TOPIC: STAGES WHEN JUDICIAL NOTICE MAY BE TAKEN

G.R. No. 160795

June 27, 2008

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and
TERESITA CUASO, respondent.

Spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own 2 lots at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, which is managed by Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand,
spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own a lot whichisadjacenttotheTanjangcoslots.
After the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc.
(C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on one of the Tanjangcos lots by 87 square
meters.
The Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused,
prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with
Damages.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that the Cuasos perimeter wall
encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were
builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the
encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion,theperimeterwallshouldbedemolishedatthelattersexpense.TheRTCalsoorderedtheCuasos
to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint.
When the case was appealed, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted
in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion ofthe Tanjangcoslot. Correlatively, the CA
allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted under Articles 449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New
Civil Code, which include the right to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after
reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area. The Cuasos
were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from
1989 up to the time they vacate the property considering the location and category of the same. They were,
likewise, ordered to pay the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P150,000.00asattorneysfees.TheCAalsoimposedsixpercent(6%)interest per annum on
all the awards.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount
prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the
portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00.
Held:

Yes. The ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag is instructive:

Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997], petitioners argue that the MTC may
take judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to
determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In that case, however, this Court relied
on the CA's factual findings, which were based on the evidence presented before the trial court. In
determining reasonable rent,
the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land, 2) the
increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court
relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of
rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence.
As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its
action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court awarded rent to the
defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable
amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before
taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence,
there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper
rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was
due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform factual
finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal
v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances
of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful
possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more
than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental
fixed by the CA.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA

FACTS:
Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the
Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise
importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. The DOE is a
governmental agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 and tasked to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government relative to
energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an
original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance
was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001, approved by respondent
Mayor on November 28, 2001, and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication. Sections 1
and 3 thereof state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata
St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in
the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L.
Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.,
Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity
of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-calledPandacanTerminalsoftheoilcompanies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
ofunderstanding(MOU)withtheoilcompanies.TheyagreedthatthescalingdownofthePandacan
Terminals was the mostviableandpracticableoption.The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU
in Resolution No. 97.In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the
mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of the March 7, 2007
decision. The court ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code
(LGC)toenforcealllawsandordinancesrelativetothegovernanceofthecity,includingOrdinance
No. 8027. The court also held that it need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the

City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
After the court rendered its decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene
and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively.
On April 11, 2007, the court conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent
and movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.
ISSUE: Whether the court has the ministerial duty to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by
Congress.
HELD:
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled
AnOrdinanceAdoptingtheManilaComprehensiveLandUsePlanandZoningRegulationsof2006and
ProvidingfortheAdministration,EnforcementandAmendmenttheretowhichwasapprovedby
respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this
ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to
local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of
the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken
steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court
about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court
is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have
access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text
of the rules the party desires it to have notice of? Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a
trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice
of local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute
does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the
ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other.
Inthesamewaythatwedeemtheintervenorslateinterventioninthiscaseunjustified,wefindthe
failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the
partiesintheirjointmotiontowithdrawcomplaintandcounterclaimstatedthattheissue...hasbeen
renderedmootandacademicbyvirtueofthepassageofOrdinanceNo.8119].Theycontendthatsuch
admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and
legalityofOrdinanceNo.8027andthatithadconcededtheissueofsaidordinancesconstitutionality,
opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119. The oil companies deny this and further
argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for
the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance
No. 8027:
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were
given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance no.
8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus
provided for an even longer term, that is, seven years
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4.
Judicial admissions.Anadmission,verbalorwritten,madebyapartyinthecourseof
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary
to or inconsistent with what was pleaded,the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances whicharenotthesameasthiscasebeforethecourt.Toconstitutea
judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.

G HOLDINGS V. NAMAWU (Sorry for the very detailed facts baka magtanong kasi ulit si Sir)
GR No. 160 236
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Thepetitioner,GHoldings,Inc.(GHI),isadomesticcorporationprimarilyengagedinthebusiness
of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies. Private respondent, National Mines and
Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC). an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex
at Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine
NationalBank(PNB),onaccountoftheirforeclosureofMarinduqueMiningandIndustrialCorporations
assets. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization
because it had become a non-performing asset.
Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust
(APT),theformerboughtninetypercent(90%)ofMMCssharesandfinancialclaims. These financial
claims were converted into three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and
securedbymortgagesoverMMCsproperties. The notes, which were similarly worded except for their
amounts.
Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction of the stipulated
down payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took full
control of the management and operation of MMC.
Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute (refusal to bargain collectively and unfair labor
practice) arose between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with the NCMB a notice of
strike. Then Labor Secretary, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, later assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and
ruled in favor of NAMAWU and issued an order (Quisimbing Order) declaring that the lay-off (of workers)
was illegal and that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laidoff workers with payment of monetary claims.
Then Acting DOLE Secretary, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of
a partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises
for the execution of the same. The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied becauseMMCsresidentmanager
resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered
the issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). The respondent acting
sheriffs, the members of the union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied
on the properties of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.

GHI filed with the RTC a case for contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriffs Levy on
Properties. GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage executed by MMC in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this
deed was registered and that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed and sold to
GHI as the highest bidder.
The trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Injunction enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from
further enforcing the Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-on properties and
denied the MR of NAMAWU.
Aggrieved, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the
orders of the RTC. After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC
issuances and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ. The CA ruled, among others, that
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the
conclusion that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent. The CA further ruled that the subsequent
foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment
against MMC and it also pierce the veil of corporate fiction of GHI and MMC.

ISSUE:
Evidence- Whether or not the CA failed to take judicial notice of the previous cases
decided by the SC which is so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent with the case at bar

(Substantial Issues- in case lang itanong ni Sir

1.

WhetherthemortgageoftheMMCspropertiestoGHIwasasham

2.

Whether there was an effective levy by the DOLE upon the MMCs real and personal
properties; and

3.

Whether it was proper for the CA to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MMC and
GHI.)

HELD:
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of the following two decisions
on the case at bar. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge
our Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G

Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and
thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. Thus, it is necessary to
reiteratethat:courtshavealsotakenjudicialnoticeofpreviouscasestodeterminewhetherornotthecase
pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under consideration. The
two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant case
cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

The lower court and the CA failed to take judicial notice of, or to consider, our Decisions
in Republic,etc.,v.GHoldings,Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU, in
which we respectively recognized the entitlement of GHI to the shares and the company notes of MMC
(under the Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its labor claims. At this stage,
therefore, neither the lower court nor the CA, nor even this Court, can depart from our findings in those
two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
From our discussion above, we now rule that the trial court, in issuing the questioned orders, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, because its issuance was amply supported by factual and legal bases

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES in case itanong ni Sir

The mortgage was not a sham.
Republic etc., v. G Holdings, Inc. acknowledged the existence of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement between the APT and the GHI. Accordingly, the notes (and the stipulations therein) enjoy the
benefit of the same presumption of regularity accorded to government actions. Given the Government
consent thereto, and clothed with the presumption of regularity, the mortgages cannot be characterized as
sham, fictitious or fraudulent.To repeat, this Court has recognized this Purchase and Sale Agreement
in Republic,etc.,v.GHoldings,Inc.
It is undeniable that the Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was formally documented two
weeks after NAMAWU filed its notice of strike against MMC on August 23, 1996. However, this fact
alone cannot give rise to an adverse inference for two reasons. First, the mortgages had already been
establishedandconstitutedasearlyasOctober2,1992inthePromissoryNotes,showingtheclearintent
ofthepartiestoimposealienuponMMCsproperties , it may have become necessary to execute the Deed
ofRealEstateandChattelMortgageonSeptember5,1996,inordertoenforcethetrialcourtsdecisionof
June 11, 1996. This appears to be the most plausible explanation for the execution of the Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage only in September 1996. Second, the mere filing of a notice of strike by
NAMAWU did not, as yet, vest in NAMAWU any definitive right that could be prejudiced by the execution
of the mortgage deed.

On the issue of whether there

had been an effective levy upon

the properties of GHI.
Since the properties were already mortgaged to GHI, the only interest remaining in the mortgagor
was its right to redeem said properties from the mortgage. The right of redemption was the only leviable or
attachable property right of the mortgagor in the mortgaged real properties. At that moment in time, with
the registration of the mortgage, either NAMAWU had no properties of MMC to attach because the same
had been previously foreclosed byGHIasmortgageethereoforbyvirtueoftheDOLEslevytoenforce
NAMAWUsclaims,thelattersrightsaresubjecttothenoticeoftheforeclosureonthesubjectproperties
byapriormortgageesright. GHIsmortgagerighthadalreadybeenregisteredbythen,andit is basic
that mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged credit, not for the judgment credit of the
mortgagorsunsecuredcreditor.
On the issue of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction.

The negotiations between the GHI and the Government--through APT, dating back to 1992-culminating in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, cannot be depicted as a contrived transaction. In fact, in
the said Republic,etc., v.G Holdings,Inc., this Court adjudged that GHI was entitled to its rightful
claims not just to the shares of MMC itself, or just to the financial notes that already contained the
mortgage clauses over MMCs disputed assets, but also to the delivery of those instruments. Certainly, we
cannot impute to this Courtsfindingsonthecaseanybadgeoffraud. Thus,werejecttheCAsconclusion
that it was right to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, because the foregoing circumstances belie such an
inference. Furthermore, we cannot ascribe to the Government, or the APT in particular, any undue motive
to participate in a transaction designed to perpetrate fraud.
We also cannot agree that the presumption of fraud in Article 1387 of the Civil Code relative to
property conveyances, when there was already a judgment rendered or a writ of attachment issued,
authorizes piercing the veil of corporate identity in this case. We find that Article 1387 finds less
application to an involuntary alienation such as the foreclosure of mortgage made before any final judgment
of a court. We thus hold that when the alienation is involuntary, and the foreclosure is not fraudulent
because the mortgage deed has been previously executed in accordance with formalities of law, and the
foreclosure is resorted to in order to liquidate a bona fide debt, it is not the alienation by onerous title
contemplated in Article 1387 of the Civil Code wherein fraud is presumed.)

SPOUSES LATIP VS. CHUA

GR NO. 177809, OCTOBER 16, 2009
FACTS:
Rosalie Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located in Baclaran,
Paraaque City. She leased 2 cubicles in said building to Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, the
lessees. A contract of lease was signed by them. A year after the commencement of the lease and with
Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Chua, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When
SpousesLatipdidnotheedRosaliesdemand,sheinstitutedtheaforesaid complaint on July 6, 2001,
and attached to it is the contract of lease.
IntheirAnswer,SpousesLatiprefutedRosaliesclaims.Theyaverredthattheleaseofthetwocubicles
hadalreadybeenpaidinfullasevidencedby3receipts,inChuashandwriting, showing payment to
Chua of the amounts of P2M in check, P500,000 cash and P70,000 cash.
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over 2
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they
readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000 would be
used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished
cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them
without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of
lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they
were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a
complaint against them.
MeTC and RTC
MeTC ruled in favor of Chua. RTC reversed the MeTC. The RTC did not give credence to the contract
oflease,rulingthatitwasnotnotarizedand,inallothersubstantialaspects,incomplete.AstoChuas
claim that her receipt of P2,570,000 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor,
and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart
from her bare allegations, Chua did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the
RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid
for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration
of the lease period (December 2005).
Court of Appeals
CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease,
albeit lacking the signature of Chuas husband and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did

not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000 merely constituted
payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial
notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all
had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
Issue:
Whether the Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles, since the CA took judicial notice
of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.

Held:
No. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is
mandatory or discretionary on the courts.
The SC reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
It is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite
of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill
money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling
in favor of Chua, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known. SC also
noted that RTC specifically ruled that Chua, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to
prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.
In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Chua; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill
money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be
reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in
the negative.

On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000, SC held
that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial
notice.
Since the contract ofleaseremainedoperative,wefindthatRosaliesreceiptofthemoniesshouldbe
considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the
lease.
Finally, SC noted that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the
leased premises when this decision was promulgated in 2009, however, the amount of P2,570,000,
covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Chua.

TOPIC: EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS/CONFESSION

PEOPLE VS. MUIT
G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
Justice Tinga
FACTS:
Millano Muit, Sergio Pancho Jr., Rolando Dequillo, Romeo Pancho, Eduardpo Hermano and
Joseph Ferraer were charged with kidnappin for ransom with homicide and carnapping in two (2) separate
informations. However, only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by RTC Tanauan City, Batangas and was utilized as a state
witness. The facts showed that the accused conspired to kidnap and detain a certain Engr. Ignacio Ong Jr.
for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family and they chose the house of Ferraer as their safehouse
andRomeoasthegroupsinformant.
On Dec. 2, 1997, the group received a call from Romeo informing that the victim was already at
the construction site at Brgy. Darasa, Tanauan. They commuted to the site while Pancho Jr was on board a
gray Mitsubishi car as back-up. The victim arrived at the site in a blue Pajero being driven by a certain
Roger Seraspe. After the victims inspection together with his two engineers on the site, the three (3)
engineers walked towards the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the 3 engineer suddenly lay prostrate
on the ground. An unidentified man standing near the 3 engineers and three more surrounded the Pajero.
While two of them approached Serasepe, one of them was Muit who poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered
him to lay prostrate on the ground. The accused forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to
the Pajero. When the victim was already on board the Pajero, they drove away and passed through the Pagasa Road Gate where 2 more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa Road boarded the Pajero.
Supt. Mission, Deputy Chief of Lipa City PNP received a radio from Tanauan Police Station that a
kidnapping was ongoing and kidnappers on board a Pajero were heading owards Lipa City. The PNP team
put up a barricade. Right after, the Pajero was spotted, the driver stopped. Two policemen approached the
Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. The cross
fire lasted for around four minutes and all the occupants of the Pajero including the victim died except the
driver and the front passenger who managed t escape.
Muit, the driver of the Pajero was apprehended at Brgy. San Carlos, Batangas. Pancho Jr. returned
toFerraershouseandwaitedfor the group to come back but the group did not return. It was only at the
news that they found out that the group died in a cross fire while Muit was in handcuffs.
Dequillo was arrested at his house in Quezon City. Alleging he was forced to sign a statement
without being allowed to read it and denied any participation in the crimes. Pancho claimed that he was
arrested in Calbayog, Samar and was transferred to Camp Crame alleging the same that he was forced to
sign the written Confession of his participation.
Muit claimed that he was in Lipa City to attend a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for
his Uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him.
The RTC found Muit, Pancho Jr, Dequillo and Romeo guilty. It held that were denials and alibis
of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecutionswitnesses. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC did not give credence to the claims were procured through torture
as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallareandappellantsmedicalcertificatewhichwereissued
during their incarceration and after the execution of their statements.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr and
Dequillo and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.
RULING:
NO.Thereisnothingonrecordtosupportappellantsclaimthattheywerecoercedandtortured
into executing their extrajudicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellantsextrajudicial statements is that each contains many detailsand factswhichthe investigation
officers could not have know and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given
by appellants. Moreover, Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements
voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their
constitutional rights. Muit was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extrajudicial
confessions and cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, he was positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at
them during the kidnapping. Claims of torture are not supported by Medical Certificate from the physical
examinations done on them. Such claims are easily concocted and cannot be given credence unless
substantiated the extrajudicial confessions of the three have strengthened the prosecution case against
Romeo. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognized
various exceptions. One such exception is where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several
persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.
They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show
theprobabilityofthelattersactualparticipationinthecommissionofthecrimeandmaylikewiseserveas
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had participated
in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as interlocking confessions.

TOPIC: EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS/CONFESSION

PEOPLE V SATORRE
G.R. No. 133858
August 12, 2003
Facts:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre (a.k.a Emiano Satorre) was charged with Murder for allegedly killing
Romero Pantilgan with the use of .38 paltik revolver. The appellant pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. Thus, trial ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses. Among them is one Flavio Gelle who narrated
that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Brgy. Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu
where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was detained. This narration was
corroborated by Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, who testified that Abraham
Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. Appellant
allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That
same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She
further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which
he wrestled from his possession.
The appellant denied all the charges against him: that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the
incident; that Rufino AbayatahadagrudgeagainsthimbecauseofanincidentwhenhetiedRufinoscow
to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm; denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan; disclaimed
ownership over the paltik .38 revolver; and stated that he could not even remember having surrendered a
firearm to Castaares. His statements were corroborated by his father and brothers.
Givingcredencetotheprosecutionsevidence,thetrialcourtfoundhimguiltyofthecrimeofMurder.
The appellant filed an appeal claiming that his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by
the Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a
competent and independent counsel of his choice.
Issue:
WONappellantsalleged oral extrajudicial confession is a sufficient basis to warrant his conviction.
Held:
No. Evidently,appellantsallegeddeclarationowninguptothekillingbeforetheBarangayCaptainwasa
confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial
confession.
Thereisnoquestionastotheadmissibilityofappellantsallegedoralextrajudicialconfession.Indeed,as
far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction whether
the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made.

On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances
prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings
of the accused. This is the position taken by the courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating
statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must be
shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting that he
made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the full
import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the
confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. However, due to the aforesaid
personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not be definitively
appraised and evaluated.
MainprosecutionwitnessCastaarestestifiedthatafterappellantsallegedoral confession, she brought the
latter to the office of the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu. At the police station, Castaares
was investigated, after which she executed her sworn statement. Also at the police station, appellant
allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. His statement was not taken nor was his
confessionreducedintowriting.Thiscircumstancealonecastssomedoubtontheprosecutionsaccount
that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises questions not only as to the
voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on whether appellant indeed made an oral confession.
Thetrialcourtgavecredencetoappellantsoralextrajudicialconfessionrelyingonjurisprudencewhichwe
find are not applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court, the convictions were based on circumstantial
evidenceinadditiontotheappellantsconfessions,ortheextrajudicialconfessionswerereducedtowriting
and were replete with details which only appellants could have supplied. In the case at bar, however, there
was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of appellant. More
importantly, the said confession does not contain details which could have only been known to appellant.
Onthewhole,itappearsthatthetrialcourtsimplybasedappellantsconvictiononthetestimonialevidence
ofprosecutionwitnessesthatappellantorallyowneduptothekilling.TheCourtcannotaffirmappellants
conviction on mere testimonial evidence, considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be
conclusively established because of appellants personal circumstances and the failure of the police to
reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. The doubts surrounding the alleged oral confession, the
conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited by the trial court do
notleadtothesamemoralcertaintyofappellantsguilt.
Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.

TOPIC: ADMISSION BY A CONSPIRATOR

G.R. No. 177727

January 19, 2010

HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner, vs.ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and

LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around
5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had
no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit.
He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered
killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled
Columna.
Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit on March 8, 2004 wherein he admitted
his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias
"Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio
Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the
mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention
for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten
lettertorespondentLloyd,sentfromColumnasjailcellinManila. In the letter, Columna disowned the
contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession.
He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted
an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his
handwritten letter.
During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited
letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain
or extract the affidavit from him.1avvphi1
Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the
city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia, Columna said that
he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing
because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention
center.
The DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the

Informations for murder. Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and
assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.
However,SecretaryGonzalesgrantedtheAntipordasmotionforreconsideration(MR)anddirectedthe
withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was
inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other
evidence. As a result, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations. The
cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR
ofpetitioner.Sheruledthat,basedonColumnasMarch8,2004affidavitwhichheaffirmedbeforethe
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the co-cospiratorsadmissioninthiscaseconstituteavalidvicariousadmission(exception
to the res inter alios acta rule).
HELD:
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.1avvphi1
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c)
it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be
used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with
the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was
presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of

Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible
as evidence against them.

TOPIC: PLEA OF GUILTY LATER WITHDRAWN

CUENCO V TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX
G.R. No. 174154

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner leased from respondents the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex for the operation
of a cockpit. The lease was for a period of two (2) years, but was subsequently renewed for a period
of four (4) years. Compliant with the lease contract, petitioner gave respondents a deposit equivalent
tosix(6)monthsrental,amounting to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), to answer for
whatever damages may be caused to the premises during the period of the lease. Upon expiration of
the lease contract on May 8, 1998, a public bidding was conducted. The contract was awarded to a
newlessee. Thus, petitioner demanded the returnof the amount deposited. However, petitioners
four (4) demand letters remained unheeded. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money,
damagesandattorneysfeesbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt (RTC) of Cebu City.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and directed the respondents to return the full
amount of the deposit plus interest of three percent (3%) per month from August 18, 1998 until full
payment thereof. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. Unsatisfied, both parties
moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the uncontroverted testimony of a witness is binding.

RULING: Borne out by the records of the case is the testimony of Ateniso Coronado that petitioner
continued to hold cockfights for two months beyond the expiration of the lease contract. Such
declaration was neither questioned nor denied by petitioner during the trial of the case in the RTC
and on appeal before the CA. Neither was it contested by petitioner in his Memorandum filed with
this Court. Binding is the finding of the CA on the matter that witness Ateniso Coronado whose
credibility has not been impeached, and whose testimony has neither been overthrown by
contradictory evidence, gave the most telltale factual account. Appellee [petitioner] did not refute
the pronouncement of witness that he continued to hold cockfights during the months of June and
July despite knowledge that his lease would no longer be renewed as evidenced by the very first letter

he sent to appellants. The assessment of rentals from appellee for two (2) extended months therefore
came as a necessary consequence pursuant to Articles 1670 and 1687 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines in relation to the contract of lease.

Well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review
by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea
of fair play, justice and due process. Furthermore, the Court required the parties to submit their
memoranda, and were apprised that no new issues may be raised; and the issues raised in the
pleadings not included in the memoranda shall be deemed waived or abandoned, per Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 99-2-04-SC.

TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
FACTS:
In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997, Toshiba declared input VAT payments in the
aggregate sum of P3,875,139.65, with no zero-rated sales. Toshiba subsequently submitted its amended
VAT returns in the same amount of input VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated sales
totaling P7,494,677,000.00.
Toshiba filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop applications for tax credit/refund in the total amount
of P3,685,446.73. CIR opposed the claim for tax refund/credit of Toshiba. Upon being advised by the CTA,
Toshiba and the CIR filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues.
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax
credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence at all. CTA rendered its Decision favoring
Toshiba. According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were subject to
zero percent (0%) VAT based on the Tax Code. Toshiba could then claim tax credit or refund.
Both Toshiba and the CIR sought reconsideration of the foregoing CTA Decision. Toshiba asserted that it
had presented proper substantiation for the input VAT disallowed by the CTA. The CIR, on the other hand,
argued in his Motion for Reconsideration that Toshiba was not entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT
payments because as a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was not subject to
VAT. CIR contended that all businesses and establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the
government five percent (5%) of their gross income earned within the zone, in lieu of all taxes, including
VAT. The VAT-exemption of Toshiba meant that its sale of goods was not subject to output VAT and
Toshiba as seller was not allowed any tax credit on the input VAT it had previously paid.
The CTA issued a Resolution denying both Motions for Reconsideration of Toshiba and the CIR. The CTA
took note that the pieces of evidence referred to by Toshiba in its Motion for Reconsideration were
insufficient substantiation, being mere schedules of input VAT payments it had purportedly paid. On the
other hand, CTA refused to consider the argument that Toshiba was not entitled to a tax credit/refund
because it was only raised by the CIR for the first time in his Motion for Reconsideration.
CIR filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the. The appellate
court ruled that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input VAT payments because
it was a tax-exempt entity. As a PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting to the
national government the five percent (5%) preferential rate on its gross income earned within the
ECOZONE, in lieu of all other national and local taxes, including VAT.
The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the export sales of Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not
zero-rated, transactions. The appellate court found that the Answer filed by the CIR did not contain any
admission that the export sales of Toshiba were zero-rated transactions. At the least, what was admitted by

the CIR in said Answer was that the Tax Code provisions cited in the Petition for Review of Toshiba were
correct. As to the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues filed by the parties, the appellate court declared that
the CIR signed the said pleading through palpable mistake. This palpable mistake in the stipulation of facts
should not be taken against the CIR, for to do otherwise would result in suppressing the truth through
falsehood. In addition, the State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents.
Toshiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, Toshiba filed the instant Petition for
Review.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to dismiss outright and gave due course to
CIRspetitionnotwithstandingitsfailuretoadequatelyraiseinissueduringthetrialinthe
CourtofTaxAppealsToshibasclaimforrefund.
WON the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Court of TaxAppealsfindings,
with regard Toshibas export sales being zero rated sales for vat purposes, were based
merely on the admissions made by CIRs counsel and not supported by substantial
evidence.
RULING:
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The CIR did not timely raise before the CTA the issues on the VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export
sales.
Upon the failure of the CIR to timely plead and prove before the CTA the defenses or objections that
Toshiba was VAT-exempt, and that its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions, the CIR is deemed to
have waived the same.
The CIR did not argue straight away that Toshiba had no right to the credit/refund of its input VAT
payments because the latter was VAT-exempt and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions. The
CIR passed up the opportunity to prove the supposed VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export sales when
the CIR chose not to present any evidence at all during the trial before the CTA. The CIR had waited until
the CTA already rendered its Decision which granted the claim for credit/refund of Toshiba, before
asserting in his Motion for Reconsideration that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and its export sales were VATexempt transactions.
It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by
due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. The Court cannot simply grant the plea of the
CIR that the procedural rules be relaxed based on the general averment of the interest of substantive
justice. It should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to
secure a just determination of every action. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the
Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intends to forge a weapon for erring litigants
to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper

cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their
counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of
the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
The CIR judicially admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered and its export sales were subject to VAT
at zero percent (0%) rate.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially
when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof.
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint
StipulationarethatToshibaisadulyregisteredvalue-added tax entity,thatissubjecttozeropercent
(0%) value-added tax on its export sales. The CIR was bound by these admissions, which he could not
eventually contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision by arguing that Toshiba was
actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba
could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales
of Toshiba could not have been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as well.
The CIR cannot escape the binding effect of his judicial admissions.
The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it ruled in its Decision that the CIR could not be bound
byhisadmissionsintheJointStipulationbecause(1)thesaidadmissionsweremadethroughpalpable
mistakewhich,ifcountenanced,wouldresultinfalsehood,unfairnessandinjustice; and (2) the State
could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court of Appeals
isrootedinitsconclusionthatapalpablemistakehadbeencommittedbytheCIRinthesigningofthe
Joint Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the commission of a mistake, much more, of a
palpable one.
The CIR does not deny that his counsel, Atty. Joselito F. Biazon, signed the Joint Stipulation, together with
the counsel of Toshiba. Considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, Atty.
Biazon is presumed to have read, studied, and understood the contents of the Joint Stipulation before he
signed the same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the contrary.
Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
Decision, nor in his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon committed a mistake
in signing the Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did he present any
proof in support thereof. The CIR began to aver the existence of a palpable mistake only after the Court of
Appeals made such a declaration in its Decision.

Despite the absence of allegation and evidence by the CIR, the Court of Appeals, on its own, concluded
that the admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation were due to a palpable mistake based on the following
deduction.
The Court of Appeals provided no explanation as to why the admissions of the CIR in his Answer deserved
more weight and credence than those he made in the Joint Stipulation. The appellate court failed to
appreciate that the CIR, through counsel, Atty. Biazon, also signed the Joint Stipulation; and that absent
evidence to the contrary, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have signed the Joint Stipulation willingly and
knowingly, in the regular performance of his official duties. Additionally, the Joint Stipulation of Toshiba
and the CIR was a more recent pleading than the Answer of the CIR. It was submitted by the parties after
the pre-trial conference held by the CTA, and subsequently approved by the tax court. If there was any
discrepancy between the admissions of the CIR in his Answer and in the Joint Stipulation, the more logical
and reasonable explanation would be that the CIR changed his mind or conceded some points to Toshiba
during the pre-trial conference which immediately preceded the execution of the Joint Stipulation. To
automatically construe that the discrepancy was the result of a palpable mistake is a wide leap which this
Court is not prepared to take without substantial basis.

TOPIC:POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
PEOPLE V. VILLACORTA
GR No. 172468, October 15, 2008
FACTS
On March 1, 1998, the accused allegedly set fire on a residential house owned by one Angge Arguelles in
Sampaloc by pouring kerosene on a mattress placed in the room of the said house and ignited it with a
lighter. It was also during and by reason of the said fire that one Rodolfo Cabrera, an occupant of the said
house sustained burn injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
The RTC rendered its decision convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Arson with Homicide.
According to the RTC, the prosecution had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence, together with the
written confession of the accused-appellant, to sustain her conviction of the crime charged.
The prosecution presented the following evidence:
First, William Lim, a Kagawad of Barangay 395. He testified that his former typist called him to tell him
that a woman (accused-appellant) wanted to surrender to a barangay official. According to him, the woman
said that she was bothered by her conscience and admitted that she burned her residence. When she was
escorted to the fire station, she immediately reduced into writing her confession.
Second was Ronnia Gallardo, also an occupant of the house burned by the appellant. According to him, he
saw the appellant in her room with her folding bed on fire. When the fire was getting bigger she told him,
Pabayaanmonaiyan.Dmaaydamaynatayo.
Third was Rodolfo Lorenzo, a Kagawad of Barangay 457. He testified that he saw the accused two days
before the incident. He claims that the accused was drunk because she was having problems with her live
in partner who broke up with her. She told Lorenzo that mangugulo ako at manununog. He tried to
appease her but she just ignored him. Days later, his attention was called on the alleged fire that broke in
thesquattersareawheretheaccusedresided.Heprocededtotheplaceandwhenhesawtheaccusedand
triedtochaseher,shetoldhim.damaydamaynatayodyanhuwagnyopatayinangsunog.
Fourth was SF01 Redentor ASlumno who investigated the fire. he testified that on March 1, 1998, Kagawad
Lim turned over to their office the accused and informed them that the latter voluntarily surrendered to him.
The accused-appellant denied that she voluntarily wrote the confession. She also contends that the
circumstantial evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the quantum of proof to hold her liable for the
charge. She argues that although prosecution witness Gallardo saw her mattress on fire, he never saw her
deliberately burning the said mattress.
ISSUE
Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused.
HELD
The circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness
to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may
identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the
very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,

he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is
that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are the
only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless
there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless
an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime
is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct
evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following: the testimony of Kagawad
Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of the accused-appellant at the time she caused a public
disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors into this turmoil, two days
prior to the conflagration; the testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the
room of the accused-appellant, the latter said to
himinthevernacular:Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo. the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo
Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to chase the accused-appellant during the fire incident, he again heard her
utter a nonchalant remark: Damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog.andthe
testimony of Kagawad William Lim that the accused-appellant approached and admitted to him
immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the conflagration
The aforementioned circumstantial evidence would constitute positive identification of the accusedappellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had
the motive to commit the crime, and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in
her neighborhood -- the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as
immediately before and after the fire-- sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the author of the said
crime.
In this case, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified consistently and truthfully. The
chain of events before, during, and after the fire -- as narrated by the prosecution witnesses - - established
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant committed the acts alleged in the information, which
constituted the crime of arson with homicide. The accused-appellantfailedtoshowanymisconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances ofsubstancethatcouldaltertheoutcome
of the case. She also
did not show any credible motive why the prosecution witnesses testified against her.

TOPIC: DOCUMENTED ALIBI

ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176389

14 December 2010

FACTS:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their
home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime.
She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency
to criminals. Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile,thatAlfarohadbecomethedarlingof
the NBI because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
Alfarosdirectandspontaneousnarrationofeventsunshakenbygruesomecross-examination should be
given a great weight in the decision of the case.
InAlfarosstory,shestatedthataftersheand the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela
at their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became
piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other
hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had
taken place, he was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and
only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport
withfourstampsrecordinghisentryandexitfromboththePhilippinesandtheUS,FlightsPassenger
Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated
certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a
thorough recount of his activities in the US
ISSUE:
WhetherornotWebbsdocumentedalibiofhisU.S.travelshouldbegivenmorecredencebytheCourt
than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
1. The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
2. Thewitnessstoryofwhatshepersonally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria. She did not show
up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around the
agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And
although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew

of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just so she can
accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that:
1. He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb.
ThisalibialtogetherimpeachesAlfarostestimonynotonlywithrespecttohim,butalsowithrespecttothe
other accused. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took
place,Alfarostestimonywillnotholdaltogether.WebbsparticipationistheanchorofAlfarosstory.

TOPIC: OFFER TO COMPROMISE

PEOPLE VS ERGUIZA
G.R. NO. 171348
NOVEMBER 26,2008
Facts:
The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Cour
t may be moved by compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law
. Basic is the rule that for conviction of a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt -conviction with moral certainty.
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high scho
ol student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at
the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes.[7] When they were bound for home at arou
nd 5:00 o'clockintheafternoon,AAAsshortpantsgothookedonthefence.AAAaskedJoyandRickyt
o wait for her but they ran away and left her.[8] While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry s
uddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would mak
e a noise.[9] Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other thorny pla
nts grow. Then Larry removed his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Therea
fter, he removed her short pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her p
rivatepartsandmadepushandpullmovements.HelikewiseraisedAAAssandoandmashedherbreas
t. AAA felt pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private part after
Larry made the push and pull movements.[10] Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident othe
rwise he would kill her and all the members of her family and then he ran away.[11] AAA lingered for a w
hile at the place and kept crying. Having spent her tears, she wore her panty and short pants and proceeded
to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After staying for some time at the store, AAA deci
ded to come (sic) home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed. Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept
mum on the incident.[12] On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's m
other), a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AA
A's throat and the absence of her monthly period.[13] After examining AAA, her grandmother told BBB t
hat her daughter was pregnant. BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused
to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that
she was raped by accused-appellant.[14] On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle,
went to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[15] Then the police brought he
r to YYY DistrictHospital[16] where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital conducted the e
xamination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made the following findings: "In layman's term, Dr. Sison found no ph
ysical injury from the breast, the body except the genital area wherein he found a significant laceration co

mplete(sic)healedover11:00o'clock.[17]Dr.Sisonalsotestifiedthatasinglesexualintercoursecould
make a woman pregnant."
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she was raped. CCC (AAA's father), t
estified that on May 2, 2000, the family of accused-appellant went to their house and initially offered P50,
000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house for the wedding recep
tion[18], Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
DEFENSE'S VERSION
On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's[19] house from 8:00 o'clock in the mor
ning up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his mother Albina Erg
uizainstructedhimtofetchahilotashiswifeJosiewasalreadyexperiencinglaborpains.Heproceeded
tofetchthehilotJuanitaAngelesandstayedintheirhouseuntilhiswifedeliveredababyataround3:00
o'clock in the morning of January 6, 2000.[20]
Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony th
at he indeed fetched her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his wife who was experiencing
labor pains and who delivered a baby at about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his w
ife's side until the latter gave birth.
Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is
thedaughterofherbalaeSpousesCCCandBBBthathersonLarry,her husband and two others left C
CC and BBB's residence at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that she went to Spous
es CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were askin
g forP1,000,000.00 which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.0
0.[21]
Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on
January 5, 2000; that she never left AAA when her short pants got hooked; that they went together to the s
tore of Auntie Beth where they parted.[22]
Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testifi
ed that the house of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes from the mango orchard; that if o
ne runs fast, it would only take a minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having seen Larry
in the orchard.
The RTC and CA adjudged Larmy guilty of the charge.
Issue:
Did the prosecution's evidence pass the test of moral certainty?
Held:
NO.

This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to di
sprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very natu
re of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convinci
ngly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all th
at is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of credibilit
y and unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.[32] After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court fin
ds that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which
no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense wi
tness. The testimony of Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of rape having taken place as n
arrated by complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles (Jua
nita) corroborated the alibi of appellant
Dr. Sison testified that his findings were not conclusive, but were rather suggestive that complainant was r
aped. Furthermore, as to the question of paternity of the child of complainant, Dr. Sison suggested doing a
DNA match
CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the prosecution. In order to rebut the allegation
made by appellant's family that the present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job in prep
aring for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito, CCC testified that on the con
trary, the wedding went smoothly.[40] CCC further claimed that the family of appellant knelt before him
crying and offered money to settle the case.[41] Moreover, CCC testified that appellant left his house at 4
:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000. On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses, namely: Juanito Ma
caraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy. Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orcha
rd, testified that he did not see appellant on any occasion in the orchard.[42] More specifically, Macaraeg
emphasized that he did not see appellant on January 5, 2000.[43] However, on crossexamination, he testifi
ed that the house of appellant is only a three-minute walk from the mango orchard and probably a minute i
f one walks fast.[44] Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she was with appel
lant at the house of CCC and BBB preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's brot
her Carlito. She said that they left the house of CCC at around 5:00 p.m.[45] Albina narrated that when t
hey arrived home, at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as the wife of appellant w
as having some labor pains.[46] She said that appellant and the hilot arrived at around 5:30 p.m.[47] Acc
ording to Albinaappellant never left their house.[48] On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she h
ad an altercation with BBB regarding the bills and that they never resolved their quarrel.[49] She spoke to
BBB and CCC because she learned that they were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA.[50] After ta
lking to BBB and CCC, she and her husband confronted appellant and asked if he had raped complainant,

which appellant denied.[51] Albina claimed that CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that t
hey later reduced it to P250,000.00.[52] Albinasaid that she offered P5,000.00 to BBB and CCC only to p
reserve their relationship as in-laws and for peace
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain poi
nts, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case. This,
however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00. T
he offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and jurisprud
ence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied admission o
f guilt
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as evidence
of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was
not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made. An offer of compromise from an unauthorized per
son cannot amount to an admission of the party himself.[59] Although the Court has held in some cases t
hat an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt,[60] we belie
ve that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused sho
uld have been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise.[61] Moreover, it has been held tha
t where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer
of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution
The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to the case of the prosecut
ion:first,thatJoydidnotleavebehindAAAwhenthelattersshortsgothookedtothefenceandsecondl
y, that Joy and AAA left the orchard, went home together and separated at their Aunt Beth's house, indicat
ing that no untoward incident, much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time and place that comp
lainant had testified on
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecutionmiserablyfailedtorebutJoystestimony.Neithercomplainantn
orRicky,BBBoranyotherwitnesswascalledtothewitnessstandtorefuteJoystestimony.True,itisu
p to the prosecution to determine who to present as witnesses.[76] However, considering that the testimon
y of Joy critically damaged the case of the prosecution, it behooved the prosecution to present evidence to
rebut the defense evidence. Witnesses such as Ricky, AAA and BBB should have been presented by the p
rosecution to demolish Joy's testimony. The testimony of Ricky is particularly significant, especially sinc
e AAA claimed that he was with her and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on the day of the alleged rape
incident. The failure on the part of the prosecution to present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense evidence
, that no rape happened on the date and time claimed by AAA
Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to the mango orchard, the time was 1:00 p.m.[
80] However, AAA testified that she went to the mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m.[81] The variance i

n the testimonies of Joy and AAA as to the time they went to the mango orchard on the day of the alleged
rape incident may be disregarded as they are de minimis in nature and do not relate to the commission of t
he crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of both Joy and AAA; that is, that both referre
dtothedaywhenAAAsshortgothookedtothefence.Moreover,assumingarguendothatthevar
iance between the testimonies of AAA and Joy as to the time they were together at the mango orchard is a
n indicia that AAA may have been raped by appellant on a different day, not on January 5, 2000, to still i
mpute to appellant the crime of rape is not plausible
This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense, appellant must establish
by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the off
ense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[85] In the case at bar, alth
ough the orchard is just a minute away from the house of appellant, in view of the testimony of the hilot Ju
anita that appellant was with her from 5:10 p.m. and never left his house from that time until his wife gave
birth at 3:00 a.m.; and the testimony of Joy that she never left AAA in the orchard and that they both went
home together, the defense of alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a cr
edible witness.[86] Thus, the Court finds that appellant's alibi is substantiated by clear and convincing evi
dence. What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- moral certainty that the accused is guilty.[87] The conflicting testimonies of Joy and c
omplainant,andthetestimonyofJuanitathatcorroboratedappellantsalibiprecludetheCourtfromconvi
cting appellant of rape with moral certainty
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule.[88] Thus, where the inculp
atory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test o
f moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.[89] The equipoise rule provides that where
the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the sc
ales in favor of the accused.[90] It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.[91] What is requir
ed of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty.[92] Upon the prosecution's failure
to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the t
hought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.

TOPIC: SIMILAR CONDUCT

BANK OF COMMERCE v. MANALO
** Evidence In Question: the deeds of Conditional Sale between Xavierville Estate Inc. and three
other lot buyers to prove that there indeed is a stipulated manner of payment in the purported
Contract to Sell (the August 22, 1972 letter).

FACTS:
1. Xavierville Estate Inc. (XEI) owns the Xavierville Estate Subdivision.
2. XEI sold some residential lots to Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) and they executed a Deed of Real
Estate.
3. The transaction was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of OBM and was covered by real
estate mortgages in favor of the PNB as security for its account and the Central Bank of the Philippines
as security for advances
4. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM.
5. XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in
business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under the business name Hurricane
Commercial, Inc
6. Manalo, Jr. installed awaterpumpatRamosresidence
7. Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and
offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him
8. XEI, through Ramos, agreed.
9. Manalo, Jr. met with Ramos and informed him that he and his wife Perla had chosen Lots 1 and 2 of
Block 2 with a total area of 1,740.3 square meters.
10. VERY IMPORTANT FACT (this is the fact relevant to the topic in Evidence): In a letter dated
August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots. He also pegged the
price of the lots at P200.00 per square meter, or a total of P348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of
the purchase price amounting to P69,612.00 less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos, payable on or
before December 31, 1972; the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or
before the same date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance
of the down payment would fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five
(5) days from receipt of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. It was also stated in the
letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce improvements thereon subject to the rules and
regulations imposed by XEI in the subdivision. Perla Manalo conformed to the letter agreement.
11. Manalo spouses took possession of the property and constructed a house thereon and installed a fence
around the perimeter lots.
12. Important Fact: The spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI.
However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare
a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature
13. Perla Manalo went to the XEI office and requested that the payment of the amount representing the
balance of the downpayment be deferred, which, however, XEI rejected
14. XEI furnished Mrs. Manalo with the statement of account showing the balance plus interests.
15. Manalo,Jr.statedtheyhadnotyetreceivedthenoticeofresumptionofLeissellingoperations,and
that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should not be charged with
interest on the balance of the down payment on the property
16. Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his house.

17. XEI informed Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that
he remove the same, on the ground, among others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he
had purchased on installment basis from XEI.
18. Another Important Fact: Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the
receivables for lots already contracted and those yet to be sold
19. Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block 2, and
TCT No. T-265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of the OBM
20. Another Important Fact: Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from
OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the president of Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of
January 31, 1983, Manalo, Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the subdivision. CBM reiterated in its letter
to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the subdivision
21. CBM, the new owner of the Xavierville Estate, told Manalo to stop any constructin in the property,
because it is the owner of the lot (CMB that is).
22. Mrs. Manalo met with CBM officers and she told them that her husband had a contract with OBM,
through XEI to purchase the property.
23. When asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the documents to CBM. However, she failed
to do so
24. CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City
25. spouses Manalo wrote CBM to offer an amicable settlement, promising to abide by the purchase price
of the property (P313,172.34), per agreement with XEI, through Ramos. But the CBM proposed that
they pay the price of 1,500 per sq. m. Manalos rejected the proposal.
26. Manalos then filed a case against CBM (which was then named as Boston Bank) for specific
performance and damages.
27. Manalosstance we were always ready, able and willing to pay the installments. We already offered
to pay the balance of the purchase price hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed in our
favor!
28. CBMsAnswer of course not! The August 22, 1972 letter was not binding. There is no contract to
sell executed by OBM, through XEI, in favor of you Manalos! Hence,wecantbeobligedto execute
the Deed of Sale.
29. ANOTHERVERYIMPORTANTFACTFOROURTOPIC:Manalosevidence During the
trial, the Manalos adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale executed between
XEI and Alberto Soller; Alfredo Aguila, and Dra. Elena Santos-Roque to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots
(these people are other purchasers of the lots in the Xavierville Estate)
30. CBMsevidence presented in evidence letter dated August 22, 1972, where XEI proposed to sell
the two lots subject to two suspensive conditions: the payment of the balance of the downpayment of
the property, and the execution of the corresponding contract of conditional sale. Since plaintiffs failed
to pay, OBM consequently refused to execute the corresponding contract of conditional sale and
forfeited the P34,877.66 downpayment for the two lots, but did not notify them of said forfeiture. It
alleged that OBM considered the lots unsold because the titles thereto bore no annotation that they had
beensoldunderacontractofconditionalsale,andtheplaintiffswerenotnotifiedofXEIsresumption
of its selling operations.
31. RTC in favor of Manalos. The Aug 22, 1972 letter is equivalent to a Complete Contract to Sell, and
that they had already partially consummated the same. It declared that the failure of the defendant to
notify the plaintiffs of the resumption of its selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale
did not preventthedefendantsobligationtoconveytitlestothelotsfromacquiringbindingeffect.
Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action to compel the defendant to execute a deed of sale
over the lots in their favor.
32. CA (important to note CAs reasoning)
affirmed RTC with modification. It said that that the
balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to P278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts,

inclusive of pre-computed interests, from delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees on
a monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of
other lot buyers. (DigestersNote:medyo malabo ito pero later on the SC said that the CA ruled na
walang indicated na schedule of payment sa letter/Contract to Sell na yun. The Court discussed that
for a valid Contract to Sell to exist, such shall indicate a schedule/manner of payment and here, CA
said na wala but still they said na may valid contract to selllater we will see na may error ang CA
for ruling in such a way)
33. Hence this petition by CBM/Boston Bank
34. CBMsstance unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount,
including the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or
contract to sell. Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to respondent spouses dated August 22, 1972
merely confirmed their reservation for the purchase of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, consisting of 1,740.3 square
meters, more or less, at the price of P200.00 per square meter (or P348,060.00), the amount of the
downpayment thereon and the application of the P34,887.00 due from Ramos as part of such
downpayment (DigestersNote:inotherwords,sabingCBM,walapangagreednamannerofpayment
kaya there cannot be a Contract to Sell)
35. Manalosstance as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract of sale as to
theprice,thecontractisvaliddespitethepartiesfailuretoagreeonthemannerofpayment.Insucha
situation, the balance of the purchase price would be payable on demand, conformably to Article 1169
of the New Civil Code. They insist that the law does not require a party to agree on the manner of
payment of the purchase price as a prerequisite to a valid contract to sell. Important to note: They
point out that such letters referred to the terms of the terms of the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform
terms of 120 equal monthly installments (excluding the downpayment, but inclusive of precomputed interests) (please refer to fact #29theybasedtheirpositionsontheallegeduniformity
oftermsastothemannerofpaymentasstipulatedinthethreecontractsofconditionalsaleinfavor
of the three other lot buyers). Simply put, ang sinasabi lang nila Manalo is, since yung three other
deeds of conditional sales (fact #29) have in their stipulations the uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
installments, then it can be said na yun rin ang manner of payment na na-agreed upon nila Manalo at
OBM, through XEI as agent. (parang lumalabas ganun ang policy ng OBM)
ISSUE:
WON OBM, through its agent XEI, really executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the Manalos? NO. There
was no stipulated manner of payment, hence, a valid Contract to Sell did not exist.

RATIO:
1.

2.

Rule: for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an agreement of
the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by
the vendee
In the case at bar: We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA, there is no
showing, in the records, of the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price on the
property amounting to P278,448.00. Wehavemeticulouslyreviewedtherecords,includingRamos
February 8, 1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents, and find that said parties confined
themselves to agreeing on the price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the
purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part
of the 20% downpayment. The timeline for the payment of the balance of the downpayment
(P34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on or before XEI resumed its selling operations, on or before

3.

4.

December 31, 1972, or within five (5) days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations.
The parties had also agreed to incorporate all the terms and conditions relating to the sale, inclusive of
the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price and the other substantial terms and conditions
inthecorrespondingcontractofconditionalsale,tobelatersignedbytheparties,simultaneously
withrespondentssettlementofthebalanceof the downpayment. (The SC went on further saying that
based on the letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed
upon on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the corresponding
contract of conditional sale
EVIDENCE TOPIC: (again please refer to fact #29) We reject the submission of respondents
that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment contained in the three
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEIandotherlotbuyersinthecorrespondingcontract
ofconditionalsale,whichwouldlaterbesignedbythem.Wehavemeticulouslyreviewedthe
respondentscomplaintandfindnosuchallegationtherein.Indeed, respondents merely alleged
in their complaint that they were bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property
in installments. When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on direct
examination or even on cross-examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
buyerswouldformpartofthecorrespondingcontractofconditionalsaletobesignedbythem
simultaneously with the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price.
FURTHER ON WITH THE EVIDENCE DISCUSSION Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed
to allege in their complaint that the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 to be incorporated in the
correspondingcontractofconditionalsalewerethosecontainedinthecontractsofconditionalsale
executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this
Court. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed
to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the P278,448.00.

DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR: (Caveat: cut and paste ito, kasi I think
everything is important)

Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although
such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the
parties.
Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

CASE AT BAR: However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter
of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of
the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and
that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the

two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision
as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the
part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said
lots in 120 months. It further failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said deeds as part of the
testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.

Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must
contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct,
the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that
ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semiautomatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that
might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern
of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity
of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger
of prejudice and confusion.

In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria
are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a
person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern
of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction
to situations.

There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade
or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme
Court:Lifecaststhemouldsofconduct,whichwillsomedaybecomefixedaslaw.Lawpreservesthe
mouldswhichhavetakenformandshapefromlife. Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement
of many of the rights and acts of men. It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter
concerning which known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if
nothing is said to be contrary.

However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove
usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the
contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the P278,448.00 in
120months,presumablybecauseofrespondentsbeliefthatthemannerofpaymentofthesaid
amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM
and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment
of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had executed contracts of conditional

sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120
months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but granted one
180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers
of two or more lots.

5.

Manalos failed and refused to pay the balance of the downpayment and price of property despite the
notice to them of the resumption by XEI of its selling operations. XEI and OBM failed and refused to
transmit the deed of conditional sale to the Manalos. Manalos could have consigned the balance of the
downpayment after notice of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI and filed an action to
compel XEI and OBM to transmit the deed of conditional sale, but they failed to do so.

HELD: CA ruling reversed and set aside.

TOPIC: MEANING OF ORIGINALS UNDER RULES ON ELECTRONICE EVIDENCE

EDSA SHANGRILA VS BF CORPORATION

FACTS: In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort,
Inc. (ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen assail
the Decision[1] dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming the
Decision[2] dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in Pasig City in
Civil Case No. 63435 that ordered them to pay jointly and severally respondent BF Corporation (BF) a
sum of money with interests and damages. They also assail the CA Resolution dated October 25, 2000
which,apartfromsettingasideanearlierResolution[3]ofAugust13,1999grantingESHRIsapplication
for restitution and damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid September 23, 1996 RTC Decision.
In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo also assails
the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her jointly and severally
liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC Decision.

Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of
BuildersWorkfortheEDSAShangri-la Hotel Project[4] that ESHRI and BF executed for the
construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract
stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the
monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI
which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that
monthsprogressbilling.[5]
In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF was to
follow, to wit: (1) submission of theprogressbillingtoESHRIsEngineeringDepartment(2)followingup of the preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying
Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF
adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992,
submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly progress billings, including
an evaluation of the work in accordancewiththeProjectManagersInstructions(PMIs)andthedetailed
valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF
said that the values of the WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the sectionChange
Orders.[6]
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure
agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.[7]
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the work done,

did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods
covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by
ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a
suit for a sum of money and damages.
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of
counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged
BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
On September 23, 1996, the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the
payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money corresponding
to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment for BF
The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the issues the parties raised
in their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no reason to
disturbthecasedispositionoftheRTC,inclusiveofitsawardofdamagesandattorneysfeesandthe
reasons underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently established its case by preponderance of
evidence. Part of what it had sufficiently proven relates to ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to remeasureBFslaterworkaccomplishmentsandpaythesame.Ontheotherhand,ESHRIhadfailedto
prove the basis of its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the defective work accomplished
by BF.

AproposESHRIsentitlementtotheremedyofrestitutionorreparationarisingfromtheexecutionofthe
RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy may peremptorily be allowed only if the
executed judgment is reversed, a situation not obtaining in this case.

Issue: Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law raised
by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos.
14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].

Held: Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19,

PMIs and WVOs
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to
petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have
laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to the best
evidence rule.

Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis requirement.
Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents
aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the documents since they were in
the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests.
WeagreewithBF.Theonlyactualrulethatthetermbestevidencedenotesistherulerequiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced[17] and secondary evidence of
its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC.6.Whenoriginaldocumentisinadversepartyscustodyorcontrol. If the document is in
the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the
original instrument or document itself.[18] A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a
writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party
can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question
as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed. The
stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and
ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES:

During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that
certain exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these
documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these are
internal documents and I am referring specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested
your Honor, that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that opposing
counsel first be given opportunity to present the originals which are in their possession. May we know if
they have brought the originals and whether they will present the originals in court, Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been
claimed by plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured that, they will
try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of
the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In
other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the
original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
documentsexecutionorexistence(2)thereisproofofthecauseoftheoriginaldocuments
unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.[19] While perhaps not on all fours because it involved
a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt, thus:

To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or
control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactory proof of its existence.

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done
all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document.
The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does
not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

CHUA-GAW vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 160855 April 16, 2008
Facts:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises[3] namely: Hagonoy
Lumber,CapitolSawmillCorporation,andColumbiaWoodIndustries.AtthetimeofChuaChinsdeath,
the
net
worth
of
Hagonoy
Lumber
was
P415,487.20.
The heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a
Co-Heir, wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will
pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half will
be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25K each.
Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy
Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them
P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed
that the loan will be payable within six (6) months without interest. Chua issued in their favor China
Banking Corporation Check No. 240810 for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in
Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio Gaw later encashed the check.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated period. Chua
sent the couple a demand letter requesting them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will be
constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so. Failing to heed his demand, Chua filed
a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC.
Defense of Gaw: Spouses Gaw contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan butpetitionersshareinthe
profitsofHagonoyLumber,oneofherfamilysbusinesses.Accordingtothespouses,whentheytransferred
residence to Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an accounting, and payment of her share in
the profits, of Capital Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy
Lumber. They claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it would
offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will
defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber.
According to Chua, Gaw did not demand from him an accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation,
Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right
whatsoever in these businesses that would entitle them to an accounting thereof. His sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8,
1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as
evidenced
by
the
Deed
of
Sale.
RTC held in favour of respondent Chua. It noted that respondent personally issued Check No. 240810 to
petitioner and her husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded
that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not remunerations for
services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the profits of their parents
businesses.

CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON the P200 was a loan obligation and not profits from the lumber business which Gaw was
entitled to?
Held:
Yes.RTCsfindingthattheP200,000.00wasgiven to the petitioner and her husband as a loan is supported
by the evidence on record. On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to remember
that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. A check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a
loan transaction. It is pure naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources of income and has
access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any amount.
ThepetitionersallegationthattheP200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber
is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the parents of petitioner and
respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs freely renounced and waived in favor of their sister
Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein, as shown by the Deed of Partition which
the petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor
of Hagonoy Lumber. When Chua delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988,
Chua Sioc Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and
respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither had a right to demand a share in
the profits of the business.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was an advance onthe petitioners sharein the profits ofthe
business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent would deliver a check drawn against his personal, and
notagainstthebusinessenterprisesaccount.

G.R. No.
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO
ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR
PACIENCIA,
Petitioners,
- versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
and HELPMATE, INC.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 176240
October 17, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., et. al. filed with the NLRC in Cebu City separate
complaints against Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank) and Helpmate, Inc. (HI) for illegal dismissal. In their
position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to
the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial
services to the bank (at its branch in Cebu, and other branches in Visayas) for more than one year; that EPCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform
their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since
they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners wages, monitored petitioners daily time records and uniforms, and
exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to
terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had
committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that E-PCIBank, one of its clients, no longer renewed it Contract of Service
with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and
Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same.
Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively. Their refusal, without justifiable
reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was tantamount to abandonment.
LA: On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor
Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that
it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service
under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only
contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. The
undisputed facts show that the petitioners were made to perform not only as janitors but also as messengers,
drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician. These jobs are not only directly related to the main
business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of E-PCIBanks principal
business.

Aggrieved by the decision of the LA, E-PCIBank and HI appealed to the NLRC, where, in support of its
allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted several documents which it did not present
before the LA:
1.) Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock (from P1.5M to P20M);
2.) Audited Financial Statement of HI (Total Assets = P20,939,935.72);
3.) TCT and Tax Declaration registered under the name of HI with Market Value of P1,168,860.00;
4.) Tax Declaration registered under the name of HI showing that it has a commercial building constructed
on the preceding with market value of P2,515,170.00.
NLRC: The NLRC modified the ruling of the LA taking into consideration the documentary evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized
venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in labor-only contracting.
Petitioners MR was denied by the NLRC.
CA: The CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not
illegally dismiss petitioners.
ISSUE (1): Can there be presentation of new evidence on appeal in the NLRC?
HELD (1): YES. The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New
Rules of Procedure. Even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same,
instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal.
After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The
NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of
substantial justice. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic
notions of fairness.
In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents
and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence
on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
ISSUE (2): Is presentation of photocopies of documentary evidence be allowed?
HELD (2): Yes. The court cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary evidence
submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies, invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section
3, Rule130 of the RoC, which explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to
the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that
proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed
in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds
from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position
papers and other documents.
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counterevidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI. They had every opportunity to strengthen their

positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI
before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot
now be heard to complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor. It cannot win its case by merely
raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties evidence.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS, petitioner,

vs.
JULIA DEL ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and HEIRS OF
SANTOS DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

FACTS:
On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the
Heirs of Santos Del Rosario ("respondents") filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of
Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). Respondents alleged
that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters ("Property") situated in Kaypombo,4
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name of respondents under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. Respondents alleged that the
Kaypombo Primary School Annex ("KPPS") under DECS was occupying a portion of the Property through
respondentstoleranceand that of their predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS
refused to vacate the premises despite their valid demands to do so.

InitsAnswer,DECScounteredthatKPPSsoccupationofaportionofthePropertywaswiththeexpress
consentandapprovalofrespondentsfather,thelateIsaiasDelRosario("Isaias").DECSclaimedthatsome
time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion ("Donated Site") of the Property to the Municipality of Sta. Maria
("Municipality") for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge ("Judge
Natividad"), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS started occupying the Donated Site
in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary educational needs of approximately 60 children between
the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter Donated
Site. In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted the existence and execution of
TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"), Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax receipts in
respondentsnamesfortheyears1991and1992(Exhibits"B-1" and "B-2"). On the other hand, respondents
admitted the existenceofJudgeNatividadsaffidavitthathepreparedthedeedofdonation(Exhibit"1")
andthetaxdeclarationfor1985intheMunicipalitysname(Exhibit"2").(NoDeedofDonationpresented).
Since there was no dispute that the Property was registeredinrespondentsnames,thepartiesagreedtoa
reverse trial with DECS presenting its evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the
Municipality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation

HELD:
There is no valid donation.
Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a public
instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public is a
public document.12 The notary public shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the instrument
and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument, acknowledging that the instrument is
his free act and deed. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument.
An acceptance made in a separate instrument must also be in a public document. If the acceptance is in a
separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both instruments must state
the fact of such notification.13

Best and Secondary Evidence

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of donation
with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the original document
arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence
of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to prove the
contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in Section
3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) xxx;

(c) xxx;

(d) xxx.

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document
itself.14 A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when
the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad
faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this
order if necessary.15

Applied in the present case

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of
donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and
that he witnessed the signing of the document.1a\^/phi1.net However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during
cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the document
that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.16

In the same vein,VidalDeJesustestimonydoesnothelptoestablishthedeedofdonationsexistence,

execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On cross-examination, Vidal
De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to

himbyJudgeNatividadhimself.17Ifatall,DECSofferedVidalDeJesustestimonytoestablish the loss

of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed
but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal office was
transferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved
futile too.

This leaves us with Judge Natividadstestimony.JudgeNatividadtestifiedthathepreparedandnotarized

the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution, signed in the Office
of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to the donor. He
furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court of Sta.
Maria a copy of the deed of donation.

DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There is also
no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance
thatDECSconstructedtheschoolduringIsaiaslifetimewithoutobjectiononhispart.Thereisabsolutely
no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.

Copy of the Deed in Notary Public

The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary information
regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the notary public to
retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him when it is a contract.20 The notarial register is a
recordofthenotarypublicsofficialacts.Acknowledgedinstrumentsrecordedinthenotarialregisterare
public documents.21 If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the
notarial records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.22

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary public
should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the
unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained why he did not retain
a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was
no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National
Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent
search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
Much as we sympathize with the plight of the schoolchildren, we do not find reversible error in the Decision
of the Court of Appeals. We cannot grant the relief DECS is seeking and disregard existing laws and
jurisprudence. DECS, however, is not without remedy. The government can expropriate at any time the
Donated Site, paying just compensation to respondents.

TOPIC: PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE

. G.R. No. 174466

July 14, 2008

ACI PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA C. COQUIA, DOING BUSINESS IN THE NAME OF E. CARDOZO COQUIA
ENTERPRISE, Respondent
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc.1 is engaged in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which is used in
both commercial and industrial equipment for thermal and acoustic insulation. In 1993, it ceased from using
silica sand in the manufacture of fiberglass and started using instead recycled broken glass or flint cullets
to save on manufacturing costs.2
Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C. Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint cullets,
consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order No. 1062113
Several deliveries were then made by respondent to herein petitioner.
Subsequently, however, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price from P4.20 per kilo to
P3.65 per kilo to which respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under duress. Further deliveries where then
made by respondent to herein petitioner. Petitioner accepted the deliveries but refused to pay for them even
at the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that the unit price be further reduced to P3.10 per
kilo.7
Respondent then filed a Complaint8 for specific performance and damages against petitioner seeking
payment for the deliveries made under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735, amounting to 46,390 kilos
at the renegotiated price of P3.65 per kilo. Respondent further demanded that petitioner be directed to accept
and pay for the remaining deliveries to complete the one (1) lot of flint cullets originally contracted for.
Three (3) days after the complaint against it was filed, petitioner paid for the flint cullets under Delivery
Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735 at the unit price of P3.65 per kilo.
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the trial court ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of the flint cullets
contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said deliveries within ten (10) days from
each delivery at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo. The same court also awarded damages.
CA affirmed and said that said contract was a contract of adhesion which should be strictly construed
againstthepetitioner,thecreatorthatpetitionersdemandforreductionofthepricewascontrarytothe
terms stipulated in the contract thus liable for damages to respondent.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotthetrialcourtsrefusaltoacceptpetitionersevidencealiundebasedontheParolEvidence
rule valid
HELD:

NO
Condition 4 of the contract, between petitioner and respondent, seems to have worked to petitioners
disadvantage as it underpins the refusal of the trial court to accept evidence aliunde to show that time was
of the essence in the transaction. The said condition specifically mentions that the "delivery date shown on
(the purchase order) shall be of the essence of any contract arising" and that "delivery must be made in
strictaccordancewiththeorderordeliveryschedule"PurchaseOrderNo.106211,however,isunusually
silent as to the date the flint cullets are needed.
Petitioner remedied this seeming inadvertence by squarely raising the failure of the purchase order to
express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered into a contract with respondent conditioned
upon the latters prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an issue in its Answer with Counterclaims. 19
Unfortunately,thetrialcourtsustainedrespondentsobjectionbasedontheparol evidence rule.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is
the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written
contract is establishedastherepositoryofthepartiesstipulations,anyotherevidenceisexcludedandthe
same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them. 20 This rule,
however, is not without exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception
to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have been
so inflexible as to completely disregardpetitionersevidence.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, we find that although she was not given definite days during
whichsheshoulddelivertheflintcullets,shewasindeedapprisedofpetitionersurgentneedforlarge
quantities thereof.21 Furthermore, petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its
materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only because
respondentassureditofpromptdeliveriessufficientforpetitionersproductionrequirements.
Coming now to the second purchase order, we find that Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed been
superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 as the latter plainly states. Respondent testified that the
deliveries of flint cullets on 28 October 1994 and on subsequent dates were already covered by the new
purchase order which did indicate the reduced unit price but did not mention the quantity to be delivered.
Respondent knew, at the time she made the deliveries on 28 October 1994 and thereafter, that Purchase
Order No. 106373 would already govern the transaction. Significantly, payments on these deliveries were
made by petitioner on 26 November and 8 December 1994, after the complaint for specific performance
was filed and without respondent making as much as a whimper of protest against the terms of the new
purchase order or the reduced purchase price indicated therein.
By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no longer indicated a specific quantity of flint cullets to
be delivered, respondent knew or should be presumed to have known that deliveries made thereafter were
no longer meant to complete the original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211.
SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. AUTOCORP GRP. AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 164326 October 17, 2008

Facts: On September 24, 1994, defendant-appellant Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of
ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from plaintiff-appellee Autcorp Group. The original cost of the
unit was P2.5 million but was increased to P3,112,519.94 because it was paid in 12 monthly installments
up to September 30, 1995. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice No. A-0209
and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Both documents were signed by Francis Yu, president of Seaoil,
on behalf of said corporation. Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of the excavator, ownership
thereof was toremainwithAutocorpuntiltheobligationisfullysettled.Inthislight,Seaoilscontractor,
Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept the checks because they
werenotunderSeaoilsname.Hence,Yu,onbehalfofSeaoil, signed and issued 12 postdated checks for
P259,376.62 each with Autocorp as payee.
The relationship started to become sour when the first check bounced. However, it was remedied
when Seaoil replaced it with a good check. The second check likewise was also good when presented for
payment. However, the remaining 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested the
payment be stopped. It was downhill from thereon.
Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance of P2,593,766.20. Hence, on
January 24, 1995, Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not oral testimony can be taken as an exception to the Parol Evidence rule?

HELD: No. The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written
agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the purported written contract. Although Parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
The Vehicle Sale Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. A Sales invoice is a commercial
document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transaction. Business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like,
are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and at the very
least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired. These documents
are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial
transaction. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.
Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome
of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Hence,petitionerscontentionthatthedocumentfallswithintheexceptiontotheparolevidenceruleis
untenable.Thexceptionobtainsonlywherethewritten contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that
the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such

a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other,
and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received
to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.

Marquez v. Espejo
GR 168387
Facts:
Respondent Espejos were the original registered owners of 2 parcels of agricultural land (2 hectares each).
One is located at Brgy. Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya while the other is located in Brgy. Murong,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
There is no disupute that the Lantap property is tenanted by Nemi Fernandez (husband of resp. Elenita
Espejo), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz
Respondents mortgaged both properties to Rural Bank of Bayombong Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans.
Upon failure to pay loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. Them, RBBI
consolidated title to the properties and TCT were issued in RBBI's name.
On 26 Feb 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The deed of sale did not
mention the brgy where the property was located but mentioned the TCT which corresponds to the
Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi continued working on the other property (Lantap
property) without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner.
Meanwhile, 20 june 1990, RBBI executed separate deeds of voluntary land transfer in favor of Marquez
and Dela Cruz, the tenants of Murong property. Both VLTs described subject thereof as the land located
in Brgy Murong and covered by TCT T-62836 (which however is the title corresponding to Lantap).
After the petitioners completed payment of the purchase price to RBBI, DAR issued the corresponding
Certificate of Land Ownership Award to petititoners marquez and Dela Cruz
Several years later, respondents filed a complaint before Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of bayombong, nueva vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners' CLOA, and the execution of
a deed and voluntary land transfer in favor of nemi. The complaint was based on respondents' theory that
the murong property, occupied by petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buyback, as documented in the deed of sale.
Petitioners argued that the Espejos repurchased in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidence by
their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi. RBBI
answered that it was lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents
Espejos.
OIC-RARAD concluded that the buy-back was Murong property since TCT T-62096 appeared on
respondents' Deed of Sale.
On the other hand, since petitioners' VLT referred to TCT T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap
property, OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners' CLOA necessarily refer to the lantap property. Further,
since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, OIC-RARAD
declared that they are disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap and ordered cancellation of their
CLOAs. It also ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of lantap property,
Nemi.
On appeal, DARAB reversed and ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners
as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that
the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the
corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled
that they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs
claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as
owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their
brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased
the lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded the murong property. CA agreed with
respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed

of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object
of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096
the Murong property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased. Additionally, the CA
ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject
property since the same particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
Held:
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between
respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents.
Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the
Murong property then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise,
the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for
the Lantap property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of
the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is
not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their
contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to
adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule
states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original
document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible
as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with
the document.42
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no
dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed
of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay
Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the
true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers
to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No.
T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap
property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong"
was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to "Barangay Murong"
reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute
reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to
adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other
evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the
Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which
provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.43
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary,
add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA

actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was
the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms
of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the
written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
"between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question,
and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement
if he puts in issue in his pleading: (1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as
covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject property as being
located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true
intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement
failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties
respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that
in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of
a contract,45 not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise
would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap
property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the
petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.

TOPIC: DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG"
FACTS:
In the month of August 1996, the accused Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong", armed with a bladed weapon,
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge of one Evelyn Canchela against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
FactsshowedthatEvelynisamentalretard.WhenhermotherleftforSingapore,Evelynscustodyand
care was entrusted to her sister, Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at
Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon. Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed
private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.As
he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina.
His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to
her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her. Sometime in December of the same
year,LornaHachero,Evelynshalf-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to
fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided.
Dutifully,LornaimmediatelyrepairedtoappellantshomeinBical,andbroughtEvelynwithhertoManila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she
noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza,
Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
LornassuspicionswereconfirmedastheexaminationsrevealedthatEvelynwasindeedpregnant.Shethus
asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse
with her while holding a knife. They then went to Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal
complaint against appellant. They filed a criminal complaint for rape against appellant before the Municipal
Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.
Appellant Salvador Golimlim on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true
"[b]ecause her mind is not normal," she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual
intercourse with her." Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision,
convicted appellant as charged.
Appellantappealed.HearguesthatEvelynstestimonyisnotcategoricalandisrepletewithcontradictions,
thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Evelyn is disqualified from being witness for reasons of her mental retardation
HELD:
NO.Thetrialjudgesassessmentofthecredibilityofwitnessestestimoniesis,ashasrepeatedlybeenheld
by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it
having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor
of the witnesses. In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the
findingsofthetrialcourtwithrespecttotheassessmentofEvelynstestimony.

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate
what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the
Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental
retardation with an IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
Moreover,appellantsbaredenialisnotonlyaninherentlyweakdefense.Itisnotsupportedbyclearand
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly
identified him as her rapist.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KAKINGCIO CAETE

[G.R. No. 142930. March 28, 2003]

Facts:

Paquito Caete was estranged from his wife Sedaria and decided to live with his brother Kakingcio
Caete in Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte bringing along his daughter, Alma.
Paquito became blind and paralytic and by this time Alma is already 12 yrs. Old.
Alma noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and amiable to her.
OnFebruary1,1996,Kakingcioscommonlawwife,Alejandra,wentawaytovisittheirdaughter
in Kananga, Leyte.
That night, while Alma was sleeping, she was awakened by her uncle Kakingcio caressing her.
When Alma opened her eyes, she saw her uncle Kakingcio who was wearing a pair of short pants
but naked from waist up.
Alma could smell liquor from his breath.
Kakingcio poked an 8-inchlongknifeonherneckandwhisperedtoher:Ma,donttellyouryaya
because I willdosomethingtoyou.
Kakingcio then removed his short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down her panties.
KakingciotheninsertedhisprivateorganintoAlmasvaginaandmadea push and pull movement
of his body.
Alma felt pain in her private part and could do nothing but cry as Kakingcio ravished her.
In the process, Alma lost consciousness.
On February 3, 1996, while Alma was asleep in the sala, she was awakened when she felt her pants
being pulled down again by Kaingcio.
She resisted and ran out of the house to escape and rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to
whom Alma revealed that her uncle raped her and that he was about to rape her again.
Caring advised Alma not to return to their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring.
Alma returned to their house the next day, February 4, 1996. By then, Kakingcio was no longer in
the house.
Thenextday,Alejandra,Kakingcioswifewentupthehilltogathercamotetopsandarmedwith
a bolo.
Alma followed Alejandra to the hills and revealed to her that Kakingcio raped her on February 1,
1996.
Alejandra was livid with rage and rushed back to the house and confronted Kakingcio and they
quarreled.
She berated him for having taken advantage of his own flesh and blood. She told him to leave the
house to which Kakingcio agreed.
After Kakingcio left, Alejandra accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and complained against
Kakingcio.
On February 9, 1996, Dra. Bibiana A. Cardente, the Municipal Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte,
examined Alma.
The doctor prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate on her examination of Alma which
contains her findings:
o Cervix: pinkish,softhymenalhealedoldlacerationsat6oclockand9oclock
o Discharges: scanty brownish discharges

On April 26, 1996, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 36,
charging Kakingcio with rape
When arraigned, Kakingcio, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
He interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he was out gathering coconuts in the coconut
plantation of one Romulo in the mountains.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
imposing on him the penalty of death in view of the presence of the special qualifying circumstance
of the minority of private complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio and the special
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon and without any mitigating circumstance in
the commission of the crime.
Accused: Whentheprosecutiontriedtoelicitfromtheoffendedpartyhowappellantspeniscould
havebeeninsertedintohervaginawithhispantsstillonandtheappellants counsel objected to the
question, the presiding judge himself took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded
questions on the private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions to the
private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in participating directly and actively in the presentation and reception
of the prosecution's evidence.
Held:
NO.
A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of
evidentiary rules.
The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure.
He must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential
to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth.
After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective
claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings.
Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent
in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure
to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome.
A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness.
He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth.
The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court.
It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his
short pants before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to
penetrate her sexual organ with his penis.
Althoughcrudelyandungrammaticallyphrased,thequestionofthepublicprosecutorwhere did
he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pantswasnotleading.
The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant
could have inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his short pants.

Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on
December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be
allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of
justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse,
frighten and intimidate the child:
o Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control over the questioning of
children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are
stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children
from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
Ruling:

The records show that the private complainant lived in a rural area, unaffected by the worldly ways
of urban life.
It is thus incredible that the private complainant would weave a story of defloration and undergo a
medical examination of her private parts and charge the appellant with rape for which, if convicted,
he could be meted the penalty of either reclusion perpetua or death.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellant KAKINGCIO CAETE is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principal, of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

TOPIC: GOVERNMENT PRIVELAGE

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643

September 4, 2008

(Shorter version)
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
BillionPesos).TheProjectwastobefinancedbythePeoplesRepublicofChina.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invokingexecutiveprivilege.Inparticular,herefusedtoanswerthequestionson:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege

HELD:
YES. The communications are covered by executive privilege.

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when
they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1)Theprotectedcommunicationmustrelatetoaquintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2)ThecommunicationmustbeauthoredorsolicitedandreceivedbyacloseadvisorofthePresidentor
the President himself. Thejudicial test isthat an advisor must be in operational proximity withthe
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showingofadequateneed,suchthattheinformationsoughtlikelycontainsimportantevidenceandby
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
processand,thattheinformationsoughttobedisclosedmightimpairourdiplomaticaswellaseconomic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive

agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
thecommunicationsarereceivedbyacloseadvisorofthePresident.Undertheoperationalproximity
test, petitioner can be consideredacloseadvisor,beingamemberofPresidentArroyoscabinet.Andthird,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

RespondentCommitteesfurthercontendthatthegrantofpetitionersclaimofexecutiveprivilegeviolates
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.
Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
(Longer, more detaled version)

FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
(11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded
by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

RespondentCommitteespersistedinknowingpetitionersanswerstothesethreequestionsbyrequiring
him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. He stated in his letter that "The context in which executive
privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
wellaseconomicrelationswiththePeoplesRepublicofChina.Giventheconfidentialnatureinwhich
these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect."

RespondentCommitteesfoundpetitionersexplanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request

for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008;
and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. Petitioner then filed his
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction). In the
CourtsResolution,thepartieswererequiredtoobservethestatusquoprevailingpriortotheOrderdated
January 30, 2008.

On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. On April 8, 2008, respondent
Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, hence this resolution.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) Whether there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by executive privilege;
(3) Whether respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) Whether respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.

HELD:
(1) YES. There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege
is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this
concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized,
among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and
Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public,16" that there is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";
andthat"therighttoinformationdoesnotextendtomattersrecognizedasprivilegedinformationunder
the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

(2) YES. There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three
(3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege

First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report
to Congress.

This argument is unpersuasive. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity
does not make such power less executive. The fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its
decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature
of the power.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational
proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to communications between those who are operationally proximate to the
President but who may have "no direct communications with her."

In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch"
(a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter
ego and a member of her official family.
Third,respondentCommitteesclaimthattheCourterredinupholdingthePresidentsinvocation,through
theExecutiveSecretary,ofexecutiveprivilegebecause(a)betweenrespondentCommitteesspecificand
demonstratedneedandthePresidentsgeneralizedinterestinconfidentiality,thereisaneedtostrikethe
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.

ItmustbestressedthatthePresidentsclaimofexecutiveprivilegeisnotmerelyfoundedonher
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim, saying that:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosedmightimpairourdiplomaticaswellaseconomicrelationswiththePeoplesRepublicof
China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
Furthermore, in the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three
(3) specific questions, did not in any waycurbthepublicsrighttoinformationordiminishthe
importance of public accountability and transparency. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the
assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All
that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.

(3) NO. Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications Elicited by the Three
Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions

The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information
sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative
purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to
successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential
communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the
burden of proof astowhetherthedisclosurewillsignificantlyimpairthePresidentsperformanceofher

function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government
officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate
to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or
wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary
cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for
truth,"whichinrespondentCommitteesviewappearstobeequatedwiththesearchforpersonsresponsible
for "anomalies" in government contracts. However, no matter how noble the intentions of respondent
Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The
determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each
official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not
functions of the Senate.

(4) YES. Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt
Order

Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is
flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the
contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the
contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings
that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were
present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Allthelimitationsembodiedintheforegoingprovisionformpartofthewitnesssettledexpectation.Ifthe
limitations are not observed, the witness settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a

majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the
right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the
matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the
concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding.

Moreover, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent Committees,
petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He repeatedly manifested his
willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was that he be
furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource person.
He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an
executive official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner
for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior? Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was
very cooperative during the September 26, 2007 hearing.

TOPIC: PRIVELAGE COMMUNICATIONS

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO
Facts:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification
of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.Complainants husband filed for annulment of their marriage. Counsel of
complainant died respondent entered his appearance. respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her
children.
Issue:
Whether or not filing of complaint violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client.
Held:
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information
to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. In engaging the services of an attorney, the client
reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required
by necessity and public interest.Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The factors to be considered are as follows:There exists an attorneyclient relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that
the client made the communication. Also Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected
by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer
or the latter declines the employment.On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a
lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged.however the complaint was dismissed due to the failure of complainant to attend hearing and
provide testimony.

TOPIC: PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO, appellant.

Facts:
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review[1] is the Decision[2] dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
-Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate
complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
-Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.
Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father
Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthiasloud cries. Looking
towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his
father put on his short pants.[3] Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a
drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he
would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro
-Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the
house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through
a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemioshouse.HesawCynthialyingon
her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for
about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish.[5] He reported what he had
witnessedtoArtemiosstepfather,Celestino,laterthatmorning
-Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to
the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually
abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac
and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.[8]

-Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996.
She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at
3,5,8oclockpositions,whichcouldhavebeencausedbysexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted
in her private part.[9]
-Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her
mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her
father Artemio. She then executed a written statement,[10] which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Canlas
-The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida,
took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when
he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of
Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its
windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the
front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his
children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside.[12] Atty. Salamida then
concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen what
Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early
morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Elven (son) was a competent to testify against his father Artemio

HELD:
No. As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of
theRulesofCourt,[19]otherwiseknownastheruleonfilialprivilege.Thisruleisnotstrictlyaruleon
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.[20]
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As
correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to
waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was
testifyingasawitnessagainsthisfatherofhisownaccordandonlytotellthetruth.[21]
NeithercanArtemiochallengetheprosecutionsactofpropoundingleadingquestionsonElven. Section
10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[22] expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child
of tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such
insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age,
could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other
than to bring to justice the despoiler ofhissistersvirtue.ThereisnoindicationthatElventestifiedbecause
of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or

influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence
that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence
NOTE: In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered
inevidencetoproveCynthiasage.ThestatementinthemedicalcertificateshowingCynthiasageisnot
proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover,
pursuanttoPruna,GloriastestimonyregardingCynthiasagewasinsufficient,sinceCynthiawasalleged
to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18
years old. Moreover, thetrialcourtdidnotevenmakeacategoricalfindingonCynthiasminority.Finally,
thesilenceofArtemioorhisfailuretoobjecttothetestimonialevidenceregardingCynthiasagecouldnot
be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence.[32] Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proofofCynthiasminority,Artemio
cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted
of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape,[33] should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.

TOPIC: CHARACTER EVIDENCE

[G.R. No. 139070. May 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL LEE
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
- Automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City which sentenced
accused-appellant Noel Lee to death for the murder of Joseph Marquez
- Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
- At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
(a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim;
(b) Dr. Darwin Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan University (MCU) Hospital; (c)
PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a police officer who examined the crime scene;
(d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory.
-

Facts of the crime: At 9pm of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46, and her son, Joseph, 26,
were in the living room of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, watching a basketball game. The living room was brightly lit by a circular
fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to General Evangelista
Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and activity. Herminia was seated on an
armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and
window of their house and the television was to his right. Herminia looked away from the game
and casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming
out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering
through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph
turnedhisbodytowardsthewindow,andsimultaneously,appellantfiredhisgunhittingJosephs
head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired
a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor.
When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a
blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body
to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought
Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later died.

Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted
murder in 1989.
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses:
(a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbour;
(b) himself
He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening of
September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. He was having some drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson
Columba. They were enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in the house
were his wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went home and
accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and
learnedthatJosephMarquez,aneighbor,wasshottodeath.Toappellantssurprise,hewastagged
asJosephskiller.

Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his
death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car
stereo. Joseph scampered away.

ISSUE: WoN the character evidence presented by accused-appellant about Joseph is admissible in
evidence.
RULING:
-

NO. It is not admissible in evidence.

Accused-appellantmakescapitalofJosephsbadreputationintheircommunity.Heallegesthatthe
victimsdrughabitledhimtocommitothercrimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons
from whom he had stolen. AsproofofJosephsbadcharacter,appellantpresentedHerminiasletter
to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal,
Herminia admittedthatshewrotesuchlettertoMayorMalonzobutdeniedanythingabouthersons
thievery.

Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the
common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. Goodmoralcharacter
includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty
and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among
people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average
citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.

The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining
a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. There are exceptions to this rule
however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.

Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
the accused. And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged,meaning,thatthecharacterevidencemustberelevantandgermanetothekindoftheact
charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity.

Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended
party. Characterevidence,whethergoodorbad,oftheoffendedpartymaybeprovedifittends
to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbabilityoftheoffensecharged.Such
evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide
case or a claim of consent in a rape case.

In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with
frequency in sex offenses and homicide. In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim
isadmissibleintwosituations:(1)asevidenceofthedeceasedsaggressionand(2)asevidence
of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of
the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to
prove self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was
the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the

deceasedsdrugaddictionandthieverywithhisviolentdeathinthehandsofaccused-appellant. In
lightofthepositiveeyewitnesstestimony,theclaimthatbecauseofthevictimsbadcharacterhe
could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.
-

Moreover,proofofthevictimsbadmoralcharacterisnotnecessaryincasesofmurdercommitted
with treachery and premeditation.

TOPIC: OPINION EVIDENCE

Domingo vs. domingo kulang

TOPIC: DYING DECLARATION

People Of The Philippines v. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero
G.R. No. 168169; February 24, 2010
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.;
FACTS: Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary Tabarnero (Gary) went to the house of the deceased
Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto),theplacewhereGaryusedtoresidewithErnestosstepdaughterMaryJane
Acibar (Mary Jane) when they were live-in partners. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which
Ernesto was stabbed 9 times, causing his death.
On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder. Warrants were
issued for the arrest of Gary and Alberto by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. During the pre-trial conference,
Gary admitted having killed Ernesto but claimed that it was an act of self-defense, thus warranting a reverse
trial.
At the course of the trial, Senior Police Officer (SPO2) Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty that
night. The brother of Mary Jane, Emerito, reported to the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. Both
of them proceeded to the hospital where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak, due
to multiple injuries. While in the presence of two doctors, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him.
Ernesto answered that they were the Father and Son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero. Ernesto was not able to
affix his signature in the Sinumpaang Salaysay because he could no longer talk after the 4th question.
On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary and Alberto of the crime of murder.
Gary an Alberto both appealed to the Supreme Court, but pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo, The
Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement of Ernesto before SPO2 Morales is admissible in court, given that he
failed to testify by reason of his death.
RULING: YES. While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible under
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
Itmustbeshownthatadyingdeclarationwasmadeunderarealizationbythedecedentthathisdemiseor
at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by
thestatementofthedeceasedhimselforitmaybeinferredfromthenatureandextentofthedecedents
wounds,orotherrelevantcircumstances.

In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48 hours. At the
time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already very rapidly
deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows
of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the point of death,
every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak
the truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an
impending demise, would summon every remaining strength that he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.

TOPIC: ENTRIES IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS

Security Bank v. Eric Gan (GR 150464 June 27 2006)
Ponente: CJ Corona
Doctrine: Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate
books required the satisfaction of the following conditions: 1. the person who made the entry must be
dead, or unable to testify; 2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; 3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. the entries were made in
his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious;
and 5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Facts:
Respondent Gan opened a current account withthepetitionersbranchatSoler,Sta.Cruz Manila
from which he can draw checks from its fund.
Under a special agreement with the petitioner manager Mr. Qui, respondent is allowed
to transfer funds fromhisaccounttoanotherpersonsaccount.Thesetransactionsoftransferring
funds from his account to another are covered by debit memos since respondent had no sufficient
funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
In December 14, 1982, he was reportedly to have incurred a negative balance in the amount of
P153,757.78. By Sept. 15, 1990 his total obligation to the petitioner allegedly amounted to
P297,060.01 inclusive of interest.
Petitioner filed a complaint to recover the sum of money from the respondent after his refusal to
pay contending that the alleged overdraft was made from transactions without his knowledge and
consent.
Petitioner presented its bookkeeper, Patricio Mercado who handles the respondents account
and transactions in a ledger. Records show that a transfer offundfromtherespondentsaccount
was made to another personsaccountwhichwasmadewithauthorityfromQuiwhichresultedto
the overdraft of his account.
Respondent denied to have authorized such transaction. The lower court dismissed the case on the
ground that the petitioner failed to establish with substantial evidence that the respondent does owe
them that sum of money.
The CA affirmed the lower court decision upon the court hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has established substantial evidence that respondent is liable for the overdraft on
his account?
Held:

No. The court held that the ledger presented is not competent evidence to prove that the respondent
consentedtothetransactionmadeonhisaccount.PetitionerinvokedSection43ofRule130:Entriesin
the course of business Entries made at, or near the time of thetransactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance
of dutyandintheordinaryorregularcourseofbusinessorduty.Underthisexceptiontothe hearsay rule,
the admission in evidence of entries in corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify; 2. the entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries; 4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and 5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.

The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.ItwasduetoMercadostestimonythatthe
ledgers were presented thus there is no need to justify its necessity for presentation since the person who
made them was available to testify in court. Mercado does not have personal knowledge as to the
truthfulness of the entries after stating that the agreement was made between Qui and Gan. It is undeniable
that the ledger does contains the transaction records in the ordinary course of business but it cannot be used
as a prima facie evidence as to the facts that were recorded therein. Mercado knows the facts of the entry
of the check deposits and the withdrawals but he does not have knowledge as to the facts involving the
debit memos issued to support the transaction.

Petitioner argues that the respondent isestoppedfromdenyingthepetitionersclaimafterbenefitingfrom

the special agreement accorded to him resulting to the negative balance. The court held that the principle
of estoppel is not applicable at the case at bar since it was not established that the respondent received the
copy of the ledger to be given the chance to review the entries therein. Respondent did not benefit from the
said agreement since the fund transfer wasfromandnottotherespondentsaccount.Hence,thebenefit
goes to anotherpersonsaccountandnotfromtherespondents.Thecourtdeniedthepetitionandaffirmed
thelowercourtsdecision.

TOPIC: COMMERCIAL LIST

Manila Electric Company v. Hon. Secretary of Labor Leonardo Quisumbing and Meralco
Employees and Workers Association
February 22, 2000
J. Ynares-Santiago
Facts: Dissatisfied with the January 27, 1999 decision of the Supreme Court, private respondent Union filed
this motion for reconsideration alleging basically the same issues as presented in the January 1999 decision.
No new arguments were, however, presented by the parties. Nevertheless, the Court granted the motion
particularly with regard to the amount of wages and the retroactivity of Collective Bargaining Agreement
arbitral awards. Below are the modifications made in the decision of the Secretary of Labor by theCourts
earlier Decision:
Wages
XmasBonus
Retirees
Loan to coops
GHSIP, HMP and Housing
loans
Signing Bonus
Union Leave
High voltage/pole
Collectors
CBU
Union Security
Contracting Out
All benefits
Retroactivity

January 27, 1999 decision

P1,900.00 for 1995-1996
modified to one month
remanded to the Secretary
denied
granted up to P60,000.00

Secretarysresolution
P2,200.00
2 months
granted
granted
granted

denied
40 days (typo error)
not apply to those who are not
exposed to the risk
no need for cash bond, no need
to reduce quota and MAPL
exclude confidential employees
maintenance of membership
no need to consult union
existing terms and conditions
Dec. 28, 1996-Dec. 27, 1999

granted
30 days
members of a team

include
closed shop
consult first
all terms
from Dec. 1, 1995

Issue: Whether or not a P2,200.00 wage increase would result in a corresponding increase in the rate of
electricity to be paid by consumers
Held: The argument by petitioner of an increase in the rate of electricity is misleading. An increase in the
prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not
automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument
presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which
the Union relies to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only
"if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is
a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which
carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented.
Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items
such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly
prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With
more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of
the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.

TOPIC: PART OF RES GESTAE

Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 163217

18 April 2006

FACTS:
On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople with lunch,
Artemioreturnedtohisstorewhichwasfive(5)metersawayfromSantoshouse. At about 7:30 in the
evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot. Artemio had been shot on the
chest.HeshoutedatSantosTabangikoPre,gipusilkonikapitan.(Helpme,Pre,Iwasshotbythe
captain.) LitosawamanrunningawayfromthedirectionofArtemiosstore,buthewasntabletosee his
face.Artemioswife,Ernita,camerunningfromherhousetoherhusbandssideuponseeinghimsprawled
on the ground and bloodied. She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise. Ernita shouted
severaltimes,Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akongbana.(Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)
Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police station upon
informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople. He also took with him
his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same
to the Bunawan PNP. To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters
awayfromArtemiosstore.Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads
wantedtoseehimbecauseoftheshootingincident.HeeventriedtoapproachArtemiosfamily,buthe
could not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence.
During the trialofthecase,ErnitapositivelyidentifiedMarturillasasherhusbandsassailant.Thispositive
identificationiscorroboratedbySantostestimonyandexpertwitnessDr.DaniloLedesma,amedico-legal
officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound inArtemiosbodyhadbeencausedbyabulletthatisofthe
same size as that fired from an M-14Rifle.However,thesameexpertwitnesstestifiedthatMarturillas
hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.

ISSUE:
Whethertheprosecutionsevidenceiscredible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.

RULING:
ErnitapositivelyidentifiedMarturillasastheonerunningawayimmediatelyafterthesoundofagunshot.
Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and
thedirectiontowardswhichhewasrunning.Shealsoclarifiedthatshehadheardthestatement,helpme
pre,Iwasshotbythecaptain.TheSupremeCourtupheldthefindingsoftheRTCandtheCAthatErnitas

testimony is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house.
Theidentificationofapersoncanbeestablishedthroughfamiliaritywithonesphysicalfeatures.Oncea
person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a
considerable distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities
generallyknoweachotherbothbyfaceandname,andcanbeexpectedtoknoweachothersdistinctand
particular features and characteristics. Settled is the rule that on questions of credibility of witnesses and
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.
It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the victim.
Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by Ernita. E
confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.
Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration and res gestae.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. Res gestae
refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately
before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.
All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case: 1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; 2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3.) the
statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Both the
statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.

TOPIC: BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

MANONGSONG VS ESTIMO
FACTS
SpousesAgatonaGuevarra(Guevarra)andCiriacoLopezhadsix(6)children,namely: (1)
Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio
Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters) (3) Victor Lopez, married to
respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso,
Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopezdela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin
Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora
dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
(Manongsong).
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, Metro
Manilawithanareaofapproximately152squaremeters(Property). The records do not show
that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly described in
Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390[3] as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle
Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390
was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in
thenameofBenignaLopez,etal.[4] However, the improvements on the portion of the Property
denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared in the
nameofFilomenaJ.EstimounderTaxDeclarationNo.90-001-02145 dated 14 October 1991.[5]
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint[6] on 19 June 1992,
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking
Article 494 of the Civil Code,[7] petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. UponGuevarras
death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there
were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente
Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. AsVicenteLopezsole
survivingheir,Manongsongclaimsherfathers1/5shareinthePropertybyrightofrepresentation.
Thereisnodisputethatrespondents,whoarethesurvivingspousesofGuevarraschildren
and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember. The
area actually occupied by each respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25
to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the
Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda
OrtizOcampo(Ortizfamily),aswellasBenjaminSr.,BenjaminJr.,andRobertodelaCruz,
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz family), entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement[8] dated12September1992(Agreement),petitionersandtheOrtizandDelaCruz
families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The
signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and

prayedfurtherthatthosewhohaveexceededsaidone-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those

whohavelessandthosewhohavenoneshallgetthecorrectandproperportion.[9]
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy 50
square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the
Agreement.[10]However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners claim. The
JumaquiosisterscontendedthatJustinaNavarro(Navarro),supposedlythemotherofGuevarra,
sold the Property toGuevarrasdaughterEnriquetaLopezJumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911[11] for the year 1949 in
the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an
area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal with the following
boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and
San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona
Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements. The Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA[12] (Kasulatan)dated11October
1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for
more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners,
and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present
action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by
Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition
only in 1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision[14] of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of
petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its
validity.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit
presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in
evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that
Navarro was the original owner of the Property

ISSUE WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON

THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
HELD The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law
are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial court
and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the
findings of fact of the lower courts.[22] This is precisely the situation in this case.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence
and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :[23]
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of
evidencereferstoevidencewhichisofgreater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered
in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

TOPIC: CORPUS DELICTI

Arturo Rimorin Sr. v. People
(GR 146481 April 30 2003)

Ponente: Justice Panganiban

Doctrine: Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not
to the physical body of the deceased or to the ashes of a burned building or -- as in the present
case -- to the smuggled cigarettes. The corpus delicti may be proven by the credible testimony
of a sole witness, not necessarily by physical evidence such as those aforementioned.
Facts:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the facts as follows: On October 12,
1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity), received information that certain
syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and the
smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck [were] being escorted by some
police and military personnel. He fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following
night along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they
were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. On
October 14, 1979, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car
with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had
no information whatsoever about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to
intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted and searched. The search
yielded 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes inside said truck. The cargo truck
driverknownonlyasBoywasable to escape while the other passengers or riders of said
truck were apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force,
Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian. The Toyota
Corona was chased and when intercepted, its passengers included four members of the 2nd
COSAC
Detachment who were without mission orders.
The accused Rimorin claims that he did not see the Metrocom men open their truck. They
were hauled later to Camp Crame. There he asked: Whats this? But a certain
Barrameda,whilepointingtoatruckdifferentfromwhattheyused,toldthemthatsthe
reasonwhyyoullbejailed. So he thought they were being framed up. It was only two
to three days later that he saw the alleged smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG
when it was presented by the investigator. They were not present when these alleged
smuggled cigarettes were taken from the truck they rode in.

The accused Arturo Rimorin, was accused and found guilty by the RTC of smuggling
undertheTariffandCustomsCode.TheCAaffirmedthetrialcourtsdecisionandruled
that the defense of denial interposed by petitioner paled in comparison with the
overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence against him. Moreover, the CA held
that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue seal cigarettes was not fatal to
respondentscause,becausethecrimewasestablishedbyothercompetentevidence.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs
Code, because respondent failed to present the seized contraband cigarettes in
court. Equating the actual physical evidence -- the 305 cases of blue seal cigarettes -- with
the corpus delicti, he urges this Court to rule that the failure to present it was fatal to
respondentscause.
Issues:
1. Whether it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti;
2. Whether petitioner knew that the cargo being transported was illegal; and
3. Whether, in the sale of the seized cargo, a notice to petitioner was required.

Held:
1. No. The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus delicti refers to the fact of
the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal
sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransomor to
the body of the person murdered. Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven -- say, a person has
died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible
for the act.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
thatevenasinglewitnessuncorroboratedtestimony,ifcredible,maysuffice to prove it
and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently established
byrespondentsevidence,whichconsistedofthe testimonies of credible witnesses and
the Custody Receipt] issued by the Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods. Col.
PanfiloLacsonstestimonyontheapprehensionofpetitionerandontheseizureofthe
blue seal cigarettes was also clear, straightforward and categorical.
2. Yes. he conveniently overlooks the fact that the burden of proving knowledge that the
seized goods were smuggled was no longer incumbent upon respondent, as it had
sufficiently established the fact of possession. This point is clear from Section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, which reads:
SEC.3601- Unlawful Importation. - Any person who shall fraudulently import or bring
into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive,
conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of

such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law,
shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be punished
When, upon trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or to
have had possession of the article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession to
the satisfaction of the court; Provided, however that payment of the tax due after
apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this
section. (Emphasis provided)
The prosecution competently established that (1) the 305 cases of untaxed blue seal
cigarettes discovered inside the cargo truck were fraudulently imported; and (2) petitioner
was in control of the truck when it transported the cargo on October 15, 1979. Petitioner
was unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the untaxed cigarettes, which the
MISG agents seized from him and his co-accused.
3. No. Section 2603 of the Code states that the seized goods shall be sold at public auction
after the required ten-day notice. In the instant case, these were sold on November 1516, 1979. Thus, absent any evidence to the contrary, the sale is presumed to have been
conducted by public officers in the regular performance of their duties.

TOPIC: PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDANCE

Raymunddo vs. lunaria- kulang

TOPIC: CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOHNNY M. QUIZON, appellant.
VITUG, J.:

A decision, dated 27 March 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 29, found
appellant Johnny M. Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced by the trial court to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Information charging him with the offense, to which
he plednotguilty,.
Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was associated with Suarez Travel Services in Angeles City. She
used the offices of the travel agency as also her residence
On05September1997,aroundnineoclockinthemorning,Conchitawenttotheadjacent Quitalig
Law Office and lent a magazine to a friend, Rowena Abril, a secretary in the law firm. In the
afternoon of that day, between one and two oclock, Rowena heard loud noises coming from
Conchitasoffice, but shedidnot paytoo muchattentiontothe incident. Twenty-five minutes
later, a man passed by Rowena as she was leaving her office to go to a nearby store. Rowena had
the impression that the man, who was walking hurriedly, came from the office of Suarez Travel
Services. At about four-fifty in the afternoon, Rowena went to see Conchita to return the magazine.
ShenoticedthatthedoorleadingtoConchitasofficewasopenbutthemaindoorwasclosed.
Since nobody opened the door for her, Rowena decided to leave.

At lunch time on 05 September 1997, Myla Miclat and her live-in partner Roel Sicangco went to
seeConchitatohandovertheamountofP17,000.00inpaymentforMylasroundtripplanefare
toGuam.WhiletheywereinsideConchitasoffice,JohnnyQuizon,whomConchitaintroducedas
her nephew, came in. Conchita asked her nephew if he already had taken his lunch. Conchita told
Myla that her nephew was a former drug addict, and that she was helping him mend his ways.
Quizon was present when Myla gave the money to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was
going to purchase the ticket and instructed her to return later that day to pick it up. It was
approximately seven oclock in the evening when Myla, accompanied by a friend, returned to
Suarez Travel Services. She knocked at the door but nobody answered although she could see that
there was still light inside the work place. Myla tried calling up Conchita but the telephone just
kept on ringing. The following day of 06 September 1997, around five-thirty in the morning, Myla
returned to Conchitasoffice.Again,nobodywasinsight.Mylawenttotheagencysneighborto
inquire if there was someone inside the office. The neighbor climbed, peeped inside and saw a
body covered with a blanket.

Marietta Suarez, the owner of Suarez Travel Services, received a call at six-thirty in the morning
of 06 September 1997 to inform her that something bad had happened to Conchita. She did not go
to the office the day previous as she had to accompany her husband to a social function. Marietta
and her husband forthwith proceeded to the agency. A number of police officers and some people
were by then at the scene. Apparently, the policemen forced open the door and found the body of
Conchitawrappedwithawhiteblanket.Conchitasjewelryboxandthemoneypaidby Myla were
missing.

Ontheeveningof06September1997,Conchitashusband,BonifacioPasquin,whowasthenin
Bataan received a call from his brother-in-lawJoseServidalinforminghimofConchitasdeath.
The following morning, on his way to Angeles City, Pasquin chanced upon Conchitas eldest
brother, Jose Magpantay, who was also bound for the city. Magpantay informed Pasquin that on
05 September 1997, he received a call from Conchita who told him that she was going to Manila
to bring an undetermined sum of money. Conchita happened to mention that her nephew, Johnny
Quizon, was in her office at that time. Later, during the investigation, Pasquin showed Rowena a
picture of Quizon and she identified him to be the same person who passed by her in haste that
afternoon of 05 September 1997.

Dr. Proceso Mejia, a City Health Officer of Angeles City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Conchita at half past noon on 06 September 1997. The body showed discoloration on the face,
neck, back and upper extremities, contusion on the right side of the face and abrasions on her right
and left side of the neck, right elbow, right forearm and the palm. Dr. Mejia concluded that at the
time of his examination, Conchita must have been dead for more than twelve, but not beyond
twenty-four, hours. Dr. Mejia did not find any abnormalities on the body of the victim and decided
to send the vital organs to the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for toxicological and histopath examination.
Dr. Noel Minay, a medical specialist of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a
pathological examination on the vital organs of Conchita, particularly, her brain, heart, lungs and
pancreas. He concluded that Conchita could have died of cardiac arrest, asphyxiation or ingestion
of a considerable amount of poisonous substance.
The case was referred for investigation to SPO2 Danilo Cruz of the Angeles City Detective Group.
After reading the initial report, SPO2 Cruz, accompanied by SPO2 Alfredo Quiambao and a
brotherofConchita,wenttoQuizonshouseat174IsarogSt.,LaLoma,QuezonCity.Johnnys
relatives were not aware of his whereabouts but could only say that on the morning of 06
September 1997, Johnny and his live-in partner Fe Coronel went to Tondo, Manila. The trio
decidedtogotoFeshouseinParaaqueCity,arrivingthereatataroundtenoclockintheevening.
FesmothertoldthemthatFehadlefton05September1997andhadnotreturnedsince.Inthe
course of their investigation, SPO2 Cruz interviewed one Rodolfo Cueva, a mailman at the Angeles
CityPostOffice,whotoldhimthathe(Cueva)wenttoConchitasofficebetweentwoandtwo-

thirty in the afternoon of 05 September 1997 to deliver an express mail. Cueva left when nobody
would open the door. Returning in the morning, he learned that the addressee was already dead.
-Johnny Quizon was arrested at his house in Quezon City by police operatives a week after
Conchitasburial
The defense gave its version of the incident.: Nimfa Quizon married the father of Johnny Quizon
in 1980, three years following the death of his first wife, Imelda, a sister of Nimfa. Nimfa took
care of Johnny since he was barely five years old. On the evening of 04 September 1997, Nimfa
asked Johnny to go and visit his aunt Conchita in Angeles City whose television set needed repair.
JohnnyleftLaLoma,QuezonCity,atabouttenoclockthefollowingmorningof05September
1997. He arrived in Angeles City between twelve-thirtyandoneoclockintheafternoon.Atthe
offices of Suarez Travel Services, he found his aunt Conchita talking with Roel Sicangco and Myla
Miclat. He waited. After Roel and Myla had left, Conchita told him that he could not work as yet
on the television set as she had a lot of other things to attend to first in Manila. He asked Conchita
if she wanted company but she told him to go ahead as she still had to entertain a woman who just
camein.HeleftConchitasofficeandsawRoelandMylawaitingforapassengerjeepney.Johnny
noticed a man on board a parked vehicle who was holding a clutch bag. He saw the man enter his
aunts office. Meanwhile, he boarded a passenger jeepney and went to the terminal of the
PhilippineRabbitbusline.JohnnyreachedLaLomaatfouroclockintheafternoon.Heinformed
NimfathathewasunabletorepairConchitastelevisionset.Betweenfour-thirtyandfiveoclock
in the afternoon, Nimfa received a call from Conchita who informed him that she sent Johnny
home since she had as yet a lot of paper work to do. The following morning, Nimfa was informed
of Conchitas death. Johnny was advised by Nimfa not to go to the wake because Conchitas
brothers suspected him of being responsible for the killing of their sister. Johnny stayed at the
house of his live-in partner and came home only after the burial.
ISSUE: (1)Whether or not the guild of Johnny Quizon was proven beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section4. Circumstantialevidence, when sufficient. -Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonabledoubt.

The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an accused.
The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.[6] It must be
shown (a) that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been firmly established and (b) that the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances recited by
the trial court, however, would be insufficient to create in the mind of the Court a moral certainty
thatappellantwastheoneresponsibleforthecommissionofthecrime.Appellantsmerepresence
at the locus criminis would be inadequate to implicate him[8] in the commission of the crime. No
evidence was adduced that appellant was the last person to see or talk to the victim before she was
killed.RoelSicangcotestifiedthatwhenheandMylaarrivedatConchitasoffice,thelatterhad
just finished talking to a womanandamanwithacollectorsbag.AfterRoelandMylafinished
their transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman, whom they saw earlier, again entered
Conchitasoffice.RoeltestifiedthathesawJohnnycomeoutoftheofficeandboardapassenger
jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The prosecution failed to show that Sicangco had
anygoodreasontolie.EvenwhilethetrialcourthadobservedthatConchitasjewelryandmoney
were never found, no evidence was introduced that appellant had them, or that he had them in his
possessionatanytimeafterConchitasdeath.Thetrialcourtfounditstrangethatappellantdidnot
wait for Conchita when the latter said that she was also leaving for Manila. Appellant said that he
did offer to wait for Conchita but she told him to go ahead as she still had some other work to
attend to.
ThefactthatappellantdidnotattendConchitaswakeisnotanindicationofeitherflightorguilt.
Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned appellant against going to the wake after he earned
the ire of their relatives who had suspected him to be the killer.
Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of suspicion on
the part of the trial court of appellants involvement, but suspicion is not enough to warrant
conviction. A finding of guilt based on conjecture, even if likely, cannot satisfy the need for
evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
complicity in the crime.[9] No matter how weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the
prosecution, it has been said, must at all times stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be

allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[10] An accused has the right to be
presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until and unless it is overturned by competent
and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] In case of any reservation
against the guilt of accused, the Court should entertain no other alternative but to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of finding appellant JOHNNY M.
QUIZON guilty of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is
ACQUITTEDofthecrimecharged.TheCourtfurtherordersappellantsimmediatereleasefrom
custody, unless he is lawfully held for another lawful cause.

TOPIC: CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION

DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. and/or JAIME B. AQUINO vs. BELGRAVIA REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SAMPAGUITA BROKERAGE, INC
G.R. No. 144268 August 30, 2006

FACTS:
The premises involved in this case is a warehouse (bodega) used by petitioner Datalift for its
cargoes in connection with its brokerage business. The warehouse stands on a lot owned by the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) and located at No. 883 Santibaez Street corner Cristobal
Street, Pandacan, Manila.

Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita, pursuant to a written contract
commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a monthly rental of P6,282.49,
subject to a ten (10%) percent increase every year.

Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia,
whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. True enough, Belgravia
did put up a warehouse. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet
it to petitioner Datalift, represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written
contract of lease 1 dated October 2, 1990, subject to extension upon mutual agreement by the
parties. By the terms of lease, Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental of P40K payable on or
before the 15th day of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2) months is paid upon
execution of the contract.

After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment
of the leased warehouse, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding
of the parties. Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to P60K starting
June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly rental was again increased from P60K to P130K beginning
November 1994 onwards, allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on
Sampaguitaforthelattersleaseoftheformerslotwhereonthewarehouseinquestionstands.
Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for
the warehouse.

Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in
arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The
demands having proved futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their
complaint 2 for ejectment against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder, Jaime B. Aquino.

MeTC of Manila, Branch 3: rendered judgment for plaintiffs Sampaguita and Belgravia but
reduced the amount of rental arrearages to a reasonable level of P80k a month, saying that such
increase is arbitrary, highly unconscionable and beyond the ambit of equity and justice. In the same
decision, the MeTC rejected thedefendantschallengeagainstBelgraviastitleoverthePNRlot
occupied by the subject warehouse.

RTC: The assailed decision of MeTC of Manila, Branch 3 is affirmed in toto.

CA: Dismissed the petitioners recourse thereto and affirmed with slight modification the
challenged affirmatory decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:WhetherDataliftcanquestionBelgraviasownershiptotheproperty
HELD:
NO.

The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being
questioned by the petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor
because having admitted the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred
from assailing Belgravia's title of better right of possession as their lessor.

Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law makes so peremptory
that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong." As long as the
lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former,
as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that
Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they
have.

It was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title or
right of possession over the leased premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at
all, Belgravia's title or right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case
between PNR and Belgravia, but not in the present case. Any ruling which the court may render
on this issue will, at the very least, be an obiter dictum, if not outrightly ultra vires.

The apparent error made by the MeTC will, however, not affect the result of the judgment rendered
in this case. In fact, the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted
Section 2, Rule 131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly
ordered to vacate the leased premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence
of the operation of this conclusive presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have
the personality to question whether an implied new lease was created between PNR and the
respondents, because so long as there is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship has
terminated,thelessorstitleorbetterrightofpossessionasagainstthelesseewilleternallybea
non-issue in any proceeding before any court.

TOPIC: OFFER OF EVIDENCE

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Devt Corp. is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws engaged in the production of copper concentrates for export. In 1993, it filed
its VAT return for the first quarter of 1993 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on April 20,
1993, and also filed an amended VAT return. On September 20, 1993, Atlas applied with the BIR
for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code. The
Court of Tax Appeals however denied such claim for issuance of tax certificate or refund of valueadded taxes for the first quarter of 1993 for insufficiency of evidence. IndenyingAtlasclaim for
tax credit or refund, the CTA held that Atlas failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the
grant of tax credit or refund for the alleged input taxes paid by Atlas. . Relying on Revenue
Regulation No. (RR) 3-88 which was issued to implement the then VAT law and list the documents
to be submitted in actions for refunds or tax credits of input taxes in export sales, it found that the
documents submitted by Atlas did not comply with said regulation. It pointed out that Atlas failed
to submit photocopies of export documents, invoices, or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and
others. Atlas filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating therein that under Sec. 106 of the Tax Code
which merely required proof that the foreign exchange proceeds has been accounted for in
accordance with the regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Consequently, Atlas
asserted that the documents it presented, coupled with the testimony of its Accounting and Finance
Manager, Isabel Espeno, sufficiently proved its case. Such motion was denied. OnAtlasappeal,
theCAdeniedanddismissedAtlaspetitiononthegroundofinsufficiencyofevidencetosupport
Atlasactionfortaxcreditorrefund.
TheCAconcurredwiththeCTAinthefindingthatAtlasfailureto submit the required
documents in accordance with RR 3-88 is fatal to Atlasaction,for, withoutthese documents,
AtlasVATexportsalesindicatedinitsamendedVATreturnandthecreditableorrefundable
input VAT could not be ascertained. The CA struckdownAtlascontentionthatithassufficiently
established the existence of its export sales through the testimony of its Accounting and Finance
Manager, as her testimony is not required under RR 3-88 and is self-serving.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund
HELD:
When claiming tax refund/credit, the VAT-registered taxpayer must be able to establish
that it does not have refundable or creditable input VAT, and the same has not been applied against
its output VAT liabilities informationwhicharesupposedtobereflectedinthetaxpayersVAT
returns.Thus,anapplicationfortaxrefund/creditmustbeaccompaniedbycopiesofthetaxpayers
VAT return/s for the taxable quarter/s concerned. The formal offer of evidence of Atlas failed to
include photocopy of its export documents, as required. Without the export documents, the

purchase invoice/receipts submitted by Atlas as proof of its input taxes cannot be verified as being
directly attributable to the goods so exported. The Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasijudicial proceedings, particularly Sec. 349 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear that
no evidence which has not been formally offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent
invoices or receipts purportedly evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts
a quo evidently could not determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when
Atlas likewise failed to submit pertinent export documents to prove actual export sales with due
certification from accredited banks on the export proceeds in foreign currency with the
corresponding conversion rate into Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not
determinetheveracityoftheexportsalesasindicatedinAtlasamendedVATreturn.
It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to prove
the allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best
evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the
pertinent documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.

TOPIC: OFFER OF EVIDENCE

Dizon vs. court appeals- MADRID

TOPIC: TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005

July 14, 2006

[OCA-IPI No. 04-2122-RTJ]

JOSEFINA CRUZ-AREVALO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN-LAYOSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City,
respondent.

FACTS:
This administrative Complaint1 filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia QuerubinLayosa2 with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. Q03-50379, entitled Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz v. Home Development Mutual
Fund and Federico S. Quimbo.

Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter3 and a special power
of attorney (SPA)4 in her favor to represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he undergoes
medical treatment in the United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the presentation of the
authorization letter and SPA during the pre-trial, respondent judge declared Cruz non-suited due
to his absence. She also refused to issue an order to that effect thus depriving Cruz the right to
challenge her order by way of petition for certiorari. Complainant also assails the order of
respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the
direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a chance to comment on the objections
raised by the defendants. Moreover, she refused to issue a written order excluding certain
paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to file certiorari proceedings.

Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by silence5

with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad
Testificandum6 thus providing opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and proper dispensation of
justice.7

Respondent's comment

In her Comment9 dated January 12, 2005, respondent judge explains that the letter presented by
complainant allegedly authorizing her to represent Cruz in the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-0350379 is defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She likewise found the
SPA defective as it pertains to complainant's authority to receive Cruz's contribution to the PAGIBIG Provident Fund and not to represent him in the pre-trial of the civil case. Thus, finding the
absence of Cruz during the pre-trial inexcusable and without any proper representation in his
behalf, respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as he is concerned.

As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the direct testimony
of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., respondent judge points out that she gave the other party the chance
to go over the affidavit and make objections thereto like any direct testimonial evidence. She claims
that no written order is necessary as demanded by complainant's counsel because her rulings were
made in open court during the course of trial and are already reflected in the transcript of the
stenographic notes. With regard to complainant's Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum
and Ad Testificandum, respondent judge avers that they were not given due course because the
legal fees for said motions were unpaid and the person alleged to have possession or control of the
documents sought to be produced is not named or specified therein.10

In its Report11 dated October 18, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
complainant's accusations unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case for lack of merit.12

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge manifested bias in ruling the case

HELD:
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant's witness, the rule is
that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to
form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in
his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence. The appellate court will better
understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record
of the case.16

Complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of respondent judge; mere
suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.20 Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in
an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice
without fear or favor. It bears to stress again that a judge's appreciation or misappreciation of the
sufficiency of evidence adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a judge's orders or rulings on
the objections of counsels during the hearing, without proof of malice on the part of respondent
judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality.21 The Court will not shirk from its responsibility
of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court
should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice.