having a diverging expectation,
and compares it with the situation generated by the classical St. Petersburg paradox.
However, Clark and Shackel argue that this blaming it all on "the strange behaviour of infinity" does not resolve the
paradox at all; neither in the single case nor the averaged case. They provide a simple example of a pair of random
variables both having infinite mean but where it is clearly sensible to prefer one to the other, both conditionally and
on average. They argue that decision theory should be extended so as to allow infinite expectation values in some
situations.
Non-probabilistic variant
The logician Raymond Smullyan questioned if the paradox has anything to do with probabilities at all. He did this by
expressing the problem in a way that does not involve probabilities. The following plainly logical arguments lead to
conflicting conclusions:
1. Let the amount in the envelope chosen by the player be A. By swapping, the player may gain A or lose A/2. So the
potential gain is strictly greater than the potential loss.
2. Let the amounts in the envelopes be X and 2X. Now by swapping, the player may gain X or lose X. So the
potential gain is equal to the potential loss.
A number of solutions have been put forward. Careful analyses have been made by some logicians. Though solutions
differ, they all pinpoint semantic issues concerned with counterfactual reasoning. We want to compare the amount
that we would gain by switching if we would gain by switching, with the amount we would lose by switching if we
would indeed lose by switching. However, we cannot both gain and lose by switching at the same time. We are
asked to compare two incompatible situations. Only one of them can factually occur, the other is a counterfactual
situationsomehow imaginary. To compare them at all, we must somehow "align" the two situations, providing
some definite points in common.
James Chase (2002) argues that the second argument is correct because it does correspond to the way to align two
situations (one in which we gain, the other in which we lose), which is preferably indicated by the problem
description. Also Bernard Katz and Doris Olin (2007) argue this point of view. In the second argument, we consider
the amounts of money in the two envelopes as being fixed; what varies is which one is first given to the player.
Because that was an arbitrary and physical choice, the counterfactual world in which the player, counterfactually,
got the other envelope to the one he was actually (factually) given is a highly meaningful counterfactual world and
hence the comparison between gains and losses in the two worlds is meaningful. This comparison is uniquely
indicated by the problem description, in which two amounts of money are put in the two envelopes first, and only
after that is one chosen arbitrarily and given to the player. In the first argument, however, we consider the amount of
money in the envelope first given to the player as fixed and consider the situations where the second envelope
contains either half or twice that amount. This would only be a reasonable counterfactual world if in reality the
envelopes had been filled as follows: first, some amount of money is placed in the specific envelope that will be
given to the player; and secondly, by some arbitrary process, the other envelope is filled (arbitrarily or randomly)
either with double or with half of that amount of money.
Byeong-Uk Yi (2009), on the other hand, argues that comparing the amount you would gain if you would gain by
switching with the amount you would lose if you would lose by switching is a meaningless exercise from the outset.
261
262
According to his analysis, all three implications (switch, indifferent, do not switch) are incorrect. He analyses
Smullyan's arguments in detail, showing that intermediate steps are being taken, and pinpointing exactly where an
incorrect inference is made according to his formalization of counterfactual inference. An important difference with
Chase's analysis is that he does not take account of the part of the story where we are told that the envelope called
Envelope A is decided completely at random. Thus, Chase puts probability back into the problem description in
order to conclude that arguments 1 and 3 are incorrect, argument 2 is correct, while Yi keeps "two envelope problem
without probability" completely free of probability, and comes to the conclusion that there are no reasons to prefer
any action. This corresponds to the view of Albers et al., that without probability ingredient, there is no way to argue
that one action is better than another, anyway.
In perhaps the most recent paper on the subject, Bliss argues that the source of the paradox is that when one
mistakenly believes in the possibility of a larger payoff that does not, in actuality, exist, one is mistaken by a larger
margin than when one believes in the possibility of a smaller payoff that does not actually exist. If, for example, the
envelopes contained $5.00 and $10.00 respectively, a player who opened the $10.00 envelope would expect the
possibility of a $20.00 payout that simply does not exist. Were that player to open the $5.00 envelope instead, he
would believe in the possibility of a $2.50 payout, which constitutes a smaller deviation from the true value.
Albers, Kooi, and Schaafsma (2005) consider that without adding probability (or other) ingredients to the problem,
Smullyan's arguments do not give any reason to swap or not to swap, in any case. Thus there is no paradox. This
dismissive attitude is common among writers from probability and economics: Smullyan's paradox arises precisely
because he takes no account whatever of probability or utility.
Extensions to the problem

Since the two envelopes problem became popular, many authors have studied the problem in depth in the situation in
which the player has a prior probability distribution of the values in the two envelopes, and does look in Envelope A.
One of the most recent such publications is by McDonnell and Douglas (2009), who also consider some further
generalizations.
If a priori we know that the amount in the smaller envelope is a whole number of some currency units, then the
problem is determined, as far as probability theory is concerned, by the probability mass function
describing
our prior beliefs that the smaller amount is any number x = 1,2, ... ; the summation over all values of x being equal to
1. It follows that given the amount a in Envelope A, the amount in Envelope B is certainly 2a if a is an odd number.
However, if a is even, then the amount in Envelope B is 2a with probability
, and a/2
with probability
. If one would like to switch envelopes if the expectation value of
what is in the other is larger than what we have in ours, then a simple calculation shows that one should switch if
, keep to Envelope A if
.
If on the other hand the smaller amount of money can vary continuously, and we represent our prior beliefs about it
with a probability density
, thus a function that integrates to one when we integrate over x running from zero
to infinity, then given the amount a in Envelope A, the other envelope contains 2a with probability
, and a/2 with probability
. If again we decide to
switch or not according to the expectation value of what's in the other envelope, the criterion for switching now
becomes
.
The difference between the results for discrete and continuous variables may surprise many readers. Speaking
intuitively, this is explained as follows. Let h be a small quantity and imagine that the amount of money we see when
we look in Envelope A is rounded off in such a way that differences smaller than h are not noticeable, even though
actually it varies continuously. The probability that the smaller amount of money is in an interval around a of length
h, and Envelope A contains the smaller amount is approximately
. The probability that the larger
amount of money is in an interval around a of length h corresponds to the smaller amount being in an interval of
length h/2 around a/2. Hence the probability that the larger amount of money is in a small interval around a of length
263
h and Envelope A contains the larger amount is approximately
. Thus, given Envelope A contains an am
equal to a, the probability it is the smaller of the two is roughly

If the player only wants to end up with the larger amount of money, and does not care about expected amounts, then
in the discrete case he should switch if a is an odd number, or if a is even and
. In the continuous
case he should switch if
Some authors prefer to think of probability in a frequentist sense. If the player knows the probability distribution
used by the organizer to determine the smaller of the two values, then the analysis would proceed just as in the case
when p or f represents subjective prior beliefs. However, what if we take a frequentist point of view, but the player
does not know what probability distribution is used by the organiser to fix the amounts of money in any one
instance? Thinking of the arranger of the game and the player as two parties in a two person game, puts the problem
into the range of game theory. The arranger's strategy consists of a choice of a probability distribution of x, the
smaller of the two amounts. Allowing the player also to use randomness in making his decision, his strategy is
determined by his choosing a probability of switching
for each possible amount of money a he might see in
Envelope A. In this section we so far only discussed fixed strategies, that is strategies for which q only takes the
values 0 and 1, and we saw that the player is fine with a fixed strategy, if he knows the strategy of the organizer. In
the next section we will see that randomized strategies can be useful when the organizer's strategy is not known.
Randomized solutions
Suppose as in the previous section that the player is allowed to look in the first envelope before deciding whether to
switch or to stay. We'll think of the contents of the two envelopes as being two positive numbers, not necessarily two
amounts of money. The player is allowed either to keep the number in Envelope A, or to switch and take the number
in Envelope B. We'll drop the assumption that one number is exactly twice the other, we'll just suppose that they are
different and positive. On the other hand, instead of trying to maximize expectation values, we'll just try to maximize
the chance that we end up with the larger number.
In this section we ask the question, is it possible for the player to make his choice in such a way that he goes home
with the larger number with probability strictly greater than half, however the organizer has filled the two envelopes?
We are given no information at all about the two numbers in the two envelopes, except that they are different, and
strictly greater than zero. The numbers were written down on slips of paper by the organiser, put into the two
envelopes. The envelopes were then shuffled, the player picks one, calls it Envelope A, and opens it.
We are not told any joint probability distribution of the two numbers. We are not asking for a subjectivist solution.
We must think of the two numbers in the envelopes as chosen by the arranger of the game according to some
possibly random procedure, completely unknown to us, and fixed. Think of each envelope as simply containing a
positive number and such that the two numbers are not the same. The job of the player is to end up with the envelope
with the larger number. This variant of the problem, as well as its solution, is attributed by McDonnell and Abbott,
and by earlier authors, to information theorist Thomas M. Cover.
Counter-intuitive though it might seem, there is a way that the player can decide whether to switch or to stay so that
he has a larger chance than 1/2 of finishing with the bigger number, however the two numbers are chosen by the
arranger of the game. However, it is only possible with a so-called randomized algorithm: the player must be able to
generate his own random numbers. Suppose he is able to produce a random number, let's call it Z, such that the
probability that Z is larger than any particular quantity z is exp(-z). Note that exp(-z) starts off equal to 1 at z=0 and
decreases strictly and continuously as z increases, tending to zero as z tends to infinity. So the chance is 0 that Z is
exactly equal to any particular number, and there is a positive probability that Z lies between any two particular
different numbers. The player compares his Z with the number in Envelope A. If Z is smaller he keeps the envelope.
If Z is larger he switches to the other envelope.

Think of the two numbers in the envelopes as fixed (though of course unknown to the player). Think of the player's
random Z as a probe with which he decides whether the number in Envelope A is small or large. If it is small
compared to Z he switches, if it is large compared to Z he stays.
If both numbers are smaller than the player's Z, his strategy does not help him. He ends up with the Envelope B,
which is equally likely to be the larger or the smaller of the two. If both numbers are larger than Z his strategy does
not help him either, he ends up with the first Envelope A, which again is equally likely to be the larger or the smaller
of the two. However if Z happens to be in between the two numbers, then his strategy leads him correctly to keep
Envelope A if its contents are larger than those of B, but to switch to Envelope B if A has smaller contents than B.
Altogether, this means that he ends up with the envelope with the larger number with probability strictly larger than
1/2. To be precise, the probability that he ends with the "winning envelope" is 1/2 + P(Z falls between the two
numbers)/2.
In practice, the number Z we have described could be determined to the necessary degree of accuracy as follows.
Toss a fair coin many times, and convert the sequence of heads and tails into the binary representation of a number U
between 0 and 1: for instance, HTHHTH... becomes the binary representation of u=0.101101.. . In this way, we
generate a random number U, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Then define Z = ln (U) where "ln" stands for
natural logarithm, i.e., logarithm to base e. Note that we just need to toss the coin long enough to verify whether Z is
smaller or larger than the number a in the first envelopewe do not need to go on for ever. We only need to toss the
coin a finite (though random) number of times: at some point we can be sure that the outcomes of further coin tosses
would not change the outcome.
The particular probability law (the so-called standard exponential distribution) used to generate the random number
Z in this problem is not crucial. Any probability distribution over the positive real numbers that assigns positive
probability to any interval of positive length does the job.
This problem can be considered from the point of view of game theory, where we make the game a two-person
zero-sum game with outcomes win or lose, depending on whether the player ends up with the higher or lower
amount of money. The organiser chooses the joint distribution of the amounts of money in both envelopes, and the
player chooses the distribution of Z. The game does not have a "solution" (or saddle point) in the sense of game
theory. This is an infinite game and von Neumann's minimax theorem does not apply.
History of the paradox

The envelope paradox dates back at least to 1953, when Belgian mathematician Maurice Kraitchik proposed a puzzle
in his book Recreational Mathematics concerning two equally rich men who meet and compare their beautiful
neckties, presents from their wives, wondering which tie actually cost more money. It is also mentioned in a 1953
book on elementary mathematics and mathematical puzzles by the mathematician John Edensor Littlewood, who
credited it to the physicist Erwin Schroedinger. Martin Gardner popularized Kraitchik's puzzle in his 1982 book Aha!
Gotcha, in the form of a wallet game:
Two people, equally rich, meet to compare the contents of their wallets. Each is ignorant of the contents of the
two wallets. The game is as follows: whoever has the least money receives the contents of the wallet of the
other (in the case where the amounts are equal, nothing happens). One of the two men can reason: "I have the
amount A in my wallet. That's the maximum that I could lose. If I win (probability 0.5), the amount that I'll
have in my possession at the end of the game will be more than 2A. Therefore the game is favourable to me."
The other man can reason in exactly the same way. In fact, by symmetry, the game is fair. Where is the
mistake in the reasoning of each man?
In 1988 and 1989, Barry Nalebuff presented two different two-envelope problems, each with one envelope
containing twice what's in the other, and each with computation of the expectation value 5A/4. The first paper just
presents the two problems, the second paper discusses many solutions to both of them. The second of his two
problems nowadays the most common, and is presented in this article. According to this version, the two envelopes
264

are filled first, then one is chosen at random and called Envelope A. Martin Gardner independently mentioned this
same version in his 1989 book Penrose Tiles to Trapdoor Ciphers and the Return of Dr Matrix. Barry Nalebuff's
asymmetric variant, often known as the Ali Baba problem, has one envelope filled first, called Envelope A, and
given to Ali. Then a fair coin is tossed to decide whether Envelope B should contain half or twice that amount, and
only then given to Baba.

[1] A complete list of published and unpublished sources in chronological order can be found in the talk page.
[2] A famous example of a proper probability distribution of the amounts of money in the two envelopes, for which
UNIQ-math-0-e545348fab159bc7-QINU for all a.
[3] (letters to the editor, comment on Christensen and Utts (1992)
Von Neumann paradox

In mathematics, the von Neumann paradox, named after John von Neumann, is the idea that one can break a planar
figure such as the unit square into sets of points and subject each set to an area-preserving affine transformation such
that the result is two planar figures of the same size as the original. This was proved in 1929 by John von Neumann,
assuming the axiom of choice. It is based on the earlier BanachTarski paradox, which is in turn based on the
Hausdorff paradox.
Banach and Tarski had proved that, using isometric transformations, the result of taking apart and reassembling a
two-dimensional figure would necessarily have the same area as the original. This would make creating two unit
squares out of one impossible. But von Neumann realized that the trick of such so-called paradoxical decompositions
was the use of a group of transformations that include as a subgroup a free group with two generators. The group of
area-preserving transformations (whether the special linear group or the special affine group) contains such
subgroups, and this opens the possibility of performing paradoxical decompositions using them.
Sketch of the method

The following is an informal description of the method found by von Neumann. Assume that we have a free group H
of area-preserving linear transformations generated by two transformations, and , which are not far from the
identity element. Being a free group means that all the its elements can be expressed uniquely in the form
for some n, where the s and s are all non-zero integers, except possibly the first
and the last . We can divide this group into two parts: those that start on the left with to some non-zero power
(we call this set A) and those that start with to some power (that is,
is zerowe call this set B, and it includes
the identity).
If we operate on any point in Euclidean 2-space by the various elements of H we get what is called the orbit of that
point. All the points in the plane can thus be classed into orbits, of which there are an infinite number with the
cardinality of the continuum. Using the axiom of choice, we can choose one point from each orbit and call the set of
these points M. We exclude the origin, which is a fixed point in H. If we then operate on M by all the elements of H,
we generate each point of the plane (except the origin) exactly once. If we operate on M by all the elements of A or
of B, we get two disjoint sets whose union is all points but the origin.
Now we take some figure such as the unit square or the unit disk. We then choose another figure totally inside it,
such as a smaller square, centred at the origin. We can cover the big figure with several copies of the small figure,
albeit with some points covered by two or more copies. We can then assign each point of the big figure to one of the
copies of the small figure. Let us call the sets corresponding to each copy
. We shall now make a
one-to-one mapping of each point in the big figure to a point in its interior, using only area-preserving
265
Von Neumann paradox

transformations. We take the points belonging to
266
and translate them so that the centre of the
square is at the origin.
We then take those points in it which are in the set A defined above and operate on them by the area-preserving
operation . This puts them into set B. We then take the points belonging to B and operate on them with 2. They
will now still be in B, but the set of these points will be disjoint from the previous set. We proceed in this manner,
using 3 on the A points from C2 (after centring it) and 4 on its B points, and so on. In this way, we have mapped
all points from the big figure (except some fixed points) in a one-to-one manner to B type points not too far from the
centre, and within the big figure. We can then make a second mapping to A type points.
At this point we can apply the method of the Cantor-Bernstein-Schroeder theorem. This theorem tells us that if we
have an injection from set D to set E (such as from the big figure to the A type points in it), and an injection from E
to D (such as the identity mapping from the A type points in the figure to themselves), then there is a one-to-one
correspondence between D and E. In other words, having a mapping from the big figure to a subset of the A points in
it, we can make a mapping (a bijection) from the big figure to all the A points in it. (In some regions points are
mapped to themselves, in others they are mapped using the mapping described in the previous paragraph.) Likewise
we can make a mapping from the big figure to all the B points in it. So looking at this the other way round, we can
separate the figure into its A and B points, and then map each of these back into the whole figure (that is, containing
both kinds of points)!
This sketch glosses over some things, such as how to handle fixed points. It turns out that it is necessary more
mappings and more sets to work around this.
Consequences
The paradox for the square can be strengthened as follows:
Any two bounded subsets of the Euclidean plane with non-empty interiors are equidecomposable with respect
to the area-preserving affine maps.
This has consequences concerning the problem of measure. As von Neumann notes,
"Infolgedessen gibt es bereits in der Ebene kein nichtnegatives additives Ma (wo das Einheitsquadrat das
Ma 1 hat), dass [sic] gegenber allen Abbildungen von A2 invariant wre."[1]
"In accordance with this, already in the plane there is no nonnegative additive measure (for which the unit
square has a measure of 1), which is invariant with respect to all transformations belonging to A2 [the group of
area-preserving affine transformations]."
To explain this a bit more, the question of whether a finitely additive measure exists, that is preserved under certain
transformations, depends on what transformations are allowed. The Banach measure of sets in the plane, which is
preserved by translations and rotations, is not preserved by non-isometric transformations even when they do
preserve the area of polygons. As explained above, the points of the plane (other than the origin) can be divided into
two dense sets which we may call A and B. If the A points of a given polygon are transformed by a certain
area-preserving transformation and the B points by another, both sets can become subsets of the B points in two new
polygons. The new polygons have the same area as the old polygon, but the two transformed sets cannot have the
same measure as before (since they contain only part of the B points), and therefore there is no measure that "works".
The class of groups isolated by von Neumann in the course of study of BanachTarski phenomenon turned out to be
very important for many areas of mathematics: these are amenable groups, or groups with an invariant mean, and
include all finite and all solvable groups. Generally speaking, paradoxical decompositions arise when the group used
for equivalences in the definition of equidecomposability is not amenable.
Von Neumann paradox
Recent progress
Von Neumann's paper left open the possibility of a paradoxical decomposition of the interior of the unit square with
respect to the linear group SL(2,R) (Wagon, Question 7.4). In 2000, Mikls Laczkovich proved that such a
decomposition exists. More precisely, let A be the family of all bounded subsets of the plane with non-empty interior
and at a positive distance from the origin, and B the family of all planar sets with the property that a union of finitely
many translates under some elements of SL(2,R) contains a punctured neighbourhood of the origin. Then all sets in
the family A are SL(2,R)-equidecomposable, and likewise for the sets in B. It follows that both families consist of
paradoxical sets.
References
[1] On p. 85 of:
267
268
Miscellaneous
Bracketing paradox
In linguistic morphology, the term bracketing paradox refers to morphologically complex words which apparently
have more than one incompatible analysis, or bracketing, simultaneously.
One type of a bracketing paradox found in English is exemplified by words like unhappier or uneasier.[1] The
synthetic comparative suffix -er generally occurs with monosyllabic adjectives and a small class of disyllabic
adjectives with the primary (and only) stress on the first syllable. Other adjectives take the analytic comparative
more. Thus, we have older and grumpier, but more correct and more restrictive. This suggests that a word like
uneasier must be formed by combining the suffix er with the adjective easy, since uneasy is a three syllable word:
However, uneasier means "more uneasy", not "more difficult". Thus, from a semantic perspective, uneasier must be
a combination of er with the adjective uneasy:
however violates the morphophonological rules for the suffix -er. Phenomena such as this have been argued to
represent a mismatch between different levels of grammatical structure.[2]
Another type of English bracketing paradox is found in compound words that are a name for a professional of a
particular discipline, preceded by a modifier that narrows that discipline: nuclear physicist, historical linguist,
political scientist, etc.[3][4] Taking nuclear physicist as an example, we see that there are at least two reasonable ways
that the compound word can be bracketed (ignoring the fact that nuclear itself is morphologically complex):
1.
- one who studies physics, and who happens also to be nuclear
2.
- one who studies nuclear physics, a subfield of physics that deals with nuclear
phenomena
What is interesting to many morphologists about this type of bracketing paradox in English is that the correct
bracketing 2 (correct in the sense that this is the way that a native speaker would understand it) does not follow the
usual bracketing pattern 1 typical for most compound words in English.
References
[1] Pesetsky, D. 1985. "Morphology and logical form." Linguistic Inquiry 16:193-246.
[2] Sproat, R. 1988. "Bracketing paradoxes, cliticization, and other topics: The mapping between syntactic and phonological structure." In
Everaert et al. (eds), Morphology and Modularity. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[3] Williams, E. 1981. "On the notions 'lexically related' and 'head of a word.'" Linguistic Inquiry 12:245-274.
[4] Spencer, A. 1988. "Bracketing paradoxes and the English lexicon." Language 64:663-682.
Buridan's ass
269
Buridan's ass
Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the
conception of free will.
It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass that is equally
hungry and thirsty is placed precisely midway between a stack of hay
and a pail of water. Since the paradox assumes the ass will always go
to whichever is closer, it will die of both hunger and thirst since it
cannot make any rational decision to choose one over the other. The
paradox is named after the 14th century French philosopher Jean
Buridan, whose philosophy of moral determinism it satirizes. A
common variant of the paradox substitutes two identical piles of hay
for the hay and water; the ass, unable to choose between the two, dies
of hunger.
History
Political cartoon c.1900, showing the United

States Congress as Buridan's ass (the two hay
piles version), hesitating between a Panama route
or a Nicaragua route for an Atlantic-Pacific canal.
The paradox predates Buridan; it dates to antiquity, being found in Aristotle's On the Heavens. Aristotle, in
ridiculing the Sophist idea that the Earth is stationary simply because it is circular and any forces on it must be equal
in all directions, says that is as ridiculous as saying that
...a man, being just as hungry as thirsty, and placed in between food and drink, must necessarily remain where
he is and starve to death.
Aristotle, On the Heavens, ca.350 BCE
However, the Greeks only used this paradox as an analogy in the context of discussions of the equilibrium of
physical forces.
The 12th century Persian Islamic scholar and philosopher Al-Ghazali discusses the application of this paradox to
human decision making, asking whether it is possible to make a choice between equally good courses without
grounds for preference. He takes the attitude that free will can break the stalemate.
Suppose two similar dates in front of a man, who has a strong desire for them but who is unable to take them
both. Surely he will take one of them, through a quality in him, the nature of which is to differentiate between
two similar things.
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali,The Incoherence of the Philosophers 1100
Moorish Islamic philosopher Averroes (11261198), in commentary on Ghazali, takes the opposite view.
Although Buridan nowhere discusses this specific problem, its relevance is that he did advocate a moral determinism
whereby, save for ignorance or impediment, a human faced by alternative courses of action must always choose the
greater good. In the face of equally good alternatives Buridan believed a rational choice could not be made.
Should two courses be judged equal, then the will cannot break the deadlock, all it can do is to suspend
judgement until the circumstances change, and the right course of action is clear.
Jean Buridan, 1340
Later writers satirised this view in terms of an ass which, confronted by both food and water must necessarily die of
both hunger and thirst while pondering a decision.
Buridan's ass
270
Discussion
Some proponents of hard determinism have granted the unpleasantness of the scenario, but have denied that it
illustrates a true paradox, since one does not contradict oneself in suggesting that a man might die between two
equally plausible routes of action. For example, Baruch Spinoza in his Ethics, suggests that a person who sees two
options as truly equally compelling cannot be fully rational:
[I]t may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally
balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? [In reply,] I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the
equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink,
each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such a one should not
rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, &c.
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Book2, Scholium, 1677
Other writers have opted to deny the validity of the illustration. A typical counter-argument is that rationality as
described in the paradox is so limited as to be a straw man version of the real thing, which does allow the
consideration of meta-arguments. In other words, it is entirely rational to recognize that both choices are equally
good and arbitrarily (randomly) pick one instead of starving. This counter-argument is sometimes used as an
attempted justification for faith or intuitivity (called by Aristotle noetic or noesis). The argument is that, like the
starving ass, we must make a choice in order to avoid being frozen in endless doubt. Other counter-arguments exist.
According to Edward Lauzinger, Buridan's ass fails to incorporate the latent biases that humans always bring with
them when making decisions.[1]Wikipedia:Citing sources#What information to include
Buridan's principle
The situation of Buridan's ass was given a mathematical basis in a 1984 paper by American computer scientist Leslie
Lamport, in which Lamport presents an argument that, given certain assumptions about continuity in a simple
mathematical model of the Buridan's ass problem, there will always be some starting conditions under which the ass
will starve to death, no matter what strategy it takes.
Lamport calls this result "Buridans principle":
A discrete decision based upon an input having a continuous range of values cannot be made within a bounded
length of time.
Application to digital logic: Metastability

Main article: Metastability in electronics
A version of Buridan's principle actually occurs in electrical engineering. Specifically, the input to a digital logic
gate must convert a continuous voltage value into either a 0 or a 1 which is typically sampled and then processed. If
the input is changing and at an intermediate value when sampled, the input stage acts like a comparator. The voltage
value can then be likened to the position of the ass, and the values 0 and 1 represent the bales of hay. Like the
situation of the starving ass, there exists an input on which the converter cannot make a proper decision, resulting in
a metastable state. Having the converter make an arbitrary choice in ambiguous situations does not solve the
problem, as the boundary between ambiguous and unambiguous values introduces another binary decision with its
own metastable state.
The metastability problem is a significant issue in digital circuit design, and metastable states are a possibility
wherever asynchronous inputs (digital signals which are not synchronized to a clock signal) occur. The ultimate
reason the problem is manageable is that the probability of a metastable state persisting longer than a given time
interval t is an exponentially declining function of t. In electronic devices, the probability of such an "undecided"
Buridan's ass
state lasting longer than a few nanoseconds, while always possible, is infinitesimal. Similar scaling laws in the
operation of neurons may explain why "Buridan" states of indecision are not often observed in human behavior.
In popular culture
Characters in Fargo (season 1), episode 6, titled "Buridan's Ass", are placed in this situation.
References
[1] "Thought and Process", Lauzinger, Edward, 1994
Bibliography
The Columbia Encyclopedia (6th ed.). 2006.

Knowles, Elizabeth (2006). The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable.
Mawson, T.J. (2005). Belief in God. New York, NY: Oxford University (Clarendon) Press. p.201.
Rescher, Nicholas (1959/60). "Choice Without Preference: A Study of the History and of the Logic of the
Problem of "Buridans Ass"". Kant-Studien 51: 14275.
Zupko, Jack (2003). John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master. Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press. pp.258, 400n71.
Ullmann-Margalit, E.; Morgenbesser, S. (1977). "Picking and Choos-ing". Social Research 44: 757785.
External links
Vassiliy Lubchenko (August 2008). "Competing interactions create functionality through frustration" (http://
www.pnas.org/content/105/31/10635.full). Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105 (31): 106356. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0805716105 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0805716105). PMC 2504771 (http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2504771). PMID 18669666 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
18669666).
Definition of term at wordsmith.org (http://wordsmith.org/words/buridans_ass.html)
271
272

The buttered cat paradox is a common joke based on the tongue-in-cheek
combination of two adages:
Cats always land on their feet.
Buttered toast always lands buttered side down.
The paradox arises when one considers what would happen if one attached a
piece of buttered toast (butter side up) to the back of a cat, then dropped the cat
from a large height. The buttered cat paradox, submitted by artist John Frazee
of Kingston, New York, won a 1993 OMNI magazine competition about
paradoxes.
Thought experiments
Some people jokingly maintain that the experiment will produce an anti-gravity
effect. They propose that as the cat falls towards the ground, it will slow down
and start to rotate, eventually reaching a steady state of hovering a short
distance from the ground while rotating at high speed as both the buttered side
of the toast and the cats feet attempt to land on the ground. In June 2003,
Kimberly Miner won a Student Academy Award for her film Perpetual
Motion.[1] Miner based her film on a paper written by a high-school friend that
explored the potential implications of the cat and buttered toast idea.[2]
In humor
A cartoon illustration of the thought
experiment
The faux paradox has captured the imagination of science-oriented humorists.
In May 1992, the Usenet Oracle Digest #441 included a question from a
supplicant asking about the paradox.[3] Testing the theory is the main theme in an episode of the comic book strip
Jack B. Quick, the title character seeks to test this theory, leading to the cat hovering above the ground, with the cat's
wagging tail providing propulsion. The March 31, 2005, strip of the webcomic Bunny also explored the idea in the
guise of a plan for a "Perpetual Motion MoggieToast 5k Power Generator", based on Sod's Law. In Science Askew,
Donald E. Simanek comments on this phenomenon.
The idea appeared on the British panel game QI, where the idea was discussed. As well as talking about the idea,
they also brought up other questions regarding the paradox. These included "Would it still work if you used
margarine?", "Would it still work if you used I Can't Believe It's Not Butter?", and "What if the toast was covered in
something that was not butter, but the cat thought it was butter?", the idea being that it would act like a placebo.
The paradox also appeared in the episode "Gravitational Anarchy" of the scientific podcast RadioLab. Later, a
humoristic explainer animation was put together by the animated production company Barq,[4] based on an extracted
audio clip from this very RadioLab episode.
Brazilian energy drink brand Flying Horse has released a commercial that simulates the recreation of this
phenomenon, which is then used to create perpetual energy.[5]
In reality
In reality, cats possess the ability to turn themselves right side up in mid-air if they should fall upside-down, known
as the cat righting reflex. This enables them to land on their feet if dropped from sufficient height (about 30cm
(12in)). Toast, being an inanimate object, obviously lacks both the ability and the desire to right itself.
Toast typically lands on the floor butter-side-down due to the manner in which it is typically dropped from a table.
As the toast falls from the table, it rotates. Given the typical speed of rotation for a slice of toast as it falls from the
table and the typical height of a table, a slice of toast that began butter-side-up on the table will land
butter-side-down on the floor in 81% of cases.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Available at http:/ / www. kminer. net/ 2011/ 07/ perpetual-motion/

PG Klein. University of Leeds. Perpetual Motion (http:/ / www. physics. leeds. ac. uk/ pages/ PerpetualMotion).
Usenet Oracle, Usenet Oracularities #441 (http:/ / internetoracle. org/ digest. cgi?N=441#441-07) (1992.05.04), compiled by Steve Kinzler
www.barqvideo.com (http:/ / www. barqvideo. com)
http:/ / www. youtube. com/ watch?feature=player_embedded& v=Z8yW5cyXXRc
External links
Frazee Fine Arts (http://www.frazeefinearts.com) Website of Teresa and John Frazee.
"Feedback" (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg15220568.300). New Scientist (2056). 16 November
1996.
Loopholes for the paradox (http://www.xs4all.nl/~jcdverha/scijokes/2_21.html#subindex)
Lombard's Paradox
Lombard's paradox describes a paradoxical muscular contraction in humans. When rising to stand from a sitting or
squatting position, both the hamstrings and quadriceps contract at the same time, despite their being antagonists to
each other.
The rectus femoris biarticular muscle acting over the hip has a smaller hip moment arm than the hamstrings.
However, the rectus femoris moment arm is greater over the knee than the hamstring knee moment. This means that
contraction from both rectus femoris and hamstrings will result in hip and knee extension. Hip extension also adds a
passive stretch component to rectus femoris, which results in a knee extension force. This paradox allows for
efficient movement, especially during gait.
References
Lombard, W.P., & Abbott, F.M. (1907). The mechanical effects produced by the contraction of individual
muscles of the thigh of the frog. American Journal of Physiology, 20, 1-60.
http://moon.ouhsc.edu/dthompso/namics/lombard.htm
External links
Andrews JG (1987). "The functional roles of the hamstrings and quadriceps during cycling: Lombard's Paradox
revisited". J Biomech 20 (6): 56575. doi:10.1016/0021-9290(87)90278-8 [1]. PMID3611133 [2].
Gregor RJ, Cavanagh PR, LaFortune M (1985). "Knee flexor moments during propulsion in cycling--a creative
solution to Lombard's Paradox". J Biomech 18 (5): 30716. doi:10.1016/0021-9290(85)90286-6 [3].
PMID4008501 [4].
273
Lombard's Paradox
274
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016%2F0021-9290%2887%2990278-8

http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016%2F0021-9290%2885%2990286-6

Part of a series on
Utilitarianism
Politics portal
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e [1]
The mere addition paradox, also known as the repugnant conclusion, is a problem in ethics, identified by Derek
Parfit, and appearing in his book Reasons and Persons (1984). The paradox identifies an inconsistency between four
seemingly true beliefs about the relative value of populations.
The paradox
Consider the four populations depicted in the following diagram: A, A+, B and B. Each bar, within a population,
represents a distinct group of people, whose size is represented by the bar's width and whose happiness is represented
by the bar's height. Unlike A and B, A+ and B are thus complex populations, comprising two distinct groups of
people. (For simplicity, we might imagine that everyone in a group has exactly the same level of happiness, although
this is not essential to the argument. We might instead imagine that the height of a bar represents the average
happiness within that group of people.)
How do these four populations compare in value? Let's start by making comparisons between pairs of populations.

First, it seems that A+ is no worse than A. This is because the people in A are no worse off in A+, while the
additional people who exist in A+ are better off in A+ compared to A. (Arguably, existence is good for these
additional people, assuming that they have lives which are worth living.)
Second, it seems that B is better than A+. This is because B has greater total and average happiness than A+.
Finally, B seems equally as good as B as the only difference between B and B is that the two groups in B are
merged to form one group in B.
Put together, these three comparisons entail that B is better than A. (If y is no worse than z and x is better than y it
follows that x is better than z.) However, when we directly compare A and B, it may seem that B is in fact worse
than A. The basic idea behind this intuition is that increasing the world's population makes the world worse if, by
doing so, we reduce everyone's wellbeing.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Thus, we have a paradoxthe mere addition paradoxbecause the following intuitively plausible claims are jointly
inconsistent: (a) that A+ is no worse than A, (b) that B is better than A+, (c) that B is equally as good as B, and
(d) that B is worse than A.
Criticisms and responses

Some scholars, such as Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels, argue that the apparent inconsistency between the four
claims just outlined relies on the assumption that the "better than" relation is transitive. We may resolve the
inconsistency, thus, by rejecting the assumption. On this view, from the fact that A+ is no worse than A and that B
is better than A+ it simply does not follow that B is better than A.
Torbjrn Tnnsj argues that we must resist that the intuition that B is worse than A. While the lives of those in B
are worse than those in A, there are more of them and thus the collective value of B is greater than A.
Alternative usage
An alternative use of the term mere addition paradox was presented in a paper by Hassoun in 2010 [2]. It identifies
paradoxical reasoning that occurs when certain statistical measures are used to calculate results over a population.
For example, if a group of 100 people together control $100 worth of resources, the average wealth per capita is $1.
If a single rich person then arrives with 1 million dollars, then the total group of 101 people controls $1000100,
making average wealth per capita $9901, implying a drastic shift away from poverty even though nothing has
changed for the original 100 people. Hassoun defines a no mere addition axiom to be used for judging such statistical
measures: "merely adding a rich person to a population should not decrease poverty" (although acknowledging that
in actual practice adding rich people to a population may provide some benefit to the whole population).
This same argument can be generalized to many cases where proportional statistics are used: for example, a game
sold on a download service may be considered a failure if less than 20% of those who download the demo then
purchase the game. Thus, if 10000 people download the demo of a game and 2000 buy it, the game is a borderline
success; however, it would be rendered a failure by an extra 500 people downloading the demo and not buying, even
though this "mere addition" changes nothing with regard to income or consumer satisfaction from the previous
situation.
275
External links
The Repugnant Conclusion [3] (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Contestabile, Bruno. "On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics [4]", Contemporary
Buddhism, Vol. 11 Issue 1, pp.103113, Routledge 2010
References
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons, ch. 17 and 19. Oxford University Press 1986.
Temkin, Larry. Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox [5], Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 2
(Spring 1987) pp.138187
Tnnsj, Torbjrn. Hedonistic Utilitarianism [6]. Edinburgh University Press 1988.
Hassoun, Nicole. Another Mere Addition Paradox, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2010, [2].
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Utilitarianism& action=edit

http:/ / www. wider. unu. edu/ publications/ working-papers/ 2010/ en_GB/ wp2010-120/
http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ repugnant-conclusion/
http:/ / www. socrethics. com/ Folder2/ Population. htm
[5] http:/ / www. jstor. org/ pss/ 2265425

[6] http:/ / www. amazon. com/ dp/ 0748610421
Navigation paradox
The Navigation paradox states that increased navigational precision may result in increased collision risk. In the
case of ships and aircraft, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation has enabled craft to follow
navigational paths with such greater precision (often on the order of plus or minus 2 meters), that, without better
distribution of routes, coordination between neighboring craft and collision avoidance procedures, the likelihood of
two craft occupying the same space on the shortest distance line between two navigational points has increased.
Research
Robert E. Machol[1] attributes the term "navigation paradox" to Peter G. Reich, writing in 1964,[2] and 1966,[3] who
recognized that "in some cases (see below) increases in navigational precision increase collision risk." In the "below"
explanation, Machol noted "that if vertical station-keeping is sloppy, then if longitudinal and lateral separation are
lost, the planes will probably pass above and below each other. This is the navigation paradox mentioned earlier."
Russ Paielli wrote a mid-air collision simulating computer model 500sqmi (1,300km2) centered on Denver,
Colorado[4] In Table 3 Paielli notes that aircraft cruising at random altitudes have five times fewer collisions than
those obeying with only 25ft (7.6m) RMS of vertical error discrete cruising altitude rule, such as the internationally
required hemispherical cruising altitude rules. At the same vertical error, the prototype linear cruising altitude rule
tested produced 33.8 fewer mid-air collisions than the hemispherical cruising altitude rules.
Paiellis 2000 model corroborated an earlier 1997 model by Patlovany[5] showing in Figure 1 that zero altitude error
by pilots obeying the hemispherical cruising altitude rules resulted in six times more mid-air collisions than random
cruising altitude non compliance. Similarly, Patlovanys computer model test of the Altimeter-Compass Cruising
Altitude Rule (ACCAR) with zero piloting altitude error (a linear cruising altitude rule similar to the one
recommended by Paielli), resulted in about 60% of the mid-air collisions counted from random altitude non
compliance, or 10 times fewer collisions than the internationally accepted hemispherical cruising altitude rules. In
other words, Patlovanys ACCAR alternative and Paiellis linear cruising altitude rule would reduce cruising midair
276
Navigation paradox
collisions between 10 and 33 times, compared to the currently recognized, and internationally required,
hemispherical cruising altitude rules, which institutionalize the navigation paradox on a world wide basis.
The ACCAR alternative to the hemispherical cruising altitude rules, if adopted in 1997, could have eliminated the
navigation paradox at all altitudes, and could have saved 342 lives in over 30 midair collisions (up to November
2006) since the Risk Analysis proof that the current regulations multiply midair collision risk in direct proportion to
pilot accuracy in compliance.[6] The Namibian collision in 1997, the Japanese near-miss in 2001, the berlingen
collision in Germany in 2002, and the Amazon collision in 2006,[7] are all examples where human or hardware errors
doomed altitude-accurate pilots killed by the navigation paradox designed into the current cruising altitude rules. The
current system as described by Paielli noted as examples that nuclear power plants and elevators are designed to be
passively safe and fault tolerant. Reactivity control rods fall into the reactor to cause a shutdown on loss of electrical
power, and elevator fall-arresting brakes are released by torque from support cable tension. The navigation paradox
describes a midair collision safety system that by design cannot tolerate a single failure in human performance or
electronic hardware.
To mitigate the described problem, many recommend, as legally allowed in very limited authorized airspace, that
planes fly one or two miles offset from the center of the airway (to the right side) thus eliminating the problem only
in the head-on collision scenario. The International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) "Procedures for Air
Navigation--Air Traffic Management Manual," authorizes lateral offset only in oceanic and remote airspace
worldwide.[8] However, this workaround for the particular case of a head-on collision threat on a common assigned
airway fails to address the navigation paradox in general, and it fails to specifically address the inherent system
safety fault intolerance inadvertently designed into international air traffic safety regulations.[4] To be specific, in the
cases of intersecting flight paths where either aircraft is not on an airway (for example, flying under a "direct"
clearance, or a temporary diversion clearance for weather threats), or where intersecting aircraft flights are on
deliberately intersecting airways, these more general threats receive no protection from flying one or two miles to the
right of the center of the airway. Intersecting flight paths must still intersect somewhere. As with the midair collision
over Germany, an offset to the right of an airway would have simply changed the impact point by a mile or two away
from where the intersection actually did occur. Of the 342 deaths since 1997 so far encouraged by the lack of a linear
cruising altitude rule (like ACCAR) improvement to the fault intolerance of the hemispherical cruising altitude rules,
only the head-on collision over the Amazon could have been prevented if either pilot had been flying an offset to the
right of the airway centerline. In contrast, ACCAR systematically separates conflicting traffic in all airspace at all
altitudes on any heading, whether over the middle of the ocean or over high density multinational-interface
continental airspace. Nothing about Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) system design addresses the
inherent vulnerability of the air traffic system to expected faults in hardware and human performance, as experienced
in the Namibian, German, Amazon and Japanese accidents.[5]
References
[1] Machol, Robert E., Interfaces 25:5, SeptemberOctober 1995 (151-172), page 154.
[2] Reich, Peter G., "A theory of safe separation standards for air traffic control," RAE Technical Reports Nos. 64041, 64042, 64043, Royal
Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, United Kingdom.
[3] Reich, Peter G., "Analysis of long-range air traffic systems: Separation standardsI, II, and III," Journal of Navigation, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp.
88-96; No. 2, pp. 169-176; No. 3, pp. 331-338.
[4] Paielli, Russ A., "A Linear Altitude Rule for Safer and More Efficient Enroute Air Traffic," Air Traffic Control Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall
2000.
[5] Patlovany, Robert W., "U.S. Aviation Regulations Increase Probability of Midair Collisions," Risk Analysis: An International Journal, April
1997, Volume 17, No. 2, Pages 237-248.
[6] Patlovany, Robert, W., "Preventable Midair Collisions Since 26 June 1997 Request Denied for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
28996 Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR)," Preventable Midair Collisions Since 26 June 1997 Request Denied for Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 28996 Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR) (http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/
20091027124508/ http:/ / www. geocities. com/ rpatlovany/ PreventableMidairs. html)
277
Navigation paradox
278
[7] Langwiesche, William, "The Devil at 37,000 Feet", Vanity Fair, January 2009 (http:/ / www. vanityfair. com/ magazine/ 2009/ 01/
air_crash200901)
[8] Werfelman, Linda, "Sidestepping the Airway," AeroSafety World March 2007, pages 40-45, Flight Safety Foundation (http:/ / flightsafety.
org/ asw/ mar07/ asw_mar07_p40-45. pdf).
Paradox of the plankton

In aquatic biology, the paradox of the plankton describes the
situation in which a limited range of resources (light, nutrients)
supports a much wider range of planktonic organisms. The paradox
results from the competitive exclusion principle (sometimes referred to
as Gause's Law), which suggests that when two species compete for
the same resource, ultimately only one will persist and the other will be
driven to extinction. Phytoplankton life is diverse at all phylogenetic
levels despite the limited range of resources (e.g. light, nitrate,
phosphate, silicic acid, iron) for which they compete amongst
themselves.
A batch of marine diatoms, just some of the many

organisms to gain energy from the Sun
The paradox was originally described in 1961 by limnologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson, who proposed that the paradox
could be resolved by factors such as vertical gradients of light or turbulence, symbiosis or commensalism,
differential predation, or constantly changing environmental conditions.[1] More recent work has proposed that the
paradox can be resolved by factors such as: chaotic fluid motion;[2] size-selective grazing;[3] spatio-temporal
heterogeneity;[4] and environmental fluctuations.[5] More generally, some researchers suggest that ecological and
environmental factors continually interact such that the planktonic habitat never reaches an equilibrium for which a
single species is favoured.[6]
References
[1] Hutchinson, G. E. (1961) The paradox of the plankton (http:/ / cmore. soest. hawaii. edu/ agouron/ 2007/ documents/
paradox_of_the_plankton. pdf). American Naturalist 95, 137-145.
[2] Krolyi, G., Pntek, ., Scheuring, I., Tl, T., Toroczkai, Z. (2000) Chaotic flow: the physics of species coexistence (http:/ / www. pnas. org/
content/ 97/ 25/ 13661). Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97, 13661-13665.
[3] Wiggert, J.D., Haskell, A.G.E., Paffenhofer, G.A., Hofmann, E.E. and Klinck, J.M. (2005) The role of feeding behavior in sustaining copepod
populations in the tropical ocean (http:/ / plankt. oxfordjournals. org/ cgi/ content/ short/ fbi090v1). Journal of Plankton Research 27,
1013-1031.
[4] Miyazaki, T., Tainaka, K., Togashi, T., Suzuki, T. and Yoshimura, J. (2006) Spatial coexistence of phytoplankton species in ecological
timescale (http:/ / sciencelinks. jp/ j-east/ article/ 200611/ 000020061106A0324715. php). Population Ecology 48(2), 107-112.
[5] Descamps-Julien, B. and Gonzalez, A. (2005) broken link: http:/ / www. biologie. ens. fr/ bioemco/ biodiversite/ descamps/ ecology05. pdf
Stable coexistence in a fluctuating environment: An experimental demonstration (http:/ / www. esajournals. org/ doi/ abs/ 10. 1890/ 04-1700).
Ecology 86, 2815-2824.
[6] Scheffer, M., Rinaldi, S., Huisman, J. and Weissing, F.J. (2003) Why plankton communities have no equilibrium: solutions to the paradox
(http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ vn768133l633114x/ ). Hydrobiologia 491, 9-18.
External links
The Paradox of the Plankton (http://knol.google.com/k/klaus-rohde/the-paradox-of-the-plankton/
xk923bc3gp4/40#)
Temporal paradox
279
Temporal paradox
Main article: Origin of birds
See also: Evolution of birds
The temporal paradox, or time problem is a controversial issue in the evolutionary relationships of birds. It was
described by paleornithologist Alan Feduccia[1] in 1994.
Objection to consensus
The concept of a "temporal paradox" is based on the following facts.
The consensus view is that birds evolved from dinosaurs, but the most
bird-like dinosaurs, including almost all of the feathered dinosaurs and
those believed to be most closely related to birds are known mostly
from the Cretaceous, by which time birds had already evolved and
diversified. If bird-like dinosaurs are the ancestors of birds they should,
then, be older than birds, but Archaeopteryx is 155 million years old,
while the very bird-like Deinonychus is 35 million years younger. This
idea is sometimes summarized as "you can't be your own
grandmother". As Dodson pointed out:
Diagram illustrating the determined age of four

different prehistoric bird genera, compared to the
age of some birdlike dinosaurs and feathered
dinosaurs.
I hasten to add that none of the known small theropods,

including Deinonychus, Dromaeosaurus, Velociraptor,
Unenlagia, nor Sinosauropteryx, Protarchaeopteryx, nor Caudipteryx is itself relevant to the origin of
birds; these are all Cretaceous fossils ... and as such can at best represent only structural stages through
which an avian ancestor may be hypothezised to have passed.
Problems
Numerous researchers have discredited the idea of the temporal paradox. Witmer (2002) summarized this critical
literature by pointing out that there are at least three lines of evidence that contradict it.
First, no one has proposed that maniraptoran dinosaurs of the Cretaceous are the ancestors of birds. They have
merely found that dinosaurs like dromaeosaurs, troodontids and oviraptorosaurs are close relatives of birds. The true
ancestors are thought to be older than Archaeopteryx, perhaps Early Jurassic or even older. The scarcity of
maniraptoran fossils from then is unsurprising as fossilization is a rare event requiring special circumstances, and
fossils of animals in sediments from ages that they actually inhabited may never be found.
Second, fragmentary remains of maniraptoran dinosaurs actually had been known from Jurassic deposits in China,
North America, and Europe for many years. For example, the femur of a tiny maniraptoran from the Late Jurassic of
Colorado was reported by Padian and Jensen in 1989 while teeth of dromaeosaurids and troodontids are known from
Jurassic England.[] Complete skeletons of Middle-Late Jurassic maniraptorans were subsequently described from
China. The known diversity of pre-Tithonian (and thus pre-Archaeopteryx) non-avian maniraptorans includes
Ornitholestes, the possible therizinosaur Eshanosaurus, the troodontids Anchiornis and the as yet unnamed Morrison
WDC DML 001, the scansoriopterygids Epidexipteryx and Epidendrosaurus and the basal alvarezsaur Haplocheirus.
Third, if the temporal paradox would indicate that birds should not have evolved from dinosaurs, then this raises the
question of what animals would be more likely ancestors considering their age. Brochu and Norell (2001) analyzed
this question using six of the other archosaurs that have been proposed as bird ancestors, and found that all of them
create temporal paradoxes long stretches between the ancestor and Archaeopteryx where there are no intermediate
fossils that are actually worse. The MSM valueWikipedia:Please clarify for the theropod option was 0.4380.466.
Temporal paradox
However, because of computational limitations, six taxa considered in SCI and SMIG calculationsWikipedia:Please
clarify (Compsognathus, Eoraptor, Herrerasauridae, Marasuchus, Pseudolagosuchus, and Choristodera) were not
included in calculation of MSM. Thus, even if one used the logic of the temporal paradox, one should still prefer
dinosaurs as the ancestors to birds.[2] Pol and Norell (2006) calculated MSM* values for the same proposed bird
ancestors and obtained the same relative results. The MSM* value for the theropod option was 0.310.40.
References
[1] Feduccia, Alan (1996) "The Origin and Evolution of Birds." Yale University Press. New Haven, Conn. USA.
[2] Brochu, Christopher A. Norell, Mark A. (2001) "Time and trees: A quantitative assessment of temporal congruence in the bird origins debate"
pp.51135 in "New Perspectives on the Origin and Early Evolution of Birds" Gauthier&Gall, ed. Yale Peabody Museum. New Haven, Conn.,
USA.
Tritone paradox
The tritone paradox is an auditory illusion in which a
sequentially played pair of Shepard tones [1] separated by an
interval of a tritone, or half octave, is heard as ascending by
some people and as descending by others.[2] Different
populations tend to favor one of a limited set of different
spots around the chromatic circle as central to the set of
"higher" tones. The tritone paradox was first reported by
psychology of music researcher Diana Deutsch in 1986.[3]
Each Shepard tone consists of a set of octave related
sinusoids, whose amplitudes are scaled by a fixed bell
shaped spectral envelope based on a log frequency scale.
For example, one tone might consist of a sinusoid at 440
Hz, accompanied by sinusoid at the higher octaves (880 Hz,
1760 Hz, etc.) and lower octaves (220 Hz, 110 Hz, etc.).
The other tone might consist of a 311 Hz sinusoid, again
accompanied by higher and lower octaves (622 Hz, 155.5
Hz, etc.). The amplitudes of the sinusoids of both
complexes are determined by the same fixed amplitude
envelope - for example the envelope might be centered at
370 Hz and span a 6 octave range.
Shepard predicted that the two tones would constitute a
bistable figure, the auditory equivalent of the Necker cube,
that could be heard ascending or descending, but never both
at the same time. Diana Deutsch later found that perception of which tone was higher depended on the absolute
frequencies involved: an individual will usually find the same tone to be higher, and this is determined by the tones'
absolute pitches. This is consistently done by a large portion of the population, despite the fact that responding to
different tones in different ways must involve the ability to hear absolute pitch, which was thought to be extremely
rare. This finding has been used to argue that latent absolute-pitch ability is present in a large proportion of the
population. In addition, Deutsch found that subjects from the south of England and from California resolved the
ambiguity the opposite way. Also, Deutsch, Henthorn and Dolson found that native speakers of Vietnamese, a tonal
language, heard the tritone paradox differently from Californians who were native speakers of English.
280
Tritone paradox
Notes
[1] R.N. Shepard. Circularity in judgments of relative pitch. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 36(12):23462353, 1964.
[2] Deutsch's Musical Illusions (http:/ / deutsch. ucsd. edu/ psychology/ deutsch_research6. php)
[3] Deutsch (1986).
References
Deutsch, D. (1986). "A musical paradox". Music Perception 3: 275280. doi: 10.2307/40285337 (http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/40285337). Weblink (http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&uid=1987-27127-001)
PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/MP-1986_3_275-280.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (1986). "An auditory paradox". Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 80: s93. doi:
10.1121/1.2024050 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.2024050). Weblink (http://scitation.aip.org/vsearch/
servlet/VerityServlet?KEY=ASADL&smode=strresults&sort=chron&maxdisp=25&threshold=0&
pjournals=journals&pjournals=JASMAN&pjournals=ARLOFJ&pjournals=NOCOAN&pjournals=SOUCAU&
possible1=An auditory paradox. &possible1zone=title&OUTLOG=NO&viewabs=JASMAN&
key=DISPLAY&docID=1&page=1&chapter=0)
Deutsch, D. (1987). "The tritone paradox: Effects of spectral variables". Perception & Psychophysics 41 (6):
563575. doi: 10.3758/BF03210490 (http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03210490). PMID 3615152 (http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3615152). PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/P&P-1987_41_563-575.
pdf)
Deutsch, D., North, T. and Ray, L. (1990). "The tritone paradox: Correlate with the listener's vocal range for
speech". Music Perception 7: 371384. doi: 10.2307/40285473 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40285473). PDF
Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/MP-1990_7_371-384.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (1991). "The tritone paradox: An influence of language on music perception". Music Perception 8:
335347. doi: 10.2307/40285517 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40285517). PDF Document (http://philomel.
com/pdf/MP-1991_8_335-347.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (1992). "Paradoxes of musical pitch". Scientific American 267 (2): 8895. doi:
10.1038/scientificamerican0892-88 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0892-88). PMID 1641627
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1641627). PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/
Sci_Am-1992-Aug_267_88_95.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (1992). "Some new pitch paradoxes and their implications. In Auditory Processing of Complex
Sounds". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 336 (1278): 391397. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1992.0073
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1992.0073). PMID 1354379 (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
1354379). PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/Proc_Royal_Soc-1992_336_391-397.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (1997). "The tritone paradox: A link between music and speech". Current Directions in
Psychological Science 6 (6): 174180. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.ep10772951 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
1467-8721.ep10772951). PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/Curr_Dir-1997_6_174-180.pdf)
Deutsch, D., Henthorn T. and Dolson, M. (2004). "Speech patterns heard early in life influence later perception of
the tritone paradox". Music Perception 21 (3): 357372. doi: 10.1525/mp.2004.21.3.357 (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1525/mp.2004.21.3.357). PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/MP-2004-21_357-372.pdf)
Deutsch, D. (2007). "Mothers and their offspring perceive the tritone paradox in closely similar ways". Archives
of Acoustics 32: 314. PDF Document (http://philomel.com/pdf/archives_of_acoustics-2007_32_3-14.pdf)
281
Tritone paradox
282
External links
Audio example (requires Java) (http://www.cs.ubc.ca/nest/imager/contributions/flinn/Illusions/TT/tt.html)
Diana Deutsch's page on auditory illusions (http://deutsch.ucsd.edu/psychology/deutsch_research1.php)
Sound example of the tritone paradox (http://philomel.com/musical_illusions/play.
php?fname=Tritone_paradox)
Voting paradox
This article is about the arguably irrational results that can arise in a collective choice among three or more
alternatives. For the contention that an individual's vote will probably not affect the outcome, see Paradox of voting.
The voting paradox (also known as Condorcet's paradox or the paradox of voting) is a situation noted by the
Marquis de Condorcet in the late 18th century, in which collective preferences can be cyclic (i.e., not transitive),
even if the preferences of individual voters are not. This is paradoxical, because it means that majority wishes can be
in conflict with each other. When this occurs, it is because the conflicting majorities are each made up of different
groups of individuals.
For example, suppose we have three candidates, A, B, and C, and that there are three voters with preferences as
follows (candidates being listed in decreasing order of preference):
Voter
First preference Second preference Third preference
Voter 1
Voter 2
Voter 3
If C is chosen as the winner, it can be argued that B should win instead, since two voters (1 and 2) prefer B to C and
only one voter (3) prefers C to B. However, by the same argument A is preferred to B, and C is preferred to A, by a
margin of two to one on each occasion. The requirement of majority rule then provides no clear winner.
Also, if an election were held with the above three voters as the only participants, nobody would win under majority
rule, as it would result in a three way tie with each candidate getting one vote.
When a Condorcet method is used to determine an election, a voting paradox among the ballots can mean that the
election has no Condorcet winner. The several variants of the Condorcet method differ on how they resolve such
ambiguities when they arise to determine a winner. Note that there is no fair and deterministic resolution to this
trivial example because each candidate is in an exactly symmetrical situation.
283
Philosophy
Fitch's paradox of knowability is one of the fundamental puzzles of epistemic logic. It provides a challenge to the
knowability thesis, which states that any truth is, in principle, knowable. The paradox is that this assumption implies
the omniscience principle, which asserts that any truth is known. Essentially, Fitch's paradox asserts that the
existence of an unknown truth is unknowable. So if all truths were knowable, it would follow that all truths are in
fact known.
The paradox is of concern for verificationist or anti-realist accounts of truth, for which the knowability thesis is very
plausible, but the omniscience principle is very implausible.
The paradox appeared as a minor theorem in a 1963 paper by Frederic Fitch, "A Logical Analysis of Some Value
Concepts". Other than the knowability thesis, his proof makes only modest assumptions on the modal nature of
knowledge and of possibility. He also generalised the proof to different modalities. It resurfaced in 1979 when W.D.
Hart wrote that Fitch's proof was an "unjustly neglected logical gem".
Proof
Suppose p is a sentence which is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In
such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be
possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". But this isn't possible, because as soon as we know "p is an unknown
truth", we know that p is true, rendering p no longer an unknown truth, so the statement "p is an unknown truth"
becomes a falsity. Hence, the statement "p is an unknown truth" cannot be both known and true at the same time.
Therefore, if all truths are knowable, the set of "all truths" must not include any of the form "something is an
unknown truth"; thus there must be no unknown truths, and thus all truths must be known.
This can be formalised with modal logic. K and L will stand for known and possible, respectively. Thus LK means
possibly known, in other words, knowable. The modality rules used are:
(A) Kp p
knowledge implies truth.
(B) K(p & q) (Kp

& Kq)
knowing a conjunction implies knowing each conjunct.
(C) p LKp
all truths are knowable.
(D) from p, deduce

Lp
if p can be proven false without assumptions, then p is impossible (which is similar to the rule of necessitation: if p can
be proven true without assumptions, then p is necessarily true).
The proof proceeds:
284
1. Suppose K(p & Kp)

2. Kp & KKp
from line 1 by rule (B)
3. Kp
from line 2 by conjunction elimination
4. KKp
5. Kp
from line 4 by rule (A)
6. K(p & Kp)
from lines 3 and 5 by reductio ad absurdum, discharging assumption 1
7. LK(p & Kp)
from line 6 by rule (D)
8. Suppose p & Kp
9. LK(p & Kp)
from line 8 by rule (C)
10. (p & Kp)
from lines 7 and 9 by reductio ad absurdum, discharging assumption 8.
11. p Kp
from line 10 by a classical tautology
The last line states that if p is true then it is known. Since nothing else about p was assumed, it means that every truth
is known.
Generalisations
The proof uses minimal assumptions about the nature of K and L, so other modalities can be substituted for
"known". Salerno gives the example of "caused by God": rule (C) becomes that every true fact could have been
caused by God, and the conclusion is that every true fact was caused by God. Rule (A) can also be weakened to
include modalities which don't imply truth. For instance instead of "known" we could have the doxastic modality
"believed by a rational person" (represented by B). Rule (A) is replaced with:
(E) Bp BBp
rational belief is transparent; if p is rationally believed, then it is rationally believed that p is rationally believed.
(F) (Bp & Bp) rational beliefs are consistent
This time the proof proceeds:

1. Suppose B(p & Bp)
2. Bp & BBp
from line 1 by rule (B)
3. Bp
4. BBp
from line 3 by rule (E)
5. BBp
6. BBp & BBp
from lines 4 and 5 by conjunction introduction
7. (BBp & BBp)
by rule (F)
8. B(p & Bp)
from lines 6 and 7 by reductio ad absurdum, discharging assumption 1
The last line matches line 6 in the previous proof, and the remainder goes as before. So if any true sentence could
possibly be believed by a rational person, then that sentence is believed by one or more rational persons.
Some anti-realists advocate the use of intuitionistic logic; however, except for the very last line which moves from
there are no unknown truths to all truths are known, the proof is, in fact, intuitionistically valid.
The knowability thesis

Rule (C) is generally held to be at fault rather than any of the other logical principles employed. It may be contended
that this rule does not faithfully translate the idea that all truths are knowable, and that rule (C) should not apply
unrestrictedly. Kvanvig contends that this represents an illicit substitution into a modal context.
Gdel's Theorem proves that there are statements, even in pure mathematics, which are undecidable. In that context,
it is difficult to state that "all truths are knowable" since some potential truths are uncertain.
External links
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability [1]. Article at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, by Berit Brogaard and Joe
Salerno.
Not Every Truth Can Be Known: at least, not all at once [2]. Discussion page on an article of the same name by
Greg Restall can be found in Salerno's book
Joe Salerno [3]
References
[1] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ fitch-paradox/
[2] http:/ / consequently. org/ writing/ notevery/
[3] http:/ / sites. google. com/ site/ knowability/ joesalerno
Frederick Fitch, " A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts (http://www.jstor.org/pss/2271594)". Journal
of Symbolic Logic Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1963), pp.135142
W. D. Hart. "The Epistemology of Abstract Objects", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 53,
1979, pp.15365.
Johnathan Kvanvig. The Knowability Paradox (http://books.google.ca/books?id=nhRZqgREEQMC). Oxford
University Press, 2006.
Joe Salerno, ed. New essays on the knowability paradox (http://knowability.googlepages.com/home). Oxford
University Press, 2009.
External links
Fitch's paradox of knowability (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitch-paradox/) entry in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Knowability (http://philpapers.org/browse/knowability) at PhilPapers
Fitch's paradox of knowability (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/998) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology
Project
285
Grandfather paradox
Grandfather paradox
The grandfather paradox is a proposed paradox of time travel first described by the science fiction writer Ren
Barjavel in his 1943 book Le Voyageur Imprudent (Future Times Three).[1] The paradox is described as follows: the
time traveller went back in time to the time when his grandfather had not married yet and killed him. As a result, the
time traveller was never born when he was meant to be. If he was never born, then he is unable to travel through time
and kill his grandfather, which means the traveller would be born after all, and so on.
Despite the name, the grandfather paradox does not exclusively regard the impossibility of one's own birth. Rather, it
regards any action that makes impossible the ability to travel back in time in the first place. The paradox's namesake
example is merely the most commonly thought of when one considers the whole range of possible actions. Another
example would be using scientific knowledge to invent a time machine, then going back in time and (whether
through murder or otherwise) impeding a scientist's work that would eventually lead to the very information that you
used to invent the time machine. An equivalent paradox is known (in philosophy) as autoinfanticide, going back in
time and killing oneself as a baby.[2]
Assuming the causal link between the time traveller's present and future, the grandfather paradox that disrupts that
link may be regarded as impossible (thus precluding the arbitrary alteration of one's fate). However, a number of
hypotheses have been postulatedWikipedia:Citation needed to avoid the paradox, such as the idea that the past is
unchangeable, so the grandfather must have already survived the attempted killing (as stated earlier); or the time
traveller createsor joinsan alternate timeline or parallel universe[3] in which the traveller was never born.
A variant of the grandfather paradox is the Hitler paradox or Hitler's murder paradox, a fairly frequent trope in
science fiction, in which the protagonist travels back in time to murder Adolf Hitler before he can instigate World
War II. Rather than necessarily physically preventing time travel, the action removes any reason for the travel, along
with any knowledge that the reason ever existed, thus removing any point in travelling in time in the first place.
Additionally, the consequences of Hitler's existence are so monumental and all-encompassing that for anyone born in
the decades after World War II, it is likely that the grandfather paradox would directly apply in some way (due to the
fact that practically anyone born after World War II likely had their birth influenced in some way by its effects).
Scientific theories
Novikov self-consistency principle
The Novikov self-consistency principle expresses one view on how backwards time travel could be possible without
a danger of paradoxes. According to this hypothesis, the only possible time lines are those entirely
self-consistentso anything a time traveler does in the past must have been part of history all along, and the time
traveler can never do anything to prevent the trip back in time from happening, since this would represent an
inconsistency. Nicholas J. J. Smith argues, for example, that if some time traveler killed the child who lived in his
old address, this would ipso facto necessitate that the child was not the time traveler's younger self, nor the younger
self of anyone alive in the time frame that the time traveler came from. This could be extrapolated further into the
possibility that the child's death led to the family moving away, which in turn led to the time traveler's family
moving into the house guaranteeing that the house later became the home the time traveler would then grow up in,
forming a predestination paradox.
Seth Lloyd and other researchers at MIT have proposed an expanded version of the Novikov principle, according to
which probability bends to prevent paradoxes from occurring. Outcomes would become stranger as one approaches a
forbidden act, as the universe must favor improbable events to prevent impossible ones.[4][5]
It might be argued that the ordinary concept of human "free will" is equivalent to this sort of time-travel paradox, for
if one could travel back in time to change a future relative to that past space time interval, then how would that be
286
Grandfather paradox
distinguishable, in principle, from the everyday choices and decisions considered to be freely made within any space
time frame taken as the "present"?
One might build a more plausible case for the prohibition of classical time-travel simply by considering how it might
violate several conservation laws by the duplication of matter along a single space time line and perhaps require a
near-universal redistribution of mass-energy.
Parallel universes
There could be "an ensemble of parallel universes" such that when the traveler kills the grandfather, the act took
place in (or resulted in the creation of) a parallel universe where the traveler's counterpart never exists as a result.
However, his prior existence in the original universe is unaltered. Succinctly, this explanation states that: if time
travel is possible, then multiple versions of the future exist in parallel universes. This theory would also apply if a
person went back in time to shoot himself, because in the past he would be dead as in the future he would be alive
and well.
Examples of parallel universes postulated in physics are:
In quantum mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation suggests that every seemingly random quantum event with
a non-zero probability actually occurs in all possible ways in different "worlds", so that history is constantly
branching into different alternatives. The physicist David Deutsch has argued that if backwards time travel is
possible, it should result in the traveler ending up in a different branch of history than the one he departed from.
See also quantum suicide and immortality.
M-theory is put forward as a hypothetical master theory that unifies the six superstring theories, although at
present it is largely incomplete. One possible consequence of ideas drawn from M-theory is that multiple
universes in the form of 3-Dimensional membranes known as branes could exist side-by-side in a fourth large
spatial dimension (which is distinct from the concept of time as a fourth dimension)see Brane cosmology.
However, there is currently no argument from physics that there would be one brane for each physically possible
version of history as in the many-worlds interpretation, nor is there any argument that time travel would take one
to a different brane.
Theories in science fiction

Nonexistence theory
According to this theory, if someone were to do something in the past that would cause their nonexistence, upon
returning to the future, they would find themselves in a world where the effects of (and chain reactions thereof) their
actions are not present, as the person never existed. Through this theory, they would still exist, though. Two
well-known examples of this are found in It's A Wonderful Life and Roswell that ends well.
Parallel universes resolution

The idea of preventing paradoxes by supposing that the time traveller is taken to a parallel universe while his original
history remains intact, which is discussed above in the context of science, is also common in science fictionsee
Time travel as a means of creating historical divergences.
287
Grandfather paradox
Restricted action resolution

See also: Predestination paradoxes in fiction
Another resolution, of which the Novikov self-consistency principle can be taken as an example, holds that if one
were to travel back in time, the laws of nature (or other intervening cause) would simply forbid the traveler from
doing anything that could later result in their time travel not occurring. For example, a shot fired at the traveler's
grandfather misses, or the gun jams or misfires, or the grandfather is injured but not killed, or the person killed turns
out to be not the real grandfatheror some other event prevents the attempt from succeeding. No action the traveler
takes to affect or change history can ever succeed, as some form of "bad luck" or coincidence always prevents the
outcome. In effect, the traveler cannot change history. Often in fiction, the time traveler does not merely fail to
prevent the actions, but in fact precipitates them (see predestination paradox), usually by accident.
This theory might lead to concerns about the existence of free will (in this model, free will may be an illusion, or at
least not unlimited). This theory also assumes that causality must be constant: i.e. that nothing can occur in the
absence of cause, whereas some theories hold that an event may remain constant even if its initial cause was
subsequently eliminated.
Closely related but distinct is the notion of the time line as self-healing. The time-traveler's actions are like throwing
a stone in a large lake; the ripples spread, but are soon swamped by the effect of the existing waves. For instance, a
time traveler could assassinate a politician who led his country into a disastrous war, but the politician's followers
would then use his murder as a pretext for the war, and the emotional effect of that would cancel out the loss of the
politician's charisma. Or the traveler could prevent a car crash from killing a loved one, only to have the loved one
killed by a mugger, or fall down the stairs, choke on a meal, killed by a stray bullet, etc. In the 2002 film The Time
Machine, this scenario is shown where the main character builds a time machine to save his fiance from being killed
by a mugger, only for her to die in a car crash instead; as he learns from a trip to the future, he cannot save her with
the machine or he would never have been inspired to build the machine so that he could go back and save her in the
first place. In some stories it is only the event that precipitated the time traveler's decision to travel back in time that
cannot be substantially changed, in others all attempted changes "heal" in this way, and in still others the universe
can heal most changes but not sufficiently drastic ones. This is also the explanation advanced by the Doctor Who
role-playing game, which supposes that Time is like a stream; you can dam it, divert it, or block it, but the overall
direction resumes after a period of conflict.
It also may not be clear whether the time traveler altered the past or precipitated the future he remembers, such as a
time traveler who goes back in time to persuade an artist whose single surviving work is famous to hide the rest
of the works to protect them. If, on returning to his time, he finds that these works are now well-known, he knows he
has changed the past. On the other hand, he may return to a future exactly as he remembers, except that a week after
his return, the works are found. Were they actually destroyed, as he believed when he traveled in time, and has he
preserved them? Or was their disappearance occasioned by the artist's hiding them at his urging, and the skill with
which they were hidden, and so the long time to find them, stemmed from his urgency?
288
Grandfather paradox
Bad Wolf Resolution

A resolution to the Hitler's Murder paradox is that the murderer traveled back in time in order to kill Hitler because
he discovered a note telling him to do so. Then after killing Hitler, the murderer writes a note to himself telling him
to travel back in time to kill Hitler. This results in the murderer effectively writing a note to his relative past self. A
more well known example is the Doctor Who story arc of the same name.
Destruction resolution
Some science fiction stories suggest that any paradox would destroy the universe, or at least the parts of space and
time affected by the paradox. The plots of such stories tend to revolve around preventing paradoxes, such as the final
episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation.
A less destructive alternative of this theory suggests the death of the time traveler whether the history is altered or
not; an example would be in the first part of the Back to the Future trilogy, where the lead character's alteration of
history results in a risk of his own disappearance, and he has to fix the alteration to preserve his own existence. In
this theory, killing one's grandfather would result in the disappearance of oneself, history would erase all traces of
the person's existence, and the death of the grandfather would be caused by another means (say, another existing
person firing the gun); thus, the paradox would never occur from a historical viewpoint.
Temporal Modification Negation Theory

While stating that if time travel is possible it would be impossible to violate the grandfather paradox, it goes further
to state that any action taken that itself negates the time travel event cannot occur. The consequences of such an
event would in some way negate that event, be it by either voiding the memory of what one is doing before doing it,
by preventing the action in some way, or even by destroying the universe among other possible consequences. It
states therefore that to successfully change the past one must do so incidentally.
For example, if one tried to stop the murder of one's parents, he would fail. On the other hand, if one traveled back
and did something else that as a result prevented the death of someone else's parents, then such an event would be
successful, because the reason for the journey and therefore the journey itself remains unchanged preventing a
paradox.
In addition, if this event had some colossal change in the history of mankind, and such an event would not void the
ability or purpose of the journey back, it would occur, and would hold. In such a case, the memory of the event
would immediately be modified in the mind of the time traveler.
An example of this would be for someone to travel back to observe life in Austria in 1887 and while there shoot five
people, one of which was one of Hitler's parents. Hitler would therefore never have existed, but since this would not
prevent the invention of the means for time travel, or the purpose of the trip, then such a change would hold. But for
it to hold, every element that influenced the trip must remain unchanged. The Third Reich would not exist and the
world we know today would be completely different. This would void someone convincing another party to travel
back to kill the people without knowing who they are and making the time line stick, because by being successful,
they would void the first party's influence and therefore the second party's actions.
These issues are treated humorously in an episode of Futurama in which Fry travels back in time and inadvertently
causes his grandfather Enis's death before Enis marries his grandmother. Fry's distraught grandmother then seduces
him, and Fry learns that he is his own grandfather.
289
Grandfather paradox
290
Other considerations
Consideration of the grandfather paradox has led some to the idea that time travel is by its very nature paradoxical
and therefore logically impossible, on the same order as round squares. For example, the philosopher Bradley
Dowden made this sort of argument in the textbook Logical Reasoning, where he wrote:
Nobody has ever built a time machine that could take a person back to an earlier time. Nobody should be seriously trying to build one, either,
because a good argument exists for why the machine can never be built. The argument goes like this: suppose you did have a time machine
right now, and you could step into it and travel back to some earlier time. Your actions in that time might then prevent your grandparents from
ever having met one another. This would make you not born, and thus not step into the time machine. So, the claim that there could be a time
machine is self-contradictory.
But, some philosophers and scientists believe that time travel into the past need not be logically impossible provided
that there is no possibility of changing the past, as suggested, for example, by the Novikov self-consistency principle.
Bradley Dowden himself revised the view above after being convinced of this in an exchange with the philosopher
Norman Swartz.
Consideration of the possibility of backwards time travel in a hypothetical universe described by a Gdel metric led
famed logician Kurt Gdel to assert that time might itself be a sort of illusion. He seems to have been suggesting
something along the lines of the block time view in which time does not really "flow" but is just another dimension
like space, with all events at all times being fixed within this 4-dimensional "block".
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
; actually, the book refers to an ancestor of the time traveller not his grandfather.
When the term was coined by Paul Horwich, he used the term autofanticide.
See also Alfred Bester, The Men Who Murdered Mohammed, published in 1958, just the year following Everett's Ph.D thesis
Laura Sanders, "Physicists Tame Time Travel by Forbidding You to Kill Your Grandfather", Wired, 20 July 2010. "But this dictum against
paradoxical events causes possible but unlikely events to happen more frequently. 'If you make a slight change in the initial conditions, the
paradoxical situation wont happen. That looks like a good thing, but what it means is that if youre very near the paradoxical condition, then
slight differences will be extremely amplified,' says Charles Bennett of IBMs Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York."
[5] Seth Lloyd et al., " The quantum mechanics of time travel through post-selected teleportation (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ 1007. 2615)", arXiv.org,
submitted 15 July 2010, revised 19 July 2010.
External links
tvtropes - Grandfather Paradox (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/GrandfatherParadox) and
Hitler's Time Travel Exemption Act (http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/
HitlersTimeTravelExemptionAct) and for examples in fiction
Liberal paradox
291
Liberal paradox
The liberal paradox, also Sen paradox or Sen's paradox, is a logical paradox discovered by Amartya Sen which
purports to show that no social system can simultaneously (1) be committed to a minimal sense of freedom, (2)
always result in a type of economic efficiency known as Pareto efficiency, and (3) be capable of functioning in any
society whatsoever. This paradox is contentious because it appears to contradict the classical liberal claim that
markets are both efficient and respect individual freedoms. If, as Sen claims, classical liberalism means Pareto
efficiency by the word efficiency, there is a paradox, then this liberal claim cannot be true.
The paradox is similar in many respects to Arrow's impossibility theorem and uses similar mathematical techniques.
Pareto efficiency
Main article: Pareto efficiency
Definition
A particular distribution of goods or outcome of any social process is regarded as Pareto efficient if there is no way
to improve one or more people's situations without harming another. Put another way, an outcome is not Pareto
efficient if there is a way to improve at least one person's situation without harming anyone else.
For example, suppose a mother has ten dollars which she intends to give to her two children Carlos and Shannon.
Suppose the children each only want money, and they do not get jealous of one another. The following distributions
are Pareto efficient:
Carlos Shannon
$5
$5
$10
$0
$2
$8
But a distribution that gives each of them $2 and where the mother wastes the remaining $6 is not Pareto efficient,
because she could have given the wasted money to either child and made that child better off without harming the
other.
In this example, it was presumed that a child was made better or worse off by gaining money, and that neither child
gained or lost by evaluating her share in comparison to the other. To be more precise, we must evaluate all possible
preferences that the child might have and consider a situation as Pareto efficient if there no other social state that at
least one person prefers and no one disprefers.
Use in economics
Pareto efficiency is often used in economics as a minimal sense of economic efficiency. If a mechanism does not
result in Pareto efficient outcomes, it is regarded as inefficient since there was another outcome which could have
made some people better off without harming anyone else.
The view that markets produce Pareto efficient outcomes is regarded as an important and central justification for
capitalism. This result was established (with certain assumptions) in an area of study known as general equilibrium
theory, and is known as the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics. As a result, these results often feature
prominently in libertarian justifications of unregulated markets.
Liberal paradox
292
Two examples
Sen's original example
Sen's original example used a simple society with only two people and only one social issue to consider. The two
members of society are named "Lewd" and "Prude." In this society there is a copy of a Lady Chatterly's Lover and it
must be given either to Lewd to read, to Prude to read, or disposed of unread. Suppose that Lewd enjoys this sort of
reading and would prefer to read it himself rather than have it disposed of. However, he would get even more
enjoyment out of Prude being forced to read it.
Prude thinks that the book is indecent and that it should be disposed of unread. However, if someone must read it
Prude would prefer that he, himself read it rather than Lewd since Prude thinks it would be even worse for someone
to read and enjoy the book rather than read it in disgust.
Given these preferences of the two individuals in the society, a social planner must decide what to do. Should the
planner force Lewd to read the book, force Prude to read the book, or let it go unread? More particularly, the social
planner must rank all three possible outcomes in terms of their social desirability. The social planner decides that she
should be committed to individual rights, each individual should get to choose whether he, himself will read the
book. Lewd should get to decide whether the outcome "Lewd reads" will be ranked higher than "No one reads," and
similarly Prude should get to decide whether the outcome "Prude reads" will be ranked higher than "No one reads."
Following this strategy, the social planner declares that the outcome "Lewd reads" will be ranked higher than "No
one reads" (because of Lewd's preferences) and that "No one reads" will be ranked higher than "Prude reads"
(because of Prude's preferences). Consistency then requires that "Lewd reads" be ranked higher than "Prude reads,"
and so the social planner gives the book to Lewd to read.
Notice that this outcome is regarded as worse than "Prude reads" by both Prude and Lewd, and the chosen outcome
is therefore Pareto inferior to another available outcomethe one where Prude is forced to read the book.
Gibbard's example
Another example was provided by philosopher Allan Gibbard. Suppose there are two individuals Alice and Bob who
live next door to one another. Alice loves the color blue and hates red. Bob loves the color green and hates yellow. If
each were free to choose the color of their house independently of the other, they would choose their favorite colors.
But Alice hates Bob with a passion, and she would gladly endure a red house if it meant that Bob would have to
endure his house being yellow. Bob similarly hates Alice, and would gladly endure a yellow house if that meant that
Alice would live in a red house.
If each individual is free to chose their own house color, independently of the other, Alice would choose a blue
house and Bob would choose a green one. But, this outcome is not Pareto efficient, because both Alice and Bob
would prefer the outcome where Alice's house is red and Bob's is yellow. As a result, giving each individual the
freedom to choose their own house color has led to an inefficient outcomeone that is inferior to another outcome
where neither is free to choose their own color.
Mathematically, we can represent Alice's preferences with this symbol:
and Bob's preferences with this one:
. We can represent each outcome as a pair: (Color of Alice's house, Color of Bob's house). As stated Alice's
preferences are:
(Blue, Yellow)
(Red, Yellow)
(Blue, Green)
(Red, Green)
And Bob's are:

(Red, Green)
(Red, Yellow)
(Blue, Green)
(Blue, Yellow)
If we allow free and independent choices of both parties we end up with the outcome (Blue, Green) which is
dispreferred by both parties to the outcome (Red, Yellow) and is therefore not Pareto efficient.
Liberal paradox
293
The theorem
Suppose there is a society made of
individuals where
examples). Suppose there is a set of social outcomes

Prude
(Lewd and Prude, or Alice and Bob in the above

with at least two outcomes. In the example with Lewd and
Lewd reads, Prude reads, No one reads
, and in the example with Alice and Bob
(Blue,
Yellow), (Blue, Green), (Red, Yellow), (Red, Green) .

Each person, denoted by , in
is endowed with a preference relation over the set of social outcomes
individual's preference is represented by a relation
over
. Each
which is total and transitive.
A benign social planner must choose one or many "best" social options using the information about the individuals'
preferences. The planner is represented as a function from the set of all possible combinations of preferences for the
members of society to a subset of
. Because we are representing this as a function, it is presumed that the social
planner is prepared for all possible preferences of community members (this is sometimes called the Universal
Domain assumption).
Mathematically, we represent by
the set of all complete and transitive preference orderings over
planner is represented as a function
(where
is the power set of
. The social
).
There are two properties for this social choice function:

1. A social choice function respects the Paretian principle (also called Pareto optimality) if whenever every
individual strictly prefers outcome to outcome , then the social planner cannot choose . Mathematically,
For all societies
, if for all ,
, then
2. A social choice function respects minimal liberalism if there are at least two individuals, each of whom has at
least one pair of alternatives over which he is decisive. That is, where regardless of other individuals' preferences,
the social planner will not select the decisive individual's least preferred outcome from that pair. For example,
there is a pair
such that if he prefers to , then the society should also prefer to . Mathematically,
There are at least two individuals
such that for each there exists a pair of outcomes
) such that for all societies
only if
(or
(or
only if
).
In the example above, Lewd was decisive for the pair ("Lewd reads", "No one reads") and Prude was decisive for the
pair ("Prude reads", "No one reads").
Sen's impossibility theorem establishes that it is impossible for the social planner to satisfy both conditions. In other
words, for every social choice function there is at least one set of preferences that forces the planner to violate
either condition (1) or condition (2).
Ways out of the paradox

Because the paradox relies on very few conditions, there are a limited number of ways to escape the paradox.
Essentially one must either reject the universal domain assumption, the Pareto principle, or the minimal liberalism
principle. Sen himself suggested two ways out, one a rejection of universal domain another a rejection of the Pareto
principle.
Universal domain
Julian Blau proves that Sen's paradox can only arise when individuals have "nosy" preferencesthat is when their
preference depends not only on their own action but also on others' actions. In the example of Alice and Bob above,
Alice has a preference over how Bob paints his house, and Bob has a preference over Alice's house color as well.
Most arguments which demonstrate market efficiency assume that individuals only care about their own
consumption and not others' consumption and therefore do not consider the situations that give rise to Sen's paradox.
In fact, this shows a strong relationship between Sen's paradox and the well known result that markets fail to produce
Liberal paradox
Pareto outcomes in the presence of externalities.[1] Externalities arise when the choices of one party affect another.
Classic examples of externalities include pollution or over fishing. Because of their nosy preferences, Alice's choice
imposes a negative externality on Bob and vice versa.
To prevent the paradox, Sen suggests that "The ultimate guarantee for individual liberty may rest not on rules for
social choice but on developing individual values that respect each other's personal choices." Doing so would
amount to limiting certain types of nosy preferences, or alternatively restricting the application of the Pareto
principle only to those situations where individuals fail to have nosy preferences.
Note that if we consider the case of cardinal preferences for instance, if Alice and Bob both had to state, within
certain bounds, how much happiness they would get for each color of each house separately, and the situation which
produced the most happiness were chosen a minimally-liberal solution does not require that they have no nosiness
at all, but just that the sum of all "nosy" preferences about one house's color are below some threshold, while the
"non-nosy" preferences are all above that threshold. Since there are generally some questions for which this will be
true Sen's classic example is an individual's choice of whether to sleep on their back or their side the goal of
combining minimal liberalism with pareto efficiency, while impossible to guarantee in all theoretical cases, may not
in practice be impossible to obtain.
Pareto
Alternatively, one could remain committed to the universality of the rules for social choice and to individual rights
and instead reject to universal application of the Pareto principle. Sen also hints that this should be how one escapes
the paradox:
What is the moral? It is that in a very basic sense liberal values conflict with the Pareto principle. If
someone takes the Pareto principle seriously, as economists seem to do, then he has to face problems of
consistency in cherishing liberal values, even very mild ones. Or, to look at it in another way, if
someone does have certain liberal values, then he may have to eschew his adherence to Pareto
optimality. While the Pareto criterion has been thought to be an expression of individual liberty, it
appears that in choices involving more than two alternatives it can have consequences that are, in fact,
deeply illiberal.
Minimal liberalism
Most commentators on Sen's paradox have argued that Sen's minimal liberalism condition does not adequately
capture the notion of individual rights. Essentially what is excluded from Sen's characterization of individual rights is
the ability to voluntarily form contracts that lay down one's claim to a right.
For example, in the example of Lewd and Prude, although each has a right to refuse to read the book, Prude would
voluntarily sign a contract with Lewd promising to read the book on condition that Lewd refrain from doing so. In
such a circumstance there was no violation of Prude's or Lewd's rights because each entered the contract willingly.
Similarly, Alice and Bob might sign a contract to each paint their houses their dispreferred color on condition that
the other does the same.
In this vein, Gibbard provides a weaker version of the minimal liberalism claim which he argues is consistent with
the possibility of contracts and which is also consistent with the Pareto principle given any possible preferences of
the individuals.
294
Liberal paradox
References
[1] J.J. Laffont (2008). "externalities," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Ed. Abstract. (http:/ / www. dictionaryofeconomics.
com/ article?id=pde2008_E000200& q=externality& topicid=& result_number=9)
Moore's paradox
Not to be confused with Moore's Law. See Tfd
Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such
as, "It's raining, but I don't believe that it is raining" or "It's raining but I believe that it is not raining." The first
author to note this apparent absurdity was G.E. Moore. These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are
paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless:
1. can be true,
2. are (logically) consistent, and moreover
3. are not (obviously) contradictions.
The term 'Moore's paradox' is attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who considered the paradox Moore's most
important contribution to philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote about the paradox extensively in his later writings, which
brought Moore's paradox the attention it would not have otherwise received.
Moore's paradox has also been connected to many other of the well-known logical paradoxes including, though not
limited to, the liar paradox, the knower paradox, the unexpected hanging paradox, and the preface paradox.
There is currently no generally accepted explanation of Moore's paradox in the philosophical literature. However,
while Moore's paradox remains a philosophical curiosity, Moorean-type sentences are used by logicians, computer
scientists, and those working in the artificial intelligence community as examples of cases in which a knowledge,
belief, or information system is unsuccessful in updating its knowledge/belief/information store in light of new or
novel information.
The problem
Since Jaakko Hintikka's seminal treatment of the problem, it has become standard to present Moore's paradox by
explaining why it is absurd to assert sentences that have the logical form: "P and NOT(I believe that P)" or "P and I
believe that NOT-P." Philosophers nowadays refer to these, respectively, as the omissive and commissive versions of
Moore's paradox.
Moore himself presented the problem in two ways.
The first more fundamental way of setting the problem up starts from the following three premises:
1. It can be true at a particular time both that P, and that I do not believe that P.
2. I can assert or believe one of the two at a particular time.
3. It is absurd to assert or believe both of them at the same time.
I can assert that it is raining at a particular time. I can assert that I don't believe that it is raining at a particular time.
If I say both at the same time, I am saying or doing something absurd. But the content of what I say -- the
proposition the sentence expresses -- is perfectly consistent: it may well be raining, and I may not believe it. So why
cannot I assert that it is so?
Moore presents the problem in a second, distinct, way:
1. It is not absurd to assert the past-tense counterpart, e.g. "It was raining, but I did not believe that it was raining."
2. It is not absurd to assert the second- or third-person counterparts to Moore's sentences, e.g. "It is raining, but you
do not believe that it is raining," or "Michael is dead, but they do not believe that he is."
3. It is absurd to assert the present-tense "It is raining and I don't believe that it is raining."
295
Moore's paradox
I can assert that I was a certain way, e.g. believing it was raining when it wasn't, and that you, he, or they, are that
way but not that I am that way. Why not?
Subsequent philosophers have further noted that there is also an apparent absurdity in asserting a first-person
future-tense sentence such as "It will be raining, and I will believe that it is not raining."
Many philosophers -- though by no means all -- also hold that Moore's paradox arises not only at the level of
assertion but also at the level of belief. Interestingly, one who believes an instance of a Moorean sentence is
tantamount to one who is subject to or engaging in self-deception, at least on one standard way of describing it.
Proposed explanations
Philosophical interest in Moore's paradox, since Moore and Wittgenstein, has undergone a resurgence, starting with,
though not limited to, Jaakko Hintikka, continuing with Roy Sorensen, David Rosenthal, Sydney Shoemaker and the
first publication, in 2007, of a collection of articles devoted to the problem.
There have been several proposed constraints on a satisfactory explanation in the literature, including (though not
limited to):
It should explain the absurdity of both the omissive and the commissive versions.
It should explain the absurdity of both asserting and believing Moore's sentences.
It should preserve, and reveal the roots of, the intuition that contradiction (or something contradiction-like) is at
the root of the absurdity.
The first two conditions have generally been the most challenged, while the third appears to be the least
controversial. Some philosophers have claimed that there is, in fact, no problem in believing the content of Moore's
sentences (e.g. David Rosenthal). Others (e.g. Sydney Shoemaker) hold that an explanation of the problem at the
level of belief will automatically provide us with an explanation of the absurdity at the level of assertion via the
linking principle that what can reasonably be asserted is determined by what can reasonably be believed. Some have
also denied (e.g. Rosenthal) that a satisfactory explanation to the problem need be uniform in explaining both the
omissive AND commissive versions. Most of the explanations offered of Moore's paradox are united in holding that
contradiction is at the heart of the absurdity.
One type of explanation at the level of assertion exploits the view that assertion implies or expresses belief in some
way so that if someone asserts that p they imply or express the belief that p. Several versions of this view exploit
elements of speech act theory, which can be distinguished according to the particular explanation given of the link
between assertion and belief. Whatever version of this view is preferred, whether cast in terms of the Gricean
intentions (see Paul Grice) or in terms of the structure of Searlean illocutionary acts (see speech act), it does not
obviously apply to explaining the absurdity of the commissive version of Moore's paradox. To take one version of
this type of explanation, if someone asserts p and conjoins it with the assertion (or denial) that he does not believe
that p, then he has in that very act contradicted himself, for in effect what the speaker says is: I believe that p and I
do not believe that p. The absurdity of asserting p & I do not believe that p is thus revealed as being of a more
familiar kind. Depending on one's view of the nature of contradiction, one might thus interpret a speaker of the
omissive Moorean sentence as asserting everything (that is, asserting too much) or asserting nothing (that is, not
asserting enough).
An alternative view is that the assertion "I believe that p" often (though not always) functions as an alternative way
of asserting "p", so that the semantic content of the assertion "I believe that p" is just p: it functions as a statement
about the world and not about anyone's state of mind. Accordingly what someone asserts when they assert "p and I
believe that not-p" is just "p and not-p" Asserting the commissive version of Moore's sentences is again assimilated
to the more familiar (putative) impropriety of asserting a contradiction.
At the level of belief, there are two main kinds of explanation. The first, much more popular one, agrees with those
at the level of assertion that contradiction is at the heart of the absurdity. The contradiction is revealed in various
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Moore's paradox
ways, some using the resources of doxastic logic (e.g. Hintikka), others (e.g. Sorensen) principles of rational belief
maintenance and formation, while still others appeal to our putative capacity for self-knowledge and the first-person
authority (e.g. Shoemaker) we have over our states of mind.
Another alternative view, due to Richard Moran, views the existence of Moore's paradox as symptomatic of
creatures who are capable of self-knowledge, capable of thinking for themselves from a deliberative point of view, as
well as about themselves from a theoretical point of view. On this view, anyone who asserted or believed one of
Moore's sentences would be subject to a loss of self-knowledgein particular, would be one who, with respect to a
particular 'object', broadly construed, e.g. person, apple, the way of the world, would be in a situation which violates,
what Moran calls, the Transparency Condition: if I want to know what I think about X, then I consider/think about
nothing but X itself. Moran's view seems to be that what makes Moore's paradox so distinctive is not some
contradictory-like phenomenon (or at least not in the sense that most commentators on the problem have construed
it), whether it be located at the level of belief or that of assertion. Rather, that the very possibility of Moore's paradox
is a consequence of our status as agents (albeit finite and resource-limited ones) who are capable of knowing (and
changing) their own minds.
References
External links
"Epistemic Paradoxes" (including Moore's) at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/#MooPro)
Moravec's paradox
Moravec's paradox is the discovery by artificial intelligence and robotics researchers that, contrary to traditional
assumptions, high-level reasoning requires very little computation, but low-level sensorimotor skills require
enormous computational resources. The principle was articulated by Hans Moravec, Rodney Brooks, Marvin Minsky
and others in the 1980s. As Moravec writes, "it is comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult level
performance on intelligence tests or playing checkers, and difficult or impossible to give them the skills of a
one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility."[1]
Linguist and cognitive scientist Steven Pinker considers this the most significant discovery uncovered by AI
researchers. In his book The Language Instinct, he writes:
The main lesson of thirty-five years of AI research is that the hard problems are easy and the easy
problems are hard. The mental abilities of a four-year-old that we take for granted recognizing a face,
lifting a pencil, walking across a room, answering a question in fact solve some of the hardest
engineering problems ever conceived... As the new generation of intelligent devices appears, it will be
the stock analysts and petrochemical engineers and parole board members who are in danger of being
replaced by machines. The gardeners, receptionists, and cooks are secure in their jobs for decades to
come.[2]
Marvin Minsky emphasizes that the most difficult human skills to reverse engineer are those that are unconscious.
"In general, we're least aware of what our minds do best," he writes, and adds "we're more aware of simple processes
that don't work well than of complex ones that work flawlessly."[3]
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Moravec's paradox
The biological basis of human skills

One possible explanation of the paradox, offered by Moravec, is based on evolution. All human skills are
implemented biologically, using machinery designed by the process of natural selection. In the course of their
evolution, natural selection has tended to preserve design improvements and optimizations. The older a skill is, the
more time natural selection has had to improve the design. Abstract thought developed only very recently, and
consequently, we should not expect its implementation to be particularly efficient.
As Moravec writes:
Encoded in the large, highly evolved sensory and motor portions of the human brain is a billion years of
experience about the nature of the world and how to survive in it. The deliberate process we call
reasoning is, I believe, the thinnest veneer of human thought, effective only because it is supported by
this much older and much more powerful, though usually unconscious, sensorimotor knowledge. We are
all prodigious olympians in perceptual and motor areas, so good that we make the difficult look easy.
Abstract thought, though, is a new trick, perhaps less than 100 thousand years old. We have not yet
mastered it. It is not all that intrinsically difficult; it just seems so when we do it.[4]
A compact way to express this argument would be:
We should expect the difficulty of reverse-engineering any human skill to be roughly proportional to the amount
of time that skill has been evolving in animals.
The oldest human skills are largely unconscious and so appear to us to be effortless.
Therefore, we should expect skills that appear effortless to be difficult to reverse-engineer, but skills that require
effort may not necessarily be difficult to engineer at all.
Some examples of skills that have been evolving for millions of years: recognizing a face, moving around in space,
judging peoples motivations, catching a ball, recognizing a voice, setting appropriate goals, paying attention to
things that are interesting; anything to do with perception, attention, visualization, motor skills, social skills and so
on.
Some examples of skills that have appeared more recently: mathematics, engineering, human games, logic and much
of what we call science. These are hard for us because they are not what our bodies and brains were primarily
evolved to do. These are skills and techniques that were acquired recently, in historical time, and have had at most a
few thousand years to be refined, mostly by cultural evolution.[5]
Historical influence on artificial intelligence

In the early days of artificial intelligence research, leading researchers often predicted that they would be able to
create thinking machines in just a few decades (see history of artificial intelligence). Their optimism stemmed in part
from the fact that they had been successful at writing programs that used logic, solved algebra and geometry
problems and played games like checkers and chess. Logic and algebra are difficult for people and are considered a
sign of intelligence. They assumed that, having (almost) solved the "hard" problems, the "easy" problems of vision
and commonsense reasoning would soon fall into place. They were wrong, and one reason is that these problems are
not easy at all, but incredibly difficult. The fact that they had solved problems like logic and algebra was irrelevant,
because these problems are extremely easy for machines to solve.[6]
Rodney Brooks explains that, according to early AI research, intelligence was "best characterized as the things that
highly educated male scientists found challenging", such as chess, symbolic integration, proving mathematical
theorems and solving complicated word algebra problems. "The things that children of four or five years could do
effortlessly, such as visually distinguishing between a coffee cup and a chair, or walking around on two legs, or
finding their way from their bedroom to the living room were not thought of as activities requiring intelligence."[7]
This would lead Brooks to pursue a new direction in artificial intelligence and robotics research. He decided to build
intelligent machines that had "No cognition. Just sensing and action. That is all I would build and completely leave
298
Moravec's paradox
out what traditionally was thought of as the intelligence of artificial intelligence." This new direction, which he
called "Nouvelle AI" was highly influential on robotics research and AI.[8]
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Moravec 1988, p.15.

Pinker 2007, pp.19091.
Minsky 1988, p.29.
Moravec 1988, pp.1516.
Even given that cultural evolution is faster than genetic evolution, the difference in development time between these two kinds of skills is five
or six orders of magnitude, and (Moravec would argue) there hasn't been nearly enough time for us to have "mastered" the new skills.
[6] These are not the only reasons that their predictions did not come true: see the problems.
[7] , quoted in
[8] McCorduck 2004, p.456.
References
Bibliography
Brooks, Rodney (1986), Intelligence Without Representation, MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
(2002), Flesh and Machines, Pantheon Books

Campbell, Jeremy (1989), The Improbable Machine, Simon and Schuster, pp.3031
Minsky, Marvin (1986), The Society of Mind, Simon and Schuster, p.29
Moravec, Hans (1988), Mind Children, Harvard University Press
McCorduck, Pamela (2004), Machines Who Think (http://www.pamelamc.com/html/machines_who_think.
html) (2nd ed.), Natick, MA: A. K. Peters, Ltd., ISBN1-56881-205-1, p.456.
Nilsson, Nils (1998), Artificial Intelligence: A New Synthesis, Morgan Kaufmann, p.7, ISBN978-1-55860-467-4
Pinker, Steven (September 4, 2007) [1994], The Language Instinct, Perennial Modern Classics, Harper,
ISBN0-06-133646-7
299
Newcomb's paradox
Newcomb's paradox
In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's paradox, also referred to as Newcomb's problem, is a thought
experiment involving a game between two players, one of whom purports to be able to predict the future. Whether
the problem is actually a paradox is disputed.
Newcomb's paradox was created by William Newcomb of the University of California's Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory. However, it was first analyzed and was published in a philosophy paper spread to the philosophical
community by Robert Nozick in 1969, and appeared in Martin Gardner's Scientific American column in 1974.[1]
Today it is a much debated problem in the philosophical branch of decision theoryWikipedia:Citation needed but has
received little attention from the mathematical side.Wikipedia:Citation needed
The problem
A person is playing a game operated by the Predictor, an entity somehow presented as being exceptionally skilled at
predicting people's actions. The exact nature of the Predictor varies between retellings of the paradox. Some assume
that the character always has a reputation for being completely infallible and incapable of error; others assume that
the predictor has a very low error rate. The Predictor can be presented as a psychic, as a superintelligent alien, as a
deity, as a brain-scanning computer, etc. However, the original discussion by Nozick says only that the Predictor's
predictions are "almost certainly" correct, and also specifies that "what you actually decide to do is not part of the
explanation of why he made the prediction he made". With this original version of the problem, some of the
discussion below is inapplicable.
The player of the game is presented with two boxes, one transparent (labeled A) and the other opaque (labeled B).
The player is permitted to take the contents of both boxes, or just the opaque box B. Box A contains a visible $1,000.
The contents of box B, however, are determined as follows: At some point before the start of the game, the Predictor
makes a prediction as to whether the player of the game will take just box B, or both boxes. If the Predictor predicts
that both boxes will be taken, then box B will contain nothing. If the Predictor predicts that only box B will be taken,
then box B will contain $1,000,000.
Nozick also stipulates that if the Predictor predicts that the player will choose randomly, then box B will contain
nothing.
By the time the game begins, and the player is called upon to choose which boxes to take, the prediction has already
been made, and the contents of box B have already been determined. That is, box B contains either $0 or $1,000,000
before the game begins, and once the game begins even the Predictor is powerless to change the contents of the
boxes. Before the game begins, the player is aware of all the rules of the game, including the two possible contents
of box B, the fact that its contents are based on the Predictor's prediction, and knowledge of the Predictor's
infallibility. The only information withheld from the player is what prediction the Predictor made, and thus what the
contents of box B are.
300
Newcomb's paradox
301
Predicted choice Actual choice
Payout
A and B
A and B
$1,000
A and B
B only
$0
B only
A and B
$1,001,000
B only
B only
$1,000,000
The problem is called a paradox because two analyses that both sound intuitively logical give conflicting answers to
the question of what choice maximizes the player's payout. The first analysis argues that, regardless of what
prediction the Predictor has made, taking both boxes yields more money. That is, if the prediction is for both A and
B to be taken, then the player's decision becomes a matter of choosing between $1,000 (by taking A and B) and $0
(by taking just B), in which case taking both boxes is obviously preferable. But, even if the prediction is for the
player to take only B, then taking both boxes yields $1,001,000, and taking only B yields only $1,000,000taking
both boxes is still better, regardless of which prediction has been made.
The second analysis suggests that taking only B is the correct option. This analysis argues that we can ignore the
possibilities that return $0 and $1,001,000, as they both require that the Predictor has made an incorrect prediction,
and the problem states that the Predictor is almost never wrong. Thus, the choice becomes whether to receive $1,000
(both boxes) or to receive $1,000,000 (only box B)so taking only box B is better.
In his 1969 article, Nozick noted that "To almost everyone, it is perfectly clear and obvious what should be done.
The difficulty is that these people seem to divide almost evenly on the problem, with large numbers thinking that the
opposing half is just being silly."
A solution of the paradox must point out an error in one of the two arguments. Either the intuition is wrong, or there
is something wrong with the way proposed for affecting the past.
Attempted resolutions
Simon Burgess has argued that we need to recognize two stages to the problem. The first stage is that before which
the predictor has gained all the information on which the prediction will be based. If, for example, we suppose that
the prediction is at least partially based on a brain scan of the player then the first stage will not be over at least until
that brain scan has been taken. An important point to appreciate is that while the player is still in that first stage he or
she will presumably be able to influence the predictor's prediction (e.g., by committing to taking only one box). The
second stage commences after the completion of the brain scan (and/or after the gathering of any other information
on which the prediction is based). As Burgess points out, the first stage is the one in which all of us currently find
ourselves. Moreover, there is a clear sense in which the first stage is more significant than the second because it is
then that the player can determine whether the $1m is in box B. Once he or she gets to the second stage, the best that
can be done is to determine whether to get the $1000 in box A.
Those persuaded by Burgess's approach do not say, tout court, either that it is rational to one-box or that it is rational
to two-box. Rather, they argue that a player should make his or her decision while in the first stage and that that
decision should be to commit to one-boxing. Once in the second stage, the rational decision would be to two-box,
although by that stage the player should already have made up his or her mind to one-box. Burgess has repeatedly
emphasized that he is not arguing that the player should change his or her mind on getting to the second stage. The
safe and rational strategy to adopt is to simply make a commitment to one-boxing while in the first stage and to have
no intention of wavering from that commitment, i.e., make an unqualified resolution. Burgess points out that those
who make no such commitment and therefore miss out on the $1m have simply failed to be prepared. In a more
recent paper Burgess has explained that, given his analysis, Newcomb's problem should be seen as being akin to the
toxin puzzle. This is because both problems highlight the fact that one can have a reason to intend to do something
without having a reason to actually do it.
Newcomb's paradox
With regard to causal structure, Burgess has consistently followed Ellery Eells and others in treating Newcomb's
problem as a common cause problem. Contrary to David Lewis, he argues against the idea that Newcomb's problem
is another version of the prisoner's dilemma. Burgess's argument on this point emphasizes the contrasting causal
structures of the two problems.
William Lane Craig has suggested that, in a world with perfect predictors (or time machines, because a time machine
could be used as a mechanism for making a prediction), retrocausality can occur.[2] If a person truly knows the
future, and that knowledge affects his or her actions, then events in the future will be causing effects in the past. The
chooser's choice will have already caused the predictor's action. Some have concluded that if time machines or
perfect predictors can exist, then there can be no free will and choosers will do whatever they're fated to do. Taken
together, the paradox is a restatement of the old contention that free will and determinism are incompatible, since
determinism enables the existence of perfect predictors. Some philosophers argue this paradox is equivalent to the
grandfather paradox. Put another way, they claim the paradox presupposes a perfect predictor, implying the
"chooser" is not free to choose, yet simultaneously presumes a choice can be debated and decided. This suggests to
some that the paradox is an artifact of these contradictory assumptions. However, Nozick's exposition specifically
excludes backward causation (such as time travel) and requires only that the predictions be of high accuracy, not that
they are absolutely certain to be correct.
David Wolpert and Gregory Benford have reformulated the problem as a noncooperative game in which players set
the conditional distributions in a Bayes net. It is straightforward to prove that the two strategies for which boxes to
choose make mutually inconsistent assumptions for the underlying Bayes net. Depending on which Bayes net one
assumes, one can derive either strategy as optimal. In this there is no paradox, only unclear language that hides the
fact that one is making two inconsistent assumptions. However, that paper also gives a "time reversed" version of
Newcomb's problem, in which the so-called "prediction" is made after the strategy has been chosen - which the
authors claim is equivalent because the probability arguments make no mention of time. In that time reversed
version, at least, the assumption according to which one is always completely free to choose a strategy without
affecting the predictor's "prediction" in any way, is incompatible with the original statement of the problem, in which
the predictor is very accurate.
Gary Drescher argues in his book Good and Real that the correct decision is to one-box, by appealing to a situation
he argues is analogous - a rational agent in a deterministic universe deciding whether or not to cross a potentially
busy street.
Eliezer Yudkowsky argues that the correct decision is to one-box, from a conception of rationality as "systematized
winning"[3][4] and a principle he calls "reflective consistency".[5]
Andrew Irvine argues that the problem is structurally isomorphic to Braess' Paradox, a non-intuitive but ultimately
non-paradoxical result concerning equilibrium points in physical systems of various kinds.[6]
Newcomb's paradox can also be related to the question of machine consciousness, specifically if a perfect simulation
of a person's brain will generate the consciousness of that person. Suppose we take the predictor to be a machine that
arrives at its prediction by simulating the brain of the chooser when confronted with the problem of which box to
choose. If that simulation generates the consciousness of the chooser, then the chooser cannot tell whether they are
standing in front of the boxes in the real world or in the virtual world generated by the simulation in the past. The
"virtual" chooser would thus tell the predictor which choice the "real" chooser is going to make.
302
Newcomb's paradox
Applicability to the real world

In versions of the Newcomb problem that do not include Nozick's stipulation that a predicted random choice will be
"punished" with an empty box, the problem is not realisable in the real world. This is because, according to chaos
theory, it is not possible even in principle to always predict a complex entity's future behavior with high accuracy.
The entity (person or computer program) could simply choose to use an inherently unpredictable process, such as a
quantum event source, to make a totally random decision.
Nozick's additional stipulation, in a footnote in the original article, attempts to preclude this problem by stipulating
that any predicted use of a random choice or random event will be treated as equivalent, by the predictor, to a
prediction of choosing both boxes. However, this assumes that inherently unpredictable quantum events (e.g. in
people's brains) would not come into play anyway during the process of thinking about which choice to make, which
is an unproven assumption. Indeed, some have speculated that quantum effects in the brain might be essential for a
full explanation of consciousness (see Orchestrated objective reduction), or - perhaps even more relevantly for
Newcomb's problem - for an explanation of free will.
Extensions to Newcomb's problem

Many thought experiments similar to or based on Newcomb's problem have been discussed in the literature. For
example, a quantum-theoretical version of Newcomb's problem in which box B is entangled with box A has been
proposed.
The Meta-Newcomb Problem

Another related problem is the Meta-Newcomb Problem. The setup of this problem is similar to the original
Newcomb problem. However, the twist here is that the Predictor may elect to decide whether to fill box B after the
player has made a choice, and the player does not know whether box B has already been filled. Also, there is also
another predictor - a Meta-Predictor, who has also predicted correctly every single time in the past, who predicts the
following: "Either you will choose both boxes, and the Predictor will make its decision after you, or you will choose
only box B, and the Predictor will already have made its decision."
In this situation, a proponent of taking both boxes is faced with a dilemma. If the player takes both boxes, the
Predictor will not yet have made its decision, and therefore it will have been more rational for the player to take box
B only. But if the player takes box B only, the Predictor will already have made its decision, so the player's decision
cannot cause the Predictor's decision, so the usual argument for taking both boxes applies.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Reprinted with an addendum and annotated bibliography in his book The Colossal Book of Mathematics (ISBN 0-393-02023-1)
Craig 1988.
Newcomb's Problem and Regret of Rationality (http:/ / lesswrong. com/ lw/ nc/ newcombs_problem_and_regret_of_rationality/ )
Rationality is Systematized Winning (http:/ / lesswrong. com/ lw/ 7i/ rationality_is_systematized_winning/ )
Timeless Decision Theory (http:/ / intelligence. org/ files/ TDT. pdf)
Andrew Irvine, "How Braess Paradox Solves Newcombs Problem," International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7 (1993), 141-60
References
Bar-Hillel, Maya & Margalit, Avishai (1972), Newcomb's paradox revisited. British Journal of Philosophy of
Science, 23, 295-304.
Campbell, Richmond and Lanning Sowden, ed. (1985), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoners'
Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. (an anthology discussing
Newcomb's Problem, with an extensive bibliography)
303
Newcomb's paradox
Collins, John. "Newcomb's Problem", International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Neil
Smelser and Paul Baltes (eds), Elsevier Science (2001) (http://collins.philo.columbia.edu/econphil/newcomb.
pdf) (Requires proper credentials)
Craig, William Lane (1988). "Tachyons, Time Travel, and Divine Omniscience". The Journal of Philosophy 85
(3): 135150. JSTOR 2027068 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/2027068).
Drescher, Gary (2006). Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics. ISBN978-0262042338.
Levi, Isaac (1982), "A Note on Newcombmania," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 337-42. (a paper discussing
the popularity of Newcomb's Problem)
External links
The cat that is not there (http://losthunderlads.com/2010/04/04/the-cat-that-is-not-there/)

Newcomb's Paradox (http://www.franzkiekeben.com/newcomb.html) by Franz Kiekeben
Thinking Inside the Boxes (http://www.slate.com/?id=2061419) by Jim Holt, for Slate
Free Will: Two Paradoxes of Choice (http://mises.org/multimedia/mp3/Long/Long-3.mp3) (lecture) by
Roderick T. Long
Newcomb's Problem (http://w3.ub.uni-konstanz.de/kops/volltexte/2000/524/) by Marion Ledwig
Omnipotence paradox
14th-century depiction of Averroes (detail from Triunfo de Santo

Toms by Andrea da Firenze), who addressed the omnipotence
paradox in the 12th century
304
Omnipotence paradox
305
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The omnipotence paradox is a family of semantic paradoxes which address two general issues and three specific
issues: Is an omnipotent entity logically possible? and What do we mean by 'omnipotence'?; and What do we mean
by 'power'?, What do we mean by 'logic'?, and What is the relation between power and logic?.
The omnipotence paradox states that: If a being can perform any action, then it should be able to create a task which
this being is unable to perform; hence, this being cannot perform all actions. Yet, on the other hand, if this being
cannot create a task that it is unable to perform, then there exists something it cannot do.
One version of the omnipotence paradox is the so-called paradox of the stone: "Could an omnipotent being create a
stone so heavy that even he could not lift it?" If he could lift the rock, then it seems that the being would not have
been omnipotent to begin with in that he would have been incapable of creating a heavy enough stone; if he could
not lift the stone, then it seems that the being either would never have been omnipotent to begin with or would have
ceased to be omnipotent upon his creation of the stone.[3]
The argument is medieval, dating at least to the 12th century, addressed by Averros (11261198) and later by
Thomas Aquinas.[4] Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (before 532) has a predecessor version of the paradox, asking
whether it is possible for God to "deny himself".
Several answers to the paradox have been proposed.
Omnipotence paradox
Overview
A common modern version of the omnipotence paradox is expressed in the question: "Can [an omnipotent being]
create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it?" This question generates a dilemma. The being can either create a stone
which it cannot lift, or it cannot create a stone which it cannot lift. If the being can create a stone that it cannot lift,
then it seems that it can cease to be omnipotent. If the being cannot create a stone which it cannot lift, then it seems
it is already not omnipotent.
The problem is whether the above question is ad hoc, or, instead, is inherently required by the concept of
omnipotence. If it is ad hoc, then the concept of omnipotence does not include being subject to be exceeded. If it is
inherently required, then there is no way to exclude answering the question in either the affirmative or the negative,
and, thus, no way to determine whether an omnipotent being is logically possible or impossible. But, if the question
is inherently required by the concept of omnipotence, then it seems the logic which allows it to be inherently
required is a paradox since the particular concept of omnipotence which requires it is a paradox. In short, the act of
seeming to find omnipotence to be a contradiction-of-terms is founded on the act of conceiving something against
which to construct the contradiction: prior to any act, omnipotence is conceived as coherent both with itself and
with the possibility of knowledge (which begs the question of what is the knowledge that constitutes the
identifiability of omnipotence-as-a-paradox?).
But, whether the concept of omnipotence itself is a material paradox, or is simply too obscure to us to preclude being
construed by paradoxical thinking, the central issue of the omnipotence paradox is whether the concept of the
'logically possible' is different for a world in which omnipotence exists from a world in which omnipotence does not
exist. The reason this is the central issue is because our sense of material paradox, and of the logical contradiction of
which material paradox is an expression, are functions of the fact that we presuppose that there must be something
which exists which is inherently meaningful or logical, that is, which is concretely not a compound of other things or
other concepts. So, for example, in a world in which exists a materially paradoxical omnipotence, its very
paradoxicality seems either to be a material-paradox-of-a-material-paradox, or to be a non-paradox per the
proposition that it exists (i.e., if it exists, then nothing has inherent meaning, including itself). Whereas, a world in
which exists non-paradoxical omnipotence, its own omnipotence is coextensive with whatever is the concrete basis
of our presupposition that something must be inherently meaningful.
The dilemma of omnipotence is similar to another classic paradox, the irresistible force paradox: What happens when
an irresistible force meets an immovable object? One response to this paradox is that if a force is irresistible, then,
by definition, there is no truly immovable object; conversely, if an immovable object were to exist, then no force
could be defined as being truly irresistible. Some claim that the only way out of this paradox is if the irresistible
force and the immovable object never meet. But, this way out is not possible in the omnipotence case, because the
purpose is to ask if the being's own inherent omnipotence makes its own inherent omnipotence impossible.
Moreover, an object cannot in principle be immovable, if there is a force which may move it, regardless of whether
the force and the object never meet. So, while, prior to any task, it is easy to imagine that omnipotence is in state of
coherence with itself, some imaginable tasks are not possible for such a coherent omnipotence to perform without
compromising its coherence.
307
Omnipotence paradox
Types of omnipotence
Main article: Omnipotence
Peter Geach describes and rejects four levels of omnipotence. He also defines and defends a lesser notion of the
"almightiness" of God.
1. "Y is absolutely omnipotent" means that "Y" can do everything absolutely. Everything that can be expressed in
a string of words even if it can be shown to be self-contradictory, "Y"is not bound in action, as we are in thought
by the laws of logic."[5] This position is advanced by Descartes. It has the theological advantage of making God
prior to the laws of logic. Some claim that it in addition gives rise to the theological disadvantage of making
God's promises suspect. On this account, the omnipotence paradox is a genuine paradox, but genuine paradoxes
might nonetheless be so.
2. "Y is omnipotent" means "Y can do X" is true if and only if X is a logically consistent description of a state of
affairs. This position was once advocated by Thomas Aquinas.[6] This definition of omnipotence solves some of
the paradoxes associated with omnipotence, but some modern formulations of the paradox still work against this
definition. Let X = "to make something that its maker cannot lift". As Mavrodes points out there is nothing
logically contradictory about this; a man could, for example, make a boat which he could not lift.[7] It would be
strange if humans could accomplish this feat, but an omnipotent being could not. Additionally, this definition has
problems when X is morally or physically untenable for a being like God. But this brings about a new problem
that if God is bound by logic he therefore cannot be the author of logic.
3. "Y is omnipotent" means "Y can do X" is true if and only if "Y does X" is logically consistent. Here the idea is
to exclude actions which would be inconsistent for Y to do but might be consistent for others. Again sometimes it
looks as if Aquinas takes this position.[8] Here Mavrodes' worry about X= "to make something its maker cannot
lift" will no longer be a problem because "God does X" is not logically consistent. However, this account may
still have problems with moral issues like X = "tells a lie" or temporal issues like X = "brings it about that Rome
was never founded."
4. "Y is omnipotent" means whenever "Y will bring about X" is logically possible, then "Y can bring about X" is
true. This sense, also does not allow the paradox of omnipotence to arise, and unlike definition #3 avoids any
temporal worries about whether or not an omnipotent being could change the past. However, Geach criticizes
even this sense of omnipotence as misunderstanding the nature of God's promises.
5. "Y is almighty" means that Y is not just more powerful than any creature; no creature can compete with Y in
power, even unsuccessfully. In this account nothing like the omnipotence paradox arises, but perhaps that is
because God is not taken to be in any sense omnipotent. On the other hand, Anselm of Canterbury seems to think
that almightiness is one of the things that makes God count as omnipotent.[9]
St Augustine in his City of God writes "God is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills" and thus
proposes the definition that "Y is omnipotent" means "If Y wishes to do X then Y can and does do X".
The notion of omnipotence can also be applied to an entity in different ways. An essentially omnipotent being is an
entity that is necessarily omnipotent. In contrast, an accidentally omnipotent being is an entity that can be
omnipotent for a temporary period of time, and then becomes non-omnipotent. The omnipotence paradox can be
applied to each type of being differently.[10]
Some Philosophers, such as Ren Descartes, argue that God is absolutely omnipotent.[11] In addition, some
philosophers have considered the assumption that a being is either omnipotent or non-omnipotent to be a false
dilemma, as it neglects the possibility of varying degrees of omnipotence.[12] Some modern approaches to the
problem have involved semantic debates over whether languageand therefore philosophycan meaningfully
address the concept of omnipotence itself.[13]
308
Omnipotence paradox
Proposed answers
A common response from Christian philosophers, such as Norman Geisler or Richard Swinburne is that the paradox
assumes a wrong definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence, they say, does not mean that God can do anything at all
but, rather, that he can do anything that's possible according to his nature. The distinction is important. God cannot
perform logical absurdities; he cannot, for instance, make 1+1=3. Likewise, God cannot make a being greater than
himself because he is, by definition, the greatest possible being. God is limited in his actions to his nature. The Bible
supports this, they assert, in passages such as Hebrews 6:18 which says it is "impossible for God to lie." This raises
the question, similar to the Euthyphro Dilemma, of where this law of logic, which God is bound to obey, comes
from. According to these theologians, this law is not a law above God that he assents to but, rather, logic is an eternal
part of God's nature, like his omniscience or omnibenevolence. God obeys the laws of logic because God is eternally
logical in the same way that God does not perform evil actions because God is eternally good. So, God, by nature
logical and unable to violate the laws of logic, cannot make a boulder so heavy he cannot lift it because that would
violate the law of non contradiction by creating an immovable object and an unstoppable force.
Another common response is that since God is supposedly omnipotent, the phrase "could not lift" does not make
sense and the paradox is meaningless.[14][15] This may mean that the complexity involved in rightly understanding
omnipotence---contra all the logical details involved in misunderstanding it---is a function of the fact that
omnipotence, like infinity, is perceived at all by contrasting reference to those complex and variable things which it
is not. But, an alternative meaning is that a non-corporeal God cannot lift anything, but can raise it (a linguistic
pedantry) - or to use the beliefs of ChristiansWikipedia:Verifiability and Hindus (that there is one God, who can be
manifest as several different beings) that whilst it is possible for God to do all things, it is not possible for all his
incarnations to do them. As such, God could create a stone so heavy that, in one incarnation, he was unable to lift it but would be able to do something that an incarnation that could lift it could not.
Other responses claim that the question is sophistry, meaning it makes grammatical sense, but has no intelligible
meaning. The lifting a rock paradox (Can God lift a stone larger than he can carry?) uses human characteristics to
cover up the main skeletal structure of the question. With these assumptions made, two arguments can stem from it:
1. Lifting covers up the definition of translation, which means moving something from one point in space to
another. With this in mind, the real question would be, "Can God move a rock from one location in space to
another that is larger than possible?" In order for the rock to not be able to move from one space to another, it
would have to be larger than space itself. However, it is impossible for a rock to be larger than space, as space
will always adjust itself to cover the space of the rock. If the supposed rock was out of space-time dimension, then
the question would not make sense, because it would be impossible to move an object from one location in space
to another if there is no space to begin with, meaning the faulting is with the logic of the question and not God's
capabilities.
2. The words, "Lift a Stone", are used instead to substitute capability. With this in mind, essentially the question is
asking if God is incapable, so the real question would be, "Is God capable of being incapable?" If God is capable
of being incapable, it means that He is incapable, because He has the potential to not be able to do something.
Conversely, if God is incapable of being incapable, then the two inabilities cancel each other out, making God
have the capability to do something.
The act of killing oneself is not applicable to an omnipotent being, since, despite that such an act does involve some
power, it also involves a lack of power: the human person who can kill himself is already not indestructible, and, in
fact, every agent constituting his environment is more powerful in some ways than himself. In other words, all
non-omnipotent agents are concretely synthetic: constructed as contingencies of other, smaller, agents, meaning that
they, unlike an omnipotent agent, logically can exist not only in multiple instantiation (by being constructed out of
the more basic agents of which they are made), but are each bound to a differentiated location in space contra
transcendent omnipresence.
309
Omnipotence paradox
Thomas Aquinas asserts that the paradox arises from a misunderstanding of omnipotence. He maintains that inherent
contradictions and logical impossibilities do not fall under the omnipotence of God. J. L Cowan sees this paradox as
a reason to reject the concept of 'absolute' omnipotence,[16] while others, such as Ren Descartes, argue that God is
absolutely omnipotent, despite the problem.
C. S. Lewis argues that when talking about omnipotence, referencing "a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it" is
nonsense just as much as referencing "a square circle"; that it is not logically coherent in terms of power to think that
omnipotence includes the power to do the logically impossible. So asking "Can God create a rock so heavy that even
he cannot lift it?" is just as much nonsense as asking "Can God draw a square circle?" The logical contradiction here
being God's simultaneous ability and disability in lifting the rock: the statement "God can lift this rock" must have a
truth value of either true or false, it cannot possess both. This is justified by observing that in order for the
omnipotent agent to create such a stone, the omnipotent agent must already be more powerful than itself: such a
stone is too heavy for the omnipotent agent to lift, but the omnipotent agent already can create such a stone; If an
omnipotent agent already is more powerful than itself, then it already is just that powerful. Which means that its
power to create a stone thats too heavy for it to lift is identical to its power to lift that very stone. While this doesnt
quite make complete sense, Lewis wished to stress its implicit point: that even within the attempt to prove that the
concept of omnipotence is immediately incoherent, one admits that it is immediately coherent, and that the only
difference is that this attempt if forced to admit this despite that the attempt is constituted by a perfectly irrational
route to its own unwilling end, with a perfectly irrational set of 'things' included in that end.
In other words, that the 'limit' on what omnipotence 'can' do is not a limit on its actual agency, but an epistemological
boundary without which omnipotence could not be identified (paradoxically or otherwise) in the first place. In fact,
this process is merely a fancier form of the classic Liar Paradox: If I say, "I am a liar", then how can it be true if I am
telling the truth therewith, and, if I am telling the truth therewith, then how can I be a liar? So, to think that
omnipotence is an epistemological paradox is like failing to recognize that, when taking the statement, 'I am a liar'
self-referentially, the statement is reduced to an actual failure to lie. In other words, if one maintains the supposedly
'initial' position that the necessary conception of omnipotence includes the 'power' to compromise both itself and all
other identity, and if one concludes from this position that omnipotence is epistemologically incoherent, then one
implicitly is asserting that one's own 'initial' position is incoherent. Therefore the question (and therefore the
perceived paradox) is meaningless. Nonsense does not suddenly acquire sense and meaning with the addition of the
two words, "God can" before it. Lewis additionally said that "unless something is self-evident, nothing can be
proved", which implies for the debate on omnipotence that, as in matter, so in the human understanding of truth: it
takes no true insight to destroy a perfectly integrated structure, and the effort to destroy has greater effect than an
equal effort to build; so, a man is thought a fool who assumes its integrity, and thought an abomination who argues
for it. It is easier to teach a fish to swim in outer space than to convince a room full of ignorant fools why it cannot
be done.
John Christian Uy said that it is just the same as someone with double-bladed sword (accidentally omnipotent), or
sword and a shield (essentially omnipotent). Therefore, an accidentally omnipotent deity CAN remove its
omnipotence while an essentially omnipotent deity CANNOT do anything that would make it non-omnipotent. Both
however, have no limitations so far other than the essential omnipotent being who cannot do anything which will
make it non-omnipotent like making someone equal with him, lowering or improving himself (for omnipotence is
the highest) etc. It could, however, make someone with a great power, though it cannot be 99% because
Omnipotence is infinite, because that created being is not equal with him. Overall, God in the Christian Bible, is
essentially omnipotent.
In a 1955 article published in the philosophy journal Mind, J. L. Mackie attempted to resolve the paradox by
distinguishing between first-order omnipotence (unlimited power to act) and second-order omnipotence (unlimited
power to determine what powers to act things shall have).[17] An omnipotent being with both first and second-order
omnipotence at a particular time might restrict its own power to act and, henceforth, cease to be omnipotent in either
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Omnipotence paradox
sense. There has been considerable philosophical dispute since Mackie, as to the best way to formulate the paradox
of omnipotence in formal logic.[18]
Another common response to the omnipotence paradox is to try to define omnipotence to mean something weaker
than absolute omnipotence, such as definition 3 or 4 above. The paradox can be resolved by simply stipulating that
omnipotence does not require the being to have abilities which are logically impossible, but only to be able to do
anything which conforms to the laws of logic. A good example of a modern defender of this line of reasoning is
George Mavrodes.[7] Essentially, Mavrodes argues that it is no limitation on a being's omnipotence to say that it
cannot make a round square. Such a "task" is termed by him a "pseudo-task" as it is self-contradictory and inherently
nonsense. Harry Frankfurtfollowing from Descarteshas responded to this solution with a proposal of his own:
that God can create a stone impossible to lift and also lift said stone
For why should God not be able to perform the task in question? To be sure, it is a taskthe task of
lifting a stone which He cannot liftwhose description is self-contradictory. But if God is supposed
capable of performing one task whose description is self-contradictorythat of creating the problematic
stone in the first placewhy should He not be supposed capable of performing anotherthat of lifting
the stone? After all, is there any greater trick in performing two logically impossible tasks than there is
in performing one?[19]
If a being is accidentally omnipotent, then it can resolve the paradox by creating a stone which it cannot lift and
thereby becoming non-omnipotent. Unlike essentially omnipotent entities, it is possible for an accidentally
omnipotent being to be non-omnipotent. This raises the question, however, of whether or not the being was ever
truly omnipotent, or just capable of great power. On the other hand, the ability to voluntarily give up great power is
often thought of as central to the notion of the Christian Incarnation.[20]
If a being is essentially omnipotent, then it can also resolve the paradox (as long as we take omnipotence not to
require absolute omnipotence). The omnipotent being is essentially omnipotent, and therefore it is impossible for it
to be non-omnipotent. Further, the omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible and have no limitations just
like the accidentally omnipotent but the ability to make oneself non-omnipotent. The creation of a stone which the
omnipotent being cannot lift would be an impossibility. The omnipotent being cannot create such a stone because its
power will be equal to him and thus, remove his omnipotence for there can only be one omnipotent being in
existence, but nevertheless retains its omnipotence. This solution works even with definition 2, as long as we also
know the being is essentially omnipotent rather than accidentally so. However, it is possible for non-omnipotent
beings to compromise their own powers, which presents the paradox that non-omnipotent beings can do something
(to themselves) which an essentially omnipotent being cannot do (to itself).
This was essentially the position taken by Augustine of Hippo in his The City of God:
For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He
wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some
things for the very reason that He is omnipotent.[21]
Thus Augustine argued that God could not do anything or create any situation that would in effect make God not
God.
Language and omnipotence

The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is often interpreted as arguing that language is not up to the task of describing
the kind of power an omnipotent being would have. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he stays generally within
the realm of logical positivism, until claim 6.4, but at 6.41 and following the succeeding propositions argue that
ethics and several other issues are "transcendental" subjects which we cannot examine with language. Wittgenstein
also mentions the will, life after death, and God; arguing that "When the answer cannot be put into words, neither
can the question be put into words".[22]
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Omnipotence paradox
Wittgenstein's work makes the omnipotence paradox a problem in semantics, the study of how symbols are given
meaning. (The retort "That's only semantics" is a way of saying that a statement only concerns the definitions of
words, instead of anything important in the physical world.) According to the Tractatus, then, even attempting to
formulate the omnipotence paradox is futile, since language cannot refer to the entities the paradox considers. The
final proposition of the Tractatus gives Wittgenstein's dictum for these circumstances: "What we cannot speak of, we
must pass over in silence".[23] Wittgenstein's approach to these problems is influential among other 20th century
religious thinkers such as D. Z. Phillips.[24]
But in his later years, Wittgenstein wrote works which are often interpreted as conflicting with his positions in the
Tractatus,[25] and indeed the later Wittgenstein is mainly seen as the leading critic of the early Wittgenstein.
Other versions of the paradox

In the 6th century, Pseudo-Dionysius claims that a version of the omnipotence paradox constituted the dispute
between St. Paul and Elymas the Magician mentioned in Acts 13:8, but it is phrased in terms of a debate as to
whether or not God can "deny himself" ala 2 Tim 2:13.[26] In the 11th century, St. Anselm argues that there are many
things that God cannot do, but that nonetheless he counts as omnipotent.[27]
Thomas Aquinas advanced a version of the omnipotence paradox by asking whether God could create a triangle with
internal angles that did not add up to 180 degrees. As Aquinas put it in Summa contra Gentiles:
Since the principles of certain sciences, such as logic, geometry and arithmetic are taken only from the formal
principles of things, on which the essence of the thing depends, it follows that God could not make things
contrary to these principles. For example, that a genus was not predicable of the species, or that lines drawn
from the centre to the circumference were not equal, or that a triangle did not have three angles equal to two
right angles.[28]
This can be done on a sphere, and not on a flat surface. The later invention of non-Euclidean geometry does not
resolve this question; for one might as well ask, "If given the axioms of Riemannian geometry, can an omnipotent
being create a triangle whose angles do not add up to more than 180 degrees?" In either case, the real question is
whether or not an omnipotent being would have the ability to evade the consequences which follow logically from a
system of axioms that the being created.
A version of the paradox can also be seen in non-theological contexts. A similar problem occurs when accessing
legislative or parliamentary sovereignty, which holds a specific legal institution to be omnipotent in legal power, and
in particular such an institution's ability to regulate itself.[29]
In a sense, the classic statement of the omnipotence paradox a rock so heavy that its omnipotent creator cannot
lift it is grounded in Aristotelian science. After all, if one considers the stone's position relative to the sun around
which the planet orbits, one could hold that the stone is constantly being liftedstrained though that interpretation
would be in the present context. Modern physics indicates that the choice of phrasing about lifting stones should
relate to acceleration; however, this does not in itself of course invalidate the fundamental concept of the generalized
omnipotence paradox. However, one could easily modify the classic statement as follows: "An omnipotent being
creates a universe which follows the laws of Aristotelian physics. Within this universe, can the omnipotent being
create a stone so heavy that the being cannot lift it?"
Ethan Allen's Reason addresses the topics of original sin, theodicy and several others in classic Enlightenment
fashion.[30] In Chapter 3, section IV, he notes that "omnipotence itself" could not exempt animal life from mortality,
since change and death are defining attributes of such life. He argues, "the one cannot be without the other, any more
than there could be a compact number of mountains without valleys, or that I could exist and not exist at the same
time, or that God should effect any other contradiction in nature." Labeled by his friends a Deist, Allen accepted the
notion of a divine being, though throughout Reason he argues that even a divine being must be circumscribed by
logic.
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Omnipotence paradox
In Principles of Philosophy, Descartes tried refuting the existence of atoms with a variation of this argument,
claiming God could not create things so indivisible that he could not divide them.
It is even in popular culture. In an episode of The Simpsons, Homer asks Ned Flanders the question "Could Jesus
microwave a burrito so hot that He Himself could not eat it?" In one strip of the webcomic Saturday Morning
Breakfast Cereal, a child is seen asking a priest "Could God make an argument so circular that even He couldn't
believe it?"
In the Marvel Comics Runaways, Victor Mancha, the technorganic android created by Ultron, is shown as unable to
process correctly paradoxes: as such, it's known that a small number of well known paradoxes may force his logic in
a permanent loop, shutting his functions down until someone steps in to give Victor the proper solution. As such, his
peers stop him once by asking "Could God make a sandwich so big that even he couldn't finish it?", and reboot his
mind by explaining him a simplified version of the God as essentially omnipotent solution ("Yes. God could make a
sandwich so big that even he couldn't finish it, and eat it all").
In the book Bart Simpson's Guide to Life this question is phrased as, "If God can do anything, could he create a hot
dog so big that even he couldn't eat it?"
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Philosophy_of_religion_(sidebar)& action=edit

http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Atheism_sidebar& action=edit
Savage, C. Wade. "The Paradox of the Stone" Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 7479
Averros, Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) trans. Simon Van Den Bergh, Luzac & Company 1969, sections 529536
Geach, P. T. "Omnipotence" 1973 in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 6375
Aquinas, Thomas Summa Theologica Book 1 Question 25 article 3
Mavrodes, George. " Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence (http:/ / spot. colorado. edu/ ~kaufmad/ courses/ Mavrodes. pdf)" first
published 1963 now in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University
Press 1978 pp. 13134
[8] Aquinas Summa Theologica Book 1 Question 25 article 4 response #3
[9] Anselm of Canterbury Proslogion Chap VII in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton
eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 3536
[10] Hoffman, Joshua, Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Omnipotence" (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ archives/ sum2002/ entries/ omnipotence/ ) The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
[11] Descartes, Rene, 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy. Cottingham, J., trans., 1996. Cambridge University Press. Latin original.
Alternative English title: Metaphysical Meditations. Includes six Objections and Replies. A second edition published the following year,
includes an additional Objection and Reply and a Letter to Dinet
[12] Haeckel, Ernst. The Riddle of the Universe. Harper and Brothers, 1900.
[13] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.41 and following)
[14] The Problem of Pain, Clive Staples Lewis, 1944 MacMillan
[15] Loving Wisdom: Christian Philosophy of Religion by Paul Copan, Chalice Press, 2007 page 46
[16] Cowan, J. L. "The Paradox of Omnipotence" first published 1962, in The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood
Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 14452
[17] Mackie, J. L., "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind LXIV, No, 254 (April 1955).
[18] The Power of God: Readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978. Keene
and Mayo disagree p. 145, Savage provides 3 formalizations p. 13841, Cowan has a different strategy p. 147, and Walton uses a whole
separate strategy p. 15363
[19] Frankfurt, Harry. "The Logic of Omnipotence" first published in 1964 in Philosophical Review and now in Necessity, Volition, and Love.
Cambridge University Press November 28, 1998 pp.12
[20] Gore, Charles, "A Kenotic Theory of Incarnation" first published 1891, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood
Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 16568
[21] City of God, Book 5, Chapter 10 (http:/ / www. ccel. org/ ccel/ schaff/ npnf102. iv. V. 10. html)
[22] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposition 6.5
[23] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposition 7
[24] D. Z. Phillips "Philosophy, Theology and the Reality of God" in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. William Rowe and William
Wainwright eds. 3rd ed. 1998 Oxford University Press
[25] Hacker, P.M.S. Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. 1996 Blackwell
313
Omnipotence paradox
[26] Pseudo-Dionysius, "Divine Names" 893B in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. trans Colm Luibheid Paulist Press. 1987. ISBN
0-8091-2838-1
[27] Anselm of Canterbury Proslogion Chap. VII, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass
Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 3536
[28] "Cum principia quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, geometriae et arithmeticae, sumantur ex solis principiis formalibus rerum, ex quibus
essentia rei dependet, sequitur quod contraria horum principiorum Deus facere non possit: sicut quod genus non sit praedicabile de specie; vel
quod lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam non sint aequales; aut quod triangulus rectilineus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus
rectis". Aquinas, T. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Section 25. trans. Edward Buckner
[29] Suber, P. (1990) The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change (http:/ / www. earlham. edu/ ~peters/
writing/ psa/ sec01. htm#C). Peter Lang Publishing
[30] Allen, Ethan. Reason: The Only Oracle of Man. (http:/ / libertyonline. hypermall. com/ allen-reason. html) J.P. Mendum, Cornill; 1854.
Originally published 1784. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
References
Allen, Ethan. Reason: The Only Oracle of Man. (http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/allen-reason.html) J.P.
Mendum, Cornill; 1854. Originally published 1784. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
Augustine. City of God and Christian Doctrine. (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.html) The
Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1890. (Accessed on 26 September 2006)
Burke, James. The Day the Universe Changed. Little, Brown; 1995 (paperback edition). ISBN 0-316-11704-8.
Gleick, James. Genius. Pantheon, 1992. ISBN 0-679-40836-3.
Haeckel, Ernst. The Riddle of the Universe. Harper and Brothers, 1900.
Hoffman, Joshua, Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Omnipotence" (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/
omnipotence/) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
(Accessed on 19 April 2006)
Mackie, J. L., "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind LXIV, No, 254 (April 1955).
Wierenga, Edward. "Omnipotence" The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (http://www.courses.
rochester.edu/wierenga/REL111/omnipch.html). Cornell University Press, 1989. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Available online (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/
5740) via Project Gutenberg. Accessed 19 April 2006.
314
Paradox of hedonism
315
Paradox of hedonism
Part of a series on
Utilitarianism
Politics portal
v
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e [1]
The paradox of hedonism, also called the pleasure paradox, is a concept in ethics that focuses upon pleasure and
happiness as strange phenomena that do not adhere to normal principles. The philosopher Henry Sidgwick was first
to note in The Methods of Ethics that the paradox of hedonism is that pleasure cannot be acquired directly, it can only
be acquired indirectly.
Overview
Part of a series on
Hedonism
v
t
e [1]
It is often said that we fail to attain pleasures if we deliberately seek them. This has been described variously, by
many:
John Stuart Mill, the utilitarian philosopher, in his autobiography:
But I now thought that this end [one's happiness] was only to be attained by not making it the direct end.
Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own
happiness[....] Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness along the way[....] Ask yourself
whether you are happy, and you cease to be so.[2]
Viktor Frankl in Man's Search for Meaning:
Happiness cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the unintended side effect of one's
personal dedication to a cause greater than oneself or as the by-product of one's surrender to a person
other than oneself.
The more a man tries to demonstrate his sexual potency or a woman her ability to experience orgasm,
the less they are able to succeed. Pleasure is, and must remain, a side-effect or by-product, and is
destroyed and spoiled to the degree to which it is made a goal in itself.[3]
Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche in The Antichrist (1895) and The Will to Power (1901):
What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself.
What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness.
Paradox of hedonism
What is happiness? The feeling that power increases that a resistance is overcome.[4]
[...] it is significantly enlightening to substitute for the individual 'happiness' (for which every living
being is supposed to strive) power [...] joy is only a symptom of the feeling of attained power [...] (one
does not strive for joy [...] joy accompanies; joy does not move)[5]
Psychologist Alfred Adler in The Neurotic Constitution (1912):
Nietzsche's "will to power" and "will to seem" embrace many of our views, which again resemble in
some respects the views of Fr and the older writers, according to whom the sensation of pleasure
originates in a feeling of power, that of pain in a feeling of feebleness.
Poet and satirist Edward Young:
The love of praise, howe'er concealed by art,
Reigns more or less supreme in every heart;
The Proud to gain it, toils on toils endure;
The modest shun it, but to make it sure![6]
Politician William Bennett:
Happiness is like a cat, If you try to coax it or call it, it will avoid you; it will never come. But if you pay
no attention to it and go about your business, you'll find it rubbing against your legs and jumping into
your lap.
Novelist Joo Guimares Rosa:
Happiness is found only in little moments of inattention.[7]
Example
Suppose Paul likes to collect stamps. According to most models of behavior, including not only utilitarianism, but
most economic, psychological and social conceptions of behavior, it is believed that Paul collects stamps because he
gets pleasure from it. Stamp collecting is an avenue towards acquiring pleasure. However, if you tell Paul this, he
will likely disagree. He does get pleasure from collecting stamps, but this is not the process that explains why he
collects stamps. It is not as though he says, "I must collect stamps so I, Paul, can obtain pleasure". Collecting stamps
is not just a means toward pleasure. He simply likes collecting stamps, therefore acquiring pleasure indirectly.
This paradox is often spun around backwards, to illustrate that pleasure and happiness cannot be reverse-engineered.
If for example you heard that collecting stamps was very pleasurable, and began a stamp collection as a means
towards this happiness, it would inevitably be in vain. To achieve happiness, you must not seek happiness directly,
you must strangely motivate yourself towards things unrelated to happiness, like the collection of stamps.
Suggested explanations
Happiness is often imprecisely equated with pleasure. If, for whatever reason, one does equate happiness with
pleasure, then the paradox of hedonism arises. When one aims solely towards pleasure itself, one's aim is frustrated.
Henry Sidgwick comments on such frustration after a discussion of self-love in the above-mentioned work:
I should not, however, infer from this that the pursuit of pleasure is necessarily self-defeating and futile;
but merely that the principle of Egoistic Hedonism, when applied with a due knowledge of the laws of
human nature, is practically self-limiting; i.e., that a rational method of attaining the end at which it aims
requires that we should to some extent put it out of sight and not directly aim at it.[8]
While not addressing the paradox directly, Aristotle commented on the futility of pursuing pleasure. Human beings
are actors whose endeavors bring about consequences, and among these is pleasure. Aristotle then argues as follows:
How, then, is it that no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we grow weary? Certainly all human
things are incapable of continuous activity. Therefore pleasure also is not continuous; for it accompanies
316
Paradox of hedonism
activity.[9]
Sooner or later, finite beings will be unable to acquire and expend the resources necessary to maintain their sole goal
of pleasure; thus, they find themselves in the company of misery. Evolutionary theory explains that humans evolved
through natural selection and follow genetic imperatives that seek to maximize reproduction, not happiness. As a
result of these selection pressures, the extent of human happiness is limited biologically. David Pearce argues in his
treatise The Hedonistic Imperative that humans might be able to use genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and
neuroscience to eliminate suffering in all sentient life and allow for peak levels of happiness and pleasure that are
currently unimaginable .
References
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Hedonism& action=edit
[2] John Stuart Mill, Autobiography in The Harvard Classics, Vol. 25, Charles Eliot Norton, ed. (New York: P. F. Collier & Son Company, 1909
(p. 94)
[3] Viktor Frankl. Man's Search for Meaning.
[4] The Antichrist, 2
[5] The Will to Power, 688
[6] Geoffrey Brennan. The Esteem Engine: A Resource for Institutional Design (http:/ / www. assa. edu. au/ publications/ occasional/
2005_No1_The_Esteem_Engine. pdf)
[7] Rosa, Guimares. Tutamia Terceiras Estrias (8.a ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 2001, p. 60.
[8] Henry Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics. BookSurge Publishing (1 March 2001) (p. 3)
[9] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, page 4 (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ nicomachaen. 10. x. html)
Further reading
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1175, 36 in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon ed. (New York:
Random House, 1941)
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography in The Harvard Classics, Vol. 25, Charles Eliot Norton, ed. (New York: P. F.
Collier & Son Company, 1909)
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1874/1963)
317
Paradox of nihilism
Paradox of nihilism
Paradox of nihilism is the name of several paradoxes.
Meaning
According to Hegarty, the paradox of nihilism is "that the absence of meaning seems to be some sort of meaning".
Truth
Niklas Luhmann construes the paradox as stating "that consequently, only the untrue could be the truth". In a
footnote in his PhD thesis, Slocombe equates nihilism with the liar paradox.Wikipedia:Please clarify
Religion
Rivas locates the paradox in the "conservative attitude of Roman Catholicism" developed in reaction to Nietzschean
nihilism, in that it "betrays a form of nihilism, that is, the forced oblivion of the real ambiguity and the paradox that
inform the distinction between the secular and the sacred".
Critical legal theory

In Critical Legal Studies (CLS) theory, the arguments used to criticize the centrist position also undermine the
position of CLS.Wikipedia:Please clarify
Ethical nihilism
According to Jonna Bornemark, "the paradox of nihilism is the choice to continue one's own life while at the same
time stating that it is not worth more than any other life". Richard Ian Wright sees relativism as the root of the
paradox.Wikipedia:Please clarify
References
318
The tolerance paradox arises from a problem that a tolerant person might be antagonistic toward intolerance, hence
intolerant of it. The tolerant individual would then be by definition intolerant of intolerance.
Discussions
Michael Walzer asks "Should we tolerate the intolerant?". He notes that most minority religious groups who are the
beneficiaries of tolerance are themselves intolerant, at least in some respects. In a tolerant regime, such people may
learn to tolerate, or at least to behave "as if they possessed this virtue".[1] Philosopher Karl Popper asserted, in The
Open Society and Its Enemies Vol. 1, that we are warranted in refusing to tolerate intolerance. Philosopher John
Rawls concludes in A Theory of Justice that a just society must tolerate the intolerant, for otherwise, the society
would then itself be intolerant, and thus unjust. However, Rawls also insists, like Popper, that society has a
reasonable right of self-preservation that supersedes the principle of tolerance: "While an intolerant sect does not
itself have title to complain of intolerance, its freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with
reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger."
Homophily and intolerance

The relation between homophily (a preference for interacting with those with similar traits) and intolerance is
manifested when a tolerant person is faced with the dilemma of choosing between establishing a positive relationship
with a tolerant individual of a dissimilar group, or establishing a positive relationship with an intolerant group
member. In the first case, the intolerant in-group member disapproves the established link with an other-group
individual, leading necessarily to a negative relationship with his tolerant equal; while in the second case, the
negative relationship toward the other-group individual is endorsed by the intolerant in-group member and promotes
a positive relationship between them.
This dilemma has been considered by Aguiar and Parravano in Tolerating the Intolerant: Homophily, Intolerance,
and Segregation in Social Balanced Networks, modeling a community of individuals whose relationships are
governed by a modified form of the Heider balance theory.
References
[1] Michael Walzer, On Toleration, (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997) pp. 80-81 ISBN 0-300-07600-2
External links
The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/#ConTolPar), in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Paradoxes of Tolerance (http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/
detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=EJ707855&
ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=EJ707855),Wikipedia:Link rot Barbara Pasamonik in Social Studies,
v95 n5 p206 Sep-Oct 2004.
"Puzzles and Paradoxes of Tolerance" (http://books.google.com/books?id=S1j8KXp20qwC&pg=PA9&
lpg=PA9&dq#v=onepage&q=&f=false), Hans Oberdiek, 2001.
Tolerating the Intolerant (http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2006/07/tolerating-the-intolerant.php),
Michael Totten.
319
"Causal loop" redirects here. For the diagram, see Causal loop diagram.
A predestination paradox (also called causal loop, causality loop, and, less frequently, closed loop or closed time
loop) is a paradox of time travel that is often used as a convention in science fiction. It exists when a time traveler is
caught in a loop of events that "predestines" or "predates" him or her to travel back in time. Because of the
possibility of influencing the past while time traveling, one way of explaining why history does not change is by
saying that whatever has happened must happen. This means either that time travelers attempts to alter the past in
this model, intentionally or not, would only fulfill their role in creating history as we know it and not change it or
that time-travelers' personal knowledge of history already includes their future travels in their own experience of the
past (for the Novikov self-consistency principle).
In other words: time travelers are in the past, which requires that they were in the past before. Therefore, their
presence is vital to the future, and they do something that causes the future to occur in the same way that their
knowledge of the future has already happened. It is very closely related to the ontological paradox and usually occurs
at the same time.
Temporal causality loop

A temporal causality loop or predestination paradox is a theoretical phenomenon, which is said to occur when a
chain of cause-effect events is circular. For instance, if event A causes event B, and event B causes event C, and
event C causes event A, then these events are said to be in a causality loop.
The concept of a causality loop is functionally comparable to positive feedback, coproduction, and co-evolution,
each of which describes how two or more variables of a system affect each other and therefore create each other,
albeit with respect to different variables operating at different scales. Co-production is concerned with the variables
of science/technology and society operating at the scale of society. Co-evolution is concerned with the variables of
species operating at the scale of the evolutionary process. Causality loops and positive feedback are more abstract,
and theoretically applicable to any set of variables operating at any scale.
Co-production, causality loops, and positive feedback are also related to the concept of virtuous circle and vicious
circle when the co-production, causality loop, or positive feedback produces a desirable effect, systems change is
described as a virtuous circle; when they produce an undesirable effect, systems change is described as a vicious
circle. Because these concepts refer to variables interacting in a complex system, they all produce unintended
consequences virtuous cycles produce unintended benefits and vicious cycles produce unintended harms. Although
such consequences are unintended in the sense that no actor deliberately intends for them to occur, unintended
consequences are an expected emergent property of systems change (in accordance with the ways Langdon Winner
proposes that artifacts can have politics), and can be used as an indicator of systems change. Taking examples from
the field of environmental justice, although community empowerment was an unintended benefit of bucket brigades
(which were originally intended as a practical air sampling device), they are an indicator of systems change. On the
flipside, although environmental injustices may be unintentional, they are an expected consequence of inequality in
our socio-economic system.
Although these various concepts have significant differences, a result of the disciplines from which they emerged
and the topics to which theyre applied, they are functionally comparable in that they satisfy a similar conceptual
function of describing dynamic and generative interaction between two or more variables in a system.
320
Examples and variations

A variation on the predestination paradoxes which involves information, rather than objects, traveling through time
is similar to the self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, a man receives information about his own future, telling him
that he will die from a heart attack. He resolves to get fit so as to avoid that fate, but in doing so overexerts himself,
causing him to suffer the heart attack that kills him.
In these examples, causality is turned on its head, as the flanking events are both causes and effects of each other,
and this is where the paradox lies.
One example of a predestination paradox that is not simultaneously an ontological paradox is the following. In 1850,
Bob's horse was spooked by something, and almost took Bob over a cliff, had it not been for a strange man stopping
the horse. This strange man was later honored by having a statue of him erected. Two hundred years later, Bob goes
back in time to sight-see, and sees someone's horse about to go over a cliff. He rushes to his aid and saves his life.
In most examples of the predestination paradox, the person travels back in time and ends up fulfilling their role in an
event that has already occurred. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the person is fulfilling their role in an event that has yet
to occur, and it is usually information that travels in time (for example, in the form of a prophecy) rather than a
person. In either situation, the attempts to avert the course of past or future history both fail.
Examples from literature and fiction

Main article: Predestination paradoxes in popular culture
A dual example of a predestination paradox is depicted in the classic Ancient Greek play 'Oedipus'. Laius hears a
prophecy that his son will kill him and marry his wife. Fearing the prophecy, Laius pierces newborn Oedipus' feet
and leaves him out to die, but a herdsman finds him and takes him away from Thebes. Oedipus, not knowing he was
adopted, leaves home in fear of the same prophecy that he would kill his father and marry his mother. Laius,
meanwhile, ventures out to find a solution to the Sphinx's riddle. As prophesied, Oedipus crossed paths with a
wealthy man leading to a fight in which Oedipus slays him. Unbeknownst to Oedipus the man is Laius. Oedipus then
defeats the Sphinx by solving a mysterious riddle to become king. He marries the widow queen Jocasta not knowing
she is his mother.
Many fictional works have dealt with various circumstances that can logically arise from time travel, usually dealing
with paradoxes. The predestination paradox is a common literary device in such fiction. Examples include Robert
Heinlein's "All You Zombies", in which a young man is taken back in time and tricked into impregnating his
younger, female self before he underwent a sex change, or The Man Who Folded Himself, a 1973 science fiction
novel by David Gerrold that includes a series of similar paradoxes.
Prior to the use of time travel as a plot device, the self-fulfilling prophecy variant was more common. Shakespeare's
Macbeth is a classic example of this. The movie Minority Report, imagined a world where prophecies were so
reliable that they could be routinely used by police forces to eliminate crime.
In the Harry Potter Universe, a prophecy by Sybill Trelawney is partly overheard by Snape about the birth of a
wizard, with the power to vanquish Voldemort. Snape then informs Voldemort about it. Aware of the prophecy, and
assuming the baby to be Harry, he attacks the Potters, killing Harry's parents, but failing to kill newborn Harry, as his
attack backfires, leaving him severely weakened and setting up the scenario in which Harry vanquishes him 18 years
later.
The first Terminator movie relies on the predestination paradox. In the first movie, the cyborg T-800, sent back in
time to assassinate the mother of Skynet's opponent, is destroyed, but its parts are salvaged, creating a timeline where
the creation of a T-800 is possible. Additionally, in order to stop Skynet's assassination plan, Kyle Reese follows the
T-800 back in time and winds up fathering the very opponent Skynet was trying to eliminate.
Time travel paradoxes appear in video game backstories, such as Bioshock Infinite.
321
References
Zeno's paradoxes
"Achilles and the Tortoise" redirects here. For other uses, see Achilles and the Tortoise (disambiguation).
"Arrow paradox" redirects here. For other uses, see Arrow paradox (disambiguation).
Zeno's paradoxes are a set of philosophical problems generally thought to have been devised by Greek philosopher
Zeno of Elea (ca. 490430 BC) to support Parmenides's doctrine that contrary to the evidence of one's senses, the
belief in plurality and change is mistaken, and in particular that motion is nothing but an illusion. It is usually
assumed, based on Plato's Parmenides (128a-d), that Zeno took on the project of creating these paradoxes because
other philosophers had created paradoxes against Parmenides's view. Thus Plato has Zeno say the purpose of the
paradoxes "is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more
absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one." (Parmenides 128d). Plato has Socrates claim that Zeno and
Parmenides were essentially arguing exactly the same point (Parmenides 128a-b).
Some of Zeno's nine surviving paradoxes (preserved in Aristotle's Physics[1] and Simplicius's commentary thereon)
are essentially equivalent to one another. Aristotle offered a refutation of some of them. Three of the strongest and
most famousthat of Achilles and the tortoise, the Dichotomy argument, and that of an arrow in flightare
presented in detail below.
Zeno's arguments are perhaps the first examples of a method of proof called reductio ad absurdum also known as
proof by contradiction. They are also credited as a source of the dialectic method used by Socrates.[2]
Some mathematicians and historians, such as Carl Boyer, hold that Zeno's paradoxes are simply mathematical
problems, for which modern calculus provides a mathematical solution. Some philosophers, however, say that Zeno's
paradoxes and their variations (see Thomson's lamp) remain relevant metaphysical problems.
The origins of the paradoxes are somewhat unclear. Diogenes Laertius, a fourth source for information about Zeno
and his teachings, citing Favorinus, says that Zeno's teacher Parmenides was the first to introduce the Achilles and
the tortoise paradox. But in a later passage, Laertius attributes the origin of the paradox to Zeno, explaining that
Favorinus disagrees.[3]
Paradoxes of motion
Achilles and the tortoise
322
Zeno's paradoxes
"Achilles and the Tortoise" redirects here. For the 2008 Japanese film,
see Achilles and the Tortoise (film).
In a race, the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest,
since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued
started, so that the slower must always hold a lead. as
recounted by Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b15
In the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, Achilles is in a footrace
with the tortoise. Achilles allows the tortoise a head start of 100
metres, for example. If we suppose that each racer starts running at
some constant speed (one very fast and one very slow), then after some
finite time, Achilles will have run 100 metres, bringing him to the
Distance vs. time, assuming the tortoise to run at
tortoise's starting point. During this time, the tortoise has run a much
Achilles' half speed
shorter distance, say, 10 metres. It will then take Achilles some further
time to run that distance, by which time the tortoise will have advanced
farther; and then more time still to reach this third point, while the tortoise moves ahead. Thus, whenever Achilles
reaches somewhere the tortoise has been, he still has farther to go. Therefore, because there are an infinite number of
points Achilles must reach where the tortoise has already been, he can never overtake the tortoise.[4]
Dichotomy paradox
That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal. as recounted by
Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b10
Suppose Homer wants to catch a stationary bus. Before he can get there, he must get halfway there. Before he can
get halfway there, he must get a quarter of the way there. Before traveling a quarter, he must travel one-eighth;
before an eighth, one-sixteenth; and so on.
The resulting sequence can be represented as:
This description requires one to complete an infinite number of tasks, which Zeno maintains is an impossibility.
This sequence also presents a second problem in that it contains no first distance to run, for any possible (finite) first
distance could be divided in half, and hence would not be first after all. Hence, the trip cannot even begin. The
paradoxical conclusion then would be that travel over any finite distance can neither be completed nor begun, and so
all motion must be an illusion. An equally valid conclusion, as Henri Bergson proposed, is that motion (time and
distance) is not actually divisible.
This argument is called the Dichotomy because it involves repeatedly splitting a distance into two parts. It contains
some of the same elements as the Achilles and the Tortoise paradox, but with a more apparent conclusion of
motionlessness. It is also known as the Race Course paradox. Some, like Aristotle, regard the Dichotomy as really
just another version of Achilles and the Tortoise.
There are two versions of the dichotomy paradox. In the other version, before Homer could reach the stationary bus,
he must reach half of the distance to it. Before reaching the last half, he must complete the next quarter of the
distance. Reaching the next quarter, he must then cover the next eighth of the distance, then the next sixteenth, and
so on. There are thus an infinite number of steps that must first be accomplished before he could reach the bus.
323
Zeno's paradoxes
Expressed this way, the dichotomy paradox is very much analogous to that of Achilles and the tortoise.
Arrow paradox
If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always
occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless. as recounted by
Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b5
In the arrow paradox (also known as the fletcher's paradox), Zeno states that for motion to occur, an object must
change the position which it occupies. He gives an example of an arrow in flight. He states that in any one
(durationless) instant of time, the arrow is neither moving to where it is, nor to where it is not. It cannot move to
where it is not, because no time elapses for it to move there; it cannot move to where it is, because it is already there.
In other words, at every instant of time there is no motion occurring. If everything is motionless at every instant, and
time is entirely composed of instants, then motion is impossible.
Whereas the first two paradoxes divide space, this paradox starts by dividing timeand not into segments, but into
points.
Three other paradoxes as given by Aristotle

Paradox of Place
From Aristotle:
if everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum.[5]
Paradox of the Grain of Millet

From Aristotle:
there is no part of the millet that does not make a sound: for there is no reason why any such part should
not in any length of time fail to move the air that the whole bushel moves in falling. In fact it does not of
itself move even such a quantity of the air as it would move if this part were by itself: for no part even
exists otherwise than potentially.[6]
Description of the paradox from the Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy:
The argument is that a single grain of millet makes no sound upon falling, but a thousand grains make a
sound. Hence a thousand nothings become something, which is absurd.[7]
Description from Nick Huggett:
This a Parmenidean argument that one cannot trust one's sense of hearing. Aristotle's response seems to
be that even inaudible sounds can add to an audible sound.[8]
The Moving Rows (or Stadium)

From Aristotle:
concerning the two rows of bodies, each row being composed of an equal number of bodies of equal
size, passing each other on a race-course as they proceed with equal velocity in opposite directions, the
one row originally occupying the space between the goal and the middle point of the course and the
other that between the middle point and the starting-post. This...involves the conclusion that half a given
time is equal to double that time.[9]
For an expanded account of Zeno's arguments as presented by Aristotle, see Simplicius' commentary On Aristotle's
Physics.
324
Zeno's paradoxes
Proposed solutions
Simplicius of Cilicia
According to Simplicius, Diogenes the Cynic said nothing upon hearing Zeno's arguments, but stood up and walked,
in order to demonstrate the falsity of Zeno's conclusions. To fully solve any of the paradoxes, however, one needs to
show what is wrong with the argument, not just the conclusions. Through history, several solutions have been
proposed, among the earliest recorded being those of Aristotle and Archimedes.
Aristotle
Aristotle (384 BC322 BC) remarked that as the distance decreases, the time needed to cover those distances also
decreases, so that the time needed also becomes increasingly small.[10][11] Aristotle also distinguished "things
infinite in respect of divisibility" (such as a unit of space that can be mentally divided into ever smaller units while
remaining spatially the same) from things (or distances) that are infinite in extension ("with respect to their
extremities").[12] Aristotle's objection to the arrow paradox was that "Time is not composed of indivisible nows any
more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles."
Saint Thomas Aquinas
Saint Thomas Aquinas, commenting on Aristotle's objection, wrote "Instants are not parts of time, for time is not
made up of instants any more than a magnitude is made of points, as we have already proved. Hence it does not
follow that a thing is not in motion in a given time, just because it is not in motion in any instant of that time."[13]
Archimedes
Before 212 BC, Archimedes had developed a method to derive a finite answer for the sum of infinitely many terms
that get progressively smaller. (See: Geometric series, 1/4 + 1/16 + 1/64 + 1/256 + , The Quadrature of the
Parabola.) Modern calculus achieves the same result, using more rigorous methods (see convergent series, where the
"reciprocals of powers of 2" series, equivalent to the Dichotomy Paradox, is listed as convergent). These methods
allow the construction of solutions based on the conditions stipulated by Zeno, i.e. the amount of time taken at each
step is geometrically decreasing.[14]
Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell offered what is known as the "at-at theory of motion". It agrees that there can be no motion
"during" a durationless instant, and contends that all that is required for motion is that the arrow be at one point at
one time, at another point another time, and at appropriate points between those two points for intervening times. In
this view motion is a function of position with respect to time.
Nick Huggett
Nick Huggett argues that Zeno is begging the question when he says that objects that occupy the same space as they
do at rest must be at rest.
Peter Lynds
Peter Lynds has argued that all of Zeno's motion paradoxes are resolved by the conclusion that instants in time and
instantaneous magnitudes do not physically exist.[15][16][17] Lynds argues that an object in relative motion cannot
have an instantaneous or determined relative position (for if it did, it could not be in motion), and so cannot have its
motion fractionally dissected as if it does, as is assumed by the paradoxes. For more about the inability to know both
speed and location, see Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
325
Zeno's paradoxes
Hermann Weyl
Another proposed solution is to question one of the assumptions Zeno used in his paradoxes (particularly the
Dichotomy), which is that between any two different points in space (or time), there is always another point. Without
this assumption there are only a finite number of distances between two points, hence there is no infinite sequence of
movements, and the paradox is resolved. The ideas of Planck length and Planck time in modern physics place a limit
on the measurement of time and space, if not on time and space themselves. According to Hermann Weyl, the
assumption that space is made of finite and discrete units is subject to a further problem, given by the "tile argument"
or "distance function problem". According to this, the length of the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle in
discretized space is always equal to the length of one of the two sides, in contradiction to geometry. Jean Paul Van
Bendegem has argued that the Tile Argument can be resolved, and that discretization can therefore remove the
paradox.
Hans Reichenbach
Hans Reichenbach has proposed that the paradox may arise from considering space and time as separate entities. In a
theory like general relativity, which presumes a single space-time continuum, the paradox may be blocked.[18]
The paradoxes in modern times

Infinite processes remained theoretically troublesome in mathematics until the late 19th century. The epsilon-delta
version of Weierstrass and Cauchy developed a rigorous formulation of the logic and calculus involved. These works
resolved the mathematics involving infinite processes.
While mathematics can be used to calculate where and when the moving Achilles will overtake the Tortoise of
Zeno's paradox, philosophers such as Brown and Moorcroft claim that mathematics does not address the central
point in Zeno's argument, and that solving the mathematical issues does not solve every issue the paradoxes raise.
Zeno's arguments are often misrepresented in the popular literature. That is, Zeno is often said to have argued that
the sum of an infinite number of terms must itself be infinitewith the result that not only the time, but also the
distance to be travelled, become infinite. However, none of the original ancient sources has Zeno discussing the sum
of any infinite series. Simplicius has Zeno saying "it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of things in a finite
time". This presents Zeno's problem not with finding the sum, but rather with finishing a task with an infinite number
of steps: how can one ever get from A to B, if an infinite number of (non-instantaneous) events can be identified that
need to precede the arrival at B, and one cannot reach even the beginning of a "last event"?
Today there is still a debate on the question of whether or not Zeno's paradoxes have been resolved. In The History
of Mathematics, Burton writes, "Although Zeno's argument confounded his contemporaries, a satisfactory
explanation incorporates a now-familiar idea, the notion of a 'convergent infinite series.'".[19]
Bertrand Russell offered a "solution" to the paradoxes based on modern physics,Wikipedia:Citation needed but
Brown concludes "Given the history of 'final resolutions', from Aristotle onwards, it's probably foolhardy to think
we've reached the end. It may be that Zeno's arguments on motion, because of their simplicity and universality, will
always serve as a kind of 'Rorschach image' onto which people can project their most fundamental
phenomenological concerns (if they have any)."
Pat Corvini offers a solution to the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise by first distinguishing the physical world
from the abstract mathematics used to describe it. She claims the paradox arises from a subtle but fatal switch
between the physical and abstract. Zeno's syllogism is as follows: P1: Achilles must first traverse an infinite number
of divisions in order to reach the tortoise; P2: it is impossible for Achilles to traverse an infinite number of divisions;
C: therefore, Achilles can never surpass the tortoise. Corvini shows that P1 is a mathematical abstraction which
cannot be applied directly to P2 which is a statement regarding the physical world. The physical world requires a
resolution amount used to distinguish distance while mathematics can use any resolution.
326
Zeno's paradoxes
Quantum Zeno effect

Main article: Quantum Zeno effect
In 1977, physicists E. C. G. Sudarshan and B. Misra studying quantum mechanics discovered that the dynamical
evolution (motion) of a quantum system can be hindered (or even inhibited) through observation of the system. This
effect is usually called the "quantum Zeno effect" as it is strongly reminiscent of Zeno's arrow paradox. This effect
was first theorized in 1958.
Zeno behaviour
In the field of verification and design of timed and hybrid systems, the system behaviour is called Zeno if it includes
an infinite number of discrete steps in a finite amount of time. Some formal verification techniques exclude these
behaviours from analysis, if they are not equivalent to non-Zeno behaviour.
In systems design these behaviours will also often be excluded from system models, since they cannot be
implemented with a digital controller.
A simple example of a system showing Zeno behaviour is a bouncing ball coming to rest. The physics of a bouncing
ball, ignoring factors other than rebound, can be mathematically analyzed to predict an infinite number of bounces.
Notes
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Aristotle's Physics (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ physics. html) "Physics" by Aristotle translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye
([fragment 65], Diogenes Laertius. IX (http:/ / classicpersuasion. org/ pw/ diogenes/ dlzeno-eleatic. htm) 25ff and VIII 57).
Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9.23 and 9.29.
, mathforum.org
Aristotle Physics IV:1, 209a25 (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ physics. 4. iv. html)
Aristotle Physics VII:5, 250a20 (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ physics. 7. vii. html)
The Michael Proudfoot, A.R. Lace. Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy. Routledge 2009, p. 445
Huggett, Nick, "Zeno's Paradoxes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http:/ / plato.
stanford. edu/ entries/ paradox-zeno/ #GraMil
[9] Aristotle Physics VI:9, 239b33 (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ physics. 6. vi. html)
[10] Aristotle. Physics 6.9
[11] Aristotle's observation that the fractional times also get shorter does not guarantee, in every case, that the task can be completed. One case in
which it does not hold is that in which the fractional times decrease in a harmonic series, while the distances decrease geometrically, such as:
1/2 s for 1/2 m gain, 1/3 s for next 1/4 m gain, 1/4 s for next 1/8 m gain, 1/5 s for next 1/16 m gain, 1/6 s for next 1/32 m gain, etc. In this case,
the distances form a convergent series, but the times form a divergent series, the sum of which has no limit. Archimedes developed a more
explicitly mathematical approach than Aristotle.
[12] Aristotle. Physics 6.9; 6.2, 233a21-31
[13] Aquinas. Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Book 6.861
[14] George B. Thomas, Calculus and Analytic Geometry, Addison Wesley, 1951
[15] Lynds, Peter. Zeno's Paradoxes: a Timely Solution (http:/ / philsci-archive. pitt. edu/ 1197/ )
[16] Lynds, Peter. Time and Classical and Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs. Discontinuity. Foundations of Physics Letter s (Vol. 16, Issue
4, 2003). doi:10.1023/A:1025361725408
[17] Times Up Einstein (http:/ / www. wired. com/ wired/ archive/ 13. 06/ physics. html), Josh McHugh, Wired Magazine, June 2005
[18] Hans Reichenbach (1958) The Philosophy of Space and Time. Dover
[19] Burton, David, A History of Mathematics: An Introduction, McGraw Hill, 2010, ISBN 978-0-07-338315-6
327
Zeno's paradoxes
References
Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, M. Schofield (1984) The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of
Texts, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-27455-9.
Huggett, Nick (2010). "Zeno's Paradoxes" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/). Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2011-03-07.
Plato (1926) Plato: Cratylus. Parmenides. Greater Hippias. Lesser Hippias, H. N. Fowler (Translator), Loeb
Classical Library. ISBN 0-674-99185-0.
Sainsbury, R.M. (2003) Paradoxes, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-48347-6.
External links
Dowden, Bradley. " Zenos Paradoxes (http://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/)." Entry in the Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001), "Antinomy" (http://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php?title=p/
a012710), Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer, ISBN978-1-55608-010-4
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (https://www.coursera.org/course/mathphil),
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt Mnchen
Silagadze, Z. K. " Zeno meets modern science, (http://uk.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0505042)"
Zeno's Paradox: Achilles and the Tortoise (http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/
ZenosParadoxAchillesAndTheTortoise/) by Jon McLoone, Wolfram Demonstrations Project.
Kevin Brown on Zeno and the Paradox of Motion (http://www.mathpages.com/rr/s3-07/3-07.htm)
Palmer, John (2008). "Zeno of Elea" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zeno-elea/). Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
This article incorporates material from Zeno's paradox on PlanetMath, which is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License.
Grime, James. "Zeno's Paradox" (http://www.numberphile.com/videos/zeno_paradox.html). Numberphile.
Brady Haran.
328
329
Physics
Algol paradox
In stellar astronomy, the Algol paradox is an apparently paradoxical situation when elements of a binary star seem
to evolve in discord with the established theories of stellar evolution. A fundamental feature of these theories is that
the rate of evolution of stars depends on their mass: The greater the mass, the faster this evolution, and the more
quickly it leaves the main-sequence, entering either a subgiant or giant phase.
In the case of Algol and other binary stars, something completely different is observed: The less massive star is
already a subgiant while the star with much greater mass is still on the main-sequence. Since the partner stars of the
binary are thought to have formed at approximately the same time and so should have similar ages, this appears
paradoxical. The more massive star, rather than the less massive one, should have left the main sequence.
The paradox is resolved by the fact that in many binary stars, there can be a flow of material between the two,
disturbing the normal process of stellar evolution. As the flow progresses, their evolutionary stage will advance, even
as the relative masses change. Eventually, the originally more massive star will reach the next stage in its evolution
despite having lost much of its mass to its companion.
References
Archimedes paradox
The Archimedes paradox, named after Archimedes of Syracuse, or the hydrostatic paradox,[1] states that an object
can float in a quantity of water that has less volume than the object itself, if its average density is less than that of
water. A more general formulation of the paradox is that "that any quantity of water, or other fluid, how small
soever, may be made to balance and support any quantity, or any weight, how great soever".[2]
The implication of this is that a large, massive object can float in a relatively small volume of liquid, provided that it
is surrounded by it. One extreme application of the paradox is that a battleship can float in a few buckets of water,
provided that the water surrounds the hull completely and that the ship would have floated had it been in open water.
Origin
Archimedes' principle (also referred to as the Law of Buoyancy), as stated in Book 1 of Archimedes' work On
Floating Bodies, states that "the buoyant force is equal to the weight of the displaced fluid." Simon Stevin developed
this idea into the hydrostatic paradox in his De Beghinselen des Waterwichts (Elements of Hydrostatics) (1586). His
proof rested partly on the principle of solidification: if a large proportion of the water in a vessel were to be frozen
without affecting its weight or volume, leaving just a narrow region of liquid between it and the container, then the
forces everywhere would be the same as before solidification, and therefore the frozen water would remain floating
in the same position as its liquid precursor. The frozen water could then be replaced by any object of the same
Volume, shape, weight and centre of gravity, and the object would continue to float.[3]
In the case of a ship, the upward force exerted on it is equal to the weight of water of equal volume to the part of the
ship that is submerged. If this upward force is greater than the weight of the ship, then the ship will float.
Archimedes paradox
The Archimedes Paradox implies that if a mould of the hull of ship is made and a relatively small amount of water is
placed in the mould, then the ship would float on the thin layer of water between itself and the mould, even though
the total volume of water is much less than the volume of the ship.
Explanation
The paradox originates from the fact that the volume of the immersed part of the object is important, not the actual
volume of water that is displaced by it. In other words, no fluid needs to be actually displaced for Archimedes'
principle to take effect. The object merely needs to be surrounded by the fluid.
One method offered to visualize the solution to the paradox is to conduct a simple thought experiment. Instead of a
ship suspended in the water, imagine a lightweight bucket filled with water. Since the density of the bucket of water
is the same as the water in the dock, the bucket would remain suspended, or floating. Nothing changes
hydrostatically by replacing the bucket with a ship of equal or lower density than water (which it would have to be or
else it would sink in open water anyway), therefore the ship would also float.
Another way of looking at it is that the buoyant force is the integral of the ambient pressure over the surface. In this
model the volume is not directly relevant. When the object is immersed at the interface between two fluids, there is a
different pressure distribution with depth on the parts exposed to the different fluids.
References
Prof. Robert L. Merlino (2003). "Statics - Fluids at rest" [4]. Retrieved 2006-11-26.
Carol Hodanbosi (1996). "Buoyancy: Archimedes Principle" [5]. Archived [6] from the original on 8 December
2006. Retrieved 2006-11-26.
[1] Koehl, George M., "Archimedes' Principle and the Hydrostatic ParadoxSimple Demonstrations" (http:/ / www. deepdyve. com/ lp/
american-association-of-physics-teachers/ archimedes-principle-and-the-hydrostatic-paradox-simple-demonstrations-nR0IV8cJbw), The
American Journal of Physics, Volume 17 (9), American Association of Physics Teachers, Dec 1, 1949, p.579, accessed 2012-01-09
[2] Hutton, Charles, Mathematical and Philosophical Dictionary (http:/ / archimedes. mpiwg-berlin. mpg. de/ cgi-bin/ toc/ toc.
cgi?page=641;dir=hutto_dicti_078_en_1795;step=textonly), 1795, accessed 2012-01-09
[3] Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, The hydrostatic paradox and the origins of Cartesian dynamics (http:/ / descartes-agonistes. com/ index.
php?option=com_docman& task=doc_download& gid=70& Itemid=53), Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 33 (2002) 535572, accessed 2012-01-09; also
published in John Schuster, Descartes-Agonistes: Physico-mathematics, Method & Corpuscular-Mechanism 1618-33, ISBN 9400747454
[4] http:/ / www. physics. uiowa. edu/ ~rmerlino/ 6Fall06/ 6S06pp_L13. ppt
[5] http:/ / www. grc. nasa. gov/ WWW/ K-12/ WindTunnel/ Activities/ buoy_Archimedes. html
[6] http:/ / web. archive. org/ web/ 20061208055009/ http:/ / www. grc. nasa. gov/ WWW/ K-12/ WindTunnel/ Activities/ buoy_Archimedes.
html
External links
Can a Battleship Float on a Gallon of Water? (http://web.archive.org/web/20101226160447/http://wiskit.
com/marilyn/battleship.html)
330

Aristotle's wheel paradox is a
paradox from the Greek work
Mechanica traditionally attributed to
Aristotle. There are two wheels, one
within the other, whose rims take the
shape of two circles with different
diameters. The wheels roll without
slipping for a full revolution. The paths
traced by the bottoms of the wheels are
straight lines, which are apparently the wheels' circumferences. But the two lines have the same length, so the wheels
must have the same circumference, contradicting the assumption that they have different sizes: a paradox.
The fallacy is the assumption that the smaller wheel indeed traces out its circumference, without ensuring that it, too,
rolls without slipping on a fixed surface. In fact, it is impossible for both wheels to perform such motion. Physically,
if two joined concentric wheels with different radii were rolled along parallel lines then at least one would slip; if a
system of cogs were used to prevent slippage then the wheels would jam. A modern approximation of such an
experiment is often performed by car drivers who park too close to a curb. The car's outer tire rolls without slipping
on the road surface while the inner hubcap both rolls and slips across the curb; the slipping is evidenced by a
screeching noise.
Alternatively, the fallacy is the assumption that the smaller wheel is independent of the larger wheel. Imagine a tire
as the larger wheel, and imagine the smaller wheel as the interior circumference of the tire and not as the rim. The
movement of the inner circle is dependent on the larger circle. Thus its movement from any point to another can be
calculated by using an inverse of their ratio.
References
Further reading
Rota Aristotelica, The Archimedes Project, Digital Research Library (http://archimedes.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/
cgi-bin/toc/toc.cgi?page=1106;dir=hutto_dicti_078_en_1795;step=textonly)
Weisstein, Eric W., "Aristotle's Wheel Paradox" (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/AristotlesWheelParadox.
html), MathWorld.
331

Bell's spaceship paradox is a thought
experiment in special relativity. It was
first designed by E. Dewan and M.
Beran in 1959 and became more
widely known when J. S. Bell included
a modified version.[1] A delicate string
or thread hangs between two
spaceships. Both spaceships now start
accelerating
simultaneously
and
equally as measured in the inertial
frame S, thus having the same velocity
at all times in S. Therefore they are all
Above: In S the distance between the spaceships stays the same, while the string contracts.
subject to the same Lorentz
Below: In S the distance between the spaceships increases, while the string length stays
contraction, so the entire assembly
the same.
seems to be equally contracted in the S
frame with respect to the length at the
start. Therefore at first sight it might appear that the thread will not break during acceleration.
This argument, however, is incorrect as shown by Dewan & Beran and Bell. The distance between the spaceships
does not undergo Lorentz contraction with respect to the distance at the start, because in S it is effectively defined to
remain the same, due to the equal and simultaneous acceleration of both spaceships in S. It also turns out that the rest
length between the two has increased in the frames in which they are momentarily at rest (S), because the
accelerations of the spaceships are not simultaneous here due to relativity of simultaneity. The thread, on the other
hand, being a physical object held together by electrostatic forces, maintains the same rest length. Thus in frame S it
must be Lorentz contracted, which result can also be derived when the electromagnetic fields of bodies in motion are
considered. So the thread must break in both frames: In S due to the non-simultaneous acceleration and the
increasing distance between the spaceships, in S due to length contraction of the thread.
In the following, the rest length or proper length of an object is its length measured in the object's rest frame. (This
length corresponds to the proper distance between two events in the special case, when these events are measured
simultaneously at the endpoints in the object's rest frame.[])
Dewan and Beran

Dewan and Beran stated the thought experiment by writing:
"Consider two identically constructed rockets at rest in an inertial frame S. Let them face the same direction
and be situated one behind the other. If we suppose that at a prearranged time both rockets are simultaneously
(with respect to S) fired up, then their velocities with respect to S are always equal throughout the remainder
of the experiment (even though they are functions of time). This means, by definition, that with respect to S
the distance between the two rockets does not change even when they speed up to relativistic velocities."
Then this setup is repeated again, but this time the back of the first rocket is connected with the front of the second
rocket by a silk thread. They concluded:
"According to the special theory the thread must contract with respect to S because it has a velocity with
respect to S. However, since the rockets maintain a constant distance apart with respect to S, the thread (which
we have assumed to be taut at the start) cannot contract: therefore a stress must form until for high enough
332
333
velocities the thread finally reaches its elastic limit and breaks."
Dewan and Beran also discussed the result from the viewpoint of inertial frames momentarily comoving with the
first rocket, by applying a Lorentz transformation:
"Since
the
, (..) each frame used here has a different synchronization scheme because of
factor. It can be shown that as
increases, the front rocket will not only appear to be a larger
distance from the back rocket with respect to an instantaneous inertial frame, but also to have started at an
earlier time."
They concluded:
"One may conclude that whenever a body is constrained to move in such a way that all parts of it have the
same acceleration with respect to an inertial frame (or, alternatively, in such a way that with respect to an
inertial frame its dimensions are fixed, and there is no rotation), then such a body must in general experience
relativistic stresses."
Then they discussed the objection, that there should be no difference between a) the distance between two ends of a
connected rod, and b) the distance between two unconnected objects which move with the same velocity with respect
to an inertial frame. Dewan and Beran removed those objections by arguing:
Since the rockets are constructed exactly the same way, and starting at the same moment in S with the same
acceleration, they must have the same velocity all of the time in S. Thus they are traveling the same distances in
S, so their mutual distance cannot change in this frame. Otherwise, if the distance were to contract in S, then this
would imply different velocities of the rockets in this frame as well, which contradicts the initial assumption of
equal construction and acceleration.
They also argued that there indeed is a difference between a) and b): Case a) is the ordinary case of length
contraction, based on the concept of the rod's rest length l0 in S0, which always stays the same as long as the rod
can be seen as rigid. Under those circumstances, the rod is contracted in S. But the distance cannot be seen as
rigid in case b) because it is increasing due to unequal accelerations in S0, and the rockets would have to
exchange information with each other and adjust their velocities in order to compensate for this all of those
complications don't arise in case a).
334
Bell
In Bell's version of the thought experiment, three spaceships A, B
and C are initially at rest in a common inertial reference frame, B
and C being equidistant to A. Then a signal is sent from A to reach
B and C simultaneously, causing B and C starting to accelerate in
the vertical direction (having been pre-programmed with identical
acceleration profiles), while A stays at rest in its original reference
frame. According to Bell, this implies that B and C (as seen in A's
rest frame) "will have at every moment the same velocity, and so
remain displaced one from the other by a fixed distance." Now, if
a fragile thread is tied between B and C, it's not long enough
anymore due to length contractions, thus it will break. He
concluded that "the artificial prevention of the natural contraction
imposes intolerable stress".
Bell reported that he encountered much skepticism from "a
distinguished experimentalist" when he presented the paradox. To
attempt to resolve the dispute, an informal and non-systematic
survey of opinion at CERN was held. According to Bell, there was
"clear consensus" which asserted, incorrectly, that the string would
not break. Bell goes on to add,
Vertical arrangement as suggested by Bell.
"Of course, many people who get the wrong answer at first
get the right answer on further reflection. Usually they feel obliged to work out how things look to observers B
or C. They find that B, for example, see C drifting further and further behind, so that a given piece of thread
can no longer span the distance. It is only after working this out, and perhaps only with a residual feeling of
unease, that such people finally accept a conclusion which is perfectly trivial in terms of A's account of things,
including the Fitzgerald contraction."
Importance of length contraction

In general, it was concluded by Dewan & Beran and Bell, that relativistic stresses arise when all parts of an object
are accelerated the same way with respect to an inertial frame, and that length contraction has real physical
consequences. For instance, Bell argued that the length contraction of objects as well as the lack of length
contraction between objects in frame S can be explained using Relativistic electromagnetism. The distorted
electromagnetic intermolecular fields cause moving objects to contract, or to become stressed if hindered from doing
so. In contrast, no such forces act on the space between objects. (Generally, Richard Feynman demonstrated how the
Lorentz transformation can be derived from the case of the potential of a charge moving with constant velocity (as
represented by the LinardWiechert potential). As to the historical aspect, Feynman alluded to the circumstance
that Hendrik Lorentz arrived essentially the same way at the Lorentz transformation, see also History of Lorentz
transformations).
However, Petkov (2009) and Franklin (2009) interpret this paradox differently. They agreed with the result that the
string will break due to unequal accelerations in the rocket frames, which causes the rest length between them to
increase (see the Minkowski diagram in the analysis section). However, they denied the idea that those stresses are
caused by length contraction in S. This is because, in their opinion, length contraction has no "physical reality", but
is merely the result of a Lorentz transformation, i.e. a rotation in four-dimensional space which by itself can never
cause any stress at all. Thus the occurrence of such stresses in all reference frames including S and the breaking of
the string is supposed to be the effect of relativistic acceleration alone.
335
Discussions and publications

Paul Nawrocki (1962) gives three arguments why the string should not break, while Edmond Dewan (1963) showed
in a reply that his original analysis still remains valid.[2] Many years later and after Bell's book, Matsuda and
Kinoshita reported receiving much criticism after publishing an article on their independently rediscovered version
of the paradox in a Japanese journal. Matsuda and Kinoshita do not cite specific papers, however, stating only that
these objections were written in Japanese.[3]
However, in most publications it is agreed that stresses arise in the string, with some reformulations, modifications
and different scenarios, such as by Evett & Wangsness (1960), Dewan (1963), Romain (1963), Evett (1972),
Gershtein & Logunov (1998), Tartaglia & Ruggiero (2003), Cornwell (2005), Flores (2005), Semay (2006), Styer
(2007), Freund (2008), Redzic (2008), Peregoudov (2009), Redi (2009), Gu (2009), Petkov (2009),[] Franklin
(2009), Miller (2010), Fernflores (2011), Kassner (2012). A similar problem was also discussed in relation to angular
accelerations: Grn (1979), MacGregor (1981), Grn (1982, 2003).
Analysis
Rotating disc
Bell's spaceship paradox is not about preserving the rest length between objects (as in Born rigidity), but about
preserving the distance in an inertial frame relative to which the objects are in motion, for which the Ehrenfest
paradox is an example. Historically, already Albert Einstein recognized in the course of his development of general
relativity, that the circumference of a rotating disc is measured to be larger in the corotating frame than the one
measured in an inertial frame. Einstein explained in 1916:[4]
"We suppose that the circumference and diameter of a circle have been measured with a standard measuring
rod infinitely small compared with the radius, and that we have the quotient of the two results. If this
experiment were performed with measuring rods at rest relatively to the Galilean system K, the quotient
would be . With measuring rods at rest relatively to K, the quotient would be greater than . This is readily
understood if we envisage the whole process of measuring from the "stationary" system K, and take into
consideration that the measuring rods applied to the periphery undergoes a Lorentz contraction, while the ones
applied along the radius do not. Hence Euclidean geometry does not apply to K."
As pointed out more precisely by Einstein in 1919, the relation is given
,
being the circumference in the corotating frame,
in the laboratory frame,
is the Lorentz factor
. Therefore it's impossible to bring a disc from the state of rest into rotation in a Born rigid manner.
Instead, stresses arise during the phase of accelerated rotation, until the disc enters the state of uniform rotation.
336
Accelerating ships
Minkowski diagram: The world lines (navy blue curves) of two observers A and B who accelerate in the same
direction with the same constant magnitude acceleration. At A and B, the observers stop accelerating. The dotted
line is a "line of simultaneity" for either observer after acceleration stops.
Loedel diagram: Length
between the ships in S after acceleration is longer than the previous length
in S,
and longer than the unchanged length in S. The dashed lines indicate the broken string in S and S.
Similarly, in the case of Bell's spaceship paradox the relation between the initial rest length
between the ships
(identical to the moving length in S after acceleration) and the new rest length
in S after acceleration, is:
.
This length increase can be calculated in different ways. For instance, if the acceleration is finished the ships will
constantly remain at the same location in the final rest frame S, so it's only necessary to compute the distance
between the x-coordinates transformed from S to S. If
and
are the ships' positions in S, the
positions in their new rest frame S are:
Another method was shown by Dewan (1963) who demonstrated the importance of relativity of simultaneity. The
perspective of frame S is described, in which both ships will be at rest after the acceleration is finished. The ships
are accelerating simultaneously at
in S (assuming acceleration in infinitesimal small time), though B is
337
accelerating and stopping in S before A due to relativity of simultaneity, with the time difference:
Since the ships are moving with the same velocity in S before acceleration, the initial rest length
shortened in S by
in S is
due to length contraction. This distance starts to increase after B came to stop,
because A is now moving away from B with constant velocity during
until A stops as well. Dewan arrived at
the relation (in different notation):
It was also noted by several authors that the constant length in S and the increased length in S is consistent with the
length contraction formula
, because the initial rest length
is increased by
in S, which is
contracted in S by the same factor, so it stays the same in S:
Summarizing: While the rest distance between the ships increases to
in S, the relativity principle requires that
the string (whose physical constitution is unaltered) maintains its rest length
in its new rest system S. Therefore
it breaks in S due to the increasing distance between the ships. As explained above, the same is also obtained by
only considering the start frame S using length contraction of the string (or the contraction of its moving molecular
fields) while the distance between the ships stays the same due to equal acceleration.
Born rigidity
The mathematical treatment of this paradox is similar to the treatment of Born rigid motion. However, rather than
ask about the separation of spaceships with the same acceleration in an inertial frame, the problem of Born rigid
motion asks, "What acceleration profile is required by the second spaceship so that the distance between the
spaceships remains constant in their proper frame?" In order for the two spaceships, initially at rest in an inertial
frame, to maintain a constant proper distance, the lead spaceship must have a lower proper acceleration.[5]
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
in chapter 9 of his popular 1976 book on quantum mechanics.

(Note that this reference also contains the first presentation of the ladder paradox.)
eprint version (http:/ / skfiz. wdfiles. com/ local--files/ materialy/ space_ships. pdf)
. See English translation (http:/ / www. alberteinstein. info/ gallery/ gtext3. html).
Mathpages: Born Rigidity and Acceleration (http:/ / www. mathpages. com/ home/ kmath422/ kmath422. htm)
External links
Michael Weiss, Bell's Spaceship Paradox (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/SR/
spaceship_puzzle.html) (1995), USENET Relativity FAQ (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/index.
html)
Bentley's paradox
338
Bentley's paradox
Bentley's paradox is a cosmological paradox pointing to a problem occurring when Newton's theory of gravitation
is applied to cosmology: "According to Newton, each star in the universe ought to be attracted towards every other
star. They should not remain motionless, at a constant distance from each other, but should all fall together to some
central point. Newton admitted as much in a letter to Richard Bentley, a leading Cambridge philosopher of the
time."[1] Newton solved the paradox by claiming that God prevented the collapse by making "constant minute
corrections".
References and notes

[1] "This Month in Physics History - Einstein's Biggest Blunder", APS News, Vol. 14, Nr. 7, July 2005, online (http:/ / www. aps. org/
publications/ apsnews/ 200507/ history. cfm)

The black hole information paradox results from the combination of
quantum mechanics and general relativity. It suggests that physical
information could permanently disappear in a black hole, allowing
many physical states to devolve into the same state. This is
controversial because it violates a commonly assumed tenet of
sciencethat in principle complete information about a physical
system at one point in time should determine its state at any other time.
A fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics is that complete
information about a system is encoded in its wave function up to when
the wave function collapses. The evolution of the wave function is
determined by a unitary operator, and unitarity implies that information
is conserved in the quantum sense. This is the strictest form of determinism.
Artist's representation of a black hole
Principles in action
There are two main principles in play:
Quantum determinism means that given a present wave function, its future changes are uniquely determined by
the evolution operator.
Reversibility refers to the fact that the evolution operator has an inverse, meaning that the past wave functions are
similarly unique.
The combination of the two means that information must always be preserved.
Starting in the mid-1970s, Stephen Hawking and Jacob Bekenstein put forward theoretical arguments based on
general relativity and quantum field theory that appeared to be inconsistent with information conservation.
Specifically, Hawking's calculations indicated that black hole evaporation via Hawking radiation does not preserve
information. Today, many physicists believe that the holographic principle (specifically the AdS/CFT duality)
demonstrates that Hawking's conclusion was incorrect, and that information is in fact preserved.[1] In 2004 Hawking
himself conceded a bet he had made, agreeing that black hole evaporation does in fact preserve information.
339
Hawking radiation
In 1975, Stephen Hawking and Jacob Bekenstein showed that black
holes should slowly radiate away energy, which poses a problem. From
the no-hair theorem, one would expect the Hawking radiation to be
completely independent of the material entering the black hole.
Nevertheless, if the material entering the black hole were a pure
quantum state, the transformation of that state into the mixed state of
Hawking radiation would destroy information about the original
quantum state. This violates Liouville's theorem and presents a
physical paradox.
More precisely, if there is an entangled pure state, and one part of the
entangled system is thrown into the black hole while keeping the other
part outside, the result is a mixed state after the partial trace is taken
into the interior of the black hole. But since everything within the
interior of the black hole will hit the singularity within a finite time, the
part which is traced over partially might disappear completely from the
physical system.
The Penrose diagram of a black hole which

forms, and then completely evaporates away.
Information falling into it will hit the
singularity.Wikipedia:Please clarify Time shown
on vertical axis from bottom to top; space shown
on horizontal axis from left (radius zero) to right
(growing radius).
Hawking remained convinced that the equations of black-hole

thermodynamics together with the no-hair theorem led to the
conclusion that quantum information may be destroyed. This annoyed
many physicists, notably John Preskill, who in 1997 bet Hawking and
Kip Thorne that information was not lost in black holes. The
implications Hawking had opened led to the Susskind-Hawking battle, where Leonard Susskind and Gerard 't Hooft
publicly 'declared war' on Hawking's solution, with Susskind publishing a popular book about the debate in 2008
(The Black Hole War: My battle with Stephen Hawking to make the world safe for quantum mechanics, ISBN
978-0-316-01640-7). The book carefully notes that the "war" was purely a scientific one, and that at a personal level,
the participants remained friends.[2] The solution to the problem that concluded the battle is the holographic
principle, which was first proposed by 't Hooft but was given a precise string theory interpretation by Susskind. With
this, as the title of an article puts it, "Susskind quashes Hawking in quarrel over quantum quandary".[3]
There are various ideas about how the paradox is solved. Since the 1997 proposal of the AdS/CFT correspondence,
the predominant belief among physicists is that information is preserved and that Hawking radiation is not precisely
thermal but receives quantum corrections. Other possibilities include the information being contained in a Planckian
remnant left over at the end of Hawking radiation or a modification of the laws of quantum mechanics to allow for
non-unitary time evolution.
In July 2004, Stephen Hawking published a paper presenting a theory that quantum perturbations of the event
horizon could allow information to escape from a black hole, which would resolve the information paradox. His
argument assumes the unitarity of the AdS/CFT correspondence which implies that an AdS black hole that is dual to
a thermal conformal field theory. When announcing his result, Hawking also conceded the 1997 bet, paying Preskill
with a baseball encyclopedia "from which information can be retrieved at will." However, Thorne remains
unconvinced of Hawking's proof and declined to contribute to the award.
According to Roger Penrose, loss of unitarity in quantum systems is not a problem: quantum measurements are by
themselves already non-unitary. Penrose claims that quantum systems will in fact no longer evolve unitarily as soon
as gravitation comes into play, precisely as in black holes. The Conformal Cyclic Cosmology advocated by Penrose
critically depends on the condition that information is in fact lost in black holes. This new cosmological model might
in future be tested experimentally by detailed analysis of the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMB): if true

the CMB should exhibit circular patterns with slightly lower or slightly higher temperatures. In November 2010,
Penrose and V. G. Gurzadyan announced they had found evidence of such circular patterns, in data from the
Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) corroborated by data from the BOOMERanG experiment. The
significance of the findings was subsequently debated by others.Wikipedia:Please clarify
Main approaches to the solution of the paradox

Information is irretrievably lost
Advantage: Seems to be a direct consequence of relatively non-controversial calculation based on semiclassical
gravity.
Disadvantage: Violates unitarity, as well as energy conservation or causality.
Information gradually leaks out during the black-hole evaporation

Advantage: Intuitively appealing because it qualitatively resembles information recovery in a classical process of
burning.
Disadvantage: Requires a large deviation from classical and semiclassical gravity (which do not allow
information to leak out from the black hole) even for macroscopic black holes for which classical and
semiclassical approximations are expected to be good approximations.
Information suddenly escapes out during the final stage of black-hole evaporation
Advantage: A significant deviation from classical and semiclassical gravity is needed only in the regime in which
the effects of quantum gravity are expected to dominate.
Disadvantage: Just before the sudden escape of information, a very small black hole must be able to store an
arbitrary amount of information, which violates the Bekenstein bound.
Information is stored in a Planck-sized remnant

Advantage: No mechanism for information escape is needed.
Disadvantage: To contain the information from any evaporated black hole, the remnants would need to have an
infinite number of internal states. It has been argued that it would be possible to produce an infinite amount of
pairs of these remnants since they are small and indistinguishable from the perspective of the low-energy effective
theory.
Information is stored in a baby universe that separates from our own universe.
Advantage: This scenario is predicted by the EinsteinCartan theory of gravity which extends general relativity to
matter with intrinsic angular momentum (spin). No violation of known general principles of physics is needed.
Disadvantage: It is difficult to test the EinsteinCartan theory because its predictions are significantly different
from general-relativistic ones only at extremely high densities.
Information is encoded in the correlations between future and past

Advantage: Semiclassical gravity is sufficient, i.e., the solution does not depend on details of (still not well
understood) quantum gravity.
Disadvantage: Contradicts the intuitive view of nature as an entity that evolves with time.
340
References
[1] Barbn, J. L. F. "Black holes, information and holography" J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 171 01 (2009) http:/ / iopscience. iop. org/ 1742-6596/ 171/ 1/
012009 p.1: "The most important departure from conventional thinking in recent years, the holographic principle...provides a definition of
quantum gravity...[and] guarantees that the whole process is unitary."
[2] The Black Hole War p. 10: "It was not a war between angry enemies; indeed the main participants are all friends. But it was a fierce
intellectual struggle of ideas between people who deeply respected each other but also profoundly disagreed."
[3] http:/ / richarddawkins. net/ articles/ 2846
External links
Black Hole Information Loss Problem (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/BlackHoles/
info_loss.html), a USENET physics FAQ page
Preskill, John (1992). "Do black holes destroy information?". An international symposium on Black Holes: 22.
arXiv: hep-th/9209058 (http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9209058). Bibcode: 1993bhmw.conf...22P (http://adsabs.
harvard.edu/abs/1993bhmw.conf...22P). Discusses methods of attack on the problem, and their apparent
shortcomings.
Report (http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99996193) on Hawking's 2004 theory at New
Scientist
Report (http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040715/full/news040712-12.html) on Hawking's 2004 theory at
Nature
Hawking, S. W. (July 2005), Information Loss in Black Holes, arxiv:hep-th/0507171 (http://arxiv.org/abs/
hep-th/0507171). Stephen Hawking's purported solution to the black hole unitarity paradox.
Hawking and unitarity (http://motls.blogspot.com/2005/07/hawking-and-unitarity.html): an up-to-date
discussion of the information loss paradox and Stephen Hawking's role in it
The Hawking Paradox - BBC Horizon documentary (2005) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/
horizon/hawking_prog_summary.shtml)
"Horizon" The Hawking Paradox (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0819995/) at the Internet Movie Database
341
Braess's paradox
342
Braess's paradox
Braess's paradox, credited to the German mathematician Dietrich Braess, states that adding extra capacity to a
network when the moving entities selfishly choose their route, can in some cases reduce overall performance. This is
because the Nash equilibrium of such a system is not necessarily optimal.
The paradox is stated as follows:
"For each point of a road network, let there be given the number of cars starting from it, and the
destination of the cars. Under these conditions one wishes to estimate the distribution of traffic flow.
Whether one street is preferable to another depends not only on the quality of the road, but also on the
density of the flow. If every driver takes the path that looks most favorable to him, the resultant running
times need not be minimal. Furthermore, it is indicated by an example that an extension of the road
network may cause a redistribution of the traffic that results in longer individual running times."
The reason for this is that in a Nash equilibrium, drivers have no incentive to change their routes. If the system is not
in a Nash equilibrium, selfish drivers must be able to improve their respective travel times by changing the routes
they take. In the case of Braess's paradox, drivers will continue to switch until they reach Nash equilibrium, despite
the reduction in overall performance.
If the latency functions are linear then adding an edge can never make total travel time at equilibrium worse by a
factor of more than 4/3.
Example
Consider a road network as shown in
the adjacent diagram, on which 4000
drivers wish to travel from point Start
to End. The travel time in minutes on
the Start-A road is the number of
travelers (T) divided by 100, and on
Start-B is a constant 45 minutes
(likewise with the roads across from them). If the dashed road does not exist (so the traffic network has 4 roads in
total), the time needed to drive Start-A-End route with A drivers would be
. And the time needed to drive
the Start-B-End route with B drivers would be
. If either route were shorter, it would not be a Nash
equilibrium: a rational driver would switch routes from the longer route to the shorter route. As there are 4000
drivers, the fact that
can be used to derive the fact that
when the system is at
equilibrium. Therefore, each route takes
minutes.
Now suppose the dashed line is a road with an extremely short travel time of approximately 0 minutes. In this
situation, all drivers will choose the Start-A route rather than the Start-B route, because Start-A will only take
minutes at its worst, whereas Start-B is guaranteed to take 45 minutes. Once at point A, every
rational driver will elect to take the "free" road to B and from there continue to End, because once again A-End is
guaranteed to take 45 minutes while A-B-End will take at most
minutes. Each driver's travel time
is
minutes, an increase from the 65 minutes required when the fast A-B road did not exist. No
driver has an incentive to switch, as the two original routes (Start-A-End and Start-B-End) are both now 85 minutes.
If every driver were to agree not to use the A-B path, every driver would benefit by reducing their travel time by 15
minutes. However, because any single driver will always benefit by taking the A-B path, the socially optimal
distribution is not stable and so Braess's paradox occurs.
Braess's paradox
343
Existence of an equilibrium
Let
be the formula for the cost of
of the form
people driving along edge
where
Suppose we have a linear traffic graph with
(If
let
and
. If a traffic graph has linear edges (those
are constants) then an equilibrium will always exist.
people driving along edge
. Let the energy of e,
be
). Let the total energy of the traffic graph be the sum of the energies of every edge in the
graph.
Suppose that the distribution for the traffic graph is not an equilibrium. There must be at least one driver who can
switch their route and improve total travel time. Suppose their original route is
while their new
route is
. Let
be total energy of the traffic graph, and consider what happens when the route
is removed. The energy of each edge
will be reduced by
and so the
will be reduced by
. Note that this is simply the total travel time needed to take the original route. If we then add the new
route,
will be increased by the total travel time needed to take the new route. Because the new
route is shorter than the original route,
must decrease. If we repeat this process,
will continue to decrease. As
must remain positive, eventually an equilibrium must occur.
Finding an equilibrium
The above proof outlines a procedure known as Best Response Dynamics, which finds an equilibrium for a linear
traffic graph and terminates in a finite number of steps. The algorithm is termed "best response" because at each step
of the algorithm, if the graph is not at equilibrium then some driver has a best response to the strategies of all other
drivers, and switches to that response.
Pseudocode for Best Response Dynamics:
Let P be some traffic pattern.
while P is not at equilibrium:
compute the potential energy e of P
for each driver d in P:
for each alternate path p available to d:
compute the potential energy n of the pattern when d takes path p
if n < e:
modify P so that d takes path p
continue the topmost while
At each step, if some particular driver could do better by taking an alternate path (a "best response"), doing so strictly
decreases the energy of the graph. If no driver has a best response, the graph is at equilibrium. Since the energy of
the graph strictly decreases with each step, the Best Response Dynamics algorithm must eventually halt.
Braess's paradox
344
How far from optimal is traffic at equilibrium

At worst, traffic in equilibrium is twice as bad as socially optimal
Proof
Strategies for car j are possible paths from
to
Each edge e has a travel function
for some
Energy on edge e with x drivers:
Total time spent by all drivers on that edge:

((where there are x terms))
E(e) is less than or equal to T(e) and
Resulting Inequality
If Z is a traffic pattern:
If we start from a socially optimal traffic pattern Z and end in an equilibrium pattern Z':
Thus we can see that worst is twice as bad as optimal.
How rare is Braess's paradox?

In 1983 Steinberg and Zangwill provided, under reasonable assumptions, necessary and sufficient conditions for
Braess's paradox to occur in a general transportation network when a new route is added. (Note that their result
applies to the addition of any new route not just to the case of adding a single link.) As a corollary, they obtain
that Braess's paradox is about as likely to occur as not occur; their result applies to random rather than planned
networks and additions.
In Seoul, South Korea, a speeding-up in traffic around the city was seen when a motorway was removed as part of
the Cheonggyecheon restoration project. In Stuttgart, Germany after investments into the road network in 1969, the
traffic situation did not improve until a section of newly built road was closed for traffic again. In 1990 the closing of
42nd street in New York City reduced the amount of congestion in the area. In 2008 Youn, Gastner and Jeong
demonstrated specific routes in Boston, New York City and London where this might actually occur and pointed out
roads that could be closed to reduce predicted travel times.
In 2012, scientists at the Max Planck Institute for Dynamics and Self-Organization demonstrated through
computational modeling the potential for this phenomenon to occur in power transmission networks where power
Braess's paradox
generation is decentralized.
In 2012, an international team of researchers from Institut Nel (CNRS, France), INP (France), IEMN (CNRS,
France) and UCL (Belgium) published in Physical Review Letters a paper showing that Braess paradox may occur in
mesoscopic electron systems. In particular, they showed that adding a path for electrons in a nanoscopic network
paradoxically reduced its conductance. This was shown both by theoretical simulations and experiments at low
temperature using as scanning gate microscopy.
Dynamics analysis of Braess's paradox

In 2013, Dal Forno and Merlone interpret Braess paradox as a dynamical ternary choice problem. The analysis
shows how the new path changes the problem. Before the new path is available the dynamics is the same as in binary
choices with externalities, but the new path transforms it into a ternary choice problem. The addition of an extra
resource enriches the complexity of the dynamics. In fact, in this case, there can even be coexistence of cycles. This
way, the implication of the paradox on the dynamics can be seen from both a geometrical and analytical perspective.
References
Further reading
D. Braess, ber ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschung 12, 258268 (1969) (http://
homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Dietrich.Braess/paradox.pdf) (http://homepage.rub.de/Dietrich.Braess/
Paradox-BNW.pdf)
Katharina Belaga-Werbitzky: Das Paradoxon von Braess in erweiterten Wheatstone-Netzen mit
M/M/1-Bedienern ISBN 3-89959-123-2
Translation of the Braess 1968 article from German to English appears as the article "On a paradox of traffic
planning," by D. Braess, A. Nagurney, and T. Wakolbinger in the journal Transportation Science, volume 39,
2005, pp.446450. More information (http://supernet.som.umass.edu/cfoto/braess-visit/braessvisit.html)
A. D. Irvine. How Braess's Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem. International Studies in Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 7 (1993), no. 2, 145164.
R. Steinberg and W.I. Zangwill. The Prevalence of Braess's Paradox. Transportation Science, Vol. 17 (1983), no.
3, 301318.
A. Rapoport, T. Kugler, S. Dugar, and E. J. Gisches, Choice of routes in congested trafc networks: Experimental
tests of the Braess Paradox. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (2009) (http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/
IMG/pdf/Choices_of_routes.pdf)
T. Roughgarden. "The Price of Anarchy." MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
External links
Software Testing Paradoxes (http://msdn.microsoft.com/msdnmag/issues/05/12/TestRun/default.aspx)

Braess's homepage (http://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Dietrich.Braess/#paradox)
Characterizing Braess's Paradox for Traffic Networks (http://tigger.uic.edu/~hagstrom/Research/Braess/)
The Road Network Paradox (http://www.davros.org/science/roadparadox.html)
345
346

The cool tropics paradox refers to an apparent
difference between modeled estimates of tropical
temperatures during warm, ice-free periods of the
Cretaceous and Eocene, and the colder temperatures
which proxies suggested were present. The
long-standing paradox was resolved when novel
proxy derived temperatures showed significantly
warmer tropics during past greenhouse climates. The
low-gradient problem, i.e. the very warm polar
regions with respect to present day, is still an issue
for state-of-the-art climate models.
Origin of the paradox
The cool tropics paradox. The geological evidence appeared to

constrain temperatures to the red/blue band, whereas models produced
the brown line taking just continental configuration into account, and
the blue line when they included increased atmospheric CO
2. Vertical axis: Temperature; horizontal:latitude.
Proxy-based reconstructions of paleotemperature

appeared to predict a low temperature gradient
between the tropics and poles. Data from surface-dwelling foramanifera suggested that during the late Cretaceous, an
unusually warm period, sea surface temperatures were cooler than today's. The term was later applied to similar
situations, for example during the Eocene.
Climate models which worked during the Tertiary failed to produce this low temperature gradient; in order to match
the observed data, they predicted that the tropics should be 40C or more - much hotter than the proxies said they
were, and much hotter than the tropical surface temperatures observed today, which average around 25C (77F).
To attempt to match the data, bizarre models involving unreasonable eddies were required.
Models
Models were developed to predict and explain the lack of ice during the warm periods of the Cretaceous and Eocene.
Models are developed according to the fundamental principle that they should be kept as simple as possible.
Consequently, the first models attempted to explain the lack of ice using solely the different continental
configuration. These could not produce an ice-free state without using an increased atmospheric concentration of CO
2; this assumption was checked against the evidence and found to be valid. This introduced a new difficulty: more
CO
2 would produce warmer tropical sea temperatures, and the evidence suggested they were the same or even colder
than today's.
Data supporting cool tropical oceans

Foraminiferal data, suggesting tropical temperatures cooler than today's, disagreed with terrestrial proxies, which
spoke of warmer temperatures - although most of the terrestrial figures are based on extrapolation of data from
outside the tropics.
Sources of error
Analytical error is around 23C for individual specimens, but this drops to 0.51.0C when a sample is analysed not enough to explain the discrepancy. Other factors mean that any pristine sample can be considered to have an
associated error of up to 3C. Changes in salinity, kinetic and diagenesis, can also confound analysis: the latter two
are each estimated to reduce estimated temperatures by 12C, and are difficult to quantify.
Reconciling the data with the model

Taking the data to be true, how could they be reconciled with the predictions of the model? The only way the model
could be "tweaked" was by fiddling with the parameterisation of clouds, one of the most unpredictable aspects of any
model. The model was adjusted to assume that the higher CO
2 levels produced more tropical cloud, shielding these regions from the sun's heat. However, there was no evidence
for this behaviour, and still left problems. The poles were still warmer than the models predicted. Further feedbacks,
including increased poleward heat transport by the oceans, and vegetational responses at high latitudes, were
proposed, but these didn't fully explain behaviour in the southern hemisphere, and winter, respectively.
Unravelling the paradox

Hints of warmth - terrestrial proxies
Data from terrestrial proxies suggested that the equator may have reached 30C - however, this figure is based upon
extrapolation of data found outside the tropics. This would imply that the foramaniferal proxies were wrong - the
tests may perhaps have been overprinted by diagenesis. Researchers turned to shallow marine molluscs as it is easy
to determine whether their shells had been altered by diagenesis.
Detecting diagenesis in molluscs

Many mollusc shells are constructed from aragonite, a mineral that is quickly replaced by calcite by diagenetic
alteration. Also, near-shore molluscs preserve seasonal variability in their shells, a feature that would be lost in the
presence of a diagenetic signal. This removes ambiguity about whether or not a shell has been affected by
post-deposition processes.
Data from molluscs

Evidence from the molluscs suggested a cooling between the Eocene and Oligocene. Taken from the Mississippi
embayment, they recorded temperatures of around 26C in the Eocene, and 22C in the Oligocene; this cooling was
markedly seasonal, with reconstructed water temperatures being 5 cooler in the summer, but just 3 cooler in
winter. This trend fits best if CO
2 was the dominant force for cooling.
The winter temperatures of molluscs match well with the foramaniferal temperatures, suggesting that foramanifera
predominantly grew during the winter months. The overall temperatures corresponded well with terrestrial and
modelled estimates of a sea surface temperature around 45 warmer than today's.
347
348
Reassessment of the foraminiferal record

The magnesium/calcium paleothermometer is a recently developed alternative to the 18O method, and avoids many
of the uncertainties inherent in the latter method. Use of this technique generates results more consistent with those
expected, in contrast to the original 18O records from the same sites. Further painstaking studies targeted solely
those foraminifera which could be demonstrated not to have undergone any diagenesis in fact give a 18O signature
similar to that expected, suggesting that poor preservation was responsible for the original confusion.
References
In fluid dynamics, d'Alembert's paradox (or the hydrodynamic
paradox) is a contradiction reached in 1752 by French mathematician
Jean le Rond d'Alembert.[1] D'Alembert proved that for
incompressible and inviscid potential flow the drag force is zero on a
body moving with constant velocity relative to the fluid.[2] Zero drag is
in direct contradiction to the observation of substantial drag on bodies
moving relative to fluids, such as air and water; especially at high
velocities corresponding with high Reynolds numbers. It is a particular
example of the reversibility paradox.
DAlembert, working on a 1749 Prize Problem of the Berlin Academy
on flow drag, concluded: "It seems to me that the theory (potential
flow), developed in all possible rigor, gives, at least in several cases, a
strictly vanishing resistance, a singular paradox which I leave to future
Geometers [i.e. mathematicians - the two terms were used
interchangeably at that time] to elucidate".[3] A physical paradox
indicates flaws in the theory.
Jean le Rond d'Alembert (17171783), who

formulated the paradox.
Fluid mechanics was thus discredited by engineers from the start, which resulted in an unfortunate split between
the field of hydraulics, observing phenomena which could not be explained, and theoretical fluid mechanics
explaining phenomena which could not be observed in the words of the Chemistry Nobel Laureate Sir Cyril
Hinshelwood.[4]
According to scientific consensus, the occurrence of the paradox is due to the neglected effects of viscosity. In
conjunction with scientific experiments, there were huge advances in the theory of viscous fluid friction during the
19th century. With respect to the paradox, this culminated in the discovery and description of thin boundary layers
by Ludwig Prandtl in 1904. Even at very high Reynolds numbers, the thin boundary layers remain as a result of
viscous forces. These viscous forces cause friction drag on streamlined objects, and for bluff bodies the additional
result is flow separation and a low-pressure wake behind the object, leading to form drag.[5][6][7]
349
The general view in the fluid mechanics community is that, from a

practical point of view, the paradox is solved along the lines suggested
by Prandtl.[8][9] A formal mathematical proof is lacking, and difficult
to provide, as in so many other fluid-flow problems involving the
NavierStokes equations (which are used to describe viscous flow).
Viscous friction: Saint-Venant, Navier and

Stokes
First steps towards solving the paradox were made by Saint-Venant,
who modelled viscous fluid friction. Saint-Venant states in 1847:
"But one finds another result if, instead of an ideal fluid object
of the calculations of the geometers of the last century one
uses a real fluid, composed of a finite number of molecules and
exerting in its state of motion unequal pressure forces or forces
having components tangential to the surface elements through
which they act; components to which we refer as the friction of
the fluid, a name which has been given to them since Descartes
and Newton until Venturi."
Soon after, in 1851, Stokes calculated the drag on a sphere in Stokes
flow, known as Stokes' law.[10] Stokes flow is the low
Reynolds-number limit of the NavierStokes equations describing the
motion of a viscous liquid.[11]
From experiments it is known that there is always

except in case of superfluidity a drag force
for a body placed in a steady fluid onflow. The
figure shows the drag coefficient Cd for a sphere
as a function of Reynolds number Re, as obtained
from laboratory experiments. The solid line is for
a sphere with a smooth surface, while the dashed
line is for the case of a rough surface. The
numbers along the line indicate several flow
regimes and associated changes in the drag
coefficient: 2: attached flow (Stokes flow) and
steady separated flow, 3: separated unsteady
flow, having a laminar flow boundary layer
upstream of the separation, and producing a
vortex street, 4: separated unsteady flow with a
laminar boundary layer at the upstream side,
before flow separation, with downstream of the
sphere a chaotic turbulent wake, 5: post-critical
separated flow, with a turbulent boundary layer.
However, when the flow problem is put into a non-dimensional form, the viscous NavierStokes equations converge
for increasing Reynolds numbers towards the inviscid Euler equations, suggesting that the flow should converge
towards the inviscid solutions of potential flow theory having the zero drag of the d'Alembert paradox. Of this,
there is no evidence found in experimental measurements of drag and flow visualisations.[12] This again raised
questions concerning the applicability of fluid mechanics in the second half of the 19th century.
Inviscid separated flow: Kirchhoff and Rayleigh

In the second half of the 19th century, focus
shifted again towards using inviscid flow
theory for the description of fluid
dragassuming that viscosity becomes less
important at high Reynolds numbers. The
model proposed by Kirchhoff and
Rayleigh[14]
was
based
on
the
[15]
free-streamline theory of Helmholtz
and
consists of a steady wake behind the body.
Assumptions applied to the wake region
include: flow velocities equal to the body
velocity, and a constant pressure. This wake
region is separated from the potential flow
outside the body and wake by vortex sheets
with discontinuous jumps in the tangential
Steady and separated incompressible potential flow around a plate in two
velocity across the interface.[16] In order to
[13]
dimensions,
with a constant pressure along the two free streamlines separating
have a non-zero drag on the body, the wake
from the plate edges.
region must extend to infinity. This
condition is indeed fulfilled for the Kirchhoff flow perpendicular to a plate. The theory correctly states the drag force
to be proportional to the square of the velocity. In first instance, the theory could only be applied to flows separating
at sharp edges. Later, in 1907, it was extended by Levi-Civita to flows separating from a smooth curved boundary.
It was readily known that such steady flows are not stable, since the vortex sheets develop so-called
KelvinHelmholtz instabilities. But this steady-flow model was studied further in the hope it still could give a
reasonable estimate of drag. Rayleigh asks "... whether the calculations of resistance are materially affected by this
circumstance as the pressures experienced must be nearly independent of what happens at some distance in the rear
of the obstacle, where the instability would first begin to manifest itself."
However, fundamental objections arose against this approach: Kelvin observed that if a plate is moving with
constant velocity through the fluid, the velocity in the wake is equal to that of the plate. The infinite extent of the
wakewidening with the distance from the plate, as obtained from the theoryresults in an infinite kinetic energy
in the wake, which must be rejected on physical grounds.[17] Moreover, the observed pressure differences between
front and back of the plate, and resulting drag forces, are much larger than predicted: for a flat plate perpendicular to
the flow the predicted drag coefficient is CD=0.88, while in experiments CD=2.0 is found. This is mainly due to
suction at the wake side of the plate, induced by the unsteady flow in the real wake (as opposed to the theory which
assumes a constant flow velocity equal to the plate's velocity).[18]
So, this theory is found to be unsatisfactory as an explanation of drag on a body moving through a fluid. Although it
can be applied to so-called cavity flows where, instead of a wake filled with fluid, a vacuum cavity is assumed to
exist behind the body.[19]
350
351
Thin boundary layers: Prandtl

The German physicist Ludwig Prandtl
suggested in 1904 that the effects of a thin
viscous boundary layer possibly could be
the source of substantial drag.[20] Prandtl put
forward the idea that, at high velocities and
high Reynolds numbers, a no-slip boundary
condition causes a strong variation of the
flow speeds over a thin layer near the wall
of the body. This leads to the generation of
vorticity and viscous dissipation of kinetic
energy in the boundary layer. The energy
dissipation, which is lacking in the inviscid
theories, results for bluff bodies in
separation of the flow. The low pressure in
the wake region causes form drag, and this
can be larger than the friction drag due to
the viscous shear stress at the wall.
Pressure distribution for the flow around a circular cylinder. The dashed blue line
is the pressure distribution according to potential flow theory, resulting in
d'Alembert's paradox. The solid blue line is the mean pressure distribution as found
in experiments at high Reynolds numbers. The pressure is the radial distance from
the cylinder surface; a positive pressure (overpressure) is inside the cylinder,
towards the centre, while a negative pressure (underpressure) is drawn outside the
cylinder.
Evidence that Prandtl's scenario occurs for

bluff bodies in flows of high Reynolds
numbers can be seen in impulsively started
flows around a cylinder. Initially the flow
resembles potential flow, after which the flow separates near the rear stagnation point. Thereafter, the separation
points move upstream, resulting in a low-pressure region of separated flow.
Prandtl made the hypothesis that the viscous effects are important in thin layers called boundary layers adjacent
to solid boundaries, and that viscosity has no role of importance outside. The boundary-layer thickness becomes
smaller when the viscosity reduces. The full problem of viscous flow, described by the non-linear NavierStokes
equations, is in general not mathematically solvable. However, using his hypothesis (and backed up by experiments)
Prandtl was able to derive an approximate model for the flow inside the boundary layer, called boundary-layer
theory; while the flow outside the boundary layer could be treated using inviscid flow theory. Boundary-layer theory
is amenable to the method of matched asymptotic expansions for deriving approximate solutions. In the simplest
case of a flat plate parallel to the incoming flow, boundary-layer theory results in (friction) drag, whereas all inviscid
flow theories will predict zero drag. Importantly for aeronautics, Prandtl's theory can be applied directly to
streamlined bodies like airfoils where, in addition to surface-friction drag, there is also form drag. Form drag is due
to the effect of the boundary layer and thin wake on the pressure distribution around the airfoil.[21]
Open questions
To verify, as Prandtl suggested, that a vanishingly small cause (vanishingly small viscosity for increasing Reynolds
number) has a large effect substantial drag may be very difficult.
The mathematician Garrett Birkhoff in the opening chapter of his book Hydrodynamics from 1950,[22] addresses a
number of paradoxes of fluid mechanics (including d'Alembert's paradox) and expresses a clear doubt in their
official resolutions:
"Moreover, I think that to attribute them all to the neglect of viscosity is an unwarranted oversimplification
The root lies deeper, in lack of precisely that deductive rigor whose importance is so commonly minimized by
physicists and engineers."[23]
In particular, on d'Alembert's paradox, he considers another possible route to the creation of drag: instability of the
potential flow solutions to the Euler equations. Birkhoff states:
"In any case, the preceding paragraphs make it clear that the theory of non-viscous flows is incomplete.
Indeed, the reasoning leading to the concept of a "steady flow" is inconclusive; there is no rigorous
justification for the elimination of time as an independent variable. Thus though Dirichlet flows (potential
solutions) and other steady flows are mathematically possible, there is no reason to suppose that any steady
flow is stable."[24]
In his 1951 review of Birkhoff's book, the mathematician James J. Stoker sharply criticizes the first chapter of the
book:
"The reviewer found it difficult to understand for what class of readers the first chapter was written. For
readers that are acquainted with hydrodynamics the majority of the cases cited as paradoxes belong either to
the category of mistakes long since rectified, or in the category of discrepancies between theory and
experiments the reasons for which are also well understood. On the other hand, the uninitiated would be very
likely to get the wrong ideas about some of the important and useful achievements in hydrodynamics from
reading this chapter."
In the second and revised edition of Birkhoff's Hydrodynamics in 1960, the above two statements no longer
appear.[25]
The importance and usefulness of the achievements, made on the subject of the d'Alembert paradox, are reviewed by
Stewartson thirty years later. His long 1981 survey article starts with:
"Since classical inviscid theory leads to the patently absurd conclusion that the resistance experienced by a
rigid body moving through a fluid with uniform velocity is zero, great efforts have been made during the last
hundred or so years to propose alternate theories and to explain how a vanishingly small frictional force in
the fluid can nevertheless have a significant effect on the flow properties. The methods used are a combination
of experimental observation, computation often on a very large scale, and analysis of the structure of the
asymptotic form of the solution as the friction tends to zero. This three-pronged attack has achieved
considerable success, especially during the last ten years, so that now the paradox may be regarded as largely
resolved."
For many paradoxes in physics, their resolution often lies in transcending the available theory.[26] In the case of
d'Alembert's paradox, the essential mechanism for its resolution was provided by Prandtl through the discovery and
modelling of thin viscous boundary layers which are non-vanishing at high Reynolds numbers.
352
353
Proof of zero drag in steady potential flow

Potential flow
The three main assumptions in the
derivation of d'Alembert's paradox is that
the steady flow is incompressible, inviscid
and irrotational.[27] An inviscid fluid is
described by the Euler equations, which for
an incompressible flow read
Streamlines for the potential flow around a circular cylinder in a uniform onflow.
where u denotes the flow velocity of the fluid, p the pressure, the density, and is the gradient operator. The
assumption that the flow is irrotational means that the velocity satisfies u = 0.
Hence, we have
where the first equality is a vector calculus identity and the second equality uses that the flow is irrotational.
Furthermore, for every irrotational flow, there exists a velocity potential such that u = . Substituting this all in
the equation for momentum conservation yields
Thus, the quantity between brackets must be constant (any t-dependence can be eliminated by redefining ).
Assuming that the fluid is at rest at infinity and that the pressure is defined to be zero there, this constant is zero, and
thus
which is the Bernoulli equation for unsteady potential flow.
Zero drag
Now, suppose that a body moves with constant velocity v through the fluid, which is at rest infinitely far away. Then
the velocity field of the fluid has to follow the body, so it is of the form u(x, t) = u(x vt, 0), where x is the spatial
coordinate vector, and thus:
Since u = , this can be integrated with respect to x:
The force F that the fluid exerts on the body is given by the surface integral
where A denotes the body surface and n the normal vector on the body surface. But it follows from (2) that
thus
with the contribution of R(t) to the integral being equal to zero.

At this point, it becomes more convenient to work in the vector components. The kth component of this equation
reads
Let V be the volume occupied by the fluid. The divergence theorem says that
The right-hand side is an integral over an infinite volume, so this needs some justification, which can be provided by
appealing to potential theory to show that the velocity u must fall off as r3 corresponding to a dipole potential
field in case of a three-dimensional body of finite extent where r is the distance to the centre of the body. The
integrand in the volume integral can be rewritten as follows:
where first equality (1) and then the incompressibility of the flow are used. Substituting this back into the volume
integral and another application of the divergence theorem again. This yields
Substituting this in (3), we find that
The fluid cannot penetrate the body and thus n u = n v on the body surface. Thus,
354
Finally, the drag is the force in the direction in which the body moves, so
Hence the drag vanishes. This is d'Alembert's paradox.
Notes
[1] Jean Le Rond d'Alembert (1752).
[2] Grimberg, Pauls & Frisch (2008).
[3] Reprinted in: Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1768).
[4] Report on a conference.
[5] Landau & Lifshitz (1987), p. 15.
[6] Batchelor (2000), pp. 264265, 303, 337.
[7] , pp. XIXXXIII.
[8] Stewartson (1981).
[9] , Vol. 2, 415: The limit of zero viscosity, pp. 419 4110.
[10] . Reprinted in
[11] The Stokes flow equations have a solution for the flow around a sphere, but not for the flow around a circular cylinder. This is due to the
neglect of the convective acceleration in Stokes flow. Convective acceleration is dominating over viscous effects far from the cylinder
(Batchelor, 2000, p. 245). A solution can be found when convective acceleration is taken into account, for instance using the Oseen equations
(Batchelor, 2000, pp. 245246).
[12] Batchelor (2000), pp. 337343 & plates.
[13] Batchelor (2000), p. 499, eq. (6.13.12).
[14] . Reprinted in: Scientific Papers 1:287296.
[15] . Reprinted in: Philosophical Magazine (1868) 36:337346.
[16] Batchelor (2000), pp. 338339
[17] Reprinted in: Mathematical and Physical Papers 4: 215230.
[18] Batchelor (2000), p. 500.
[19] Batchelor (2000), pp. 493494.
[20] Prandtl (1904).
[21] Batchelor (2000) pp. 302314 & 331337.
[22] Garrett Birkhoff, Hydrodynamics: a study in logic, fact, and similitude, Princeton University Press, 1950
[23] Birkhoff (1950) p. 4.
[24] Birkhoff (1950) p. 21.
[25] Closest to the first quote comes, on page 5:
"...It is now usually claimed that such paradoxes are due to the differences between real fluids having small
but finite viscosity, and ideal fluids having zero viscosity. Thus it is essentially implied that one can rectify
Lagrange's claim, by substituting Navier-Stokes for Euler. This claim will be discussed critically in Ch. II;
it may well be correct in principle for incompressible viscous flow. However, taken literally, I think it is still
very misleading, unless explicit attention is paid to the plausible hypotheses listed above, and to the lack of
rigor implied by their use. Though I do not know of any case when a deduction, both physically and
mathematically rigorous, has led to a wrong conclusion, very few of the deductions of rational hydrodynamics
can be established rigorously. The most interesting ones involve free use of Hypotheses (A)-(F)..."
The Lagrange claim is given by Birkhoff on page 3:
"...One owes to Euler the first general formulas for fluid motion ... presented in the simple and luminous
notation of partial differences ... By this discovery, all fluid mechanics was reduced to a single point of
analysis, and if the equations involved were integrable, one could determine completely, in all cases, the
motion of a fluid moved by any forces..."
(Birkhoff, 1960, 2nd ed.)
[26] For instance, the paradox of the constancy of the speed of light in all directions, was solved by the special theory of relativity.
[27] This article follows the derivation in Section 6.4 of Batchelor (2000).
355
References
Historical
d'Alembert, Jean Le Rond (1752), Essai d'une nouvelle thorie de la rsistance des fluides (http://gallica.bnf.fr/
ark:/12148/bpt6k206036b)
d'Alembert, Jean le Rond (1768), "Memoir XXXIV", Opuscules Mathmatiques 5 (I ed.), pp.132138.
Prandtl, Ludwig (1904), Motion of fluids with very little viscosity (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=712863&
id=1&qs=Ntt=prandtl%2B452&Ntk=all&Ntx=mode%20matchall&N=0&Ns=HarvestDate%7c1) 452, NACA
Technical Memorandum
Further reading
Batchelor, G. (2000), An introduction to fluid dynamics, Cambridge Mathematical Library (2nd ed.), Cambridge
University Press, ISBN978-0-521-66396-0, MR 1744638 (http://www.ams.org/
mathscinet-getitem?mr=1744638)
Grimberg, G.; Pauls, W.; Frisch, U. (2008), "Genesis of dAlemberts paradox and analytical elaboration of the
drag problem", Physica D 237 (1417): 18781886, arXiv: 0801.3014 (http://arxiv.org/abs/0801.3014),
Bibcode: 2008PhyD..237.1878G (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2008PhyD..237.1878G), doi:
10.1016/j.physd.2008.01.015 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physd.2008.01.015)
Landau, L. D.; Lifshitz, E. M. (1987), Fluid Mechanics, Course of Theoretical Physics 6 (2nd ed.), Pergamon
Press, ISBN978-0-08-009104-4
Falkovich, G. (2011), Fluid Mechanics, a short course for physicists, Cambridge University Press,
ISBN978-1-107-00575-4
Stewartson, K. (1981), "D'Alembert's Paradox", SIAM Review 23 (3): 308343, doi: 10.1137/1023063 (http://dx.
doi.org/10.1137/1023063)
External links
Potential Flow and d'Alembert's Paradox (http://www.mathpages.com/home/kmath211/kmath211.htm) at
MathPages
356
Denny's paradox
357
Denny's paradox
In the study of animal locomotion on the surface layer of water, Denny's paradox refers to the apparent
impossibility of surface-dwelling animals such as the water strider generating enough propulsive force to move. It is
named after Mark Denny. If capillary waves are assumed to generate the momentum transfer to the water, the
animal's legs must move faster than the phase speed
of the waves, given by
where
is the acceleration due to gravity,
is the strength of surface tension, and
the density of water. For
standard conditions, this works out to be about 0.23m/s.

Infant water striders' legs move at speeds much less than this and, according to this physical picture, cannot move.
Writing in the Journal of Fluid Mechanics, David Hu and John Bush state that Denny's paradox "rested on two
flawed assumptions. First, water striders' motion was assumed to rely on the generation of capillary waves, since the
propulsive force was thought to be that associated with wave drag on the driving leg. Second, in order to generate
capillary waves, it was assumed that the strider leg speed must exceed the minimum wave speed,
. We note that this second assumption is strictly true only for steady motions".
References
Ehrenfest paradox
The Ehrenfest paradox concerns the rotation of a "rigid" disc in the theory of relativity.
In its original formulation as presented by Paul Ehrenfest 1909 in relation to the concept of Born rigidity within
special relativity, it discusses an ideally rigid cylinder that is made to rotate about its axis of symmetry. The radius R
as seen in the laboratory frame is always perpendicular to its motion and should therefore be equal to its value R0
when stationary. However, the circumference (2R) should appear Lorentz-contracted to a smaller value than at rest,
by the usual factor . This leads to the contradiction that R=R0 and R<R0.
The paradox has been deepened further by Albert Einstein, who showed that since measuring rods aligned along the
periphery and moving with it should appear contracted, more would fit around the circumference, which would thus
measure greater than 2R. This indicates that geometry is non-Euclidean for rotating observers, and was important
for Einstein's development of general relativity.
Any rigid object made from real materials, which is rotating with the transverse velocity close to the speed of sound
in this material, must exceed the point of rupture due to centrifugal force because centrifugal pressure can not exceed
shear modulus of material
where
is speed of sound,
is density and
is shear modulus. Therefore, when considering velocities close to
the speed of light, it is only a thought experiment. Neutron-degenerate matter allows velocities close to speed of
light, because e.g. the speed of neutron-star oscillations is relativistic; however; these bodies cannot strictly be said
to be "rigid".
Ehrenfest paradox
358
Essence of the paradox

Imagine a disk of radius R rotating with constant angular velocity
The reference frame is fixed to the stationary center of the disk. Then
the magnitude of the relative velocity of any point in the circumference
of the disk is
. So the circumference will undergo Lorentz
contraction by a factor of
However, since the radius is perpendicular to the direction of motion, it

will
not
undergo
any
contraction.
So
. This is paradoxical, since in accordance with Euclidean geometry, it

should be exactly equal to .
Ehrenfest paradox - Circumference of a rotating

disk should contract but not the radius, as radius
is in perpendicular to the direction of motion.
Ehrenfest's argument
Ehrenfest considered an ideal Born-rigid cylinder that is made to rotate. Assuming that the cylinder does not expand
or contract, its radius stays the same. But measuring rods laid out along the circumference
should be
Lorentz-contracted to a smaller value than at rest, by the usual factor . This leads to the paradox that the rigid
measuring rods would have to separate from one another due to Lorentz contraction; the discrepancy noted by
Ehrenfest seems to suggest that a rotated Born rigid disk should shatter.
Thus Ehrenfest argued by reductio ad absurdum that Born rigidity is not generally compatible with special relativity.
According to special relativity an object cannot be spun up from a non-rotating state while maintaining Born rigidity,
but once it has achieved a constant nonzero angular velocity it does maintain Born rigidity without violating special
relativity, and then (as Einstein later showed) a disk riding observer will measure a circumference:
.
Einstein and general relativity

The rotating disc and its connection with rigidity was also an important thought experiment for Albert Einstein in
developing general relativity. He referred to it in several publications in 1912, 1916, 1917, 1922 and drew the insight
from it, that the geometry of the disc becomes non-Euclidean for a co-rotating observer. Einstein wrote (1922):
p. 66ff: "Imagine a circle drawn about the origin in the x'y' plane of K' and a diameter of this circle. Imagine,
further, that we have given a large number of rigid rods, all equal to each other. We suppose these laid in
series along the periphery and the diameter of the circle, at rest relatively to K'. If U is the number of these
rods along the periphery, D the number along the diameter, then, if K' does not rotate relatively to K, we shall
have
. But if K' rotates we get a different result. Suppose that at a definite time t, of K we
determine the ends of all the rods. With respect to K all the rods upon the periphery experience the Lorentz
contraction, but the rods upon the diameter do not experience this contraction (along their lengths!). It
therefore follows that
It therefore follows that the laws of configuration of rigid bodies with respect to K' do not agree with the laws
of configuration of rigid bodies that are in accordance with Euclidean geometry. If, further, we place two
similar clocks (rotating with K'), one upon the periphery, and the other at the centre of the circle, then, judged
Ehrenfest paradox
359
from K, the clock on the periphery will go slower than the clock at the centre. The same thing must take place,
judged from K' if we define time with respect to K' in a not wholly unnatural way, that is, in such a way that
the laws with respect to K' depend explicitly upon the time. Space and time, therefore, cannot be defined with
respect to K' as they were in the special theory of relativity with respect to inertial systems. But, according to
the principle of equivalence, K' is also to be considered as a system at rest, with respect to which there is a
gravitational field (field of centrifugal force, and force of Coriolis). We therefore arrive at the result: the
gravitational field influences and even determines the metrical laws of the space-time continuum. If the laws
of configuration of ideal rigid bodies are to be expressed geometrically, then in the presence of a gravitational
field the geometry is not Euclidean."
Brief history
Citations to the papers mentioned below (and many which are not) can be found in a paper by yvind Grn which is
available on-line.
1909: Max Born introduces a notion of rigid motion in special
relativity.
1909: After studying Born's notion of rigidity, Paul Ehrenfest
demonstrated by means of a paradox about a cylinder that goes from
rest to rotation, that most motions of extended bodies cannot be
Born rigid.
1910: Gustav Herglotz and Fritz Noether independently elaborated
on Born's model and showed (Herglotz-Noether theorem) that Born
rigidity only allows of three degrees of freedom for bodies in
motion. For instance, it's possible that a rigid body is executing
uniform rotation, yet accelerated rotation is impossible. So a Born
rigid body cannot be brought from a state of rest into rotation,
confirming Ehrenfest's result.
This figure shows the world line of a Langevin

observer (red helical curve). The figure also
depicts the light cones at several events with the
frame field of the Langevin observer passing
through that event.
1910: Max Planck calls attention to the fact that one should not
confuse the problem of the contraction of a disc due to spinning it
up, with that of what disk-riding observers will measure as
compared to stationary observers. He suggests that resolving the first problem will require introducing some
material model and employing the theory of elasticity.
1910: Theodor Kaluza points out that there is nothing inherently paradoxical about the static and disk-riding
observers obtaining different results for the circumference. This does however imply, Kaluza argues, that "the
geometry of the rotating disk" is non-euclidean. He asserts without proof that this geometry is in fact essentially
just the geometry of the hyperbolic plane.
1911: Max von Laue shows, that an accelerated body has an infinite amount of degrees of freedom, thus no rigid
bodies can exist in special relativity.
1916: While writing up his new general theory of relativity, Albert Einstein notices that disk-riding observers
measure a longer circumference, C= 2 r (1v2)1. That is, because rulers moving parallel to their length axis
appear shorter as measured by static observers, the disk-riding observers can fit smaller rulers of a given length
around the circumference than stationary observers could.
1922: In his seminal book "The Mathematical Theory of Relativity" (p.113), A.S.Eddington calculates a
contraction of the radius of the rotating disc (compared to stationary scales) of one quarter of the 'Lorentz
contraction' factor applied to the circumference.
1935: Paul Langevin essentially introduces a moving frame (or frame field in modern language) corresponding to
the family of disk-riding observers, now called Langevin observers. (See the figure.) He also shows that distances
Ehrenfest paradox
measured by nearby Langevin observers correspond to a certain Riemannian metric, now called the
Langevin-Landau-Lifschitz metric. (See Born coordinates for details.)
1937: Jan Weyssenhoff (now perhaps best known for his work on Cartan connections with zero curvature and
nonzero torsion) notices that the Langevin observers are not hypersurface orthogonal. Therefore, the
Langevin-Landau-Lifschitz metric is defined, not on some hyperslice of Minkowski spacetime, but on the
quotient space obtained by replacing each world line with a point. This gives a three-dimensional smooth
manifold which becomes a Riemannian manifold when we add the metric structure.
1946: Nathan Rosen shows that inertial observers instantaneously comoving with Langevin observers also
measure small distances given by Langevin-Landau-Lifschitz metric.
1946: E. L. Hill analyzes relativistic stresses in a material in which (roughly speaking) the speed of sound equals
the speed of light and shows these just cancel the radial expansion due to centrifugal force (in any physically
realistic material, the relativistic effects lessen but do not cancel the radial expansion). Hill explains errors in
earlier analyses by Arthur Eddington and others.
1952: C. Mller attempts to study null geodesics from the point of view of rotating observers (but incorrectly tries
to use slices rather than the appropriate quotient space)
1968: V. Cantoni provides a straightforward, purely kinematical explanation of the paradox.
1975: yvind Grn writes a classic review paper about solutions of the "paradox"
1977: Grnbaum and Janis introduce a notion of physically realizable "non-rigidity" which can be applied to the
spin-up of an initially non-rotating disk (this notion is not physically realistic for real materials from which one
might make a disk, but it is useful for thought experiments).
1981: Grn notices that Hooke's law is not consistent with Lorentz transformations and introduces a relativistic
generalization.
1997: T. A. Weber explicitly introduces the frame field associated with Langevin observers.
2000: Hrvoje Nikoli points out that the paradox disappears when (in accordance with general theory of relativity)
each piece of the rotating disk is treated separately, as living in its own local non-inertial frame.
2002: Rizzi and Ruggiero (and Bel) explicitly introduce the quotient manifold mentioned above.

Grn states that the resolution of the paradox stems from the impossibility of synchronizing clocks in a rotating
reference frame.
The modern resolution can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Small distances measured by disk-riding observers are described by the Langevin-Landau-Lifschitz metric, which
is indeed well approximated (for small angular velocity) by the geometry of the hyperbolic plane, just as Kaluza
had claimed.
2. For physically reasonable materials, during the spin-up phase a real disk expands radially due to centrifugal
forces; relativistic corrections partially counteract (but do not cancel) this Newtonian effect. After a steady-state
rotation is achieved and the disk has been allowed to relax, the geometry "in the small" is approximately given by
the Langevin-Landau-Lifschitz metric.
360
Ehrenfest paradox
References
A few papers of historical interest:
A few classic "modern" references:
Reichenbach, Hans (1969). Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
LCCN 68021540 (http://lccn.loc.gov/68021540).
Cantoni, V. (1968). "What is wrong with Relativistic Kinematics?". Il Nuovo Cimento 57 B: 220223.
Grn, . (1975). "Relativistic description of a rotating disk". Amer. J. Phys. 43 (10): 869876. Bibcode:
1975AmJPh..43..869G (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1975AmJPh..43..869G). doi: 10.1119/1.9969 (http://
dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.9969).
Landau, L. D. & Lifschitz, E. F. (1980). The Classical Theory of Fields (4th ed.). London:
Butterworth-Heinemann. ISBN0-7506-2768-9. See Section 84 and the problem at the end of Section 89.
Some experimental work and subsequent discussion:
Davies, P. A. & Jennison, R. C. (1975). "Experiments involving mirror transponders in rotating frames". J. Phys.
A: Math. Gen. 8, No.9 (9): 13907. Bibcode: 1975JPhA....8.1390D (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1975JPhA.
...8.1390D). doi: 10.1088/0305-4470/8/9/007 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/8/9/007).
Ashworth, D. G. & Jennison, R. C. (1976). "Surveying in rotating systems". J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 9 (1): 3543.
Bibcode: 1976JPhA....9...35A (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1976JPhA....9...35A). doi:
10.1088/0305-4470/9/1/008 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/9/1/008).
Davies, P. A. (1976). "Measurements in rotating systems". J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 9, No.6 (6): 9519. Bibcode:
1976JPhA....9..951D (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1976JPhA....9..951D). doi:
10.1088/0305-4470/9/6/014 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/9/6/014).
Boone, P. F. (1977). "Relativity of rotation". J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 10 (5): 72744.
Ashworth, D. G. & Davies, P. A. (1979). "Transformations between inertial and rotating frames of reference". J.
Phys. A: Math. Gen. 12, No.9 (9): 142540. Bibcode: 1979JPhA...12.1425A (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/
1979JPhA...12.1425A). doi: 10.1088/0305-4470/12/9/011 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/12/9/
011).
Selected recent sources:
Rizzi, G.; & Ruggiero, M.L. (2002). "Space geometry of rotating platforms: an operational approach". Found.
Phys. 32 (10): 15251556. doi: 10.1023/A:1020427318877 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1020427318877).
They give a precise definition of the "space of the disk" (non-Euclidean), and solve the paradox without
extraneous dynamic considerations. See also the eprint version (http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0207104).
Rizzi, G. ; & Ruggiero, M. L. (2004). Relativity in Rotating Frames. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ISBN1-4020-1805-3.
This book contains a comprehensive historical survey by yvind Grn, on which the "brief history" in this article
is based, and some other papers on the Ehrenfest paradox and related controversies. Hundreds of additional
references may be found in this book, particularly the paper by Grn.
Pauri, Massimo; & Vallisneri, Michele (2000). "Mrzke-Wheeler coordinates for accelerated observers in special
relativity". Found. Phys. Lett. 13 (5): 401425. doi: 10.1023/A:1007861914639 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/
A:1007861914639). Studies a coordinate chart constructed using radar distance "in the large" from a single
Langevin observer. See also the eprint version (http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0006095).
Nikolic, Hrvoje (2000). "Relativistic contraction and related effects in noninertial frames". Phys. Rev. A 61 (3):
032109. arXiv: gr-qc/9904078 (http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9904078). Bibcode: 2000PhRvA..61c2109N (http://
adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2000PhRvA..61c2109N). doi: 10.1103/PhysRevA.61.032109 (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1103/PhysRevA.61.032109). Studies general non-inertial motion of a point particle and treats rotating disk as a
collection of such non-inertial particles. See also the eprint version (http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/
9904078).
361
Ehrenfest paradox
External links
The Rigid Rotating Disk in Relativity (http://www2.corepower.com:8080/~relfaq/rigid_disk.html), by
Michael Weiss (1995), from the sci.physics FAQ.
Einstein's Carousel (section 3.4.4) (http://www.lightandmatter.com/html_books/genrel/ch03/ch03.
html#Section3.4), by B. Crowell
Elevator paradox
This article refers to the elevator paradox as it relates to the physics of a hydrometer. For the elevator
paradox as it relates to the elevator as a transportation device, see elevator paradox.
The elevator paradox relates to a hydrometer placed on an "elevator" or vertical conveyor that, by moving to
different elevations, changes the atmospheric pressure. In this classic demonstration, the floating hydrometer remains
at an equilibrium position. Essentially, a hydrometer measures specific gravity of liquids independent of barometric
pressure. This is because the change in air pressure is applied to the entire hydrometer flask. The submerged portion
of the flask receives a transmitted force through the liquid, thus no portion of the apparatus receives a net force
resulting from a change in air pressure.
This is a paradox if the buoyancy of the hydrometer is said to depend on the weight of the liquid that it displaces. At
a higher barometric pressure, the liquid occupies a slightly smaller volume, and thus more dense might be considered
to have a higher specific gravity. However, the hydrometer also displaces air, and the weight of the liquid and the air
are affected equally by elevation.
Cartesian divers
A Cartesian diver, on the other hand, has an internal space that, unlike a hydrometer, is not rigid, and thus can
change its displacement as increasing external air pressure compresses the air in the diver. If the diver, instead of
being placed in the classic plastic bottle, were floated in a flask on an elevator, the diver would respond to a change
in air pressure. Similarly, a non-rigid container like a toy balloon will be affected, as will the rib cage of a human
SCUBA diver, and such systems will vary in buoyancy. A glass hydrometer is rigid under normal pressure, for all
practical purposes.
The hydrometer in an accelerating frame of reference

The upward or downward acceleration of the elevator, as long as the net force is directed downward, will not change
the equilibrium point of the hydrometer either. The force due to acceleration acts on the hydrometer exactly as it
would on an equal mass of water or other liquid.
362
EPR paradox
363
EPR paradox
Albert Einstein
Quantum
mechanics
Uncertainty principle
Introduction
Glossary
History
v
t
e [1]
The EPR paradox is an early and influential critique leveled against the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Albert Einstein and his colleagues Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen (known collectively as EPR)
designed a thought experiment which revealed that the accepted formulation of quantum mechanics had a
consequence which had not previously been noticed, but which looked unreasonable at the time. The scenario
described involved the phenomenon that is now known as quantum entanglement.
According to quantum mechanics, under some conditions, a pair of quantum systems may be described by a single
wave function, which encodes the probabilities of the outcomes of experiments that may be performed on the two
systems, whether jointly or individually. At the time the EPR article discussed below was written, it was known from
experiments that the outcome of an experiment sometimes cannot be uniquely predicted. An example of such
indeterminacy can be seen when a beam of light is incident on a half-silvered mirror. One half of the beam will
reflect, the other will pass. If the intensity of the beam is reduced until only one photon is in transit at any time,
EPR paradox
whether that photon will reflect or transmit cannot be predicted quantum mechanically.
The routine explanation of this effect was, at that time, provided by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Physical
quantities come in pairs which are called conjugate quantities. Examples of such conjugate pairs are position and
momentum of a particle and components of spin measured around different axes. When one quantity was measured,
and became determined, the conjugated quantity became indeterminate. Heisenberg explained this as a disturbance
caused by measurement.
The EPR paper, written in 1935, was intended to illustrate that this explanation is inadequate. It considered two
entangled particles, referred to as A and B, and pointed out that measuring a quantity of a particle A will cause the
conjugated quantity of particle B to become undetermined, even if there was no contact, no classical disturbance.
The basic idea was that the quantum states of two particles in a system cannot always be decomposed from the joint
state of the two. An example (in braket notation) is:
Heisenberg's principle was an attempt to provide a classical explanation of a quantum effect sometimes called
non-locality. According to EPR there were two possible explanations. Either there was some interaction between the
particles, even though they were separated, or the information about the outcome of all possible measurements was
already present in both particles.
The EPR authors preferred the second explanation according to which that information was encoded in some 'hidden
parameters'. The first explanation, that an effect propagated instantly, across a distance, is in conflict with the theory
of relativity. They then concluded that quantum mechanics was incomplete since, in its formalism, there was no
room for such hidden parameters.
Violations of the conclusions of Bell's theorem are generally understood to have demonstrated that the hypotheses of
Bell's theorem, also assumed by Einstein, Poldolsky and Rosen, do not apply in our world.[2] Most physicists who
have examined the issue concur that experiments, such as those of Alain Aspect and his group, have confirmed that
physical probabilities, as predicted by quantum theory, do exhibit the phenomena of Bell-inequality violations that
are considered to invalidate EPR's preferred "local hidden-variables" type of explanation for the correlations to
which EPR first drew attention.[3]
History of EPR developments

The article that first brought forth these matters, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete?" was published in 1935. Einstein struggled to the end of his life for a theory that could better
comply with his idea of causality, protesting against the view that there exists no objective physical reality other than
that which is revealed through measurement interpreted in terms of quantum mechanical formalism. However, since
Einstein's death, experiments analogous to the one described in the EPR paper have been carried out, starting in 1976
by French scientists Lamehi-Rachti and Mittig[4] at the Saclay Nuclear Research Centre. These experiments appear
to show that the local realism idea is false.
Quantum mechanics and its interpretation

Main article: Interpretations of quantum mechanics
Since the early twentieth century, quantum theory has proved to be successful in describing accurately the physical
reality of the mesoscopic and microscopic world, in multiple reproducible physics experiments.
Quantum mechanics was developed with the aim of describing atoms and explaining the observed spectral lines in a
measurement apparatus. Although disputed especially in the early twentieth century, it has yet to be seriously
challenged. Philosophical interpretations of quantum phenomena, however, are another matter: the question of how
to interpret the mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics has given rise to a variety of different answers from
people of different philosophical persuasions (see Interpretations of quantum mechanics).
364
EPR paradox
Quantum theory and quantum mechanics do not provide single measurement outcomes in a deterministic way.
According to the understanding of quantum mechanics known as the Copenhagen interpretation, measurement
causes an instantaneous collapse of the wave function describing the quantum system into an eigenstate of the
observable that was measured. Einstein characterized this imagined collapse in the 1927 Solvay Conference. He
presented a thought experiment in which electrons are introduced through a small hole in a sphere whose inner
surface serves as a detection screen. The electrons will contact the spherical detection screen in a widely dispersed
manner. Those electrons, however, are all individually described by wave fronts that expand in all directions from
the point of entry. A wave as it is understood in everyday life would paint a large area of the detection screen, but the
electrons would be found to impact the screen at single points and would eventually form a pattern in keeping with
the probabilities described by their identical wave functions. Einstein asks what makes each electron's wave front
"collapse" at its respective location. Why do the electrons appear as single bright scintillations rather than as dim
washes of energy across the surface? Why does any single electron appear at one point rather than some alternative
point? The behavior of the electrons gives the impression of some signal having been sent to all possible points of
contact that would have nullified all but one of them, or, in other words, would have preferentially selected a single
point to the exclusion of all others.[5]
Einstein's opposition
Einstein was the most prominent opponent of the Copenhagen interpretation. In his view, quantum mechanics is
incomplete. Commenting on this, other writers (such as John von Neumann[6] and David Bohm[7]) hypothesized that
consequently there would have to be 'hidden' variables responsible for random measurement results, something
which was not expressly claimed in the original paper.
The 1935 EPR paper [8] condensed the philosophical discussion into a physical argument. The authors claim that
given a specific experiment, in which the outcome of a measurement is known before the measurement takes place,
there must exist something in the real world, an "element of reality", that determines the measurement outcome.
They postulate that these elements of reality are local, in the sense that each belongs to a certain point in spacetime.
Each element may only be influenced by events which are located in the backward light cone of its point in
spacetime (i.e., the past). These claims are founded on assumptions about nature that constitute what is now known
as local realism.
Though the EPR paper has often been taken as an exact expression of Einstein's views, it was primarily authored by
Podolsky, based on discussions at the Institute for Advanced Study with Einstein and Rosen. Einstein later expressed
to Erwin Schrdinger that, "it did not come out as well as I had originally wanted; rather, the essential thing was, so
to speak, smothered by the formalism."[9] In 1936, Einstein presented an individual account of his local realist
ideas.[10]

The original EPR paradox challenges the prediction of quantum mechanics that it is impossible to know both the
position and the momentum of a quantum particle. This challenge can be extended to other pairs of physical
properties.
EPR paper
The original paper purports to describe what must happen to "two systems I and II, which we permit to interact ...",
and, after some time, "we suppose that there is no longer any interaction between the two parts." In the words of
Kumar (2009), the EPR description involves "two particles, A and B, [which] interact briefly and then move off in
opposite directions." According to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, it is impossible to measure both the
momentum and the position of particle B exactly. However, according to Kumar, it is possible to measure the exact
position of particle A. By calculation, therefore, with the exact position of particle A known, the exact position of
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EPR paradox
particle B can be known. Also, the exact momentum of particle A can be measured, so the exact momentum of
particle B can be worked out. Kumar writes: "EPR argued that they had proved that ... [particle] B can have
simultaneously exact values of position and momentum. ... Particle B has a position that is real and a momentum that
is real."
EPR appeared to have contrived a means to establish the exact values of either the momentum or the
position of B due to measurements made on particle A, without the slightest possibility of particle B
being physically disturbed.
EPR tried to set up a paradox to question the range of true application of Quantum Mechanics: Quantum theory
predicts that both values cannot be known for a particle, and yet the EPR thought experiment purports to show that
they must all have determinate values. The EPR paper says: "We are thus forced to conclude that the
quantum-mechanical description of physical reality given by wave functions is not complete."
The EPR paper ends by saying:
While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the
physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe,
however, that such a theory is possible.
Measurements on an entangled state

We have a source that emits electronpositron pairs, with the electron sent to destination A, where there is an
observer named Alice, and the positron sent to destination B, where there is an observer named Bob. According to
quantum mechanics, we can arrange our source so that each emitted pair occupies a quantum state called a spin
singlet. The particles are thus said to be entangled. This can be viewed as a quantum superposition of two states,
which we call state I and state II. In state I, the electron has spin pointing upward along the z-axis (+z) and the
positron has spin pointing downward along the z-axis (z). In state II, the electron has spin z and the positron has
spin +z. Therefore, it is impossible (without measuring) to know the definite state of spin of either particle in the spin
singlet.:421422
The EPR thought experiment, performed with electronpositron pairs. A source (center) sends particles toward two observers, electrons to
Alice (left) and positrons to Bob (right), who can perform spin measurements.
Alice now measures the spin along the z-axis. She can obtain one of two possible outcomes: +z or z. Suppose she
gets +z. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the quantum state of the system
collapses into state I. The quantum state determines the probable outcomes of any measurement performed on the
system. In this case, if Bob subsequently measures spin along the z-axis, there is 100% probability that he will obtain
z. Similarly, if Alice gets z, Bob will get +z.
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EPR paradox
There is, of course, nothing special about choosing the z-axis: according to quantum mechanics the spin singlet state
may equally well be expressed as a superposition of spin states pointing in the x direction.:318 Suppose that Alice and
Bob had decided to measure spin along the x-axis. We'll call these states Ia and IIa. In state Ia, Alice's electron has
spin +x and Bob's positron has spin x. In state IIa, Alice's electron has spin x and Bob's positron has spin +x.
Therefore, if Alice measures +x, the system 'collapses' into state Ia, and Bob will get x. If Alice measures x, the
system collapses into state IIa, and Bob will get +x.
Whatever axis their spins are measured along, they are always found to be opposite. This can only be explained if the
particles are linked in some way. Either they were created with a definite (opposite) spin about every axisa
"hidden variable" argumentor they are linked so that one electron "feels" which axis the other is having its spin
measured along, and becomes its opposite about that one axisan "entanglement" argument. Moreover, if the two
particles have their spins measured about different axes, once the electron's spin has been measured about the x-axis
(and the positron's spin about the x-axis deduced), the positron's spin about the z-axis will no longer be certain, as if
(a) it knows that the measurement has taken place, or (b) it has a definite spin already, about a second axisa hidden
variable. However, it turns out that the predictions of Quantum Mechanics, which have been confirmed by
experiment, cannot be explained by any hidden variable theory. This is demonstrated in Bell's theorem.[11]
In quantum mechanics, the x-spin and z-spin are "incompatible observables", meaning the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle applies to alternating measurements of them: a quantum state cannot possess a definite value for both of
these variables. Suppose Alice measures the z-spin and obtains +z, so that the quantum state collapses into state I.
Now, instead of measuring the z-spin as well, Bob measures the x-spin. According to quantum mechanics, when the
system is in state I, Bob's x-spin measurement will have a 50% probability of producing +x and a 50% probability of
-x. It is impossible to predict which outcome will appear until Bob actually performs the measurement.
Here is the crux of the matter. You might imagine that, when Bob measures the x-spin of his positron, he would
get an answer with absolute certainty, since prior to this he hasn't disturbed his particle at all. Bob's positron has a
50% probability of producing +x and a 50% probability of xso the outcome is not certain. Bob's positron
"knows" that Alice's electron has been measured, and its z-spin detected, and hence B's z-spin has been calculated,
but the x-spin of Bob's positron remains uncertain.
Put another way, how does Bob's positron know which way to point if Alice decides (based on information
unavailable to Bob) to measure x (i.e., to be the opposite of Alice's electron's spin about the x-axis) and also how to
point if Alice measures z, since it is only supposed to know one thing at a time? The Copenhagen interpretation rules
that say the wave function "collapses" at the time of measurement, so there must be action at a distance
(entanglement) or the positron must know more than it's supposed to know (hidden variables).
Here is the paradox summed up:
It is one thing to say that physical measurement of the first particle's momentum affects uncertainty in its own
position, but to say that measuring the first particle's momentum affects the uncertainty in the position of the other is
another thing altogether. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen asked how can the second particle "know" to have precisely
defined momentum but uncertain position? Since this implies that one particle is communicating with the other
instantaneously across space, i.e., faster than light, this is the "paradox".
Incidentally, Bell used spin as his example, but many types of physical quantitiesreferred to as "observables" in
quantum mechanicscan be used. The EPR paper used momentum for the observable. Experimental realisations of
the EPR scenario often use photon polarization, because polarized photons are easy to prepare and measure.
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EPR paradox
Locality in the EPR experiment

The principle of locality states that physical processes occurring at one place should have no immediate effect on the
elements of reality at another location. At first sight, this appears to be a reasonable assumption to make, as it seems
to be a consequence of special relativity, which states that information can never be transmitted faster than the speed
of light without violating causality. It is generally believed that any theory which violates causality would also be
internally inconsistent, and thus useless.:427428
It turns out that the usual rules for combining quantum mechanical and classical descriptions violate the principle of
locality without violating causality.:427428 Causality is preserved because there is no way for Alice to transmit
messages (i.e., information) to Bob by manipulating her measurement axis. Whichever axis she uses, she has a 50%
probability of obtaining "+" and 50% probability of obtaining "", completely at random; according to quantum
mechanics, it is fundamentally impossible for her to influence what result she gets. Furthermore, Bob is only able to
perform his measurement once: there is a fundamental property of quantum mechanics, known as the "no cloning
theorem", which makes it impossible for him to make a million copies of the electron he receives, perform a spin
measurement on each, and look at the statistical distribution of the results. Therefore, in the one measurement he is
allowed to make, there is a 50% probability of getting "+" and 50% of getting "", regardless of whether or not his
axis is aligned with Alice's.
However, the principle of locality appeals powerfully to physical intuition, and Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen were
unwilling to abandon it. Einstein derided the quantum mechanical predictions as "spooky action at a distance". The
conclusion they drew was that quantum mechanics is not a complete theory.
In recent years, however, doubt has been cast on EPR's conclusion due to developments in understanding locality
and especially quantum decoherence. The word locality has several different meanings in physics. For example, in
quantum field theory "locality" means that quantum fields at different points of space do not interact with one
another. However, quantum field theories that are "local" in this sense appear to violate the principle of locality as
defined by EPR, but they nevertheless do not violate locality in a more general sense. Wavefunction collapse can be
viewed as an epiphenomenon of quantum decoherence, which in turn is nothing more than an effect of the
underlying local time evolution of the wavefunction of a system and all of its environment. Since the underlying
behaviour doesn't violate local causality, it follows that neither does the additional effect of wavefunction collapse,
whether real or apparent. Therefore, as outlined in the example above, neither the EPR experiment nor any quantum
experiment demonstrates that faster-than-light signaling is possible.
Resolving the paradox

Hidden variables
There are several ways to resolve the EPR paradox. The one suggested by EPR is that quantum mechanics, despite
its success in a wide variety of experimental scenarios, is actually an incomplete theory. In other words, there is
some yet undiscovered theory of nature to which quantum mechanics acts as a kind of statistical approximation
(albeit an exceedingly successful one). Unlike quantum mechanics, the more complete theory contains variables
corresponding to all the "elements of reality". There must be some unknown mechanism acting on these variables to
give rise to the observed effects of "non-commuting quantum observables", i.e. the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Such a theory is called a hidden variable theory.
To illustrate this idea, we can formulate a very simple hidden variable theory for the above thought experiment. One
supposes that the quantum spin-singlet states emitted by the source are actually approximate descriptions for "true"
physical states possessing definite values for the z-spin and x-spin. In these "true" states, the positron going to Bob
always has spin values opposite to the electron going to Alice, but the values are otherwise completely random. For
example, the first pair emitted by the source might be "(+z, x) to Alice and (z, +x) to Bob", the next pair "(z, x)
to Alice and (+z, +x) to Bob", and so forth. Therefore, if Bob's measurement axis is aligned with Alice's, he will
368
EPR paradox
necessarily get the opposite of whatever Alice gets; otherwise, he will get "+" and "" with equal probability.
Assuming we restrict our measurements to the z- and x-axes, such a hidden variable theory is experimentally
indistinguishable from quantum mechanics. In reality, there may be an infinite number of axes along which Alice
and Bob can perform their measurements, so there would have to be an infinite number of independent hidden
variables. However, this is not a serious problem; we have formulated a very simplistic hidden variable theory, and a
more sophisticated theory might be able to patch it up. It turns out that there is a much more serious challenge to the
idea of hidden variables.
Bell's inequality
Main article: Bell's theorem
In 1964, John Bell showed that the predictions of quantum mechanics in the EPR thought experiment are
significantly different from the predictions of a particular class of hidden variable theories (the local hidden variable
theories). Roughly speaking, quantum mechanics has a much stronger statistical correlation with measurement
results performed on different axes than do these hidden variable theories. These differences, expressed using
inequality relations known as "Bell's inequalities", are in principle experimentally detectable. Later work by
Eberhard showed that the key properties of local hidden variable theories which lead to Bell's inequalities are locality
and counter-factual definiteness. Any theory in which these principles apply produces the inequalities. Arthur Fine
subsequently showed that any theory satisfying the inequalities can be modeled by a local hidden variable theory.
After the publication of Bell's paper, a variety of experiments to test Bell's inequalities were devised. These generally
relied on measurement of photon polarization. All experiments conducted to date have found behavior in line with
the predictions of standard quantum mechanics theory.
However, Bell's theorem does not apply to all possible philosophically realist theories. It is a common misconception
that quantum mechanics is inconsistent with all notions of philosophical realism. Realist interpretations of quantum
mechanics are possible, although as discussed above, such interpretations must reject either locality or
counter-factual definiteness. Mainstream physics prefers to keep locality, while striving also to maintain a notion of
realism that nevertheless rejects counter-factual definiteness. Examples of such mainstream realist interpretations are
the consistent histories interpretation and the transactional interpretation (first proposed by John G. Cramer in 1986).
Fine's work showed that, taking locality as a given, there exist scenarios in which two statistical variables are
correlated in a manner inconsistent with counter-factual definiteness, and that such scenarios are no more mysterious
than any other, despite the fact that the inconsistency with counter-factual definiteness may seem 'counter-intuitive'.
Violation of locality is difficult to reconcile with special relativity, and is thought to be incompatible with the
principle of causality. However, the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics keeps counter-factual definiteness,
while introducing a conjectured non-local mechanism in the form of the 'quantum potential' that is defined as one of
the terms of the Schrdinger equation. Some workers in the field have also attempted to formulate hidden variable
theories that exploit loopholes in actual experiments, such as the assumptions made in interpreting experimental data,
although no theory has been proposed that can reproduce all the results of quantum mechanics.
There are also individual EPR-like experiments that have no local hidden variables explanation. Examples have been
suggested by David Bohm and by Lucien Hardy.
Einstein's hope for a purely algebraic theory

The Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics hypothesizes that the state of the universe evolves smoothly through
time with no collapsing of quantum wavefunctions. One problem for the Copenhagen interpretation is to precisely
define wavefunction collapse. Einstein maintained that quantum mechanics is physically incomplete and logically
unsatisfactory. In "The Meaning of Relativity", Einstein wrote, "One can give good reasons why reality cannot at all
be represented by a continuous field. From the quantum phenomena it appears to follow with certainty that a finite
system of finite energy can be completely described by a finite set of numbers (quantum numbers). This does not
369
EPR paradox
seem to be in accordance with a continuum theory and must lead to an attempt to find a purely algebraic theory for
the representation of reality. But nobody knows how to find the basis for such a theory." If time, space, and energy
are secondary features derived from a substrate below the Planck scale, then Einstein's hypothetical algebraic system
might resolve the EPR paradox (although Bell's theorem would still be valid). Edward Fredkin in the Fredkin Finite
Nature Hypothesis has suggested an informational basis for Einstein's hypothetical algebraic system. If physical
reality is totally finite, then the Copenhagen interpretation might be an approximation to an information processing
system below the Planck scale.
"Acceptable theories" and the experiment

According to the present view of the situation, quantum mechanics flatly contradicts Einstein's philosophical
postulate that any acceptable physical theory must fulfill "local realism".
In the EPR paper (1935), the authors realised that quantum mechanics was inconsistent with their assumptions, but
Einstein nevertheless thought that quantum mechanics might simply be augmented by hidden variables (i.e.,
variables which were, at that point, still obscure to him), without any other change, to achieve an acceptable theory.
He pursued these ideas for over twenty years until the end of his life, in 1955.
In contrast, John Bell, in his 1964 paper, showed that quantum mechanics and the class of hidden variable theories
Einstein favored would lead to different experimental results: different by a factor of 32 for certain correlations. So
the issue of "acceptability", up to that time mainly concerning theory, finally became experimentally decidable.
There are many Bell test experiments, e.g., those of Alain Aspect and others. They support the predictions of
quantum mechanics rather than the class of hidden variable theories supported by Einstein.
Implications for quantum mechanics

Most physicists today believe that quantum mechanics is correct, and that the EPR paradox is a "paradox" only
because classical intuitions do not correspond to physical reality. How EPR is interpreted regarding locality depends
on the interpretation of quantum mechanics one uses. In the Copenhagen interpretation, it is usually understood that
instantaneous wave function collapse does occur. However, the view that there is no causal instantaneous effect has
also been proposed within the Copenhagen interpretation: in this alternate view, measurement affects our ability to
define (and measure) quantities in the physical system, not the system itself. In the many-worlds interpretation,
locality is strictly preserved, since the effects of operations such as measurement affect only the state of the particle
that is measured. However, the results of the measurement are not uniqueevery possible result is obtained.
The EPR paradox has deepened our understanding of quantum mechanics by exposing the fundamentally
non-classical characteristics of the measurement process. Before the publication of the EPR paper, a measurement
was often visualized as a physical disturbance inflicted directly upon the measured system. For instance, when
measuring the position of an electron, one imagines shining a light on it, thus disturbing the electron and producing
the quantum mechanical uncertainties in its position. Such explanations, which are still encountered in popular
expositions of quantum mechanics, are debunked by the EPR paradox, which shows that a "measurement" can be
performed on a particle without disturbing it directly, by performing a measurement on a distant entangled particle.
In fact, Yakir Aharonov and his collaborators have developed a whole theory of so-called Weak
measurement.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Technologies relying on quantum entanglement are now being developed. In quantum cryptography, entangled
particles are used to transmit signals that cannot be eavesdropped upon without leaving a trace. In quantum
computation, entangled quantum states are used to perform computations in parallel, which may allow certain
calculations to be performed much more quickly than they ever could be with classical computers.
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EPR paradox
371
Mathematical formulation
The above discussion can be expressed mathematically using the quantum mechanical formulation of spin. The spin
degree of freedom for an electron is associated with a two-dimensional complex vector space V, with each quantum
state corresponding to a vector in that space. The operators corresponding to the spin along the x, y, and z direction,
denoted Sx, Sy, and Sz respectively, can be represented using the Pauli matrices::9
where
is the reduced Planck constant (or the Planck constant divided by 2).
The eigenstates of Sz are represented as
and the eigenstates of Sx are represented as
The vector space of the electron-positron pair is
, the tensor product of the electron's and positron's vector
spaces. The spin singlet state is
where the two terms on the right hand side are what we have referred to as state I and state II above.
From the above equations, it can be shown that the spin singlet can also be written as
where the terms on the right hand side are what we have referred to as state Ia and state IIa.
To illustrate how this leads to the violation of local realism, we need to show that after Alice's measurement of Sz (or
Sx), Bob's value of Sz (or Sx) is uniquely determined, and therefore corresponds to an "element of physical reality".
This follows from the principles of measurement in quantum mechanics. When Sz is measured, the system state
collapses into an eigenvector of Sz. If the measurement result is +z, this means that immediately after measurement
the system state undergoes an orthogonal projection of onto the space of states of the form
For the spin singlet, the new state is
Similarly, if Alice's measurement result is z, the system undergoes an orthogonal projection onto
which means that the new state is
This implies that the measurement for Sz for Bob's positron is now determined. It will be z in the first case or +z in
the second case.
It remains only to show that Sx and Sz cannot simultaneously possess definite values in quantum mechanics. One may
show in a straightforward manner that no possible vector can be an eigenvector of both matrices. More generally,
one may use the fact that the operators do not commute,
along with the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
EPR paradox
References
Selected papers
P.H. Eberhard, Bell's theorem without hidden variables. Nuovo Cimento 38B1 75 (1977).
P.H. Eberhard, Bell's theorem and the different concepts of locality. Nuovo Cimento 46B 392 (1978).
A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered
complete? [12] Phys. Rev. 47 777 (1935). [8]
A. Fine, Hidden Variables, Joint Probability, and the Bell Inequalities. Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982).[13]
A. Fine, Do Correlations need to be explained?, in Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory: Reflections
on Bell's Theorem, edited by Cushing & McMullin (University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).
L. Hardy, Nonlocality for two particles without inequalities for almost all entangled states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 71
1665 (1993).[14]
M. Mizuki, A classical interpretation of Bell's inequality. Annales de la Fondation Louis de Broglie 26 683
(2001).
P. Pluch, "Theory for Quantum Probability", PhD Thesis University of Klagenfurt (2006)
M. A. Rowe, D. Kielpinski, V. Meyer, C. A. Sackett, W. M. Itano, C. Monroe and D. J. Wineland, Experimental
violation of a Bell's inequality with efficient detection, Nature 409, 791794 (15 February 2001). [15]
M. Smerlak, C. Rovelli, Relational EPR [16]
Notes
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Quantum_mechanics& action=edit
[2] Gaasbeek, Bram. "Demystifying the Delayed Choice Experiments", p. 1 (arXiv:1007.3977v1 [quant-ph] 22 Jul 2010)
[3] Bell, John. On the EinsteinPoldolskyRosen paradox (http:/ / www. drchinese. com/ David/ Bell_Compact. pdf), Physics 1 3, 195-200, Nov.
1964
[4] Advances in atomic and molecular physics, Volume 14 By David Robert Bates (http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=dkaCKHKLo3gC&
pg=PA330& lpg=PA330& dq="Saclay"+ "Bell's+ inequality"& source=bl& ots=u-b4s3klA0& sig=1P7sX78b-I9TKtT15KvRSADgLlo&
hl=en& ei=VJ7aTpn-FMW8iAeJs-jsDQ& sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=2& ved=0CCEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage& q="Saclay"
"Bell's inequality"& f=false)
[5] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ qt-epr/
[6] von Neumann, J. (1932/1955). In Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, Springer, Berlin, translated into English by Beyer, R.T.,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, cited by Baggott, J. (2004) Beyond Measure: Modern physics, philosophy, and the meaning of quantum
theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, ISBN 0-19-852927-9, pages 144145.
[7] Bohm, D. (1951). Quantum Theory (http:/ / books. google. com. au/ books?id=9DWim3RhymsC& printsec=frontcover& dq=david+ bohm+
quantum+ theory& source=bl& ots=6G-2u1wtav& sig=Q1GcoVDLFRmKOmDYFAJte6LzrZU& hl=en& ei=Pv45TNSnLYffcfnS6foO&
sa=X& oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=7& ved=0CEEQ6AEwBg#v=onepage& q& f=false), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, page 29,
and Chapter 5 section 3, and Chapter 22 Section 19.
[8] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1103/ PhysRev. 47. 777
[9] Quoted in Kaiser, David. "Bringing the human actors back on stage: the personal context of the EinsteinBohr debate", British Journal for
the History of Science 27 (1994): 129152, on page 147.
[10] English translation by Jean Piccard, pp 349382 in the same issue, doi: 10.1016/S0016-0032(36)91047-5 (http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016/
S0016-0032(36)91047-5)).
[11] George Greenstein and Arthur G. Zajonc, The Quantum Challenge, p. "[Experiments in the early 1980s] have conclusively shown that
quantum mechanics is indeed orrect, and that the EPR argument had relied upon incorrect assumptions."
[12] http:/ / www. drchinese. com/ David/ EPR. pdf
[13] http:/ / prola. aps. org/ abstract/ PRL/ v48/ i5/ p291_1
[14] http:/ / prola. aps. org/ abstract/ PRL/ v71/ i11/ p1665_1
[15] http:/ / www. nature. com/ nature/ journal/ v409/ n6822/ full/ 409791a0. html
[16] http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0604064
372
EPR paradox
Books
John S. Bell (1987) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN
0-521-36869-3.
Arthur Fine (1996) The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory, 2nd ed. Univ. of Chicago Press.
J.J. Sakurai, J. J. (1994) Modern Quantum Mechanics. Addison-Wesley: 174187, 223232. ISBN
0-201-53929-2.
Selleri, F. (1988) Quantum Mechanics Versus Local Realism: The EinsteinPodolskyRosen Paradox. New
York: Plenum Press. ISBN 0-306-42739-7
Leon Lederman, L., Teresi, D. (1993). The God Particle: If the Universe is the Answer, What is the Question?
Houghton Mifflin Company, pages 21, 187 to 189.
John Gribbin (1984) In Search of Schrdinger's Cat. Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-552-12555-0
External links
The EinsteinPodolskyRosen Argument in Quantum Theory; 1.2 The argument in the text;
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-epr/#1.2
The original EPR paper. (http://prola.aps.org/abstract/PR/v47/i10/p777_1)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " The EinsteinPodolskyRosen Argument in Quantum Theory (http://
plato.stanford.edu/)" by Arthur Fine.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities (http://
www.iep.utm.edu/epr/)".
Abner Shimony (2004) " Bells Theorem. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bell-theorem/)"
EPR, Bell & Aspect: The Original References. (http://www.drchinese.com/David/EPR_Bell_Aspect.htm)
Does Bell's Inequality Principle rule out local theories of quantum mechanics? (http://math.ucr.edu/home/
baez/physics/Quantum/bells_inequality.html) From the Usenet Physics FAQ.
Theoretical use of EPR in teleportation. (http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/481/brassard.html)
Effective use of EPR in cryptography. (http://www.dhushara.com/book/quantcos/aq/qcrypt.htm)
EPR experiment with single photons interactive. (http://www.QuantumLab.de)
Spooky Actions At A Distance?: Oppenheimer Lecture by Prof. Mermin. (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ta09WXiUqcQ)
373

The faint young Sun paradox or problem describes the apparent contradiction between observations of liquid
water early in the Earth's history and the astrophysical expectation that the Sun's output would be only 70% as
intense during that epoch as it is during the modern epoch. The issue was raised by astronomers Carl Sagan and
George Mullen in 1972. Explanations of this paradox have taken into account greenhouse effects, astrophysical
influences, or a combination of the two.
Early solar output

Early in the Earth's history, the Sun's output would have been only 70% as intense as it is during the modern epoch.
In the then current environmental conditions, this solar output would have been insufficient to maintain a liquid
ocean. Astronomers Carl Sagan and George Mullen pointed out in 1972 that this is contrary to the geological and
paleontological evidence.
According to the Standard Solar Model, stars similar to the Sun should gradually brighten over their main sequence
lifetime. However, with the predicted solar luminosity 4 billion (4 109) years ago and with greenhouse gas
concentrations the same as are current for the modern Earth, any liquid water exposed to the surface would freeze.
However, the geological record shows a continually relatively warm surface in the full early temperature record of
the Earth, with the exception of a cold phase, the Huronian glaciation, about 2.4 to 2.1 billion years ago.
Water-related sediments have been found that date to as early as 3.8 billion years ago. Hints of early life forms have
been dated from as early as 3.5 billion years, and the basic carbon isotopy is very much in line with what is found
today. A regular alternation between ice ages and warm periods is only to be found occurring in the period since one
billion years ago.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Greenhouse hypothesis
When it first formed, Earth's atmosphere may have contained more greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide concentrations
may have been higher, with estimated partial pressure as large as 1,000kPa (10bar), because there was no bacterial
photosynthesis to reduce the gas to carbon and oxygen. Methane, a very active greenhouse gas which reacts with
oxygen to produce carbon dioxide and water vapor, may have been more prevalent as well, with a mixing ratio of
104 (100 parts per million by volume).
Based on a study of geological sulfur isotopes, in 2009 a group of scientists including Yuichiro Ueno from the
University of Tokyo proposed that carbonyl sulfide (OCS) was present in the Archean atmosphere. Carbonyl sulfide
is an efficient greenhouse gas and the scientists estimate that the additional greenhouse effect would have been
sufficient to prevent the Earth from freezing over.
Based on an "analysis of nitrogen and argon isotopes in fluid inclusions trapped in 3.0- to 3.5-billion-year-old
hydrothermal quartz" a 2013 paper concludes that "dinitrogen did not play a significant role in the thermal budget of
the ancient Earth and that the Archean partial pressure of CO2 was probably lower than 0.7 bar". Burgess, one of the
authors states "The amount of nitrogen in the atmosphere was too low to enhance the greenhouse effect of carbon
dioxide sufficiently to warm the planet. However, our results did give a higher than expected pressure reading for
carbon dioxide at odds with the estimates based on fossil soils which could be high enough to counteract the
effects of the faint young Sun and will require further investigation."
Following the initial accretion of the continents after about 1 billion years, geo-botanist Heinrich Walter and others
believe that a non-biological version of the carbon cycle provided a negative temperature feedback. The carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere dissolved in liquid water and combined with metal ions derived from silicate weathering
to produce carbonates. During ice age periods, this part of the cycle would shut down. Volcanic carbon emissions
would then restart a warming cycle due to the greenhouse effect.
374
375
According to the Snowball Earth hypothesis, there may have been a number of periods when the Earth's oceans froze
over completely. The most recent such period may have been about 630 million years ago. Afterwards, the Cambrian
explosion of new multicellular life forms started.
Alternatives
A minority view, propounded by the
Israeli-American physicist Nir Shaviv, uses
climatological influences of solar wind,
combined with a hypothesis of Danish
physicist Henrik Svensmark for a cooling
effect of cosmic rays, to explain the
paradox. According to Shaviv, the early Sun
had emitted a stronger solar wind that
produced a protective effect against cosmic
rays. In that early age, a moderate
greenhouse effect comparable to today's
would have been sufficient to explain an
ice-free Earth. Evidence for a more active
early Sun has been found in meteorites.
Phanerozoic Climate Change
The temperature minimum around 2.4

billion years goes along with a cosmic ray flux modulation by a variable star formation rate in the Milky Way
Galaxy. The reduced solar impact later results into a stronger impact of cosmic ray flux (CRF), which is
hypothesized to lead to a relationship with climatological variations.
An alternative model of solar evolution may explain the faint young Sun paradox. In this model, the early Sun
underwent an extended period of higher solar wind output. This caused a mass loss from the Sun on the order of
510% over its lifetime, resulting in a more consistent level of solar luminosity (as the early Sun had more mass,
resulting in more energy output than was predicted). In order to explain the warm conditions in the Archean era, this
mass loss must have occurred over an interval of about one billion years. However, records of ion implantation from
meteorites and lunar samples show that the elevated rate of solar wind flux only lasted for a period of 0.1 billion
years. Observations of the young Sun-like star 1 Ursae Majoris matches this rate of decline in the stellar wind
output, suggesting that a higher mass loss rate can not by itself resolve the paradox.
Examination of Archaean sediments appears inconsistent with the hypothesis of high greenhouse concentrations.
Instead, the moderate temperature range may be explained by a lower surface albedo brought about by less
continental area and the "lack of biologically induced cloud condensation nuclei". This would have led to increased
absorption of solar energy, thereby compensating for the lower solar output.
References
Further reading
Bengtsson, Lennart; Hammer, Claus U. (2004). Geosphere-Biosphere Interactions and Climate. Cambridge
University Press. ISBN0-521-78238-4.
Fermi paradox
Fermi paradox
This article is about the absence of evidence for extraterrestrial intelligence. For the type of estimation problem, see
Fermi problem.
The Fermi paradox (or Fermi's paradox) is the apparent contradiction between
high estimates of the probability of the existence of extraterrestrial civilization and
humanity's lack of contact with, or evidence for, such civilizations.[1] The basic
points of the argument, made by physicists Enrico Fermi and Michael H. Hart, are:
The Sun is a typical star, and relatively young. There are billions of stars in the
galaxy that are billions of years older.
Almost surely, some of these stars will have Earth-like planets. Assuming the
Earth is typical, some of these planets may develop intelligent life.
Some of these civilizations may develop interstellar travel, a technology Earth is
investigating even now (such as the 100 Year Starship).
Even at the slow pace of currently envisioned interstellar travel, the galaxy can
be completely colonized in a few tens of millions of years.
According to this line of thinking, the Earth should already have been colonized, or
at least visited. But no convincing evidence of this exists. Furthermore, no
confirmed signs of intelligence (see Empirical resolution attempts) elsewhere have
been spotted, either in our galaxy or in the more than 80 billion other galaxies of the
observable universe. Hence Fermi's question, "Where is everybody?"
Overview
The age of the universe and its vast number of stars suggest that unless the Earth is
very atypical, extraterrestrial life should be common.[2] In an informal discussion in
A graphical representation of the
1950, the physicist Enrico Fermi questioned why, if a multitude of advanced
Arecibo message Humanity's
extraterrestrial civilizations exists in the Milky Way galaxy, evidence such as
first attempt to use radio waves to
spacecraft or probes is not seen. A more detailed examination of the implications of
actively communicate its
the topic began with a paper by Michael H. Hart in 1975, and it is sometimes
existence to alien civilizations
referred to as the FermiHart paradox. Other common names for the same
phenomenon are Fermi's question ("Where are they?"), the Fermi Problem, the Great Silence, and silentium universi
(Latin for "silence of the universe").
There have been attempts to resolve the Fermi paradox by locating evidence of extraterrestrial civilizations, along
with proposals that such life could exist without human knowledge. Counterarguments suggest that intelligent
extraterrestrial life does not exist or occurs so rarely and/or briefly that humans will never make contact with it.
Starting with Hart, a great deal of effort has gone into developing scientific hypotheses about, and possible models
of, extraterrestrial life, and the Fermi paradox has become a theoretical reference point in much of this work. The
problem has spawned numerous scholarly works addressing it directly, while questions that relate to it have been
addressed in fields as diverse as astronomy, biology, ecology, and philosophy. The emerging field of astrobiology
has brought an interdisciplinary approach to the Fermi paradox and the question of extraterrestrial life.
376
Fermi paradox
Basis
The Fermi paradox is a conflict between an argument of scale and probability and a lack of evidence. A more
complete definition could be stated thus:
The apparent size and age of the universe suggest that many technologically advanced extraterrestrial
civilizations ought to exist.
However, this hypothesis seems inconsistent with the lack of observational evidence to support it.
The first aspect of the paradox, "the argument by scale", is a function of the raw numbers involved: there are an
estimated 200400 billion (24 1011) stars in the Milky Way and 70 sextillion (71022) in the visible universe.
Even if intelligent life occurs on only a minuscule percentage of planets around these stars, there might still be a
great number of civilizations extant in the Milky Way galaxy alone. This argument also assumes the mediocrity
principle, which states that Earth is not special, but merely a typical planet, subject to the same laws, effects, and
likely outcomes as any other world.
The second cornerstone of the Fermi paradox is a rejoinder to the argument by scale: given intelligent life's ability to
overcome scarcity, and its tendency to colonize new habitats, it seems likely that at least some civilizations would be
technologically advanced, seek out new resources in space and then colonize first their own star system and
subsequently the surrounding star systems. Since there is no conclusive or certifiable evidence on Earth or elsewhere
in the known universe of other intelligent life after 13.8 billion years of the universe's history, we have the conflict
requiring a resolution. Some examples of possible resolutions are that intelligent life is rarer than we think, that our
assumptions about the general development or behavior of intelligent species are flawed, or, more radically, that our
current scientific understanding of the nature of the universe or reality itself is seriously incomplete.
The Fermi paradox can be asked in two ways. The first is, "Why are no aliens or their artifacts physically here?" If
interstellar travel is possible, even the "slow" kind nearly within the reach of Earth technology, then it would only
take from 5 million to 50 million years to colonize the galaxy.[3] This is a relatively small amount of time on a
geological scale, let alone a cosmological one. Since there are many stars older than the Sun, or since intelligent life
might have evolved earlier elsewhere, the question then becomes why the galaxy has not been colonized already.
Even if colonization is impractical or undesirable to all alien civilizations, large-scale exploration of the galaxy is
still possible using various means of exploration and theoretical probes. However, no signs of either colonization or
exploration have been generally acknowledged.
Travel times may well explain the lack of physical presence on Earth of alien inhabitants of far away galaxies, but a
sufficiently advanced civilization[4] could potentially be observable over a significant fraction of the size of the
observable universe. Even if such civilizations are rare, the scale argument indicates they should exist somewhere at
some point during the history of the universe, and since they could be detected from far away over a considerable
period of time, many more potential sites for their origin are within range of our observation. However, no
incontrovertible signs of such civilizations have been detected.
It is unclear whether the paradox is stronger for our galaxy or for the universe as a whole.[5]
Name
In 1950, while working at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Fermi had a casual conversation while walking to lunch
with colleagues Emil Konopinski, Edward Teller and Herbert York. The men discussed a recent spate of UFO
reports and an Alan Dunn cartoon facetiously blaming the disappearance of municipal trashcans on marauding
aliens. They then had a more serious discussion regarding the chances of humans observing faster-than-light travel
by some material object within the next ten years. Teller thinks Fermi directed the question at him, asking "Edward,
what do you think? How probable is it that within the next ten years we shall have clear evidence of a material object
moving faster than light?" Teller answered one in a million. Teller remembers Fermi said, "This is much too low.
The probability is more like ten percent" [the probability of a 'Fermi miracle']. Konopinski did not remember the
377
Fermi paradox
exact numbers "except that they changed rapidly as Edward and Fermi bounced arguments off each other."[6]
The conversation shifted to other subjects, until during lunch Fermi suddenly exclaimed, "Where are they?"
(alternatively, "Where is everybody?"). Teller remembers, "The result of his question was general laughter because
of the strange fact that in spite of Fermis question coming from the clear blue, everybody around the table seemed to
understand at once that he was talking about extraterrestrial life."
Edward Teller further remembers, "I do not believe that much came of this conversation, except perhaps a statement
that the distances to the next location of living beings may be very great and that, indeed, as far as our galaxy is
concerned, we are living somewhere in the sticks, far removed from the metropolitan area of the galactic center."
Herbert York recollects that Fermi then made a series of rapid calculations using estimated figures. (Fermi was
known for his ability to make good estimates from first principles and minimal data, see Fermi problem.) York
writes that Enrico Fermi "followed up with a series of calculations on the probability of earthlike planets, the
probability of life given an earth, the probability of humans given life, the likely rise and duration of high
technology, and so on. He concluded on the basis of such calculations that we ought to have been visited long ago
and many times over." If so, Fermi anticipated and pre-dated many of the elements that went into the Drake
equation.
Drake equation
Main article: Drake equation
The theories and principles in the Drake equation are closely related to the Fermi paradox. The equation was
formulated by Frank Drake in 1961, a decade after the objections raised by Enrico Fermi, in an attempt to find a
systematic means to evaluate the numerous probabilities involved in the existence of alien life. The speculative
equation factors in: the rate of star formation in the galaxy; the fraction of stars with planets and the number per star
that are habitable; the fraction of those planets which develop life, the fraction of intelligent life, and the further
fraction of detectable technological intelligent life; and finally the length of time such civilizations are detectable.
The fundamental problem is that the last four terms (fraction of planets with life, odds life becomes intelligent, odds
intelligent life becomes detectable, and detectable lifetime of civilizations) are completely unknown. We have only
one example, rendering statistical estimates impossible, and even the example we have is subject to a strong
anthropic bias.
A deeper objection is that the very form of the Drake equation assumes that civilizations arise and then die out
within their original star systems. If interstellar colonization is possible, then this assumption is invalid, and the
equations of population dynamics would apply instead.[7]
The Drake equation has been used by both optimists and pessimists with wildly differing results. Carl Sagan, using
optimistic numbers, suggested as many as one million communicating civilizations in the Milky Way in 1966,
though he later suggested that the actual number could be far smaller. Frank Tipler and John D Barrow used
pessimistic numbers and concluded that the average number of civilizations in a galaxy is much less than one.[8]
Frank Drake himself has commented that the Drake equation is unlikely to settle the Fermi paradox; instead it is just
a way of "organizing our ignorance" on the subject.[9]
Empirical resolution attempts

One obvious way to resolve the Fermi paradox would be to find conclusive evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence.
Efforts to find such evidence have been made since 1960, and several are ongoing.[10] As human beings do not
possess interstellar travel capability, such searches are being remotely carried out at great distances and rely on
analysis of very subtle evidence. This limits possible discoveries to civilizations which alter their environment in a
detectable way, or produce effects that are observable at a distance, such as radio emissions. It is very unlikely that
non-technological civilizations will be detectable from Earth in the near future.
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Fermi paradox
One difficulty in searching is avoiding an overly anthropocentric viewpoint. Conjecture on the type of evidence
likely to be found often focuses on the types of activities that humans have performed, or likely would perform given
more advanced technology. Intelligent aliens might avoid these "expected" activities, or perform activities dissimilar
to those of humans.
Mainstream astronomy and SETI

There are two ways that astronomy might find evidence of an extraterrestrial civilization. One is that conventional
astronomers, studying stars, planets, and galaxies, might serendipitously observe some phenomenon that cannot be
explained without positing an intelligent civilization as the source. This has been suspected several times. Pulsars,
when first discovered, were called little green men (LGM), because of the precise repetition of their pulses (they
rival the best atomic clocks). Likewise Seyfert galaxies were suspected to be industrial accidents because their
enormous and directed energy output had no initial explanation. Eventually, natural explanations not involving
intelligent life have been found for all such observations to date,[11] but the possibility of discovery remains.
Proposed examples include asteroid mining that would change the appearance of debris disks around stars or
large-scale use of solar power changing the light curve of planets measured near eclipse.
The other way astronomy might settle the Fermi paradox is through a search specifically dedicated to finding
evidence of life.
Radio emissions
Further information: SETI, Project Ozma, Project Cyclops, Project Phoenix (SETI), SERENDIP and Allen
Telescope Array
Radio technology and the ability to construct a radio telescope are
presumed to be a natural advance for technological species,
theoretically creating effects that might be detected over interstellar
distances. Sensitive observers of the Solar System, for example, would
note unusually intense radio waves for a G2 star due to Earth's
television and telecommunication broadcasts. In the absence of an
apparent natural cause, alien observers might infer the existence of a
terrestrial civilization. It should be noted however that even much more
sensitive
radio telescopes than those currently available on Earth would
Radio telescopes are often used by SETI projects
not be able to detect non-directional radio signals even at a fraction of
a light year, so it is questionable whether any such signals could be detected by an extraterrestrial civilization.[12]
Therefore, the careful searching of radio emissions from space for non-natural signals may lead to the detection of
alien civilizations. Such signals could be either "accidental" by-products of a civilization, or deliberate attempts to
communicate, such as the Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence's Arecibo message. A number of
astronomers and observatories have attempted and are attempting to detect such evidence, mostly through the SETI
organization, although other approaches, such as optical SETI, also exist.
Several decades of SETI analysis have not revealed any main sequence stars with unusually bright or meaningfully
repetitive radio emissions, although there have been several candidate signals. On August 15, 1977 the "Wow!
signal" was picked up by The Big Ear radio telescope. However, the Big Ear only looked at each point on the sky for
72 seconds, and re-examinations of the same spot have found nothing. In 2003, Radio source SHGb02+14a was
isolated by SETI@home analysis, although it has largely been discounted by further study. There are numerous
technical assumptions underlying SETI that may cause human beings to miss radio emissions with present search
techniques; these are discussed below.
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Fermi paradox
380
Direct planetary observation

Detection and classification of
exoplanets has come out of recent
refinements
in
mainstream
astronomical instruments and analysis.
While this is a new field in
astronomythe first published paper
claiming to have discovered an
exoplanet was released in 1989it is
possible that planets which are likely
able to support life will be found in the
near future.
A composite picture of Earth at night, created with data from the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Linescan System (OLS). Large-scale artificial
[13]
lighting as produced by the human civilization is detectable from space.
Direct evidence for the existence of

life may eventually be observable,
such as the detection of biotic
signature gases (such as methane and oxygen)or even the industrial air pollution of a technologically advanced
civilizationin an exoplanet's atmosphere by means of spectrographic analysis. With improvements in our
observational capabilities, it may eventually even be possible to detect direct evidence such as that which humanity
produces (see right).
However, exoplanets are rarely directly observed (the first claim to have done so was made in 2004); rather, their
existence is usually inferred from the effects they have on the stars they orbit. This means that usually only the mass
and orbit of an exoplanet can be deduced. This information, along with the stellar classification of its sun, and
educated guesses as to its composition (usually based on the mass of the planet, and its distance from its sun), allows
only for rough approximations of the planetary environment.
Prior to 2009, methods for exoplanet
detection were not likely to detect
life-bearing Earth-like worlds. Methods
such as gravitational microlensing can
detect the presence of "small" worlds,
potentially even smaller than the Earth, but
can only detect such worlds for very brief
moments of time, and no follow-up is
possible. Other methods such as radial
velocity, astrometry, and the transit method
allow prolonged observations of exoplanet
effects, but only work with worlds that are
many times the mass of Earth, at least when
performed while looking through the
atmosphere. These seem unlikely candidates
to harbor Earth-like life. However,
exoplanet detection and classification is a
very active sub-discipline in astronomy,
with 424 such planets being detected
between 1988 and 2010, and the first
Nearest terrestrial ("rocky") exoplanets at a distance of up to 50 light-years from

the Solar System: - lying inside their star's habitable zone
Fermi paradox
possibly terrestrial planet discovered within a star's habitable zone being found in 2007. New refinements in
exoplanet detection methods, and use of existing methods from space, (such as the Kepler Mission, launched in
2009) are starting to (as of 2014) detect and characterize terrestrial-size planets, and determine if they are within the
habitable zones of their stars. Such observational refinements may allow us to better gauge how common potentially
habitable worlds are. Using methods like the Drake equation with this data would therefore allow a much better idea
of how common life in the universe might be; this would have a profound influence over the expectations behind the
Fermi paradox itself.
Alien constructs
Probes, colonies, and other artifacts
Further information: Von Neumann probe and Bracewell probe
As noted, given the size and age of the universe, and the relative rapidity at which dispersion of intelligent life can in
principle occur, evidence of alien colonization attempts might plausibly be discovered. Evidence of exploration not
containing extraterrestrial life, such as probes and information gathering devices, may also await discovery.
Some theoretical exploration techniques such as the Von Neumann probe (a self-replicating device) could
exhaustively explore a galaxy the size of the Milky Way in as little as half a million years, with comparatively little
investment in materials and energy relative to the results. If even a single civilization in the Milky Way attempted
this, such probes could spread throughout the entire galaxy. Evidence of such probes might be found in the Solar
Systemperhaps in the asteroid belt where raw materials would be plentiful and easily accessed.
Another possibility for contact with an alien probeone that would be trying to find human beingsis an alien
Bracewell probe. Such a device would be an autonomous space probe whose purpose is to seek out and communicate
with alien civilizations (as opposed to Von Neumann probes, which are usually described as purely exploratory).
These were proposed as an alternative to carrying a slow speed-of-light dialogue between vastly distant neighbours.
Rather than contending with the long delays a radio dialogue would suffer, a probe housing an artificial intelligence
would seek out an alien civilization to carry on a close range communication with the discovered civilization. The
findings of such a probe would still have to be transmitted to the home civilization at light speed, but an
information-gathering dialogue could be conducted in real time.
Since the 1950s, direct exploration has been carried out on a small fraction of the Solar System and no evidence that
it has ever been visited by alien colonists, or probes, has been uncovered. Detailed exploration of areas of the Solar
System where resources would be plentifulsuch as the asteroids, the Kuiper belt, the Oort cloud and the planetary
ring systemsmay yet produce evidence of alien exploration, though these regions are vast and difficult to
investigate. There have been preliminary efforts in this direction in the form of the SETA and SETV projects to
search for extraterrestrial artifacts or other evidence of extraterrestrial visitation within the Solar System. There have
also been attempts to signal, attract, or activate Bracewell probes in Earth's local vicinity, including by scientists
Robert Freitas and Francisco Valdes. Many of the projects that fall under this umbrella are considered "fringe"
science by astronomers and none of the projects has located any artifacts.
Should alien artifacts be discovered, even here on Earth, they may not be recognizable as such. The products of an
alien mind and an advanced alien technology might not be perceptible or recognizable as artificial constructs.
Exploratory devices in the form of bio-engineered life forms created through synthetic biology would presumably
disintegrate after a point, leaving no evidence; an alien information gathering system based on molecular
nanotechnology could be all around us at this very moment, completely undetected. The same might be true of
civilizations that actively hide their investigations from us, for possible reasons described further in this article. Also,
Clarke's third law suggests that an alien civilization well in advance of humanity's might have means of investigation
that are not yet conceivable to human beings.
381
Fermi paradox
382
Advanced stellar-scale artifacts

Further information: Dyson sphere, Kardashev scale, Alderson disk, Matrioshka brain, Stellar engine
In 1959, Freeman Dyson observed that
every developing human civilization
constantly increases its energy consumption,
and, theoretically, a civilization of sufficient
age would require all the energy produced
by its star. The Dyson Sphere was the
thought experiment that he derived as a
solution: a shell or cloud of objects
enclosing a star to harness as much radiant
energy as possible. Such a feat of
astroengineering would drastically alter the
observed spectrum of the star involved,
changing it at least partly from the normal
emission lines of a natural stellar
atmosphere to that of a black body radiation,
probably with a peak in the infrared. Dyson
himself speculated that advanced alien
civilizations might be detected by
examining the spectra of stars and searching
for such an altered spectrum.
A variant of the speculative Dyson sphere. Such large scale artifacts would
drastically alter the spectrum of a star.
Since then, several other theoretical

stellar-scale megastructures have been proposed, but the central idea remains that a highly advanced
civilizationType II or greater on the Kardashev scalecould alter its environment enough so as to be detectable
from interstellar distances.
However, such constructs may be more difficult to detect than originally thought. Dyson spheres might have
different emission spectra depending on the desired internal environment; life based on high-temperature reactions
may require a high temperature environment, with resulting "waste radiation" in the visible spectrum, not the
infrared.[14] Additionally, a variant of the Dyson sphere has been proposed which would be difficult to observe from
any great distance; a Matrioshka brain is a series of concentric spheres, each radiating less energy per area than its
inner neighbour. The outermost sphere of such a structure could be close to the temperature of the interstellar
background radiation, and thus be all but invisible.
There have been some preliminary attempts to find evidence of the existence of Dyson spheres or other large Type-II
or Type-III Kardashev scale artifacts that would alter the spectra of their core stars. These surveys have not located
anything yet, though they are still incomplete. Similarly, direct observation of thousands of galaxies has shown no
explicit evidence of artificial construction or modifications.
Explaining the paradox hypothetically

Certain theoreticians accept that the apparent absence of evidence implies the absence of extraterrestrials and attempt
to explain why. Others offer possible frameworks in which the silence may be explained without ruling out the
possibility of such life, including assumptions about extraterrestrial behaviour and technology. Each of these
hypothesized explanations is essentially an argument for decreasing the value of one or more of the terms in the
Drake equation. The arguments are not, in general, mutually exclusive. For example, it could be both that life is rare
and that technical civilizations are short lived, or many other combinations of the explanations below.
Fermi paradox
Few, if any, other civilizations currently exist

One explanation is that the human civilization is alone (or very nearly so) in the galaxy. Several theories along these
lines have been proposed, explaining why intelligent life might be either very rare, or very short lived. Implications
of these hypotheses are examined as the Great Filter.
No other civilizations have arisen
See also: Rare Earth hypothesis
Those who believe that extraterrestrial intelligent life does not exist argue that the conditions needed for lifeor at
least complex lifeto evolve are rare or even unique to Earth. This is known as the Rare Earth hypothesis, which
attempts to resolve the Fermi paradox by rejecting the mediocrity principle, and asserting that Earth is not typical,
but unusual or even unique. While a unique Earth has historically been assumed on philosophical or religious
grounds, the Rare Earth Hypothesis uses quantifiable and statistical arguments to argue that multicellular life is
exceedingly rare in the universe because Earth-like planets are themselves exceedingly rare and/or many improbable
coincidences have converged to make complex life on Earth possible. It is possible that complex life may evolve
through other mechanisms than those found specifically here on Earth, but the fact that in the history of life on the
Earth only one species has developed a civilization to the point of being capable of space flight and radio technology
lends more credence to the idea of technologically advanced civilizations being rare in the universe.
For example, the emergence of intelligence may have been an evolutionary accident. Geoffrey Miller proposes that
human intelligence is the result of runaway sexual selection, which takes unpredictable directions. Steven Pinker, in
his book How the Mind Works, cautions that the idea that evolution of life (once it has reached a certain minimum
complexity) is bound to produce intelligent beings relies on the fallacy of the "ladder of evolution": Since evolution
does not strive for a goal but just happens, it uses the adaptation most useful for a given ecological niche, and the
fact that, on Earth, this led to technological intelligence only once so far may suggest that this outcome of natural
selection is rare and hence by no means a certain development of the evolution of a tree of life.
Another hypothesis estimates that evolution to the stage of intelligent life required about ten billion years, rather than
five billion years normally assumed. This implies that the first five billion years of our own evolution occurred in
other locations, for instance planets that existed before the Earth. According to this hypothesis, intelligent life is rare
because it is only now that enough time has elapsed since the big bang for evolution to occur. Another hypothesis
along these lines is that, even if conditions needed for life are common in the universe, the initial abiogenesis on a
potentially life-bearing planet the formation of life itself the existence of a complex array of molecules that are
simultaneously capable of reproduction, extraction of base components from the environment, and obtaining energy
in a form that can be used to maintain the reaction, might ultimately be very rare.
Additionally, in the nondirectional meandering from initial life to humans, other low-probability happenings may
have been the transition from prokaryotic cells to eukaryotic cells (with separate nucleus, organelles, specialization,
and a cytoskeleton allowing the cell to take on various shapes) and the transition from single-cellular life to
multicellular life, which was recorded in the Cambrian Explosion of 530 million years ago when significant numbers
of organisms evolved hard body parts, although multicellular life perhaps first started to evolve a couple of hundred
million years before that. Single celled life emerged c. 3.5 billion years ago, and for most of Earth's history and for
reasons not fully understood there have only been single-celled creatures. And even fundamental conditions such as
the chemical composition of the nursery nebula from which a planetary system forms could have unusual or
detrimental consequences for the emergence and survival of life.
And there are many other potential branching points. For example, perhaps the transition from ocean creatures to
land-dwelling creatures crucially depends on an unusually large moon and significant tides. Many astronomers refer
to our Earth-Moon pairing as a double planet. This ratio between parent and satellite is rare in our planetary system.
There is no observational data on the numbers of "double planets" in other planetary systems. The obliquity of
Earth's axis of rotation is 23.5 with 1.5 variation over 41,000 years. Mars has an obliquity of 25 with 10
383
Fermi paradox
variation over 100,000 years, and calculations indicate over longer time periods, Mars' obliquity changes chaotically,
perhaps ranging from 0 to 60 over the last 10 million years. With no Moon to act as a stabilizing influence, Earth's
obliquity might also wander chaotically.
It is also possible that intelligence is common, but industrial civilization is not. For example, the rise of industrialism
on Earth was driven by the presence of convenient energy sources such as fossil fuels. If such energy sources are rare
or nonexistent elsewhere, then it may be far more difficult for an intelligent alien race to advance technologically to
the point where humans could communicate with it. There may also be other unique factors on which our civilization
is dependent. For example, in a planet covered with water, where intelligent life takes the form of creatures similar to
dolphins, it may be difficult or impossible to discover fire or forge metals.
Another possibility is that Earth is the first planet in the Milky Way on which industrial civilization can arise.
However, critics note that, according to current understanding, many Earth-like planets were created many billions
of years prior to Earth, so this explanation requires repudiation of the mediocrity principle.
Insofar as the Rare Earth Hypothesis privileges life on Earth and its process of formation, it is a variant of the
anthropic principle. The variant of the anthropic principle states the universe seems uniquely suited towards
developing human intelligence. This philosophical stance opposes not only the mediocrity principle, but also the
wider Copernican principle, which suggests there is no privileged location in the universe.
Opponents dismiss both Rare Earth and the anthropic principle as tautologicalif a condition must exist in the
universe for human life to arise, then the universe must already meet that condition, as human life existsand as an
argument from incredulity or lack of imagination. According to this analysis, the Rare Earth hypothesis confuses a
description of how life on Earth arose with a uniform conclusion of how life must arise.[15] While the probability of
the specific conditions on Earth being widely replicated is low, we do not know what complex life may require in
order to evolve.
It is the nature of intelligent life to destroy itself
This is the argument that technological civilizations may usually or invariably destroy themselves before or shortly
after developing radio or space flight technology. Possible means of annihilation include nuclear war, biological
warfare or accidental contamination, climate change, nanotechnological catastrophe, ill-advised physics
experiments,[16] a badly programmed super-intelligence, or a Malthusian catastrophe after the deterioration of a
planet's ecosphere. This general theme is explored both in fiction and in mainstream scientific theorizing. Indeed,
there are probabilistic arguments which suggest that human extinction may occur sooner rather than later. In 1966
Sagan and Shklovskii speculated that technological civilizations will either tend to destroy themselves within a
century of developing interstellar communicative capability or master their self-destructive tendencies and survive
for billion-year timescales. Self-annihilation may also be viewed in terms of thermodynamics: insofar as life is an
ordered system that can sustain itself against the tendency to disorder, the "external transmission" or interstellar
communicative phase may be the point at which the system becomes unstable and self-destructs.
From a Darwinian perspective, self-destruction would be an ironic outcome of evolutionary success. The
evolutionary psychology that developed during the competition for scarce resources over the course of human
evolution has left the species subject to aggressive, instinctual drives. These compel humanity to consume resources,
extend longevity, and to reproducein part, the very motives that led to the development of technological society. It
seems likely that intelligent extraterrestrial life would evolve in a similar fashion and thus face the same possibility
of self-destruction. And yet, to provide a good answer to Fermi's Question, self-destruction by technological species
(or any sociological explanation) would have to be a near universal occurrence. Otherwise, the few civilizations to
which it does not apply would colonize the galaxy.
This argument does not require the civilization to entirely self-destruct, only to become once again
non-technological. In other ways it could persist and even thrive according to evolutionary standards, which
postulate producing offspring as the sole goal of lifenot "progress", be it in terms of technology or even
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Fermi paradox
intelligence.
It is the nature of intelligent life to destroy others
See also: Technological singularity and Von Neumann probe
Another possibility is that an intelligent species beyond a certain point of technological capability will destroy other
intelligence as it appears, as is exemplified by the theorised extermination of Neanderthals by early humans. The
idea that something, or someone, is destroying intelligent life in the universe has been well explored in science
fiction[17] and scientific literature. A species might undertake such extermination out of expansionist motives,
paranoia, or simple aggression. In 1981, cosmologist Edward Harrison argued that such behavior would be an act of
prudence: an intelligent species that has overcome its own self-destructive tendencies might view any other species
bent on galactic expansion as a kind of virus. It has also been suggested that a successful alien species would be a
superpredator, as is Homo sapiens.
This hypothesis requires at least one civilization to have arisen in the past, and the first civilization would not have
faced this problem. However, it could still be that Earth is alone now. Like exploration, the extermination of other
civilizations might be carried out with self-replicating spacecraft. Under such a scenario, even if a civilization that
created such machines were to disappear, the probes could outlive their creators, destroying civilizations far into the
future.
This scenario reduces the number of visible civilizations in two ways, by destroying some civilizations, and by
forcing others to remain quiet, under fear of discovery so we would see no signs of them, making their lack of
interaction a choice. This may also make it impossible for life to evolve in regions of the universe close to a
developed civilization, assuring that any new civilizations will start off far away from preexisting ones.
Life is periodically destroyed by naturally occurring events
On Earth, there have been numerous major extinction events that destroyed the majority of complex species alive at
the time. The extinction of the dinosaurs is the best known example. These are believed to be caused by events such
as impact from a large meteorite, massive volcanic eruptions, or astronomical events such as gamma ray bursts. It
may be the case that such extinction events are common throughout the universe and periodically destroy intelligent
life (or at least destroy their civilizations) before the species is able to develop the technology to communicate with
other species.[18]
Human beings were created alone
Religious and philosophical speculation about extraterrestrial intelligent life long predates modern scientific inquiry
into the subject. Greek philosophers Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus (5th and 4th centuries BC) suggested that
there may be other inhabited worlds. Some religious thinkers, including the Jewish philosopher Rabbi Hasdai
Crescas (c. 13401410/1411) and the Christian philosopher Nicholas of Cusa (14011464), also put forward their
views of the possibility of such extraterrestrial intelligence.
On the other hand, philosophers such as Aristotle and religious thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas claim that human
beings are unique in the divine plan and counsel against belief in intelligent life on other worlds. Aristotle believed
the element of the heavens was Fire, as opposed to Earth, and so the heavens could not support life. Thomas Aquinas
additionally believed the uniqueness of God implied the uniqueness of Earth, and also notes the Bible refers to the
world in the singular.
Religious reasons for doubting the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent life resemble some forms of the Rare Earth
Hypothesis. The argument here would be a teleological form of the strong anthropic principle: the universe was
designed for the express purpose of creating human (and only human) intelligence. This argument presupposes that a
prior advanced intelligence existed in order to create human life, which might pose the question whether that
intelligence was the only one to exist before it created us, but the perspective is a philosophical and abstract one.
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Fermi paradox
Inflation hypothesis and the youngness argument
Cosmologist Alan Guth proposed a multi-verse solution to the Fermi paradox. In this scenario, using the
synchronous gauge probability distribution, young universes exceedingly outnumber older ones (by a factor of e1037
for every second of age). Therefore, averaged over all universes, universes with civilizations will almost always have
just one, the first to develop. However, Guth notes "Perhaps this argument explains why SETI has not found any
signals from alien civilizations, but I nd it more plausible that it is merely a symptom that the synchronous gauge
probability distribution is not the right one."
They do exist, but we see no evidence

It may be that technological extraterrestrial civilizations exist but that human beings cannot communicate with them
because of constraints such as problems of scale or technology. Perhaps their nature is too alien for meaningful
communication or their methods of communication too alien even to be recognized as technology. Even on our own
planet, there are immense differences between a blue whale and a common ant. The differences may be even greater
between human beings and members of extraterrestrial civilizations. Perhaps, also, they may not wish to
communicate with us.
Communication is improbable due to problems of scale
See also: Relativity of simultaneity
Intelligent civilizations are too far apart in space or time
It may be that non-colonizing technologically capable alien
civilizations exist, but that they are simply too far apart for meaningful
two-way communication. If two civilizations are separated by several
thousand light years, it is very possible that one or both cultures may
become extinct before meaningful dialogue can be established. Human
searches may be able to detect their existence, but communication will
remain impossible because of distance. This problem might be
ameliorated somewhat if contact/communication is made through a
Bracewell probe. In this case at least one partner in the exchange may
NASA's conception of the Terrestrial Planet
obtain meaningful information. Alternatively, a civilization may
Finder
simply broadcast its knowledge, and leave it to the receiver to make
what they may of it. This is similar to the transmission of information
from ancient civilizations to the present, and humanity has undertaken similar activities like the Arecibo message,
which could transfer information about Earth's intelligent species, even if it never yields a response (or does not yield
a response in time for humanity to receive it). It is also possible that archaeological evidence of past civilizations
may be detected through deep space observationsespecially if they left behind large artifacts such as Dyson
spheres.
The problem of distance is compounded by the fact that timescales affording a "window of opportunity" for
detection or contact might be quite small. Advanced civilizations may periodically arise and fall throughout our
galaxy, but this may be such a rare event, relatively speaking, that the odds of two or more such civilizations existing
at the same time are low. There may have been intelligent civilizations in the galaxy before the emergence of
intelligence on Earth, and there may be intelligent civilizations after its extinction, but it is possible that human
beings are the only intelligent civilization in existence now. The term "now" is somewhat complicated by the finite
speed of light and the nature of spacetime under relativity. Assuming that an extraterrestrial intelligence is not able to
travel to our vicinity at faster-than-light speeds, in order to detect an intelligence 1,000 light-years distant, that
intelligence will need to have been active 1,000 years ago. Strictly speaking, only the portions of the universe lying
386
Fermi paradox
within the past light cone of Earth need be considered, since any civilizations outside it could not be detected.
Another issue is the possibly very small length of time (even in historical timescales) that a civilization might be
"loudly" broadcasting material that could be reasonably detected (see below).
A related argument holds that other civilizations exist, and are transmitting and exploring, but their signals and
probes simply have not arrived yet. However, critics have noted that this is unlikely, since it requires that humanity's
advancement has occurred at a very special point in time, while the Milky Way is in transition from empty to full.
This is a tiny fraction of the life of a galaxy under ordinary assumptions and calculations resulting from them, so the
likelihood that we're in the midst of this transition is considered low in the paradox. Work on the theory of
neocatastrophism, wherein galactic and even super-galactic dynamics are seen as possibly frequently injurious to
extant biospheres in a way that is roughly analogous to the way geological and climatological catastrophes have
occasionally set back biological developments on Earth, might be given as a partial, if not full, resolution to the
paradox, as advanced species might well be fragile to major events at a pace that would argue against a short
transition.
It is too expensive to spread physically throughout the galaxy
See also: Project Daedalus, Project Orion (nuclear propulsion) and Project Longshot
Many assumptions about the ability of an alien culture to colonize other stars are based on the idea that interstellar
travel is technologically feasible. While the current understanding of physics rules out the possibility of faster than
light travel, it appears that there are no major theoretical barriers to the construction of "slow" interstellar ships, even
though the engineering required is considerably beyond present capabilities. This idea underlies the concept of the
Von Neumann probe and the Bracewell probe as evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence.
It is possible, however, that present scientific knowledge cannot properly gauge the feasibility and costs of such
interstellar colonization. Theoretical barriers may not yet be understood and the cost of materials and energy for such
ventures may be so high as to make it unlikely that any civilization could afford to attempt it. Even if interstellar
travel and colonization are possible, they may be difficult, leading to a colonization model based on percolation
theory. Colonization efforts may not occur as an unstoppable rush, but rather as an uneven tendency to "percolate"
outwards, within an eventual slowing and termination of the effort given the enormous costs involved and the fact
that colonies will inevitably develop a culture and civilization of their own. Colonization may thus occur in
"clusters," with large areas remaining uncolonized at any one time.Wikipedia:No original research
A similar argument holds that interstellar physical travel may be possible, but is much more expensive than
interstellar communication. Furthermore, to an advanced civilization, travel itself may be replaced by
communication, through mind uploading and similar technologies. Therefore the first civilization may have
physically explored or colonized the galaxy, but subsequent civilizations find it cheaper, faster, and easier to travel
and get information through contacting existing civilizations rather than physically exploring or traveling
themselves. In this scenario, since there is little or no physical travel, and directed communications are hard to see
except to the intended receiver, there could be many technical and interacting civilizations with few signs visible
across interstellar distances.
Another economic argument is that although advanced virtual civilizations possibly en route developmentally to a
Matrioshka Brain could engage in travel to other star systems, they choose not to. This is not due to a lack of
curiosity, but more through a set of energy-information economic choices, whereby in an information market
predicated on available stellar energy and planetary matter for building more computing capacity, the most
successful virtual intelligences have to remain central to the star. Energy and proximity (and therefore wireless
communication bandwidth and speed) are much greater closer to the matter and energy sources of the star, and larger
planets, and so to be successful requires focus on their home planetary system. In this scenario, economic incentives
to travel out of a star system are inhibited.
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Fermi paradox
Human beings have not been searching long enough
Humanity's ability to detect and comprehend intelligent extraterrestrial life has existed for only a very brief
periodfrom 1937 onwards, if the invention of the radio telescope is taken as the dividing lineand Homo sapiens
is a geologically recent species. The whole period of modern human existence to date (about 200,000 years) is a very
brief period on a cosmological scale, while radio transmissions have only been propagated since 1895. Thus it
remains possible that human beings have neither been searching long enough to find other intelligences, nor been in
existence long enough to be found.
One million years ago there would have been no humans for any extraterrestrial emissaries to meet. For each further
step back in time, there would have been increasingly fewer indications to such emissaries that intelligent life would
develop on Earth. In a large and already ancient universe, a space-faring alien species may well have had many other
more promising worlds to visit and revisit. Even if alien emissaries visited in more recent times, they may have been
interpreted by early human cultures as supernatural entities.
This hypothesis is more plausible if alien civilizations tend to stagnate or die out, rather than expand. In addition,
"the probability of a site never being visited, even [with an] infinite time limit, is a non-zero value." Thus, even if
intelligent life expands elsewhere, it remains statistically possible that such extraterrestrial life might never discover
Earth.
Communication is improbable for technical reasons
Humans are not listening properly
There are some assumptions that underlie the SETI search programs that may cause searchers to miss signals that are
present. For example, the radio searches to date would completely miss highly compressed data streams (which
would be almost indistinguishable from "white noise" to anyone who did not understand the compression algorithm).
Extraterrestrials might also use frequencies that scientists have decided are unlikely to carry signals, or do not
penetrate our atmosphere (e.g., gamma rays), or use modulation strategies that are not being looked for. The signals
might be at a data rate that is too fast for our electronics to handle, or too slow to be recognised as attempts at
communication. "Simple" broadcast techniques might be employed, but sent from non-main sequence stars which
are searched with lower priority; current programs assume that most alien life will be orbiting Sun-like stars.
The greatest problem is the sheer size of the radio search needed to look for signals (effectively spanning the entire
visible universe), the limited amount of resources committed to SETI, and the sensitivity of modern instruments.
SETI estimates, for instance, that with a radio telescope as sensitive as the Arecibo Observatory, Earth's television
and radio broadcasts would only be detectable at distances up to 0.3 light years. Clearly detecting an Earth type
civilization at great distances is difficult. A signal is much easier to detect if the signal energy is limited to either a
narrow range of frequencies (narrowband transmissions), and/or directed at a specific part of the sky. Such signals
can be detected at ranges of hundreds to tens of thousands of light-years distance. However this means that detectors
must be listening to an appropriate range of frequencies, and be in that region of space to which the beam is being
sent. Many SETI searches, starting with the venerable Project Cyclops, go so far as to assume that extraterrestrial
civilizations will be broadcasting a deliberate signal (like the Arecibo message), in order to be found.
Thus to detect alien civilizations through their radio emissions, Earth observers either need more sensitive
instruments or must hope for fortunate circumstances: that the broadband radio emissions of alien radio technology
are much stronger than our own (e.g., gamma-ray bursts); that one of SETI's programs is listening to the correct
frequencies from the right regions of space; or that aliens are sending focused transmissions such as the Arecibo
message in our general direction.
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Fermi paradox
Aliens aren't monitoring Earth because Earth is not superhabitable
The Milky Way contains billions of worlds that may support life. Listening for radio signals from all planets may be
too complex, or may require too many separate telescopes and monitoring devices. If that is the case, aliens may
focus on superhabitable planets, and ignore marginally habitable planets such as the Earth.
Civilizations broadcast detectable radio signals only for a brief period of time
It may be that alien civilizations are detectable through their radio emissions for only a short time, reducing the
likelihood of spotting them. There are two possibilities in this regard: civilizations outgrow radio through
technological advance or, conversely, resource depletion cuts short the time in which a species broadcasts.
The first idea, that civilizations advance beyond radio, is based in part on the "fiber optic objection": the use of high
power radio with low-to-medium gain (i.e., non-directional) antennas for long-distance transmission is wasteful of
spectrum, yet this "waste" is precisely what makes these systems conspicuous at interstellar distances. Humans are
moving to directional or guided transmission channels such as electrical cables, optical fibers, narrow-beam
microwave and lasers, and conventional radio with non-directional antennas is increasingly reserved for low-power,
short-range applications such as cell phones and Wi-Fi networks. These signals are far less detectable from space.
Analog television, developed in the mid-20th century, contains strong carriers to aid reception and demodulation.
Carriers are spectral lines that are very easily detected yet do not convey any information beyond their highly
artificial nature. Nearly every SETI project is looking for carriers for just this reason, and UHF TV carriers are the
most conspicuous and artificial signals from Earth that could be detected at interstellar distances. But advances in
technology are replacing analog TV with digital television which uses spectrum more efficiently by eliminating or
reducing components such as carriers that make them so conspicuous. Using our own experience as an example, we
could set the date of radio-visibility for Earth as December 12, 1901, when Guglielmo Marconi sent radio signals
from Cornwall, England, to Newfoundland, Canada. Visibility is now ending, or at least becoming orders of
magnitude more difficult, as analog TV is being phased out. And so, if our experience is typical, a civilization
remains radio-visible for approximately a hundred years. So a civilization may have been very visible from 1325 to
1483, but we were just not listening at that time. This is essentially the solution, "Everyone is listening, no one is
sending."
More hypothetically, advanced alien civilizations evolve beyond broadcasting at all in the electromagnetic spectrum
and communicate by principles of physics we don't yet understand. Some scientists have hypothesized that advanced
civilizations may send neutrino signals. If such signals exist they could be detectable by neutrino detectors that are
now under construction. If stable wormholes could be created and used for communications then interstellar
broadcasts would become largely redundant. Thus it may be that other civilizations would only be detectable for a
relatively short period of time between the discovery of radio and the switch to more efficient technologies.
One counter to this argument is that although broadcast communication may become difficult to detect, other uses
for radio such as radar and power transmission cannot be replaced by low power technologies or fiber optics. These
will potentially remain visible even after broadcast emission are replaced by less observable technology.
A different argument is that resource depletion will soon result in a decline in technological capability. Human
civilization has been capable of interstellar radio communication for only a few decades and is already rapidly
depleting fossil fuels and confronting possible problems such as peak oil. It may only be a few more decades before
energy becomes too expensive, and the necessary electronics and computers too difficult to manufacture, for us to
continue the search. If the same conditions regarding energy supplies hold true for other civilizations, then radio
technology may be a short-lived phenomenon. Unless two civilizations happen to be near each other and develop the
ability to communicate at the same time it would be virtually impossible for any one civilization to "talk" to another.
Critics of the resource depletion argument point out that alternate energy sources exist, such as solar power, which
are renewable and have enormous potential relative to technical barriers. For depletion of fossil fuels to end the
"technological phase" of a civilization, some form of technological regression would have to invariably occur,
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Fermi paradox
preventing the exploitation of renewable energy sources.
They tend to experience a technological singularity
See also: Sentience Quotient and Matrioshka brain
Another possibility is that technological civilizations invariably experience a technological singularity and attain a
posthuman (or more properly, post-biological) character. Hypothetical civilizations of this sort may have advanced
drastically enough to render communication impossible. The intelligences of a post-singularity civilization might
require more information exchange than is possible through interstellar communication, for example. Or perhaps any
information humanity might provide would appear elementary, and thus they do not try to communicate, any more
than human beings attempt to talk to antseven though we do ascribe a form of intelligence to them. For example, a
superintelligent civilization might consist of an advanced megastructure such as a Matrioshka brain or a black hole
and communicate using neutrinos or by gamma-ray bursts at bandwidths that exceed our receiving capabilities.
Even more extreme forms of post-singularity have been suggested, particularly in fiction: beings that divest
themselves of physical form, create massive artificial virtual environments, transfer themselves into these
environments through mind uploading, and exist totally within virtual worlds, ignoring the external physical
universe. Surprisingly early treatments, such as Lewis Padgett's short story Mimsy were the Borogoves (1943),
suggest a migration of advanced beings out of the presently known physical universe into a different and presumably
more agreeable alternative one.
The transcension hypothesis of singularity scholar John Smart proposes that the evolutionary development of
accelerating change may require complex systems to inhabit increasingly local domains of space and time, leading
post-singularity civilizations to black-hole-like domains, and nonlocal access to other universal intelligence. A
powerful ethical injunction against sending self-replicating probes or broadcasting messages prior to transcension
might emerge if such one-way messaging would proveably reduce the evolutionary diversity of all civilizations
receiving the messages, as they would no longer transcend in their own unique way. Smart proposes tests of the
hypothesis via future high-sensitivity radio and optical SETI searches, including regular ending of passive EM
signals from Earth-like planets once they reach their technological singularities, and later optical transition of these
planets to black-hole-like objects.[19]
They are too busy online
It may be that intelligent alien life forms cause their own "increasing disinterest" in the outside world. Perhaps any
sufficiently advanced society will develop highly engaging media and entertainment well before the capacity for
advanced space travel, and that the rate of appeal of these social contrivances is destined, because of their inherent
reduced complexity, to overtake any desire for complex, expensive endeavors such as space exploration and
communication. Once any sufficiently advanced civilization becomes able to master its environment, and most of its
physical needs are met through technology, various "social and entertainment technologies", including virtual reality,
are postulated to become the primary drivers and motivations of that civilization.
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Fermi paradox
They are too alien
Another possibility is that human theoreticians have underestimated how much alien life might differ from that on
Earth. Aliens may be psychologically unwilling to attempt to communicate with human beings. Perhaps human
mathematics is parochial to Earth and not shared by other life,[20] though others argue this can only apply to abstract
math since the math associated with physics must be similar (in results, if not in methods.)
Physiology might also cause a communication barrier. In Contact, Carl Sagan briefly speculated that an alien species
might have a thought process orders of magnitude slower (or faster) than humans. Such a species could conceivably
speak so slowly that it requires years to say even a simple phrase like "Hello". A message broadcast by that species
might well seem like random background noise to humans, and therefore go undetected.
They are non-technological
It may be that at least some civilizations of intelligent beings are not technological, perhaps because it is difficult in
their environment, or because they choose not to, or for other reasons yet unknown. Such civilizations would be very
hard for humans to detect. While there are remote sensing techniques which could perhaps detect life-bearing planets
without relying on the signs of technology,[21] none of them has any ability to tell if any detected life is intelligent.
Not even any theoretical methods for doing so have been proposed, short of an actual physical visit by an astronaut
or probe. This is sometimes referred to as the "algae vs. alumnae" problem.
The evidence is being suppressed
It is theoretically possible that SETI groups are not reporting positive detections, or governments have been blocking
extraterrestrial signals or suppressing publication of detections. This response might be attributed to National
Security and Trade Interests from the potential use of advanced extraterrestrial technology or weapons. It has been
suggested that the detection of an extraterrestrial radio signal or technology could well be the most highly classified
military information that exists. Claims that this has already happened are common in the popular press, but the
scientists involved report the opposite experience the press becomes informed and interested in a potential
detection even before a signal can be confirmed.[22] Another issue is the diverse number of organisations and
governments involved in science activities that might chance upon detections, of which SETI forms only a small
part. Numerous conspiracy theories have been proposed, including the possibility of extraterrestrial life at Area 51.
They choose not to interact with us
In these scenarios, alien civilizations exist that are technically capable of contacting Earth, but explicitly choose not
to do so. This is the official position of the Earth today; we listen (SETI), but except for a few small efforts, do not
explicitly transmit. Of course if all, or even most, civilizations act the same way, the galaxy could be full of
civilizations eager for contact, but everyone is listening and no one is transmitting. This is the so-called SETI
Paradox.
They don't agree among themselves
Official policy within SETI community is that "[no] response to a signal or other evidence of extraterrestrial
intelligence should be sent until appropriate international consultations have taken place." However, given the
possible impact of any reply it may be very difficult to obtain any consensus on "Who speaks for Earth?" and "What
should we say?" Other civilizations might suffer from this same lack of consensus, and therefore send no messages at
all.
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Fermi paradox
392
Earth is deliberately not contacted (the zoo hypothesis)

Main article: Zoo hypothesis
The zoo hypothesis states that superintelligent extraterrestrial life
exists and does not contact life on Earth to allow for its natural
evolution and development.
These ideas are perhaps most plausible if there is a relatively universal
cultural or legal policy among a plurality of extraterrestrial
civilizations necessitating isolation with respect to alien life. In a
Universe without a hegemonic power, random civilizations with
independent principles would, in all likelihood, make contact. This
makes a crowded Universe with clearly defined rules seem more
plausible.
Schematic representation of a planetarium
This theory may break down under the uniformity of motive flaw: all it
simulating the universe to humans. The "real"
universe
is outside the black sphere, the simulated
takes is a single culture or civilization to decide to act contrary to the
one projected on/filtered through it.
imperative within our range of detection for it to be abrogated, and the
probability of such a violation increases with the number of
civilizations. However, perhaps a sufficiently technologically and socially advanced civilization would be capable of
enforcing rules.
T. W. Hair[23] has done Monte Carlo analysis of the inter-arrival times between civilizations in the galaxy based on
common astrobiological assumptions that suggest that since the initial civilization would have such a commanding
lead over the later arrivals, it may have established what we call zoo hypothesis as a galactic/universal norm and the
resultant "paradox" by a cultural founder effect with or without the continued activity of the founder.
Compare with the Prime Directive from Star Trek.
Earth is purposely isolated (planetarium hypothesis)
Main article: Planetarium hypothesis
A related idea is that, beyond a certain distance, the perceived universe is a simulated reality. The planetarium
hypothesis holds that beings may have created this simulation so that the universe appears to be empty of other life.
It is dangerous to communicate
An alien civilization might feel it is too dangerous to communicate, either for us or for them. After all, when very
different civilizations have met on Earth, the results have often been disastrous for one side or the other, and the
same may well apply to interstellar contact. Even contact at a safe distance could lead to infection by computer code
or even ideas themselves (see meme). Perhaps prudent civilizations actively hide not only from us but from
everyone, out of fear of other civilizations.
The Fermi paradox itself is what prevents communication
Perhaps the Fermi paradox itselfor the alien equivalent of itis the ultimate reason for any civilization to avoid
contact with other civilizations, even if no other obstacles existed. From any one civilization's point of view, it would
be unlikely for them to be the first ones to make first contact. Therefore it is likely that previous civilizations faced
fatal problems with first contact. So perhaps every civilization keeps quiet because of the possibility that there is a
real reason for others to do so.
Fermi paradox
They are here unobserved
It may be that intelligent alien life forms not only exist, but are already present here on Earth. They are not detected
because they do not wish it, human beings are technically unable to, or because societies refuse to admit to the
evidence. Several variations of this idea have been proposed:
Carl Sagan and Iosif Shklovsky argued for serious consideration of "paleocontact" with extraterrestrials in the early
historical era, and for examination of myths and religious lore for evidence of such contact. Sagan and Shklovsky
noted that many or most religions were founded by men who claimed contact with supernatural entities who
bestowed wisdom, guidance and technology, citing the fish-god Oannes as a particularly salient example. This can
be a case of any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic, Clarke's third law.
It is possible that a life form technologically advanced enough to travel to Earth might also be sufficiently advanced
to exist here undetected. In this view, the aliens have arrived on Earth, or in our solar system, and are observing the
planet, while concealing their presence. Observation could conceivably be conducted in a number of ways that
would be very difficult to detect. For example, a complex system of microscopic monitoring devices constructed via
molecular nanotechnology could be deployed on Earth and remain undetected, or sophisticated instruments could
conduct passive monitoring from elsewhere while concealing themselves with stealth technologies that need not be
much more advanced than current terrestrial ones.
UFO researchers note that the Fermi Paradox arose within the context of a wave of UFO reports, yet Fermi, Teller,
York and Konopinski apparently dismissed the possibility that flying saucers might be extraterrestrial despite
contemporary US Air Force investigations that judged a small portion of UFO reports as inexplicable by
contemporary technology. Mainstream scientific publications have occasionally addressed the possibility of
extraterrestrial contact, but the scientific community in general has given little serious attention to claims of
unidentified flying objects or to the extraterrestrial hypothesis. Given that UFO investigators argue compelling
evidence supports the reality of UFOs as anomalies, but that extant UFO evidence does not support an
extraterrestrial origin, it is suggested that closer examination of UFO data may support or falsify the Fermi paradox
and/or the extraterrestrial hypothesis of UFO origins: "Any refusal of interest [by mainstream scientists] in
investigating the UFO phenomenon, using an ETI [extraterrestrial intelligence] concept as one working hypothesis,
should surely be astonishing."[24] Others however argue that the lack of solid photographic evidence, despite billions
of cell-phone, dashboard, and surveillance cameras, indicates that pursuing UFO reports is unlikely to be fruitful.
This extraterrestrial hypothesis was jokingly suggested in response to Fermi's paradox by his fellow physicist, Le
Szilrd, who suggested to Fermi that extraterrestrials "are already among usbut they call themselves Hungarians",
a humorous reference to the peculiar Hungarian language, unrelated to most other languages spoken in Europe.[25]
In science fiction and other media

Many, perhaps most, of the serious explanations for the Fermi Paradox have appeared in science fiction literature,
along with many that are not so serious. Less commonly the Fermi Paradox appears in other media. Examples
include:
Literature
Books
Manifold: Space (2000) by Stephen Baxter and the other books in this series
Existence (2012) by David Brin
Short stories
"Fermi and Frost" (1985) by Frederik Pohl
"The Fermi Paradox Is Our Business Model" (August 11, 2010) by Charlie Jane Anders
"Fermi's Urbex Paradox" by TerraHerz, published online
393
Fermi paradox
Movies
The Fermi Paradox
Music
Fermi Paradox (2002), album by Tub Ring
"The Fermi Paradox: a Song" by Hank Green, on YouTube
Notes
[1] The Washington Post (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ opinions/ are-we-alone-in-the-universe/ 2011/ 12/ 29/ gIQA2wSOPP_story. html)
[2] Sagan, Carl Cosmos, Random House 2002 ISBN 0-375-50832-5
[3] Crawford, I.A., "Where are They? Maybe we are alone in the galaxy after all" (http:/ / www. scientificamerican. com/ article.
cfm?id=where-are-they), Scientific American, July 2000, 3843, (2000).
[4] The Soviet astronomer Nikolai Kardashev has stated that an alien civilization on Kardashev scale of 3 could send signals up to 10 billion light
years.
[5] Let UNIQ-math-0-e545348fab159bc7-QINU be the number of civilizations (per unit volume) that can be seen at a radius
UNIQ-math-1-e545348fab159bc7-QINU . Let UNIQ-math-2-e545348fab159bc7-QINU be the radius of the galaxy. So the number of
civilizations we see is:
UNIQ-math-3-e545348fab159bc7-QINU
where the first integral are those in the galaxy, and the second those outside. Which integral is bigger depends on how fast N(r) decreases,
which is completely unknown. This observation is due to Kardashev.
[6] Jones, Eric "Where is everybody?", An account of Fermi's question" (http:/ / www. fas. org/ sgp/ othergov/ doe/ lanl/ la-10311-ms. pdf), Los
Alamos Technical report LA-10311-MS, March, 1985.
[7] Chapter 6, What does a Martian look like?.
[8] Note that, even though there is at least one civilization in our galaxy (namely our own), the average or "most likely" number of civilizations
in our galaxy as described by this equation may still be smaller than one. In other words, the fact that there is at least one civilization in our
galaxy does not mean that this was a likely outcome. This is an example of anthropic bias. No civilization can use itself to estimate the
average number of civilizations in a galaxy, since if there was not at least one civilization the question could not arise. The Drake equation
computes only the long-term average number of civilizations; even if the average number of civilizations per galaxy is less than one, there
could be more than one in any given galaxy at any given time.
[9] Gowdy, Robert H., VCU Department of Physics SETI: Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence. The Interstellar Distance Problem (http:/ /
www. courses. vcu. edu/ PHY-rhg/ astron/ html/ mod/ 019/ s5. html), 2008
[10] See, for example, the SETI Institute, The Harvard SETI Home Page (http:/ / seti. harvard. edu/ seti/ ), or The Search for Extra Terrestrial
Intelligence at Berkeley (http:/ / seti. berkeley. edu/ )
[11] Pulsars are now attributed to neutron stars, and Seyfert galaxies to an end-on view of the accretion onto the black holes.
[12] SETI@home FAQ, How far away could we detect radio transmissions? (http:/ / setifaq. org/ faq. html#1. 2. 3)
[13] The Light of Alien Cities (http:/ / www. centauri-dreams. org/ ?p=20482)
[14] Niven, Larry, "Bigger than Worlds", Analog, March 1974.
[15] Andreadis, Athena "E. T., Call Springer-Verlag!" (http:/ / www. setileague. org/ reviews/ rarearth. htm) SETI League Publications, 2000.
[16] An example of fears of civilization-destroying physics experiments. This particular fear (particle colliders creating black holes, destroying
the false vacuum, etc.) is discounted among scientists, since cosmic rays of much higher energy have been striking the Earth and Moon for
eons. ( NYT article (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2008/ 06/ 21/ science/ 21blackhole. html), Technical report (http:/ / lsag. web. cern. ch/ lsag/
LSAG-Report. pdf)).
[17] See, for example, Berserker (Saberhagen), The Heechee Saga (Pohl), Revelation Space (Reynolds)
[18] Section 12.5 The Fermi Paradox and Mass Extinctions.
[19] Smart, John, "The Transcension Hypothesis: Sufficiently Advanced Civilizations May Invariably Leave Our Universe, and Implications for
METI and SETI" (http:/ / accelerating. org/ articles/ transcensionhypothesis. html), Acta Astronautica, 78:55-68, 2012.
[20] Schombert, James. "Fermi's paradox (i.e. Where are they?)" (http:/ / abyss. uoregon. edu/ ~js/ cosmo/ lectures/ lec28. html) Cosmology
Lectures, University of Oregon.
[21] Arxiv preprint (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ 0710. 1444).
[22] Page 17.
[23] Hair, Thomas W. (2011). "Temporal Dispersion of the Emergence of Intelligence: An Inter-arrival Time Analysis", International Journal of
Astrobiology 10(2): 131135 (2011), (http:/ / journals. cambridge. org/ action/ displayAbstract?fromPage=online& aid=8143571)
[24] Swords, Michael D. (1989) "Science and the Extraterrestrial Hypothesis", Journal of UFO Studies, New Series 1, 1989, 67102, p. 88;
reprinted in pp. 368373 in Jerome Clark's The UFO Encyclopedia: The Phenomenon from the Beginning. 2nd edition. 1998. Omingraphics.
ISBN 0-7808-0097-4
394
Fermi paradox
[25] See, for example, George Marx's 1995 lecture, " Conflicts and Creativity The Hungarian Lesson (http:/ / epa. oszk. hu/ 00300/ 00342/
00113/ marx1. html)", which was based on his 1994 book, The Voice of the Martians, Roland Etvs Physical Society ISBN 963-05-7427-6,
and his article
References
Bibliography
Crowe, Michael J. (2008). The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, Antiquity to 1915. University of Notre Dame Press.
ISBN978-0-268-02368-3.
Shklovskii, Iosif; Sagan, Carl (1966). Intelligent Life in the Universe. San Francisco: HoldenDay.
ISBN1-892803-02-X.
Webb, Stephen (2002). If the Universe Is Teeming with Aliens... Where Is Everybody? (http://books.google.co.
uk/books?id=-vZ0BVSHix4C). Copernicus Books. ISBN0-387-95501-1.
Further reading
Ben Zuckerman and Michael H. Hart, Extraterrestrials: Where Are They? ISBN 0-521-44803-4 Amazon (http://
www.amazon.com/dp/0521448034)
Savage, Marshall T. (1992). The Millennial Project: Colonizing the Galaxy in 8 Easy Steps. Denver: Empyrean
Publishing. ISBN0-9633914-8-8.
Michaud, Michael (2006). Contact with Alien Civilizations: Our Hopes and Fears about Encountering
Extraterrestrials. Copernicus Books. ISBN978-0-387-28598-6.
Gold, Thomas (1998). The Deep Hot Biosphere. Springer. ISBN978-0-387-95253-6.
External links
The dictionary definition of Fermi paradox at Wiktionary

Interstellar Radio Messages (http://www.cplire.ru/html/ra&sr/irm/index.html)
Exotic Civilizations: Possible Answer to Fermi's Paradox (http://www.enthea.org/writing/
exotic-civilizations-a-possible-answer-to-fermis-paradox/) by Paul Hughes
Introduction and Drake equations for the Fermi paradox (http://www.fermisparadox.com/)
So much space, so little time: why aliens haven't found us yet (http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/
0,,1993006,00.html) by Ian Sample,The Guardian January 18, 2007
The Possibilities of FTL: Or Fermi's Paradox Reconsidered (http://www-personal.engin.umich.edu/~fritx/
Ftlessay/essay.html) by F.E. Freiheit IV
Fermi's Paradox (i.e. Where are They?) (http://zebu.uoregon.edu/~js/cosmo/lectures/lec28.html) by James
Schombert (http://zebu.uoregon.edu/~js/)
Life in the Universe (http://members.verizon.net/~vze3fs8i/astro/litu.pdf), by Eric Schulman, Mercury
Magazine (May/June to November/December 2000)
Answering the Fermi Paradox: Exploring the Mechanisms of Universal Transcension (http://www.accelerating.
org/articles/answeringfermiparadox.html) by John Smart
Extraterrestrial Intelligence in the Solar System: Resolving the Fermi Paradox (http://www.rfreitas.com/
Astro/ResolvingFermi1983.htm), which argues that our observations are incomplete, and There Is No Fermi
Paradox (http://www.rfreitas.com/Astro/ThereIsNoFermiParadox1985.htm), arguing that the paradox is
based on a logical flaw, both by Robert Freitas
Fermi Paradox debate (http://www.astrobio.net/news/article242.html) Astrobiology Magazine July 2002.
Michael Meyer, Frank Drake, Christopher McKay, Donald Brownlee, & David Grinspoon.
395
Fermi paradox
The Fermi Paradox: Back With a Vengeance (http://www.sentientdevelopments.com/2007/08/
fermi-paradox-back-with-vengeance.html) by George Dvorsky
Virtual Reality Could Explain the Fermi Paradox (http://michaelgr.com/2008/05/09/
virtual-reality-could-explain-the-fermi-paradox/) by Michael Graham Richard
A list of possible answers to the Fermi paradox (http://www.aleph.se/andart/archives/2010/10/
finding_fermi.html) (with references to published works discussing some of these options) by Anders Sandberg
Translation (http://www.setileague.org/press/silence.htm) of the documentary "Overcome the Great Silence!"
provided by Aleksandr Leonidovich Zaitsev
- Huffington Post & Wait-But-Why The Fermi Paradox (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wait-but-why/
the-fermi-paradox_b_5489415.html)
Feynman sprinkler
A Feynman sprinkler, also referred to as a Feynman inverse sprinkler or as a reverse sprinkler, is a
sprinkler-like device which is submerged in a tank and made to suck in the surrounding fluid. The question of how
such a device would turn was the subject of an intense and remarkably long-lived debate.
A regular sprinkler has nozzles arranged at angles on a freely rotating wheel such that when water is pumped out of
them, the resulting jets cause the wheel to rotate; both a Catherine wheel and the aeolipile ("Hero engine") work on
the same principle. A "reverse" or "inverse" sprinkler would operate by aspirating the surrounding fluid instead. The
problem is now commonly associated with theoretical physicist Richard Feynman, who mentions it in his bestselling
memoirs Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman! The problem did not originate with Feynman, nor did he publish a
solution to it.
396
Feynman sprinkler
History
The first documented treatment of the problem is in
chapter III, section III of Ernst Mach's textbook The
Science of Mechanics, first published in 1883.[1] There,
Mach argued that the device shows "no distinct
rotation."[2] In the early 1940s (and apparently without
awareness of the earlier discussion by Mach), the
problem began to circulate among members of the
physics department at Princeton University, generating
a lively debate. Richard Feynman, at the time a young
graduate student at Princeton, became intrigued by the
problem and eventually built a makeshift experiment
within the facilities of the university's cyclotron
laboratory. The experiment ended with the explosion of
the glass carboy that he was using as part of his setup.
In 1966, Feynman turned down an offer from the editor
of Physics Teacher to discuss the problem in print and
objected to it being called "Feynman's problem,"
Illustration 153a from Ernst Mach's Mechanik (1883). When the
hollow rubber ball is squeezed, air flows in the direction of the short
pointing instead to the discussion of it in Mach's
arrows and the wheel turns in the direction of the long arrow. When
textbook.[3] The sprinkler problem attracted a great
the rubber ball is released, the direction of the flow of the air is
deal of attention after the incident was mentioned in
reversed but Mach observed "no distinct rotation" of the device.
Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!, a book of
autobiographical reminiscences published in 1985.[4]
Feynman neither explained his understanding of the relevant physics, nor did he describe the results of the
experiment. In an article written shortly after Feynman's death in 1988, John Wheeler, who had been his doctoral
advisor at Princeton, revealed that the experiment at the cyclotron had shown a little tremor as the pressure was first
applied [...] but as the flow continued there was no reaction. The sprinkler incident is also discussed in James
Gleick's biography of Feynman, Genius, published in 1992, where Gleick claims that a sprinkler will not turn at all if
made to suck in fluid.[5]
In 2005, physicist Edward C. Creutz (who was in charge of the Princeton cyclotron at the time of the incident)
revealed in print that he had assisted Feynman in setting up his experiment and that, when pressure was applied to
force water out of the carboy through the sprinkler head,
There was a little tremor, as [Feynman] called it, and the sprinkler head rapidly moved back to its
original position and stayed there. The water flow continued with the sprinkler stationary. We adjusted
the pressure to increase the water flow, about five separate times, and the sprinkler did not move,
although water was flowing freely through it in the backwards direction [...] The carboy then exploded,
due to the internal pressure. A janitor then appeared and helped me clean up the shattered glass and mop
up the water. I don't know what [Feynman] had expected to happen, but my vague thoughts of a time
reversal phenomenon were as shattered as the carboy.
397
Feynman sprinkler
Solution
The behavior of the reverse sprinkler is qualitatively quite distinct from that of the ordinary sprinkler, and one does
not behave like the other "played backwards." Most of the published theoretical and experimental treatments of this
problem have claimed (as did Mach and Gleick) that a sprinkler will not turn when made to suck in the surrounding
fluid. It is now understood, however, that an ideal reverse sprinkler (i.e., one which can turn without friction and is
surrounded by an ideal fluid) will indeed accelerate "backwards" towards the incoming fluid as the suction is being
switched on, and will come to a stop as the suction is switched off.[6] The ideal reverse sprinkler will not experience
any torque in its steady state. This behavior may be understood in terms of conservation of angular momentum: in its
steady state, the amount of angular momentum carried by the incoming fluid is constant, which implies that there is
no torque on the sprinkler itself.
Most experimental setups fail to detect any turning of the reverse sprinkler because the transient torque is not large
enough to overcome the friction of the sprinkler's bearing. The increased friction prevents the sprinkler from actually
turning "backwards", although it is being (weakly) pushed in that direction. On the other hand, experiments with
very low-friction bearings do find a small torque on the reverse sprinkler even in its steady state.[7] This is now
understood to be a consequence of the viscosity of the fluid being sucked into the sprinkler, which leads to the
dissipation of some of the energy of the incoming fluid and diffuses some of its angular momentum to the
surrounding tank. This torque, induced by the viscosity, causes the reverse sprinkler to turn weakly towards the
incoming fluid (i.e., in the direction contrary to the motion of a regular sprinkler expelling water).
The smallness of the torque on a reverse sprinkler is closely analogous to the propulsion of the so-called "pop pop
boat," a toy boat that moves forward as it alternately expels and then sucks in water through a pipe connected to a
small internal tank heated by a candle.
References
[1] Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in Ihrer Entwicklung Historisch-Kritisch Dargerstellt (http:/ / echo. mpiwg-berlin. mpg. de/
ECHOdocuViewfull?mode=imagepath& url=/ mpiwg/ online/ permanent/ einstein_exhibition/ sources/ Q179XRYG/ pageimg&
viewMode=images), (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1883). Available in English as The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its
Development (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=IgYADjGcJcAC& pg=PA299), (Chicago: Open Court, 1919), 4th ed., pp. 299-301.
[2] Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of its Development (http:/ / books. google. com/
books?id=IgYADjGcJcAC& pg=PA301), (Chicago: Open Court, 1919), 4th ed., p. 301.
[3] Richard P. Feynman, Perfectly Reasonable Deviations From the Beaten Track: The Letters of Richard P. Feynman, ed. Michelle Feynman,
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), pp. 209-211. ISBN 0-465-02371-1
[4] Richard P. Feynman, Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!, (Norton, New York, NY, 1985), pp. 63-65.
[5] James Gleick, Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman (New York: Pantheon, 1992), pp. 106-108.
[6] James B. Calvert, " Turbines (http:/ / www. du. edu/ ~jcalvert/ tech/ fluids/ turbine. htm)," University of Denver. Retrieved April 5, 2006.
[7] D3-22: Inverse Sprinkler - Metal Model (http:/ / www. physics. umd. edu/ lecdem/ services/ demos/ demosd3/ d3-22. htm), The University of
Maryland Department of Physics, retrieved June 29, 2011
External links
D3-22: Inverse Sprinkler - Metal Model (http://www.physics.umd.edu/lecdem/services/demos/demosd3/
d3-22.htm), University of Maryland Physics Lecture-Demonstration Facility
The Edgerton Center Corridor Lab: Feynman Sprinkler (http://web.mit.edu/Edgerton/www/
FeynmanSprinkler.html)
Physics dissertation by A. Jenkins, Caltech (http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0607239) (see chapter 6)
398
Gibbs paradox
399
Gibbs paradox
In statistical mechanics, a semi-classical derivation of the entropy that does not take into account the
indistinguishability of particles, yields an expression for the entropy which is not extensive (is not proportional to the
amount of substance in question). This leads to a paradox known as the Gibbs paradox, after Josiah Willard Gibbs.
The paradox allows for the entropy of closed systems to decrease, violating the second law of thermodynamics. A
related paradox is the "mixing paradox". If one takes the perspective that the definition of entropy must be changed
so as to ignore particle permutation, the paradox is averted.
Illustration of the problem

Gibbs himself considered the following problem that arises if the ideal gas entropy is not extensive.[1] Two identical
containers of an ideal gas sit side-by-side. There is a certain amount of entropy S associated with each container of
gas, and this depends on the volume of each container. Now a door in the container walls is opened to allow the gas
particles to mix between the containers. No macroscopic changes occur, as the system is in equilibrium. The entropy
of the gas in the two-container system could be immediately calculated, but if the equation is not extensive, the
entropy would not be 2S. In fact, Gibbs' non-extensive entropy equation would predict additional entropy. Closing
the door then reduces the entropy again to 2S, in supposed violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
As understood by Gibbs, and reemphasized more recently, this is a misuse of the entropy equation. If the gas
particles are distinguishable, closing the doors will not return the system to its original state - many of the particles
will have switched containers. There is a freedom in what is defined as ordered, and it would be a mistake to
conclude the entropy had not increased. In particular, Gibbs' non-extensive entropy equation of an ideal gas was not
intended for varying numbers of particles.
The paradox is averted by concluding the indistinguishability (at least effective indistinguishability) of the particles
in the volume. This results in the extensive SackurTetrode equation for entropy, as derived next.
Calculating the entropy of ideal gas, and making it extensive

In classical mechanics, the state of an ideal gas of energy U, volume V and with N particles, each particle having
mass m, is represented by specifying the momentum vector p and the position vector x for each particle. This can be
thought of as specifying a point in a 6N-dimensional phase space, where each of the axes corresponds to one of the
momentum or position coordinates of one of the particles. The set of points in phase space that the gas could occupy
is specified by the constraint that the gas will have a particular energy:
and be contained inside of the volume V (let's say V is a box of side X so that V=X3):
for :
and
The first constraint defines the surface of a 3N-dimensional hypersphere of radius (2mU)1/2 and the second is a
3N-dimensional hypercube of volume VN. These combine to form a 6N-dimensional hypercylinder. Just as the area
of the wall of a cylinder is the circumference of the base times the height, so the area of the wall of this
hypercylinder is:
Gibbs paradox
400
The entropy is proportional to the logarithm of the number of states that the gas could have while satisfying these
constraints. In classical physics, the number of states is infinitely large, but according to quantum mechanics it is
finite. Before the advent of quantum mechanics, this infinity was regularized by making phase space discrete. Phase
space was divided up in blocks of volume
. The constant h thus appeared as a result of a mathematical trick and
thought to have no physical significance. However, using quantum mechanics one recovers the same formalism in
the semi-classical limit, but now with h being Planck's constant. One can qualitatively see this from Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle; a volume in N phase space smaller than h3N (h is Planck's constant) cannot be specified.
To compute the number of states we must compute the volume in phase space in which the system can be found and
divide that by
. This leads us to another problem: The volume seems to approach zero, as the region in phase
space in which the system can be is an area of zero thickness. This problem is an artifact of having specified the
energy U with infinite accuracy. In a generic system without symmetries, a full quantum treatment would yield a
discrete non-degenerate set of energy eigenstates. An exact specification of the energy would then fix the precise
state the system is in, so the number of states available to the system would be one, the entropy would thus be zero.
When we specify the internal energy to be U, what we really mean is that the total energy of the gas lies somewhere
in an interval of length
around U. Here
is taken to be very small, it turns out that the entropy doesn't
depend strongly on the choice of
for large N. This means that the above "area"
of a thickness equal to an uncertainty in momentum
must be extended to a shell

, so the entropy is given by:
where the constant of proportionality is k, Boltzmann's constant. Using Stirling's approximation for the Gamma
function which omits terms of less than order N, the entropy for large N becomes:
This quantity is not extensive as can be seen by considering two identical volumes with the same particle number
and the same energy. Suppose the two volumes are separated by a barrier in the beginning. Removing or reinserting
the wall is reversible, but the entropy difference after removing the barrier is
which is in contradiction to thermodynamics. This is the Gibbs paradox.

The paradox is resolved by postulating that the gas particles are in fact indistinguishable. This means that all states
that differ only by a permutation of particles should be considered as the same state. For example, if we have a
2-particle gas and we specify AB as a state of the gas where the first particle (A) has momentum p1 and the second
particle (B) has momentum p2, then this state as well as the BA state where the B particle has momentum p1 and the
A particle has momentum p2 should be counted as the same state.
For an N-particle gas, there are N! states which are identical in this sense, if one assumes that each particle is in a
different single particle state. One can safely make this assumption provided the gas isn't at an extremely high
density. Under normal conditions, one can thus calculate the volume of phase space occupied by the gas, by dividing
Equation 1 by N!. Using the Stirling approximation again for large N, ln(N!) N ln(N) - N, the entropy for large N is:
which can be easily shown to be extensive. This is the SackurTetrode equation.
Gibbs paradox
The mixing paradox

A closely related paradox is the mixing paradox. Again take a box with a partition in it, with gas A on one side, gas
B on the other side, and both gases are at the same temperature and pressure. If gas A and B are different gases, there
is an entropy that arises due to the mixing. If the gases are the same, no additional entropy is calculated. The
additional entropy from mixing does not depend on the character of the gases. The paradox is that the two gases can
be arbitrarily similar, but the entropy from mixing does not disappear unless they are the same gas.
The resolution is provided by a careful understanding of entropy. In particular, as explained concisely by Jaynes,
there is an arbitrariness in the definition of entropy.
A central example in Jaynes' paper relies on the fact that, if one develops a theory based on the idea that the two
different types of gas are indistinguishable, and one never carries out any measurement which detects this fact, then
the theory will have no internal inconsistencies. In other words, if there are two gases A and B and we have not yet
discovered that they are different, then assuming they are the same will cause no theoretical problems. If ever an
experiment is performed with these gases that yields incorrect results, we will certainly have discovered a method of
detecting their difference and recalculating the entropy increase when the partition is removed.
This insight suggests that the idea of thermodynamic state and entropy are somewhat subjective. The differential
increase in entropy (dS), as a result of mixing dissimilar element sets (the gases), multiplied by the temperature (T) is
equal to the minimum amount of work we must do to restore the gases to their original separated state. Suppose that
the two different gases are separated by a partition, but that we cannot detect the difference between them. We
remove the partition. How much work does it take to restore the original thermodynamic state? None simply
reinsert the partition. The fact that the different gases have mixed does not yield a detectable change in the state of
the gas, if by state we mean a unique set of values for all parameters that we have available to us to distinguish
states. As soon as we become able to distinguish the difference, the amount of work necessary to recover the original
macroscopic configuration becomes non-zero, and the amount of work does not depend on the magnitude of that
difference.
This line of reasoning is particularly informative when considering the concepts of indistinguishable particles and
correct Boltzmann counting. Boltzmann's original expression for the number of states available to a gas assumed that
a state could be expressed in terms of a number of energy "sublevels" each of which contain a particular number of
particles. While the particles in a given sublevel were considered indistinguishable from each other, particles in
different sublevels were considered distinguishable from particles in any other sublevel. This amounts to saying that
the exchange of two particles in two different sublevels will result in a detectably different "exchange macrostate" of
the gas. For example, if we consider a simple gas with N particles, at sufficiently low density that it is practically
certain that each sublevel contains either one particle or none (i.e. a MaxwellBoltzmann gas), this means that a
simple container of gas will be in one of N! detectably different "exchange macrostates", one for each possible
particle exchange. Just as the mixing paradox begins with two detectably different containers, and the extra entropy
that results upon mixing is proportional to the average amount of work needed to restore that initial state after
mixing, so the extra entropy in Boltzmann's original derivation is proportional to the average amount of work
required to restore the simple gas from some "exchange macrostate" to its original "exchange macrostate". If we
assume that there is in fact no experimentally detectable difference in these "exchange macrostates" available, then
using the entropy which results from assuming the particles are indistinguishable will yield a consistent theory. This
is "correct Boltzmann counting". It is often said that the resolution to the Gibbs paradox derives from the fact that,
according to the quantum theory, like particles are indistinguishable in principle. By Jaynes' reasoning, if the
particles are experimentally indistinguishable for whatever reason, Gibbs paradox is resolved, and quantum
mechanics only provides an assurance that in the quantum realm, this indistinguishability will be true as a matter of
principle, rather than being due to an insufficiently refined experimental capability.
401
Gibbs paradox
402
Entropy of two ideal gases with particle exchange

A purely classical calculation of the entropy of an ideal gas yields an extensive result for two systems if they are
allowed to exchange particles. The following calculation simplifies this calculation in three ways:
1. The ideal gas consists of particles that confined to one spatial dimension.
2. Terms are neglected that become important when n is not very large. These terms may be neglected in the limit
that
, but nevertheless are important, for example in deriving the SackurTetrode equation. These
neglected terms are also likely to be important in computer simulation and nanotechnology where the number of
particles is not very large.
3. The subdivision of phase space into units of Planck's constant (h) is omitted. Instead entropy is taken as an
integral over available phase space. This serves to highlight the purely classical nature of the calculation.
We begin with a version of Boltzmann's entropy in which the integrand is all of accessible phase space:
The integral is restricted to a contour of available regions of phase space, subject to conservation of energy. In
contrast to the one-dimensional line integrals students encounter in college physics, the contour of constant energy
possesses a vast number of dimensions. The justification for integrating over canonical phase space involves the
assumption of equal probability. The assumption can be made by invoking the ergodic hypothesis (not always valid
in computer simulations and actual experiments.) as well as the Liouville's theorem (mathematically provable for
Hamiltonian systems.) Liouville's theorem assumes a fixed number of dimensions that the system 'explores'. In most
calculations of entropy, the number dimensions equals the number of particles in the system, which forces phase
space to abruptly change dimensionality when particles are added or subtracted. This may explain the difficulties in
constructing a clear and simple derivation for the dependence of entropy on the number of particles.
For the ideal gas, the accessible phase space is an n-sphere (also called a hypershpere) in the
dimensional
space:
To recover the paradoxical result that entropy is not extensive, we integrate over phase space for a gas of
monatomic particles confined to a single spatial dimension by
. Since expressions for classical entropy
are well known, and our goal is to resolve a paradox, we simplify notation by taking both the particle's mass and
Boltzmann's constant equal to unity:
. Since the gas is one-dimensional, we may use the vector
symbol to denote N and 2N dimensional vectors:
where
To calculate entropy, we use the fact that the n-sphere,
Note that this "surface" is actually a

hypersurface,
and
has a hypersurface of,
dimensional volume. If n = 2, the n-sphere is a circle, and the
, is the (one-dimensional) circumference. If n is an odd number, it is necessary use
the gamma function to evaluate the factorial.
Gibbs paradox
403
Gibb's paradox in a one-dimensional gas

Gibb's paradox arises when entropy is calculated using an dimensional phase space, where is also the number
of particles in the gas. These particles are spatially confined to the one-dimensional interval
:
The subscripts on
are used to define the 'state variables' and will be will be discussed later, when it is argued that
the number of particles, lacks full status as a state variable in this calculation. The integral over configuration
space is
. As indicated by the underbrace, the integral over velocity space is restricted to the "surface area" of the
n dimensional hypo-sphere of radius
, and is therefore equal to the "area" of that hypo-surface:
Click to view the algebraic steps

We begin with:
Both terms on the right hand side have dominant terms. Using the Stirling approximation for large M,
we have:
Terms are neglected if they exhibit less variation with a parameter, and we compare terms that vary with the same parameter. Entropy is defined
with an additive arbitrary constant because the area in phase space depends on what units are used. For that reason it does not matter if entropy is
large or small for a given value of E. We instead to seek how entropy varies with E, i.e., we seek
:
An expression such as
is much less important than an expression like
An expression like
is much less important than an expression like
. Note that the logarithm is not a strongly increasing function. The
neglect of terms proportional to n compared with terms proportional to nlnn is only justified if n is extremely large.
Combining the important terms:
After dropping the small terms:
In the second expression, the term
was subtracted and added, using the fact that
This was done to highlight the fact that entropy must be an extensive property of matter. Third term is neither
Gibbs paradox
404
extensive nor intensive and is therefore wrong. The arbitrary constant has been added because entropy can usually be
viewed as being defined with an arbitrary additive constant. This is especially true in entropy is defined as the
logarithm of a phase space measured in units of momentum-position. Any change in how these units are defined will
add or subtract a constant from the value of the entropy.
Alternative ways to make classical entropy extensive

As discussed above, an extensive form of entropy is recovered if we divide the volume of phase space,
, by n!.
An alternative approach is to argue that the dependence on particle number cannot be trusted on the grounds that
changing also changes the dimensionality of phase space. Such changes in dimensionality lie outside the scope of
Hamiltonian mechanics and Liouville's theorem. For that reason it is plausible to allow the arbitrary constant to be a
function of . Defining the function to be,
, we have:
which has extensive scaling:
Integrating phase space

Following Swendsen,[2] we allow two systems to exchange particles. This essentially 'makes room' in phase space
for particles to enter or leave without requiring a change in the number of dimensions of phase space. The total
number of particles is
:
particles have coordinates
The total energy of these particles is
particles have coordinates
The total energy of these particles is

The system is subject to the constraints,
and
Taking the integral over phase space, we have:
The question marks (?) serve as a reminder that we may not assume that that the first nA particles (i.e. 1 though nA)
are in system-A while the other particles (nB through N) are in system-B. (This is further discussed in the next
section.)
Taking the logarithm and keeping only the largest terms, we have:
Gibbs paradox
405
This can be interpreted as the sum of the entropy of system-A and system-B, both extensive. And there is a term,
, that is not extensive.
Letting N = 3 for three-D visualization

The correct (extensive) formulas for systems A and B were obtained because
we included all the possible ways that the two systems could exchange
particles. The use of combinations (i.e. N particles choose NA) was used to
ascertain the number of ways N particles can be divided into system-A
containing nA particles and system_B containing nB particles. This counting
is not justified on physical grounds, but on the need to integrate over phase
space. As will be illustrated below, phase space contains not a single
nA-sphere and a single nB-sphere, but instead
pairs of n-spheres, all situated in the same N-dimensional velocity space. The
integral over accessible phase space must include all of these n-spheres, as
can be seen in the figure, which shows the actual velocity phase space
associated a gas that consists of three particles. Moreover, this gas has been
divided into two systems, A and B.
If we ignore the spatial variables, the phase space of a gas with three
particles is three dimensional, which permits one to sketch the n-spheres over
which the integral over phase space must be taken. If all three particles are
together, the split between the two gasses is 3|0. Accessible phase space is a
three dimensional sphere (3-sphere) with a radius that is either
or
(depending which system has the particles).
A three particle ideal gas partitioned into
If the split is 2|1, then phase space consists of circles and points. Each circle
two parts
occupies two dimensions, and for each circle, two points lie on the third axis,
equidistant from the center of the circle. In other words, if system-A has 2 particles, accessible phase space consists
of 3 pairs of n-spheres, each pair being a 2-sphere and a 1-sphere:
Note that
Gibbs paradox
References
[1] Reprinted in
and in
[2] See both references to Swendsen above
Further reading
Chih-Yuan Tseng and Ariel Caticha (2001). "Yet another resolution of the Gibbs paradox: an information theory
approach". In R. L. Fry. Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering. AIP
Conference Proceedings 617 (617). p.331. arXiv: cond-mat/0109324 (http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/
0109324). doi: 10.1063/1.1477057 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.1477057).
Dieks, Dennis (2011). "The Gibbs Paradox Revisited". In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan
Hartmann, Thomas Uebel and Marcel Weber. Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. The Philosophy of
Science in a European Perspective. pp.367377. arXiv: 1003.0179 (http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.0179). doi:
10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_25 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_25).
ISBN978-94-007-1179-2.
External links
Gibbs paradox and its resolutions (http://www.mdpi.org/lin/entropy/gibbs-paradox.htm) - varied collected
papers
Hardy's paradox
Hardy's paradox is a thought experiment in quantum mechanics devised by Lucien Hardy in 1992-3 in which a
particle and its antiparticle may interact without annihilating each other.
Experiments[1] using the technique of weak measurement[2] have studied an interaction of polarized photons and
these have demonstrated that the phenomenon does occur. However, the consequence of these experiments is only
that past events can be inferred after their occurrence as a probabilistic wave collapse. These weak measurements are
considered to be an observation themselves, and therefore part of the causation of wave collapse, making the
objective results only a probabilistic function rather than a fixed reality. However, a careful analysis of the
experiment shows that Hardy's paradox only proves that a local hidden variable theory can not exist, as there can not
be a theory that assumes that the system meets the states of reality regardless of the interaction with the measuring
apparatus. This confirms that a quantum theory, to be consistent with the experiments, must be non-local (in the
sense of Bell) and contextual.
406
Hardy's paradox
407
Setup description and the results

The basic building block of Hardys
thought
experiment
are
two
MachZehnder interferometers for
quantum particles and antiparticles.
We will describe the case using
electrons
and
positrons.
Each
interferometer consists of bent paths
and two beam splitters (labeled BS1
and BS2 in the accompanying diagram)
and is tuned so that when operating
individually particles always exit to the
same particle detector (the ones labeled
"c" in the diagram "c" is for
"constructive interference" and "d" is
for "destructive interference"). For
example, for the right-hand side
interferometer, when operating alone,
entering electrons (labeled e) become
a quantum superposition of electrons
Setup for Hardy's thought experiment
taking the path v- and electrons taking
path w (in the diagram, the latter part
of the w path is called u), but these constructively interfere and thus always exit in arm c:
Similarly, positrons (labeled e+) are always detected at c+. In the actual experiment the interferometers are arranged
so that part of their paths overlap as shown in the diagram. If the amplitude for the particle in one arm, say w, were
to be obstructed by a second particle in w+ that collides with it, only the v amplitude would reach the second beam
splitter, and would split into arms c+ and d+ with equal amplitude. The detection of a particle in d+ would thus
indicate the presence of the obstructing particle, but without an annihilation taking place. For this reason, this
scheme was named interaction-free measurement.
If (classically speaking) both the electron and the positron take the w paths in their respective interferometers, they
will annihilate to produce two gamma rays:
. There is a 1 in 4 chance of this happening. We
can express the state of the system, before the final beam splitters, as
Since the c detectors click for
and the d detectors for
, this becomes:
Since the probabilities are the squares of the absolute values of these amplitudes, this means a 9 in 16 chance of each
particle being detected in its respective c detector, a 1 in 16 chance for one particle being detected in its c detector
and the other in its d detector, or for both being detected in their d detectors, and a 4 in 16 (1 in 4) chance that the
electron and positron annihilate so neither is detected. Notice that a detection in both d detectors is represented by
Hardy's paradox
This is not orthogonal to the expression above for the state before the final beam splitters. The scalar product
between them is 1/4, showing that there is a 1 in 16 chance of this happening, paradoxically.
The situation can be analyzed in terms of two simultaneous interaction-free measurements: from the point of view of
the interferometer on the left, a click at d+ implies the presence of the obstructing electron in u. Similarly, for the
interferometer on the right, a click at d implies the presence of the positron in u+. Indeed, every time a click is
recordered at d+ (or d) the other particle is found in u (or u+, resp.). If we assume the particles are independent
(described by local hidden variables), we conclude that they can never emerge simultaneously in d+ and d. This
would imply that they were in u+ and u, which cannot occur because of the annihilation process.
A paradox then arises because sometimes the particles do emerge simultaneously at d+ and d (with probability
p=1/16). Quantum mechanically, the
term arises, in fact, from the nonmaximally entangled nature of the
state just before the final beam splitters.
A paper by Yakir Aharonov and colleagues in 2001[3] pointed out that the number of electrons or positrons in each
branch is theoretically observable, and is 0 in the w branches and 1 in the v branches. And yet, the number of
electron-positron pairs in any combination is also observable, and is not given by the product of the single-particle
values. So we find that the number of ww pairs (both particles in their w path) is 0, each wv pair is 1, and the number
in the vv combination is 1! They proposed a way that this could be observed physically by temporarily trapping the
electron and the positron in the v paths in boxes and noting the effect of their mutual electrostatic attraction. They
stated that one would actually find a repulsion between the boxes.
In 2009 Jeff Lundeen and Aephraim Steinberg published work in which they set up a "Hardy's paradox" system
using photons. A 405 nm laser goes through a barium borate crystal to produce pairs of 810 nm photons, with
polarizations orthogonal one to the other. These then hit a beam splitter, which sends photons back to the barium
borate crystal with 50% probability. The 405 nm pumping beam also bounces off a mirror and comes back to the
barium borate. If both the 810 nm photons come back to the crystal, they are annihilated by interaction with the
returning pump beam. In any case, the beam of photons that make it through the crystal and the beam of photons that
pass through the beam splitter are both separated into "vertically polarized" and "horizontally polarized" beams,
which correspond to the "electrons" and the "positrons" of Hardy's scheme. The two "electron" beams (the photons
with one kind of polarization) are united at a beam splitter and go to one or two detectors, and the same for the
"positrons" (the other photons). Classically, no photons should be detected at what the authors call the "dark ports"
because if they take both directions from the first beam splitter, they will interfere with themselves, whereas if they
take only one path, then one cannot detect them both at the dark ports because of the paradox. By introducing a 20
rotation in polarization and using half-wave plates on certain beams, and then measuring coincidence rates at the
detectors, they were able to make weak measurements that allowed them to calculate the "occupation" of different
arms (paths) and combinations. As predicted by Aharonov and colleagues, they found a negative value for the
combination in which both photons take the outer (no-annihilation) route. The results were not exactly as predicted
and they attribute this to imperfect switching (annihilation) and interaction-free measurements.
408
Hardy's paradox
References
[1] . Also available here (http:/ / www. photonicquantum. info/ Research/ publications/ Lundeen PRL 102, 020404 (2009). pdf).
[2] Y. Aharonov, D.Z. Albert, L. Vaidman, "How the result of a measurement of a component of the spin of a spin-1/2 particle can turn out to be
100," Physical Review Letters, 1988. (http:/ / prola. aps. org/ abstract/ PRL/ v60/ i14/ p1351_1)
[3] Revisiting Hardys Paradox: Counterfactual Statements, Real Measurements, Entanglement and Weak Values (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/
quant-ph/ 0104062), by Yakir Aharonov et al., 2001.
External links
Lecture by Aephraim Steinberg (https://perimeterinstitute.ca/videos/praise-weakness), 2012
Heat death paradox

Formulated in 1862 by Lord Kelvin, Hermann von Helmholtz and William John Macquorn Rankine, the heat death
paradox, also known as Clausius' paradox and thermodynamic paradox, is a reductio ad absurdum argument that
uses thermodynamics to show the impossibility of an infinitely old universe.
Assuming that the universe is eternal, a question arises: How is it that thermodynamic equilibrium has
not already been achieved?
This paradox is based upon the classical model of the universe in which the universe is eternal. Clausius paradox is
paradox of paradigm. It was necessary to amend the fundamental ideas about the universe, which brought about the
change of the paradigm. The paradox was solved when the paradigm was changed. The paradox which is valid in the
classical stationary model of the universe is not so in Fridmans nonstationary relativistic model. This is a solved
paradox and therefore is an exparadox.
The paradox was based upon the rigid mechanical point of view of the Second principle of thermodynamics
postulated by Rudolf Clausius according to which heat can only be transferred from a warmer to a colder object. If
the universe was eternal, as claimed in the classical stationary model of the universe, it should already be cold.
Any hot object transfers heat to its cooler surroundings, until everything is at the same temperature. For two objects
at the same temperature as much heat flows from one body as flows from the other, and the net effect is no change. If
the universe were infinitely old, there must have been enough time for the stars to cool and warm their surroundings.
Everywhere should therefore be at the same temperature and there should either be no stars, or everything should be
as hot as stars.
Since there are stars and the universe is not in thermal equilibrium it cannot be infinitely old.
The paradox does not arise in Big Bang, steady state or chaotic inflationary cosmologies. In Big Bang cosmology,
the universe is not old enough to have reached equilibrium. Steady state and chaotic inflation escape the paradox by
expanding.Wikipedia:Citation needed Radiation is continually being red-shifted by the expansion, causing
background cooling. Thus, they balance entropy production, and are in eternal equilibrium.
References
409

The irresistible force paradox, also called the unstoppable force paradox or shield and spear paradox, is a
classic paradox formulated as "What happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object?" This paradox
is a form of the omnipotence paradox, which is a simple demonstration that challenges omnipotence: "Can God
create a stone so heavy that not even God is strong enough to lift it?" The immovable object and the irresistible force
are both implicitly assumed to be indestructible, or else the question would have a trivial resolution ("it destroys it").
Furthermore, it is assumed that they are two separate entities, since an irresistible force is implicitly an immovable
object, and vice versa.
The paradox arises because it rests on two premisesthat there exist such things as irresistible forces and
immovable objectswhich cannot both be true at once. If there exists an irresistible force, it follows logically that
there cannot be any such thing as an immovable object, and vice versa.
Origins
An example of this paradox in non-western thought can be found in the origin of the Chinese word for paradox
(Chinese: ; pinyin: modn; literally: "Spear-Shield"). This term originates from a story (see the Kanbun
example) in the 3rd century BC philosophical book Han Feizi.[1] In the story, a man was trying to sell a spear and a
shield. When asked how good his spear was, he said that his spear could pierce any shield. Then, when asked how
good his shield was, he said that it could defend from all spear attacks. Then one person asked him what would
happen if he were to take his spear to strike his shield; the seller could not answer. This led to the idiom of "zxang
modn" ( ), or "self-contradictory". Another ancient and mythological example illustrating this theme
can be found in the story of the Teumessian fox, who can never be caught, and the hound Laelaps, who never misses
what it hunts. Realizing the paradox, Zeus turns both creatures into static stars.
In popular culture, Iain Banks refers to this paradox extensively in the novel Walking on Glass, and provides an
alternative answer.
References
[1] Han Feizi ( ), chapter 36, Nanyi ( "Collection of Difficulties, No. 1")'.
410
Ladder paradox
411
Ladder paradox
The ladder paradox (or barn-pole paradox) is a thought experiment in special relativity. It involves a ladder,
parallel to the ground, travelling horizontally and therefore undergoing a Lorentz length contraction. As a result, the
ladder fits inside a garage which would normally be too small to contain it. On the other hand, from the point of view
of an observer moving with the ladder, it is the garage that is moving, so it is the garage which will be contracted to
an even smaller size, thus being unable to contain the ladder. This apparent paradox results from the mistaken
assumption of absolute simultaneity. The ladder fits into the garage only if both of its ends are simultaneously inside
the garage. In relativity, simultaneity is relative to each observer, and so the question of whether the ladder fits inside
the garage is relative to each observer, and the paradox is resolved.
Paradox
Figure 1: An overview of the garage and the ladder at rest
Figure 2: In the garage frame, the ladder

undergoes length contraction and will
therefore fit into the garage.
Figure 3: In the ladder frame, the garage

undergoes length contraction and is too
small to contain the ladder.
The simplest version of the problem involves a garage, with a front and back
door which are open, and a ladder which, when at rest with respects to the
garage, is too long to fit inside. We now move the ladder at a high horizontal
velocity through the stationary garage. Because of its high velocity, the
ladder undergoes the relativistic effect of length contraction, and becomes
significantly shorter. As a result, as the ladder passes through the garage, it is,
for a time, completely contained inside it. We could, if we liked,
simultaneously close both doors for a brief time, to demonstrate that the
ladder fits.
So far, this is consistent. The apparent paradox comes when we consider the
symmetry of the situation. As an observer moving with the ladder is
travelling at constant velocity in the inertial reference frame of the garage,
this observer also occupies an inertial frame, where, by the principle of
relativity, the same laws of physics apply. From this perspective, it is the
ladder which is now stationary, and the garage which is moving with high
velocity. It is therefore the garage which is length contracted, and we now
conclude that it is far too small to have ever fully contained the ladder as it
passed through: the ladder does not fit, and we can't close both doors on
either side of the ladder without hitting it. This apparent contradiction is the
paradox.
Ladder paradox
412
Resolution
The solution to the apparent paradox lies in the relativity of
simultaneity: what one observer (e.g. with the garage)
considers to be two simultaneous events may not in fact be
simultaneous to another observer (e.g. with the ladder). When
we say the ladder "fits" inside the garage, what we mean
precisely is that, at some specific time, the position of the back
of the ladder and the position of the front of the ladder were
both inside the garage; in other words, the front and back of
the ladder were inside the garage simultaneously. As
simultaneity is relative, then, two observers can disagree
without contradiction on whether the ladder fits. To the
observer with the garage, the back end of the ladder was in the
garage at the same time that the front end of the ladder was,
and so the ladder fit; but to the observer with the ladder, these
two events were not simultaneous, and the ladder did not fit.
Figure 4: Scenario in the garage frame: a length contracted

ladder passing through the garage
A clear way of seeing this is to consider the doors, which, in

the frame of the garage, close for the brief period that the
ladder is fully inside. We now look at these events in the frame
of the ladder. The first event is the front of the ladder
approaching the exit door of the garage. The door closes, and
then opens again to let the front of the ladder pass through. At
a later time, the back of the ladder passes through the entrance
door, which closes and then opens. We see that, as
simultaneity is relative, the two doors did not need to be shut at
the same time, and the ladder did not need to fit inside the
garage.
The situation can be further illustrated by the Minkowski diagram below. The diagram is in the rest frame of the
garage. The vertical light-blue band shows the garage in space-time, and the light-red band shows the ladder in
space-time. The x and t axes are the garage space and time axes, respectively, and x and t are the ladder space and
time axes, respectively.
In the frame of the garage, the ladder at any specific time is represented by a horizontal set of points, parallel to the x
axis, in the red band. One example is the bold blue line segment, which lies inside the blue band representing the
garage, and which represents the ladder at a time when it is fully inside the garage. In the frame of the ladder,
however, sets of simultaneous events lie on lines parallel to the x' axis; the ladder at any specific time is therefore
represented by a cross section of such a line with the red band. One such example is the bold red line segment. We
see that such line segments never lie fully inside the blue band; that is, the ladder never lies fully inside the garage.
Ladder paradox
Figure 5: Scenario in the ladder frame: a length

contracted garage passing over the ladder
413
Ladder paradox
414
Figure 6: A Minkowski diagram of ladder paradox. The garage is shown in light blue, the
ladder in light red. The diagram is in the rest frame of the garage, with x and t being the
garage space and time axes, respectively. The ladder frame is for a person sitting on the
front of the ladder, with x and t being the ladder space and time axes respectively.
Shutting the ladder in the garage
Figure 7: A ladder contracting under

acceleration to fit into a length
contracted garage
In a more complicated version of the paradox, we can physically trap the ladder
once it is fully inside the garage. This could be done, for instance, by not
opening the exit door again after we close it. In the frame of the garage, we
assume the exit door is immovable, and so when the ladder hits it, we say that it
instantaneously stops.[1] By this time, the entrance door has also closed, and so
the ladder is stuck inside the garage. As its relative velocity is now zero, it is
not length contracted, and is now longer than the garage - so it will have to
bend, snap, or explode.
Again, the puzzle comes from considering the situation from the frame of the
ladder. In the above analysis, in its own frame, the ladder was always longer
than the garage. So how did we ever close the doors and trap it inside?
It is worth noting here a general feature of relativity: we have deduced, by considering the frame of the garage, that
we do indeed trap the ladder inside the garage. This must therefore be true in any frame - it cannot be the case that
the ladder snaps in one frame but not in another! From the ladder's frame, then, we know that there must be some
explanation for how the ladder came to be trapped; we must simply find the explanation.
The explanation is that, although all parts of the ladder simultaneously decelerate to zero in the garage's frame,
because simultaneity is relative, the corresponding accelerations in the frame of the ladder are not simultaneous.
Instead, each part of the ladder accelerates sequentially,[2] from front to back, until finally the back of the ladder
accelerates, by which time it is already within the garage.
Ladder paradox
415
Figure 8: A Minkowski diagram of the case

where the ladder is stopped all along its length,
simultaneously in the garage frame. When this
occurs, the garage frame sees the ladder as AB,
but the ladder frame sees the ladder as AC. When
the back of the ladder enters the garage at point
D, it has not yet felt the effects of the acceleration
of its front end. At this time, according to
someone at rest with respect to the back of the
ladder, the front of the ladder will be at point E
and will see the ladder as DE. It is seen that this
length in the ladder frame is not the same as CA,
the rest length of the ladder before the
deceleration.
Ladder paradox
416
Ladder paradox and transmission of force

What if the back door (the door the ladder exits out of) is closed
permanently and does not open? Suppose that the door is so solid that
the ladder will not penetrate it when it collides, so it must stop. Then,
as in the scenario described above, in the frame of reference of the
garage, there is a moment when the ladder is completely within the
garage (i.e., the back of the ladder is inside the front door), before it
collides with the back door and stops. However, from the frame of
reference of the ladder, the ladder is too big to fit in the garage, so by
the time it collides with the back door and stops, the back of the ladder
still has not reached the front door. This seems to be a paradox. The
question is, does the back of the ladder cross the front door or not?
The difficulty arises mostly from the assumption that the ladder is rigid
(i.e., maintains the same shape). Ladders seem pretty rigid in everyday
life. But being rigid requires that it can transfer force at infinite speed
(i.e., when you push one end the other end must react immediately,
otherwise the ladder will deform). This contradicts special relativity,
which states that information can only travel at most the speed of light
(which is too fast for us to notice in real life, but is significant in the
ladder scenario). So objects cannot be perfectly rigid under special
relativity.
Figure 1: A Minkowski diagram of the case

where the ladder is stopped by impact with the
back wall of the garage. The impact is event A.
At impact, the garage frame sees the ladder as
AB, but the ladder frame sees the ladder as AC.
The ladder does not move out of the garage, so its
front end now goes directly upward, through
point E. The back of the ladder will not change its
trajectory in space-time until it feels the effects of
the impact. The effect of the impact can
propagate outward from A no faster than the
speed of light, so the back of the ladder will never
feel the effects of the impact until point F or later,
at which time the ladder is well within the garage
in both frames. Note that when the diagram is
drawn in the frame of the ladder, the speed of
light is the same, but the ladder is longer, so it
takes more time for the force to reach the back
end; this gives enough time for the back of the
ladder to move inside the garage.
In this case, by the time the front of the ladder collides with the back
door, the back of the ladder does not know it yet, so it keeps moving
forwards (and the ladder "compresses"). In both the frame of the
garage and the inertial frame of the ladder, the back end keeps moving
at the time of the collision, until at least the point where the back of the
ladder comes into the light cone of the collision (i.e., a point where
force moving backwards at the speed of light from the point of the
collision will reach it). At this point the ladder is actually shorter than
the original contracted length, so the back end is well inside the garage. Calculations in both frames of reference will
show this to be the case.
What happens after the force reaches the back of the ladder (the "green" zone in the diagram) is not specified.
Depending on the physics, the ladder could break into a million pieces; or, if it were sufficiently elastic, it could
re-expand to its original length and push the back end out of the garage.
Ladder paradox
417
Man falling into grate variation

This paradox was originally proposed and solved
by Wolfgang Rindler and involved a fast walking
man, represented by a rod, falling into a grate. It is
assumed that the rod is entirely over the grate in
the grate frame of reference before the downward
acceleration begins simultaneously and equally
applied to each point in the rod.
From the perspective of the grate, the rod
undergoes a length contraction and fits into the
grate. However, from the perspective of the rod, it
is the grate undergoing a length contraction,
through which it seems the rod is then too long to
fall.
In fact, the downward acceleration of the rod,
which is simultaneous in the grate's frame of
reference, is not simultaneous in the rod's frame of
reference. In the rod's frame of reference, the
bottom of the front of the rod is first accelerated
downward (not shown in drawing), and as time
goes by, more and more of the rod is subjected to
the downward acceleration, until finally the back
of the rod is accelerated downward. This results in
A man (represented by a segmented rod) falling into a grate
a bending of the rod in the rod's frame of
reference. It should be stressed that, since this
bending occurs in the rod's rest frame, it is a true physical distortion of the rod which will cause stresses to occur in
the rod.
Bar and ring paradox

The above paradox is complicated: It
involves non-inertial frames of
reference since at one moment the man
is walking horizontally, and a moment
later he is falling downward. It
involves a physical deformation of the
man (or segmented rod), since the rod
is bent in one frame of reference and
straight in another. These aspects of
the problem introduce complications
involving the stiffness of the bar which
tends to obscure the real nature of the
"paradox". A very similar but simpler
problem involving only inertial frames
The diagram on the left illustrates a bar and a ring in the rest frame of the ring at the
instant that their centers coincide. The bar is Lorentz-contracted and moving upward and
to the right while the ring is stationary and uncontracted. The diagram on the right
illustrates the situation at the same instant, but in the rest frame of the bar. The ring is
now Lorentz-contracted and rotated with respect to the bar, and the bar is uncontracted.
Again, the ring passes over the bar without touching it.
Ladder paradox
is the "bar and ring" paradox (Ferraro 2007) in which a bar which is slightly larger in length than the diameter of a
ring is moving upward and to the right with its long axis horizontal, while the ring is stationary and the plane of the
ring is also horizontal. If the motion of the bar is such that the center of the bar coincides with the center of the ring
at some point in time, then the bar will be Lorentz-contracted due to the forward component of its motion, and it will
pass through the ring. The paradox occurs when the problem is considered in the rest frame of the bar. The ring is
now moving downward and to the left, and will be Lorentz-contracted along its horizontal length, while the bar will
not be contracted at all. How can the bar pass through the ring?
The resolution of the paradox again lies in the relativity of simultaneity (Ferraro 2007). The length of a physical
object is defined as the distance between two simultaneous events occurring at each end of the body, and since
simultaneity is relative, so is this length. This variability in length is just the Lorentz contraction. Similarly, a
physical angle is defined as the angle formed by three simultaneous events, and this angle will also be a relative
quantity. In the above paradox, although the rod and the plane of the ring are parallel in the rest frame of the ring,
they are not parallel in the rest frame of the rod. The uncontracted rod passes through the Lorentz-contracted ring
because the plane of the ring is rotated relative to the rod by an amount sufficient to let the rod pass through.
In mathematical terms, a Lorentz transformation can be separated into the product of a spatial rotation and a "proper"
Lorentz transformation which involves no spatial rotation. The mathematical resolution of the bar and ring paradox
is based on the fact that the product of two proper Lorentz transformations may produce a Lorentz transformation
which is not proper, but rather includes a spatial rotation component.
References
[1] Rindler describes a rod that experiences simultaneous acceleration
[2] Rindler describes the rod undergoing sequential acceleration.
Wells, Willard H. (1961). "Length paradox in relativity". American Journal of Physics 29 (12): 858858.
Bibcode: 1961AmJPh..29..858W (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1961AmJPh..29..858W). doi:
10.1119/1.1937641 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.1937641).
Shaw, R. (1962). "Length contraction paradox". American Journal of Physics 30 (1): 7272. Bibcode:
1962AmJPh..30...72S (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1962AmJPh..30...72S). doi: 10.1119/1.1941907
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.1941907).
Martins, Roberto De A. (1978). "Length paradox in relativity". American Journal of Physics 46 (6): 667670.
Bibcode: 1978AmJPh..46..667M (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1978AmJPh..46..667M). doi:
10.1119/1.11227 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.11227).
Sastry, G. P. (1987). "Is length contraction really paradoxical?". American Journal of Physics 55 (10): 943946.
Bibcode: 1987AmJPh..55..943S (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1987AmJPh..55..943S). doi:
10.1119/1.14911 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.14911).
Grn, yvind; Johannesen, Steinar (1993). "Computer simulation of Rindler's length contraction paradox".
European Journal of Physics 14 (3): 97100. Bibcode: 1993EJPh...14...97G (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/
1993EJPh...14...97G). doi: 10.1088/0143-0807/14/3/001 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0143-0807/14/3/
001).
van Lintel, Harald; Gruber, Christian (2005). "The rod and hole paradox re-examined". European Journal of
Physics 26 (1): 1923. Bibcode: 2005EJPh...26...19V (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2005EJPh...26...
19V). doi: 10.1088/0143-0807/26/1/003 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0143-0807/26/1/003).
Iyer, Chandru; Prabhu, G. M. (2008). "Reversal in the time order of interactive events: the collision of inclined
rods". European Journal of Physics 27 (4): 819824. arXiv: 0809.1721 (http://arxiv.org/abs/0809.1721).
Bibcode: 2006EJPh...27..819I (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006EJPh...27..819I). doi:
10.1088/0143-0807/27/4/013 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0143-0807/27/4/013).
418
Ladder paradox
Pierce, Evan (2007). "The lock and key paradox and the limits of rigidity in special relativity". American Journal
of Physics 75 (7): 610614. Bibcode: 2007AmJPh..75..610P (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2007AmJPh..75.
.610P). doi: 10.1119/1.2711827 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.2711827).
Iyer, Chandru; Prabhu, G. M. (2008). "Differing observations on the landing of the rod into the slot". American
Journal of Physics 74 (11): 9981001. arXiv: 0809.1740 (http://arxiv.org/abs/0809.1740). Bibcode:
2006AmJPh..74..998I (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006AmJPh..74..998I). doi: 10.1119/1.2346686 (http:/
/dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.2346686).
McGlynn, Enda; van Kampen, Paul (2008). "A note on linking electrical current, magnetic fields, charges and the
pole in a barn paradox in special relativity". European Journal of Physics 29 (6): N63N67. Bibcode:
2008EJPh...29...63M (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2008EJPh...29...63M). doi:
10.1088/0143-0807/29/6/N03 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0143-0807/29/6/N03).
Further reading
Edwin F. Taylor and John Archibald Wheeler, Spacetime Physics (2nd ed) (Freeman, NY, 1992)
- discusses various apparent SR paradoxes and their solutions
Rindler, Wolfgang (2001). Relativity: Special, General and Cosmological. Oxford University Press.
ISBN0-19-850836-0.
Ferraro, Rafael (2007). Einstein's space-time: an introduction to special and general relativity (http://books.
google.com/books?id=wa3CskhHaIgC&dq=relativity+bar+and+ring). Springer. ISBN978-0-387-69946-2.
External links
Special Relativity Animations (http://math.ucr.edu/~jdp/Relativity/SpecialRelativity.html) from John de
Pillis.This inter-active animated train-and-tunnel paradox is an analog of the pole (train) and barn (tunnel)
paradox.
419
Loschmidt's paradox
Loschmidt's paradox
Loschmidt's paradox, first published by Sir William Thomson, 1st Baron Kelvin, in 1874,[1] also known as the
reversibility paradox, irreversibility paradox or German: Umkehreinwand, is the objection that it should not be
possible to deduce an irreversible process from time-symmetric dynamics. This puts the time reversal symmetry of
(almost) all known low-level fundamental physical processes at odds with any attempt to infer from them the second
law of thermodynamics which describes the behaviour of macroscopic systems. Both of these are well-accepted
principles in physics, with sound observational and theoretical support, yet they seem to be in conflict; hence the
paradox.
Johann Loschmidt's criticism was provoked by the H-theorem of Boltzmann, which was an attempt to explain using
kinetic theory the increase of entropy in an ideal gas from a non-equilibrium state, when the molecules of the gas are
allowed to collide. In 1876, Loschmidt pointed out that if there is a motion of a system from time t0 to time t1 to time
t2 that leads to a steady decrease of H (increase of entropy) with time, then there is another allowed state of motion
of the system at t1, found by reversing all the velocities, in which H must increase. This revealed that one of
Boltzmann's key assumptions, molecular chaos, or, the Stosszahlansatz, that all particle velocities were completely
uncorrelated, did not follow from Newtonian dynamics. One can assert that possible correlations are uninteresting,
and therefore decide to ignore them; but if one does so, one has changed the conceptual system, injecting an element
of time-asymmetry by that very action.
Reversible laws of motion cannot explain why we experience our world to be in such a comparatively low state of
entropy at the moment (compared to the equilibrium entropy of universal heat death); and to have been at even lower
entropy in the past.
Arrow of time
Main article: Arrow of time
Any process that happens regularly in the forward direction of time but rarely or never in the opposite direction, such
as entropy increasing in an isolated system, defines what physicists call an arrow of time in nature. This term only
refers to an observation of an asymmetry in time, it is not meant to suggest an explanation for such asymmetries.
Loschmidt's paradox is equivalent to the question of how it is possible that there could be a thermodynamic arrow of
time given time-symmetric fundamental laws, since time-symmetry implies that for any process compatible with
these fundamental laws, a reversed version that looked exactly like a film of the first process played backwards
would be equally compatible with the same fundamental laws, and would even be equally probable if one were to
pick the system's initial state randomly from the phase space of all possible states for that system.
Although most of the arrows of time described by physicists are thought to be special cases of the thermodynamic
arrow, there are a few that are believed to be unconnected, like the cosmological arrow of time based on the fact that
the universe is expanding rather than contracting, and the fact that a few processes in particle physics actually violate
time-symmetry, while they respect a related symmetry known as CPT symmetry. In the case of the cosmological
arrow, most physicists believe that entropy would continue to increase even if the universe began to contract
(although the physicist Thomas Gold once proposed a model in which the thermodynamic arrow would reverse in
this phase). In the case of the violations of time-symmetry in particle physics, the situations in which they occur are
rare and are only known to involve a few types of meson particles. Furthermore, due to CPT symmetry reversal of
time direction is equivalent to renaming particles as antiparticles and vice versa. Therefore this cannot explain
Loschmidt's paradox.
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Loschmidt's paradox
Dynamical systems
Main article: Entropy (arrow of time)
Current research in dynamical systems offers one possible mechanism for obtaining irreversibility from reversible
systems. The central argument is based on the claim that the correct way to study the dynamics of macroscopic
systems is to study the transfer operator corresponding to the microscopic equations of motion. It is then argued that
the transfer operator is not unitary (i.e. is not reversible) but has eigenvalues whose magnitude is strictly less than
one; these eigenvalues corresponding to decaying physical states. This approach is fraught with various difficulties;
it works well for only a handful of exactly solvable models.[2]
Abstract mathematical tools used in the study of dissipative systems include definitions of mixing, wandering sets,
and ergodic theory in general.
Fluctuation theorem
Main article: Fluctuation theorem
One approach to handling Loschmidt's paradox is the fluctuation theorem, proved by Denis Evans and Debra
Searles, which gives a numerical estimate of the probability that a system away from equilibrium will have a certain
change in entropy over a certain amount of time. The theorem is proved with the exact time reversible dynamical
equations of motion and the Axiom of Causality. The fluctuation theorem is proved using the fact that dynamics is
time reversible. Quantitative predictions of this theorem have been confirmed in laboratory experiments at the
Australian National University conducted by Edith M. Sevick et al. using optical tweezers apparatus.
However, the fluctuation theorem assumes that the system is initially in a non-equilibrium state, so it can be argued
that the theorem only verifies the time-asymmetry of the second law of thermodynamics based on an a priori
assumption of time-asymmetric boundary conditions. If no low-entropy boundary conditions in the past are assumed,
the fluctuation theorem should give exactly the same predictions in the reverse time direction as it does in the
forward direction, meaning that if you observe a system in a nonequilibrium state, you should predict that its entropy
was more likely to have been higher at earlier times as well as later times. This prediction appears at odds with
everyday experience in systems that are not closed, since if you film a typical nonequilibrium system and play the
film in reverse, you typically see the entropy steadily decreasing rather than increasing. Thus we still have no
explanation for the arrow of time that is defined by the observation that the fluctuation theorem gives correct
predictions in the forward direction but not the backward direction, so the fundamental paradox remains unsolved.
Note, however, that if you were looking at an isolated system which had reached equilibrium long in the past, so that
any departures from equilibrium were the result of random fluctuations, then the backwards prediction would be just
as accurate as the forward one, because if you happen to see the system in a nonequilibrium state it is
overwhelmingly likely that you are looking at the minimum-entropy point of the random fluctuation (if it were truly
random, there's no reason to expect it to continue to drop to even lower values of entropy, or to expect it had dropped
to even lower levels earlier), meaning that entropy was probably higher in both the past and the future of that state.
So, the fact that the time-reversed version of the fluctuation theorem does not ordinarily give accurate predictions in
the real world is reason to think that the nonequilibrium state of the universe at the present moment is not simply a
result of a random fluctuation, and that there must be some other explanation such as the Big Bang starting the
universe off in a low-entropy state (see below).
421
Loschmidt's paradox
The Big Bang

Another way of dealing with Loschmidt's paradox is to see the second law as an expression of a set of boundary
conditions, in which our universe's time coordinate has a low-entropy starting point: the Big Bang. From this point of
view, the arrow of time is determined entirely by the direction that leads away from the Big Bang, and a hypothetical
universe with a maximum-entropy Big Bang would have no arrow of time. The theory of cosmic inflation tries to
give reason why the early universe had such a low entropy.
References
[1] The kinetic theory of the dissipation of energy, as reprinted in S. Brush, ed., Kinetic Theory, vol. 2, Pergamon Press, 1966, pp. 176--187, as
quoted in Jan von Plato, Creating Modern Probability, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994, p. 85.
[2] Dean J. Driebe, Fully Chaotic Maps and Broken Time Symmetry, (1999) Kluwer Academic ISBN 0-7923-5564-4
J. Loschmidt, Sitzungsber. Kais. Akad. Wiss. Wien, Math. Naturwiss. Classe 73, 128142 (1876)
External links
Reversible laws of motion and the arrow of time (http://www.nyu.edu/classes/tuckerman/stat.mech/lectures/
lecture_3/node2.html) by Mark Tuckerman
A toy system with time-reversible discrete dynamics showing entropy increase (http://www.scientificblogging.
com/hammock_physicist/fibonacci_chaos_and_times_arrow)
Mpemba effect
The Mpemba effect, named after Erasto Mpemba, is the observation that, in some circumstances, warmer water can
freeze faster than colder water. Although there is evidence of the effect, there is no agreement on exactly what the
effect is and under what circumstances it occurs. There have been reports of similar phenomena since ancient times,
although with insufficient detail for the claims to be replicated. A number of possible explanations for the effect have
been proposed. Further investigations will need to decide on a precise definition of "freezing" and control a vast
number of starting parameters in order to confirm or explain the effect.
Definition
The effect has been defined as the following:
"There exists a set of initial parameters, and a pair of temperatures, such that given two bodies of water
identical in these parameters, and differing only in initial uniform temperatures, the hot one will freeze
sooner."
However, even with this definition it is not clear whether "freezing" refers to the point at which water forms a visible
surface layer of ice, the point at which the entire volume of water becomes a solid block of ice, or when the water
reached 0C.
With the above definition there are simple ways in which the effect might be observed, for example if the hotter
temperature melts the frost on a cooling surface and thus increases the thermal conductivity between the cooling
surface and the water container. On the other hand there may be many circumstances in which the effect is not
observed.
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Mpemba effect
Observations
Historical context
Similar behavior was observed by ancient scientists such as Aristotle: "The fact that the water has previously been
warmed contributes to its freezing quickly: for so it cools sooner. Hence many people, when they want to cool water
quickly, begin by putting it in the sun. So the inhabitants of Pontus when they encamp on the ice to fish (they cut a
hole in the ice and then fish) pour warm water round their reeds that it may freeze the quicker, for they use the ice
like lead to fix the reeds."[1] Aristotle's explanation involved an erroneous property he called antiperistasis, defined
as "the supposed increase in the intensity of a quality as a result of being surrounded by its contrary quality"
Early modern scientists such as Francis Bacon noted that "slightly tepid water freezes more easily than that which is
utterly cold."[2] In the original Latin, "aqua parum tepida facilius conglacietur quam omnino frigida."
Ren Descartes wrote in his Discourse Premier, "One can see by experience that water that has been kept on a fire
for a long time freezes faster than other, the reason being that those of its particles that are least able to stop bending
evaporate while the water is being heated."[3] Descartes' explanation here relates to his theory of vortices.
Mpemba's observation
The effect is named after Tanzanian Erasto Mpemba. He first encountered the phenomenon in 1963 in Form 3 of
Magamba Secondary School, Tanganyika, when freezing ice cream mix that was hot in cookery classes and noticing
that it froze before the cold mix. After passing his O-level examinations, he became a student at Mkwawa Secondary
(formerly High) School, Iringa, Tanzania. The headmaster invited Dr. Denis G. Osborne from the University College
in Dar Es Salaam to give a lecture on physics. After the lecture, Erasto Mpemba asked him the question "If you take
two similar containers with equal volumes of water, one at 35C (95F) and the other at 100C (212F), and put
them into a freezer, the one that started at 100C (212F) freezes first. Why?" only to be ridiculed by his classmates
and teacher. After initial consternation, Dr. Osborne experimented on the issue back at his workplace and confirmed
Mpemba's finding. They published the results together in 1969, while Mpemba was studying at the College of
African Wildlife Management near Moshi.[4]
Modern context
Mpemba and Osbourne describe placing 70 ml samples of water in 100 ml beakers in the ice box of a domestic
refrigerator on a sheet of polystyrene foam. They showed the time for freezing to start was longest with an initial
temperature of 25C and that it was much less at around 90C. They ruled out loss of liquid volume by evaporation
as a significant factor and the effect of dissolved air. In their setup most heat loss was found to be from the liquid
surface.
David Auerbach describes how the effect can be observed in samples in glass beakers placed into a liquid cooling
bath. In all cases the water supercools, reaching a temperature of typically -6C to -18C before spontaneously
freezing. Considerable random variation was observed in the time required for spontaneous freezing to start and in
some cases this resulted in the water which started off hotter (partially) freezing first.
In studies appearing in Phys.org, James Brownridge, a radiation safety officer at the State University of New York,
indicates supercooling is involved.
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Mpemba effect
Suggested explanations
The behaviour seems contrary to natural expectation but many explanations have been proposed to explain the
claimed effect.
Evaporation: The evaporation of the warmer water reduces the mass of the water to be frozen. Evaporation is
endothermic, meaning that the water mass is cooled by vapor carrying away the heat, but this alone probably does
not account for the entirety of the effect.
Convection: Accelerating heat transfers. Reduction of water density below 4C (39F) tends to suppress the
convection currents that cool the lower part of the liquid mass; the lower density of hot water would reduce this
effect, perhaps sustaining the more rapid initial cooling. Higher convection in the warmer water may also spread
ice crystals around faster.[5]
Frost: Has insulating effects. The lower temperature water will tend to freeze from the top, reducing further heat
loss by radiation and air convection, while the warmer water will tend to freeze from the bottom and sides
because of water convection. This is disputed as there are experiments that account for this factor.
Supercooling: It is hypothesised that cold water, when placed in a freezing environment, supercools more than hot
water in the same environment, thus solidifying slower than hot water. However, super-cooling tends to be less
significant where there are particles that act as nuclei for ice crystals, thus precipitating rapid freezing.
Solutes: The effects of calcium carbonate, magnesium carbonate among others.
Thermal conductivity: The container of hotter liquid may melt through a layer of frost that is acting as an insulator
under the container (frost is an insulator, as mentioned above), allowing the container to come into direct contact
with a much colder lower layer that the frost formed on (ice, refrigeration coils, etc.) The container now rests on a
much colder surface (or one better at removing heat, such as refrigeration coils) than the originally colder water,
and so cools far faster from this point on.
Dissolved Gases: Cold water can contain more dissolved gases than hot water, which may somehow change the
properties of the water with respect to convection currents, a proposition that has some experimental support but
no theoretical explanation.
Recent views
A reviewer for Physics World writes, "Even if the Mpemba effect is real if hot water can sometimes freeze more
quickly than cold it is not clear whether the explanation would be trivial or illuminating." He pointed out that
investigations of the phenomenon need to control a large number of initial parameters (including type and initial
temperature of the water, dissolved gas and other impurities, and size, shape and material of the container, and
temperature of the refrigerator) and need to settle on a particular method of establishing the time of freezing, all of
which might affect the presence or absence of the Mpemba effect. The required vast multidimensional array of
experiments might explain why the effect is not yet understood.[]
New Scientist recommends starting the experiment with containers at 35C (95F) and 5C (41F) to maximize the
effect.[6] In a related study, it was found that freezer temperature also affects the probability of observing the
Mpemba phenomena as well as container temperature. For a liquid bath freezer, a temperature range of 3C
(27F) to 8C (18F) was recommended.
In 2012, the Royal Society of Chemistry held a competition calling for papers offering explanations to the Mpemba
effect.[7] More than 22,000 people entered and Erasto Mpemba himself announced Nikola Bregovi as the winner,
suggesting that convection and supercooling were the reasons for the effect.[8]
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Mpemba effect
References
[1] Aristotle, Meteorology (http:/ / classics. mit. edu/ Aristotle/ meteorology. 1. i. html) I.12 348b31349a4
[2] Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Lib. II (http:/ / www. thelatinlibrary. com/ bacon/ bacon. liber2. shtml), L
[3] Descartes, Les Meteores (http:/ / posner. library. cmu. edu/ Posner/ books/ pages. cgi?call=423_D44D_1637& layout=vol0/ part0/ copy0&
file=0247)
[4] republished as
[5] CITV Prove It! Series 1 Programme 13 (http:/ / www. proveit. tv/ series-1/ fs. html?p=13& s=3)
[6] How to Fossilize Your Hamster: And Other Amazing Experiments For The Armchair Scientist, ISBN 1-84668-044-1
[7] Mpemba Competition (http:/ / www. rsc. org/ mpemba-competition/ ). Royal Society of Chemistry. 2012.
[8] Winner of the Mpemba Competition (http:/ / www. rsc. org/ mpemba-competition/ mpemba-winner. asp). Royal Society of Chemistry. 2013.
Bibliography
Dorsey, N. Ernest (1948). "The freezing of supercooled water". Trans. Am. Phil. Soc. (American Philosophical
Society) 38 (3): 247326. doi: 10.2307/1005602 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1005602). JSTOR 1005602
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/1005602). An extensive study of freezing experiments.
Auerbach, David (1995). "Supercooling and the Mpemba effect: when hot water freezes quicker than cold" (http:/
/robot-tag.com/evan/ajp-mpemba.pdf). American Journal of Physics 63 (10): 882885. Bibcode:
1995AmJPh..63..882A (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995AmJPh..63..882A). doi: 10.1119/1.18059 (http:/
/dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.18059). Auerbach attributes the Mpemba effect to differences in the behaviour of
supercooled formerly hot water and formerly cold water.
Knight, Charles A. (May 1996). "The MPEMBA effect: The freezing times of hot and cold water" (http://
scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=AJPIAS000064000005000524000001&
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18275).
Monwhea, Jeng (2006). "The Mpemba effect: When can hot water freeze faster than cold?". American Journal of
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(http://dx.doi.org/10.1119/1.2186331).
Chown, Marcus (June 2006). "Why water freezes faster after heating" (http://www.eurekalert.org/
pub_releases/2006-05/ns-wwf053106.php). New scientist.
External links
Mpemba Competition - Royal Society of Chemistry (http://www.rsc.org/mpemba-competition/)
Xi Zhang Yongli Huang, Zengsheng Ma, Chang Q Sun. "O:H-O Bond Anomalous Relaxation Resolving Mpemba
Paradox" (http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.6514).
Mpemba, E B; Osborne, D G. "The Mpemba effect" (http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/0031-9120/14/7/312/
pev14i7p410.pdf). Institute of Physics.
Adams, Cecil; Mary M.Q.C. (1996). "Which freezes faster, hot water or cold water?" (http://www.straightdope.
com/classics/a2_098b.html). The Straight Dope. Chicago Reader, Inc. Retrieved January 2008.
Brownridge, James (2010). "A search for the Mpemba effect: When hot water freezes faster than cold water".
arXiv: 1003.3185 (http://arxiv.org/abs/1003.3185)[ physics.pop-ph (http://arxiv.org/archive/physics.
pop-ph)].
"Heat questions" (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/thermo/freezhot.html). HyperPhysics. Georgia
State University.
assabs.harvard.edu (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-abs_connect?db_key=AST&db_key=PHY&
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start_mon=&start_year=&end_mon=&end_year=&ttl_logic=OR&title=&txt_logic=OR&text=Mpemba+&
nr_to_return=100&start_nr=1&jou_pick=ALL&ref_stems=&data_and=ALL&group_and=ALL&
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start_entry_day=&start_entry_mon=&start_entry_year=&end_entry_day=&end_entry_mon=&
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txt_syn=YES&aut_wt=1.0&obj_wt=1.0&ttl_wt=0.3&txt_wt=3.0&aut_wgt=YES&obj_wgt=YES&
ttl_wgt=YES&txt_wgt=YES&ttl_sco=YES&txt_sco=YES&version=1) article collection.
"The Mpemba Effect" (http://www.thecolourblue.co.uk/mpemba.shtml). - History and analysis of the
Mpemba Effect.
Jeng, Monwhea (November 1998). "Can hot water freeze faster than cold water?" (http://math.ucr.edu/home/
baez/physics/General/hot_water.html). in the University of California Usenet Physics FAQ
"The Phase Anomalies of Water: Hot Water may Freeze Faster than Cold Water" (http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/
water/explan.html#mpemba). An analysis of the Mpemba effect. London South Bank University.
"Mpemba effect: Why hot water can freeze faster than cold" (http://www.physorg.com/news188801988.html).
A possible explanation of the Mpemba Effect
"The story of the Mpemba effect told by the protagonists" (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dOAUdJR0SIo). An historical interview with Erasto Mpemba, Dr Denis Osborne and Ray deSouza
Olbers' paradox
In astrophysics and physical cosmology,
Olbers' paradox, named after the German
astronomer Heinrich Wilhelm Olbers
(17581840) and also called the "dark
night sky paradox", is the argument that
the darkness of the night sky conflicts with
the assumption of an infinite and eternal
static universe. The darkness of the night
sky is one of the pieces of evidence for a
non-static universe such as the Big Bang
model. If the universe is static,
homogeneous at a large scale, and populated
by an infinite number of stars, any sight line
from Earth must end at the (very bright)
surface of a star, so the night sky should be
completely bright. This contradicts the
observed darkness of the night.
History
Olbers' paradox in action
Edward Robert Harrison's Darkness at Night: A Riddle of the Universe (1987) gives an account of the dark night sky
paradox, seen as a problem in the history of science. According to Harrison, the first to conceive of anything like the
paradox was Thomas Digges, who was also the first to expound the Copernican system in English and also
postulated an infinite universe with infinitely many stars. Kepler also posed the problem in 1610, and the paradox
took its mature form in the 18th century work of Halley and Cheseaux. The paradox is commonly attributed to the
German amateur astronomer Heinrich Wilhelm Olbers, who described it in 1823, but Harrison shows convincingly
that Olbers was far from the first to pose the problem, nor was his thinking about it particularly valuable. Harrison
argues that the first to set out a satisfactory resolution of the paradox was Lord Kelvin, in a little known 1901
paper,[1] and that Edgar Allan Poe's essay Eureka (1848) curiously anticipated some qualitative aspects of Kelvin's
Olbers' paradox
427
argument:
Were the succession of stars endless, then the background of the sky would present us a uniform
luminosity, like that displayed by the Galaxy since there could be absolutely no point, in all that
background, at which would not exist a star. The only mode, therefore, in which, under such a state of
affairs, we could comprehend the voids which our telescopes find in innumerable directions, would be
by supposing the distance of the invisible background so immense that no ray from it has yet been able
to reach us at all.
The paradox
The paradox is that a static, infinitely old universe with an
infinite number of stars distributed in an infinitely large space
would be bright rather than dark.
To show this, we divide the universe into a series of
concentric shells, 1 light year thick. Thus, a certain number of
stars will be in the shell 1,000,000,000 to 1,000,000,001 light
years away. If the universe is homogeneous at a large scale,
then there would be four times as many stars in a second shell
between 2,000,000,000 to 2,000,000,001 light years away.
However, the second shell is twice as far away, so each star in
it would appear four times dimmer than the first shell. Thus
the total light received from the second shell is the same as the
total light received from the first shell.
What if every line of sight ended in a star? (Infinite universe
Thus each shell of a given thickness will produce the same net
assumption #2)
amount of light regardless of how far away it is. That is, the
light of each shell adds to the total amount. Thus the more
shells, the more light. And with infinitely many shells there would be a bright night sky.
Dark clouds could obstruct the light. But in that case the clouds would heat up, until they were as hot as stars, and
then radiate the same amount of light.
Kepler saw this as an argument for a finite observable universe, or at least for a finite number of stars. In general
relativity theory, it is still possible for the paradox to hold in a finite universe:[2] though the sky would not be
infinitely bright, every point in the sky would still be like the surface of a star.
Olbers' paradox
428
The mainstream explanation

See also: Redshift, Lambda-CDM model and metric expansion of
space
Poet Edgar Allan Poe suggested that the finite size of the observable
universe resolves the apparent paradox. More specifically, because the
universe is finitely old and the speed of light is finite, only finitely
many stars can be observed within a given volume of space visible
from Earth. The density of stars within this finite volume is sufficiently
low that any line of sight from Earth is unlikely to reach a star.
However, the Big Bang theory introduces a new paradox: it states that
the sky was much brighter in the past, especially at the end of the
recombination era, when it first became transparent. All points of the
local sky at that era were comparable in brightness to the surface of the
sun, due to the high temperature of the universe in that era; and most
light rays will terminate not in a star but in the relic of the Big Bang.
In a universe of three dimensions with stars

distributed evenly, the number of stars would be
proportional to volume. If the surface of
concentric sphere shells were considered, the
number of stars on each shell would be
proportional to the square of the radius of the
shell. In the picture above, the shells are reduced
to rings in two dimensions with all of the stars on
them.
This paradox is explained by the fact that the Big Bang theory also
involves the expansion of space which can cause the energy of emitted
light to be reduced via redshift. More specifically, the extreme levels of
radiation from the Big Bang have been redshifted to microwave wavelengths (1100 times longer than its original
wavelength) as a result of the cosmic expansion, and thus form the cosmic microwave background radiation. This
explains the relatively low light densities present in most of our sky despite the assumed bright nature of the Big
Bang. The redshift also affects light from distant stars and quasars, but the diminution is minor, since the most
distant galaxies and quasars have redshifts of only around 5 to 8.6.
Alternative explanations
Steady state
The redshift hypothesised in the Big Bang model would by itself explain the darkness of the night sky, even if the
universe were infinitely old. The steady state cosmological model assumed that the universe is infinitely old and
uniform in time as well as space. There is no Big Bang in this model, but there are stars and quasars at arbitrarily
great distances. The light from these distant stars and quasars will be redshifted accordingly (by the Doppler effect
and thermalisation[3]), so that the total light flux from the sky remains finite. Thus the observed radiation density (the
sky brightness of extragalactic background light) can be independent of finiteness of the Universe. Mathematically,
the total electromagnetic energy density (radiation energy density) in thermodynamic equilibrium from Planck's law
is
e.g. for temperature 2.7K it is 40fJ/m3...4.51031kg/m3 and for visible temperature 6000K we get
1J/m3...1.11017kg/m3. But the total radiation emitted by a star (or other cosmic object) is at most equal to the
total nuclear binding energy of isotopes in the star. For the density of the observable universe of about
4.61028kg/m3 and given the known abundance of the chemical elements, the corresponding maximal radiation
energy density of 9.21031 kg/m3, i.e. temperature 3.2K. This is close to the summed energy density of the cosmic
microwave background and the cosmic neutrino background. The Big Bang hypothesis, by contrast, predicts that the
Olbers' paradox
CBR should have the same energy density as the binding energy density of the primordial helium, which is much
greater than the binding energy density of the non-primordial elements; so it gives almost the same result. But
(neglecting quantum fluctuations in the early universe) the Big Bang would also predict a uniform distribution of
CBR, while the steady-state model predicts nothing about its distributionWikipedia:Citation needed. Nevertheless
the isotropy is very probable in steady state as in the kinetic theory.
Since the speed of light is a constant value, regardless of the shift towards infrared frequencies, the universe is still
sharply constrained to finite sizes in space as well as in time. Some models of an infinite (Steady State theory or
static universe) solution of the universe are still viable, and Olber's paradox cannot sharply distinguish between them
from some variants of the Big Bang model.
Finite age of stars

Stars have a finite age and a finite power, thereby implying that each star has a finite impact on a sky's light field
density. But if the universe were infinitely old, there would be infinitely many other stars in the same angular
direction, with an infinite total impact.
Absorption
A commonly proposed alternative explanation is that the universe is not transparent, and the light from distant stars
is blocked by intermediate dark stars or absorbed by dust or gas, so that there is a bound on the distance from which
light can reach the observer.
This would not resolve the paradox given the following argument: according to the laws of thermodynamics, the
intermediate matter must eventually heat up (or cool down, if it was initially hotter) until it is in thermal equilibrium
with the surrounding stars. Once this happens, the matter would then radiate the energy it receives from the stars at
the same (average) temperature, so the sky would still appear uniformly bright.
Brightness
Suppose that the universe were not expanding, and always had the same stellar density; then the temperature of the
universe would continually increase as the stars put out more radiation. Eventually, it would reach 3000K
(corresponding to a typical photon energy of 0.3 eV and so a frequency of 7.51013 Hz), and the photons would
begin to be absorbed by the hydrogen plasma filling most of the universe, rendering outer space opaque. This
maximal radiation density corresponds to about 1.21017 eV/m3 = 2.11019kg/m3, which is much greater than the
observed value of 4.71031kg/m3. So the sky is about fifty billion times darker than it would be if the universe
were neither expanding nor too young to have reached equilibrium yet.
Fractal star distribution

A different resolution, which does not rely on the Big Bang theory, was first proposed by Carl Charlier in 1908 and
later rediscovered by Benot Mandelbrot in 1974. They both postulated that if the stars in the universe were
distributed in a hierarchical fractal cosmology (e.g., similar to Cantor dust)the average density of any region
diminishes as the region considered increasesit would not be necessary to rely on the Big Bang theory to explain
Olbers' paradox. This model would not rule out a Big Bang but would allow for a dark sky even if the Big Bang had
not occurred.
Mathematically, the light received from stars as a function of star distance in a hypothetical fractal cosmos is:
where:
r0 = the distance of the nearest star. r0 > 0;
429
Olbers' paradox
430
r = the variable measuring distance from the Earth;

L(r) = average luminosity per star at distance r;
N(r) = number of stars at distance r.
The function of luminosity from a given distance L(r)N(r) determines whether the light received is finite or infinite.
For any luminosity from a given distance L(r)N(r) proportional to ra,
is infinite for a1 but finite for
a<1. So if L(r) is proportional to r2, then for
to be finite, N(r) must be proportional to rb, where b<1. For
b=1, the numbers of stars at a given radius is proportional to that radius. When integrated over the radius, this
implies that for b=1, the total number of stars is proportional to r2. This would correspond to a fractal dimension of
2. Thus the fractal dimension of the universe would need to be less than 2 for this explanation to work.
This explanation is not widely accepted among cosmologists since the evidence suggests that the fractal dimension
of the universe is at least 2. Moreover, the majority of cosmologists take the cosmological principle as a given,
which assumes that matter at the scale of billions of light years is distributed isotropically. Contrasting this, fractal
cosmology requires anisotropic matter distribution at the largest scales.
References
[1] For a key extract from this paper, see Harrison (1987), pp. 22728.
[2] D'Inverno, Ray. Introducing Einstein's Relativity, Oxford, 1992.
[3] http:/ / physicsessays. org/ doi/ abs/ 10. 4006/ 1. 3028952?journalCode=phes - Gilles Corriveau: The 3 K Background Emission, the
Formation of Galaxies, and the LargeScale Structure of the Universe
Further reading
Edward Robert Harrison (1987) Darkness at Night: A Riddle of the Universe, Harvard University Press. Very
readable.
-------- (2000) Cosmology, 2nd ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. Chpt. 24.
Taylor Mattie, Fundamentals of Heat Transfer. MAHS
Wesson, Paul (1991). "Olbers' paradox and the spectral intensity of the extragalactic background light". The
Astrophysical Journal 367: 399406. Bibcode: 1991ApJ...367..399W (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1991ApJ.
..367..399W). doi: 10.1086/169638 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/169638).
External links
Relativity FAQ about Olbers' paradox (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/GR/olbers.html)

Astronomy FAQ about Olbers' paradox (http://www.faqs.org/faqs/astronomy/faq/part9/section-17.html)
Cosmology FAQ about Olbers' paradox (http://supernova.lbl.gov/~evlinder/umass/faqm.html#olber)
"On Olber's Paradox" (http://www.mathpages.com/home/kmath141/kmath141.htm) at MathPages.com.
Why is the sky dark? (http://www.physics.org/facts/sand-dark.asp) physics.org page about Olbers' paradox
Why is it dark at night? (http://q2cfestival.com/play.php?lecture_id=8250&talk=alice) A 60-second animation
from the Perimeter Institute exploring the question with Alice and Bob in Wonderland
Ontological paradox
Ontological paradox
The bootstrap paradox, or ontological paradox, is a paradox of time travel in which information or objects can
exist without having been created. After information or an object is sent back in time, it is recovered in the present
and becomes the very object or information that was initially brought back in time in the first place. Numerous
science fiction stories are based on this paradox, which has also been the subject of serious physics articles.
The term "bootstrap paradox" refers to the expression "pulling yourself up by your bootstraps"; the use of the term
for the time-travel paradox was popularized by Robert A. Heinlein's story By His Bootstraps.
Definition
Because of the possibility of influencing the past while time traveling, one way of explaining why history does not
change is to posit that these changes already are contained self-consistently in the past timeline. A time traveler
attempting to alter the past in this model, intentionally or not, would only be fulfilling his or her role in creating
history, not changing it. The Novikov self-consistency principle proposes that contradictory causal loops cannot
form, but that consistent ones can.
However, a scenario can occur where items or information are passed from the future to the past, which then become
the same items or information that are subsequently passed back. This not only creates a loop, but a situation where
these items have no discernible origin. Physical items are even more problematic than pieces of information, since
they should ordinarily age and increase in entropy according to the Second law of thermodynamics. But if they age
by any nonzero amount at each cycle, they cannot be the same item to be sent back in time, creating a contradiction.
Another problem is the "reverse grandfather paradox", where whatever is sent to the past allows the time travel in the
first place (such as saving your past self's life, or sending vital information about the time travel mechanism).
The paradox raises the ontological questions of where, when and by whom the items were created or the information
derived. Time loop logic operates on similar principles, sending the solutions to computation problems back in time
to be checked for correctness without ever being computed "originally".
Whether or not a scenario described in this paradox would actually be possible, even if time travel itself were
possible, is not presently known.
The bootstrap paradox is similar to, but distinct from, the predestination paradox, in which individuals or information
travel back in time and ultimately trigger events they already experienced in their own present. In the latter case,
information and objects involved have definite origins.
Examples
Involving information
On the person's 30th birthday, a person who wishes to build a time machine is visited by a future version of
themself. This future self explains to this person that they should not worry about designing the time machine, as
they have done in the future. The person receives the schematics from the future self and starts building the time
machine. Time passes until they finally complete the time machine. The person then uses it to travel back in time
to the 30th birthday, where the schematics are given to the past self, closing the loop.
A professor travels forward in time, and reads in a physics journal about a new equation that was recently derived.
The professor travels back a few seconds after the journey was made, and relates it to one of the students who
writes it up, and the article is published in the same journal which the professor reads in the future.
A person builds a time machine. This person goes into the future and steals a valuable gadget. This person then
returns and reveals the gadget to the world, claiming it as their own. Eventually, a copy of the device ends up
being the item the person originally steals. In other words, the device is a copy of itself and it is not possible to
431
Ontological paradox
state where the original idea for the device came from.
A young physicist receives an old, disintegrating notebook containing information about future events sent by this
person's future self via a time machine; before the book deteriorates so badly as to be unusable, the person copies
the information in it into a new notebook. Over the years the predictions of the notebook come true, allowing this
person to become wealthy enough to fund their own research, which results in the development of a time
machine, which is used to send the now old, tattered, disintegrating notebook back to the former self. The
notebook is not a paradox (it has an end and a beginning; the beginning where it is received and the end where it
is disposed of after the information is copied out), but the information is: It's impossible to state where it came
from. The professor has transferred the information that was written out by oneself, so there was no original
information.
A person with a time machine takes the complete plays of Shakespeare, translated into Elizabethan English, and
travels back in time to Tudor England. He then gives the plays to the young William Shakespeare before he wrote
them, telling him to publish them as his own work. He does, and a copy of the 'original' publication is what is
taken back in time. This means that nobody wrote the plays of Shakespeare, as he essentially gave them to
himself, thereby closing the loop.
Involving physical items

A person is locked outside their house because the keys have been lost. While the person searches the pockets, a set
of keys fall to the ground next to the person, which this person realises they belong to oneself. When this person
enters the empty house five minutes later, this person encounters a time machine which this person uses to transport
oneself and the keys back in time five minutes, allowing this person to drop them out of an upstairs window to
oneself and leave the house, closing the loop.
A further paradox present for any physical item is that the keys should age each time around the loop and eventually
wear out. Bringing back a copy of the keys would prevent this "wearing out" issue as would finding the "lost" keys
and bringing them back.
Involving people
A man travels back in time and falls in love with and marries a woman, who he later learns was his own mother, who
then gives birth to him. He is therefore his own father (and thus also his father's father, father's father's father and so
on), creating a closed loop in his ancestry and giving him no origin for his paternal genetic material.
In fiction
The bootstrap paradox has been used in fictional stories and films. In the 1980 romance film Somewhere in Time,
based on Richard Matheson's 1975 novel Bid Time Return, an elderly woman gives a young man a pocket watch in
1972. He travels back in time to 1912 and gives the pocket watch to her, which she carries with her until 1972 when
she meets the young man and gives the watch to him. The concept is named from the Robert Heinlein story "By His
Bootstraps", which is considered the "ultimate time travel paradox tale" of its time. Don D'Amassa states that "The
greatest difficulty in creating a story of this type is not so much the plotting of the various times loops, but to render
them in such a way that the reader can follow the logic."
References
432
Painlev paradox
Painlev paradox
The Painlev paradox (also called by Jean Jacques Moreau "frictional paroxysms") is a well-known example by
Paul Painlev in rigid-body dynamics that showed that rigid-body dynamics with both contact friction and Coulomb
friction is inconsistent. This is due to a number of discontinuities in the behavior of rigid bodies and the
discontinuities inherent in the Coulomb friction law, especially when dealing with large coefficients of friction.
There exist, however, simple examples which prove that the Painlev paradoxes can appear even for small, realistic
friction.
Modeling rigid bodies and friction greatly simplifies such applications as animation, robotics and bio-mechanics, it is
only an approximation to a full elastic model requiring complex systems of partial differential equations. Rigid body
assumption also allows one to clarify many features that would otherwise remain hidden: Painlev paradoxes are one
of them. Moreover the rigid body models can be reliably and efficiently simulated, avoiding stiff problems and
issues related to the estimation of compliant contact/impact models, which is often quite a delicate matter.
The paradox was mathematically resolved in the 1990s by David E. Stewart. The Painlev paradox has not only been
solved by D. E. Stewart from the mathematical point of view (i.e. Stewart has shown the existence of solutions for
the classical Painlev example that consists of a rod sliding on a rough plane in 2-dimension), but it has been
explained from a more mechanical point of view by Franck Gnot and Bernard Brogliato. Gnot and Brogliato have
studied in great detail the rod dynamics in the neighborhood of a singular point of the phase space, when the rod is
sliding. The dynamical equations are then a particular singular ordinary differential equation with vector field
f(x)/g(x), where both f and g may vanish at a certain point (angle and angular velocity). One of the results is that at
this singular point the contact force may grow unbounded, however its impulse remains always bounded (this may
explain why time-stepping numerical methods like Moreau's scheme can well handle such situations since they
estimate the impulse, not the force). Hence the infinite contact force is not at all an obstacle to the integration.
Another situation (different from the first one) is that the trajectories may attain a zone in the phase space, where the
linear complementarity problem (LCP) that gives the contact force, has no solution. Then the solution (i.e. the
angular velocity of the rod) has to jump to an area where the LCP has a solution. This creates indeed a sort of
"impact" with velocity discontinuity. Interested readers may also have a look at Section 5.5 in Brogliato's book and
at figure 5.20 therein where the various important areas of the dynamics are depicted.
It is noteworthy that J. J. Moreau has shown in his seminal paper through numerical simulation with his
time-stepping scheme (afterwards called Moreau's scheme) that Painlev paradoxes can be simulated with suitable
time-stepping methods, for the above reasons given later by Gnot and Brogliato.
Since mechanics is above all an experimental science, it is of utmost importance that experiments validate the theory.
The classical chalk example is often cited (when forced to slide on a black board, a chalk has the tendency to bounce
on the board). Since the Painlev paradoxes are based on a mechanical model of Coulomb friction (multivalued at
zero tangential velocity) that is perhaps a simplified model of contact but which nevertheless encapsulates the main
dynamical effects of friction (like sticking and slipping zones), it should logically possess some mechanical meaning
and should not be just a mathematical fuss. Painlev paradoxes have been experimentally evidenced several times,
see for instance.
References
433
Physical paradox
Physical paradox
A physical paradox is an apparent contradiction in physical descriptions of the universe. While many physical
paradoxes have accepted resolutions, others defy resolution and may indicate flaws in theory. In physics as in all of
science, contradictions and paradoxes are generally assumed to be artifacts of error and incompleteness because
reality is assumed to be completely consistent, although this is itself a philosophical assumption. When, as in fields
such as quantum physics and relativity theory, existing assumptions about reality have been shown to break down,
this has usually been dealt with by changing our understanding of reality to a new one which remains self-consistent
in the presence of the new evidence.
Paradoxes relating to false assumptions

Certain physical paradoxes defy common sense predictions about
physical situations. In some cases, this is the result of modern physics
correctly describing the natural world in circumstances which are far
outside of everyday experience. For example, special relativity has
traditionally yielded two common paradoxes: the twin paradox and the
ladder paradox. Both of these paradoxes involve thought experiments
which defy traditional common sense assumptions about time and
space. In particular, the effects of time dilation and length contraction
are used in both of these paradoxes to create situations which
seemingly contradict each other. It turns out that the fundamental
The twin paradox illustrates the theory of
postulate of special relativity that the speed of light is invariant in all
non-absolute time.
frames of reference requires that concepts such as simultaneity and
absolute time are not applicable when comparing radically different frames of reference.
Another paradox associated with relativity is Supplee's paradox which seems to describe two reference frames that
are irreconcilable. In this case, the problem is assumed to be well-posed in special relativity, but because the effect is
dependent on objects and fluids with mass, the effects of general relativity need to be taken into account. Taking the
correct assumptions, the resolution is actually a way of restating the equivalence principle.
Babinet's paradox is that contrary to naive expectations, the amount of radiation removed from a beam in the
diffraction limit is equal to twice the cross-sectional area. This is because there are two separate processes which
remove radiation from the beam in equal amounts: absorption and diffraction.
Similarly, there exists a set of physical paradoxes that directly rely on one or more assumptions that are incorrect.
The Gibbs paradox of statistical mechanics yields an apparent contradiction when calculating the entropy of mixing.
If the assumption that the particles in an ideal gas are indistinguishable is not appropriately taken into account, the
calculated entropy is not an extensive variable as it should be.
Olbers' paradox shows that an infinite universe with a uniform distribution of stars necessarily leads to a sky that is
as bright as a star. The observed dark night sky can be alternatively resolvable by stating that one of the two
assumptions is incorrect. This paradox was sometimes used to argue that a homogeneous and isotropic universe as
required by the cosmological principle was necessarily finite in extent, but it turns out that there are ways to relax the
assumptions in other ways that admit alternative resolutions.
Mpemba paradox is that under certain conditions, hot water will freeze faster than cold water even though it must
pass through the same temperature as the cold water during the freezing process. This is a seeming violation of
Newton's law of cooling but in reality it is due to non-linear effects that influence the freezing process. The
assumption that only the temperature of the water will affect freezing is not correct.
434
Physical paradox
Paradoxes relating to unphysical mathematical idealizations

A common paradox occurs with mathematical
idealizations such as point sources which describe
physical phenomena well at distant or global scales but
break down at the point itself. These paradoxes are
sometimes seen as relating to Zeno's paradoxes which all
deal with the physical manifestations of mathematical
properties of continuity, infinitesimals, and infinities
often associated with space and time. For example, the
electric field associated with a point charge is infinite at
the location of the point charge. A consequence of this
apparent paradox is that the electric field of a
point-charge can only be described in a limiting sense by
a carefully constructed Dirac delta function. This
mathematically inelegant but physically useful concept
allows for the efficient calculation of the associated
The infinitely dense gravitational singularity found as time
physical conditions while conveniently sidestepping the
approaches an initial point in the Big Bang universe is an example
philosophical issue of what actually occurs at the
of a physical paradox.
infinitesimally-defined point: a question that physics is as
yet unable to answer. Fortunately, a consistent theory of
quantum electrodynamics removes the need for infinitesimal point charges altogether.
A similar situation occurs in general relativity with the gravitational singularity associated with the Schwarzschild
solution that describes the geometry of a black hole. The curvature of spacetime at the singularity is infinite which is
another way of stating that the theory does not describe the physical conditions at this point. It is hoped that the
solution to this paradox will be found with a consistent theory of quantum gravity, something which has thus far
remained elusive. A consequence of this paradox is that the associated singularity that occurred at the supposed
starting point of the universe (see Big Bang) is not adequately described by physics. Before a theoretical
extrapolation of a singularity can occur, quantum mechanical effects become important in an era known as the
Planck time. Without a consistent theory, there can be no meaningful statement about the physical conditions
associated with the universe before this point.
Another paradox due to mathematical idealization is D'Alembert's paradox of fluid mechanics. When the forces
associated with two-dimensional, incompressible, irrotational, inviscid steady flow across a body are calculated,
there is no drag. This is in contradiction with observations of such flows, but as it turns out a fluid that rigorously
satisfies all the conditions is a physical impossibility. The mathematical model breaks down at the surface of the
body, and new solutions involving boundary layers have to be considered to correctly model the drag effects.
435
Physical paradox
Quantum mechanical paradoxes

A significant set of physical paradoxes are associated with the privileged position of the observer in quantum
mechanics.
Three of the most famous of these are:
1. the double-slit experiment;
2. the EPR paradox and
3. the Schrdinger's cat paradox,
all of them proposed as thought experiments relevant to the discussions of the correct interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
These thought experiments try to use principles derived from the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
to derive conclusions that are seemingly contradictory. In the case of Schrdinger's cat this takes the form of a
seeming absurdity.
A cat is placed in a box sealed off from
observation with a quantum mechanical
switch designed to kill the cat when
appropriately deployed. While in the
box, the cat is described as being in a
quantum superposition of "dead" and
"alive" states, though opening the box
effectively collapses the cat's wave
function to one of the two conditions. In
the case of the EPR paradox, quantum
entanglement appears to allow for the
In Schrdinger's Cat thought experiment a cat is paradoxically alive and dead at the very
physical impossibility of information
same moment.
transmitted faster than the speed of
light, violating special relativity.
Related to the EPR paradox is the phenomenon of quantum pseudo-telepathy in which parties who are prevented
from communicating do manage to accomplish tasks that seem to require direct contact.
The "resolutions" to these paradoxes are considered by many to be philosophically unsatisfying because they hinge
on what is specifically meant by the measurement of an observation or what serves as an observer in the thought
experiments. In a real physical sense, no matter what way either of those terms are defined, the results are the same.
Any given observation of a cat will yield either one that is dead or alive; the superposition is a necessary condition
for calculating what is to be expected, but will never itself be observed. Likewise, the EPR paradox yields no way of
transmitting information faster than the speed of light; though there is a seemingly instantaneous conservation of the
quantum-entangled observable being measured, it turns out that it is physically impossible to use this effect to
transmit information. Why there is an instantaneous conservation is the subject of which is the correct interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
Speculative theories of quantum gravity that combine general relativity with quantum mechanics have their own
associated paradoxes that are generally accepted to be artifacts of the lack of a consistent physical model that unites
the two formulations. One such paradox is the black hole information paradox which points out that information
associated with a particle that falls into a black hole is not conserved when the theoretical Hawking radiation causes
the black hole to evaporate. In 2004, Stephen Hawking claimed to have a working resolution to this problem, but the
details have yet to be published and the speculative nature of Hawking radiation means that it isn't clear whether this
paradox is relevant to physical reality.
436
Physical paradox
Causality paradoxes
A set of similar paradoxes occurs within the area of physics involving arrow of time and causality. One of these, the
grandfather paradox, deals with the peculiar nature of causality in closed time-like loops. In its most crude
conception, the paradox involves a person traveling back in time and murdering an ancestor who hadn't yet had a
chance to procreate. The speculative nature of time travel to the past means that there is no agreed upon resolution to
the paradox, nor is it even clear that there are physically possible solutions to the Einstein equations that would allow
for the conditions required for the paradox to be met. Nevertheless, there are two common explanations for possible
resolutions for this paradox that take on similar flavor for the explanations of quantum mechanical paradoxes. In the
so-called self-consistent solution, reality is constructed in such a way as to deterministically prevent such paradoxes
from occurring. This idea makes many free will advocates uncomfortable, though it is very satisfying to many
philosophical naturalists.Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words Alternatively, the many worlds idealization or the concept
of parallel universes is sometimes conjectured to allow for a continual fracturing of possible worldlines into many
different alternative realities. This would mean that any person who traveled back in time would necessarily enter a
different parallel universe that would have a different history from the point of the time travel forward.
Another paradox associated with the causality and the one-way nature of time is Loschmidt's paradox which poses
the question how can microprocesses that are time-reversible produce a time-irreversible increase in entropy. A
partial resolution to this paradox is rigorously provided for by the fluctuation theorem which relies on carefully
keeping track of time averaged quantities to show that from a statistical mechanics point of view, entropy is far more
likely to increase than to decrease. However, if no assumptions about initial boundary conditions are made, the
fluctuation theorem should apply equally well in reverse, predicting that a system currently in a low-entropy state is
more likely to have been at a higher-entropy state in the past, in contradiction with what would usually be seen in a
reversed film of a nonequilibrium state going to equilibrium. Thus, the overall asymmetry in thermodynamics which
is at the heart of Loschmidt's paradox is still not resolved by the fluctuation theorem. Most physicists believe that the
thermodynamic arrow of time can only be explained by appealing to low entropy conditions shortly after the big
bang, although the explanation for the low entropy of the big bang itself is still debated.
Observational paradoxes
A further set of physical paradoxes are based on sets of observations that fail to be adequately explained by current
physical models. These may simply be indications of the incompleteness of current theories. It is recognized that
unification has not been accomplished yet which may hint at fundamental problems with the current scientific
paradigms. Whether this is the harbinger of a scientific revolution yet to come or whether these observations will
yield to future refinements or be found to be erroneous is yet to be determined. A brief list of these yet inadequately
explained observations includes observations implying the existence of dark matter, observations implying the
existence of dark energy, the observed matter-antimatter asymmetry, the GZK paradox, the heat death paradox, and
the Fermi paradox.
437
Physical paradox
References
Bondi, Hermann (1980). Relativity and Common Sense. Dover Publications. p.177. ISBN0-486-24021-5.
Geroch, Robert (1981). General Relativity from A to B. University Of Chicago Press. p.233.
ISBN0-226-28864-1.
Gott, J. Richard (2002). Time Travel in Einstein's Universe. Mariner Books. p.291. ISBN0-395-95563-7.
Gamow, George (1993). Mr Tompkins in Paperback (reissue ed.). Cambridge University Press. p.202.
ISBN0-521-44771-2.
Feynman, Richard P. (1988). QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter. Princeton University Press. p.176.
ISBN0-691-02417-0.
Ford, Kenneth W. and Paul Hewitt (2004). The Quantum World : Quantum Physics for Everyone. Harvard
University Press. p.288. ISBN0-674-01342-5.
Further reading
Cuci, D. & Nikoli, A. (2006). A short insight about Thought experiment in Modern Physics. 6th International
Conference of the Balkan Physical Union BPU6, Istanbul Turkey.
Cuci, D. (2008). Astrophisics Paradoxes. XV NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ASTRONOMERS OF SERBIA,
Beograd.
Cuci, D. (2009). Paradoxes of Thermodynamics. 7th International Conference of the Balkan Physical Union
BPU7, Alexandroupolis Greece.
External links
Usenet Physics FAQ by John Baez [1]
Time travel and modern physics [2]
References
[1] http:/ / math. ucr. edu/ home/ baez/ physics/
[2] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ time-travel-phys
438
439
This article uses quantum theoretical concepts and terminology. For a generally accessible introduction to quantum
mechanics, see Introduction to quantum mechanics.
Quantum
mechanics
Introduction
Glossary
History
v
t
e [1]
Quantum pseudo-telepathy is a phenomenon in quantum game theory resulting in anomalously high success rates
in coordination games between separated players. These high success rates would require communication between
the players in a purely classical (non-quantum) world; however, the game is set up such that during the game,
communication is physically impossible. This means that for quantum pseudo-telepathy to occur, prior to the game
the participants need to share a physical system in an entangled quantum state, and during the game have to execute
measurements on this entangled state as part of their game strategy. Games in which the application of such a
quantum strategy leads to pseudo-telepathy are also referred to as quantum non-locality games.
In their 1999 paper,[1] Gilles Brassard, Richard Cleve and Alain Tapp demonstrated that winning quantum strategies
can exist in simple games for which in the absence of quantum entanglement a winning strategy can result only if the
participants were allowed to communicate. The term quantum pseudo-telepathy was later introduced[2] for this
phenomenon. The prefix 'pseudo' is appropriate, as the quantum non-locality effects that are at the heart of the
phenomenon do not allow any transfer of information, but rather eliminate the need to exchange information
between the players for achieving a mutual win in the game.
The phenomenon of quantum pseudo-telepathy is mostly used as a powerful and explicit thought experiment of the
non-local characteristics of quantum mechanics. Yet, the effect is real and subject to experimental verification, as
demonstrated by the experimental confirmation of the violation of the Bell inequalities.
440
The Mermin-Peres magic square game

An example of quantum pseudo-telepathy can be observed in the following
two-player coordination game in which, in each round, one participant fills
one row and the other fills one column of a 3x3 table with plus and minus
signs.
The two players Alice and Bob are separated so that no communication
between them is possible. In each round of the game Alice is told which
row is selected for her to fill in, and Bob is told which column is selected
for him. Alice is not told which column Bob must fill in, and Bob is not
told which row Alice must fill in. Alice and Bob must both place the same
sign in the cell shared by their row and column. Furthermore (and this is
the catch), Alice has to fill the remainder of the row such that there is an
even number of minus signs in that row, whilst Bob has to fill the
remainder of the column such that there is an odd number of minus signs in
that column.
When attempting to construct a 3x3 table

filled with the numbers +1 and 1, such that
each row has an even number and each
column an odd number of negative entries, a
conflict is bound to emerge.
It is easy to see that any prior agreement between Alice and Bob on the use
of specific tables filled with + and signs is not going to help them. The reason being that such tables simply do not
exist: as these would be self-contradictory with the sum of the minus signs in the table being even based on row
sums, and being odd when using column sums.
So, how can Alice and Bob succeed in their task?
Although they are separated "so that no communication between them is possible", coordination can be provided
through a pair of particles with entangled states, one of the particles is held by Alice, the other by Bob. Once Alice
and Bob learn which column and row they must fill, each uses that information to select which measurement they
should make to the particle. The result of that measurement will appear to each of them to be random, so no real
"communication" takes place. But there is a coordinating effect they can take advance of. If each of them follow the
advice of their measurement, they are sure to win. Moreover, it is not possible for the referee to "separate" them in
any way to keep this coordination from taking place. They can be light years apart from one another, and the
entangled particles will still provide that critical hint.
Specifically, the trick is for Alice and Bob to share an entangled quantum state and to use specific measurements on
their components of the entangled state to derive the table entries. A suitable correlated state consists of a pair of Bell
states:
here |+> and |-> are eigenstates of the Pauli operator Sz with eigenvalues +1 and 1, respectively, whilst the
subscripts a, b, c, and d identify the components of each Bell state, with a and c going to Alice, and b and d going to
Bob.
Observables for these components can be written as products of the Pauli spin matrices:
Products of these Pauli spin operators can be used to fill the 3x3 table such that each row and each column contains a
mutually commuting set of observables with eigenvalues +1 and 1, and with the product of the obervables in each
row being the identity operator, and the product of observables in each column equating to minus the identity
operator. This so-called MerminPeres magic square[3] is shown in below table.
Effectively, while it is not possible to construct a 3x3 table with entries +1 and 1 such that the product of the
elements in each row equals +1 and the product of elements in each column equals 1, it is possible to do so with the
richer algebraic structure based on spin matrices.
Current research
It has been demonstrated[4] that the above described game is the simplest two-player game in which quantum
pseudo-telepathy can occur. Other games in which quantum pseudo-telepathy occurs have been studied, including
larger magic square games,[5] graph colouring games[6] giving rise to the notion of quantum chromatic number,[7]
and multiplayer games involving more than two participants.[8] Recent studies tackle the question of the robustness
of the effect against noise due to imperfect measurements on the coherent quantum state.[9] Recent work has shown
an exponential enhancement in the communication cost of nonlinear distributed computation, due to entanglement,
when the communication channel itself is restricted to be linear.[10]
Notes
[1] Gilles Brassard, Richard Cleve, Alain Tapp, " The cost of exactly simulating quantum entanglement with classical communication (http:/ /
arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 9901035)" (1999).
[2] Gilles Brassard, Anne Broadbent, Alain Tapp, " Multi-Party Pseudo-Telepathy (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0306042)" (2003).
[3] Here we use the table as defined in: P.K. Aravind, " Quantum mysteries revisited again (http:/ / users. wpi. edu/ ~paravind/ Publications/
MSQUARE5. pdf)", American Journal of Physics. 72, 1303-7 (2004).
[4] Nicolas Gisin, Andre Allan Methot, Valerio Scarani, " Pseudo-telepathy: input cardinality and Bell-type inequalities (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/
quant-ph/ 0610175)" (2006).
[5] Samir Kunkri, Guruprasad Kar, Sibasish Ghosh, Anirban Roy, " Winning strategies for pseudo-telepathy games using single non-local box
(http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0602064)" (2006).
[6] David Avis, Jun Hasegawa, Yosuke Kikuchi and Yuuya Sasaki, " A quantum protocol to win the graph colouring game on all Hadamard
graphs (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0509047)" (2005).
[7] Peter J. Cameron, Ashley Montanaro, Michael W. Newman, Simone Severini, Andreas Winter, " On the quantum chromatic number of a
graph (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0608016)" Electronic Journal of Combinatorics 14(1), 2007.
[8] Gilles Brassard, Anne Broadbent, Alain Tapp, " Recasting Mermin's multi-player game into the framework of pseudo-telepathy (http:/ / arxiv.
org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0408052)" (2004).
[9] P. Gawron, J.A. Miszczak, J. Sladkowski, " Noise Effects in Quantum Magic Squares Game (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ 0801. 4848v1)",
International Journal of Quantum Information, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2008), pp. 667673.
[10] A. Marblestone and M. Devoret, " Exponential Quantum Enhancement for Distributed Addition with Local Nonlinearity (http:/ / arxiv. org/
pdf/ 0907. 3465. pdf)", Quantum Information Processing, Vol. 9, No.1 (2010)
External links
Understanding and simulating quantum pseudo-telepathy (http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/
Post6536_implementing-quantum-pseudo-telepathy)
441
Schrdinger's cat
442
Schrdinger's cat
This article is about the thought experiment. For the novel, see Schrdinger's Cat Trilogy. For the Linux distribution
code named Schrdinger's Cat, see Fedora (operating system).
Schrdinger's cat: a cat, a flask of poison, and a radioactive source are placed in a sealed
box. If an internal monitor detects radioactivity (i.e. a single atom decaying), the flask is
shattered, releasing the poison that kills the cat. The Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics implies that after a while, the cat is simultaneously alive and dead.
Yet, when one looks in the box, one sees the cat either alive or dead, not both alive and
dead. This poses the question of when exactly quantum superposition ends and reality
collapses into one possibility or the other.
Quantum
mechanics
Introduction
Glossary
History
v
t
e [1]
Schrdinger's cat is a thought experiment, sometimes described as a paradox, devised by Austrian physicist Erwin
Schrdinger in 1935. It illustrates what he saw as the problem of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics applied to everyday objects. The scenario presents a cat that may be both alive and dead, this state being
tied to an earlier random event. Although the original "experiment" was imaginary, similar principles have been
researched and used in practical applications.Wikipedia:Citation needed The thought experiment is also often
featured in theoretical discussions of the interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the course of developing this
experiment, Schrdinger coined the term Verschrnkung (entanglement).
Schrdinger's cat
Origin and motivation

Schrdinger intended his thought experiment as a discussion of the EPR articlenamed after its authors Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosenin 1935.[1] The EPR article highlighted the strange nature of quantum entanglement, which is
a characteristic of a quantum state that is a combination of the states of two systems (for example, two subatomic
particles) that once interacted but were then separated, and are not each in a definite state. The Copenhagen
interpretation implies that the state of the two systems collapses into a definite state when one of the systems is
measured. Schrdinger and Einstein exchanged letters about Einstein's EPR article, in the course of which Einstein
pointed out that the state of an unstable keg of gunpowder will, after a while, contain a superposition of both
exploded and unexploded states.
To further illustrate, Schrdinger describes how one could, in principle, transpose the superposition of an atom to
large-scale systems. He proposed a scenario with a cat in a sealed box, wherein the cat's life or death depended on
the state of a subatomic particle. According to Schrdinger, the Copenhagen interpretation implies that the cat
remains both alive and dead (to the universe outside the box) until the box is opened. Schrdinger did not wish to
promote the idea of dead-and-alive cats as a serious possibility; on the contrary, the paradox is a classic reductio ad
absurdum. The thought experiment illustrates quantum mechanics and the mathematics necessary to describe
quantum states. Intended as a critique of just the Copenhagen interpretation (the prevailing orthodoxy in 1935), the
"Schrdinger's Cat" thought experiment remains a typical touchstone for limited interpretations of quantum
mechanics. Physicists often use the way each interpretation deals with Schrdinger's cat as a way of illustrating and
comparing the particular features, strengths, and weaknesses of each interpretation.
The thought experiment

Schrdinger wrote:[2]
One can even set up quite ridiculous cases. A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the
following device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter,
there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of the hour one of the
atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges
and through a relay releases a hammer that shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this
entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has
decayed. The psi-function of the entire system would express this by having in it the living and dead cat
(pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts.
It is typical of these cases that an indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes
transformed into macroscopic indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct observation. That prevents
us from so naively accepting as valid a "blurred model" for representing reality. In itself, it would not embody
anything unclear or contradictory. There is a difference between a shaky or out-of-focus photograph and a
snapshot of clouds and fog banks.
Erwin Schrdinger,Die gegenwrtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik (The present situation in quantum
mechanics), Naturwissenschaften
(translated by John D. Trimmer in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society)
Schrdinger's famous thought experiment poses the question, "when does a quantum system stop existing as a
superposition of states and become one or the other?" (More technically, when does the actual quantum state stop
being a linear combination of states, each of which resembles different classical states, and instead begin to have a
unique classical description?) If the cat survives, it remembers only being alive. But explanations of the EPR
experiments that are consistent with standard microscopic quantum mechanics require that macroscopic objects, such
as cats and notebooks, do not always have unique classical descriptions. The thought experiment illustrates this
apparent paradox. Our intuition says that no observer can be in a mixture of statesyet the cat, it seems from the
443
Schrdinger's cat
thought experiment, can be such a mixture. Is the cat required to be an observer, or does its existence in a single
well-defined classical state require another external observer? Each alternative seemed absurd to Albert Einstein,
who was impressed by the ability of the thought experiment to highlight these issues. In a letter to Schrdinger dated
1950, he wrote:
You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the
assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they
are playing with realityreality as something independent of what is experimentally established. Their
interpretation is, however, refuted most elegantly by your system of radioactive atom + amplifier +
charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which the psi-function of the system contains both the cat alive
and blown to bits. Nobody really doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is something
independent of the act of observation.[3]
Note that the charge of gunpowder is not mentioned in Schrdinger's setup, which uses a Geiger counter as an
amplifier and hydrocyanic poison instead of gunpowder. The gunpowder had been mentioned in Einstein's original
suggestion to Schrdinger 15 years before, and apparently Einstein had carried it forward to the present discussion.
Interpretations of the experiment

Since Schrdinger's time, other interpretations of quantum mechanics have been proposed that give different answers
to the questions posed by Schrdinger's cat of how long superpositions last and when (or whether) they collapse.
Copenhagen interpretation
Main article: Copenhagen interpretation
The most commonly held interpretation of quantum mechanics is the Copenhagen interpretation. In the Copenhagen
interpretation, a system stops being a superposition of states and becomes either one or the other when an
observation takes place. This experiment makes apparent the fact that the nature of measurement, or observation, is
not well-defined in this interpretation. The experiment can be interpreted to mean that while the box is closed, the
system simultaneously exists in a superposition of the states "decayed nucleus/dead cat" and "undecayed
nucleus/living cat", and that only when the box is opened and an observation performed does the wave function
collapse into one of the two states.
However, one of the main scientists associated with the Copenhagen interpretation, Niels Bohr, never had in mind
the observer-induced collapse of the wave function, so that Schrdinger's cat did not pose any riddle to him. The cat
would be either dead or alive long before the box is opened by a conscious observer. Analysis of an actual
experiment found that measurement alone (for example by a Geiger counter) is sufficient to collapse a quantum
wave function before there is any conscious observation of the measurement. The view that the "observation" is
taken when a particle from the nucleus hits the detector can be developed into objective collapse theories. The
thought experiment requires an "unconscious observation" by the detector in order for magnification to occur. In
contrast, the many worlds approach denies that collapse ever occurs.
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Schrdinger's cat
445
Many-worlds interpretation and consistent histories

Main
article:
interpretation
Many-worlds
In 1957, Hugh Everett formulated the

many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which does not single out
observation as a special process. In the
many-worlds interpretation, both alive
and dead states of the cat persist after
the box is opened, but are decoherent
from each other. In other words, when
the box is opened, the observer and the
possibly-dead cat split into an observer
looking at a box with a dead cat, and
an observer looking at a box with a
live cat. But since the dead and alive
states are decoherent, there is no
effective communication or interaction
between them.
The quantum-mechanical "Schrdinger's cat" paradox according to the many-worlds

interpretation. In this interpretation, every event is a branch point. The cat is both alive
and deadregardless of whether the box is openedbut the "alive" and "dead" cats are
in different branches of the universe that are equally real but cannot interact with each
other.
When opening the box, the observer becomes entangled with the cat, so "observer states" corresponding to the cat's
being alive and dead are formed; each observer state is entangled or linked with the cat so that the "observation of
the cat's state" and the "cat's state" correspond with each other. Quantum decoherence ensures that the different
outcomes have no interaction with each other. The same mechanism of quantum decoherence is also important for
the interpretation in terms of consistent histories. Only the "dead cat" or the "alive cat" can be a part of a consistent
history in this interpretation.
Roger Penrose criticises this:
"I wish to make it clear that, as it stands, this is far from a resolution of the cat paradox. For there is
nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics that demands that a state of consciousness cannot
involve the simultaneous perception of a live and a dead cat."[4]
However, the mainstream view (without necessarily endorsing many-worlds) is that decoherence is the mechanism
that forbids such simultaneous perception.[5][6]
A variant of the Schrdinger's cat experiment, known as the quantum suicide machine, has been proposed by
cosmologist Max Tegmark. It examines the Schrdinger's cat experiment from the point of view of the cat, and
argues that by using this approach, one may be able to distinguish between the Copenhagen interpretation and
many-worlds.
Schrdinger's cat
Ensemble interpretation
The ensemble interpretation states that superpositions are nothing but subensembles of a larger statistical ensemble.
The state vector would not apply to individual cat experiments, but only to the statistics of many similarly prepared
cat experiments. Proponents of this interpretation state that this makes the Schrdinger's cat paradox a trivial matter,
or a non-issue.
This interpretation serves to discard the idea that a single physical system in quantum mechanics has a mathematical
description that corresponds to it in any way.
Relational interpretation
The relational interpretation makes no fundamental distinction between the human experimenter, the cat, or the
apparatus, or between animate and inanimate systems; all are quantum systems governed by the same rules of
wavefunction evolution, and all may be considered "observers". But the relational interpretation allows that different
observers can give different accounts of the same series of events, depending on the information they have about the
system. The cat can be considered an observer of the apparatus; meanwhile, the experimenter can be considered
another observer of the system in the box (the cat plus the apparatus). Before the box is opened, the cat, by nature of
its being alive or dead, has information about the state of the apparatus (the atom has either decayed or not decayed);
but the experimenter does not have information about the state of the box contents. In this way, the two observers
simultaneously have different accounts of the situation: To the cat, the wavefunction of the apparatus has appeared to
"collapse"; to the experimenter, the contents of the box appear to be in superposition. Not until the box is opened,
and both observers have the same information about what happened, do both system states appear to "collapse" into
the same definite result, a cat that is either alive or dead.
Objective collapse theories

According to objective collapse theories, superpositions are destroyed spontaneously (irrespective of external
observation) when some objective physical threshold (of time, mass, temperature, irreversibility, etc.) is reached.
Thus, the cat would be expected to have settled into a definite state long before the box is opened. This could loosely
be phrased as "the cat observes itself", or "the environment observes the cat".
Objective collapse theories require a modification of standard quantum mechanics to allow superpositions to be
destroyed by the process of time evolution. This process, known as "decoherence", is among the fastest processes
currently known to physics.
Applications and tests

The experiment as described is a purely theoretical one, and the machine proposed is not known to have been
constructed. However, successful experiments involving similar principles, e.g. superpositions of relatively large (by
the standards of quantum physics) objects have been performed.[7] These experiments do not show that a cat-sized
object can be superposed, but the known upper limit on "cat states" has been pushed upwards by them. In many cases
the state is short-lived, even when cooled to near absolute zero.
A "cat state" has been achieved with photons.[8]
A beryllium ion has been trapped in a superposed state.[9]
An experiment involving a superconducting quantum interference device ("SQUID") has been linked to theme of
the thought experiment: "The superposition state does not correspond to a billion electrons flowing one way and a
billion others flowing the other way. Superconducting electrons move en masse. All the superconducting
electrons in the SQUID flow both ways around the loop at once when they are in the Schrdinger's cat state."[10]
A piezoelectric "tuning fork" has been constructed, which can be placed into a superposition of vibrating and non
vibrating states. The resonator comprises about 10 trillion atoms.[11]
446
Schrdinger's cat
447
An experiment involving a flu virus has been proposed.[12]

In quantum computing the phrase "cat state" often refers to the special entanglement of qubits wherein the qubits are
in an equal superposition of all being 0 and all being 1; e.g.,
Extensions
Wigner's friend is a variant on the experiment with two external observers: the first opens and inspects the box and
then communicates his observations to a second observer. The issue here is, does the wave function "collapse" when
the first observer opens the box, or only when the second observer is informed of the first observer's observations?
In another extension, prominent physicists have gone so far as to suggest that astronomers observing dark energy in
the universe in 1998 may have "reduced its life expectancy" through a pseudo-Schrdinger's cat scenario, although
this is a controversial viewpoint.
In popular culture
Main article: Schrdinger's cat in popular culture
References
[1] Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete? (http:/ / prola. aps. org/ abstract/ PR/ v47/
i10/ p777_1) A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev.
47, 777 (1935)
[2] Schroedinger: "The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics." 5.
Are the Variables Really Blurred? (http:/ / www. tu-harburg. de/
rzt/ rzt/ it/ QM/ cat. html#sect5)
[3] Pay link to Einstein letter (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ pss/ 687649)
[4] Penrose, R. The Road to Reality, p 807.
[5] Wojciech H. Zurek, Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum
origins of the classical, Reviews of Modern Physics 2003, 75, 715
or (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0105127)
[6] Wojciech H. Zurek, "Decoherence and the transition from
quantum to classical", Physics Today, 44, pp. 3644 (1991)
Real-size cat figure in the garden of Huttenstrasse 30, Zurich, where

Erwin Schrdinger lived 1921 1926. Depending on the light
conditions, the cat appears either alive or not.
[7] What is the World's Biggest Schrodinger Cat? (http:/ / physics.

stackexchange. com/ questions/ 3309/
what-is-the-worlds-biggest-schrodinger-cat)
[8] Schrdingers Cat Now Made of Light (http:/ / www. science20. com/ news_articles/ schrdingers_cat_now_made_light)
[9] C. Monroe, et. al. A "Schrodinger Cat" Superposition State of an Atom (http:/ / www. quantumsciencephilippines. com/ seminar/
seminar-topics/ SchrodingerCatAtom. pdf)
[10] Physics World: Schrodinger's cat comes into view (http:/ / physicsworld. com/ cws/ article/ news/ 2815)
[11] Scientific American : Macro-Weirdness: "Quantum Microphone" Puts Naked-Eye Object in 2 Places at Once: A new device tests the limits
of Schrdinger's cat (http:/ / www. scientificamerican. com/ article. cfm?id=quantum-microphone)
[12] How to Create Quantum Superpositions of Living Things (http:/ / www. technologyreview. com/ blog/ arxiv/ 24101/ )>
Schrdinger's cat
448
External links
Schrdinger's cat in audio (http://soundcloud.com/siftpodcast/schr-dingers-cat) produced by Sift (http://
siftpodcast.com/)
Erwin Schrdinger, The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics (Translation) (http://www.tu-harburg.de/rzt/
rzt/it/QM/cat.html)
The EPR paper (http://prola.aps.org/abstract/PR/v47/i10/p777_1)
The story of Schroedinger's cat (an epic poem) (http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a1_122.html); The
Straight Dope
Tom Leggett (Aug. 1, 2000) New life for Schrdinger's cat, Physics World, UK (http://physicsworld.com/cws/
article/print/525) Experiments at two universities claim to observe superposition in large scale systems
Information Philosopher on Schrdinger's cat (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/
experiments/schrodingerscat/) More diagrams and an information creation explanation.
Poliakoff, Martyn (2009). "Schrdinger's Cat" (http://www.sixtysymbols.com/videos/schrodinger.htm). Sixty
Symbols. Brady Haran for the University of Nottingham.
Supplee's paradox
In relativistic physics, Supplee's paradox (also called the submarine paradox) arises when considering the buoyant
force exerted on a relativistic bullet immersed in a fluid subject to an ambient gravitational field. If a bullet with
neutral buoyancy passes through a fluid at a relativistic speed, will its increased mass in the fluid's frame of reference
cause it to sink, or will the fluid's increased mass in the bullet's frame of reference cause it to rise? The paradox was
apparently first discussed by James M. Supplee.
A bit about buoyancy

To simplify the analysis, it is customary to neglect drag and viscosity, and even to assume that the fluid has constant
density.
Consider a small object immersed in a container of fluid subject to a uniform gravitational field. Then the object will
be subject to a net downward gravitational force. Compare this with the net downward gravitational force on an
equal volume of the fluid. If the object is less dense than the fluid, the difference between these two vectors is an
upward pointing vector, the buoyant force, and the object will rise. If things are the other way around, it will sink. If
the object and the fluid have equal density, we say that the object has neutral buoyancy and it will neither rise nor
sink.
Statement of the paradox

It is simplest to assume that at rest, the bullet has neutral buoyancy.
In the rest frame of the fluid, if the bullet moves at speed , then according to the kinematic laws of special
relativity, its density (as measured in the frame of the fluid) increases by the square of the Lorentz Factor
. Therefore, a rapidly moving bullet should sink.
In the rest frame of the bullet, the density of fluid, as measured in the frame of the bullet, increases by the same
factor, so the moving bullet should rise.
Supplee's paradox
449

The resolution comes down to observing that the gravitational force lies outside the domain of kinematics; when it is
treated properly, the paradox disappears.
Supplee himself concluded that the paradox can be resolved by noting that in the frame of the bullet, the shape of the
container of fluid is altered (viz. the sea floor is curved upwards). Given certain assumptions about how to treat the
gravitational force, he argued that the bullet sinks with acceleration
, where g is the acceleration due to
gravity (assumed to be uniform over the scale of the thought experiment) and
is the factor mentioned above.
The paradox has also been studied by George Matsas, who used mathematical methods from general relativity to
remove Supplee's assumptions. In particular, he modeled the situation using a Rindler chart. Matsas concluded that
the paradox can be resolved by noting that in the frame of the fluid, the shape of the bullet is altered, and derived the
same result which had been obtained by Supplee. Matsas has applied a similar analysis to shed light on certain
questions involving the thermodynamics of black holes.
References
Matsas, George E. A. (2003). "Relativistic Arquimedes law for fast moving bodies and the general-relativistic
resolution of the "submarine paradox"". Phys. Rev. D 68 (2): 027701. arXiv:gr-qc/0305106 [1].
Bibcode:2003PhRvD..68b7701M [2]. doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.68.027701 [3]. See also the eprint version [1].
Supplee, J. M. (1989). "Relativistic buoyancy". Am. J. Phys. 57: 757. Bibcode:1989AmJPh..57...75S [4].
doi:10.1119/1.15875 [5].
External links
Light Speed Submarine [6] - article about the paradox in Physical Review Focus
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ gr-qc/ 0305106

http:/ / adsabs. harvard. edu/ abs/ 2003PhRvD. . 68b7701M
http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1103%2FPhysRevD. 68. 027701
http:/ / adsabs. harvard. edu/ abs/ 1989AmJPh. . 57. . . 75S
http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1119%2F1. 15875
http:/ / focus. aps. org/ story/ v12/ st4
Tea leaf paradox
450
Tea leaf paradox

The tea leaf paradox describes a phenomenon where tea leaves in a
cup of tea migrate to the center and bottom of the cup after being
stirred rather than being forced to the edges of the cup, as would be
expected in a spiral centrifuge. The formation of secondary flows in
annular channel was theoretically treated by Boussinesq as early as in
1868. The migration of near-bottom particles in river bent flows was
experimentally investigated by A.Ya.Milovich in 1913. The solution
first came from Albert Einstein in a 1926 paper where he used it to
explain the erosion of river banks (Baer's law).[2]
The tea leaves collect in the middle and the
bottom, instead of along the rim.
Explanation
Stirring the liquid makes it spin around the cup. In order to maintain
this curved path, a centripetal force in towards the center is needed
(similar to the tension in a string when spinning a bucket over your
head). This is accomplished by a pressure gradient outward (higher
pressure outside than inside).
However, near the bottom and outer edges the liquid is slowed by the
friction against the cup. There the centripetal force is weaker and
cannot overcome the pressure gradient, so these pressure differences
become more important for the water flow. This is called a boundary
layer or more specifically an Ekman layer.
The blue line is the secondary flow that pushes

the tea leaves to the middle of the bottom.
Because of inertia, the pressure is higher along the rim than in the
middle. If all the liquid rotated as a solid body, the inward (centripetal)
force would match the outward (inertial) force from the rotation and
there would be no inward or outward movement.
In a teacup, where the rotation is slower at the bottom, the pressure
gradient takes over and creates an inward flow along the bottom.
Higher up, the liquid flows outward instead. This secondary flow
travels inward along the bottom bringing the leaves to the center, then
up, out and down near the rim. The leaves are too heavy to lift
upwards, so they stay in the middle. Combined with the primary
rotational flow, the leaves will spiral inward along the bottom.
Applications
The phenomenon has been used to develop a new technique to separate
red blood cells from blood plasma, to understand atmospheric pressure
systems, and in the process of brewing beer to separate out coagulated
trub in the whirlpool.
Albert Einstein solved the paradox in 1926.
Tea leaf paradox
451
References
[1] His results are cited in: Reprinted in:
[2] English translation: The Cause of the Formation of Meanders in the Courses of
Rivers and of the So-Called Baers Law (http:/ / www. ucalgary. ca/ ~kmuldrew/
river. html), accessed 2008-12-28.
Additional reading
Highfield, Roger (14 January 2008). "Dr Roger's Home
Experiments" (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
scienceandtechnology/science/sciencenews/3291786/
Dr-Roger's-Home-Experiments.html). The Daily Telegraph.
Retrieved 2008-12-28.
External links
Visualization of secondary flow in river bend

[1]
model (A.Ya.Milovich, 1913, flow from right
to left). Near-bottom streamlines are marked with
dye injected by a pipette.
Sethi, Ricky J. (September 30, 1997). "Why do particles move towards the center of the cup instead of outer rim?"
(http://www.madsci.org/posts/archives/1997-12/875655758.Ph.r.html). MadSci Network. Retrieved
2008-12-29.
Booker, John R. "Student Notes - Physics of Fluids - ESS 514/414" (http://earthweb.ess.washington.edu/roe/
ESS514_notes/ch5.pdf). Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of Washington. ch.5.8 p.48.
Retrieved 2008-12-29. See also figure 25 in figures.pdf (http://earthweb.ess.washington.edu/roe/
ESS514_notes/figures.pdf)
Stubley, Gordon D. (May 31, 2001). "Mysteries of Engineering Fluid Mechanics" (http://www.ansys.com/
solutions/documents/mystery.pdf). Mechanical Engineering Department, University of Waterloo. Retrieved
2008-12-29.
Twin paradox
452
Twin paradox
"Clock problem" redirects here. For mathematical problems involving the positions of the hands on a clock face, see
Clock angle problem.
In physics, the twin paradox is a thought experiment in special relativity involving identical twins, one of whom
makes a journey into space in a high-speed rocket and returns home to find that the twin who remained on Earth has
aged more. This result appears puzzling because each twin sees the other twin as moving, and so, according to an
incorrect naive application of time dilation and the principle of relativity, each should paradoxically find the other to
have aged more slowly. However, this scenario can be resolved within the standard framework of special relativity:
the travelling twin's trajectory involves two different inertial frames, one for the outbound journey and one for the
inbound journey, and so there is no symmetry between the spacetime paths of the two twins. Therefore the twin
paradox is not a paradox in the sense of a logical contradiction.
Starting with Paul Langevin in 1911, there have been various explanations of this paradox. These explanations "can
be grouped into those that focus on the effect of different standards of simultaneity in different frames, and those that
designate the acceleration [experienced by the travelling twin] as the main reason...". Max von Laue argued in 1913
that since the traveling twin must be in two separate inertial frames, one on the way out and another on the way back,
this frame switch is the reason for the aging difference, not the acceleration per se. Explanations put forth by Albert
Einstein and Max Born invoked gravitational time dilation to explain the aging as a direct effect of acceleration.
The twin paradox has been verified experimentally by precise measurements of atomic clocks flown in aircraft and
satellites. For example, gravitational time dilation and special relativity together have been used to explain the
HafeleKeating experiment. It was also confirmed in particle accelerators by measuring time dilation of circulating
particle beams.
History
Further information: Time dilation and twin paradox
In his famous work on special relativity in 1905, Albert Einstein predicted that when two clocks were brought
together and synchronized, and then one was moved away and brought back, the clock which had undergone the
traveling would be found to be lagging behind the clock which had stayed put. Einstein considered this to be a
natural consequence of special relativity, not a paradox as some suggested, and in 1911, he restated and elaborated
on this result as printed below, (with physicist Robert Resnick's comments following Einstein's):[1]
"If we placed a living organism in a box ... one could arrange that the organism, after any arbitrary
lengthy flight, could be returned to its original spot in a scarcely altered condition, while corresponding
organisms which had remained in their original positions had already long since given way to new
generations. For the moving organism, the lengthy time of the journey was a mere instant, provided the
motion took place with approximately the speed of light."
If the stationary organism is a man and the traveling one is his twin, then the traveler returns home to
find his twin brother much aged compared to himself. The paradox centers around the contention that, in
relativity, either twin could regard the other as the traveler, in which case each should find the other
youngera logical contradiction. This contention assumes that the twins' situations are symmetrical and
interchangeable, an assumption that is not correct. Furthermore, the accessible experiments have been
done and support Einstein's prediction. ...
In 1911, Paul Langevin gave a "striking example" by describing the story of a traveler making a trip at a Lorentz
factor of = 100 (99.995% the speed of light). The traveler remains in a projectile for one year of his time, and then
reverses direction. Upon return, the traveler will find that he has aged two years, while 200 years have passed on
Earth. During the trip, both the traveler and Earth keep sending signals to each other at a constant rate, which places
Twin paradox
Langevin's story among the Doppler shift versions of the twin paradox. The relativistic effects upon the signal rates
are used to account for the different aging rates. The asymmetry that occurred because only the traveler underwent
acceleration, is used to explain why there is any difference at all, because "any change of velocity, or any
acceleration has an absolute meaning".[2]
Max von Laue (1911, 1913) elaborated on Langevin's explanation. Using Minkowski's spacetime formalism, Laue
went on to demonstrate that the world lines of the inertially moving bodies maximize the proper time elapsed
between two events. He also wrote that the asymmetric aging is completely accounted for by the fact that the
astronaut twin travels in two separate frames, while the Earth twin remains in one frame, and the time of acceleration
can be made arbitrarily small compared with the time of inertial motion. Eventually, Lord Halsbury and others
removed any acceleration by introducing the "three-brother" approach. The traveling twin transfers his clock reading
to a third one, traveling in the opposite direction. Another way of avoiding acceleration effects is the use of the
relativistic Doppler effect (see What it looks like: the relativistic Doppler shift below).
Neither Einstein nor Langevin considered such results to be literally paradoxical: Einstein only called it "peculiar"
while Langevin presented it as a consequence of absolute acceleration.[3] A paradox in logical and scientific usage
refers to results which are inherently contradictory, that is, logically impossible and both men argued that, from the
time differential illustrated by the story of the twins, no self-contradiction could be constructed. In other words,
neither Einstein nor Langevin saw the story of the twins as constituting a challenge to the self-consistency of
relativistic physics.
Specific example
Consider a space ship traveling from Earth to the nearest star system outside our solar system: a distance d = 4 light
years away, at a speed v = 0.8c (i.e., 80 percent of the speed of light).
(To make the numbers easy, the ship is assumed to attain its full speed immediately upon departureactually it
would take close to a year accelerating at 1g to get up to speed.)
The parties will observe the situation as follows:[4][5]
The Earth-based mission control reasons about the journey this way: the round trip will take t = 2d/v = 10 years in
Earth time (i.e. everybody on Earth will be 10 years older when the ship returns). The amount of time as measured
on the ship's clocks and the aging of the travelers during their trip will be reduced by the factor
, the
reciprocal of the Lorentz factor. In this case = 0.6 and the travelers will have aged only 0.6 10 = 6 years when
they return.
The ship's crew members also calculate the particulars of their trip from their perspective. They know that the distant
star system and the Earth are moving relative to the ship at speed v during the trip. In their rest frame the distance
between the Earth and the star system is d = 0.6d = 2.4 light years (length contraction), for both the outward and
return journeys. Each half of the journey takes 2.4/v = 3 years, and the round trip takes 2 3 = 6 years. Their
calculations show that they will arrive home having aged 6years. The travelers' final calculation is in complete
agreement with the calculations of those on Earth, though they experience the trip quite differently from those who
stay at home.
If twins are born on the day the ship leaves, and one goes on the journey while the other stays on Earth, they will
meet again when the traveler is 6years old and the stay-at-home twin is 10years old. The calculation illustrates the
usage of the phenomenon of length contraction and the experimentally verified phenomenon of time dilation to
describe and calculate consequences and predictions of Einstein's special theory of relativity.
453
Twin paradox
Resolution of the paradox in special relativity

The paradoxical aspect of the twins' situation arises from the fact that at any given moment the travelling twin's
clock is running slow in the earthbound twin's inertial frame, but equally the earthbound twin's clock is running slow
in the travelling twin's inertial frame. The resolution is that the earthbound twin is in the same inertial frame
throughout the journey, but the travelling twin is not: in the simplest version of the thought-experiment the travelling
twin switches at the midpoint of the trip from being at rest in an inertial frame with velocity in one direction (away
from the earth) to being at rest in an inertial frame with velocity in the opposite direction (towards the earth).
Role of acceleration
Although some texts assign a crucial
role to the acceleration of the travelling
twin at the time of the turnaround,
others note that the effect also arises if
one imagines separate outward-going
and inward-coming travellers, who
pass each other and synchronize their
clocks at the point corresponding to
"turnaround" of a single traveller. In
this version, acceleration plays no
direct role;[6] "the issue is how long the
world-lines are, not how bent". The
length referred to here is the
Lorentz-invariant length or "proper
time interval" of a trajectory which
Minkowski diagram of the twin paradox. There is a difference between the trajectories of
corresponds to the elapsed time
the two twins: the trajectory of the ship is equally divided between two different inertial
measured by a clock following that
frames, while the Earth-based twin stays in the same inertial frame.
trajectory (see Section Difference in
elapsed time as a result of differences
in twins' spacetime paths below). In Minkowski spacetime, the travelling twin must feel a different history of
accelerations from the earthbound twin, even if this just means accelerations of the same size separated by different
amounts of time, however "even this role for acceleration can be eliminated in formulations of the twin paradox in
curved spacetime, where the twins can fall freely along space-time geodesics between meetings".
Relativity of simultaneity
For a moment-by-moment understanding of how the time difference between the two twins unfolds, one must
understand that in special relativity there is no concept of absolute present. For different inertial frames there are
different sets of events that are simultaneous in that frame. This relativity of simultaneity means that switching from
one inertial frame to another requries an adjustment in what slice through spacetime counts as the "present". In the
spacetime diagram on the right, drawn for the reference frame of the Earth-based twin, that twin's world line
coincides with the vertical axis (his position is constant in space, moving only in time). On the first leg of the trip,
the second twin moves to the right (black sloped line); and on the second leg, back to the left. Blue lines show the
planes of simultaneity for the traveling twin during the first leg of the journey; red lines, during the second leg. Just
before turnaround, the traveling twin calculates the age of the Earth-based twin by measuring the interval along the
vertical axis from the origin to the upper blue line. Just after turnaround, if he recalculates, he will measure the
interval from the origin to the lower red line. In a sense, during the U-turn the plane of simultaneity jumps from blue
454
Twin paradox
to red and very quickly sweeps over a large segment of the world line of the Earth-based twin. When one transfers
from the outgoing inertial frame to the incoming inertial frame there is a jump discontinuity in the age of the
Earth-based twin.[7][8]
What it looks like: the relativistic Doppler shift

In view of the frame-dependence of simultaneity for events at different locations in space, some treatments prefer a
more phenomenological approach, describing what the twins would observe if each sent out a series of regular radio
pulses, equally spaced in time according to the emitter's clock. This is equivalent to asking, if each twin sent a video
feed of themselves to each other, what do they see in their screens? Or, if each twin always carried a clock indicating
his age, what time would each see in the image of their distant twin and his clock?
Shortly after departure, the traveling twin sees the stay-at-home twin with no time delay. At arrival, the image in the
ship screen shows the staying twin as he was 1year after launch, because radio emitted from Earth 1year after
launch gets to the other star 4years afterwards and meets the ship there. During this leg of the trip, the traveling twin
sees his own clock advance 3years and the clock in the screen advance 1year, so it seems to advance at 13 the
normal rate, just 20image seconds per ship minute. This combines the effects of time dilation due to motion (by
factor =0.6, five years on earth are 3years on ship) and the effect of increasing light-time-delay (which grows from
0 to 4years).
Of course, the observed frequency of the transmission is also 13 the frequency of the transmitter (a reduction in
frequency; "red-shifted"). This is called the relativistic Doppler effect. The frequency of clock-ticks (or of
wavefronts) which one sees from a source with rest frequency frest is
when the source is moving directly away. This is fobs = 13frest for v/c = 0.8.
As for the stay-at-home twin, he gets a slowed signal from the ship for 9years, at a frequency 13 the transmitter
frequency. During these 9years, the clock of the traveling twin in the screen seems to advance 3years, so both twins
see the image of their sibling aging at a rate only 13 their own rate. Expressed in other way, they would both see the
other's clock run at 13 their own clock speed. If they factor out of the calculation the fact that the light-time delay of
the transmission is increasing at a rate of 0.8seconds per second, both can work out that the other twin is aging
slower, at 60% rate.
Then the ship turns back toward home. The clock of the staying twin shows "1year after launch" in the screen of the
ship, and during the 3years of the trip back it increases up to "10years after launch", so the clock in the screen
seems to be advancing 3times faster than usual.
When the source is moving towards the observer, the observed frequency is higher ("blue-shifted") and given by
This is fobs = 3frest for v/c = 0.8.

As for the screen on Earth, it shows that trip back beginning 9years after launch, and the traveling clock in the
screen shows that 3years have passed on the ship. One year later, the ship is back home and the clock shows 6years.
So, during the trip back, both twins see their sibling's clock going 3times faster than their own. Factoring out the fact
that the light-time-delay is decreasing by 0.8seconds every second, each twin calculates that the other twin is aging
at 60% his own aging speed.
455
Twin paradox
Light paths for images exchanged during tripLeft:

Earth to ship. Right: Ship to Earth. Red
lines indicate low frequency images are received
Blue lines indicate high frequency images are
received
456
The xt (spacetime) diagrams at left show the paths of light signals
traveling between Earth and ship (1st diagram) and between ship and
Earth (2nd diagram). These signals carry the images of each twin and
his age-clock to the other twin. The vertical black line is the Earth's
path through spacetime and the other two sides of the triangle show the
ship's path through spacetime (as in the Minkowski diagram above). As
far as the sender is concerned, he transmits these at equal intervals
(say, once an hour) according to his own clock; but according to the
clock of the twin receiving these signals, they are not being received at
equal intervals.
After the ship has reached its cruising speed of 0.8c, each twin would
see 1second pass in the received image of the other twin for every
3seconds of his own time. That is, each would see the image of the
other's clock going slow, not just slow by the factor 0.6, but even
slower because light-time-delay is increasing 0.8seconds per second. This is shown in the figures by red light paths.
At some point, the images received by each twin change so that each would see 3seconds pass in the image for
every second of his own time. That is, the received signal has been increased in frequency by the Doppler shift.
These high frequency images are shown in the figures by blue light paths.
The asymmetry in the Doppler shifted images

The asymmetry between the Earth and the space ship is manifested in this diagram by the fact that more blue-shifted
(fast aging) images are received by the ship. Put another way, the space ship sees the image change from a red-shift
(slower aging of the image) to a blue-shift (faster aging of the image) at the midpoint of its trip (at the turnaround,
5years after departure); the Earth sees the image of the ship change from red-shift to blue shift after 9years (almost
at the end of the period that the ship is absent). In the next section, one will see another asymmetry in the images: the
Earth twin sees the ship twin age by the same amount in the red and blue shifted images; the ship twin sees the Earth
twin age by different amounts in the red and blue shifted images.
Calculation of elapsed time from the Doppler diagram

The twin on the ship sees low frequency (red) images for 3 years. During that time, he would see the Earth twin in
the image grow older by 3/3 = 1 years. He then sees high frequency (blue) images during the back trip of 3years.
During that time, he would see the Earth twin in the image grow older by 3 3 = 9 years. When the journey is
finished, the image of the Earth twin has aged by 1 + 9 = 10 years.
The Earth twin sees 9 years of slow (red) images of the ship twin, during which the ship twin ages (in the image) by
9/3 = 3 years. He then sees fast (blue) images for the remaining 1year until the ship returns. In the fast images, the
ship twin ages by 1 3 = 3 years. The total aging of the ship twin in the images received by Earth is 3 + 3 = 6 years,
so the ship twin returns younger (6years as opposed to 10years on Earth).
Twin paradox
The distinction between what they see and what they calculate
To avoid confusion, note the distinction between what each twin sees and what each would calculate. Each sees an
image of his twin which he knows originated at a previous time and which he knows is Doppler shifted. He does not
take the elapsed time in the image as the age of his twin now.
If he wants to calculate when his twin was the age shown in the image (i.e. how old he himself was then), he has
to determine how far away his twin was when the signal was emittedin other words, he has to consider
simultaneity for a distant event.
If he wants to calculate how fast his twin was aging when the image was transmitted, he adjusts for the Doppler
shift. For example, when he receives high frequency images (showing his twin aging rapidly) with frequency
, he does not conclude that the twin was aging that rapidly when the image was generated,
any more than he concludes that the siren of an ambulance is emitting the frequency he hears. He knows that the
Doppler effect has increased the image frequency by the factor 1 / (1 v/c). Therefore he calculates that his twin
was aging at the rate of
when the image was emitted. A similar calculation reveals that his twin was aging at the same reduced rate of frest in
all low frequency images.
Simultaneity in the Doppler shift calculation

It may be difficult to see where simultaneity came into the Doppler shift calculation, and indeed the calculation is
often preferred because one does not have to worry about simultaneity. As seen above, the ship twin can convert his
received Doppler-shifted rate to a slower rate of the clock of the distant clock for both red and blue images. If he
ignores simultaneity, he might say his twin was aging at the reduced rate throughout the journey and therefore should
be younger than he is. He is now back to square one, and has to take into account the change in his notion of
simultaneity at the turnaround. The rate he can calculate for the image (corrected for Doppler effect) is the rate of the
Earth twin's clock at the moment it was sent, not at the moment it was received. Since he receives an unequal number
of red and blue shifted images, he should realize that the red and blue shifted emissions were not emitted over equal
time periods for the Earth twin, and therefore he must account for simultaneity at a distance.
Viewpoint of the traveling twin

During the turnaround, the traveling twin is in an accelerated reference frame. According to the equivalence
principle, the traveling twin may analyze the turnaround phase as if the stay-at-home twin were freely falling in a
gravitational field and as if the traveling twin were stationary. A 1918 paper by Einstein presents a conceptual sketch
of the idea.[9] From the viewpoint of the traveler, a calculation for each separate leg, ignoring the turnaround, leads
to a result in which the Earth clocks age less than the traveler. For example, if the Earth clocks age 1day less on
each leg, the amount that the Earth clocks will lag behind amounts to 2days. The physical description of what
happens at turnaround has to produce a contrary effect of double that amount: 4days' advancing of the Earth clocks.
Then the traveler's clock will end up with a net 2-day delay on the Earth clocks, in agreement with calculations done
in the frame of the stay-at-home twin.
The mechanism for the advancing of the stay-at-home twin's clock is gravitational time dilation. When an observer
finds that inertially moving objects are being accelerated with respect to themselves, those objects are in a
gravitational field insofar as relativity is concerned. For the traveling twin at turnaround, this gravitational field fills
the universe. In a weak field approximation, clocks tick at a rate of t' = t (1 + / c2) where is the difference in
gravitational potential. In this case, = gh where g is the acceleration of the traveling observer during turnaround
and h is the distance to the stay-at-home twin. The rocket is firing towards the stay-at-home twin, thereby placing
that twin at a higher gravitational potential. Due to the large distance between the twins, the stay-at-home twin's
457
Twin paradox
clocks will appear to be sped up enough to account for the difference in proper times experienced by the twins. It is
no accident that this speed-up is enough to account for the simultaneity shift described above. The general relativity
solution for a static homogeneous gravitational field and the special relativity solution for finite acceleration produce
identical results.
Other calculations have been done for the traveling twin (or for any observer who sometimes accelerates), which do
not involve the equivalence principle, and which do not involve any gravitational fields. Such calculations are based
only on the special theory, not the general theory, of relativity. One approach calculates surfaces of simultaneity by
considering light pulses, in accordance with Hermann Bondi's idea of the k-calculus. A second approach calculates a
straightforward but technically complicated integral to determine how the traveling twin measures the elapsed time
on the stay-at-home clock. An outline of this second approach is given in a separate section below.
Difference in elapsed time as a result of differences in twins' spacetime paths

The following paragraph shows several things:
how to employ a precise mathematical approach in calculating the differences in the elapsed time
how to prove exactly the dependency of the elapsed time on the different paths taken through spacetime by the
two twins
how to quantify the differences in elapsed time
how to calculate proper time as a function (integral) of coordinate time
Let clock K be associated with the "stay at home twin". Let clock K' be associated with the rocket that makes the
trip. At the departure event both clocks are set to 0.
Phase 1: Rocket (with clock K') embarks with constant proper acceleration a during a time Ta as measured by
clock K until it reaches some velocity V.
Phase 2: Rocket keeps coasting at velocity V during some time Tc according to clock K.
Phase 3: Rocket fires its engines in the opposite direction of K during a time Ta according to clock K until it is
at rest with respect to clock K. The constant proper acceleration has the value a, in other words the rocket is
decelerating.
Phase 4: Rocket keeps firing its engines in the opposite direction of K, during the same time Ta according to
clock K, until K' regains the same speed V with respect to K, but now towards K (with velocity V).
Phase 5: Rocket keeps coasting towards K at speed V during the same time Tc according to clock K.
Phase 6: Rocket again fires its engines in the direction of K, so it decelerates with a constant proper
acceleration a during a time Ta, still according to clock K, until both clocks reunite.
Knowing that the clock K remains inertial (stationary), the total accumulated proper time of clock K' will be
given by the integral function of coordinate time t
where v(t) is the coordinate velocity of clock K' as a function of t according to clock K, and, e.g. during phase 1,
given by
This integral can be calculated for the 6 phases:[10]

Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
458
Twin paradox
Phase 4
Phase 5
Phase 6
where a is the proper acceleration, felt by clock K' during the acceleration phase(s) and where the following
relations hold between V, a and Ta:
So the traveling clock K' will show an elapsed time of
which can be expressed as
whereas the stationary clock K shows an elapsed time of
which is, for every possible value of a, Ta, Tc and V, larger than the reading of clock K':
Difference in elapsed times: how to calculate it from the ship

In the standard proper time formula
represents the time of the non-inertial (travelling) observer K' as a function of the elapsed time t of the inertial
(stay-at-home) observer K for whom observer K' has velocity v(t) at time t.
To calculate the elapsed time t of the inertial observer K as a function of the elapsed time of the non-inertial
observer K', where only quantities measured by K' are accessible, the following formula can be used:[]
where a() is the proper acceleration of the non-inertial observer K' as measured by himself (for instance with an
accelerometer) during the whole round-trip. The CauchySchwarz inequality can be used to show that the inequality
t > follows from the previous expression:
Using the Dirac delta function to model the infinite acceleration phase in the standard case of the traveller having
constant speed v during the outbound and the inbound trip, the formula produces the known result:
In the case where the accelerated observer K' departs from K with zero initial velocity, the general equation reduces
to the simpler form:
459
Twin paradox
which, in the smooth version of the twin paradox where the traveller has constant proper acceleration phases,
successively given by a, a, a, a, results in
where the convention c = 1 is used, in accordance with the above expression with acceleration phases Ta = t/4 and
inertial (coasting) phases Tc = 0.
A rotational version
Twins Bob and Alice inhabit a space station in circular orbit around a massive body in space. Bob departs the station
and uses a rocket to hover in the fixed position where he left Alice, while she stays in the station. When the station
completes an orbit and returns to Bob, he rejoins Alice. Alice is now younger than Bob.[11] In addition to rotational
acceleration, Bob must decelerate to become stationary and then accelerate again to match the orbital speed of the
space station.
Explanation in terms of Mach's principle

A minority of physicists also favor some version of Mach's principle, which would imply that the difference between
accelerated motion and inertial motion can only be defined relative to the rest of the matter in the universe, often
referred to as motion relative to the "fixed stars". For example, A.P. French writes, regarding the twin paradox:
"Note, though, that we are appealing to the reality of A's acceleration, and to the observability of the inertial forces
associated with it. Would such effects as the twin paradox exist if the framework of fixed stars and distant galaxies
were not there? Most physicists would say no. Our ultimate definition of an inertial frame may indeed be that it is a
frame having zero acceleration with respect to the matter of the universe at large."
Primary sources
[1] . via August Kopff, Hyman Levy (translator), The Mathematical Theory of Relativity (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1923), p. 52, as quoted
by G.J. Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 215.
[2] (translated by J. B. Sykes, 1973).
[3] "We are going to see this absolute character of the acceleration manifest itself in another form." ("Nous allons voir se manifester sous une
autre forme ce caractre absolu de l'acclration."), page 82 of Langevin1911
[4] , Extract of page 74 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=DqZlU3RJTywC& pg=PA74)
[5] , Extract of page 27 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=CX5GyYwnVLcC& pg=PA27)
[6] Einstein, A., Lorentz, H.A., Minkowski, H., and Weyl, H. (1923). Arnold Sommerfeld. ed. The Principle of Relativity. Dover Publications:
Mineola, NY. pp. 3849.
[7] Wheeler, J., Taylor, E. (1992). Spacetime Physics, second edition. W. H. Freeman: New York, pp. 38, 170-171.
[8] Einstein, A., Lorentz, H.A., Minkowski, H., and Weyl, H. (1923). Arnold Sommerfeld. ed. The Principle of Relativity. Dover Publications:
Mineola, NY. p. 38.
[9] Einstein, A. (1918) "dialog about objections against the theory of relativity", Die Naturwissenschaften 48, pp. 697702, 29 November 1918
[10] C. Lagoute and E. Davoust (1995) The interstellar traveler, Am. J. Phys. 63:221-227
[11] See exercise 9.25 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=xma1QuTJphYC& pg=PA227) on page 227.
460
Twin paradox
Secondary sources
Further reading
The ideal clock
The ideal clock is a clock whose action depends only on its instantaneous velocity, and is independent of any
acceleration of the clock. Wolfgang Rindler (2006). "Time dilation" (http:/ / books. google. com/
?id=0J_dwCmQThgC& pg=PA43). Relativity: Special, General, and Cosmological. Oxford University Press. p.43.
ISBN0-19-856731-6.
Gravitational time dilation; time dilation in circular motion
John A Peacock (2001). Cosmological Physics (http://books.google.com/?id=t8O-yylU0j0C&pg=PA7).
Cambridge University Press. p.8. ISBN0-521-42270-1.
Silvio Bonometto, Vittorio Gorini, Ugo Moschella (2002). Modern Cosmology (http://books.google.com/
?id=jtyCC-b0SToC&pg=PA12). CRC Press. p.12. ISBN0-7503-0810-9.
Patrick Cornille (2003). Advanced Electromagnetism and Vacuum Physics (http://books.google.com/
?id=y8sSFTDkQ20C&pg=PA180). World Scientific. p.180. ISBN981-238-367-0.
External links
Twin Paradox overview in the Usenet Physics FAQ (http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~dkoks/Faq/
Relativity/SR/TwinParadox/twin_paradox.html)
The twin paradox: Is the symmetry of time dilation paradoxical? (http://www.phys.unsw.edu.au/einsteinlight/
jw/module4_twin_paradox.htm) From Einsteinlight: Relativity in animations and film clips (http://www.phys.
unsw.edu.au/einsteinlight).
FLASH Animations: (http://math.ucr.edu/~jdp/Relativity/TwinParadox.html) from John de Pillis. (Scene 1):
"View" from the Earth twin's point of view. (Scene 2): "View" from the traveling twin's point of view.
461
462
Self-reference
Barber paradox
This article is about a paradox of self-reference. For an unrelated paradox in the theory of logical
conditionals with a similar name, introduced by Lewis Carroll, see the Barbershop paradox.
The barber paradox is a puzzle derived from Russell's paradox. It was used by Bertrand Russell himself as an
illustration of the paradox, though he attributes it to an unnamed person who suggested it to him.[1] It shows that an
apparently plausible scenario is logically impossible.
Paradox
Suppose there is a town with just one barber, who is male. In this town, every man keeps himself clean-shaven, and
he does so by doing exactly one of two things:
1. shaving himself; or
2. going to the barber.
Another way to state this is that "The barber is a man in town who shaves all those, and only those, men in town who
do not shave themselves."
From this, asking the question "Who shaves the barber?" results in a paradox because according to the statement
above, he can either shave himself, or go to the barber (which happens to be himself). However, neither of these
possibilities are valid: they both result in the barber shaving himself, but he cannot do this because he shaves only
those men "who do not shave themselves".
History
This paradox is often attributed to Bertrand Russell (e.g., by Martin Gardner in Aha!). It was suggested to him as an
alternative form of Russell's paradox, which he had devised to show that set theory as it was used by Georg Cantor
and Gottlob Frege contained contradictions. However, Russell denied that the Barber's paradox was an instance of
his own:
That contradiction [Russell's paradox] is extremely interesting. You can modify its form; some forms of
modification are valid and some are not. I once had a form suggested to me which was not valid, namely the
question whether the barber shaves himself or not. You can define the barber as "one who shaves all those, and
those only, who do not shave themselves." The question is, does the barber shave himself? In this form the
contradiction is not very difficult to solve. But in our previous form I think it is clear that you can only get
around it by observing that the whole question whether a class is or is not a member of itself is nonsense, i.e.
that no class either is or is not a member of itself, and that it is not even true to say that, because the whole
form of words is just noise without meaning.
Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
This point is elaborated further under Applied versions of Russell's paradox.
Barber paradox
463
In Prolog
In Prolog, one aspect of the barber paradox can be expressed by a self-referencing clause:
shaves(barber, X) :- male(X), not shaves(X,X).
male(barber).
where negation as failure is assumed. If we apply the stratification test known from Datalog, the predicate shaves is
exposed as unstratifiable since it is defined recursively over its negation.
In first-order logic
This sentence is unsatisfiable (a contradiction) because of the universal quantifier
. The universal quantifier y
will include every single element in the domain, including our infamous barber x. So when the value x is assigned to
y, the sentence can be rewritten to
, which simplifies to
, a contradiction.
In literature
In his book Alice in Puzzleland, the logician Raymond Smullyan had the character Humpty Dumpty explain the
apparent paradox to Alice. Smullyan argues that the paradox is akin to the statement "I know a man who is both five
feet tall and six feet tall," in effect claiming that the "paradox" is merely a contradiction, not a true paradox at all, as
the two axioms above are mutually exclusive.
A paradox is supposed to arise from plausible and apparently consistent statements; Smullyan suggests that the
"rule" the barber is supposed to be following is too absurd to seem plausible.
The paradox is also mentioned several times in David Foster Wallace's first novel, The Broom of the System as well
as The Information, by James Gleick.
Multiple barbers
If the paradox is altered so that there may be multiple barbers in the town, then the paradox may or may not be
resolved, depending on the exact phrasing of the initial rules.
If the initial rules state that every man in town must keep himself clean-shaven, either by
1. Shaving himself, or
2. going to a barber.
(but not both at once), then the paradox is solved. Each barber can be shaved by another barber.
However, if the initial rules describe the responsibilities of the barbers rather than the town's residents in general,
then the paradox remains. In this version, the rules state that each barber must shave everyone in town who does not
shave himself (and no one else). If Barber A asks Barber B to shave his beard, then Barber A counts as "a person
who does not shave himself". But because of this classification, Barber A must shave himself, rather than let Barber
B do it for him. However, if Barber A is shaving himself, then he must not shave himself. Either way, Barber A is
stuck. Other barbers face the same problem.
Barber paradox
Non-paradoxical variations
A modified version of the barber paradox is frequently encountered in the form of a brainteaser puzzle or joke. The
joke is phrased nearly identically to the standard paradox, but omitting a detail that allows an answer to escape the
paradox entirely. For example, the puzzle can be stated as occurring in a small town whose barber claims: I shave all
and only the men in our town who do not shave themselves. This version identifies the sex of the clients, but omits
the sex of the barber, so a simple solution is that the barber is a woman. The barber's claim applies to only "men in
our town," so there is no paradox if the barber is a woman (or a gorilla, or a child, or a man from some other
townor anything other than a "man in our town"). Such a variation is not considered to be a paradox at all: the true
barber paradox requires the contradiction arising from the situation where the barber's claim applies to himself.
Notice that the paradox still occurs if we claim that the barber is a man in our town with a beard. In this case, the
barber does not shave himself (because he has a beard); but then according to his claim (that he shaves all men who
do not shave themselves), he must shave himself.
In a similar way, the paradox still occurs if the barber is a man in our town who cannot grow a beard. Once again, he
does not shave himself (because he has no hair on his face), but that implies that he does shave himself.
References
[1] The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, reprinted in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, 1914-19, Vol 8., p. 228
External links
Proposition of the Barber's Paradox (http://www.umsl.edu/~siegel/SetTheoryandTopology/TheBarber.html)
Joyce, Helen. "Mathematical mysteries: The Barber's Paradox." (http://plus.maths.org/issue20/xfile/index.
html) Plus, May 2002.
Edsger Dijkstra's take on the problem (http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/EWD/transcriptions/EWD09xx/
EWD923a.html)
The Monist, Vol. 29, No. 3, JULY, 1919, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM, page 354 (http://
www.jstor.org/stable/27900748?seq=10)
464
Berry paradox
Berry paradox
The Berry paradox is a self-referential paradox arising from an expression like "the smallest positive integer not
definable in fewer than twelve words" (note that this defining phrase has fewer than twelve words). Bertrand Russell,
the first to discuss the paradox in print, attributed it to G. G. Berry (18671928), a junior librarian at Oxford's
Bodleian library, who had suggested the more limited paradox arising from the expression "the first undefinable
ordinal".
The paradox
Consider the expression:
"The smallest positive integer not definable in under eleven words."
Since there are finitely many words, there are finitely many phrases of under eleven words, and hence finitely many
positive integers that are defined by phrases of under eleven words. Since there are infinitely many positive integers,
this means that there are positive integers that cannot be defined by phrases of under eleven words. If there are
positive integers that satisfy a given property, then there is a smallest positive integer that satisfies that property;
therefore, there is a smallest positive integer satisfying the property "not definable in under eleven words". This is
the integer to which the above expression refers. The above expression is only ten words long, so this integer is
defined by an expression that is under eleven words long; it is definable in under eleven words, and is not the
smallest positive integer not definable in under eleven words, and is not defined by this expression. This is a
paradox: there must be an integer defined by this expression, but since the expression is self-contradictory (any
integer it defines is definable in under eleven words), there cannot be any integer defined by it.
Resolution
The Berry paradox as formulated above arises because of systematic ambiguity in the word "definable". In other
formulations of the Berry paradox, such as one that instead reads: "...not nameable in less..." the term "nameable" is
also one that has this systematic ambiguity. Terms of this kind give rise to vicious circle fallacies. Other terms with
this type of ambiguity are: satisfiable, true, false, function, property, class, relation, cardinal, and ordinal.[1] To
resolve one of these paradoxes means to pinpoint exactly where our use of language went wrong and to provide
restrictions on the use of language which may avoid them.
This family of paradoxes can be resolved by incorporating stratifications of meaning in language. Terms with
systematic ambiguity may be written with subscripts denoting that one level of meaning is considered a higher
priority than another in their interpretation. "The number not nameable0 in less than eleven words" may be
nameable1 in less than eleven words under this scheme.[2]
Formal analogues
Using programs or proofs of bounded lengths, it is possible to construct an analogue of the Berry expression in a
formal mathematical language, as has been done by Gregory Chaitin. Though the formal analogue does not lead to a
logical contradiction, it does prove certain impossibility results.
George Boolos (1989) built on a formalized version of Berry's paradox to prove Gdel's Incompleteness Theorem in
a new and much simpler way. The basic idea of his proof is that a proposition that holds of x if x = n for some natural
number n can be called a definition for n, and that the set {(n, k): n has a definition that is k symbols long} can be
shown to be representable (using Gdel numbers). Then the proposition "m is the first number not definable in less
than k symbols" can be formalized and shown to be a definition in the sense just stated.
465
Berry paradox
Relationship with Kolmogorov complexity

Main article: Kolmogorov complexity
It is not possible in general to unambiguously define what is the minimal number of symbols required to describe a
given string (given a specific description mechanism). In this context, the terms string and number may be used
interchangeably, since a number is actually a string of symbols, i.e. an English word (like the word "eleven" used in
the paradox) while, on the other hand, it is possible to refer to any word with a number, e.g. by the number of its
position in a given dictionary, or by suitable encoding. Some long strings can be described exactly using fewer
symbols than those required by their full representation, as is often experienced using data compression. The
complexity of a given string is then defined as the minimal length that a description requires in order to
(unambiguously) refer to the full representation of that string.
The Kolmogorov complexity is defined using formal languages, or Turing machines which avoids ambiguities about
which string results from a given description. It can be proven that the Kolmogorov complexity is not computable.
The proof by contradiction shows that if it were possible to compute the Kolmogorov complexity, then it would also
be possible to systematically generate paradoxes similar to this one, i.e. descriptions shorter than what the
complexity of the described string implies. That is to say, the definition of the Berry number is paradoxical because
it is not actually possible to compute how many words are required to define a number, and we know that such
computation is not possible because of the paradox.
Notes
[1] Russell and Whitehead (1927).
[2] Quine, Willard (1976) Ways of Paradox. Harvard Univ. Press
References
Bennett, Charles H. (1979). "On Random and Hard-to-Describe Numbers." (http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/
researcher/view_pubs.php?person=us-bennetc&t=1). IBM Report RC7483. CiteSeerX: 10.1.1.27.3492 (http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.27.3492)..
Boolos, George (1989) "A new proof of the Gdel Incompleteness Theorem", Notices of the American
Mathematical Society 36: 38890; 676. Reprinted in his (1998) Logic, Logic, and Logic. Harvard Univ. Press:
383-88.
Chaitin, Gregory (1993), Transcript of lecture given 27 October 1993 at the University of New Mexico (http://
www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/unm2.html)
Chaitin, Gregory (1995) " The Berry Paradox. (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.
6130010107/pdf)" Complexity 1: 26-30.
French, James D. (1988) " The False Assumption Underlying Berry's Paradox, (http://www.jstor.org/pss/
2274615)" Journal of Symbolic Logic 53: 12201223.
Russell, Bertrand (1906) "Les paradoxes de la logique", Revue de mtaphysique et de morale 14: 627650
Russell, Bertrand; Whitehead, Alfred N. (1927) Principia Mathematica. Cambridge University Press. 1962 partial
paperback reissue goes up to *56.
466
Berry paradox
467
External links
Roosen-Runge, Peter H. (1997) " Berry's Paradox. (http://www.cs.yorku.ca/~peter/Berry.html)"
Weisstein, Eric W., "Berry Paradox" (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BerryParadox.html), MathWorld.
Epimenides paradox
The Epimenides paradox reveals a problem with self-reference in
logic.
It is named after the Cretan philosopher Epimenides of Knossos (alive
circa 600 BC) who is credited with the original statement.
A typical description of the problem is given in the book Gdel,
Escher, Bach, by Douglas Hofstadter
Epimenides was a Cretan who made one immortal statement:
"All Cretans are liars."
A paradox of self-reference arises when one considers whether it is
possible for Epimenides to have spoken the truth.
Logical paradox
Epimenides from "Promptuarii Iconum

Insigniorum"
Thomas Fowler (1869) states the paradox as follows: "Epimenides the Cretan says, 'that all the Cretans are liars,' but
Epimenides is himself a Cretan; therefore he is himself a liar. But if he be a liar, what he says is untrue, and
consequently the Cretans are veracious; but Epimenides is a Cretan, and therefore what he says is true; saying the
Cretans are liars, Epimenides is himself a liar, and what he says is untrue. Thus we may go on alternately proving
that Epimenides and the Cretans are truthful and untruthful."
The Epimenides paradox in this form can however be solved, meaning that the statement can be assigned truth-value
in a way that is not self-contradicting. Namely, if the statement "all Cretans are liars" (stated by Epimenides, himself
a Cretan) is true, then Epimenides, being a Cretan, would be a liar; since liars only make false statements, the
statement should be false. So assuming the statement is true leads us to conclude that the statement is false and
cannot be accepted. However, if we assume the statement is false, then its correct negation, "there exists a Cretan
who is honest", is true. This does not lead to contradiction, since it is not required that this Cretan be Epimenides,
meaning that Epimenides can tell false statements (honest people tell only true statements) and thus be a liar
(Epimenides knows at least one honest Cretan and lies about it). Hence, from the assumption that the statement is
false it does not follow that the statement is true. So we can avoid a paradox as seeing the statement "all Cretans are
liars" as a false statement, which is made by a lying Cretan, Epimenides.[1][2] The mistake made by Thomas Fowler
(and many other people) above is to think that the negation of "all Cretans are liars" is "all Cretans are honest", when
in fact the negation is "there exists a Cretan who is honest". The Epimenides paradox can be slightly modified as to
not allow the kind of solution described above, like it was in the first paradox of Eubulides but instead leading to a
non-avoidable self-contradiction. Paradoxical versions of the Epimenides problem are closely related to a class of
more difficult logical problems, including the liar paradox, Socratic paradox, and the Burali-Forti paradox, all of
which have self-reference in common with Epimenides. Indeed, the Epimenides paradox is usually classified as a
variation on the liar paradox, and sometimes the two are not distinguished. The study of self-reference led to
important developments in logic and mathematics in the twentieth century.
Epimenides paradox
468
Origin of the phrase

Epimenides was a 6th-century BC philosopher and religious prophet who, against the general sentiment of Crete,
proposed that Zeus was immortal, as in the following poem:
They fashioned a tomb for thee, O holy and high one
The Cretans, always liars, evil beasts, idle bellies!
But thou art not dead: thou livest and abidest forever,
For in thee we live and move and have our being.
Epimenides, Cretica
Denying the immortality of Zeus, then, was the lie of the Cretans.
The phrase "Cretans, always liars" was quoted by the poet Callimachus in his Hymn to Zeus, with the same
theological intent as Epimenides:
O Zeus, some say that thou wert born on the hills of Ida;
Others, O Zeus, say in Arcadia;
Did these or those, O Father lie? -- Cretans are ever liars.
Yea, a tomb, O Lord, for thee the Cretans builded;
But thou didst not die, for thou art for ever.
Callimachus, Hymn I to Zeus
Emergence as a logical contradiction

The logical inconsistency of a Cretan asserting all Cretans are always liars may not have occurred to Epimenides, nor
to Callimachus, who both used the phrase to emphasize their point, without irony.
Later, in the 1st century AD, the quote is given similar credence as it had in the past:
One of Crete's own prophets has said it: 'Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, idle bellies'.
He has surely told the truth. For this reason correct them sternly, that they may be sound in faith instead of
paying attention to Jewish fables and to commandments of people who turn their backs on the truth.
Epistle to Titus, 1:1213
Nor does Clement of Alexandria, in the late 2nd century AD, indicate that the concept of logical paradox is an issue:
In his epistle to Titus, Apostle Paul wants to warn Titus that Cretans don't believe in the one truth of
Christianity, because "Cretans are always liars". To justify his claim, Apostle Paul cites Epimenides.
Stromata 1.14
During the early 4th century, Saint Augustine restates the closely related liar paradox in Against the Academicians
(III.13.29), but without mentioning Epimenides.
In the Middle Ages, many forms of the liar paradox were studied under the heading of insolubilia, but these were not
explicitly associated with Epimenides.
Finally, in 1740, the second volume of Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire Historique et Critique explicitly connects
Epimenides with the paradox, though Bayle labels the paradox a "sophisme".[3]
Epimenides paradox
Notes
[1] Liar paradox#History
[2] http:/ / mathworld. wolfram. com/ EpimenidesParadox. html
[3] Dictionnaire Historique et Critique at Wikipedia.
References
All of the works of Epimenides are now lost, and known only through quotations by other authors. The quotation
from the Cretica of Epimenides is given by R.N. Longenecker, "Acts of the Apostles", in volume 9 of The
Expositor's Bible Commentary, Frank E. Gaebelein, editor (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Corporation,
19761984), page 476. Longenecker in turn cites M.D. Gibson, Horae Semiticae X (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1913), page 40, "in Syriac". Longenecker states the following in a footnote:
The Syr. version of the quatrain comes to us from the Syr. church father Isho'dad of Merv (probably based on
the work of Theodore of Mopsuestia), which J.R. Harris translated back into Gr. in Exp ["The Expositor"] 7
(1907), p 336.
An oblique reference to Epimenides in the context of logic appears in "The Logical Calculus" by W. E. Johnson,
Mind (New Series), volume 1, number 2 (April, 1892), pages 235250. Johnson writes in a footnote,
Compare, for example, such occasions for fallacy as are supplied by "Epimenides is a liar" or "That surface is
red," which may be resolved into "All or some statements of Epimenides are false," "All or some of the surface
is red."
The Epimenides paradox appears explicitly in "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types", by Bertrand
Russell, in the American Journal of Mathematics, volume 30, number 3 (July, 1908), pages 222262, which opens
with the following:
The oldest contradiction of the kind in question is the Epimenides. Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans
were liars, and all other statements made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this a lie?
In that article, Russell uses the Epimenides paradox as the point of departure for discussions of other problems,
including the Burali-Forti paradox and the paradox now called Russell's paradox. Since Russell, the Epimenides
paradox has been referenced repeatedly in logic. Typical of these references is Gdel, Escher, Bach by Douglas
Hofstadter, which accords the paradox a prominent place in a discussion of self-reference.
469
The GrellingNelson paradox is a semantic self-referential paradox formulated in 1908 by Kurt Grelling and
Leonard Nelson and sometimes mistakenly attributed to the German philosopher and mathematician Hermann
Weyl.[1] It is thus occasionally called Weyl's paradox as well as Grelling's paradox. It is closely analogous to
several other well-known paradoxes, in particular the barber paradox and Russell's paradox.
The paradox
Suppose one interprets the adjectives "autological" and "heterological" as follows:
1. An adjective is autological (sometimes homological) if and only if it describes itself. For example "short" is
autological, since the word "short" is a short word. "English," "unhyphenated" and "pentasyllabic" are also
autological.
2. An adjective is heterological if it does not describe itself. Hence "long" is a heterological word (because it is not
a long word), as are "unwritten" and "monosyllabic".
All adjectives, it would seem, must be either autological or heterological, for each adjective either describes itself, or
it doesn't. Problems arise in a number of instances, however:
Paradoxical cases
The GrellingNelson paradox arises when we consider the adjective "heterological". One can ask: Is "heterological"
a heterological word? If the answer is 'no', "heterological" is autological. This leads to a contradiction. In this case,
"heterological" does not describe itself: it must be a heterological word. If the answer is 'yes', "heterological" is
heterological. This again leads to a contradiction, because if the word "heterological" describes itself, it is
autological.
Is "heterological" a heterological word?
no "heterological" is autological "heterological" describes itself "heterological" is heterological,
contradiction
yes "heterological" does not describe itself "heterological" is not heterological, contradiction
The paradox can be eliminated, without changing the meaning of "heterological" where it was previously
well-defined, by modifying the definition of "heterological" slightly to hold all nonautological words except
"heterological." But "nonautological" is subject to the same paradox, for which this evasion is not applicable because
the rules of English uniquely determine its meaning from that of "autological." A similar slight modification to the
definition of "autological" (such as declaring it false of "nonautological" and its synonyms) might seem to fix that,
but the paradox still obtains for synonyms of "autological" and "heterological" such as "selfdescriptive" and
"nonselfdescriptive," whose meanings also would need adjusting, and the consequences of those adjustments would
then need to be pursued, and so on. Freeing English of the GrellingNelson paradox entails considerably more
modification to the language than mere refinements of the definitions of "autological" and "heterological," which
need not even be in the language for the paradox to arise. The scope of these obstacles for English is comparable to
that of Russell's paradox for mathematics founded on sets.
470
Arbitrary cases
One may also ask if "autological" is autological. It can be chosen consistently to be either:
if we say that "autological" is autological, and then ask if it applies to itself, then yes, it does, and thus is
autological;
if we say that "autological" is not autological, and then ask if it applies to itself, then no, it does not, and thus is
not autological.
This is the opposite of the situation for heterological: while "heterological" logically cannot be autological or
heterological, "autological" can be either. (It cannot be both, as the category of autological and heterological cannot
overlap.)
In logical terms, the situation for "autological" is:
"autological" is autological if and only if "autological" is autological
A if and only if A, a tautology
while the situation for "heterological" is:
"heterological" is heterological if and only if "heterological" is autological
A if and only if not A, a contradiction.
Ambiguous cases
One may also ask whether "loud" is autological or heterological. If said loudly, "loud" is autological; otherwise, it is
heterological. This shows that some adjectives cannot be unambiguously classified as autological or heterological.
Newhard sought to eliminate this problem by taking Grelling's Paradox to deal specifically with word types as
opposed to word tokens.
Similarities with Russell's paradox

The GrellingNelson paradox can be translated into Bertrand Russell's famous paradox in the following way. First
one must identify each adjective with the set of objects to which that adjective applies. So, for example, the adjective
"red" is equated with the set of all red objects. In this way, the adjective "pronounceable" is equated with the set of
all pronounceable things, one of which is the word "pronounceable" itself. Thus, an autological word is understood
as a set, one of whose elements is the set itself. The question of whether the word "heterological" is heterological
becomes the question of whether the set of all sets not containing themselves contains itself as an element.
Notes
[1] Weyl refers to it as a "well-known paradox" in Das Kontinuum, mentioning it only to dismiss it. Its misattribution to him may stem from
(attested in ).
References
Grelling, K.; Nelson, L. (1908). "Bemerkungen zu den Paradoxien von Russell und Burali-Forti". Abhandlungen
der Friesschen Schule II. Gttingen. pp.301334. Also in: Nelson, Leonard (1974). Gesammelte Schriften III.
Die kritische Methode in ihrer Bedeutung fr die Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. pp.95127.
ISBN3787302220.
Ramsey, Frank P. (1926). "The Foundations of Mathematics". Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society.
2 25 (1): 338384. doi: 10.1112/plms/s2-25.1.338 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1112/plms/s2-25.1.338).
Peckhaus, Volker (2004). "Paradoxes in Gttingen". In Link, Godehard. One hundred years of Russell's paradox:
mathematics, logic, philosophy. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp.501516. ISBN3110174383.
471
472
External links
Autological words (http://www.segerman.org/autological.html)

"Blank page" redirects here. For other uses, see Blank page (disambiguation).
An intentionally blank page is a page
that is devoid of content, and may be
unexpected. Such pages may serve
purposes ranging from place-holding
to space-filling and content separation.
Sometimes, these pages carry a notice
such as, "This page [is] intentionally
left blank." Such notices typically
appear in printed works, such as legal
documents, manuals and exam papers,
in which the reader might otherwise
suspect that the blank pages are due to
a printing error and where missing
pages
might
have
serious
consequences.
Intentionally blank pages at the end of a book
Uses for intentionally blank pages

Print media
Intentionally blank pages are usually the result of
printing conventions and techniques. Chapters
conventionally start on an odd-numbered page;
therefore, if the preceding chapter happens to have an
odd number of pages, a blank page is inserted at the
end. Book pages are often printed on large sheets
because of technical and financial considerations. Thus,
a group of 8, 16, or 32 consecutive pages will be
printed on a single sheet in such a way that when the
sheet is mechanically folded and cut, the pages will be
in the correct order for binding. This is called an even
An intentionally blank page on a PDF document from the Australian
working, and the group of pages is called a section or
Electoral Commission. The document has 80 printable pages and
signature. Books printed in this manner will always
content ends on page 77.
have a number of pages which is a multiple of the
number in such a signature, such as a multiple of 8, 16,
or 32. As a result, these books will usually have pages left blank, unless by chance or editorial ingenuity the exact
number of pages are printed.
473
For example, if a book with 318 pages of content is printed using 32-page signatures, it will require 10 signatures,
320 pages in total. At the very end of the book that is, at the end of the last signature there will be 2 unused
(blank) pages.
If a printer's document processor has been designed to skip completely blank pages, notices may also be required on
intentionally blank pages to prevent incorrect page numbering.
Intentionally blank pages are ubiquitous in technical and instructional manuals, directories, and other large,
mass-produced volumes of text. The contents of manuals produced by a given product's vendor are often compiled
from generic instructions suitable for a variety of products, with additional instructions or chapters included for the
specific product or model in question. This automation of manual-generation leads to intentionally blank pages to fit
the requirements for mass printing.
In digital documents, pages are intentionally left blank so that the document can be printed correctly in double-sided
format, rather than have new chapters start on the backs of pages. Intentionally blank pages have also been used in
documents distributed in ring binders. The intention is to leave room for expansion without breaking the document's
page numbering. This allows updates to be made to a document while requiring minimal new pages, reducing
printing costs. The only drawback is the increased time required by the reader to manually insert various newly
updated pages into their correct locations in the document.
Standardized tests
Intentionally blank pages can be useful in standardized
tests such as the GCSE, Higher School Certificate,
SAT, CAT, ACT, MCAT, and GRE. In these exams,
there are often individual, timed sections in which
test-takers are prohibited from proceeding to the next
section until that section's time interval has passed and
the examiner allows them to continue. Because all of
these separate sections are printed consecutively in the
examination booklet, it may be possible for a test-taker
who has finished the section early to see through the
page and read the problems in the next section. By
placing intentionally blank pages between these
sections, the test-taker is prevented from cheating in
this way. By printing a notice on the page, such as "this
page has been intentionally left blank", test-takers will
not be concerned that their test has been misprinted,
especially as test instructions often instruct students to
check for missing or blank pages and to report any
defective test booklets to a proctor.
Sheet music
Intentionally blank page in the style used in standardized tests.
In books of sheet music, pieces of relatively short music that can span two to four pages often need to be arranged so
the number of page turns for the performer is minimized. For example, a three-page work (starting on the left hand
sheet) followed immediately by a two-page work involves one page turn during each work. If a blank page
immediately followed the three-page work (on the right hand sheet), the two-page work will span the left and right
pages, alleviating the need for a page turn during the second work. Intentionally blank pages may also appear to
prevent a page turn during a difficult passage.
Classified documents
In the United States armed forces, classified documents require page checks whenever custody is transferred or an
inventory is conducted. Blank pages are all marked "This page intentionally left blank" so page checks are
unambiguous and every page of the document is accounted for.
Variations
Intentionally blank pages placed at the end of books are often used to balance the folios which make up the book (see
bookbinding). Often these pages are completely blank with no such statement, or are used as "Notes" pages, serving
a practical purpose. In the case of telephone number directories, these pages are often used to list important numbers
and addresses. In novels, pages may list other books available from the same publisher.
Book publishers have also used stylized designs (dingbats) underneath the last paragraph of a chapter to indicate that
no other content is to be expected until the next chapter, allowing for the possibility of blank pages without
misunderstandings by the readers.
Examples
Andy Griffiths' book Just Stupid!, begins with a cartoon snail saying to the reader, "This page would be blank if I
were not here telling you that this page would be blank if I were not here telling you that..." on an endless loop.
Humorist Don Novello's 1977 book The Lazlo Letters ends with several otherwise-blank pages marked "FREE
PAPER!".Wikipedia:Verifiability
Comedian Demetri Martin's book This Is A Book contains a completely blank page which says, "This page
unintentionally left blank."
Iranian novelist Reza Amirkhani's book Man-e-oo (His Ego) has one whole chapter of blank pages.
Bungie released a printed copy of Dr Halsey's journal with Halo: Reach in 2010 that have two pages intentionally
ripped out.
References
External links
The This Page Intentionally Left Blank Project (http://www.this-page-intentionally-left-blank.org/)

Everything2 discussion of the phrase (http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=80737)
BBC h2g2 entry on the phrase (http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A676280)
"This page intentionally left blank" (http://web.archive.org/web/20070521042812/http://public.srce.hr/
~zheimer/blank.htm) phrase translated into over 60 languages. (Via Internet Archive.)
Guide to writing intentionally blank pages (http://xml.apache.org/fop/fo.html#fo-blank-pages) in XSL-FO
474
Liar paradox
Liar paradox
In philosophy and logic, the liar paradox or liar's paradox (pseudmenos lgos-- in Ancient
Greek) is the statement "this sentence is false." Trying to assign to this statement a classical binary truth value leads
to a contradiction (see paradox).
If "This sentence is false." is true, then the sentence is false, but then if "This sentence is false." is false, then the
sentence is true, and so on.
History
The Epimenides paradox (circa 600 BC) has been suggested as an example of the liar paradox, but they are not
logically equivalent. The semi-mythical seer Epimenides, a Cretan, reportedly stated that "The Cretans are always
liars."[1] However, Epimenides' statement that all Cretans are liars can be resolved as false, given that he knows of at
least one other Cretan who does not lie.
One version of the liar paradox is attributed to the Greek philosopher Eubulides of Miletus who lived in the 4th
century BC. Eubulides reportedly asked, "A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?"
The paradox was once discussed by St. Jerome in a sermon:
"I said in my alarm, 'Every man is a liar!' "(Psalms 116:11 [2]) Is David telling the truth or is he lying? If
it is true that every man is a liar, and David's statement, "Every man is a liar" is true, then David also is
lying; he, too, is a man. But if he, too, is lying, his statement: "Every man is a liar," consequently is not
true. Whatever way you turn the proposition, the conclusion is a contradiction. Since David himself is a
man, it follows that he also is lying; but if he is lying because every man is a liar, his lying is of a
different sort."[3]
In early Islamic tradition liar paradox was discussed for at least five centuries starting from late 9th century
apparently without being influenced by any other tradition. Nar al-Dn al-s could have been the first logician to
identify the liar paradox as self-referential.
Explanation of the paradox and variants

The problem of the liar paradox is that it seems to show that common beliefs about truth and falsity actually lead to a
contradiction. Sentences can be constructed that cannot consistently be assigned a truth value even though they are
completely in accord with grammar and semantic rules.
The simplest version of the paradox is the sentence:
This statement is false. (A)
If (A) is true, then "This statement is false" is true. Therefore (A) must be false. The hypothesis that (A) is true leads
to the conclusion that (A) is false, a contradiction.
If (A) is false, then "This statement is false" is false. Therefore (A) must be true. The hypothesis that (A) is false
leads to the conclusion that (A) is true, another contradiction. Either way, (A) is both true and false, which is a
paradox.
However, that the liar sentence can be shown to be true if it is false and false if it is true has led some to conclude
that it is "neither true nor false".[4] This response to the paradox is, in effect, the rejection of the claim that every
statement has to be either true or false, also known as the principle of bivalence, a concept related to the law of the
excluded middle.
The proposal that the statement is neither true nor false has given rise to the following, strengthened version of the
paradox:
475
Liar paradox
This statement is not true. (B)
If (B) is neither true nor false, then it must be not true. Since this is what (B) itself states, it means that (B) must be
true. Since initially (B) was not true and is now true, another paradox arises.
Another reaction to the paradox of (A) is to posit, as Graham Priest has, that the statement is both true and false.
Nevertheless, even Priest's analysis is susceptible to the following version of the liar:
This statement is only false. (C)
If (C) is both true and false, then (C) is only false. But then, it is not true. Since initially (C) was true and is now
not true, it is a paradox.
There are also multi-sentence versions of the liar paradox. The following is the two-sentence version:
The following statement is true. (D1)
The preceding statement is false. (D2)
Assume (D1) is true. Then (D2) is true. This would mean that (D1) is false. Therefore (D1) is both true and false.
Assume (D1) is false. Then (D2) is false. This would mean that (D1) is true. Thus (D1) is both true and false. Either
way, (D1) is both true and false - the same paradox as (A) above.
The multi-sentence version of the liar paradox generalizes to any circular sequence of such statements (wherein the
last statement asserts the truth/falsity of the first statement), provided there are an odd number of statements
asserting the falsity of their successor; the following is a three-sentence version, with each statement asserting the
falsity of its successor:
E2 is false. (E1)
E3 is false. (E2)
E1 is false. (E3)
Assume (E1) is true. Then (E2) is false, which means (E3) is true, and hence (E1) is false, leading to a contradiction.
Assume (E1) is false. Then (E2) is true, which means (E3) is false, and hence (E1) is true. Either way, (E1) is both
true and false - the same paradox as with (A) and (D1).
There are many other variants, and many complements, possible. In normal sentence construction, the simplest
version of the complement is the sentence:
This statement is true. (F)
If F is assumed to bear a truth value, then it presents the problem of determining the object of that value. But, a
simpler version is possible, by assuming that the single word 'true' bears a truth value. The analogue to the paradox is
to assume that the single word 'false' likewise bears a truth value, namely that it is false. This reveals that the paradox
can be reduced to the mental act of assuming that the very idea of fallacy bears a truth value, namely that the very
idea of fallacy is false: an act of misrepresentation. So, the symmetrical version of the paradox would be:
The following statement is false. (G1)
The preceding statement is false. (G2)
Possible resolutions
Alfred Tarski
Alfred Tarski diagnosed the paradox as arising only in languages that are "semantically closed", by which he meant a
language in which it is possible for one sentence to predicate truth (or falsehood) of another sentence in the same
language (or even of itself). To avoid self-contradiction, it is necessary when discussing truth values to envision
levels of languages, each of which can predicate truth (or falsehood) only of languages at a lower level. So, when
one sentence refers to the truth-value of another, it is semantically higher. The sentence referred to is part of the
476
Liar paradox
"object language", while the referring sentence is considered to be a part of a "meta-language" with respect to the
object language. It is legitimate for sentences in "languages" higher on the semantic hierarchy to refer to sentences
lower in the "language" hierarchy, but not the other way around. This prevents a system from becoming
self-referential.
Arthur Prior
Arthur Prior asserts that there is nothing paradoxical about the liar paradox. His claim (which he attributes to Charles
Sanders Peirce and John Buridan) is that every statement includes an implicit assertion of its own truth. Thus, for
example, the statement, "It is true that two plus two equals four", contains no more information than the statement
"two plus two equals four", because the phrase "it is true that..." is always implicitly there. And in the self-referential
spirit of the Liar Paradox, the phrase "it is true that..." is equivalent to "this whole statement is true and ...".
Thus the following two statements are equivalent:
This statement is false.
This statement is true and this statement is false.
The latter is a simple contradiction of the form "A and not A", and hence is false. There is therefore no paradox
because the claim that this two-conjunct Liar is false does not lead to a contradiction. Eugene Mills[5] and Neil
Lefebvre and Melissa Schelein[6] present similar answers.
Saul Kripke
Saul Kripke argued that whether a sentence is paradoxical or not can depend upon contingent facts. If the only thing
Smith says about Jones is
A majority of what Jones says about me is false.
and Jones says only these three things about Smith:
Smith is a big spender.
Smith is soft on crime.
Everything Smith says about me is true.
If Smith really is a big spender but is "not" soft on crime, then both Smith's remark about Jones and Jones's last
remark about Smith are paradoxical.
Kripke proposes a solution in the following manner. If a statement's truth value is ultimately tied up in some
evaluable fact about the world, that statement is "grounded". If not, that statement is "ungrounded". Ungrounded
statements do not have a truth value. Liar statements and liar-like statements are ungrounded, and therefore have no
truth value.
Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy

Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy propose that the liar sentence (which they interpret as synonymous with the
Strengthened Liar) is ambiguous. They base this conclusion on a distinction they make between a "denial" and a
"negation". If the liar means, "It is not the case that this statement is true", then it is denying itself. If it means, "This
statement is not true", then it is negating itself. They go on to argue, based on situation semantics, that the "denial
liar" can be true without contradiction while the "negation liar" can be false without contradiction. Their 1987 book
makes heavy use of non-well-founded set theory.[7]
477
Liar paradox
Dialetheism
Graham Priest and other logicians, including J.C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb have proposed that the liar
sentence should be considered to be both true and false, a point of view known as dialetheism. Dialetheism is the
view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism raises its own problems. Chief among these is that since
dialetheism recognizes the liar paradox, an intrinsic contradiction, as being true, it must discard the long-recognized
principle of explosion, which asserts that any proposition can be deduced from a contradiction, unless the dialetheist
is willing to accept trivialism - the view that all propositions are true. Since trivialism is an intuitively false view,
dialetheists nearly always reject the explosion principle. Logics that reject it are called paraconsistent.
Non-cognitivism
Andrew Irvine has argued in favour of a non-cognitivist solution to the paradox, suggesting that some apparently
well-formed sentences will turn out to be neither true nor false and that "formal criteria alone will inevitably prove
insufficient" for resolving the paradox.
Logical structure of the liar paradox

For a better understanding of the liar paradox, it is useful to write it down in a more formal way. If "this statement is
false" is denoted by A and its truth value is being sought, it is necessary to find a condition that restricts the choice of
possible truth values of A. Because A is self-referential it is possible to give the condition by an equation.
If some statement, B, is assumed to be false, one writes, B = false. The statement (C) that the statement B is false
would be written as C = B = false. Now, the liar paradox can be expressed as the statement A, that A is false:
A = A = false
This is an equation from which the truth value of A = "this statement is false" could hopefully be obtained. In the
boolean domain "A = false" is equivalent to "not A" and therefore the equation is not solvable. This is the motivation
for reinterpretation of A. The simplest logical approach to make the equation solvable is the dialetheistic approach,
in which case the solution is A being both "true" and "false". Other resolutions mostly include some modifications of
the equation; Arthur Prior claims that the equation should be "A = 'A = false and A = true'" and therefore A is false.
In computational verb logic, the liar paradox is extended to statement like, "I hear what he says; he says what I don't
hear", where verb logic must be used to resolve the paradox.
Applications
Gdel's First Incompleteness Theorem
Gdel's incompleteness theorems are two fundamental theorems of mathematical logic which state inherent
limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems for mathematics. The theorems were proven by Kurt Gdel
in 1931, and are important in the philosophy of mathematics. Roughly speaking, in proving the first incompleteness
theorem, Gdel used a modified version of the liar paradox, replacing "this sentence is false" with "this sentence is
not provable", called the "Gdel sentence G". Thus for a theory "T", "G" is true, but not provable in "T". The
analysis of the truth and provability of "G" is a formalized version of the analysis of the truth of the liar sentence.
To prove the first incompleteness theorem, Gdel represented statements by numbers. Then the theory at hand,
which is assumed to prove certain facts about numbers, also proves facts about its own statements. Questions about
the provability of statements are represented as questions about the properties of numbers, which would be decidable
by the theory if it were complete. In these terms, the Gdel sentence states that no natural number exists with a
certain, strange property. A number with this property would encode a proof of the inconsistency of the theory. If
there were such a number then the theory would be inconsistent, contrary to the consistency hypothesis. So, under
the assumption that the theory is consistent, there is no such number.
478
Liar paradox
It is not possible to replace "not provable" with "false" in a Gdel sentence because the predicate "Q is the Gdel
number of a false formula" cannot be represented as a formula of arithmetic. This result, known as Tarski's
undefinability theorem, was discovered independently by Gdel (when he was working on the proof of the
incompleteness theorem) and by Alfred Tarski.
George Boolos has since sketched an alternative proof of the first incompleteness theorem that uses Berry's paradox
rather than the liar paradox to construct a true but unprovable formula.
In popular culture
The liar paradox is occasionally used in fiction to shut down artificial intelligences, who are presented as being
unable to process the sentence. In Star Trek: The Original Series episode I, Mudd, the Liar paradox is used by the
characters of Captain Kirk and Harry Mudd to confuse and ultimately disable an android.
In the 1973 Doctor Who serial The Green Death, the Doctor temporarily stumps the insane computer BOSS by
asking it "If I were to tell you that the next thing I say would be true, but the last thing I said was a lie, would you
believe me?" However BOSS eventually decides the question is irrelevant and summons security.
The second book in Emily Rodda's Deltora Quest series, The Lake of Tears makes a notable use of the paradox. The
main character, Lief, must answer a riddle correctly or be killed by the guardian of a bridge. When Lief answers the
trick riddle wrongly, he confronts the guardian with his treachery. The guardian answers with another riddle, telling
Lief to make a statement; if false, he will kill Lief by chopping off his head; if true, he will strangle Lief. Lief replies,
"You will cut off my head." As the guardian was cursed to his fate by the evil sorceress Thaegan 'until truth and lies
become one', the paradox allows him to revert to his original form: an eagle.
Episode 14 of Season Five of the TV series "Andromeda" (The Past is Prolix) opens with the following epigram:
The following statement is false:
The previous statement is true.
Welcome to our corner of the universe
In the 2011 videogame Portal 2, GLaDOS attempts to use the "this sentence is false" paradox to defeat the nave
artificial intelligence Wheatley, but, lacking the intelligence to realize it's a paradox, he simply responds, "Um, true.
I'll go with true. There, that was easy." and is unaffected.
Comedian George Carlin says "The following statement is true: the preceding statement is false!" within a list of
announcements on his 1981 comedy album A Place For My Stuff.
In Lois McMaster Bujold's Vorkosigan Saga, Cordelia Naismith frequently muses on the axiom "all Cretans are
liars" in her inner monologue.
In an episode of The Grim Adventures of Billy and Mandy Mandy precedes the episode with the paradox, "This
statement is false."
479
Liar paradox
Notes
[1] Epimenides paradox has "All Cretans are liars."
[2] http:/ / blb. org/ cgi-bin/ index. pl?type=pf& translation=NIV& handref=Psalms+ 116%3A11
[3] St. Jerome, Homily on Psalm 115 (116B), translated by Sr. Marie Liguori Ewald, IHM, in The Homilies of Saint Jerome, Volume I (1-59 On
the Psalms), The Fathers of the Church 48 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964), 294
[4] Andrew Irvine, Gaps, Gluts, and Paradox, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary vol. 18 [Return of the A priori] (1992), 273-99
[5] Mills, Eugene (1998) A simple solution to the Liar, Philosophical Studies 89: 197-212.
[6] Lefebvre, N. and Schelein, M., "The Liar Lied," in Philosophy Now issue 51
[7] Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy (1987) The Liar. Oxford University Press.
References
Greenough, P.M., (2001) " ," American Philosophical Quarterly 38:
Hughes, G.E., (1992) John Buridan on Self-Reference : Chapter Eight of Buridan's Sophismata, with a
Translation, and Introduction, and a Philosophical Commentary, Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN 0-521-28864-9.
Buridan's detailed solution to a number of such paradoxes.
Kirkham, Richard (1992) Theories of Truth. MIT Press. Especially chapter 9.
Saul Kripke (1975) "An Outline of a Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716.
Lefebvre, Neil, and Schelein, Melissa (2005) "The Liar Lied," Philosophy Now issue 51.
Graham Priest (1984) "The Logic of Paradox Revisited," Journal of Philosophical Logic 13: 153-179.
A. N. Prior (1976) Papers in Logic and Ethics. Duckworth.
Smullyan, Raymond (19nn) What is the Name of this Book?. ISBN 0-671-62832-1. A collection of logic puzzles
exploring this theme.
Portal 2: Chapter 7 The reunion (2011) Valve Corporation
External links
Liar Paradox (http://www.iep.utm.edu/par-liar) entry by Bradley Dowden in the Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Liar Paradox (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox) entry by J C Beall and Michael Glanzberg in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
480
Opposite Day
Opposite Day
This article is about the game. For the 2009 comedy film, see Opposite Day (film). For the parliamentary
mechanism, see Opposition day.
Opposite Day is an unofficial holiday, commonly observed whenever it is declared, where every action is modified
so that meaning is inverted. Once Opposite Day is declared, statements mean the opposite of what they usually
mean. Usually, a person would say, "After this phrase is over, it will be officially opposite day," and then Opposite
Day will be officially started. Opposite Day can also be declared retroactively to indicate that what was just asserted
had the opposite meaning of what was originally intended (For example when KipleyWikipedia:Manual of
Style/Dates and numbers#Chronological items was told she was awesome by her awesome friend on opposite day,
she did not realize that it was opposite day and was delighted, only to check her calendar seconds later to find out
that it was in fact opposite day, which then lead her to go into a deep depression for the next week, illustrating
Kipley's moody and depressing nature) (similar to the practice of crossed fingers to automatically nullify promises).
Play has been compared to a children's "philosophy course", and the game has been used as an educational aid and
suggested as preparation for "standardized testing".Wikipedia:Citation needed
When declared on April 1st, Opposite Day nullifies April Fools' Day. Any person fooled by a fake news story
remains a fool, but everybody else becomes a fool, too. According to one anonymous source, the knowledge that
everyone else is a fool doesn't help ease the pain much.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Use in media
Opposite Day Australia: in Australia Opposite Day is celebrated on Saturday 5th of April. On this day all meanings
are inverted.
In the Seinfeld Episode "The Opposite", character George Costanza says the opposite of everything about himself
to get a girl. Though Opposite Day isn't directly mentioned, its rules are followed.
In the first season of the cartoon SpongeBob SquarePants, an episode was entitled "Opposite Day". In the episode
the character Squidward uses the holiday to keep his neighbors from bothering him.
A Grim Adventures of Billy & Mandy short was entitled and about Opposite Day.
Indie rock artist Andrew Bird has a song entitled "Opposite Day" on his 2005 album Andrew Bird & the
Mysterious Production of Eggs.
A Sesame Street book entitled Opposite Day was created to teach children about opposites.
A film entitled Opposite Day starring Ariel Winter is about children switching roles with adults.
In the "Full Court Dress" episode of Happy Endings, Max complains to Penny about having to babysit his niece
and nephew, about the kids' "garbage hipster names", and about their parents' marriage being "doomed" anyway,
which he is then revealed to be doing in front of his niece and nephew. In an attempt to cover, Penny tries to
explain that Max didn't mean any of it, because it's "Opposite Day". Max then elaborates that their "dad doesn't
have a secret Facebook profile under the name Jeffrey Scrotum."Wikipedia:Citation needed
In the WordGirl episode "Opposite Day", Wordgirl (Becky Botsford) has an Opposite Day
party.Wikipedia:Citation needed
References
481

The Paradox of the Court, also known as the counterdilemma of Euathlus, is a very old problem in logic
stemming from ancient Greece. It is said that the famous sophist Protagoras took on a pupil, Euathlus, on the
understanding that the student pay Protagoras for his instruction after he wins his first court case. Protagoras decided
to sue Euathlus for the amount owed.
Protagoras argued that if he won the case he would be paid his money. If Euathlus won the case, Protagoras would
still be paid according to the original contract, because Euathlus would have won his first case.
Euathlus, however, claimed that if he won, then by the court's decision he would not have to pay Protagoras. If, on
the other hand, Protagoras won, then Euathlus would still not have won a case and would therefore not be obliged to
pay.
The question is: which of the two men is in the right?
The story is related by the Latin author Aulus Gellius in Attic Nights.[1]
Analysis
From a moral standpoint it may be that either party was right, or that both weren't, due to the ambiguous nature of
the scenario. However, as a matter of law, if the Court were to rule in favor of Protagoras, the conditions of the
original contract between him and his pupil would be invalid and Euathlus would have to pay Protagoras. If, on the
other hand, Euathlus were to win, the Court could also void Euathlus's obligation of payment.
However, from an objective standpoint, the way the Court could make its ruling is not necessarily a paradox either.
The Court would either rule that Euathlus (as the defendant) had violated the terms of the contract, or had not. The
subsequent conundrum would have no legal bearing on the court's decision.
In some civil cases the respondent, if he receives the favor of the court, is also shielded from payments associated
with the act of going to court. The Court could indeed rule that Protagoras, as the unsuccessful plaintiff, pay
Euathlus the amount which it cost to win. In this case, Euathlus would pay Protagoras only to have the money
returned by order of the court. The original contract would have been fulfilled, and Euathlus would bear no further
obligation to pay Protagoras for his instruction. The net outcome for Protagoras would be to lose his case, receive
payment per the original contract, and then have to pay for the defendant's losses due to his failed suit (Which would
be equal to, or exceeding, the cost of Euathlus's education.)
Additionally, but contrary to the law of Ancient Athens where defendants were obligated to represent themselves in
court,[2] Euathlus could hire a lawyer to take on the case, thus invalidating this case as a standard for payment. Legal
counsel in the form of a logographos[3] was only permitted outside the courtroom for both defendants and accusers.
The Two Case Solution

This solution asserts that there are in fact two legal arguments to be resolved
i) Protagoras argues that an unwritten clause of the original contract is that the student must enter into the profession
of law.
If Protagoras wins this case then Euathlus must pay. If Protagoras loses then Euathlus must pay under the original
contract. However, in this event Euathlus may argue...
ii)An unwritten assumption of the contract is that cases between the two individuals are exempt from the contract.
Citing logical rules preventing the application of a condition to itself.
Euathlus can only avoid payment if he wins both case i) and ii).
482
Another theory
Another means of viewing this case is as follows:
Euathlus would win his case because Protagoras sued him BEFORE Euathlus won his first case. Protagoras would
lose that particular case because Euathlus has not yet won a case, and therefore Protagoras's cause of action had not
yet manifested itself.
The new victory of Euathlus would qualify as new evidence for Protagoras, thus constituting grounds for a new trial.
It has been criticized that though this represents a practical solution, it does not solve the logical paradox. This
however can be challenged by identifying a key assumption in the logic, that of eternal states.
This solution works because it targets the assumption of eternal states, that a description applies during all time. If
such assumption were false, that the court makes the decision without knowledge of the outcome of the court (or
excludes evidence any time after the case start but before the case end), then it is resolvable because the student has
not won the case at that time. Court can rule he has not won, therefore does not have to pay without contradiction.
Protagoras suing again is neither contradictory. At the second suing the state of the student has changed: he now has
won a case. The second suing will now include the outcome of the first trial because it happened prior to the second
trial, and the court can freely rule in favor of Protagoras. If assumption of eternal states is in play, the court is
required to have all knowledge of all cases student has fought in his lifetime, both past and future. Then there will be
a contradiction from the assumption, albeit an unrealistic one. In this solution the student can have both won his first
case and not won the first case, because they occur at different times of evaluation.
Other versions of the paradox

In some versions Protagoras would demand the money if and only if Euathlus wins his first court case. Some
accounts claim that Protagoras demanded his money as soon as Euathlus completed his education, others say that
Protagoras waited until it was obvious that Euathlus was making no effort to take on clients and still others assert
that Euathlus made a genuine attempt but that no clients ever came.
References
[1] Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, book 5, chapter 10 (http:/ / www. perseus. tufts. edu/ hopper/ text?doc=Perseus:text:2007. 01.
0072:book=5:chapter=10).
[2] http:/ / www. stoa. org/ projects/ demos/ article_intro_legal_system?page=all
[3] http:/ / www. stoa. org/ projects/ demos/ article_law_glossary?section=logographos& greekEncoding=UnicodeC
483
Petronius
484
Petronius
This article is about the Roman author. For other uses, see Petronius (disambiguation).
Petronius
Born
c. 27 AD
Massalia (ancient Marseille)
Died
c. 66 AD
Cumae
Occupation
Novelist
Notable work(s)
The Satyricon
Gaius Petronius Arbiter (/ptronis/; c. 27 66 AD) was a Roman courtier during the reign of Nero. He is
generally believed to be the author of the Satyricon, a satirical novel believed to have been written during the
Neronian era.
Life
Tacitus, Plutarch and Pliny the Elder describe Petronius as the elegantiae arbiter (also phrased arbiter
elegantiarum), "judge of elegance" in the court of the emperor Nero. He served as consul in 62 AD. Later, he
became a member of the senatorial class who devoted themselves to a life of pleasure. His relationship to Nero was
apparently akin to that of a fashion advisor. Tacitus gives this account of Petronius in his historical work the Annals
(XVI.18):
He spent his days in sleep, his nights in attending to his official duties or in amusement, that by his dissolute
life he had become as famous as other men by a life of energy, and that he was regarded as no ordinary
profligate, but as an accomplished voluptuary. His reckless freedom of speech, being regarded as frankness,
procured him popularity. Yet during his provincial government, and later when he held the office of consul, he
had shown vigor and capacity for affairs. Afterwards returning to his life of vicious indulgence, he became one
of the chosen circle of Nero's intimates, and was looked upon as an absolute authority on questions of taste
(elegantiae arbiter) in connection with the science of luxurious living.
None of the ancient sources give any further detail about his life, or mention that he was a writer. However a
medieval manuscript, written around 1450 of the Satyricon credited a "Titus Petronius" as the author of the original
work. Traditionally this reference is linked with Petronius Arbiter, since the novel appears to have been written or at
Petronius
485
least set during his lifetime. The link, however, remains speculative and disputed.
As a writer
Petronius' development of his characters in the Satyricon, namely Trimalchio, transcends the traditional style of
writing of ancient literature. In the literature written during Petronius' lifetime the emphasis was always on the
typical considerations of plot, which had been laid down by classical rules. The character, which was hardly known
in ancient literature, was secondary. Petronius goes beyond these literary limitations in his exact portrayals of
detailed speech, behavior, surroundings, and appearance of the characters.
Another literary device Petronius employs in his novel is a collection of specific allusions. The allusions to certain
people and events are evidence that the Satyricon was written during Nero's time. These also suggest that it was
aimed at a contemporary audience which consisted in part of Nero's courtiers and even Nero himself.
One such allusion, found in chapter 9, refers to the story of the good wife Lucretia which was well-known at the
time:
"If you're a Lucretia," he said, "You've found a Tarquin".
The message Petronius tries to convey in his work is far from moral and does not intend to produce reform, but is
written above all to entertain and should be considered artistically. As the title implies, the Satyricon is a satire,
specifically a Menippean satire, in which Petronius satirizes nearly anything, using his impeccable taste as the only
standard. It is speculated that Petronius' depiction of Trimalchio mirrors that of Nero. Although we never know the
author's own opinion, we see the opinions of the characters in the story and how Encolpius criticizes Trimalchio.
Death
Petronius' high position soon made him the object of envy for those around him. Having attracted the jealousy of
Tigellinus, the commander of the emperor's guard, he was accused of treason. He was arrested at Cumae in 65 AD
but did not wait for a sentence. Instead he chose to take his own life. Tacitus again records his elegant suicide in the
sixteenth book of the Annals:
Yet he did not fling away life with precipitate haste, but having made an incision in his veins and then,
according to his humour, bound them up, he again opened them, while he conversed with his friends, not in a
serious strain or on topics that might win for him the glory of courage. And he listened to them as they
repeated, not thoughts on the immortality of the soul or on the theories of philosophers, but light poetry and
playful verses. To some of his slaves he gave liberal presents, a flogging to others. He dined, indulged himself
in sleep, that death, though forced on him, might have a natural appearance. Even in his will he did not, as did
many in their last moments, flatter Nero or Tigellinus or any other of the men in power. On the contrary, he
described fully the prince's shameful excesses, with the names of his male and female companions and their
novelties in debauchery, and sent the account under seal to Nero. Then he broke his signet-ring, that it might
not be subsequently available for imperiling others.
Petronius
486
In fiction
Petronius appears or is referenced in several works of fiction:
A stanza of Petronius' poetry appears in Patrick Leigh Fermor's A Time of Gifts: "Leave thy home, O youth, and
seek out alien shores . . . Yield not to misfortune: the far-off Danube shall know thee, the cold North-wind and the
untroubled kingdom of Canopus and the men who gaze on the new birth of Phoebus or upon his setting..."
In the 1835 short story "A Tale of Roman Life" by Alexander Pushkin, Petronius' final days in Cumae are
chronicled.
David Wishart's novel Nero is narrated by Petronius, and is presented as his last testament before his enforced
suicide.
Ngaio Marsh's 1936 detective novel Death in Ecstasy features Petronius' work as some of the pornographic
literature, wrapped in brown paper dustjackets, kept on the bookshelf of the Australian drug-peddler Samuel J.
Ogden and shared with his American business partner Jasper Garnette.
Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel Quo Vadis and its adaptations, where C. Petronius is the preferred courtier of Nero,
using his wit to adulate and mock him at the same time. He is horrified at Nero's burning of Rome, and eventually
commits suicide to escape both Nero's antics and his anticipated execution.
In the 1951 film of Quo Vadis, Petronius is portrayed by Leo Genn, for which he was nominated for an Academy
Award for Best Supporting Actor.
In the 2001 film of Quo Vadis, Petronius is portrayed by Boguslaw Linda.

Mika Waltari's novel The Roman.
In Robert A. Heinlein's novel The Door into Summer, the protagonist's cat is named "Petronius the Arbiter".
Jesse Browner's novel The Uncertain Hour recounts Petronius' final banquet and suicide (as told by Tacitus,
Annals 16 [1]).
In Anthony Burgess's novel The Kingdom of the Wicked, Gaius Petronius appears as a major character, an advisor
to Nero.
George Orwell in "Bookshop Memories" (1936): "Modern books for children are rather horrible things, especially
when you see them in the mass. Personally I would sooner give a child a copy of Petronius Arbiter than Peter
Pan, but even Barrie seems manly and wholesome compared with some of his later imitators."
The Mountain Goats's first EP release is entitled "Songs for Petronius."
He appears in Books 2 (Victrix) and 3 (Gladiatrix) of Frances Hendry's Neronian-era trilogy, about a young
Briton woman, who becomes a gladiatrix (the female equivalent of a gladiator). The books cover the time from
the rebellion of Boudicca to Nero's death, the Year of the Four Emperors and the rise of Vespasian. In these
books, he is much like the character of Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel.
In recent times, a popular quotation (actually by Charlton Ogburn, 1957) on reorganization is often (but spuriously)
attributed to a Gaius Petronius. In one version it reads:
We trained hard ... but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be
reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a
wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency,
and demoralization.
Petronius
487
Notes
[1] http:/ / www. chieftainsys. freeserve. co. uk/ tacitus_annals16. htm
Further reading
This articleincorporates text from a publication now in the public domain:Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911).
Encyclopdia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Conte, Gian Biagio, The Hidden Author: An interpretation of Petronius' Satyricon (1997. Berkeley: University of
California Press).
Connors, Catherine, Petronius the Poet: Verse and Literary Tradition in the Satyricon (1998. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Jensson, Gottskalk, The Recollections of Encolpius. The Satyrica of Petronius as Milesian Fiction (2004.
Groningen: Barkhuis Publishing and Groningen University Library) (Ancient narrative Suppl. 2).
Vannini, Giulio, Petronius 19752005: bilancio critico e nuove proposte (2007. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht) (Lustrum, 49).
Prag, Jonathan and Ian Repath (eds), Petronius: A Handbook (2009. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell).
Breitenstein, Natalie, Petronius, Satyrica 115. Text, bersetzung, Kommentar (2009. Berlin New York: De
Gruyter) (Texte und Kommentare, 32).
Vannini, Giulio, Petronii Arbitri Satyricon 100115. Edizione critica e commento (2010. Berlin New York: De
Gruyter) (Beitrge zur Altertumskunde, 281).
G. Schmeling with A. Setaioli, A Commentary On The Satyrica Of Petronius (2011. Oxford U.P.)
External links
Media related to Petronius Arbiter at Wikimedia Commons
Works written by or about Petronius at Wikisource
Quotations related to Petronius at Wikiquote

Works by Petronius (http://www.gutenberg.org/author/Petronius+Arbiter) at Project Gutenberg
Latin text (http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/petronius.html) of the Satyricon from The Latin Library (http://
www.thelatinlibrary.com)
Petronii satirae et liber priapeorum (http://books.google.it/books?id=2RDIUk_UjUIC), iterum edidit
Franciscus Buecheler, adiectae sunt Varronis et Senecae satirae similesque reliquiae, Berolini apud Weidmannos,
1871.
Quine's paradox
Quine's paradox
Quine's paradox is a paradox concerning truth values, attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine. It is related to the
liar paradox as a problem, and it purports to show that a sentence can be paradoxical even if it is not self-referring
and does not use demonstratives or indexicals (i.e. it does not explicitly refer to itself). The paradox can be expressed
as follows:
"Yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation.
If the paradox is not clear, consider each part of the above description of the paradox incrementally:
it = yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation
its quotation = "yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation"
it preceded by its quotation = "yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation" yields falsehood when
preceded by its quotation.
With these tools, the description of the paradox may now be reconsidered; it can be seen to assert the following:
The statement "'yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation' yields falsehood when preceded by its
quotation" is false.
In other words, the sentence implies that it is false, which is paradoxicalfor if it is false, what it states is in fact
true.
Dialetheism provides a solution to all such paradoxes by allowing that certain statements 'dialetheia' can be both true
and false.
Motivation
The liar paradox ("This sentence is false", or "The next sentence is true. The previous sentence is false")
demonstrates essential difficulties in assigning a truth value even to simple sentences. Many philosophers,
attempting to explain the liar paradox, concluded that the problem was with the use of demonstrative word "this" or
its replacements. Once we properly analyze this sort of self-reference, according to said philosophers, the paradox no
longer arises.
Quine's construction demonstrates that paradox of this kind arises independently of such direct self-reference, for, no
lexeme of the sentence refers to the sentence, though Quine's sentence does contain a lexeme which refers to one of
its parts. Namely, "its" near the end of the sentence is a possessive pronoun whose antecedent is the very predicate in
which it occurs. Thus, although Quine's sentence per se is not self-referring, it does contain a self-referring predicate.
Any system, such as English, that contains entities such as words or sentences that can be used to apply to
themselves, must contain this type of paradox. There is no way to eliminate the paradoxes, short of a severe crippling
of the language. Wikipedia:Citation needed
488
Quine's paradox
Application
Quine suggested an unnatural linguistic resolution to such logical antinomies, inspired by Bertrand Russell's Type
theory and Tarski's work. His system would attach levels to a line of problematic expressions such as falsehood and
denote. Entire sentences would use a higher hierarchy each of their parts'. The form "'Clause about falsehood0' yields
falsehood1" will be grammatically correct, and "'Denoting0 phrase' denotes0 itself" wrong.
George Boolos, inspired by his student Michael Ernst, has written that the sentence might be syntactically
ambiguous, in using multiple quotation marks whose exact mate marks cannot be determined. He revised traditional
quotation into a system where the length of outer pairs of so-called q-marks of an expression is determined by the
q-marks that appear inside the expression. This accounts not only for ordered quotes-within-quotes but also to, say,
strings with an odd number of quotation marks.
In Gdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, author Douglas Hofstadter suggests that the Quine sentence in
fact uses an indirect type of self-reference. He then shows that indirect self-reference is crucial in many of the proofs
of Gdel's incompleteness theorems.
Bibliography
Boolos, George (1995). Leonardi, P; Santambrogio, M, eds. On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
pp.2832296. ISBN978-0-521-47091-9. Reprinted in Boolos, George (1998). "Quotational Ambiguity". Logic,
Logic and Logic. Harvard University Press. pp.392405. ISBN0-674-53766-1.
Hofstadter, Douglas (1979). Gdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Basic Books.
Quine, W.V.O (1962). "Paradox". Scientific American 206 (4). reprinted as "The Ways of Paradox" [1]. The Ways
of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1966. pp.121.
Quine, W. V. O. (1987). "Paradoxes". Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. Harvard University
Press. pp.145149. ISBN0-674-74352-0.
References
[1] http:/ / www. math. dartmouth. edu/ ~matc/ Readers/ HowManyAngels/ Paradox. html
489
Richard's paradox
Richard's paradox
In logic, Richard's paradox is a semantical antinomy in set theory and natural language first described by the
French mathematician Jules Richard in 1905. Today, the paradox is ordinarily used in order to motivate the
importance of carefully distinguishing between mathematics and metamathematics. The paradox was also a
motivation in the development of predicative mathematics.
Description
The original statement of the paradox, due to Richard (1905), has a relation to Cantor's diagonal argument on the
uncountability of the set of real numbers.
The paradox begins with the observation that certain expressions in English unambiguously define real numbers,
while other expressions in English do not. For example, "The real number whose integer part is 17 and whose nth
decimal place is 0 if n is even and 1 if n is odd" defines the real number 17.1010101..., while the phrase "the capital
of England" does not define a real number.
Thus there is an infinite list of English phrases (where each phrase is of finite length, but lengths vary in the list) that
unambiguously define real numbers; arrange this list by length and then order lexicographically, so that the ordering
is canonical. This yields an infinite list of the corresponding real numbers: r1, r2, ... . Now define a new real number
r as follows. The integer part of r is 0, the nth decimal place of r is 1 if the nth decimal place of rn is not 1, and the
nth decimal place of r is 2 if the nth decimal place of rn is 1.
The preceding two paragraphs are an expression in English which unambiguously defines a real number r. Thus r
must be one of the numbers rn. However, r was constructed so that it cannot equal any of the rn. This is the
paradoxical contradiction.
Analysis and relationship with metamathematics

Richard's paradox leaves an untenable contradiction, which must be analyzed to find an error.
The proposed definition of the new real number r clearly contains a finite string of characters, and hence it appears at
first to be a definition of a real number. However, the definition refers to definability-in-English itself. If it were
possible to determine which English expressions actually do define a real number, and which do not, then the
paradox would go through. Thus the resolution of Richard's paradox is that there is no way to unambiguously
determine exactly which English sentences are definitions of real numbers (see Good1966). That is, there is no way
to describe in a finite number of words how to tell whether an arbitrary English expression is a definition of a real
number. This is not surprising, as the ability to make this determination would also imply the ability to solve the
halting problem and perform any other non-algorithmic calculation that can be described in English.
A similar phenomenon occurs in formalized theories that are able to refer to their own syntax, such as
ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZFC). Say that a formula (x) defines a real number if there is exactly one real
number r such that (r) holds. Then it is not possible to define, in ZFC, the set of all (Gdel numbers of) formulas
that define real numbers. For, if it were possible to define this set, it would be possible to diagonalize over it to
produce a new definition of a real number, following the outline of Richard's paradox above. Note that the set of
formulas which define real numbers may exist, as a set F; the limitation of ZFC is that there is no formula which
defines F without reference to other sets. This is closely related to Tarski's indefinability theorem.
The example of ZFC illustrates the importance of distinguishing the metamathematics of a formal system from the
statements of the formal system itself. The property D() that a formula of ZFC defines a unique real number is
not itself expressible in ZFC, but must be studied in the metatheory used to formalize ZFC. From this viewpoint,
Richard's paradox results from treating a construction in the metatheory (the enumeration of all statements in the
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Richard's paradox
original system that define real numbers) as if that construction could be conducted in the original system.
Variation: Richardian numbers

A variation of the paradox uses integers instead of real-numbers, while preserving the self-referential character of the
original. Consider a language (such as English) in which the arithmetical properties of integers are defined. For
example, "the first natural number" defines the property of being the first natural number, one; and "not divisible by
any natural number other than 1 and itself" defines the property of being a prime number. (It is clear that some
properties cannot be defined explicitly, since every deductive system must start with some axioms. But for the
purposes of this argument, it is assumed that phrases such as "an integer is the sum of two integers" are already
understood.) While the list of all such possible definitions is itself infinite, it is easily seen that each individual
definition is composed of a finite number of words, and therefore also a finite number of characters. Since this is
true, we can order the definitions, first by length of word and then lexicographically (in dictionary order).
Now, we may map each definition to the set of natural numbers, such that the definition with the smallest number of
characters and alphabetical order will correspond to the number 1, the next definition in the series will correspond to
2, and so on. Since each definition is associated with a unique integer, then it is possible that occasionally the integer
assigned to a definition fits that definition. If, for example, the definition "not divisible by any integer other than 1
and itself" happened to be 43rd, then this would be true. Since 43 is itself not divisible by any integer other than 1
and itself, then the number of this definition has the property of the definition itself. However, this may not always
be the case. If the definition: "the first natural number" were assigned to the number 4, then the number of the
definition does not have the property of the definition itself. This latter example will be termed as having the
property of being Richardian. Thus, if a number is Richardian, then the definition corresponding to that number is a
property that the number itself does not have. (More formally, "x is Richardian" is equivalent to "x does not have the
property designated by the defining expression with which x is correlated in the serially ordered set of definitions".)
Now, since the property of being Richardian is itself a numerical property of integers, it belongs in the list of all
definitions of properties. Therefore, the property of being Richardian is assigned some integer, n. Finally, the
paradox becomes: Is n Richardian? Suppose n is Richardian. This is only possible if n does not have the property
designated by the defining expression which n is correlated with. In other words, this means n is not Richardian,
contradicting our assumption. However, if we suppose n is not Richardian, then it does have the defining property
which it corresponds to. This, by definition, means that it is Richardian, again contrary to assumption. Thus, the
statement "n is Richardian" can not consistently be designated as either true or false.
Relation to predicativism
Another viewpoint on Richard's paradox relates to mathematical predicativism. In this view, the real numbers are
defined in stages, with each stage only making reference to previous stages and other things that have already been
defined. From a predicative viewpoint it is not valid to quantify over all real numbers in the process of generating a
new real number, because this is believed to lead to a vicious-circle problem in the definitions. Set theories such as
ZFC are not based on this sort of predicative framework, and allow impredicative definitions.
Richard (1905) presented a solution to the paradox from the viewpoint of predicativisim. Richard claimed that the
flaw in the paradoxical construction was that the expression for the construction of the real number r does not
actually unambiguously define a real number, because the statement refers to the construction of an infinite set of
real numbers, of which r itself is a part. Thus, Richard says, the real number r will not be included as any rn, because
the definition of r does not meet the criteria for being included in the sequence of definitions used to construct the
sequence rn. Contemporary mathematicians agree that the definition of r is invalid, but for a different reason. They
believe the definition of r is invalid because there is no well-defined notion of when an English phrase defines a real
number, and so there is no unambiguous way to construct the sequence rn.
491
Richard's paradox
Although Richard's solution to the paradox did not gain favor with mathematicians, predicativism is an important
part of the study of the foundations of mathematics. Predicativism was first studied in detail by Henri Poincar and
Hermann Weyl in Das Kontinuum, where they showed that much of elementary real analysis can be conducted in a
predicative manner starting with only the natural numbers. More recently, predicativism has been studied by
Solomon Feferman, who has used proof theory to explore the relationship between predicative and impredicative
systems.
References
Fraenkel, Abraham; Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua & Levy, Azriel (1973). Foundations of Set Theory. With the
collaboration of Dirk van Dalen (Second ed.). Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche. ISBN0-7204-2270-1.
Good, I. J. (1966). "A Note on Richard's Paradox". Mind 75 (299): 431. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXV.299.431 [1].
Richard, Jules (1905). Les Principes des Mathmatiques et le Problme des Ensembles. Revue Gnrale des
Sciences Pures et Appliques. Translated in Heijenoort, J. van, ed. (1964). Source Book in Mathematical Logic
1879-1931. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
External links
"Paradoxes and contemporary logic [2]", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
References
[1] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1093%2Fmind%2FLXXV. 299. 431
[2] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ paradoxes-contemporary-logic/
Self-reference
Self-reference occurs in natural or formal languages when a sentence, idea or formula refers to itself. The reference
may be expressed either directlythrough some intermediate sentence or formulaor by means of some encoding.
In philosophy, it also refers to the ability of a subject to speak of or refer to himself, herself, or itself: to have the
kind of thought expressed by the first person nominative singular pronoun, the word "I" in English.
Self-reference is studied and has applications in mathematics, philosophy, computer programming, and linguistics.
Self-referential statements are sometimes paradoxical.
492
Self-reference
493
Usage
An example of a self-referential situation is the one of
self-creation, as the logical organization produces itself the
physical structure which creates itself.Wikipedia:Citation
needed
Self-reference also occurs in literature and film when authors
refer to their own work in the context of the work itself. Famous
examples include Cervantes's Don Quixote, Denis Diderot's
Jacques le fataliste et son matre, Italo Calvino's If on a winter's
night a traveler, many stories by Nikolai Gogol, Lost in the
Funhouse by John Barth, Luigi Pirandello's Six Characters in
Search of an Author, and Federico Fellini's 8 . This is closely
related to the concepts of breaking the fourth wall and
meta-reference, which often involve self-reference.
The surrealist painter Ren Magritte is famous for his
self-referential works. His painting The Treachery of Images,
includes the words this is not a pipe, the truth of which depends
entirely on whether the word "ceci" (in English, "this") refers to
the pipe depictedor to the painting or the sentence itself.
The Ouroboros, a dragon that continually consumes itself,

is used as a symbol for self-reference.Wikipedia:Citation
needed
In computer science, self-reference occurs in reflection, where a program can read or modify its own instructions like
any other data. Numerous programming languages support reflection to some extent with varying degrees of
expressiveness. Additionally, self-reference is seen in recursion (related to the mathematical recurrence relation),
where a code structure refers back to itself during computation.
Examples
In language
See also: Appendix:Autological words
A word that describes itself is called an autological word (or autonym). This generally applies to adjectives, for
example sesquipedalian (i.e. "sesquipedalian" is a sesquipedalian word), but can also apply to other parts of speech,
such as TLA, as a three-letter abbreviation for "three-letter abbreviation", and PHP which is a recursive acronym for
"PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor".Wikipedia:Citation needed
A sentence which inventories its own letters and punctuation marks is called an autogram.
A reflexive sentence has the same subject and object (e.g., "The man washed himself"). In contrast, a transitive
sentence requires the subject and object to be non-identical (e.g., "The man hit John").Wikipedia:Citation needed
There is a special case of meta-sentence in which the content of the sentence in the metalanguage and the content of
the sentence in the object language are the same. Such a sentence is referring to itself. However some meta-sentences
of this type can lead to paradoxes. "This is a sentence." can be considered to be a self-referential meta-sentence
which is obviously true. However "This sentence is false" is a meta-sentence which leads to a self-referential
paradox.Wikipedia:Citation needed
Hofstadter's law, which specifies that "It always takes longer than you expect, even when you take into account
Hofstadter's Law"[1] is an example of a self-referencing adage.
Fumblerules are a list of rules of good grammar and writing, demonstrated through sentences that violate those very
rules, such as "Avoid cliches like the plague" and "Don't use no double negatives". The term was coined in a
Self-reference
published list of such rules by William Safire.Wikipedia:Citation needed
In mathematics
Gdel sentence
Impredicativity
Loop (graph theory)
Tupper's self-referential formula
In literature, film, and popular culture

Main article: Metafiction
Literature
The sub-genre of "recursive science fiction" is now so extensive that it has fostered a fan-maintained bibliography
at the New England Science Fiction Association's website; some of it is about science fiction fandom, some about
science fiction and its authors.[2]
References
Notes
[1] Hofstadter, Douglas. Gdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. 20th anniversary ed., 1999, p. 152. ISBN 0-465-02656-7
[2] "Recursive Science Fiction" (http:/ / www. nesfa. org/ Recursion/ index. htm) New England Science Fiction Association website, last updated
3 August 2008
Bibliography
Hofstadter, D. R. (1980). Gdel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. New York, Vintage Books.
Smullyan, Raymond (1994), Diagonalization and Self-Reference, Oxford Science Publications, ISBN
0-19-853450-7
494
Socratic paradox
495
Socratic paradox
Part of a series on
Socrates
"I know that I know nothing"
Social gadfly Trial of Socrates
Eponymous concepts
Socratic dialogue Socratic method
Socratic questioning Socratic
irony
Socratic paradox Socratic problem
Disciples
Plato Xenophon
Antisthenes Aristippus
Related topics
Megarians Cynicism Cyrenaics
Platonism
Stoicism The Clouds
v
t
e [1]
The phrase "I know that I know nothing" or "I know one thing: that I know nothing" (originally from Latin:
"ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat",[2] a possible paraphrase from a Greek text; also quoted as "scio me nihil scire" or
"scio me nescire";[3] later back-translated to Katharevousa Greek as "[ ] ", [hn oda hti]
oudn oda),[4] sometimes called the Socratic paradox, is a well-known saying that is derived from Plato's account
of the Greek philosopher Socrates.
This saying is also connected and/or conflated with the answer Socrates is said to have received from Pythia, the
oracle of Delphi, in answer to the question "who is the wisest man in Greece?".
In Plato
The saying, though widely attributed to Plato's Socrates in both ancient and modern times, actually occurs nowhere
in Plato's works as is.[5] Two prominent Plato scholars have recently argued that the claim should not be attributed to
Plato's Socrates.[6]
However, in Apology, Plato relates that:[7]
[] , , ,
[This man, on one hand, believes that he knows something, while not knowing (anything). On the other
hand, I equally ignorant do not believe (that I know anything).]
The impreciseness of the paraphrase of this as I know that I know nothing stems from the fact that the author is not
saying that he does not know anything but means instead that one cannot know anything with absolute certainty but
Socratic paradox
can feel confident about certain things.
Chaerephon, a friend of Socrates asked Pythia, the oracle of Delphi: "Is anyone wiser than Socrates?". The answer
was: "No human is wiser". Socrates tried to find someone wiser than himself, since he denied any knowledge, among
politicians, poets, and craftsmen. It appeared that politicians claimed wisdom without knowledge; poets could touch
people with their words, but did not know their meaning; and craftsmen could claim knowledge only in specific and
narrow fields. The interpretation of the Oracle's answer might be Socrates' awareness of his own ignorance.
Socrates also deals with this phrase in Plato's dialogue Meno when he says:[8]
,
, .
[So now I do not know what virtue is; perhaps you knew before you contacted me, but now you are
certainly like one who does not know.] (trans. G.M.A. Grube)
Here, Socrates aims at the change of Meno's opinion, who was a firm believer in his own opinion and whose claim to
knowledge Socrates had disproved.
It is essentially the question that begins "post-Socratic" Western philosophy. Socrates begins all wisdom with
wondering, thus one must begin with admitting one's ignorance.[9] After all, Socrates' dialectic method of teaching
was based on that he as a teacher knew nothing, so he would derive knowledge from his students by dialogue.
There is also a passage by Diogenes Laertius in his work Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers where he lists,
among the things that Socrates used to say:[10] " ", or "that he knew
nothing except that he knew that very fact (i.e. that he knew nothing)."
Again, closer to the quote, there's a passage in Plato's Apology, where Socrates says that after discussing with
someone he started thinking that[11]

, , , ,
,
.
where the translation is roughly:
I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he
knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I
do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do
not know.
Alternative usage
A secondary usage refers to statements of Socrates that seem contrary to common sense, such as that "no one desires
evil"[12] (see Socratic paradoxes).
References
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Socrates& action=edit
[2] "He himself thinks he knows one thing, that he knows nothing"; Cicero, Academica, Book I, section 1 (http:/ / www. perseus. tufts. edu/
hopper/ text?doc=Perseus:text:2007. 01. 0032:book=1).
[3] A variant is found in von Kues, De visione Dei, XIII, 146 (Werke, Walter de Gruyter, 1967, p. 312): "...et hoc scio solum, quia scio me
nescire... [I know alone, that (or because) I know, that I do not know]."
[4] Translatum: The Greek Translation Vortal Topic: All I know is that I know nothing (http:/ / www. translatum. gr/ forum/ index.
php?topic=918. 0)
[5] Gail Fine, "Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing?", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy vol. 35 (2008), pp. 4988.
[6] Fine argues that "it is better not to attribute it to him" ("Does Socrates Claim to Know that He Knows Nothing?", Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy vol. 35 (2008), p. 51). C.C.W. Taylor has argued that the "paradoxical formulation is a clear misreading of Plato" (Socrates,
496
Socratic paradox
Oxford University Press 1998, p. 46).
[7] Plato, Apology 21d.
[8] Plato, Meno 80d13.
[9] I know that I know nothing from a blog view (http:/ / iknowonethingthatiknownothing. blogspot. com/ 2012/ 05/ i-know-that-i-know-nothing.
html)
[10] Diogenes Laertius II.32.
[11] Plato, Apology 21d.
[12] Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol. 1, Oxford University Press 2007, p. 14; Gerasimos Santas, "The Socratic Paradoxes",
Philosophical Review 73 (1964), pp. 14764.
External links
Quotations related to Socrates at Wikiquote
Yablo's paradox
Yablo's paradox is a logical paradox published by Stephen Yablo in 1993 that is similar to the liar paradox. Unlike
the liar paradox, which uses a single sentence, this paradox uses an infinite sequence of statements, each of which
refers to the truth values of the later statements in the sequence. Analysis of the statements shows there is no
consistent way to assign truth values to all the statements, although no statement directly refers to itself.
Paradox and analysis

Yablo's paradox arises from considering the following infinite set of sentences:
(S1): for all k > 1, Sk is false

...
...
The paradox can be analyzed as follows. First, suppose that some statement Si is true. Then it follows from the
statement of Si that every statement later in the sequence is false, and in particular that Si+1 is false. Hence, since Si+1
is false, there is some j>i+1 such that Sj is true. But, because j is also greater than i, this means that Si must have been
false. This is a contradiction, so the original assumption that Si is true must be wrong. Thus Si must be false for every
i. But this means, in particular, that Si is false for every i>1, and thus S1 is true. This is paradoxical, because the
analysis has already shown that S1 cannot be true.
The analysis shows that there is no consistent way to assign truth values to the statements in the paradox. Moreover,
none of the sentences refers to itself, but only to the subsequent sentences; this leads Yablo to claim that his paradox
does not rely on self-reference. However, this claim is disputed.
References
497
498
Vagueness
Absence paradox
The absence paradox, while named a paradox, is more precisely an informal fallacy and humorous misuse of
language which results in the conclusion that "No one is ever present." The statement of the argument is some
formulation of the following:
No person is ever present because he is either not in Rome or alternatively is not in Beijing.
Therefore, he must be somewhere else.
If he is somewhere else he is not here.
The use of this fallacy dates from the 19th century. The fallacy in the argument is that it interprets the relative adverb
"else" in an absolute sense.[1]
References
[1] Bothamley, Dictionary of theories
Bonini's paradox
Bonini's Paradox, named after Stanford business professor Charles Bonini, explains the difficulty in constructing
models or simulations that fully capture the workings of complex systems (such as the human brain).
Statements
In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck "As a model of a
complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more
realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents" (Computer
Simulation of Human Behaviour, 1971).
This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes
have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come.
This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by Paul Valry, "Everything simple is false. Everything which
is complex is unusable." (Notre destin et les lettres, 1937)
Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in
Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically
insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us
even if they could be solved. (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)
Related issues
Bonini's paradox can be seen as a case of the mapterritory relation: simpler maps are less accurate though more
useful representations of the territory. An extreme form is given in the fictional stories Sylvie and Bruno Concluded
and On Exactitude in Science, which imagine a map of a scale of 1:1 (the same size as the territory), which is precise
but unusable, illustrating one extreme of Bonini's paradox. Isaac Asimov's fictional science of "Psychohistory" in his
Foundation series also faces with this dilemma; Asimov even had one of his psychohistorians discuss the paradox.
Bonini's paradox
Selected bibliography
Levins, R. 1966. "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", American Scientist, 54:421-431 [1]
Odenbaugh, Jay. 2006. "The strategy of 'The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology' ", Biology and
Philosophy, 21:607-621. [2]
Orzack S. H., and E. Sober. 1993. A Critical Assessment of Levins's The Strategy of Model Building in
Population Biology. Q. Rev. Biol. 68(4):533-546 [3]
References
[1] http:/ / www. soaziglebihan. org/ 1201-PHL501/ Levins-1966-Model_Building. pdf
[2] http:/ / www. academia. edu/ 1956619/ The_strategy_of_The_strategy_of_model_building_in_population_biology_
[3] http:/ / leml. asu. edu/ jingle/ Web_Pages/ EcoMod_Website/ Readings/ Orzack_Sober_1993. pdf
Code-talker paradox
A code-talker paradox is a situation in which a language prevents communication. As an issue in linguistics, the
paradox raises questions about the fundamental nature of languages. As such, the paradox is a problem in philosophy
of language.
The term code-talker paradox was coined in 2001 by Mark Baker to describe the Navajo code talking used during
World War II. Code talkers are able to create a language mutually intelligible to each other but completely
unintelligible to everyone who does not know the code. This causes a conflict of interests without actually causing
any conflict at all. In the case of Navajo code-talkers, cryptanalysts were unable to decode messages in Navajo, even
when using the most sophisticated methods available. At the same time, the code talkers were able to encrypt and
decrypt messages quickly and easily by translating them into and from Navajo. Thus the code talker paradox refers
to how human languages can be so similar and different at once: so similar that one can learn them both and gain the
ability to translate from one to the other, yet so different that if someone knows one language but does not know
another, it is not always possible to derive the meaning of a text by analyzing it or infer it from the other language.
Baker solves the paradox with the theory of universal grammar. Within universal grammar, there are certain
parameters that are shared by all languages. Languages differ from one another in that a given parameter may have
different settings across languages. The number of possible combinations of parameter settings accounts for the
diversity of human languages, and the fact that every human brain is wired to process the same parameters means
that to learn a new language, the brain simply adapts what it already knows. The brain recognizes the parameters of
the first language to which it was exposed and when it processes a different language, it simply changes the values of
corresponding parameters. Hence human languages vary greatly from one to the other, yet each human has the
theoretical capacity to learn, converse in, and translate to and from, any human language.
References
Baker, Mark C. The Atoms of Language: The Mind's Hidden Rules of Grammar [1]. Basic Books, 2001.
References
[1] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?isbn=0786724560
499
Ship of Theseus
500
Ship of Theseus
This article is about Theseus' Paradox. For the 2013 Indian film, see Ship of Theseus (film).
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v
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e [1]
The ship of Theseus, also known as Theseus' paradox, is a thought experiment that raises the question of whether
an object which has had all its components replaced remains fundamentally the same object. The paradox is most
notably recorded by Plutarch in Life of Theseus from the late 1st century. Plutarch asked whether a ship which was
restored by replacing each and every one of its wooden parts remained the same ship.
The paradox had been discussed by more ancient philosophers such as Heraclitus, Socrates, and Plato prior to
Plutarch's writings; and more recently by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. There are several variants, notably
"grandfather's axe". This thought experiment is "a model for the philosophers"; some say, "it remained the same,"
some saying, "it did not remain the same".[2]
Variations of the paradox

Ancient philosophy
The paradox was first raised in Greek legend as reported by Plutarch,
"The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned from Crete had thirty oars, and was preserved by
the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they
decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, in so much that this ship became a standing
example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship
remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same."
Plutarch,Theseus
Plutarch thus questions whether the ship would remain the same if it were entirely replaced, piece by piece.
Centuries later, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes introduced a further puzzle, wondering: what would happen if the
original planks were gathered up after they were replaced, and used to build a second ship.[3] Which ship, if either, is
the original Ship of Theseus?
Another early variation involves a scenario in which Socrates and Plato exchange the parts of their carriages one by
one until, finally, Socrates's carriage is made up of all the parts of Plato's original carriage and vice versa. The
question is presented if or when they exchanged their carriages.
Ship of Theseus
Enlightenment era
John Locke proposed a scenario regarding a favorite sock that develops a hole. He pondered whether the sock would
still be the same after a patch was applied to the hole, and if it would be the same sock, would it still be the same
sock after a second patch was applied, and a third, etc., until all of the material of the original sock has been replaced
with patches.
George Washington's axe (sometimes "my grandfather's axe") is the subject of an apocryphal story of unknown
origin in which the famous artifact is "still George Washington's axe" despite having had both its head and handle
replaced.
...as in the case of the owner of George Washington's axe which has three times had its handle replaced and
twice had its head replaced!
Ray Broadus Browne,Objects of Special Devotion: Fetishism in Popular Culture, p. 134
This has also been recited as "Abe Lincoln's axe"; Lincoln was well known for his ability with an axe, and axes
associated with his life are held in various museums.
The French equivalent is the story of Jeannot's knife, where the eponymous knife has had its blade changed fifteen
times and its handle fifteen times, but is still the same knife. In someWikipedia:Avoid weasel words
Spanish-speaking countries, Jeannot's knife is present as a proverb, though referred to simply as "the family knife".
The principle, however, remains the same.
In the 1872 story "Dr. Ox's Experiment" by Jules Verne, there is a reference to Jeannot's knife apropos the Van
Tricasse's family. In this family, since 1340, each time one of the spouses died the other remarried with someone
younger, who took the family name. Thus the family can be said to have been a single marriage lasting through
centuries, rather than a series of generations. A similar concept, but involving more than two persons at any given
time, is described in some detail in Robert Heinlein's novel The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress as a line marriage.
Modern day
Writing for ArtReview, Sam Jacob noted that Sugababes, a British band,[4] "were formed in 1998 [..] but one by one
they left, till by September 2009 none of the founders remained in the band; each had been replaced by another
member, just like the planks of Theseuss boat." The three original members reunited in 2011 under the name Mutya
Keisha Siobhan, with the "original" Sugababes still in existence.
In the popular BBC sitcom Only Fools and Horses, Trigger (a roadsweeper) declares he has won an award for
keeping the same broom for 20 years "17 new heads and 14 new handles". This has become known as the
"Trigger's Broom" paradox.
Heraclitus
The Greek philosopher Heraclitus attempted to solve the paradox by introducing the idea of a river where water
replenishes it. Arius Didymus quoted him as saying "upon those who step into the same rivers, different and again
different waters flow".[5] Plutarch disputed Heraclitus' claim about stepping twice into the same river, citing that it
cannot be done because "it scatters and again comes together, and approaches and recedes".
Aristotle's causes
According to the philosophical system of Aristotle and his followers, there are four causes or reasons that describe a
thing; these causes can be analyzed to get to a solution to the paradox. The formal cause or form is the design of a
thing, while the material cause is the matter that the thing is made of. The "what-it-is" of a thing, according to
Aristotle, is its formal cause; so the Ship of Theseus is the same ship, because the formal cause, or design, does not
502
Ship of Theseus
change, even though the matter used to construct it may vary with time. In the same manner, for Heraclitus's
paradox, a river has the same formal cause, although the material cause (the particular water in it) changes with time,
and likewise for the person who steps in the river.
Another of Aristotle's causes is the end or final cause, which is the intended purpose of a thing. The Ship of Theseus
would have the same ends, those being, mythically, transporting Theseus, and politically, convincing the Athenians
that Theseus was once a living person, even though its material cause would change with time. The efficient cause is
how and by whom a thing is made, for example, how artisans fabricate and assemble something; in the case of the
Ship of Theseus, the workers who built the ship in the first place could have used the same tools and techniques to
replace the planks in the ship.
Definitions of "the same"

One common argument found in the philosophical literature is that in the case of Heraclitus' river one is tripped up
by two different definitions of "the same". In one sense things can be "qualitatively identical", by sharing some
properties. In another sense they might be "numerically identical" by being "one". As an example, consider two
different marbles that look identical. They would be qualitatively, but not numerically, identical. A marble can be
numerically identical only to itself.
Note that some languages differentiate between these two forms of identity. In German, for example, "gleich"
("equal") and "selbst" ("self-same") are the pertinent terms, respectively. At least in formal speech, the former refers
to qualitative identity (e.g. die gleiche Murmel, "the same [qualitative] marble") and the latter to numerical identity
(e.g. die selbe Murmel, "the same [numerical] marble"). Colloquially, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably,
however.
Four-dimensionalism
Main article: Perdurantism
Ted Sider and others have proposed that considering objects to extend across time as four-dimensional causal series
of three-dimensional 'time slices' could solve the Ship of Theseus problem because, in taking such an approach, each
time-slice and all four dimensional objects remain numerically identical to themselves while allowing individual
time-slices to differ from each other. The aforementioned river, therefore, comprises different three-dimensional
time-slices of itself while remaining numerically identical to itself across time; one can never step into the same river
time-slice twice, but one can step into the same (four-dimensional) river twice.[6]
Although no unique "correct" way to make these slices exists in special relativity speaking of a "point in time"
extended in space is meaningless any way of slicing will do (including no 'slicing' at all) if observers in all
reference frames see the boundary of the object change in the same way. Special relativity still ensures that "you can
never step into the same river time-slice twice" because even with the ability to change how spacetime is sliced, one
is still moving in a timelike fashion.
503
Ship of Theseus
Essential Element of the thing as the thing per se

Another resolution of this paradox is to designate some element of the thing as the thing itself. For example, in the
case of firearms, the lower receiver is considered to be the firearm in and of itself.[7] Thus, every other part can be
replaced and it would remain the same object; likewise, if only the lower receiver is replaced, the firearm is a
different object, even if the tens of other parts remain the same.
A similar concept would be present in most manufactured goods by looking to what the essential or key part is as
being the item itself. In the case of the axe, the axe head would be the essential element; in the case of an
automobile, the chassis is the key component.
References
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Philosophy_sidebar& action=edit
[2] Rea, M., 1995: "The Problem of Material Constitution," The Philosophical Review, 104: 525-552.
[3] Page 89:The Ship of Theseus (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=2x2I93Ui9i4C& pg=PA89& lpg=PA89& dq=hobbes+ theseus&
source=bl& ots=YOj7nxDdnB& sig=-qrGUti28VPlCWLr8H7AIEwCoXo& hl=en& ei=y1_ZSufEOozIsAPhjKGxCQ& sa=X&
oi=book_result& ct=result& resnum=5& ved=0CBQQ6AEwBA#v=onepage& q=hobbes theseus& f=false), Person and Object: A
Metaphysical Study, By Roderick M. Chisholm - Google Books
[4] Sugababes crown girl group list (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ entertainment/ 6055250. stm)
[5] Didymus, Fr 39.2, Dox. gr. 471.4
[6] David Lewis, "Survival and Identity" in Amelie O. Rorty [ed.] The Identities of Persons (1976; U. of California P.) Reprinted in his
Philosophical Papers I.
[7] http:/ / www. atf. gov/ firearms/ faq/ firearms-technology. html
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Chainstore paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614631271 Contributors: Aaron Brenneman, Agamemnus, Anomalocaris, Bellemonde, Byelf2007, Clubmarx,
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Exchange paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=443884114 Contributors: A2rael, ABaraov, Andeggs, AndrewWTaylor, Anrnusna, AzaToth, Baccyak4H,
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Necktie paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=586657827 Contributors: 18in32, Andeggs, Brookie, CBM, ChrisGualtieri, Dacium, Dmwpowers, Gerhardvalentin,
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SigPig, Tazerdadog, Violetriga, Wafulz, Walthamolian, Xaosflux, Xs935, 28 anonymous edits
Allais paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609798366 Contributors: 3mta3, Acbyram, ArnoldReinhold, Atlastawake, Bahar101, Bender235, Bob Hu, Bobblewik,
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Bertrand paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=588341026 Contributors: Adcock1689, Aftermatt, Alem, AngoraFish, Bender235, BinaryTed, Bunthorne, Byelf2007,
Byronmercury, CRGreathouse, Cretog8, Deville, EnumaElish, GregorB, Henrygb, Kzollman, Mattbrundage, Maurice Carbonaro, Maurreen, Migrant (usurped), Omnipaedista, Pakaran,
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Demographic-economic paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615069604 Contributors: AnonMoos, Ashesat, AtikuX, Auno3, Ausiaso, Awesomebillfromdawsonville,
Bender235, Bianca1975, Bmusician, Brusegadi, Byelf2007, Cherkash, Clare., Cybercobra, Demmo, Denial, EgraS, Emmanuelm, Featherlessbiped, Fumitakamy, G.Tenzing, Geremia, Glloq,
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Dollar auction Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615147284 Contributors: Acroterion, Aliasad, Alta-Snowbird, Bender235, BreakfastJr, Canned Soul, Capricorn42,
Cmdrjameson, Comet Tuttle, Coppertwig, Cretog8, DMCer, Ddstretch, Dejan Jovanovi, DropDeadGorgias, Ejwong, ElectricRay, Ettrig, Fourshade, Happyhappyallhappy!, J.delanoy, Jafeluv,
Jsf80238, Kent Wang, Kzollman, Lambiam, Mauls, Mtjaws, NawlinWiki, Oerjan, OneWeirdDude, Parhamr, Payam prz, Pete.Hurd, Philwelch, Poeticbent, PythonCharmer, R'n'B, Rasmus Faber,
Rufasto, SURIV, Scorpion451, Sebastark, Turkeyphant, Vahe Kharazyan, Volunteer Marek, Whosasking, Xaosflux, 54 anonymous edits
DownsThomson paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=594180519 Contributors: Adityaku, Bdiscoe, Bender235, Byelf2007, DeFacto, Edward, Fratrep, Good Olfactory,
Greglocock, GregorB, Grubel, Javalenok, Mariojalves, Michael Hardy, Mix321, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Rlew234, ScottJ, Sun Creator, 5 anonymous edits
Easterlin paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611806717 Contributors: Aua, BRW, Beland, Benyon3, Bodnotbod, Buergerbeck, Bultro, Byelf2007, CapFerret2011,
Daisystanton, Doremo, Faizan, Faweekee, FrankTobia, GirasoleDE, Gustavocarra, Happyorlucky, HertzaHaeon, JaGa, James Haughton, Jimboss123, John Quiggin, Jsnx, Loudubewe,
Mallexikon, Ofol, Ott2, Piano non troppo, Quanticles, Rich Farmbrough, Seglea, Shawndaviskaw'lya, Sked123, Smohin, Thomasmeeks, Tim bates, Uncle Milty, Volunteer Marek,
Wanderingstan, Widr, YechezkelZilber, 39 anonymous edits
Ellsberg paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612809980 Contributors: 069952497a, 223fms, Anil1956, Animalparty, Arthur Rubin, Avramd, Btyner, Byelf2007,
Capedia, Chealer, Cherkash, Crasshopper, Cretog8, Dratman, Econmath, Eric Forste, Ettrig, Fish and karate, Fool, Francsu, Funandtrvl, Hariraja, Hgmichna, INic, JamesBWatson, Jaysweet,
Jessemerriman, Joerg Reiher, John Newbury, John Quiggin, Joriki, Kzollman, Lambiam, Maurice Carbonaro, Maurreen, Melcombe, Mgiganteus1, Michael Hardy, Mind my edits, Nbarth,
Nhoward, Nicktxw, Nutcracker, OllieFury, Paulginz, Plunge, Polymorph self, Pomme apple apfel ringo, RDBrown, Rainwarrior, Replysixty, RoyalTS, Ruud Binnekamp, Samw, TedPavlic,
Unmet, Volunteer Marek, Xx236, Ybenhaim, Zvika, 65 anonymous edits
Green paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=573315088 Contributors: Arms & Hearts, AxelBoldt, Bearcat, Komischn, Lizia7, Luchame, Pascal666, Svaarder,
Wavelength, 10 anonymous edits
Icarus paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=602515410 Contributors: Attilios, Blanchardb, BlueNovember, Carn, Gerhardvalentin, Intershark, Mannafredo, Miracle Pen,
Paradoctor, Robofish, RockMFR, Tabletop, Wikidemon, Yotwen, 3 anonymous edits
Jevons paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615934319 Contributors: Aetheling, Anrnusna, Ayvengo21, BenKovitz, Bender235, CRGreathouse, Carlossuarez46,
Colonel Tom, Crawfose, Cretog8, Cybercobra, DASonnenfeld, Deflective, Derek Ross, Ehusman, Ernestfax, Finetooth, Flatline, Geoff Houtman, Gob Lofa, Graham87, GreenBobby, Gribeco,
Grundle2600, HGB, Half Sarah, Hooperbloob, Hyad, Jaganath, Jasperdoomen, Javabarbarian, JessieHenshaw, John187, Johnfos, Jonathan Kovaciny, Jrsnbarn, KI9357, Koavf, Ktlynch,
L33tminion, Lawrencekhoo, Lwnf360, Malleus Fatuorum, Mathish, Michael Hardy, Molten tofu, Mr3641, Mrfebruary, Nerfer, Nnemo, Olivcm, Owen, OwenX, P. S. Burton, Papa November,
Pfhenshaw, Phmoreno, Phoenix-forgotten, Premiumxc, Pseudomonas, R'n'B, RGwp9473, Rejs, Richard001, Rjwilmsi, Robinh, Romeconprof, Runarb, Scepticc, Seegoon, Ssri1983, SteinbDJ,
Tedkidd, Tharenthel, Tom Radulovich, Unyoyega, Vsmith, Wolfdog, Zen-master, 93 anonymous edits
Leontief paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=598975785 Contributors: A8UDI, Anita234, Armbrust, Bender235, Bkwillwm, Carlos3659, Charles Matthews, Creet,
Demi, Dylan Lake, Epicgenius, FrankTobia, Haeinous, Jeffrey Mall, John wesley, Katharineamy, Paradoctor, Rjwilmsi, Schi, Tree Biting Conspiracy, Verne Equinox, Vinograd19, Volunteer
Marek, Waseem7, Wolfgang Ihloff, Wragge, Wtmitchell, Zaledin, 30 anonymous edits
Lucas paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=584000662 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Buldri, Delirium, Harry, Headbomb, J.howard251, Jonkerz, Khazar, Lachambre,
Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Perceval, Smarton2346, Thinking of England, Vroman, 7 anonymous edits
Metzler paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=602020307 Contributors: Bastin, Bender235, Grochim, L Kensington, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Themightyrambo, 1
anonymous edits
Paradox of thrift Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=605181253 Contributors: AaronSw, Androidodnetnin, Angloguy, AnonMoos, Arthena, Arto B, BR1975, Beacon515L,
Billcourtney, Blah99, Boleyn, Byelf2007, Charles Matthews, Cretog8, Crosbiesmith, Cybercobra, Dark Charles, Demosta, Edward, Ewlyahoocom, Farcaster, Gary, Gugganij, Henrygb, Hroulf,
Isaac Dupree, Jarble, Jimmy.himmy.jh, John D Erickson, Johngelles, Kkmurray, LenBudney, Ligulem, Mansoorkhan114, Maurreen, Meco, MiNombreDeGuerra, Mnemeson, Mrmuk, Nbarth,
Nunquam Dormio, Oneeyedguide, Oparadoha, Paradoxsociety, PaulHanson, Pearle, Pfalstad, Philafrenzy, Reagle, Reinyday, Renaissance Man, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwrobel, SPECIFICO,
Samswit, Scott Burley, ShaunMacPherson, Shinjodenn, Straw Cat, Surturz, That Guy, From That Show!, The Anome, Trbdavies, Vonkje, Woundedknight, Yakushima, Yoctobarryc, 56
anonymous edits
Paradox of value Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=606607957 Contributors: Alienus, Anarcho-capitalism, AnaxMcShane, Andeggs, Arvand, Bgwhite, BrokenSegue, Bronx
Discount Liquor, Byelf2007, Crosbiesmith, DBigXray, Dullfig, Dylan Lake, Economizer, Elm, Forich, Hibernian, Jack Upland, Jeff3000, Jgoard, Joe54897415, John Quiggin, Julia Rossi,
506

Karada, LaszloWalrus, LenBudney, Magioladitis, Mais oui!, Ministry of random walks, Nikodemos, Nirakka, Originalwana, Peter Grey, Que, R'n'B, Red Deathy, Reinyday, Renaissance Man,
Rjwilmsi, Smyth, Sonjaaa, Spencerk, Talented Mr Miller, That Guy, From That Show!, TheIndividualist, Tld9630437, Tony1, Txomin, Ultramarine, Weaklygodlike, ZantTrang, ed, .,
71 anonymous edits
Productivity paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=605988453 Contributors: Alansohn, Bender235, Bequw, BritAc, Byelf2007, CRGreathouse, Caiaffa, Chris the speller,
ChrisGualtieri, Cybercobra, Dani.gomezdp, Giftlite, Gioto, Gmelli, Grillo, Hmains, JLaTondre, Jarble, Jbiasutti, Jbrowning100, Jgrinste, John Quiggin, JohnCD, Jonesey95, KHLehmann, Kesla,
Mandarax, MaxEnt, Michael Hardy, Mirroredlens, Miss Madeline, Mnyaseen, Mushroom, Niceguyedc, Phmoreno, Protonk, Radagast83, Rainwarrior, Rich Farmbrough, Robma, Saibo, Sepsaar,
Subsume, TimBentley, Tuntable, Vipul, Wferranini, Whosasking, Yakushima, Yorambauman, 49 anonymous edits
St. Petersburg paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614666890 Contributors: Aaron Schulz, Ais523, Albmont, Altenmann, ArnoldReinhold, Astronautics, Atia2,
Avraham, AxelBoldt, BRW, Barticus88, BenFrantzDale, Bfinn, Bhugh, Binesh@hex21.com, Bkell, Blapaul3, Blotwell, Byelf2007, CaAl, Cablehorn, Calculust, Ceouk, Chancemill, Chealer,
Chris3145, Ciphergoth, Clathe, Cretog8, Curps, Cutler, Cyan, Cybercobra, Db099221, Delmorebarry, Demonsquirrel, Dennbruce, Destynova, DimaDorfman, Dmitry123456, Dominus,
DropDeadGorgias, EAKugler, Eaglizard, Eebster the Great, Enisbayramoglu, Fioravante Patrone en, FoxyOrange, FrankTobia, Gerry D, Ghirlandajo, Giftlite, Ginsuloft, Hans Adler, Hunter 152,
Hve, INic, Indosauros, J04n, Jasper, Jeffq, Jick, Jnestorius, Joshua Issac, K kisses, KEK, Karada, Karl-Henner, Knights who say ni, Lambiam, Landroni, LlywelynII, Madmardigan53, Matchups,
Mathboy1, Matt Crypto, McGeddon, Melchoir, Melcombe, Mhartl, Michael Hardy, Midiangr, Milandesai, Nabav, Nbarth, Noisy, Nutcracker, Nybbles, OHmanEARTHBOUND, Paul Stansifer,
Peregrine981, PhilBradley, Philopedia, Pokipsy76, Qblik, Quiddity, Reddevil0728, Reddi, Remy B, Reywas92, Rickhev1, Rieger, Rjwilmsi, Root4(one), Ross Fraser, Rundquist, Ruud
Binnekamp, SCMore, SS2005, Sadanand Kasargod, Scottkosty, Slaghoople, SlamDiego, Slawekb, Smith609, Smyth, Soler97, Spoon!, StAnselm, Studboro, TaisukeMaekawa,
TheGhostOfAdrianMineha, ThomasNichols, Tony1, Tweetlebeetle367, Unyoyega, Westsider, WestwoodMatt, Xiaoshan Math, Zaslav, Zigswatson, 140 anonymous edits
All horses are the same color Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=605573413 Contributors: A.K.A.47, Action Jackson IV, Andeggs, Angr, Arctic-Editor, Arvindn, Autiger,
AxelBoldt, Bmorton3, Breed Zona, CBM, Chameleon, Dan East, David Eppstein, Dhanak, Dracon viceroy, Duoduoduo, Elwikipedista, Fafnir1, Gazpacho, Giftlite, Gwern, Hairy Dude, Hi878,
Hyad, Hyphz, Imasleepviking, JRM, JVPiano, Jao, Jitse Niesen, Josh Parris, Kaibutsu, Karada, Keahapana, Khendon, Klemen Kocjancic, Koavf, MartinHarper, Mets501, Michael Hardy,
Monkeysyodel, Namin, Oleg Alexandrov, Paddu, Paradoctor, Perey, Prosfilaes, Reedy, Rich Farmbrough, Ryan Prior, SimonP, Sjakkalle, Smyth, Sonett72, SonicBlue, Staszek Lem, TexasDex,
Wikimedes, 62 anonymous edits
Barbershop paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611701615 Contributors: 84user, AManWithNoPlan, Aaron Kauppi, Alexrexpvt, Anomalocaris, BRW, Banno,
Bender235, BreakfastJr, Byelf2007, Callowschoolboy, ChKa, Darkspartan4121, Dee-Dee, DrDentz, E1st3in, Ettrig, F.contesi, Faizan, Flipping Mackerel, Fratrep, Furrykef, Gregbard,
HeirToPendragon, Hyphz, Keenan Pepper, Lesnail, MJPotsy, Mumiemonstret, Paradoctor, RJFJR, Radgeek, Robertd, Shepherdsona, Slaporte, Smidragon, Syzygy, Tmhand, William Avery, 43
anonymous edits
Carroll's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615101389 Contributors: AndrewWTaylor, Charles Matthews, Cmdrjameson, Davilla, Dbenbenn, Dromioofephesus,
Fgegypt, Iswyn, Light current, Melchoir, Paradoctor, Robinh, Unara, Venny85, 17 anonymous edits
Crocodile Dilemma Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=527109025 Contributors: Afa86, Afterlife120, Alsims, AndrewKeenanRichardson, Anonymous Dissident, Avicennasis,
Awaniko, Gregbard, Hm29168, Mattg82, McKaot, Paradoctor, Primergrey, Recognizance, Vicki Reitta, , 25 anonymous edits
Drinker paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615290231 Contributors: 9mjb, Acid Ammo, Andeggs, Andreschulz, AndrewWTaylor, Anguis, Anna Lincoln,
Anomalocaris, BRW, Bearcat, Bonniemylove, Byelf2007, CRGreathouse, Chris3145, Dmcq, ESnyder2, Eubulide, Gregbard, Groupuscule, JRSpriggs, Jamesrmeyer, Jaxad0127, John Moore 309,
John of Reading, Kaustuv, Kernsters, Koavf, Leonbloy, Malcolma, Michael Hardy, Miquonranger03, Paradoctor, Phil Boswell, Qwerty Binary, RJHall, Robertd, Sawomir Biay, TJRC, Tijfo098,
Tinkinswood, Tkuvho, Tonywalton, Zickzack, 54 anonymous edits
Infinite regress Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=594104145 Contributors: AManWithNoPlan, AdamDeanHall, Ahruman, Airbag190, Banno, Bart Versieck, Blainster,
Bulwersator, Byelf2007, ChrisGualtieri, Coelacan, Dale Hay, DeepSkyFrontier, Doctorfluffy, Dragon's Blood, E235, Emufarmers, GVOLTT, Gennaro Prota, Gregbard, Hans Adler, Hdeasy,
Howcheng, Iketsi, Machine Elf 1735, Meco, Mgiganteus1, Michael Hardy, Monterey Bay, Ms2ger, NSLE, Neelix, Primergrey, Quajafrie, Randian, Robnpov, Scott12837, Singularity42,
StAnselm, Thebestofall007, Tomisti, Urthogie, Was a bee, Wbm1058, Winston Spencer, Wireless Keyboard, 57 anonymous edits
Lottery paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=582780667 Contributors: 5thfloorlattimore, Andeggs, Bbik, Bjenks, Brizimm, Byelf2007, Deleet, Doctorem, Dominus,
Drowne, EENola, Exteray, Gregbard, Heqwm, Jaymay, Kyle1278, Michael Hardy, Paradoctor, SigPig, The Anome, The Haunted Angel, Tom Morris, 28 anonymous edits
Paradoxes of material implication Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=583814051 Contributors: 7&6=thirteen, Alansohn, Andy Fugard, Arthur Rubin, Ben Standeven, Chalst,
ChrisGualtieri, Cwchng, Cybercobra, Danust, Dhanyavaada, EmilJ, Faustnh, Gregbard, Haifromb, Howard Landman, IncidentalPoint, Kwamikagami, PWilkinson, Paradoctor, Phiwum, Policron,
Pragmaknowledge, Pyrospirit, Ruy thompson, Soler97, Xodarap00, 38 anonymous edits
Raven paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611259965 Contributors: 130.94.122.xxx, AceMyth, Ambuj.Saxena, Amnond, Andeggs, Andres, Anonymous Dissident,
Antonio Prates, Axlrosen, Banno, Bender235, Berserkerus, Billjefferys, Bolddeciever, Brion VIBBER, Byelf2007, Cesiumfrog, Craig Baker, Cyan, DAGwyn, Danielkwalsh, DavidLevinson,
Dawdler, Deleet, Deor, Derek Ross, Download, Drew R. Smith, Elano, Enochlau, Fadeblue, Geekdiva, Giftlite, Gregbard, GregorB, Groupuscule, Guppyfinsoup, Gwern, Hyphz, Ian Moody, Itai,
Jamankowitz, JeremyA, Jimmy Pitt, Jochen Burghardt, Jonathandubois, Josephshanak, Karada, Kevin Saff, Koutheir, LC, Lab-oratory, Latexallergy, Liface, Mabisa, McGeddon, Mouzie, Mungo
Kitsch, Mysticyx, Pagrashtak, Paradoctor, Pichpich, PierreAbbat, Porcher, Radar Holds, Red Slash, Reftext, Reywas92, Rjwilmsi, Rlpowell, Robkinyon, STyx, SamuelScarano, Sceptre,
SchreiberBike, Sioraf, Snoyes, Sophia100, Storkk, Swaq, Swpb, TJRC, Tagriro, Tarotcards, Taw, Tbvdm, Timo Honkasalo, Tktktk, Turkeyphant, Unyoyega, Vanished user oij8h435jweih3,
Whitehawk julie, Wik, Xanthoxyl, , 85 anonymous edits
Unexpected hanging paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611543144 Contributors: Action Jackson IV, Andeggs, Anomalocaris, Anonymous Dissident, Arichnad,
AxelBoldt, Axl, Barticus88, Bender235, Bfinn, Billgordon1099, BradBeattie, Bryan Derksen, Burn, Byelf2007, Caulde, Charles Matthews, Chryzoumas, Conical Johnson, Cralize, DVdm,
Dah31, Danger, Daveofthenewcity, Dfeldmann, Dipakgoyal, Dogah, Drz, Dusk Orchestra, EdJohnston, Edderiofer, Em3ryguy, Eric119, Ettrig, Falcor84, GGano, Ghost420, Giftlite, Gioto, Hetar,
Hyphz, I Enjoy Commenting, Iae, Ihope127, Ilya Voyager, J heisenberg, Jengod, Jmackaerospace, Jnestorius, Joefromrandb, Juror 8, Justdig, JustinRosenstein, Kaaphi, Karada, Keenan Pepper,
Khromegnome, Kmhkmh, LC, Laurusnobilis, Lawrencekhoo, Lee Daniel Crocker, LittleDan, LunaticFringe, MBlume, Macaddct1984, Maelin, Magnus, Marudubshinki, Mgiganteus1, Nabav,
Nairobiny, Nalvage, Nasser Ali Khan, Nathan Ladd, Nehrams2020, Ningauble, NoahTye, Nortexoid, Oli Filth, OneWeirdDude, Ordinary Person, Paradoctor, Pokipsy76, Quendus, Ravikiran r,
Reil, Reyemile, Reywas92, Rich Farmbrough, Ripounet, Rjwilmsi, Robinh, Sahityapremi, Seb az86556, SimenH, Simetrical, SiobhanHansa, Stoive, Tabletop, Texture, The Earwig,
Thefightmaster, Tim Retout, Tregoweth, Unyoyega, Vibritannia, Wik, Wilfried Elmenreich, Woggly, Zfishwiki, Zhu rongji, 174 anonymous edits
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612315272 Contributors: AATroop, Aaron Kauppi, Accelerometer, Ace Frahm, Ahoerstemeier, Alan
Canon, Aleph4, Algorithm, Andeggs, AnonMoos, AugPi, AxelBoldt, Bawm79, BenRG, BreakfastJr, Byelf2007, Cfortunato, Charles Matthews, Cognita, Cretog8, Czrisher, David Shay, DrDentz,
Dromioofephesus, Enchanter, Everyking, Favonian, Floorsheim, Gregbard, Hans Adler, Hisarmwasherleg, JPG-GR, Jenks24, KSchutte, Llygadebrill, Magnus Manske, Mais oui!, Marc Venot,
MeekSaffron, Mikemoral, Narayan, Necocco123, Ohconfucius, Paolo Lipparini, Paul Stansifer, Porcher, Pyrosim, Radgeek, Rxtreme, Ryguasu, Saric, Savant1984, Sun Creator, Superm401,
TKD, ThirdParty, Tim!, Toby Bartels, TriniMuoz, Wbm1058, Wikiain, Zafar142003, , 52 anonymous edits
Accuracy paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=461158461 Contributors: Balloonguy, Charles Matthews, Den fjttrade ankan, Keenan Pepper, MartinZwirlein,
Melcombe, Nick Number, Paradoctor, R'n'B, Ralf Klinkenberg, SimonP, Sledgeas, Tilmann, YK Times, Zvika, 4 anonymous edits
Apportionment paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611416353 Contributors: Ahkond, Akriasas, Andre Engels, Arvindn, BalCoder, Byelf2007, CRGreathouse, Chick
Bowen, Digitat, Dissident, Doradus, Dthomsen8, Efenna, Eksortso, Foofighter20x, GoldRingChip, Hirudo, Jnestorius, Karada, Lincolnite, Lord Don-Jam, Mdotley, Michael Hardy, PhilipMW,
Profeshermyguad, Quidam65, Reywas92, Rumping, Run!, TAnthony, Tamfang, Tklalmighty, Whosasking, 14 anonymous edits
BanachTarski paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614370198 Contributors: 213.253.39.xxx, ABCD, Adavidb, Aetheling, Aizenr, Altenmann, Amirki, Andres,
Andrewbadr, Andrewbt, Andrey Petrov, Ankurdave, Arcfrk, ArnoldReinhold, Arthena, Arthur Rubin, Auric, AxelBoldt, Bdesham, Bender235, BeteNoir, Blindgrapefruit2, Byelf2007,
Bytesmythe, C S, CBM, Cconnett, Cdibuduo, Chalst, Charles Matthews, Chiqago, Conversion script, Crasshopper, Creolteno, Curps, Damian Yerrick, Danie Tei, David Eppstein, Dbenbenn,
Dcoetzee, Dogah, Doncram, Dori, DrIdiot, Dreadstar, Dysprosia, Earthengine, Eclecticos, El C, Electriccatfish2, Enonx1, Eric Kvaalen, Eric119, Fropuff, Fubar Obfusco, GVKKKK,
Gadykozma, Gaius Cornelius, Gandalf61, Garygoh884, Gazpacho, Giftlite, Gigacephalus, Gogobera, Graham87, Grayscale, Grouchy Chris, Gryllida, Headbomb, Hydraton31, Hypercubist,
IceKarma, Ilya (usurped), J.Gowers, Jaan Vajakas, Jacj, JanBielawski, Jason.grossman, Joe Decker, John Cross, John Newbury, Jon Awbrey, Joriki, Jose Brox, JuPitEer, KSchutte, Karada, Karl
Palmen, Kocio, Kylemcinnes, Lambiam, LeaveSleaves, Likebox, Loisel, Lowellian, Lupin, Lysdexia, Lysy, M a s, MK8, Maechler, MarSch, Mark viking, MathMartin, Mauricebench, Mct mht,
Mekong Bluesman, Michael Hardy, Michael Slone, Neithan Agarwaen, Nigellwh, Nihonjoe, Nnemo, Ohconfucius, Ott2, Pastafarianist, Patrick, Paul August, Perstar, Peruvianllama, Pfortuny,
Phiszle, Pleasantville, Point-set topologist, Psychonaut, Pugiator, RDBury, Randomblue, Redplain, Revelation60, Rgdboer, Rjwilmsi, Roadrunner, Robert K S, Rogerbrent, Ross Fraser,
Safehaven86, Schmock, SchreiberBike, Shakeer, Shanth phy, Sir Dagon, Slawekb, Stevenj, Suisui, Taxman, TechnoFaye, Teorth, Tetracube, Thorne, Timrollpickering, Timwi, Tkuvho, Tobias
507

Bergemann, Toby Bartels, Tosha, Trlkly, Trovatore, Trumpet marietta 45750, Twilsonb, Ubershmekel, Ukexpat, V35b, Vanished User 0001, Vargenau, Villarinho, Warren Dew, Xnn, YohanN7,
Ytr3wq, Zaslav, Zundark, Zyqqh, 175 anonymous edits
Berkson's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611662936 Contributors: Alexjohnc3, Baddstats, Cajolingwilhelm, Charles Matthews, Cherkash, Corvette3791, Den
fjttrade ankan, Eclecticos, Edward, Giftlite, Henrygb, Lou.weird, MathewTownsend, Melcombe, Nbarth, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Pseudomonas, Rumping, The Anome, 10 anonymous edits
Bertrand's box paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615859187 Contributors: -sebi-, 2toon2fast, APipoProduction, Ameerr, Antaeus Feldspar, Arno Matthias, Arrkhal,
Bkell, Brighterorange, Brookie, Calebegg, D'Agosta, DRosenbach, Dcoetzee, Diblidabliduu, Ekantis, Flying Hamster, Gerhardvalentin, Gill110951, GregorB, Headbomb, IanOfNorwich,
J.delanoy, JeffJor, Johnbibby, Koolabsol, Loadmaster, Marc van Leeuwen, Matt Deres, Maurice Carbonaro, McGeddon, Melchoir, Menschenfresser, Mogism, NameIsRon, Oleykin, Open4D,
Petersburg, Phiwum, Pmanderson, PoqVaUSA, Pushpendra singh yadav, Qwertyus, Rafi Neal, Shadowjams, Shorelander, TheHYPO, Vieque, Vir4030, 48 anonymous edits
Bertrand paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=610185470 Contributors: Altes, BenFrantzDale, Blotwell, Brookie, Classicalecon, Cybercobra, DMY, Davilla, Doradus,
EdC, False vacuum, Felix Hoffmann, Giftlite, GrahamN, Greedohun, GregorB, Hanspi, Headbomb, INic, InverseHypercube, Jason Quinn, Jimbowley, Kaksikolme, Martynas Patasius, Michael
Hardy, MrVoluntarist, Noe, Pmanderson, Qwfp, Rjwilmsi, Run!, STyx, Sakurambo, SamuelRiv, Sandgem Addict, Saxbryn, Tardis, The Anome, TheSeven, Timecop, Tired time, Tomixdf, Wile
E. Heresiarch, Yardcock, Zbypa, 29 anonymous edits
Birthday problem Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615560739 Contributors: Aberdeen01, Ae7flux, Agricola44, Alansohn, Ale And Quail, AlistairMcMillan, Alorkoi,
Ams80, AnOddShaman, Andrew Maiman, Andries, AngelOfSadness, Arbitrarily0, Arc-, Army1987, Arnoldlcl, Arpingstone, Arugia, Arvindn, Ascnder, Asmeurer, Audiovideo, Avoided,
AxelBoldt, BasinField, Batmanand, Bdoserror, Bhadani, Binary TSO, Binksternet, Bkell, Blodhgarm14, Bneely, Boredzo, Calebegg, Callidior, Calmer Waters, Can't sleep, clown will eat me,
Centrx, Chaddasaurus, Charterhouse, Chutzpan, Coladie, Comatose51, Constructive editor, Coreyemotela, Crd721, Cretog8, Csayfie, Daniel Quinlan, DarkToonLink, Darkstar949, Darkwind,
David Biddulph, David Brink, David Joffe, DavidFarmbrough, Dcoetzee, Dean Wormer, Deathawk, Dewritech, Dhanak, Diannaa, Djmitche, Dkasak, Don Quixote de la Mancha, Dorftrottel,
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Wikedcoder, Wolfram.Tungsten, Wtmitchell, Wzwz, Yahoolian, Ytfc23, Zudduz, Zundark, 657 anonymous edits
BorelKolmogorov paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=593301539 Contributors: 3mta3, Angela, Citrus Lover, Coffee2theorems, Cyan, Davilla, Dylan Thurston,
Eclecticos, Giftlite, Hammerite, Headbomb, Henrygb, Jmath666, Jonzim, Karada, Lenthe, Limit-theorem, Lunch, Michael Hardy, Oleg Alexandrov, Pfbenner, Quadell, RockMagnetist, Solarapex,
Trovatore, 35 anonymous edits
Boy or Girl paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=593314010 Contributors: 12barberjem, ASmartKid, AaRH, Abhilasha369, Acarina331, AceMyth, Afa86,
Alexb@cut-the-knot.com, Ameerr, Andreba, Andrewrp, AndyBloch, AnmaFinotera, AnonMoos, ArielGold, Arosa, Arthur Rubin, Averykins, Axcelis555, BD2412, Baccyak4H, Beamathan,
Bfinn, BillFlis, Blotwell, Bn, Byelf2007, Chocolateboy, Chris the speller, CombinationPermutation, Createangelos, Cretog8, Cronholm144, Crossmr, Diego Moya, Dorftrottel, DreamGuy,
EdJohnston, Erdnuess, Fitzburgh, Flyer22, Fmagnet19, Fnielsen, Fox Walker, G Colyer, Gill110951, Graham87, GroveGuy, Gryftir, Hgilbert, Hurricane111, INic, Illia Connell, Inklingstar, It Is
Me Here, Italus, J4V4, JDHeinzmann, Jac16888, JeffJor, JesseRafe, Jimmyeatskids, Jingyu.cui, Johntex, Jon513, JosephSharif, Josephers, Jovianeye, KConWiki, KevYale, Kunal6dl, Lambiam,
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Versus22, Wavelength, Wickethewok, WikiZorro, X-Fi6, Xoloz, Z9z8z7, 177 anonymous edits
Burali-Forti paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=607973341 Contributors: Aarondude919, Albmont, Apokrif, Arthena, Austinmohr, Blotwell, Charles Matthews,
Chinju, Dysprosia, Elias, Fibonacci, GregorB, HannsEwald, Herbee, JamesBWatson, JoshuaZ, Karada, Kismalac, Klemen Kocjancic, MathMartin, Mellum, Mets501, Mhss, Michael Hardy,
Patrick, R.e.b., Randall Holmes, Rgdboer, Set theorist, Spayrard, Tony1, Tulkolahten, VladimirReshetnikov, 22 anonymous edits
Cantor's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614425547 Contributors: Albmont, Bkell, Blotwell, CBM, CRGreathouse, Charles Matthews, Chinju, Cybercobra, Ft1,
Gaussgauss, Geicocouldsave, Giftlite, Hairy Dude, Know-edu, KyleGJoseph, Lethe, Lorenzo Traldi, Lyondif02, Mets501, Mhss, Oleg Alexandrov, Phyte, Ryan Reich, Tetracube, Tkuvho,
Trovatore, Twp, 27 anonymous edits
Coastline paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615631659 Contributors: Andrew Rodland, Ariel C.M.K., Avala, Blotwell, Byelf2007, CBM, CRGreathouse, Cgingold,
Chrislk02, Cntras, Cobaltcigs, Cryptic C62, Euthydemos, Gilliam, Goethean, Good Wolf, Groupuscule, Hmains, Hogne, Hosszuka, InverseHypercube, Jarble, Kane5187, Karada, Michael Hardy,
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Wwwwolf, 34 ,. anonymous edits
Cramer's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609805360 Contributors: Encyclops, Gareth Jones, Giftlite, HannsEwald, Hyacinth, ILikeThings, JP.Martin-Flatin,
JmCor, Mghomi, Michael Hardy, Myasuda, RDBury, Ssola, , 6 anonymous edits
Elevator paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=604254910 Contributors: A.Ward, Aaronbrick, Abscissa, Alan Peakall, Anthony Appleyard, Bequw, BigglesPiP,
Brettpim, CBM, Charles Merriam, Citicat, DH85868993, Davilla, Finlay McWalter, Giftlite, Graham87, Gregknicholson, Grendelkhan, Hopfrog, Id711, Inferno, Johnleemk, Kappa, Karada,
Lemon-s, Michael Hardy, MisterMorgan, Nbarth, NoSalt, OleMaster, Pakaran, Pigsonthewing, QuiteUnusual, R'n'B, Shreevatsa, Stavia, The Anome, TheHorseCollector, TheSku, Toobaz, 15
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False positive paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612470860 Contributors: Cmglee, Codeh, Craigacp, Curb Chain, Cybercobra, Dqd, Dragice, EoGuy, I dream of
horses, Illia Connell, Jeodesic, John of Reading, LilHelpa, Melcombe, Michael Hardy, Ocaasi, Paradoctor, Pashute, Perey, Pinethicket, Remember, Rjwilmsi, Scratchdawg, Sriharsh1234, Wragge,
44 anonymous edits
Gabriel's Horn Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614964131 Contributors: Ackasa, Alex Peppe, AndrewWTaylor, Andrewman327, Anonymous Dissident, Audiovideo,
Axxonnfire, BCKILLa, Badseed, Bdesham, BitJam, Booyah 007, Bt8257, Burn, Byelf2007, C S, Calle, Carnildo, Cdion, Charles Matthews, ChrisGualtieri, Comrade009, Corwin8, Corydalus,
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Goldencako, Good Olfactory, Gordon Panther, Hamiltondaniel, Henrygb, Hitman012, HitroMilanese, Hyacinth, Ixfd64, Jerry Pepsi, Jerzy, Jfmantis, Jimw338, Jludwig, JohnDevin15,
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Toon81, Yakovy, Yworo, Zain Ebrahim111, Zureks, 105 anonymous edits
Galileo's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=605116551 Contributors: Andeggs, Ascidian, Asztal, Biscuittin, CBM, Charles Matthews, Dandrake, DavidLeighEllis,
Dogah, Dominus, Dysprosia, Ejosse1, Elizium23, Furrykef, Grutness, Halmstad, Jeffq, JerroldPease-Atlanta, Jochen Burghardt, Liempt, Michael Hardy, Nk, Oleg Alexandrov, Paradoctor,
Quantpole, Scientific29, Simple Symbol, StAnselm, The Anome, TheLaeg, Thue, William M. Connolley, 39 anonymous edits
Gambler's fallacy Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613778614 Contributors: 2004-12-29T22:45Z, 2005, AKGhetto, Aaron Kauppi, Acire93, Alex W, AlexanderM, Alksub,
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Rosenzweig, Vonbontee, Waleswatcher, Wolfkeeper, Woodstone, Wotnow, Wrp103, Xanzzibar, 211 anonymous edits
Gdel's incompleteness theorems Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614971718 Contributors: .mau., 136.206.42.xxx, 4pq1injbok, 9258fahsflkh917fas, APH,
ASKingquestions, Aatu, Abecedare, Ad88110, Ademh, Admiral Norton, Ajoykt, Aleph4, AmirOnWiki, Amoss, Ancheta Wis, Andre Engels, Andrewjameskirk, Andris, AndySimpson, Andycjp,
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CRGreathouse, Cacycle, Cal 1234, Camembert, CaptinJohn, CasualUser1729, CeilingCrash, Celendin, CesarB, Chalst, Charles Matthews, Charles Moss, Chenyu, Chinju, Chris the speller,
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Germanium, Giftlite, Gioto, Graham87, Gregbard, Grover cleveland, Guruparan18, H.ehsaan, Hairy Dude, Hakeem.gadi, Hans Adler, HarmonicSphere, Harri jensen, Harttwood47, Headbomb,
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Jimpaz, Joao, JoeBruno, Joegoodbud, John wesley, Joseaperez, Joseph Solis in Australia, Jrtayloriv, Juustensson, K95, KSmrq, Karl Dickman, Kborer, Keenan Pepper, Kevin Gorman, Khalid
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SpuriousQ, Srnec, Stan the fisher, Standardfact, Steel, Suisui, Sun Creator, Sundar, Sysy, TXlogic, TakuyaMurata, Tamalet, Tarquin, Tedickey, Tesi1700, The Anome, The Rhymesmith, Third
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Wfructose, Wikid, Wikiwikifast, WoodenTaco, Wtmitchell, Wvbailey, Xamce, Xelloss, YohanN7, Yousou, Ytcracker, Zchenyu, Zero sharp, Zeus000000, jlfr, , 592 ,.
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Interesting number paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614564218 Contributors: 28bytes, A:-)Brunu, Aaron Rotenberg, Adavis444, AgentSteel, Alexbbrown,
Altenmann, Anonymous Dissident, Anthony, Anythingapplied, Arichnad, Arvindn, Bender235, Bevo, Byelf2007, C S, CRGreathouse, Charles Matthews, CharlesC, Chi Sigma, Colapeninsula,
Crisco 1492, Cyde, Decora, Derek farn, Dfranke, Dionyziz, Dirac1933, Djfiander, Dominus, Dr bab, Dwarf Kirlston, Eequor, Epicgenius, Evano1van, EverGreg, Fredrik, Fuhghettaboutit,
Geeoharee, Gejyspa, George8211, Giftlite, Gypsydoctor, Infovoria, Iph, Isomorphic, Jackson, JamesBWatson, Jim Henry, Jimp, Jjamison, Joefromrandb, JohnBlackburne, Jokes Free4Me,
JokeySmurf, Jorend, Joriki, Jre, Kaid100, Kingdon, LandruBek, Laurusnobilis, Marek69, Matt Gies, Mattbuck, Melchoir, Michael Hardy, Michael Slone, Michgrig, Mike Young, Noe,
Personman, Pichote, Pmanderson, RMFan1, Rasmus Faber, Red Slash, Rich Farmbrough, Rick Block, Robofish, Rursus, S0rC3r3r, SDaniel, Sade, Samohyl Jan, Sandover, Sarregouset,
SimonTrew, Sjorford, Slashme, Soap, Sverdrup, Sysy, Tbjablin, Template namespace initialisation script, Thatguyflint, The Anome, The Cunctator, Thrashbarg, Timwi, Trivialist, Twilsonb, Wik,
Worrydream, Zero sharp, , 52 anonymous edits
KleeneRosser paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=608852231 Contributors: Beland, Bender235, C. A. Russell, CBM, CapitalSasha, Daniel5Ko, DmitriyZotikov,
Dorftrottel, Falcor84, Jochen Burghardt, Lambiam, Leonard G., Linas, Marc van Leeuwen, Michael Hardy, Mike Schwartz, Neuralwarp, Paradoctor, Pcap, Rich Farmbrough, Seanmclaughlin,
Spug, William Avery, Zero sharp, 17 anonymous edits
Lindley's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=603329695 Contributors: 3mta3, BYS2, ChangChienFu, Coffee2theorems, Den fjttrade ankan, Dycotiles, Edward,
Itinerant1, John of Reading, Linas, Magioladitis, Melcombe, Michael Hardy, Pat5547, Pmineault, SvartMan, The Anome, ThouisJones, Whosasking, Yunjiangster, 34 anonymous edits
Low birth weight paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=480134250 Contributors: Andeggs, Anomalocaris, Arlen22, AxelBoldt, Byelf2007, Clicketyclack, DabMachine,
Dar-Ape, DavidWBrooks, Den fjttrade ankan, Diberri, Frozenport, Gary Cziko, Gdr, Gene Nygaard, Jfdwolff, Jun-Dai, Karada, LauraineCrafts, Lou.weird, Mack2, Mark viking, MrsBucket,
Nbarth, NeonMerlin, Netkinetic, Noe, Nul, Paradoctor, Quidam65, Schutz, Sittingduck123, Smyth, Tarek, Tarquin, Tomlee2060, Tony1, Una Smith, UrsaFoot, YOKOTA Kuniteru, 14
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Missing square puzzle Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614583227 Contributors: 041744, ALE!, Aarchiba, Aaron Kauppi, Aldaron, Alexb@cut-the-knot.com, Alvesgaspar,
Art LaPella, AsceticRose, Ayda D, Aymatth2, Bigup sim, Bjankuloski06en, Charles Matthews, Chaseed530, Cleverdie, Cw.pondering, DVdm, David Eppstein, DavidRF, Download,
DragonflySixtyseven, Drmies, Ed Poor, Evercat, Fraggle81, Ginsuloft, Gphoto, Gribozavr, Guilhermeappolinario, Hadal, Hatster301, Henning Makholm, Herbee, Hydrargyrum, Jayarathina,
Jjron, Jothikumar Rathinamoorthy, KSCgrace, Kaganer, Kapow, Khajidha, MCBastos, MTHarden, McGeddon, Michael miceli, Minesweeper, Mohamedhp, Moosehadley, Morning Sunshine, N
Shar, Nachra, Nanera, NeMewSys, Nebogipfel, Noe, Nomalas, Omicronpersei8, PPMBrouwers, PTSE, Paul August, Piledhigheranddeeper, Pro bug catcher, Rahatf, Reaper Eternal, Rehrenberg,
Reywas92, Salgueiro, SarekOfVulcan, Stratadrake, Tewapack, Tide rolls, Tired time, Traxs7, Trekky0623, Vedabit, Victorrocha, Violetriga, WTM, Wfisher, Whosasking, WikiLaurent,
Wikiuser100, Wizzy, Yvesnimmo, Zirland, 117 anonymous edits
Paradoxes of set theory Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=544749284 Contributors: AndrewWTaylor, Anonymous Dissident, AuburnPilot, CBM, CRGreathouse, Chas zzz
brown, DavidCBryant, DreamGuy, Eigenlambda, FAQAsker, Geoffw1948, Giftlite, Gregbard, Hippias (usurped), Hyacinth, IPonomarev, Jalanpalmer, Justavo, Lambiam, Loadmaster,
Mathemaduenn, Michael Hardy, Nick Number, Oleg Alexandrov, Paradoctor, PaulTanenbaum, RJChapman, RJGray, Rdmabry, Regards, WM, Sole Soul, Tesseran, Tobias Bergemann, WLior,
76 anonymous edits
Parrondo's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614198504 Contributors: Alexb@cut-the-knot.com, Ambuj.Saxena, Bjenks, Byelf2007, Camerafiend, Chetvorno,
Deletedx55x, Dquixote, Educuncas, Edward, Elwikipedista, Evansmike14, Fratnike, GTBacchus, Gimmetrow, Gumatu, Hatster301, JEH, Kzollman, Lambiam, Machaon4, Magioladitis,
Mathninja, Melcombe, Michael Hardy, Mstutzer, Mushroom, Noe, Objective3000, Porkolt60, QueenCake, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Rustinterry, Sentient238, Spud Gun, StAnselm,
Steamturn, Sunny vd, Svick, That Guy, From That Show!, Tkpmep, Ulric1313, Urhixidur, ZackBPro, Zippedmartin, 43 anonymous edits
Russell's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609504860 Contributors: 1010011010, 4pq1injbok, Adrionwells, AgadaUrbanit, Alan Pascoe, Alexg, Altenmann, Andres,
Andrewa, Andrewbadr, Andrewtp21, Anonymous Dissident, Ap, Argyrios Saccopoulos, Arthur Rubin, Artoasis, Arvindn, Ashera, AxelBoldt, Behnam, Bendono, BertSeghers, Bjarki S,
Byelf2007, CALR, CBM, CRGreathouse, Cal 1234, Causa sui, Cgingold, Charles Matthews, Chinju, Chocolateboy, Chuck Adams, Clive Jones, Cobra libre, ColdFeet, Colonel Warden,
Concerned cynic, Conversion script, Cybercobra, Cyde, Daniil Teplitskiy, Danman3459, David H Braun (1964), Delirium, Derek Ross, Dfeldmann, Dhanak, Diggers2004, Discospinster,
Dominus, Dongbags, DonkeyKong64, Doops, Dosilasol, Download, Dranu, Drbreznjev, Duffman, Duxwing, Ed g2s, EdC, Edonovan, Eduardoporcher, Eric119, EthanOConnor, Factitious,
FlashSheridan, Four Dog Night, Frytvm, Fwappler, GKFX, Gakmo, Gershwinrb, Giftlite, Gilliam, Glacier9, Godsoflogic, Graham87, Grahamec, Gregbard, Grover cleveland, Gtrmp, Gutza,
Hamoudafg, HappyCamper, Heron, Hgrosser, Hugo999, Hyacinth, ILIKENOTHING43217, Iccruz, J heisenberg, J.F1p., JHCC, Jacobharold, JamesBWatson, Janoside, Jaraalbe, Jefu, Jersey
Devil, Jimw338, Jleedev, JohnLloydScharf, Joseaperez, Junaidas, KSchutte, Karl E. V. Palmen, Kdau, Know-edu, Ks0stm, Ksnortum, Kzollman, LC, La goutte de pluie, Lambiam, Landroo,
Leibniz, Linas, Livajo, Loadmaster, Loginks, LtCmdrData, Lulu of the Lotus-Eaters, M11101, Madir, Madmardigan53, MarcelB612, MartinHarper, Matt Crypto, Maurice Carbonaro, Meldor,
Michael C Price, Michael Hardy, Michaelpb, Mike Schwartz, Mild Bill Hiccup, Milt, Mineralogy, Minesweeper, Modster, Mormegil, Neilc, Obradovic Goran, OttoMkel, Pace212, Paradoctor,
Paul August, Pegship, Phc120, Philogo, Pmanderson, Pomte, Porcher, Prof. Mc, Pyrospirit, R'n'B, RDF-SAS, Rainwarrior, Randall Holmes, Rasmus Faber, RedWordSmith, Renamed user 4,
Reywas92, Richard L. Peterson, Richmond96, Root4(one), Rory096, Roy W. Wright, Saga City, Salix alba, Sam Hocevar, Sapphic, Sarregouset, Saulgoode, Set theorist, SimonTrew, Skizzik,
Snoyes, Spandlingford, Stemonitis, Sukolsak, Sumchody, Sundar, Sunny256, TexasAndroid, The Anome, Tim Retout, Tobias Bergemann, Tomchiukc, Trovatore, Ttwo, Uranium grenade,
509

Usacfg, WadeSimMiser, Web-Crawling Stickler, West Brom 4ever, WikiDao, Wikiljw, Wotnow, Wvbailey, Yossarian, Yworo, Zero over zero, Zero sharp, tefica Horvat, 244 anonymous edits
Simpson's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611093298 Contributors: 81120906713, Achalootoo, Aetheling, Akh81, Alansohn, Anandcv, Anders Sandberg,
Anrnusna, Ariel., Arthena, Arvindn, AstroNomer, AxelBoldt, BAxelrod, Baccyak4H, Barabum, Barrylb, BenFrantzDale, Bender235, Boffy b, CL, Carbuncle, Charles Matthews, Chris the speller,
Chris3145, Cjpaciorek, Cliff12345, Cmglee, Computergeeksjw, Conversion script, CowboyBear, Curb Chain, Cvet, Cyberjudge, Czmilner, Dadadaddyo, Dan Rayn, Dandrake, Dandv,
Dave.Dunford, DavidWBrooks, Davidhorman, Davilla, Dbenbenn, Dcoetzee, Delldot, Den fjttrade ankan, Derek Ross, Destynova, DonAByrd, Dratman, Duoduoduo, Echo927,
Emeraldcityserendipity, Emurphy42, Erianna, EvergreenFir, Exponentiate, Extratooth2, FF2010, Flavonoid, Fnielsen, Gdr, GenericBob, Graham87, Greenharpoon, Grj23, Guybrush, Hydrox, I
dream of horses, IanRiley, Illia Connell, It Is Me Here, Ivanleung95, Jbrotobball, Jersyko, Jim.belk, Johnleemk, JokeySmurf, Karada, Keeves, Kfogel, Kkreitler, Kvihill, Kzollman, Lambiam,
LauraineCrafts, Leonbloy, Letuo, Lewis500, Linnormlord, Lirelyn, Lou.weird, Lova Falk, MC10, MarkHudson, Markjoseph125, Mattbuck, Mattstern2, Melcombe, MichaelFriendly, Miltopia,
Mindmatrix, Mjs1991, MostlyListening, NTownsend, Nbauman, NeonMerlin, Noe, Nonerds3, Obscuranym, Occultations, Opticyclic, OttRider, Paine Ellsworth, Paolo.dL, Pascal.Tesson,
PatrickFisher, Paul Stansifer, Paulmeisel, Pawyilee, Pgan002, Philip Trueman, Pointers12, Qitaana, Qwerty Binary, Qwfp, R.e.b., Rainwarrior, Rfl, Rich Farmbrough, Richard Keatinge,
Rjwilmsi, Robma, Ronnyk, RoyGoldsmith, Ryan Reich, Salix alba, Schutz, Scottanon, Securiger, Shanes, Sikon, Stefan Pantiru, Stevage, Sundar, Surajt88, Tarquin, Teeteetee, The Anome,
Thesilverbail, Thorwald, Thric3, Tide rolls, TobyK, Tomi, Tomscambler, Tyrrell McAllister, Villaonisland, Wackywill1001, Whisky drinker, Whosasking, Wik, YOKOTA Kuniteru, Zundark,
Zven, , 221 anonymous edits
Skolem's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=608086490 Contributors: 4v4l0n42, Aquishix, CBM, CBM2, Charles Matthews, Chinju, Chris Pressey, Deltahedron,
Dmcq, Gdm, Giftlite, Graue, Hanoch Ben-Yami, Hans Adler, Hugo Herbelin, Imz, Joriki, Joshtrimble, Joth, Leibniz, Loadmaster, Magidin, Maltelauridsbrigge, Mdd, Mhss, Michael Hardy,
Mrwright, Myasuda, Noosphere, Nortexoid, Oshanker, Phiwum, Pjacobi, Porton, R.e.b., Renamed user 4, Rjwilmsi, Ruakh, Sophus Bie, Spambit, TakuyaMurata, Tijfo098, Tkuvho, Tobias
Bergemann, Tosha, Trovatore, Unzerlegbarkeit, VanishedUserABC, Vaughan Pratt, Wvbailey, Xzungg, 35 anonymous edits
Smale's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611359727 Contributors: Achowat, ArnoldReinhold, AugPi, Balabiot, BiT, Byelf2007, C S, CRGreathouse, Charles
Matthews, Chris857, Daqu, Dewritech, Donner60, Dratman, Dysprosia, Faizan, Giftlite, HorsePunchKid, InverseHypercube, Kevinthe23rd, Korg, Lee M, Loadmaster, Mattbrundage, Maurice
Carbonaro, Maxx.T, Michael Hardy, MichaelMcGuffin, Nbarth, NeonMerlin, Pjacobi, PoiZaN, Point-set topologist, R.e.b., Rainwarrior, Rausch, Rgdboer, RoflCopter404, Sabbut, SchreiberBike,
Silly rabbit, Stephancom, Sutilcareh, Tano4595, Thomas.schick, Tosha, Waldir, WriterHound, Zero sharp, Zundark, 25 anonymous edits
Thomson's lamp Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612353979 Contributors: A Softer Answer, Aambrioso, AlfieNet, AnonMoos, Bkonrad, Bram28, Burn, Cammoore,
Chadernook, Chetvorno, Chinju, Chris the speller, Christian75, Dan Gluck, David Eppstein, Double sharp, Dra1001, Edward, Eequor, Epbr123, GordonRoss, Gregbard, Hamiltondaniel, It Is Me
Here, J04n, JimWae, Justlettersandnumbers, Marudubshinki, Melchoir, Mike Rosoft, NeonMerlin, Nope, that's a pronoun, OlEnglish, One is one and one is one, Paradoctor, Paul G, Pseudospin,
Rjwilmsi, Roland Longbow, Sasuke Sarutobi, SimonP, Sligocki, Tesseran, Thomas Veil, Vincent Russo, William Pietri, 50 anonymous edits
Two envelopes problem Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611449468 Contributors: A2rael, ABaraov, Andeggs, AndrewWTaylor, Anrnusna, AzaToth, Baccyak4H,
BenFrantzDale, Bender235, Betrunkener Affe, BlackStarling, Blotwell, Bodhi.root, Byelf2007, CaAl, Catgut, Chameleon, Chealer, Chocolateboy, Coffee2theorems, Corpania, CptCutLess, Curb
Chain, DLetourneau, DMacks, Dacium, Dagme, Dcljr, Dennis Ng from Hong Kong, Dfeldmann, DharmakayaClarity, Dicklyon, Dilaudid, DudeOnTheStreet, Duoduoduo, Enemyunknown, Eyal
Lev, Father Goose, Feinoha, Gerhardvalentin, Giftlite, Gill110951, Ginsengbomb, Gwern, HaeB, Hamaryns, INic, J04n, JCSantos, Jak86, Jeekc, Joefromrandb, JohnTheSecure, Johnbibby,
Judgeking, Kaslanidi, Kernsters, Khazar2, Kitsunegami, Koljepk, Ladislav Mecir, Leejoe Schar, Lowellian, Mangoe, Manning Bartlett, Marina T., Markjoseph125, Martin Hogbin, MartinPoulter,
Matt81523, McSly, Melcombe, Metaphysicist1, Michaelnikolaou, Mike Rosoft, Monguin61, Monsterman222, Moscow Connection, Mr randy watson, MrOllie, Mv240, Nagytibi, New Thought,
Newone, Niceguyedc, Noe, OdedSchramm, Oleg Alexandrov, P64, Partyzan XXI, Pascal666, Pennbrook, PhysPhD, Piperh, Pokipsy76, Prochron, R'n'B, Radagast83, Richard001, RiskAverse,
Rjwilmsi, Rmessenger, RockMFR, Rsrikanth05, Rm, STyx, Sean D Martin, Slendle84, Snalwibma, SnowFire, Soler97, Spottydog3, TedPavlic, TheFreeloader, Tkircher, Tmartin, Tomixdf,
Ukexpat, Uniqueuponhim, Untrue Believer, Username12321, WAS 4.250, Wenga66, Wiggles007, Yuzta, Zvika, 283 anonymous edits
Von Neumann paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615265242 Contributors: AndrewWTaylor, Crowsnest, Darine Of Manor, Eric Kvaalen, Geometry guy, Hmains,
Jokes Free4Me, Joshua Issac, LilHelpa, Mark viking, Michael Hardy, Mikhail Ryazanov, Super48paul, Tobias Bergemann, Tosha, Zundark, 4 anonymous edits
Bracketing paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=579752816 Contributors: Angr, Bbik, Chrislk02, CyborgTosser, Dugwiki, Kyoakoa, Maurice Carbonaro, McGeddon,
Paradoctor, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Rmalouf, 3 anonymous edits
Buridan's ass Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615251523 Contributors: Aggelos Amyntas, Alienus, Anders Sandberg, AnonMoos, Anwar saadat, Arcadianrefugee, Arthur
Rubin, Astrowest, Bender235, Borbolia777, Brewcrewer, Byelf2007, Carlj7, Chetvorno, Cholling, Cyberchimp, D-Rock, Dino, Dismas, Dshin, Ebitnet, Emurphy42, Ethaniel, Ewulp,
FeanorStar7, Fefogomez, FiveColourMap, Froid, GeorgeDishman, Gnomz007, Grutness, Haeinous, Helixblue, Icairns, Isokrates, Jag123, Jarry1250, Jason.grossman, Jasperdoomen, Jchthys,
Jessemckay, Jonesey95, Kaldari, Karada, LelosObserves, LindsayH, Loopy48, LoveMonkey, Malik Shabazz, Mark Dingemanse, Matthewamol, Maurice Carbonaro, Mavaddat, McGeddon,
Murtasa, Nbarth, Nealparr, Nk, Obradovic Goran, Ontoraul, Oreo Priest, Philoyonder, Quackking, Quelqu'un, Qwertyus, RDBrown, Roadrunner, Rob T Firefly, Samohyl Jan, Schmei,
SchreiberBike, SoCalAlum, Ssdco, StuRat, Superm401, TJRC, Tavilis, The Anome, Thumperward, Toby Bartels, WereSpielChequers, Wikiuser100, Woohookitty, Ybbor, , , 54
anonymous edits
Buttered cat paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615835367 Contributors: .mau., 5 albert square, 5theye, 7&6=thirteen, AVRS, Allefant, Andrew Maiman,
AnnaKucsma, Arms & Hearts, Arthena, Aunt Entropy, Auric, Aziraphael, Badcalculon, Baylink, Ben Tibbetts, Bfigura, Bluesbelly, Brian G. Crawford, BrookMiles, Callanecc, Can't sleep, clown
will eat me, CesarB, Chowbok, Chris857, ChrisMorgan, Clarityfiend, ClovisPt, Cmichael, ContiAWB, CronoDAS, Crunchy Frog, CyberSkull, Cyfal, DTRY, Dagonet, Daniel Brockman,
DannoNZ, Deanlaw, Dogmatic dog, Dougie monty, Dylan Lake, ESkog, Edward321, Efitu, Exacrom, Feezo, Felyza, Firsfron, Fourohfour, Frogskin9, GDallimore, Gamkiller, Gargaj, Gilderien,
Gohst, Grafen, Graham87, Grapplequip, Greghaspants, Guru Larry, HelicopterLlama, HeteroZellous, Hypnopompus, I dream of horses, ISD, Iamsvengali, JDoorjam, James David Klein, Jared
Preston, Jimp, JohnChrysostom, Jokke-svin, JoshuaZ, Korny O'Near, Kukini, Kyle Barbour, LAX, La Syd, Lathama, LewisHamiltonTR, Lineplus, Lordalpha1, Mailer diablo, Malinaccier Public,
Mareino, Marin M., MasterA113, Matthiaspaul, Method8malta, Mgiganteus1, Michaelas10, Midnighterbh, Mindmatrix, Mkten, Monty845, Msea85, Neon Fox, Nightstallion, OhanaUnited,
Oknazevad, OlEnglish, Otterathome, Paul Pogonyshev, Pengo, Petter Strandmark, Phall28, Phil Boswell, Pilchard, Pinethicket, Pixelface, Pixeltoo, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Querl,
Quidam65, Rdsmith4, Rjwilmsi, Rory O'Kane, Rory096, Ruud Koot, SYSS Mouse, Scyldscefing, Seewolf, Shafaet, Shii, SkyMachine, Slicing, Spinningspark, Suntag, Swaddon1903,
TheNobleDuke, TheSun, Tjt1012, Toddst1, Tpbradbury, Trivialist, Tryptofish, Tzler, Tra, Ulflund, Ultracoco, Voidxor, Wafulz, WhisperToMe, Whodyacryem, Wisl, Wonk619, Yellow Mage,
Zepheus, Zobango, 197 anonymous edits
Lombard's Paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=469453679 Contributors: Amalas, Arcadian, B^4, Bachrach44, Caerwine, Cristobal carrasco, DrHawkeye, Eep,
Epanalepsis, Gregbard, John, Kappa, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Penbat, Pie.er, Refulgentis, Stefan, Swpb, Thiseye, 7 anonymous edits
Mere addition paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613977550 Contributors: 0g1o2i3k4e5n6, Alecbings, Anakrin, BreakfastJr, Buzybeez, Byelf2007, C mon, Chealer,
Cholling, Common Man, DDSaeger, Dclayh, DenisDiderot, DougDante, Dspradau, EmbraceParadox, Evercat, Fairychild, Feco, Felixthehamster, Giraffedata, InverseHypercube, Karada, Koavf,
Kripkenstein, Larklight, LittleDan, Michael Hardy, Monguin61, Mvaldman1, ObsessiveMathsFreak, Owel Suv Gahool, Pseudospin, Richard001, Selinide, Sir Paul, Terrence Trent D'Arby,
Tesseract2, TheDarknessVisible, Tired time, Upsidown, Wantongods, Woohookitty, 57 anonymous edits
Navigation paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=603687871 Contributors: 1ForTheMoney, AvicAWB, Bearian, Byelf2007, CambridgeBayWeather, Colapeninsula,
DexDor, Eugene-elgato, I dream of horses, Iiar, Intersofia, Miss Madeline, Pb30, Puro pt, Rpatlovany, Rsiano, Updatehelper, Xeno, 12 anonymous edits
Paradox of the plankton Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=592137717 Contributors: Axl, BarroColorado, Byelf2007, Chiswick Chap, ChrisGualtieri, Epipelagic, GregorB,
Groupuscule, Informationtheory, Jesse V., Komischn, Magioladitis, Northamerica1000, Paradoctor, Plantdrew, Plumbago, Robinh, 5 anonymous edits
Temporal paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=606486187 Contributors: Animalparty, AnonMoos, Byelf2007, Conty, Dcarac, Dendodge, Download, Filip em, Firsfron,
Florian Blaschke, FunkMonk, George Ponderevo, Jbrougham, Koavf, MWAK, Maias, Miss Madeline, Mozzyepic24, Ozraptor4, Postdlf, Pterosaurus, Spotty11222, Steveoc 86, Toh, 15
anonymous edits
Tritone paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611506525 Contributors: 7&6=thirteen, Aeternus, AnotherOnymous, Anrnusna, Anthony Appleyard, Assianir, Barticus88,
Benjaminong, CryptoDerk, DanielLevitin, Delirium, Dianadeutsch, Epolk, Fuzzbox, Graham87, Hyacinth, Jemiller226, JerryFriedman, Jtir, Just plain Bill, Labeloccura, LilHelpa, Mjb,
Paradoctor, Rjwilmsi, RomanSpa, Thenthorn, 6 anonymous edits
Voting paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=584123988 Contributors: 204.96.33.xxx, A poor workman blames, Achituv, Andrewaskew, Ashley Y, Atemperman,
Byelf2007, CBM, CRGreathouse, Chealer, Conversion script, Daniel Mietchen, Delikedi, Dissident, Eberhard Wesche, Graham87, GregorB, Ictlogist, Iota, JamesMLane, Janlo, Jmkim dot com,
Karada, LC, Lee Carre, Llamabr, Lugnuts, Magister Mathematicae, MarSch, MarkusSchulze, Matt Gies, Maurice Carbonaro, McGeddon, Mhartl, Michael Hardy, Mikola, MushroomCloud,
Omnipaedista, Paul Stansifer, Qetuth, RobLa, Robofish, Sean r lynch, Shamrocked, Smjg, Tamfang, Taw, Telso, The Anome, Theorist2, Thomasmeeks, VoteFair, Welsh, Zundark, Zzuuzz, Z da
Silva, 27 anonymous edits
510

Fitch's paradox of knowability Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=597331326 Contributors: Chalst, EmbraceParadox, EmilJ, Gamewizard71, Gregbard, Hyphz, Infinito, John,
Kabelsalat, Kzollman, Myasuda, Neurodyn, Quietly, Robindch, Rodasmith, Roddalitz, Ryulong, Smeazel, Stephen Patrick, TheDean, TomT0m, Walton One, 9 anonymous edits
Grandfather paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613962590 Contributors: ***Ria777, 041744, 1Winston, ATD, Abomasnow, Abrech, Abu badali, Acalamari,
Acthompson, Adam keller, Adam9812, Addihockey10, AdjustShift, Adoniscik, Aerie124, Ahoerstemeier, Al E., Ale jrb, Alexius08, Altar, Amcfreely, AnonMoos, Antepenultimate,
Arctic.gnome, Are You The Cow Of Pain?, Arichnad, Ashmoo, Atomsmasher86, Auric, AxelBoldt, Backstabb, BananaFiend, Barkingdoc, Beam022, Ben 10, Bender235, Benhen1997,
BerserkerBen, Bfinn, Bhig3, Bob A, Bobthegreat157, Bolddeciever, Braindigitalis, Brandiino12, Brandmeister, Brendanmiddleton, Brianski, Bryan Derksen, Burnside65, Byelf2007, CPRdave,
Cactus Wren, Cactusbin, Calabraxthis, Calamari, Calhobs23, Caltas, Cambalachero, CanadianLinuxUser, Candent shlimazel, Captain Wacky, Captain-tucker, Cat's Tuxedo, Chicagorob1, Chris
42, Cmdrjameson, Coanda-1910, Codeh, ComaVN, Consumed Crustacean, Coollettuce, Coralmizu, Corvun, Cybercobra, DAGwyn, DHBoggs, DOSGuy, DV8 2XL, Daniel J. Leivick, Darkwind,
David Levy, Dayewalker, Dcamp314, Delicious carbuncle, Demon Lord 302, Deniskrasnov, Densus, Dermeister, Dfeldmann, Digamma, Doczilla, DoktorDec, Dominic subkey, DouglasCalvert,
Drat, Drn8, Dstebbins, Dudegalea, Duggy 1138, EVula, Eeekster, Efflo74, El Cubano, Elwood00, EncMstr, Enigmatical, Enochjli642, Eran of Arcadia, Eugene-elgato, Everyking, Ewlyahoocom,
Finog, Fiona CS, Foreverprovence, FunkyMunkyParty, Furrykef, Fusionmix, Futuresuperstar scw, Futurist110, GUllman, Garda40, Gezman, Giant89, Giftlite, Gioto, Glane23, Goldfritha,
Gorank4, GrahamHardy, Graue, Greenodd, Groupuscule, Gsp8181, Gunnar Guvararson, Guthrie, Gvimalku, Gyohng, Halcyonhazard, Hello32020, Henryodell, Heslopian, Hhhippo, Hibana,
Histrion, HovisM, Hq3473, Ht686rg90, Hu, Hughesdavidw, Humanist92, Hydrargyrum, Hypnosifl, I.am.lost, Icyisamu, Igoldste, Imagine Wizard, Imagine me2, Ineedrevelation, Ixfd64,
JIMfoamy1, Ja 62, Jakeyb33, Jamelan, JasonAQuest, Jezebel1669, Jguard18, Jitterro, John Darrow, John254, Jok2000, Jon Ascton, Jonny-mt, Josiah Rowe, Jpk, Jpmccord, Jsoulas, Junyor, Jushi,
JustAGal, K-twist808, K69, Kameraad Pjotr, Kanonkas, Karada, Karl E. V. Palmen, Katalaveno, Kdau, Kent28, Keraunos, Khaosworks, Khazar2, Kmarinas86, KnightRider, Kornboim, Koro
Neil, KrytenKoro, Kwinki, Lab-oratory, Lambiam, Lashiec, Lazzzzze, Letranova, Ligulem, Lilwik, Loadmaster, Lord E, Luiz48, MJ94, Mablanco, Maian, Majorclanger, Mallanox, Man It's So
Loud In Here, Marc Weil, Marc pasquin, Marisusis, Mark Arsten, Martarius, Matharvest, MattManic7325, Mattbuck, Mattmanp, Max Jetzer, Maximus Rex, Maxis ftw, Mbell, McGeddon,
Midasminus, Mike Peel, Mike4ty4, Milesnfowler, Mkuehn10, Mnemo, Modus Ponens, Monkeycheetah, Montgomery '39, Morven, Morwen, Mr. Garrison, Mranostay, Mritaly1000, Mrmets26,
Mthteh, Mustangwill, Mwboyer, Myscrnnm, Mythsearcher, Nakon, Nalvage, Nate1481, Nenva, Netsnipe, New Age Retro Hippie, Nhandler, NikolaiNyegaard, Notshabti, Nyttend, O.Koslowski,
Obi2Kenobi, OffsBlink, Olathe, OldRight, Oliver Pereira, OneWeirdDude, Oren0, Orville Eastland, OsirisV, Paliku, Paradoctor, Patar knight, Paul A, PaulLev, PcGnome, Peruvianllama,
Petaseakittenarmy, Peter.C, Phil Boswell, Philip Trueman, Pictureuploader, Pikawil, Pinethicket, Platypus222, Plrk, Po43026, Prasadbeeraka, Prehistoricmanthe2nd, PsychoJosh, Puap, Pupster21,
QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quadratic, Quae legit, Quercusrobur, Quuxplusone, Qwyrxian, Raiki15, Razasyed, Reenem, Reformparty82, RememberMe?, Rewop777, Rgrg, Rich Farmbrough,
Richard001, Riffsyphon1024, Rjwilmsi, Rob T Firefly, Robertd, Robofish, Rphb, Rundquist, Ryan Postlethwaite, S Whistler, SDaniel, SJK, SYSS Mouse, Sam Hocevar, Sanchom, Saric, Sastra
Manurung, Saswann, Sbmehta, Schneelocke, SchuminWeb, Sega381, Segagman, Senjuto, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Serendipodous, Shaen, Shahid1618, ShaneCavanaugh, Shawn81, Shawnallen,
Shell Kinney, Sherqnill, Shreevatsa, Signalhead, SimonLyall, Simonfielder, SingCal, Sith Lord 13, Skwinch, Smartyllama, Soccerluke22, Soumya92, SpaceFlight89, SpecialAgentUncleTito, St
Fan, StAkAr Karnak, StarDigian, Stardust8212, Steel, Stephen P. Merchant, Stephenb, Stephenchou0722, Stevertigo, Strani Beeap, Strength rune, Superbiate, Superm401, Swwright,
THATSBETTER, TKD, Taragui, Tasc, Teammm, TehPhil, Tempshill, TerrorBite, The Monster, The Rogue Penguin, TheAnimus, TheChancellor, Thegline, Thewiki userxd, Thinkr,
Thrashmeister, Tkgd2007, Tony Sidaway, Tonyv414, Tregoweth, Trer, Trovatore, Trusilver, Tyler8779, UTSRelativity, Ulric1313, UltimatePyro, VasilievVV, Vhbelvadi, Vicki Rosenzweig,
Victor8948, Viewdrix, Vinodkotiya, Voidxor, Voldemore, WDavis1911, Waldir, Wampa Jabba, Wannablessedbe, Wayne Slam, WereSpielChequers, Wereon, Wikidmage, Wikieditor1988,
Wikipelli, WillMak050389, Witteafval, Wraithdart, Writelf, Wulf eng, Wwcsa, Xenyph, Yintan, Yobmod, Zafiroblue05, Zonafan39, Zundark, 671 anonymous edits
Liberal paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609566209 Contributors: Abc123doremi1248, Akriasas, Akshayaj, Andreas Carter, Audiovideo, Austinecon, Bart v M,
Beefman, Bkessler, Blanchette, BrianAsh, CRGreathouse, Chris the speller, Countchoc, Daniel Mahu, DaraParsavand, Drmies, Earth, Edward, El otro borges, Enchanter, Eritro, Euyyn, Gabbe,
Giancarlodoria, Hairy Dude, Headbomb, Henrygb, Hires an editor, Homunq, Inebrio, Jsnx, Kingboyk, Knotwork, Kzollman, Leobold1, LilHelpa, Melab-1, Michael Hardy, N419BH,
Obscuranym, Omnipaedista, Onixz100, Paradoctor, Preisler, R'n'B, Rebeccanicely, Remuel, Richiez, Rjwilmsi, Rl, Ronbtni, Rumping, Sango123, Sigloiv, Stirling Newberry, TabooTikiGod, The
Banner Turbo, Thecinimod, Thecurran, Thomasmeeks, Toby Bartels, Voorlandt, WilliamKF, 53 anonymous edits
Moore's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613843568 Contributors: Adrian J. Hunter, Alf, Andres, Anomalocaris, Beala, Bender235, Beno1000, Bfinn, Byelf2007,
Cmlittlejohn, Coffee2theorems, CoolMike, Cybercobra, Debresser, Djinn112, EmbraceParadox, Enamex, FT2, George100, Gregbard, Grud1872, Gwern, Haoie, Heyitspeter, JForget, JaGa,
Jordanotto, Jtle515, Karada, Knuckles, Larklight, LimeyCinema1960, Lostinthepath, Lucubrations, Maurice Carbonaro, MeDrewNotYou, Megatronium, Nk, Noosphere, Novangelis,
Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Paul A, PrecisNugator, RedWolf, Reinis, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Root4(one), Salasks, SeL, Sixsous, SkpVwls, Snowboardpunk, Tarotcards, The Anome, Velho,
WAS 4.250, Xrchz, Ynhockey, Zach99998, Zamkudi, Zhu rongji, 55 anonymous edits
Moravec's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=588240388 Contributors: AnonMoos, CharlesGillingham, Gregbard, Jamelan, Jochen Burghardt, Lgfcd, Neilc,
Omeglegirlslivecha, Retama, SchreiberBike, Simeon, Tassedethe, Vegaswikian, Vroman, Was a bee, Wbeek, 23 anonymous edits
Newcomb's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611294903 Contributors: .:Ajvol:., 7532665a, Abyaly, Amerinese, AnaxMcShane, AxelBoldt, Bender235,
Bensaccount, Blahber, Blubro, Bradtem, Brokenfixer, Bryan Derksen, Certifiednutter, CharlesHBennett, Codename Lisa, Count Iblis, Crasshopper, CronoDAS, DabMachine, Danielykeren, Dante
Alighieri, Dcoetzee, Derek Ross, Diberri, Disavian, Dissident, Dobermanji, Download, DreamGuy, Eighty, Exeunt, FF2010, Flamingspinach, Flyer22, Fnorp, Fronkey, Garyzx, Geh,
Geoffw1948, GoingBatty, Goodralph, Greenrd, Gregbard, GregorB, Gwern, Haham hanuka, Headbomb, Heron, Hhhippo, Homunq, J heisenberg, JHunterJ, JJL, JamesMazur22, Joriki, Just H,
Kaikaapro, Karada, Kiekeben, King Mir, Kpeatt, Kripkenstein, LC, Loopii, Loren Rosen, Los3, M, Mackan, McKay, Mcherm, Mdob, Mechtheist, Michael Hardy, Mmm, Oconnor663,
OneWeirdDude, Pcb21, Peak, Pragmaknowledge, RG2, Radford Neal, Rasel10, Rich Farmbrough, Richard001, Rjwilmsi, Robertd, Ron Aharoni, Room429, Rossami, Schaefer, Semantic
Paradox, Senjuto, Serpent's Choice, Singularity, Slartoff, Star General, Stephen, Sunshine14angel, Suslindisambiguator, Timwi, Tsbertalan, V. Szabolcs, VeryVerily, Wragge, Yar Kramer,
Zedmelon, 106 anonymous edits
Omnipotence paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614851483 Contributors: 069952497a, 2046, A bit iffy, A.Z., ABCD, Abhingeorgegodwin, Adolphus79, Agateller,
Aghast, Ajkr925, Ajsh, Akari no ryu, Albrozdude, Alsandro, Amalas, Amodio11, Amxitsa, AnOddName, Anaptyxis, Andrew Levine, Anomalocaris, Antandrus, Anthony on Stilts, Antimatt,
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Babcock, Beowulph, Bertrc, Bevo, Bhadani, BjrnEF, Bkell, Blainster, Bmorton3, BoNoMoJo (old), Bob A, Bob0the0mighty, Bobblewik, Boing! said Zebedee, Brandmeister (old), BreakfastJr,
BrianH123, Brianmccormick, Brighterorange, BrokenSegue, Brusselsshrek, Bryan Derksen, Byelf2007, C. M. Harris, CBM, Cambalachero, Camipco, Carl.bunderson, Carnildo, Charles
Matthews, Chinju, Chochopk, Cholling, Christofurio, Christopher Parham, Chuck Carroll, Colonel Cow, Corvus, Cowman109, CptCutLess, Cybertooth85, Cyde, Dabomb87, Danmcn12, Danny,
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Gustafson, Jiohdi, Jjk, Jnorthup, John Diala, John W. Kennedy, Johnmarkh, Jon513, Jonathan.s.kt, JoshuaZ, Jusdafax, Justin Eiler, JustinWick, Kaihsu, Karada, Karl Dickman, Karl E. V. Palmen,
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;-), Plain jack, Portillo, Pretender, Project Platinum, Project2501a, Ptrwatson418, PullUpYourSocks, PyroGamer, Pyrospirit, Ramandu, Rebrane, Redux, Rellekmr, Renamed user 4, RexNL,
Reywas92, Richjkl, Rjwilmsi, Rlove, RobertG, Robg, Robth, RockMFR, Roland Longbow, RomanSpa, Ronabop, Roy Brumback, Rsl12, Ruakh, Rursus, Ruud Koot, S0uj1r0, Salgueiro, Sam Li,
SandyGeorgia, Sango123, SarekOfVulcan, Sceptre, Scs, Sdedeo, SeanR, Septegram, Sh@z@M, Shadowjams, Shagie, ShelfSkewed, Shentino, Simetrical, Skeptic Professor, Sluzzelin, Some jerk
on the Internet, SomeStranger, Somerset219, Special Creature, Sprazizi, Srleffler, Srnec, StAnselm, Steevven1, StephanNaro, Sturgeonslawyer, Suicidal mongoose, Suslindisambiguator, Swirlix,
Taibhse169, Terrifictriffid, Tgeairn, TheIndifferent, TheMadBaron, TheMusiKid, TheUnionBlood, Thefightmaster, Thomas Gilling, Thorwald, Tijuana Brass, Titoxd, Tmansbridge, Tony1,
Torsrthidesen, Treisijs, Trifon Triantafillidis, Tristessa de St Ange, Truffaut, Trumpet marietta 45750, Tuckerj1976, Tumblehome, Ucla1989, Usw., Vassyana, VegaDark, Velella, Viper Daimao,
Vizcarra, Vzbs34, WLior, Wannger27, Wayward, Ween14, WeniWidiWiki, WereSpielChequers, Weregerbil, WhiteC, Wiki alf, Wikihw, Wikiphilia, Wmahan, WotherspoonSmith, Xanzzibar,
Xaosflux, Xariskai, Yamamoto Ichiro, Zafiroblue05, Zsinj, 620 anonymous edits
Paradox of hedonism Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615748623 Contributors: Alinjefferson, AnaxMcShane, Angela, Angelastic, Angelbo, Animum, Badger Drink,
Beland, Ben101001, Bfinn, Bill3000, Binho Gomes, Brinticus, Bryan Derksen, Buddy23Lee, Byelf2007, C mon, CRGreathouse, Catslayer, Charles Matthews, Chealer, Common Man,
Cybercobra, Dan Polansky, Dave Runger, Deepblackwater, Dhidalgo, Djr36, Donner60, EIFY, Eduen, Erntab72, Frecklefoot, Gemtpm, Ghost420, Go enjoy life, Groupuscule, Grow60, Guanaco,
Hadal, InverseHypercube, JRR Trollkien, Jacobisq, Jds10, Jubileeclipman, Jwratner1, Karada, Keenan Pepper, Keith Cascio, Ketsuekigata, Koavf, Legotech, LoreMiles, MagnesianPhoenix,
MartinHarper, Michael Hardy, Micru, Mohan1986, Noe, Omnipaedista, OneWeirdDude, Paine Ellsworth, Recognizance, Rich Farmbrough, Ringhloth, Root4(one), Roykptrsn, RubyQ,
RyanHoliday, ScienceLion, Shlomi Hillel, Silent Key, Spencerk, Svunt, Swwarmuth, The Anome, The Evil IP address, Tim Ivorson, Ym2mandym2g, 75 anonymous edits
Paradox of nihilism Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=603767019 Contributors: Black Op, Byelf2007, Chealer, Geeoharee, LilHelpa, Paradoctor, 7 anonymous edits
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Paradox of tolerance Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=608967650 Contributors: A Stop at Willoughby, Andycjp, Arthur Rubin, Avanu, Aymatth2, Benzband, Chaos5023,
Chogg, ChrisGualtieri, Clavomirema, Daniel Cordoba-Bahle, ElVacilando, Eldamorie, Farzaneh, Gary123, Hilltoppers, Koopatrev, Kvng, Logical fact, Maurice Carbonaro, Mikhail Ryazanov,
Mooch025, MrBell, Noformation, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Parravano, Pollinosisss, R'n'B, Radical Mallard, RevivesDarks, Rjanag, 19 anonymous edits
Predestination paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=597302477 Contributors: 8ty3hree, A plague of rainbows, ACSE, AMK152, Adavidb, AdmiralMemo, Adonator,
Aitias, Alistair P, Alivine, Alvis, Amoffit, Andrei Cvhdsee Brazil, Angela, Angeldeb82, Anon126, Anville, Apetc, Arjayay, Astavats, AtticusX, Autobogg, BanyanTree, Bart133, Bartekmajewski,
Beeblebrox, Bennydigital, Bertrc, BillC, Binadot, Binx, Bks1209, Blasfamous, BobThePirate, Bonalaw, Brian Olsen, Bryan Derksen, Btyner, Burnside65, Byelf2007, Calhobs23, Cambalachero,
Cameron Scott, Cat's Tuxedo, Chasingsol, Chookmeister, Chris1219, ChrisGualtieri, Clem cowsie, Clockwork Angel, Cnilep, Colonies Chris, Conti, Corvun, Crackpottheorist, DBrane,
DabMachine, Daibhid C, Daniel Benfield, Dantheman531, Darksun, David Gerard, Dayewalker, Delicious carbuncle, Denny, Derktar, Desertmonk, DoctorWho42, DonQuixote, Download, Drat,
Dreamafter, Dstebbins, Dudegalea, Dyolf Knip, Emurphy42, Eric Burns, Etacar11, Everyoneandeveryone, ExoTiger, Festivewombat, FlashpointDFW, Flyte35, For An Angel, Frankie1969,
Frecklefoot, Freedom Inc, Fuchsia Groan, Fudoreaper, Furrykef, GHcool, Geogh84, Glimmer721, GoingBatty, Golbez, Goldfritha, Gregbard, Gunny01, Hailinel, Hellbus, HelloAnnyong,
Histrion, HovisM, Hu, Humuhumunuku, Ianblair23, Ichibun12, Igordebraga, Ikanreed, Incrediblehoke949, Intgr, Irandill, JAF1970, Jabberwockgee, Jagged 85, Jeff02, Jnork, Juranas, JustPhil,
Katefan0, Kelly Martin, Ketans, Keycard, Khaosworks, Kitsunegami, Kizor, Koavf, KramarDanIkabu, Krj373, Kylu, LUCAS FOX, Lambiam, Lazzzzze, Lds, Leader Vladimir, Leaflord,
Letranova, Libro0, Linhle, Lomedhi, Lotiel, LtNOWIS, Luiz48, Lyle Swann, MacGyverMagic, Madchester, Maetah, Magioladitis, Maian, Marcus Brute, Marcus2, Mark Lessig, Mark
Schierbecker, Mark5677, Markcpeck, Martarius, Master Deusoma, MattGiuca, Mattbuck, Mattmanp, Max22, Maximoff77, MegX, Menelaos, Miami33139, Michael316, Mike Klaassen, Mogism,
Monobi, MoogleDan, Morwen, Moxmalin, Mr. XYZ, Msmarmalade, Myuphrid, N W, Nationalparks, Nblschool, Ndanielm, NeoBatfreak, Niceguyedc, Nightscream, Nintendoman01,
NoriMorishima, Notcarlos, Nuclearheadache, Nutster, ONEder Boy, Omega13a, Ossie747, P.D., PC78, Paddles, Paddu, Pagrashtak, Paliku, Paradoctor, Paradoxian, Paranoid, PaulHammond,
Pavel Vozenilek, Phil Boswell, Phoenixrod, Phydend, Piisuke, Pikawil, Pokepal101, Polylerus, Pomte, Ponder, Progressive19, Protiek, Psychorob, Pudding30, Quarl, Quicksilvre, R'n'B, RJFJR,
Radix Z, RainbowCrane, Random contributor, RandomDSdevel, Razasyed, Reatlas, Relativity, Rfc1394, Rfl, Rich Farmbrough, Ricky81682, Ritchy, Rjanag, Rjwilmsi, Robert Brockway,
Robertd, Ron Stoppable, Rotek, Rvgavan, Ryvius, SAMAS, SJK, Sabbut, Saltine, Scott Sanchez, Scoutersig, Sega381, Senjuto, Shawn allen@hotmail.com, Shirt58, Simon Solts, Simulcra,
Skyfaller, Skzyp, Slightsmile, Smokizzy, Socialist10196, Soylentyellow, Sparkiegeek, Sparky the Seventh Chaos, Spud007, SpuriousQ, StAkAr Karnak, Sticknuke007, Subscriber0100, Sukima,
Surajt88, TKD, Tabletop, TaintedMustard, Terrypin, The Rogue Penguin, The Young Avenger, TheDoctor10, TheFarix, Theopolisme, Thinkpad, Tim!, Timwi, TransUtopian, Tregoweth,
Ttfntata, Tycho, UK-Logician-2006, UPL2229, UTSRelativity, Ukexpat, Umofomia, Umpa-lumpa-tooka-dumpa-onyomama, Ungvichian, Vegaswiki, Viewdrix, Vzbs34, WadeSimMiser, Waldir,
Wgrey, WikidSmaht, Wikieditor1988, Wild ste, William M. Connolley, Wong, Woohookitty, Xiner, YouMoo!, Zedmelon, 627 anonymous edits
Zeno's paradoxes Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=610670078 Contributors: ''half-moon'' bubba, .mau., 041744, 100110100, 134.39.212.xxx, 777sms, A E Francis,
AHMartin, AJR, Aa2-2004, Alansohn, Albert2810, Alexnye, AlterBerg, Amaury, Andre Engels, Andreas Kaufmann, Anir1uph, Anonymous Dissident, Ansgarf, Antonrojo, Aphid360,
Aprogressivist, Archibald Fitzchesterfield, Ardashk, Arjayay, Arthena, Artichoker, Asbestos, Ash, Atraxani, Aubreybardo, AugPi, Auntof6, Avnjay, Awl, AxelBoldt, AzaToth, Bass fishing
physicist, Bcasterline, Bdesham, Belg4mit, BenFrantzDale, Bert Carpenter, Bignose, BillFlis, Bjcairns, Bkpsusmitaa, BlackAndy, Blotwell, Bolddeciever, Borgx, Bovineboy2008, Brad7777,
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Chricho, Chris the speller, ChrisHodgesUK, Christian List, Cjmnyc, Clifton Ealy, Closedmouth, CommonsDelinker, Conversion script, Crasshopper, Cratylus3, Creidieki, Cryptic C62, CubicStar,
Cyan, D o m e, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, DJ Clayworth, DJBarney24, DVdm, Dakirw8, Dan Gluck, Danielt, Dave Runger, Dbtfz, Debresser, Decumanus, Dekimasu, Deli nk, Demiurge,
Demonkey36, DennisDaniels, Deor, Destynova, Dhawkins1234, Dogah, Domitori, DouglasCalvert, Dra1001, DropDeadGorgias, Dsmith9 99, Dysmorodrepanis, Ed Poor, EditorInTheRye,
Eequor, Egendomligt, Ekem, ElectricValkyrie, Elsweyn, Emelpy, Epbr123, Eusebeus, Evercat, Fabulous Creature, Faithlessthewonderboy, FilipeS, Flagman7, Flockmeal, FlyinLow5,
Forlornturtle, Fortesfortuna, Foxo103, Francis Gevers 18, Francis Gevers 2, Fru1tbat, Funnyguy555, Furrykef, GCord52, Gabbe, Gaius Cornelius, Gandalfe, Geometry guy, Georg Muntingh,
Georgiabiker, Gerardbeirne, Ghughesarch, Giftlite, Gilliam, Gimmetrow, Gomi no sensei, GordonRoss, Graham87, Grammarrules, Grorland, Gunnar Hendrich, Gut Monk, Hadal, Hairy Dude,
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Iohannes Animosus, Isokrates, Isopropyl, Itub, J.delanoy, JKeck, JMK, Ja 62, Jafet, Jafeucht, Jasperdoomen, Jbergquist, Jburlinson, Jfliu, Jim1138, JimWae, Jimmy da tuna, Jimp, Jiohdi, Jizzpus,
Jochen Burghardt, JohnnyHom, Jonathan.s.kt, Jrcassar, Jstiene, Junkyardprince, Justlettersandnumbers, Jwfearn, KFP, Karada, Karmos, KearnsyK, Keenan Pepper, Kenmayer, Kesuari, Khukri,
Kijana11, Knucmo2, Koavf, Kzollman, LGB, Lapasotka, Le Blue Dude, Lee M, Liongold, Lizard617, Loadmaster, LokiClock, Lord Kyler, Lordrichie, Lordvolton, LostLeviathan, Lotje,
Lucas(CA), MC10, MSGJ, Macedonian, Machine Elf 1735, Mack2, Mackinaw, Mad031683, Magioladitis, Majorsheisskopf, Martarius, MartinHarper, Materialscientist, Matj Grabovsk,
Maurits, Maxim, Mburdis, Mdwh, Michael Hardy, Michael Snow, MichaelExe, Mike Rosoft, Miles, MisterDub, Mladifilozof, Moink, Monkey 05 06, Morwen, Mpcarter, Mr Elmo, Mr Freud, Mr
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PhilipMW, Phrontis, Pichote, Pietdesomere, Pleasantville, Policron, Portillo, Praveen pillay, Profitoftruth85, Pseudospin, PurpleChez, PxT, Qetuth, QmunkE, QuantumEleven, R'n'B, RA0808,
RB972, RMFan1, Raerae42n8, Raiden09, Raiden10, Raknarf44, Rasmus Faber, Raven4x4x, Rdsmith4, Recentchanges, Reiisi, Resistance futile, Reywas92, Rich Farmbrough, Rick Norwood,
RickK, Rima8, Rjwilmsi, Rob T Firefly, Robinh, Rodeo90, Rogper, Romit3, Rsg, Rsrikanth05, Ruakh, Ruanov, Ryan.vilbig, SMcCandlish, Sabalka, Saccerzd, Salsa Shark, Sam metal, Sanders
muc, Sapphic, SchmuckyTheCat, Scottcmu, Shane mc glinchy, Shikeishu, Shikexue2, Sibidiba, Sikon, Simetrical, Skomorokh, Skyshot, Slashme, Smokedoctor, Snalwibma, Spidern, Srich32977,
Ssge, Steaphen, Stephen Bain, Steve Pucci, Su huynh, Syncategoremata, Taffer9, Tarquin, Telewatho, Terence, Tety, Tgoodwil, Thaurisil, The Sage of Stamford, The Thing That Should Not Be,
TheMolecularMan, Thedarkestclear, Thegeneralguy, Thingg, Thomas Veil, Thumperward, Tim Starling, Timneu22, Timo Honkasalo, Tkuvho, Tommy2010, Tony Sidaway, Topbanana,
Trezatium, Twonex, Tyrenius, Unyoyega, Uriah923, Velella, Vikreykja, Wereon, Wideshanks, Widr, Wiki alf, Wiki13, Wikiain, Wikid77, Wikisquirrels, Wikky Horse, William M. Connolley,
Woody, Wormholio, Wtmitchell, Ww, Xanzzibar, Xaoyin, XuetaoSweden, Yintan, Yone Fernandes, Yufeilu, Zenosparadox, 898 anonymous edits
Algol paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613093699 Contributors: BD2412, CarloMartinelli, Epbr123, Inordinate, Nechung, Nominality, Northamerica1000,
Paradoctor, RJFJR, Runningonbrains, Tinss, 4 anonymous edits
Archimedes paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=577833497 Contributors: 4Jays1034, Action Jackson IV, Bejnar, Elonka, Emurphy42, Firien, Grahamrichter, Heron,
I.aditya, Luolimao, Malcolma, Michael Hardy, Niri.M, Nixeagle, Pbsouthwood, Quatloo, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Rjwilmsi, Solipsia, Stephenchou0722, 13 anonymous edits
Aristotle's wheel paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=587181369 Contributors: AnonMoos, David Eppstein, Habitmelon, Henrygb, Ilmari Karonen, Jitse Niesen,
Lenthe, Loadmaster, Mairi, MarSch, Melchoir, Mereda, Mhaitham.shammaa, Mysid, Oleg Alexandrov, Paine Ellsworth, Pleasantville, Psiph, Seaphoto, Snailwalker, UkPaolo, W.D., Wareh,
Wolfling, 10 anonymous edits
Bell's spaceship paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615076484 Contributors: 2over0, Action Jackson IV, Alfa137, AndrewWTaylor, BillinSanDiego, BlueZenith,
Byelf2007, Czyx, D.H, DS1000, DefnerBly, Desiderata9, Dfrg.msc, Donniah1234, Downwards, Edward, Ems57fcva, Evanh2008, Fcy, F, Gregory Merchan, Hamiltondaniel, Harald88,
Headbomb, Hellbus, Hillman, Jack Beijing, Jaykov, Joeshields, Kelly Martin, Klaser, Kpeeters, Lantonov, Loren.wilton, Mako098765, Martin Hogbin, Mgiganteus1, Mpatel, Ordage, Paradoctor,
Patrick0Moran, Pearle, Pervect, Pjacobi, QuantumOfHistory, Rjwilmsi, Rod Ball, Rracecarr, Tach123, Thiseye, Urhixidur, Varano, Wolfgangbeyer, 91 anonymous edits
Bentley's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=602613857 Contributors: Amrellithy, Dukey42, GregorB, Hjweth, Jovianeye, Pakaraki, Paradoctor, Patchy1, RJHall,
Wknight94, 5 anonymous edits
Black hole information paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615085757 Contributors: 2over0, 84user, A Nobody, A. Parrot, AaronEmi, Achaeus, Acrotatus, Action
Jackson IV, Acusilaus, Aeropus II of Macedon, Agasicles, Agasides, Agateller, Anetode, Arthur Rubin, Axl, Banno, Beanyk, BenRG, Bergerj, BillC, Bkell, Bsadowski1, CZmarlin, CalebNoble,
CarlHewitt, Carnildo, CaroleHenson, Catgut, Celarnor, Christopher Thomas, Chronulator, Cogiati, Crux007, Ctxppc, DanielCD, Darkstar949, David Eppstein, Davidhorman, Dictionarium,
Dom316, Dougweller, Dr mindbender, Drbogdan, Dricherby, Dstebbins, Dude1818, Dupz, Dv82matt, Dzenanz, Dugosz, E23, Edward, Eep, Elharo, EmeraldElement, Entropy1963, Eric Shalov,
ErkDemon, Eyu100, Faethon, Faethon11, Faethon36, Father Goose, G a adams, Gary, Ginsuloft, Goodnightmush, Greg L, GregorB, Gscshoyru, HEL, Hairy Dude, Hamiltondaniel, Headbomb,
Henning Makholm, Histrion, Humblefool, Hypnosifl, I am One of Many, Iron Condor, Isaacsurh, JB Gnome, Jafet, Jaimie Henry, Jan1nad, Jedikaiti, Jehochman, JelloPiranha, Jguard18, Jheald,
JocK, Joke137, Karl Leibrecht, Khazar2, Knowledge Seeker, Llywrch, Lue3378, Maurice Carbonaro, Maury Markowitz, Mccready, MedeaMelana, Melamed katz, Michael Hardy, Misterstark,
Mpatel, Munkeegutz, Nihonjoe, Nunc aut numquam, Oblivious, Ohnoitsjamie, Omegatron, Opaqueice, Orionsyndrome, Ossipewsk, Paradoctor, Paragon12321, Particle hep, Pauli133, Phil
Boswell, Pjf, PseudonympH, Pt, Pydos, QFT, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quarkgluonsoup, R'n'B, Raidr, Reneed22, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Roadrunner, Rolf h nelson, Ronhjones,
Shivan Bird, Shizhao, Shmuel, Shredder 187, Sjakkalle, SocioPhobic, Solipsist, Solver, Stephan Schneider, Stephanwehner, Styrenemace, Sverdrup, Swastassijns, Swatjester, Taxonrath,
Tediouspedant, Telso, The Anome, The wub, Thegreatgrabber, Theleftorium, Tim Shuba, TimothyRias, Timwi, Tobias Bergemann, Ujjwol, Urvabara, User31415926, Vipinhari, Waleswatcher,
WolfmanSF, Xanchester, Zakk151, Zqudlyba, Zundark, 185 anonymous edits
Braess's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611834958 Contributors: Andthorn, Anne Bauval, Anomalocaris, Bdiscoe, Bovlb, Brunonar, Byelf2007,
CaliforniaAliBaba, Ceyockey, Charles Matthews, CombAuc, Cretog8, Dbbrun, Dbesse, Dbiel, Delio.mugnolo, Diogenes00, Dklionsk, Dlohcierekim, EAderhold, Ego White Tray, Emurphy42,
Grondax, Hazmat2, Headbomb, Henrygb, Jbolden1517, Jholdn, Jitse Niesen, Khazar2, Madmardigan53, MarcoTolo, Mariojalves, Marqueed, Mattbrundage, Michael Hardy, Oleg Alexandrov,
Paradoctor, Phil Boswell, Piet Delport, Quest for Truth, Reywas92, Rjwilmsi, Sgeo, SiobhanHansa, Sjabeyta, SteveLoughran, Superm401, Supernet, Synergy, Tobiaskunz, TransportObserver,
Ufoneda, UnitedStatesian, Urhixidur, Volunteer Marek, Widefox, Wruz6, Yopai, 76 anonymous edits
Cool tropics paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=607419612 Contributors: Alan Liefting, Chris the speller, Daniel Case, Edward, MisfitToys, PMLawrence,
Plastikspork, Smith609, Soap, WolfmanSF, 3 anonymous edits
512

D'Alembert's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=599970918 Contributors: !jim, AugPi, BillFlis, BlatantHeroics, BoH, Bob1960evens, Brvman, C S, CRGreathouse,
Crowsnest, David Eppstein, Dimacq, Dobromila, Dolphin51, Dysprosia, EdJohnston, Egbertus, Ego White Tray, Fnfal, Fubla, Gaius Cornelius, Giftlite, Hacktivist, Hammersoft, Headbomb,
JaGa, Jitse Niesen, Joseph.slater, Karada, Lear's Fool, Linas, Matthew Yeager, McGeddon, Mcarling, Michael Hardy, Moxfyre, Mu, Nickptar, Ohconfucius, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV,
Rjwilmsi, Rolo Tamasi, Salih, SamuelRiv, Shell Kinney, Snoyes, Tompw, Visitor22, Visitor222, , 33 anonymous edits
Denny's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609266685 Contributors: AndrewWTaylor, AvicAWB, Charles Matthews, Keenan Pepper, MajorRoads, Rderdwien,
Rjwilmsi, Robinh, Saga City, SimonP, The Anome, Uranium grenade, Wolfkeeper, 4 , anonymous edits
Ehrenfest paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615221232 Contributors: Alphachimp, BD2412, Brews ohare, Buntje, Charles Matthews, Chris Howard, Coder Dan,
Cogiati, D.H, DFRussia, DVdm, David Eppstein, Dr Greg, DragonflySixtyseven, Ems57fcva, Fibonacci, Foobarnix, Geek1337, Geschichte, Goldenrowley, GregorB, Harald88, Headbomb,
Hillman, Hirak 99, Hongooi, Jake Spooky, Janiefar, Joh the superstar, JohnBlackburne, KSmrq, Keraunos, Magioladitis, Mboverload, Michael Hardy, Petri Krohn, Pjacobi, Reyk, Rjwilmsi, Rod
Ball, Rolphing, Romannikov, Saihtam, Scoty6776, Sergiacid, Spiel496, Stijn Vermeeren, Sun Creator, Thorseth, Trekphiler, Vcantoni, Wnt, XJaM, 59 anonymous edits
Elevator paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=395285883 Contributors: Davilla, Ezeu, Graham87, HEL, Heron, Kablammo, Kbdank71, Scientific29, Viperist, 4
anonymous edits
EPR paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615220234 Contributors: -- April, .:Ajvol:., 207.171.93.xxx, 2over0, ASCWiki, Agge1000, Agger, Alan McBeth, Alkivar,
Amakuha, AmarChandra, Andejons, Apoc2400, Ark, Arpingstone, Astrofan7, AxelBoldt, B4hand, Ballhausflip, Bevo, Bigbluefish, Binksternet, Blauhart, Bob K31416, Brews ohare, Brianga,
Brrk.3001, Bryan Derksen, CSTAR, CYD, Camrn86, Canadian-Bacon, Carbuncle, Cardmagic, Caroldermoid, Caroline Thompson, Chas zzz brown, Chinacat1970, Chjoaygame, Chris 73, Chris
Howard, ChrisGualtieri, Clarityfiend, CobbSalad, Colonies Chris, Complexica, Cortonin, CosmiCarl, Cpiral, Craig Pemberton, Crowsnest, Cspan64, Cuzkatzimhut, D0nj03, DAGwyn, DBooth,
DVdm, Dalit Llama, Darktaco, DaveBeal, David R. Ingham, David spector, Declare, Dogcow, Dpbsmith, Dr Smith, DrBob, DrChinese, DragonflySixtyseven, Dratman, Dryke, Dzhim, Dugosz,
EdH, Edward, Eequor, Egmontaz, Ehn, Eiffel, Ejrh, Elassint, Emvan, Esb, Etabackman, Ettrig, Euyyn, Falcorian, Finemann, Finlay McWalter, Fredkinfollower, Frish, Fulldecent, Fwappler,
Fyziks123, GeorgeMoney, Giftlite, Goldfritter, Graham87, Greedohun, GregorB, Gretyl, HCPotter, Hackwrench, Harald88, Headbomb, Hephaestos, Hhhippo, Hirak 99, Houftermann, Hugo
Dufort, Hydnjo, IAdem, Iamthedeus, J-Star, JaGa, JamesMLane, Jan-ke Larsson, Jcajacob, JerryFriedman, Jimw338, Jinxman1, Jnc, JocK, JohnArmagh, JohnBlackburne, Jperl66, Jpittelo,
Jpowell, Jwrosenzweig, KHamsun, KLRajpal, Kapalama, Karada, Karol Langner, KasugaHuang, Keenan Pepper, Kri, Kuratowski's Ghost, Lapisphil, Larsobrien, Lethe, Lf89, LiDaobing, Linas,
Linus M., Looxix, Lumidek, Maher27777, Marek.zukowski, Marie Poise, Mark Arsten, Mark J, Masudr, Maurice Carbonaro, Mav, Meiskam, Metron4, Michael C Price, Michael Hardy, Moink,
MorphismOfDoom, MrJones, Msridhar, Myrvin, Naddy, Natevw, NathanHurst, Nellatnoj, Nickst, Nickyus, Noca2plus, ObsidianOrder, Orange Suede Sofa, Owen, Pace212, Paine Ellsworth,
Papile, Paranoid, Pateblen, Patrick0Moran, Peashy, Pekka.virta, PenguiN42, Peter Erwin, PeterBFZ, PeterMartinxxx, Peterdjones, PetrGlad, Phancy Physicist, PierreAbbat, Prezbo, Publicly
Visible, Pwjb, Prez, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quondum, RTreacy, Radiofriendlyunitshifta, Rama, Razimantv, Rentzepopoulos, Rich Farmbrough, Rjwilmsi, Roadrunner, Robert K S,
Robertd, Robertefields, Rolf h nelson, Ronjoseph, Rracecarr, Ryft, SGBailey, SHCarter, Sanders muc, Schneelocke, Seb, Shadanan, Shakyshake, Shalom Yechiel, Sidasta, Sigmundur, Skierpage,
Snoyes, Sonicsuicide, Srleffler, Stain, Stephen Poppitt, Steve Quinn, Suisui, Sundar, Syko, Tarotcards, Tempshill, Tercer, Texture, ThomasK, Thrain2, Timwi, Tlabshier, Trilobitealive, Tsirel,
Tsop, Ty8inf, TylerDurden8823, Uusijani, Vasi, Victor Gijsbers, Vodex, Voyajer, W. P. Uzer, WMdeMuynck, Waleswatcher, Weekwhom, Widr, Wik, Wile E. Heresiarch, William M.
Connolley, WillowW, Wing gundam, XJaM, Xgrrr, Xnquist, YUL89YYZ, Yakamashi, Yill577, Zeycus, Zmwangx, Zootm, Zymurgy, , , 350 anonymous edits
Faint young Sun paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=609957977 Contributors: Adam McMaster, Andycjp, B.d.mills, Bender235, Bryan Derksen, Byelf2007, Charles
Matthews, Christopher Thomas, Ckatz, CrizCraig, DRTllbrg, Dragons flight, Drpickem, Dual Freq, Eleassar, EmilTyf, Eroica, Flying fish, Gloriamarie, Guycucumber, Headbomb, Hisingen Erik
Svensson, John of Reading, Knowledge Seeker, LuK3, Lugnuts, Mastodizzle176, Maxim Razin, Mortense, Nabuquduriuzhur, Nick Number, Northfox, PMLawrence, Paradoctor, Polentario,
Proxima Centauri, Puzl bustr, RJHall, Rainald62, Reyk, RingtailedFox, Rjwilmsi, Roberto Mura, Roentgenium111, Rogermw, Ruslik0, SSJ 5, Sir48, Spinningspark, The Thing That Should Not
Be, The way, the truth, and the light, TimVickers, Tommy2010, Trappist the monk, Vokesk, Vsmith, Vyznev Xnebara, William M. Connolley, William Ortiz, WolfmanSF, 43 anonymous edits
Fermi paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=616038139 Contributors: "alyosha", .digamma, 100110100, 213.253.39.xxx, 24.93.53.xxx, 3starhunter, 78562X, 8digits, A
bit iffy, A purple wikiuser, AGTMADCAT, AKismet, ANTIcarrot, AarCart, Aarondude919, Abpotato, Acdx, Acoma Magic, AdamRetchless, Aduthie, Alai, Albert.a.jackson, Alessandro57,
Alexanderpopoff, Alexjohnc3, Alpha Quadrant (alt), Althai, Amicianthony, Amikake3, Andre Engels, Andrei S, Andrewhayes, Andy Smith, Andy120290, Andycjp, Anir1uph, Anlala, Anrnusna,
Ant, Anthony, Antiqueight, Arb, Arkuat, ArnoldReinhold, Arpingstone, Art Carlson, Arthena, Arthur Hal, Ashmoo, Attilios, Auric, Avsa, AxelBoldt, Axl, Aymatth2, BRW, Babbage, Bakabaka,
Bakkster Man, Baqu11, Barbara Shack, Baroquesmguy, BatteryIncluded, Ben Jos, Bender235, Beowulf314159, Berek Halfhand, BernardZ, Bernat mussons, Bgwhite, Bigger digger, Bigturtle,
Billranton, Bizso, Bkell, BlackAndy, Blackspotw, Blair P. Houghton, Blnewbold, BobKawanaka, Bobblewik, Bondegezou, BoogaLouie, Bornhj, Bornintheguz, BoyliciousDarian, BradNeuberg,
BreakfastJr, BrettAllen, Brian Eisley, Brighterorange, Brightgalrs, Bryan Derksen, Bubba73, Bubbleboys, BuickCenturyDriver, Bumhoolery, Byelf2007, CALR, CNash, CWenger, Cadwaladr,
CanOfWorms, Card Zero, Cassowary, Celeritas, Centered1, Chancemill, Chilepine, Chris 73, ChrisGualtieri, ChrisO, ChristianJorn, ChristopherWillis, Cimon Avaro, Ckatz, Clicketyclack,
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DasHermit, Daveschroeder, Davesilvan, Davewild, David Gerard, David J Johnson, David Latapie, David R. Ingham, Db26, Dcoetzee, Deanlaw, Deanos, Debresser, Deep Atlantic Blue,
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Child, Fournax, Frecklefoot, Fredcondo, Fredrik, FriendlyRiverOtter, Froid, Func, Furrykef, Fvw, GRuban, Gaius Cornelius, Galwhaa, Gap9551, Gardaud, Gareth Owen, Gdvorsky, Geniac,
Geoffrey.landis, Giftlite, Glloq, Graham france, Green meklar, Greengrapes, Gregwmay, Grick, Grrow, Gujamin, Gwern, Gyrobo, HCA, Hadal, Hamiltondaniel, Harold f, Harryboyles,
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InternetMeme, Itemirus, Ivan Bajlo, J mcandrews, JCDenton2052, JDspeeder1, JJL, JPX7, JQF, JWSchmidt, JYolkowski, Jacob Lundberg, JamesMLane, Jamesx12345, Jason Carreiro, Jasonuhl,
Jeff560, Jeffrey O. Gustafson, Jengelh, Jengod, Jeremy Banks, Jeskeca, Jeturcotte, Jim McKeeth, Jim1138, Jim127, Jmacaulay, Jonathunder, Jondeere, JorisvS, Joseph11h, JoshKW, Jossi,
Jotomicron, Joxernolan, Jpxt2000, Jruderman, Julzes, Jwrosenzweig, Kaisershatner, Kalidasa 777, Karada, Karn, Keillan, Kencomer, Keplon, Khaosworks, Khazar, Kimholder, Kingaero,
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LoganFive, Loganfalco, Looxix, Loremaster, Lou.weird, LouScheffer, Lounorte, Lowellian, Loyh, Lumos3, Lupin, Lycurgus, M Alan Kazlev, M0rphzone, M3tainfo, METIfan, ML5,
Macslacker, Maddude11, MagicalSkyMan, Magister Mathematicae, Majorly, Malu5531, Manfroze, Marek69, Mark Foskey, Marskell, Martarius, Mat-C, Materialscientist, MatrixArsenal, Matt
Crypto, Matt Gies, Mattpersons, Mav, Mawfive, Maxime.Debosschere, Mayumashu, Mcsee, Mdw0, Medic463, Meelar, Metaferon, Michael C Price, Michael Rowe, Michaelbusch,
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Mmeijeri, Monk127, Moretz, Mortene, Mostly Zen, Motor, Mr. Billion, Mr.rastapopolus, MrBill3, MrBudgens, MrOllie, Mrshaba, Mrsnuggless, Mschlindwein, Mufka, Mullet, Murgh,
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Nima Baghaei, Nk.sheridan, Noclevername, Noosfractal, Norro, Northumbrian, NotQuiteEXPComplete, NotWith, Nuggetboy, O. Harris, OAC, OOODDD, Ohnoitsjamie, OingoBoingo2,
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Quokkapox, Qwanqwa, RC Pinchey, RJHall, Race911, Radius, Raichu234352, Rajah, Raquel Baranow, RavelTwig, Rdsmith4, Reargun, Reargunner, RedSpruce, RedWolf, Redherring, Reyk,
Rhombus, Rhwawn, Rich Farmbrough, Richard001, Richardhod, Rje, Rjwilmsi, Rlquall, Roadrunner, Rob Pommer, RobKohr, Robert Brockway, RobertG, Robertinventor, Robin Lionheart,
Roboshed, Roentgenium111, Rohsage, RokasT, Romit3, Ronhjones, Room429, Ropez, Ross Fraser, Rossheth, Rothorpe, Rracecarr, Rrburke, Rrohbeck, Ryanaxp, SEWilco, SHCarter, SJP,
SQGibbon, Sam, Sam Hocevar, Samboy, Sanders muc, Sapphic, Scalene, Scarpy, SchreiberBike, Sean Et Cetera, Seb az86556, Sebastian Goll, Second Quantization, Serpent's Choice, Sfan00
IMG, Shandydrinker, Shanen, Shenme, Shiner, Shoujun, Shsilver, Silas Stoat, Silviu Mihaila, Sin-man, Sippan, Sir Paul, Skewetoo, SkyMachine, Smb1001, Snap2grid, Sndeep81, Sobrien140,
Solomonfromfinland, SoniaZ, Sonicsuns, Sonjaaa, Sparky the Seventh Chaos, Spartan-James, Sperling, Spiritchaser, SpookyMulder, StaticGull, Stephen B Streater, Stevage, Steve Pucci,
Stevedix, Stevendahlin, Stevenj, Str1977, Strike Eagle, Strobilomyces, Sun Creator, Superm401, Suruena, Susvolans, Sverdrup, TK421, TPIRFanSteve, Ta bu shi da yu, Takatoriyama, Tandrum,
Taps333, Tarquin, Tassedethe, Tedernst, TenOfAllTrades, TenPoundHammer, Thaurisil, The Anome, The Mysterious El Willstro, The Wookieepedian, Thesmothete, Thickslab, Thincat, Thiseye,
Thmazing, Threedots dead, Tide rolls, Timwakefield, Timwi, Tired time, ToFeignClef, Tony1, Topdownquark, Tpbradbury, Tr606, Tristanb, Tswsl1989, Tuviya, Twhair, Udufruduhu, Ukuk,
Ulkomaalainen, Uncle Dick, Unyoyega, Urbane Legend, Uriyan, Vald, Vantine84, Vashti, Vedexent, Velella, Verbal, Vicki Rosenzweig, VideoRanger2525, Vincecate, Vincent naveen morris,
Viriditas, Vzbs34, Wafulz, WalrusLike, War, Wavelength, Waycool27, Wayward, Wazerface, Wer900, Wereon, Wik, Wiki Wikardo, Wildonrio, Wmahan, Worldtraveller, Wragge, Wtachi,
Xanzzibar, Xaven, Xenxax, Xiaopo, Xiner, Yggdrasil, Yobmod, Ypps, ZackTheJack, Zafiroblue05, Zanardm, Zbxgscqf, Zendonut, ZeroEgo, Zhitelew, Zundark, Zven, ,
1444 anonymous edits
Feynman sprinkler Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=601293445 Contributors: Abeld, Ciotog, Download, DragonHawk, Eb.hoop, Eliyak, EncMstr, GoOhm, Headbomb,
Joehubris, Kyz, Light current, Lucien leGrey, MagneticFlux, McGeddon, MerlinMM, Mike Peel, Oleg Alexandrov, Prezbo, PubliusFL, Robofish, Sherurcij, Wolfkeeper, Zbxgscqf,
, 30 anonymous edits
Gibbs paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615247053 Contributors: AManWithNoPlan, Afernand74, Ammamaretu, Antelan, Aragorn2, Bcent1234, BenGibbs,
BethNaught, Bo Jacoby, CYD, Catslash, Cfailde, Charles Matthews, ChemicalBit, Chris Howard, ChrisChiasson, Colonies Chris, Complexica, Count Iblis, Cubbi, D3, Daniele Pugliesi, Darklilac,
DavidLeighEllis, Delirium, Deltahedron, Dieksje, Djmcphee, Ensign beedrill, Foggg, GoingBatty, Guest 86, Guy vandegrift, Headbomb, Hydraton31, IceKarma, Ilmari Karonen, Jbening, Jheald,
513

Jmnbpt, Karada, Kjkolb, Kww, Lambiam, Linas, Linshukun, Lostart, M-le-mot-dit, Marco Krohn, Mdd, Mgiganteus1, Mild Bill Hiccup, Myasuda, PAR, PianoDan, Pjacobi,
QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Qwertyus, RecSpecz, Rjwilmsi, Tomruen, Trolou, Velenik, Waleswatcher, Wavelength, YUL89YYZ, 103 anonymous edits
Hardy's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612935108 Contributors: Alec.brady, Alsee, Anti-Chronon, Cakedamber, Chris Howard, Colonel Warden, Deanlaw,
Elitzur, Eric Kvaalen, Eujin16, Gorthian, GregorB, Intelligentsium, Jeffq, Jess Riedel, Jovianeye, Keithbowden, Michael Hardy, Paradoctor, Prezbo, Rjwilmsi, Shender, Sopher99, Underpants,
Welsh, 8 anonymous edits
Heat death paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=599297590 Contributors: Aef711, Airplaneman, AsianNerd95, Byelf2007, Chris 73, Crater Creator, Dhollm, Michael C
Price, Mpov, Nabla, OlEnglish, Paradoctor, Pearle, PenguiN42, PlanetStar, Polyamorph, R'n'B, RJFJR, Robertinventor, SemperBlotto, Solomonfromfinland, Thumperward, Treelzebub, 11
anonymous edits
Irresistible force paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612367047 Contributors: Achangeisasgoodasa, Action Jackson IV, Addshore, Aeusoes1, Aks23121990,
Alan.m.russell, Alethiophile, AliCran, Andrevan, Andrew Maiman, AndrewWTaylor, Andy Farrell, Anticipation of a New Lover's Arrival, The, Anville, ArcticViper, Ballchef, Barticus88, Benny
Pollok, Bkell, Blaine Westwood, Bluemoose, Bud0011, Bullzeye, CSWarren, Captain Screebo, CleckleysProof, CoJaBo, Coppertwig, Czech is Cyrillized, DH85868993, Dabigkid, Dabomb87,
Davidfreesefan23, Dbachmann, Denisarona, Derekleungtszhei, Discospinster, Doubious, Dr.K., DragonflySixtyseven, DuncanPed, ERK, ESkog, Ektoric, Eridani, Fastily, Firien,
Foreverprovence, Gamemaster0082, George100, Glane23, Gorank4, Gregfoxgregfox, Gurch, Guru Larry, HA HA HA HA!, Hhhippo, Hmains, ILKhanate, Infophile, JMBrust, JacobLime91,
Jagun, Jheiv, Jim1138, Jojhutton, Jokeri, Kamin 978, Keahapana, Kevinb9n, Khatru2, Kinitawowi, Kyle Barbour, L Kensington, Leon..., Lllzzzttt, ManaCorp, Martbigz, McGeddon, Meishern,
Meneth, Merovingian, MpITTI, MusicMaker5376, NawlinWiki, NickBush24, Nicola79, Nikki311, Nof20, NuclearWarfare, Oolongy, Openflower, Opheicus, Osarius, Pablo-flores, Paradoja,
Passionless, Pathoschild, Peruvianllama, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Philip Trueman, PhrozenRose, Plasticup, PowerUserPCDude, RMFan1, RadioFan, Rehan.haider, RogueNinja, Rurigok,
Ryulong, Sacredtrails, Samwaltz, Sandgem Addict, Sertrel, Simeon24601, Skakkle, Smartyllama, Smurfy, Solomonfromfinland, SpacemanAfrica, Stevemidgley, Stv12888, Sumple, Tevildo, The
Joker Hee Hoo Hoo!, The Joker Returns 10, The Proffesor, The undertow, TheFreeloader, TheMadBaron, TheSandwhichWriter, Thedesktop, Tierjj, Toa Nidhiki05, Tony Sidaway, Torgo, Trisar,
Tv316, ULTIM8 Unicorn, Uno b4, VanHelsing23, Vanisaac, Wafulz, Widefox, WikHead, Wikky Horse, WildstormSong, Wuhwuzdat, XV DEaD ShOT xV, Xeno666, XxAvalanchexX,
Xyzzyplugh, Yansky, Ydam, Yoji Hajime, Zaharous, Zerokitsune, 312 anonymous edits
Ladder paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615031411 Contributors: Alfa137, Aturzillo, Ben Standeven, Brews ohare, Byelf2007, Charles Matthews, Cmdrjameson,
Czyx, D.H, Denziloe, DonQuixote, DreamGuy, ErkDemon, EverettYou, Faizan, Fredrik, Frungi, GregorB, Hairy Dude, Hamiltondaniel, Harald88, Hillman, JaGa, Jheald, KSmrq, LOL,
Lantonov, Lexchis, Life of Riley, Martin Hogbin, MatrixFrog, Michael Ross, Number36, PAR, Prezbo, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, RainyShadow, Rich Farmbrough, Speedplane,
Spinningspark, Spiral5800, Spoon!, Tarotcards, Teorth, TerryW475, That Guy, From That Show!, YellowMonkey, 77 anonymous edits
Loschmidt's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=588798003 Contributors: 2over0, 4Jays1034, Acalamari, Airplaneman, Bcrowell, Bporopat, Cacycle, Charles
Matthews, Crosbiesmith, Dan Gluck, Danc, Denevans, Dhollm, Doctor joshi, Edward, Eequor, Enormousdude, Faizhaider, Fnfal, Gcsnelgar, Hypnosifl, Jheald, JocK, Karada, Leibniz, Linas,
Lysdexia, Mbell, Michael Hardy, Mike Peel, Mjec, Nbarth, PC78, Paradoctor, Phys, Pjacobi, Robertd, Salih, Sasoriza, TakuyaMurata, Tobias Bergemann, Was a bee, WebDrake, 19 anonymous
edits
Mpemba effect Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615627846 Contributors: 2over0, A.gholami, Ahoerstemeier, Aisteco, Amatulic, Anagogist, AndrePooh, Andrs D.,
Antiqueight, Arthena, Asbestos, AtmanDave, Auntof6, AxelBoldt, Babbage, Barak Sh, BernardZ, Berny68, Blethering Scot, Blin00, Blood sliver, Bongwarrior, Bsmith2414, BullRangifer,
Cacycle, Causa sui, ChrisGualtieri, Christian75, Ckwood, Claritas, Cmdrjameson, Creation7689, Curious1i, Cutler, DaveEngineer, Dcirovic, Dcoetzee, Denisarona, DerHexer, Dhollm,
Digfarenough, Discospinster, DmitTrix, Dmitri Yuriev, Donner60, Dougweller, DragonflySixtyseven, Drgao, Drjamesaustin, Druzhnik, Dysprosia, Ehrenkater, Emitozzi, Eng.ahmed.m.ali,
Epicgenius, Eptin, Ethomsen, Ewlyahoocom, FT2, Faerengol, FireHorse, Franois Robere, Furrykef, Gabriel Kielland, Gobonobo, Gorpik, Grafen, GrahamDo, Greenguy1090, Gulliveig, Hard
Raspy Sci, Headbomb, Hede2000, Henrygb, Hephaestos, Heron, Hgilbert, IO Device, Iantresman, Icairns, Ignoscient, Isnow, Ivan tambuk, JForget, JackofOz, Jbyersjcox, Jeanb., Jfmantis,
Josephfrazier, Josve05a, Jsled, Jrme, KJS77, Karada, King of Hearts, Kjknohw, Kno333, Kvng, L Kensington, L'omo del batocio, Laurenxxx189, Libb Thims, LilHelpa, Livefreeordie22,
Loniux, Lukys, Magpieram, Malleus Fatuorum, Martin Chaplin, Martin Hogbin, Master mack, Mattwc04, Maury Markowitz, Michael Hardy, Momojeng, Mrwriter, Mukulkumar12345, Nbarth,
Noirum, Nolanus, Nroets, Nsaa, O'Dea, Ogno, Omnipaedista, PMG, Paradoctor, Pmcm, PoshFrosh, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quadparty, RaseaC, Raulshc, Rich Farmbrough, Richard A
Muller, Riki, Rjwilmsi, Rklisowski, Robinh, Rspeer, Rumping, Rxnd, Sbtxag13, Sciurin, Sentewolf, Sheepech, Shiggity, Shii, Shot info, Some jerk on the Internet, Sophia, Staka, Superbeecat,
Suppafly, Svick, Syncategoremata, Syndicate, Tgeairn, The Anome, The High Fin Sperm Whale, The Thing That Should Not Be, The Tutor, The sock that should not be, Thumperward, Toreau,
Toytoy, Tregoweth, Trilobitealive, Undecided, UnicornTapestry, Van helsing, VincentH, Viriditas, Vrenator, Vsmith, Vuo, Wdcf, Wentu, Wester, William M. Connolley, Xb2u7Zjzc32,
YixilTesiphon, Zetawoof, Zompenguin, 331 anonymous edits
Olbers' paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614214304 Contributors: 216.254.9.xxx, 2over0, Againme, Agge1000, Aldaron, Alem Dain, Alfio, Ancheta Wis, Andeggs,
Andre Engels, Andyhowlett, Atakdoug, AxelBoldt, B01010100, Barak Sh, Ben Standeven, BenBaker, Bernardoni, Blainster, Brandmeister, Bryan Derksen, Calair, ChrisGualtieri, Christopher
Cooper, Cobalt174, Coemgenus, Coinmanj, Conversion script, Cragwolf, Cyclopia, DOSGuy, Daira Hopwood, Dakkagon, Damian Yerrick, David Eppstein, Davidhorman, Dbenbenn, Dcatalyst,
Delphwhite, Dinojerm, Dismas, Dr. Submillimeter, Drrngrvy, Egil, El C, Ellsworth, Exidor, Filiocht, Geoffrey.landis, Gerbrant, Giovanni33, Gnp, Graham87, GregorB, Hamiltondaniel,
Headbomb, Heckledpie, Hereticam, Heron, HkQwerty, Hogghogg, Hrundi Bakshi, IVAN3MAN, Icairns, Ikaroka, Irrbloss, Jasonphysics, Jeffrey Odell, Jessemerriman, Johnson Lau, Jonathan
Silverlight, JonathanD, Jordgette, JorisvS, Joshuastreet, Kaldari, Karada, Karol Langner, Kazvorpal, Kelisi, Kiminatheguardian, King Hildebrand, Kiran Gopi, Kmarinas86, Knowledge Seeker,
Kurtan, LDHan, LilHelpa, Looxix, MEJ119, Magickair, Markhurd, Marvinandmilo, Marysunshine, Matthew Woodcraft, MaxEnt, Med, Meisam, Mhdkandil, Michael C Price, Michael Hardy,
Midnightdreary, Mjb, Mojo Hand, Moopet, Murtasa, Nareek, Natalia.missana, Nicapicella, Obankston, Oren0, Paine Ellsworth, Pakaran, Pdn, Personman, Pinethicket, Pisspaws, Pol098, Pomte,
Pwjb, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, RDBury, Rainwarrior, Rangerdude, Rasmus Faber, Rayman60, Reddi, Reedy, Rentier, Rjwilmsi, Rnt20, Robertinventor, Robma, Roentgenium111,
Romanm, Rwflammang, Sakkura, Salsa Shark, Scoutersig, Scowie, Shimmin, Silly rabbit, Simetrical, Smallweed, Smellsofbikes, Srleffler, Stephenb, Steveprutz, StewieK, Stormymountain,
SubSeven, Taochanger, Tarquin, Tempshill, Tjmayerinsf, Tnxman307, Touchatou, Tristan robbins, Tuntable, User2004, UtherSRG, V1adis1av, VeryVerily, Wdfarmer, Will, Wolfmankurd,
WookieInHeat, Writtenright, Wrongfilter, Yahastu, 237 anonymous edits
Ontological paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=563083978 Contributors: 0x0077BE, 18-Till-I-Die, 1ForTheMoney, 9258fahsflkh917fas, Aaron Bruce, Ahpook, Ajsh,
Alexjohnc3, AndrewTJ31, Andrewman327, Another Believer, Arielkoiman, AtaruMoroboshi, Auric, Autobogg, BDD, Bearcat, Bernatel, BillC, Bisqwit, Bolddeciever, Brandov, Bronzethumb,
Bryan Derksen, Bstepp99, Btyner, Burnside65, CTF83!, Calhobs23, CatherS, ChibiKareshi, Chimiofchanga, Chintan 1988, Chris the speller, ChrisCork, Clerks, Cljohnston108, Conspiration,
Crissyman, Daniel Benfield, David Gerard, Deadlyops, Diego, Diet, DiogenesNY, Doczilla, Dodger, DonQuixote, Dpmuk, Dream of Nyx, Droidguy1119, Drpickem, Dstebbins, Dthomsen8,
Duggy 1138, Ehsteve23, Eliyak, Elsan, Emurphy42, EoGuy, Epbr123, Fiasco229, Flyer22, Frecklefoot, Frotz, Gamer 2k4, Geeked, Godsoflogic, Gundersen53, Gzuckier, Hamiltondaniel, Harry
Mudd, Hhliao, Histrion, Hotwire379, Hu, Hvn0413, Imnotoneofyou, Int3gr4te, ItsZippy, JaGa, JackSparrow Ninja, James J. Rowland, JasonAQuest, Jasonfward, Jbgreen, Jcarroll, Jdkasper,
Jhemmila, John Darrow, John0309, Jon1104, Joncnunn, Jonny Armstrong, Jourell, Ju gatsu mikka, Juansmith, Kamikaze28, Kathy.mckenzie93, Keeves, Keycard, Khaosworks, Khazar, Kizor,
LFaraone, Lambiam, Lazyteen542, Lhopitalified, Lisa mynx, Loadmaster, Lowellian, Lrj27, Luigifan, Lukeluke112, Lyonsbane, MWielage, MaddoxJKingsley, Madmardigan53, Magioladitis,
Mandarax, Marcus Brute, Markcpeck, Martarius, Mattbuck, Mboverload, McGeddon, MichaelGranados, Michaelpremsrirat, MidNiteBlade, MightyJAK, MightyWarrior, Milesnfowler,
MileyDavidA, Mini-Geek, Mithcoriel, MoraSique, Mrquizzical, Muchness, NYKevin, NeonNero, New User, Nightscream, NonNobisSolum, Nutster, ObiWanBillKenobi, Oceanwind,
Off2Explore, Oknazevad, Onslaught262, Oren0, Overlord11001001, OwenBlacker, Paddu, Paradoctor, Pigsonthewing, Pikawil, Plushpuffin, ProtegoMaxima, Pseudo-Dionysius, Psyblade42,
Quigonkenny, R-RockMan.EXE, Rabbabodrool, Rainwarrior, Raven's Crux, Reatlas, Rev Sysyphus, Reywas92, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Richard001, RichardKleiner, Richiau, Rjwilmsi,
RonConescu, Ruby2010, Rvolz, SchfiftyThree, Sega381, Serendipodous, Sgeureka, ShadowUltra, ShaleZero, Shawn allen@hotmail.com, Shay Guy, ShelfSkewed, SiegfreidZ, Squids and Chips,
Stansfield, Steverapaport, Subtlecoolness, Supernerd170, TCHJ3K, Tad Lincoln, Tassedethe, Tavdy79, Tbmorgan74, TeamCoachingNetwork, The Big L, The Light6, The Rogue Penguin, The
Yeti, TheDJ, TheFarix, TheRedPenOfDoom, Thisisausernameok, Titoxd, Toad of Steel, Tobetheman, Tonyrex, Traxs7, Tristanaustin, Trysohard, Tustin2121, Tzfat Mystic, UK Bakosi,
Ulric1313, UltimatePyro, Uroshnor, Valley2city, Verin Sedai, VolatileChemical, Waldir, WaysToEscape, Wellspring, Westacular, Wikichao999, Wikieditor1988, Wikignome0529, Wild ste,
Wlmg, Wolfram.Tungsten, Wuzzlewazzle, Xxxmortemxxx, Youngbeelzebub666, ZPM, ZZninepluralZalpha, , 528 anonymous edits
Painlev paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=589185009 Contributors: Bernard.Brogliato, Chris the speller, Gene Nygaard, GregorB, Headbomb, Innerproduct,
InverseHypercube, Michael Hardy, WurmWoode, 6 anonymous edits
Physical paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=604946452 Contributors: 1dragon, Acdx, Angelastic, Bbartlog, Bryan Derksen, Btyner, Christianjb, Crystallina, David
Sneek, Deville, Dr Greg, DragonflySixtyseven, Gwernol, HEL, Haemo, Harald88, Headbomb, Hillman, HorsePunchKid, Hypnosifl, Icairns, IceKarma, Jeff3000, JocK, Jonnabuz, Jwanders,
Karada, Karol Langner, Kirbytime, Martarius, Matthew Yeager, Maurice Carbonaro, Mbell, Mbeychok, Mccready, Michael C Price, Michael Hardy, Millermk, Msridhar, OlEnglish, OoberMick,
Paine Ellsworth, Paradoctor, Pdcook, Phil Boswell, PoccilScript, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Reaper Eternal, Reyk, Rgclegg, RobinK, Rory096, Safalra, Sam Hocevar, Sasoriza,
SchreiberBike, Seth Ilys, Skoban, Slightsmile, Someone42, SpaceCaptain, Srleffler, Strait, That Guy, From That Show!, Timwi, Titanium Dragon, Vald, Veraladeramanera, Wikimaus, X96lee15,
49 anonymous edits
Quantum pseudo-telepathy Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611247742 Contributors: 0x0077BE, BorgQueen, Boston, Colonies Chris, Crisco 1492, Dream of Nyx,
Estudiarme, IRP, JocK, Josiah Rowe, Jschnur, Lycurgus, MC10, Maurice Carbonaro, NE2, Paulcmnt, Prezbo, Quinxorin, Revolving Bugbear, Rjanag, RobinK, Robma, Sabri Al-Safi, Scott
Bowden, Self-portmanteauvercoming, Strani Beeap, Strilanc, TJSwoboda, Theopolisme, Thingg, TopGun, Victuallers, Vyznev Xnebara, Wingedsubmariner, 22 anonymous edits
514

Schrdinger's cat Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=616014410 Contributors: -jmac-, .:Ajvol:., 100110100, 198, 24.93.53.xxx, 51kwad, 64.12.104.xxx, A. di M., A2326xyz,
A930913, ABCD, AEdwards, AVJP619, Abtract, Access Denied, Acroterion, Adashiel, Adpete, Af648, AgadaUrbanit, Agamemnon2, Agge1000, Ajfweb, Albanharrison, Aleenf1, AlexPenson,
Alfredr, Amakuru, Amcbride, Amorymeltzer, AnOddName, Andrewjlockley, Andrewpmk, Angr, Angry Lawyer, Anonymous Dissident, Antandrus, Anupamsr, Anville, Aperisic, Asbestos,
Ashley Pomeroy, Ashmodai, AstroNomer, AussieLegend, Avb, Bakkster Man, Beeblebrox, Benhocking, Bensmith53, Betterusername, Bhoch14, BigFatBuddha, Bill Spencer5, Bjdehut,
Bmicomp, Bob K31416, Bob toben, BobKawanaka, Bobby D. Bryant, Bobbydowns, Bobo192, BookgirlST, Borisblue, Boverkamp, Bovineone, Brews ohare, Brion VIBBER, Brookston, Broski,
Brusegadi, Bryan Derksen, Bth, Bubba hotep, Bucephalus, Burstorder, C6541, CShippee, CYD, CaSJer, Calvinkrishy, Camembert, Canadian Paul, CanadianLinuxUser, Canterbury Tail,
Capricorn42, Carbuncle, Catbag, Catgut, Ccruzeliberty, Ccscott, Centrx, Cgay88, Chaos, Charlesrkiss, Chase2032, Chemguy2, Cherkash, Chetvorno, Chitomcgee, Chris Longley,
ChrisHodgesUK, Christofurio, Ciphergoth, ClockwrokSoul, Closetsingle, Cmsreview, Cohesion, Colincbn, Commonbrick, Complexica, Comrade009, Connerpike, Conversion script, Corporal
Tunnel, Cpl Syx, Craw's Revenge, Crazynas, Crosbie Fitch, Crystallina, DAGwyn, DAID, DJ Clayworth, DJIndica, DV8 2XL, DVdm, Dairhead, Danlibbo, Darkwhistle, Darth Panda, David R.
Ingham, David R. Ingharn, David.Monniaux, Davidizer13, Davidpdx, Dc987, Deanlaw, Den fjttrade ankan, Denisarona, Dennisthe2, Derwyk, Dfhussey, Dhatfield, Dicklyon, Dirac66, Dirkbb,
Discospinster, Djpadz, Dmoulton, Dnabbsbsv, Donner60, Doorag1, Dr.Gonzo, Dr.K., Drmies, Drunkenmonkey, Dspradau, Eaglizard, Ebehn, Eblingdp, Ed Cormany, Eeekster, El C, Elation,
Ennerk, Epbr123, Eric Shalov, Escape Orbit, EvergreenFir, Evil Monkey, Excirial, Falcon8765, Famousdog, Faseidman, Faseidrnan, Feldspaar, Felix Schrodinger, Fenway4201912, Fetchcomms,
Fibonacci, Fieldday-sunday, FlamingSkullComics, Floria L, FlorianMarquardt, Flyer22, Foobar, Forai, Francis Ocoma, Free Bear, FriendlyRiverOtter, Fylbecatulous, Gabbe, Gagueci, Galaxiaad,
Gavin.perch, Gawaxay, Geekdiva, Gerhardvalentin, Giftlite, Giggy, Gilly3, Glacialfox, Gogo Dodo, Gore Physicist, Graham87, Greenleaf, Gregbard, Greudin, Grunt, Gruntree, Gurch, Gz33,
HDarke, HPRappaport, Haakon, Hadal, HaeB, Hamiltondaniel, Hanseer360, Harkleroad, Harry, Hasek is the best, Hcobb, Headbomb, Henning Makholm, Heracles31, Heron, Hhhippo, Hillbrand,
Hires an editor, Hmhur, Holylampposts, Hondalube32, HorsePunchKid, Hovden, Howellpm, I am One of Many, I am a Wikipedian, IAmAndrewSoul, IRP, Identity99uk, Ikarus14,
Intelligenttheorist, Ixfd64, J.delanoy, JE, JIP, JPX7, Jack Greenmaven, Jack Mickkelson, Jaganath, Jarble, Jayden54, Jblatt, Jcfolsom, Jeltz, Jim Birkenshaw, Jim McKeeth, Jim1138, Jivecat,
Jjamison, Jlarks73, Jncraton, Joao, John, JohnArmagh, JohnSankey, Johnvdenley, Jordgette, Josh Grosse, Jtmichcock, JustAddPeter, K, KagakuKyouju, Kanthoney, Karl, Kevin aylward, Khalid
Mahmood, Khazar, KittySilvermoon, Klonimus, Koogid, Koyaanis Qatsi, Kukec, Kurtz117, Lambiam, Lancereq, LeadSongDog, Lear's Fool, LearningIsLiving, Lectonar, Lefty, Light current,
Lignomontanus, Likebox, Linas, Lkstrand, Loodog, LookingGlass, Lord Anubis, Luckyherb, Lumidek, MER-C, Maelin, MafiaCapo, MagneticFlux, Maine12329, Mako098765, Mandarax,
Marc711, Martarius, MartinHarper, MathKnight, Maurice Carbonaro, Max Terry, Maziotis, Mbakewel, Me.play, MercuryBlue, Mesoderm, Michael C Price, Mieszko the first, Mightyman1995,
Mike Rosoft, MikeBartlett, Mikoangelo, Mild Bill Hiccup, Mindmatrix, Minimac, Mion, Mipadi, Mjodonnell, Mono mano, Monsieur Prolong, Mrawesomemanforeverwoo, Mrdude, Ms2ger,
Mungukwachupi, Muu-karhu, N5iln, NTK, Nabla, Nabokov, Nakon, Nard the Bard, Nasnema, NawlinWiki, NellieBly, Nessus, Nick Mks, NickW557, Nile, No Guru, NormanEinstein,
Northside777, Nullx42, Nvmandi, O18, Ofekalef, Old Moonraker, Oliver202, Opelio, Optichan, OranL, OrangeAipom, Oski97, Otis182, Owen, Parejkoj, Paste, Paul August, Pernicat,
Personman, Peter Meyrathing, Peter Tomblin, Peterdjones, Pfalstad, Pgan002, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Pharos, Philg88, Philip Trueman, Philosophus, Phoenixrod, Picaroon, PierreAbbat,
Pinethicket, Piquan, Pitamus, Pitr C, Pladask, Polyparadigm, PonyToast, Ponyo, Prezbo, Profugum, Protohiro, Prunesqualer, PseudoSudo, Psternenberg, Pureaddiction,
QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quaestor23, Quandon, RG2, RK, RMFan1, Racerx11, Raisesdead, RajZsingh, RandMC, RandomCritic, Reach Out to the Truth, Rearete, RedWolf, Redirect fixer,
Reportica, Rich Farmbrough, Richard Weil, RickDeNatale, Riconaps, Riki, Roadrunner, RobertG, Ronaldomundo, Ronhjones, Rwjensen78, Ryan4314, RyanCross, RyoGTO, SFK2, SMP,
SabineLaGrande, Sabrebd, Saebjorn, Saigon punkid, Sam Spade, Samaritan, Sampi, Sanders muc, Sango123, Saperaud, SavinSav, SchnitzelMannGreek, Scimitar, Scoutersig, Sean D Martin,
Sean.hoyland, Seaphoto, Seirscius, Serendipodous, Serpens, Sewblon, Shadowjams, Shanes, Sheliak, Shervinafshar, Shizhao, Sidesteal, Silas S. Brown, Silly rabbit, Sillybilly, SimonD, Sjorford,
Sj, Skinnyweed, Sky Harbor, Skychrono, Slightsmile, Slimshady72397, Smartneddy, Smartyhall, Smitz, Smyth, Snillet, Snoyes, Solomonfromfinland, Sophitus, Spade285, Spearhead, Splash,
Spring1, Sprowl, Srich32977, Srnitz, Sten, Stepa, Steven J. Anderson, Stevertigo, Sumsum2010, Sweetser, TUF-KAT, Tabster0000, Taejo, TaintedMustard, Tango303, Tannkrem, Teflon Don,
Teutonic Tamer, Thatsrightwearebackfools, The Cunctator, The Monster, The Rambling Man, The Thing That Should Not Be, The wub, TheSun, Theendofgravity, Thorncrag, Tide rolls,
Timotheus Canens, Timwi, Tobias Bergemann, Tom Morris, Tom Peters, Tommy2010, Toytoy, Tregoweth, Trevor MacInnis, Trilobitealive, Trusilver, Tufflaw, Twas Now, Typobox, TyrS,
Ujjwol, Ukcreation, Ukexpat, Uogl, Useight, Vacation9, Vadim Makarov, Val42, Vanischenu, Varuna, Vegasprof, Veghead, Versehalf, VincentCalci, Violetriga, Virogtheconq, VolatileChemical,
WCFrancis, WMdeMuynck, Wandall Schwartz, Wapcaplet, Waterfall117, Wdchk, Wenli, Weregerbil, Wereon, Wetllama, Whatewehtpp, Whitehorse1, Whoop whoop pull up, Whosyourjudas,
Widefox, Wik, Wikiliki, Wikimancer, Wikipelli, Will2k, Wind-up Spirit, Wisq, Worthawholebean, Wwheaton, XJaM, Yamamoto Ichiro, Yar Kramer, Yeezil, Yintan, Yngvarr, Ytrewq05, Yvwv,
Zakhebeone, Zeerak88, Zenosparadox, ZeroOne, Zginder, ^demon, 97, , , , 954 anonymous edits
Supplee's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=570482718 Contributors: Chewyrunt, Cmdrjameson, Gaius Cornelius, Galoubet, Hairy Dude, Hillman, Linas, Neparis,
QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Rainwarrior, Robinh, TechPurism, Vsion, 10 anonymous edits
Tea leaf paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613405947 Contributors: Albina-belenkaya, Apoc2400, Bruce1ee, Catslash, Cosmic Latte, Dabomb87, David Eppstein,
Elison niven, Frietjes, Giftlite, Leandrod, MichaelScottRoberts, Molestash, Spinningspark, StAnselm, Svick, UpstateNYer, Zgystardst, 8 anonymous edits
Twin paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614890048 Contributors: .:Ajvol:., 213.253.39.xxx, Aanghelescu, Aaron Kauppi, AaronSand, Acdx, Adam Keller, Alai, Alan
Hill, Algebraist, Alpertron, Andrei Stroe, Andy Dingley, Andyhowlett, Andyjsmith, AngelOfSadness, Angelo Michael, Anna Lincoln, AnnabelBuxton, Aquarius Philosophicus, Arb, Ati3414,
Auspex1729, Avana, AxelBoldt, Bartosz, Bellerophon, Benarrob, Bencherlite, Bender235, Bernardbet, Bgwhite, Blanche of King's Lynn, Brews ohare, BryanD, Bubba73, Byelf2007, CBM,
CSSberk, Carbuncle, Carnildo, Cburnett, Cfulcher, CharlotteWebb, Chenyu, Chinju, Chowbok, ChrisCork, Cinkcool, Clarityfiend, Cleonis, Complexica, Conversion script, Cpcjr, CrypticBacon,
D.H, D.T.Thom, D99figge, DGG, DS1000, DVdm, Dabuek, Dark Formal, Dbachmann, Der alte Hexenmeister, DingleGhost, Dionyziz, Dissident, Downwards, Dr.K., DrBob, DynamoDegsy,
Dugosz, E4mmacro, Edgar181, Eeekster, Email4mobile, Emiellaiendiay, Ems57fcva, EoGuy, ErNa, Erdelyiek, EvanTPeoples, Fresheneesz, Froth, Geometer, GeorgeMoney, Giftlite,
Gloumouth1, GraemeL, Greg park avenue, GregorB, Gregory9, Gscshoyru, Gulmammad, Hairy Dude, Hajhouse, Harald88, Headbomb, Hillman, Hizoomi, Hypnosifl, IDK112, Icairns, Inala,
Inextremis35, Introvert, Izabela Furjan, Jaarspohl, JabberWok, Jagged 85, Javalenok, Jeffrey O. Gustafson, Jfg284, JoanneB, Jok2000, Jvs, Jyp, JzG, Kabethme, KaiShengHu, Karada, Karch,
Ketans, Kevmitch, Khazar2, Kpengboy, LC, LRC, Lantonov, Ld, Legija, Ligulem, Looxix, Lord Zaos, Lotte Monz, Lowellian, Loxley, Lumidek, Lumpy27, Magioladitis, Mare420, Markonius,
Martin Hogbin, Maurice Carbonaro, Mav, McSly, Menchi, Michael Fontenot, Michael Hardy, Mike R, Mindmatrix, Moroder, Moyerjax, Mscuthbert, Myles325a, NOrbeck, Na217253,
NapoliRoma, Nimuaq, Nubiatech, Nwbeeson, O. Harris, Oda Mari, Oleg Alexandrov, Otyler27, Owen, Oxnard28, PStrait, Paradoctor, Patrick, PenguiN42, Phil Boswell, Pjacobi, Plastikspork,
PoccilScript, Prezbo, PuzzletChung, QTxVi4bEMRbrNqOorWBV, Quintopia, Quondum, Ranveig, Rasmus Faber, Rc7035, Rdsmith4, Ressonans, RexNL, Rich Farmbrough, Richard001,
Rjwilmsi, Robinhw, Robma, RomanSpa, Roshan220195, SCZenz, SURIV, ShaunMacPherson, SheepNotGoats, Siftpodcast, Sillybilly, Slawekb, SlyEcho, Solomonfromfinland, Stevenj,
Stigmatella aurantiaca, Stud9920, Sun Creator, Suruena, Susewho, Susurrus, THEN WHO WAS PHONE?, Ta bu shi da yu, Tailpig, TasowyTR, Tedder, Telekineticturtle, Teorth, Tero,
Tesseract2, That Guy, From That Show!, The Cunctator, Theresa knott, Thermochap, Thivierr, ThomasK, Tim Shuba, Timb66, Tobias Hoevekamp, Tom, Tothebarricades.tk, TreasuryTag,
Treknologist, Tripp12345678901, Triwbe, TwPx, Val42, ValentinKostadinov, Voorlandt, W1k13rh3nry, WDavis1911, William M. Connolley, Wknight94, Wolfkeeper, Wwoods, XCelam,
XJaM, Yanick Toutain, Yizzerin, Ymblanter, Yonngtian, ZeroOne, Zondor, , 443 anonymous edits
Barber paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=597995884 Contributors: Albany NY, Alexg, Algotr, Andres, Asbestos, AxelBoldt, BigHaz, Bonkers The Clown, Breed
Zona, Byelf2007, CBM, Chuck Adams, Cornellrockey, Danchristensen, DesertSteve, Dugwiki, EdwardH, Ex Everest, Ex-act, FauxFaux, Geetha nitc, Gorillasapiens, Graft, Grendelkhan, Guyd,
Head, Hgrosser, Hoyt Jolly, Hyad, Ijmusic, Improbcat, J Milburn, JakeVortex, Jan Winnicki, Jemmy Button, Jessecarpenter310, Karada, Kay Dekker, Koavf, Laubrau, Lethe, MJPotsy, Maurice
Carbonaro, McGeddon, Michael Hardy, Michaeln, Mike Rosoft, Mmpozulp, Mortense, NameIsRon, Neg, Neutrality, Nikai, Nlu, Paradoctor, Pasixxxx, Paul August, Paul Barlow, Quatso,
Radgeek, RadicalBender, RodC, Rohirok, Rotem Dan, Sam Hocevar, Satellizer, Slightsmile, Sonicsuns, Sputnikcccp, Sundar, Sunray, TLOuk, Tabletop, Tarquin, The Anome, Tim Retout, Tom
Morris, Trlkly, Uberdroid, Vina, Volarron, Waldir, Welcome To The Jungle, Whitehat, Widr, Wile E. Heresiarch, William Graham, Xtraeme, 146 anonymous edits
Berry paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=610661607 Contributors: 213.253.39.xxx, Ale2006, AlphaPyro, Andeggs, Andrewjrallan, Anonymous Dissident, Asmeurer,
AxelBoldt, BD2412, BenFrantzDale, Berry, Brighterorange, Bryan Derksen, Byelf2007, CRGreathouse, CSTAR, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Cleared as filed, Computationalist, Conversion
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Epimenides paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=595308339 Contributors: 203.20.98.xxx, 213.253.39.xxx, 65.66.69.xxx, Andeggs, Andrew Dalby, Andycjp, Anthony,
Anthrcer, AxelBoldt, Azzhoe305, Biblioq, Blue Tie, Brigade Piron, Bryan Derksen, Bucove, CBM, Catalographer, Conversion script, Damian Yerrick, Darkwind, Delirium, Democritus, Dhanak,
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JamesBWatson, Kathovo, Kramden, Kurtmckee, Mav, Mayhap, MichaelGensheimer, Muke, Narsil, Orange Suede Sofa, Paradoctor, Petlif, Philip Trueman, Porcher, Reaper Eternal, RichLow,
RiseAbove, Ropers, Roscelese, Roy W. Wright, Schoen, Shanenoonan, Sokkies1969, Spektr, Standardfact, Stevenzenith, Stevepeterson, Tabletop, The Epopt, Twid, Tzetzes, Wile E. Heresiarch,
, , 100 anonymous edits
GrellingNelson paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=606046126 Contributors: Ambarish, Andeggs, Anrnusna, Argyrios Saccopoulos, AxelBoldt, Azure Haights, Benc,
Bender235, Bkell, Bovlb, Calcutta ferryman, Constructive editor, Cuiusquemodi, DRosenbach, Dicklyon, False vacuum, Freakofnurture, Fubar Obfusco, GTBacchus, Gamewizard71, Gareth
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Tagishsimon, Tesseran, TheBilly, TheGeekHead, Timwi, Ubershmekel, Vaughan Pratt, Wetman, Yugsdrawkcabeht, Zundark, 67 anonymous edits
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Intentionally blank page Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615647883 Contributors: -Barry-, APerson, Abd, AbigailAbernathy, Adamfinmo, Adamv88, Aitias, Al E.,
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Zachlipton, Zzyzx11, , 226 anonymous edits
Liar paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612840473 Contributors: 7532665a, 777sms, 879(CoDe), 9mmx19, AS, AThing, AaronSand, Abc-mn-xyz, AceMyth, Acetic
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WnaStdyEvrythng, Wshun, Xgamer4, Xtra3847, Yong Zixian, You Can't See Me!, Youngvariety, Your Lord and Master, Z10x, Zgystardst, Zinoviev, Ziqidel, 472 anonymous edits
Opposite Day Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615700301 Contributors: 031586, 54321imawesome, A. Parrot, A:-)Brunu, AMK152, AThing, Addshore,
Akakkakkakakakuiwui, Albrozdude, Alcmaeonid, Alphanza, Anaxial, Andrewpmk, Angr, Animedude360, Anonymous Dissident, Armbrust, Arthena, AstroChemist, AutomaticStrikeout,
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anonymous edits
Paradox of the Court Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612460405 Contributors: 478jjjz, AleeWiki0, Bkell, CoolGuy, Efogoto, Filippowiki, HonoreDB, Infovarius,
KillKill822, Lesgles, Mtdashti, Nikkimaria, Paradoctor, Phen0m 05, Reyk, Seaphoto, Shentino, Smeazel, ThisIsMyWikipediaName, 19 anonymous edits
Petronius Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613531936 Contributors: AaronCBurke, AlbertSM, Aldux, Amphipolis, Andrew Dalby, Andycjp, Attilios, Azarcon, Bill Thayer,
Bob247, Bookwench, Byelf2007, CA30057, Cesar Tort, Ciphergoth, Classical geographer, Country Wife, Cwoyte, Cyberpageman, Cynwolfe, Dahn, Davidiad, Dcoetzee, Diiscool, Dimadick,
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Jbrowner@nyc.rr.com, Jdforrester, Jeffery Weskamp, Jim Henry, Jon Awbrey, Joy, Jusdafax, Jvano, Kay Dekker, Kbdank71, Kitsunegami, Ksnow, Kuralyov, Leuko, Llywrch, LordEniac,
Macaddct1984, Magnus Manske, Marnanel, Matthus, MaxwellPerkins, Mezigue, Michael David, Midnightblueowl, Mrubs218, Museo8bits, Nakon, Neddyseagoon, Nickleturtle, Nishidani, Nlu,
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Sirala, Skull33, Spartan22, Srnec, Stolengood, Swansnic, Technomad, Template namespace initialisation script, Textorus, The Singing Badger, TheDJ, TheTrojanHought, Tomisti, Tony1,
Tpbradbury, Treanna, Treybien, Tzetzes, Udufruduhu, VasilievVV, Waacstats, Weregerbil, WpZurp, Yolgnu, , 95 anonymous edits
Quine's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613843309 Contributors: Andeggs, AnonMoos, Baccyak4H, Banno, Brianski, Byelf2007, Charles Matthews,
ChrisHodgesUK, Danhash, Danman3459, Danny lost, Davidw, Djk3, Dominus, DreamGuy, Dsimic, Emurphy42, EvanHarper, Finell, Frank Romein, Fustbariclation, Futile Crush, Geoffw1948,
Gregbard, GregorB, Jemmy Button, MC10, Mavaddat, Mogism, N4m3, OrangeAipom, Paradoctor, Reinyday, Robokarl101, Roscelese, Smyth, SnowFire, Spontini, Tbvdm, Tgr, The Anome,
Trappist the monk, Tsparent, Twas Now, 49 anonymous edits
Richard's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=588517497 Contributors: Accelerometer, Alan McBeth, Aleph4, Alterationx10, Auntof6, AxelBoldt, Bender235, CBM,
Cdibuduo, Cispa, Danski14, Daqu, Dominus, Dorftrottel, Dratman, Eequor, Eric Herboso, Estel, Exfenestracide, Falcor84, Gregbard, Hairy Dude, HansHuttel, JRSpriggs, Justavo, Karada, Lee
Daniel Crocker, Lupinoid, Marc van Leeuwen, Mathemaduenn, Michael Hardy, Moskvax, Obradovic Goran, Oleg Alexandrov, Paradoctor, Quarl, Rjwilmsi, Roie m, STyx, Sigma-Algebra,
Somejan, Varano, Wing, Wvbailey, ZICO, 41 anonymous edits
Self-reference Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=614343663 Contributors: 041744, 16@r, 1exec1, 21655, 61.9.128.xxx, Ace9999, AgadaUrbanit, Ahoerstemeier, Ahpook, Al
Lemos, Alecmconroy, Alerante, Alevy1234, Alex43223, AlexChurchill, AnAj, Anarchia, Anatoly Vorobey, Angr, Anthere, Anthony, AnthonyMartin, Arakunem, Asafox, AstroHurricane001,
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Matthew Stannard, Matthewmayer, Maurice Carbonaro, Mav, Max Terry, MaximalIdeal, Maximuspryme, Mblub, McGeddon, Michael Hardy, Mikekearn, Mikem1234, Mindmatrix, Mintguy,
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Ophion, Orangemike, Oryanw, Otterathome, Outriggr, P.T.isfirst, PBS, Paddu, Palfrey, Paradoctor, Patrick, Paul August, Peter1c, Peterdjones, PhilHibbs, Physis, Pinethicket, Piroteknix, Profero,
Pufferfish101, Qwertyus, Rabbitslayer21, Redyka94, RevRagnarok, Rfc1394, Richi, Ritarius, Rjwilmsi, Rootbeer, Rps, Rror, Saforrest, Sasuke Sarutobi, Sbaxt641, SchuminWeb, Seven of Nine,
ShawnVW, Shimmera, Shultz III, Singularity2, Sjorford, Skrim, Slogan120, Slovakia, Smiddle, Smokizzy, Sp00n17, Steipe, Stjef, Sun Creator, Svick, Tassedethe, Tayste, TenPoundHammer,
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Trey314159, Trivialist, Uagehry456, Vanished user 47736712, VanishedUserABC, VictorLucas, Warreed, Wavelength, Wereon, Wes!, Wikiwikifast, Wildroot, William R. Buckley, Wknight94,
WojPob, Worldrimroamer, Xezbeth, Yano, Yashgaroth, Zephyrus11, Zntrip, Zondor, 362 , anonymous edits
Socratic paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=542228844 Contributors: Absool5, Ace of Spades, Aesopos, AgadaUrbanit, Ajax151, AntanO, Bibliomaniac15, Big lkz,
BillC, Capricorn42, Catalographer, Complex (de), Cybercobra, Cygnature, David Schaich, Davidiad, Dbachmann, DerHexer, Dmarquard, Dobermanji, Dr Gangrene, Drift chambers, Furrykef,
GDonato, Gilliam, Gregbard, Hans Adler, Isokrates, Iwoeque, JamesBWatson, Kwamikagami, LightSpectra, Lord Moonstone VII, Matthias Klostermayr, MeDrewNotYou, Michipedian, Minoru,
Mladifilozof, Nathan Johnson, Ningauble, Omnipaedista, Paradoctor, Philip Trueman, RenamedUser01302013, Rjwilmsi, Rossami, Servus Triviae, Sneak, Solomonfromfinland, Spirals31,
Staticd, Tarotcards, Teles, Tomisti, Treppo, Vilepluume, Wareh, Wbm1058, Wolfdog, Woohookitty, ZxxZxxZ, , 84 anonymous edits
Yablo's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=590676211 Contributors: Bender235, CBM, Ceilican, Gregbard, Lesath, Minisweet12, PMLawrence, Paradoctor, Petter
Strandmark, 12 anonymous edits
Absence paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611422081 Contributors: Brison09, Edcolins, Gregbard, Paul A, Paxse, 1 anonymous edits
Bonini's paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=612443946 Contributors: 7daysahead, Charles Matthews, Chrislk02, Fgnievinski, Justin.triplett, Lcgarcia, Mbawiz,
Nbarth, Yotwen, 9 anonymous edits
Code-talker paradox Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611098360 Contributors: A D Monroe III, ArnoldReinhold, BreFuller, Byelf2007, Caerwine, Chrajohn, Doc glasgow,
Doncorto, Donner60, Dugwiki, Georgieyoshi, Ground Zero, Hmains, JimCubb, Kyoakoa, Megapixie, MrShamrock, Phr, Schneelocke, Shenme, SnopdouS, Sobreira, The Anome, TheAMmollusc,
Thryduulf, Vojen, Welsh, Ww, Zyrath, 12 anonymous edits
Ship of Theseus Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=613704966 Contributors: 20040302, 4, A bit iffy, Abb3w, Albmont, Ali Davoodifar, Analogdrift, Andeggs, Anders
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Paradoxes

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Paradoxes

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Paradoxes

Situations that seems to defy intuition

Kavka's toxin puzzle

Arrow's impossibility theorem

St. Petersburg paradox

Paradoxes of material implication

Unexpected hanging paradox

What the Tortoise Said to Achilles

Bertrand's box paradox

Boy or Girl paradox

False positive paradox

Gdel's incompleteness theorems

Interesting number paradox

Low birth weight paradox

Missing square puzzle

Paradoxes of set theory

Two envelopes problem

Von Neumann paradox

Buttered cat paradox

Mere addition paradox

Paradox of the plankton

Fitch's paradox of knowability

Aristotle's wheel paradox

Bell's spaceship paradox

Black hole information paradox

Cool tropics paradox

Faint young Sun paradox

Heat death paradox

Irresistible force paradox

Tea leaf paradox

Intentionally blank page

Paradox of the Court

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Quine's classification of paradoxes

The Monty Hall problem: which door do you

Infinity and infinitesimals

Geometry and topology

The BanachTarski paradox: A ball can be

Coastline paradox: the perimeter of a landmass is in general

Robert Boyle's self-flowing flask fills itself in this

Linguistics and Artificial Intelligence

Applications of the theory

The chain store game

The chain store paradox

Selten's levels of decision making

The imagination level

The reasoning level

The final decision

The economy of decision effort

This is greater than A, so I gain on average by swapping.

Introduction to resolutions based on Bayesian probability theory

Proposed resolutions to the alternative interpretation

If this is equal to 1/2, it follows by simple algebra that

or p(n)=p(n-1). This must be true for all n, an impossibility.

for all a. As remarked

Foundations of mathematical economics

Controversy among philosophers

Extensions to the problem

. If one would like to switch envelopes if the expectation value of

History of the paradox

Notes and references

Kavka's toxin puzzle

Kavka's toxin puzzle