OP

THE WAR

IN

SOUTH AFRICA

CHAPTER

THE CRISIS AT HOME

With

up the gage British

Moral doubts and thfSJtSeak

a light heart the British nation had taken

down by

of battle flung

hesitations, springing

the Eepublics.

from a genuine and deep-seated abhor-

rence of the very thought of war, had perplexed

and weakened

its

policy during the years and

ceding the inevitable collision.

in an instant

by the

its

conscience

months pre-

All these had been resolved

reckless defiance of President Kruger's

Anxiety as to the military issue there was

Few even believed that the Boers would make any
none.
serious or prolonged resistance to the overwhelming advance
of the great army that was being launched against them.
For it must never be forgotten that it was the magnitude of
the force sent, not its insufficiency the abundant precaution
shown in order to insure speedy and complete success, not
the lack of some of the veriest rudiments of scientific preparaultimatum.

tion, that

impressed the public mind at the outbreak of war.

Judged by the standard of previous wars, this was the largest

force of purely British troops that had ever been sent over
Compared with the enemy to be encountered, the
the sea.
force almost equalled the total adult male white population
of the two Eepublics.
Wliat wonder, then, that a nation
profoundly ignorant of

all

military

confidently and light-heartedly

equal a conflict
VOL.

III.

affairs

should

upon what seemed

enter
so un-

of war.

TEE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

2
The

failure to

respons^Miity
of

Empire,

The memory of the first Transvaal War ought perhaps to

^^^ Suggested a warning. But the lessons of 1881 had only
been learnt in part. The political mischief and shame of
Gladstone's surrender had sunk deeply into the mind of the
the military impotence and failure which led
British people
Instead of studying and planning to
to it were overlooked.
;

secure victory, the nation rested content in the belief that

had only to make up its mind not to surrender again, and

It had yet to learn that the great
else would follow.
ideals of Empire cannot be sustained by good intentions
alone, or even by patriotic improvisation and the lavish
expenditure of money in the hour of danger, but only by
constant forethought, by sober, purposeful striving, and by
Its Imperialism was still tainted with
efficient organization.
that self-satisfied irresponsibility, that contemptuous ignoring
of things as they are, that belief in the power of wealth and
large figures in general, and that disbelief in the power of
scientific thought and earnest will concentrated upon national
objects which the word "jingoism" most nearly expresses.
From that taint the dearly-bought experiences of the South
African War should have done much to free it whether

it

all

enouorh, future events alone can show.

Efiect of the
first reverses.

The

were received in England

to be expected, so people
reassured each other, at the beginning of a war.
That was
Meanwhile, the main army
the British way of doing things.
was on its way its chosen commander had already landed
all would soon be well.
But gradually, as fuller news
of the first phase of the campaign in Natal reached home,
while at the same time the investing cordon was drawn
closer round Kimberley and Ladysmith, and while a similar
fate seemed at one time even to threaten the forces at
Estcourt and Mooi Eiver, a feeling of uneasiness began
to spring up.
Eor a moment, in the opening days of
December, when practically the whole of the original expeditionary force had landed and was pushing forward at
every point, this feeling was lulled into security.
Then
followed in quick succession the three stinging blows of
Stormberg, Magersfont^in and Colenso. With each reverse
first

tidings of unsuccess

They were only

y^\w^ calmness.

THE CRISIS AT HOME

hope concentrated more intensely upon the forces that were

With Colenso the last hope of easy \ictory
still to engage.
vanished.

The week that followed marked a

crisis in

the

life

of the The Black

There were no outward

signs of panic, no unreasoning clamour for the recall of the
Englishmen
generals, no denunciation of the Government.
remained true to their reputation for constancy and selfAll the same, the nation
control in adverse circumstances.
was more deeply stirred, more profoundly alarmed, than
perhaps at any period since the eve of Trafalgar. It was
not the magnitude of the defeats in themselves that could
make this impression. Three severe checks, involving nearly
3,000 casualties, were no doubt a shock to a generation
accustomed to the cheap military glories of savage warfare.
But that shock only formed an element in the current of the
British nation and of the Empire.

Its real significance lay in the sudden

comprehension of what those checks might imply. The eyes
of the nation were opened, and it now saw how slight and
uncertain was the reserve of military power on which the
British Empire, with all its great extent of territory, its

national emotion.

Ten days before the

have begun the
scattered fragments of the expeditionary force had been
beaten at every point. What other army was there ready
What organization had been elaborated beforeto hand ?
hand to bring a reserve force into being? The fate of
Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, perhaps even of the
troops already in the field in South Africa, depended not
upon statistics of area, population or wealth, but solely upon
the armed and trained men that could be put in the field

population and
irresistible

its

march

wealth, was based.

to

Pretoria

was

to

against the Boers within the next few weeks.

If they proved

what chance was there of regaining the lost

And, failing decisive victory, what settlement
ground ?
would follow that would not mark the beginning of the
For without the confidence of the
end of the Empire ?
colonies in the power and determination of England to
defend colonial interests, without the confidence of England
in her own strength, what hope was there of ever realizing

insufficient,

B 2

^a^^e'jiinjto
the issues
^^^ ^
*

TEE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

of Imperial unity

that great conception

which

in

recent

years had been gradually coming to be the supreme political

ideal of the nation and the religion of many of its leading

men ?
much

The

had grown so
would rapidly loosen again. England

invisible bonds of Empire, that

stronger of late,

would be

left

to

stand

alone,

and,

standing

alone,

her

marked out and all for no

downward path was
breakdown of an inadequate
sudden
other cause than the
clearly

military system in face of the resistance of a few thousand

farmers.

The need for

more men.

breakdown have been set forth at

The want of any real
sufficient length in the last volume.
our military preparaand
co-ordination between our policy

The causes

the

tions,

of that

neglect

of

the

measures

necessary to secure

adequate information, the false strategic distribution of our

forces at the outbreak of war, the absence of a General Staff
or a proper staff system, the defective peace training of

and men, had borne their fruit in disaster on the

How was that disaster to be retrieved?
The time for organization, training and preparation, had gone
All that was left was to lose no time in finding the best
by.
Overgenerals and, above all, in sending out more troops.
whelming numerical superiority alone could now make up
for those failings that no improvisation could remedy.
Numerical insufficiency, indeed, had not been the real
cause of our disasters, but it was their natural consequence, and for the moment the question of numbers was
supremely important.
The strength of the force in South Africa had already
been increased considerably above the numbers thought
The wastage of
sufficient before the war broke out.
casualties and disease had been balanced by a steady
stream of drafts. Three battalions and a mountain battery
were ordered out to replace the losses of Nicholson's Nek.
A fifth division was called out on November 11th when it
became known that Sir E. BuUer had diverted a division to
Natal, and began to arrive in South Africa from the middle
of December onwards, in time to counteract some of the
moral impression of the recent defeats. A sixth division was

officers
field

Bankruptcy
of the exist-

ing military
organization.

of battle.

TEE CRISIS AT SOME

Modder Eiver and a seventh after MagersThe former was just beginning to sail as the
reverse were received in England the latter would

ordered after
fontein.

tidings of

not be ready

till

A siege

early in January.

train of thirteen

companies of garrison artillery (four from the Mediterranean), with heavy guns and howitzers, and four more
brigade divisions of field artillery, were sent out about the

same time. In all, some 85,000 men, including the Seventh

had been sent out of England since the war began.
That left nearly 100,000 regulars still in the country, after
the calling out on December 17th of the whole of the first
class reserve, an ample margin, one might think, for further
reinforcements. After making all due allowances for recruits
and invalids, for permanent staffs and garrison forces, it would
not be unreasonable to expect that a net field force of from
40,000 to^50,000 men, say four infantry divisions with proportionate complements of the other arms, should still have been
available. Unfortunately no such force existed.
In the first
place, nearly 40 per cent, of this outwardly imposing paper
Division,

of 100,000 men consisted of fully paid regular soldiers

who, owing to extreme youth or deficient physique, were alto-

army

And

gether unfit for foreign service.

cent,

were

individually useless,

worse

still, if

nearly double

40 per

that

pro-

mere mob of men in

uniform, unorganized and unofficered.
Of the cadres existing
in peace, only fourteen battalions of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry were left in the country, Eeserve cadres
there were none, for there were no officers.*
Even had the
officers and men been available, the necessary equipment of
portion

was

useless collectively

guns, harness, saddlery, clothing, for another four divisions

would not have been forthcoming.

The provision of the
whether of officers or of equipment, indispensable

reserve,

in order to secure complete mobilization

in other words,

get full value out of the costly force kept

was

to

up by the country

a measure which a wasteful and improvident system

had never yet been able to affi^rd.

* See Evidence War Commission I. 4125, where Sir E. Wood quotes

the case of one officer having to look after 850 men divided between
Aldershot and Hounslow.

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFEICA

6
Possible

r^asurosi^
The exclusion

In the absence of any proper prevision, the only thing for

the Government to do was to have recourse to emergency

measures.

All existing cavalry and infantry units should

As for the unorganized

have been despatched at once.
make use of the few
to
either
was
possible
remainder, it
order
to stiffen such Militia
them
in
thousand fit men among
volunteer
to
for active service,
battalions as might be induced
were,
they
to swell the size of
or simply to send them out, as
The
re-enlisting
of old soldiers
their units in South Africa.
and the offering of a substantial bounty to recruits of an
age and physique suitable for immediate embarkation and
possessed of some knowledge of arms, enlisting them only
for the period of the campaign, might rapidly have supplied
Meanwhile the whole of the Militia
fresh reinforcements.
could be called under arms, the Volunteers encouraged to
strengthen and improve themselves, and every possible
appeal made to the patriotism of both forces to induce as

many

as possible of

them

to volunteer as units, or failing

that as individuals, for service in South Africa.

From

the

purely military point of view, indeed, the simplest and most

obvious step was to send 40,000 or 50,000 trained men from

new

England to take their place.

To have withdrawn so
large a part of the British troops, even for a few months,
would certainly have been a risky policy, and however justifiable on broad grounds of Imperial strategy, would never
have been acquiesced in by the Government of India. On
the other hand, the use of native Indian soldiers would have
been contrary to the decision of the Government only to
employ white troops, a decision fully justified by consideration for South African sentiment and for the political future
of the country.
Moreover, from the broadest point of view,
the danger of the British Empire is lest, like the Eoman
Empire of old, it should come to rely too much on the fighting
qualities of its subject races, and should allow the military
spirit of the ruling race to decline. Eegarded in this light, the
South African War, which was fought entirely by the soldiers
and volunteers of the dominant race the first great war so
fought since Agincourt may perhaps by future historians
India, raising

But there were

troops in

serious objections.

THE CRISIS AT HOME

be reckoned as one of the most bracing influences in the

course of our national

life.

war through without the use of The opporthe more imperative to make
ij^^^reforms
every effort to raise and despatch fresh forces from home, neglected.
The occasion was ripe for almost any measure. The nation
was in a mood to respond to every demand that might be
made upon it. Had our military affairs been directed by
any one who had thought out an effective national system,
but had hitherto been unable to carry it into execution,
now was the moment for establishing its main outlines
by a series of bold emergency measures.
But such men
are not easily produced by the existing political system
with its glorification of hand-to-mouth policy, and they
were not to be found in this crisis. The Government was
still far from rising to the magnitude of the occasion.
It
had dribbled troops out by divisions during the last few
weeks, and even after Colenso it had no real plan beyond
the sending of Lord Eoberts and Lord Kitchener to take
over the supreme command.
Instead of working upon
national emotion while it was at wliite heat and forging
The

resolve to see the

coloured troops

it

to

their

made

own

it

all

purposes,

the

chief

object

of

ministers

seems to have been to calm the public excitement, to

minimise the dangers of the situation, and to make much
of the preparations already made, or the feeble emergency
measures that were being announced. Nothing can reflect
graver discredit on this passivity of the Government than
the fact that not one of the measures it took to cope with

any strong and widespread protests.

is the natural temper of a
people that has not seen serious war for nearly fifty years,
that absence of protest can only have meant that the Government was not doing its duty not doing it as, for instance,
President Lincoln did when, after the earlier reverses of the
Civil War, he enforced conscription upon the North in the
face of the very fiercest opposition.
So far from leading or
coercing the nation, as in duty bound, it waited for a lead
from without, and such action as it did take was due quite
as much to the exhortations of the Press and the agitation

the situation evoked

For when one considers what

TEE WAR IN SOUTE AFRICA

of informal committees of patriotic citizens as to its

initiative

own

resolution.

The speeches

Feebleness of

men?^^^^"

and

of ministers during the next few

weeks and

the debates in Parliament that followed can only be read

now with

perplexed amazement.

Amid much

patriotic

verbiage about the gallantry of our soldiers and the splendid

argument of their discourses was

Government had done all its
military advisers had asked it, and had never interfered with
the generals in the field, that things could not well have
happened other^vise, and that the forces now sent out were
Mr. Balfour's
quite sufficient to achieve complete success.
singularly complacent series of addresses delivered in
Manchester early in January all the more singular because
of the courageous part he had played in the councils of the
Government just before provoked widespread dissatisfaction.
Equally ill-timed were Lord Salisbury's cynical criticisms,
when Parliament opened towards the end of January, on the
fortitude of the nation, the

chiefly to the effect that the

Constitution for the purpose of

conducting warlike operations.* The secret of their conduct
lay in the system in which they had been brought up.

inefficiency of the British

Momentous though the

crisis was, they were no more able

from their habitual attitude of party
defence, face the facts, and stand forward as the rulers of a
great nation, than the generals in the field had been able to
shake off the mental fetters of Pall Mall and Aldershot and
show themselves great military leaders. By inveterate habit,
their eyes were fixed on tTieir opponents in Parliament. They
still saw things not as they were but as they appeared through
the distorting mirage of Parliamentary debate.
Their arguments were addressed not to guiding and inspiring the nation,
but to meeting or anticipating the charges of the Opposition.
The Opposition, indeed, played an even feebler part during
this crisis than the Government itself. A small but influential
section were prepared freely to support the Government in any
jjigasures it might take and to reserve all criticism for the

to shake themselves free

Feebleness of
tion^^^^^'

National

impa

lence.

* Cf. Carlyle's 'Frederick the Great,' bk, xii. ch. 12, for a striking
description of Walpole's attitude towards the early reverses of the Spanish

War

in 1741.

THE CRISIS AT HOME

An

present.

equally small but noisier group, comprising the

anti-war idealists and the political extremists of every shade,

indulged in violent denunciations of the injustice and wicked-

With

ness of the war.

welcomed the war

these

went the

Irish ^Nationalists,

who

campaign
of denunciation against the British Government and openly
expressed their exultation at the Boer successes.
The bulk
Sir

Party, admirably

Liberal

of the

as supplying fresh food for their

typified

H. Campbell-Bannerman, wobbled

in

their

leader,

flabbily hither

and

thither in their anxiety to share the credit for patriotism

of the one wing without foregoing any political capital that
might be made by the methods of the other. Among public
men. Lord Eosebery stood almost alone in urging the seriousness of the crisis and the necessity for thoroughgoing
But unfortunately his vague warnings, unaccommeasures.
panied by definite suggestions and unsupported by continuous
effort, fell fruitless.
The nation as a whole watched the
political
proceedings of its
leaders with unconcealed impatience.
The unreal and unedifying discussions in Parliament filled ordinary men with a strong conviction of the

unfitness of the
affairs,

House

of

Commons

to

manage Imperial

a conviction without immediate tangible result but

its

effect

upon the

constitutional development of the Empire.

Had

there been

destined

in

course of

found any one

man

time to have

to stand out

above

liis

fellows

and play

the part of a Chatham, the faults of the political system

might have been obscured by practical success. But the

only man on either side who possessed the natural gifts
which might have made him a successful War Minister,
Mr. Chamberlain, was tied by the heavy work of his own
department, and by the prospect of heavier work when the
war ended. And so the political machine went jumbling
on, trying to conduct war as if it were a side issue of ordinary
peace administration, and not the one object and end of the
national existence for the time being, and displaying all
the feebleness in action and lack of foresight that tend to
characterize party government, without any of the stimulating
effect that, in peace, party discussion has upon the political
intelligence of the nation.

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

10
Early offers
of voluntary

In default of any one

to organize

it,

the nation attempted

Offers of voluntary assistance had,

^^ organize itself.

made

War

from

by
members of the auxiliary forces. As early as
August, 1899, Sir Howard Vincent, commanding the Queen's
the very outbreak of war, been

to the

Office

the leading

Westminster Volunteers,

offered to raise, at his

own

expense,

a special battalion of volunteers for active service. About

the same time Colonel Eustace Balfour, commanding the

London Scottish, offered to raise a company from his regiment to be attached to the Gordon Highlanders. Early in
October Colonel Lucas suggested to the

War

Office

the

Yeomanry for service

were made a month later by

mobilization of a composite regiment of

in South Africa.

Lord Lonsdale,

Similar offers

who

offered to equip

and transport a thousand

commanding the East Kent Yeomanry,

men, by
These offers,
by the Middlesex Yeomanry, and others.
with
much
any
originally made not so
idea that the proffered
assistance might be seriously needed, as in the hope that the
volunteer forces might be given an opportunity of showing
what they could do, were renewed from time to time during
They were declined by the
the opening weeks of the war.
authorities, whose opinion of the auxiliary forces was of the
lowest, and who refused to contemplate the possibility of
reverses that might lead to a demand for large reinforceLord Harris,

ments.

To the suggestion

regulations

for

that

it

should at least issue

the special enlistment

accordance with the Act of 1895* the

of

War

volunteers
Office

in

had no

would not be required

better reply than that such volunteers

the Militia reserve was exhausted, and that as there was

no immediate prospect of this, such a step could only " raise
till

false

hopes."!

One might have supposed

that,

without

Allowing volunteers to offer themselves for active service at any time

the order embodying the Militia is in force.
t The fact is that the permission to volunteers to go to the front was
only accorded reluctantly as a privilege which they hardly deserved and
Thus
for which they ought to be very grateful
as indeed they were.
Lord Albemarle, in addressing the C.I.V. infantry on parade just before
" The Volunteer movement had culminated
their departure, could say
in a great honour done to the Volunteer force
they had actually been
accepted for active service on the field of battle."

when

THE CRISIS AT HOME

11

" raising false hopes,"

some scheme could have been quietly

Office, but nothing of the sort was
For one thing there was no one to do it. There had

elaborated at the

done.

War

never been a proper staff to look after the auxiliary forces

in peace time, and it was difficult to create one amid the
But the main reason
general confusion and overwork of war.

was that neither the Government nor, consequently, the War

Office, had ever seriously contemplated the possibility of a
war which might necessitate the raising of emergency troops,
or had considered that, in such an emergency, any use might
be made of the auxiliary forces.
When on December 18 the Government announced that Attitude of
*
it would allow twelve battalions of Militia to volunteer for
[^""JanXon
service abroad and embody an equivalent number at home, ing such help,

and would sanction the formation of a "stroncc" force of

volunteers from the Yeomanry and a contingent of carefully
selected Volunteers for South Africa, it took a step which, at
any rate in its original intention, was quite as much political
as military.
In taking that step it looked less towards
crushing the Boers than towards allaying public excitement
in

England

less

towards devising a

new engine

towards providing a safety-valve to ease

feelings of the nation.

oft*

It is impossible to

of

war than

the pent-up

understand the

genesis and formation of the volunteer force which sprang

during the weeks following the

crisis

of the Black

up

Week

without keeping in mind clearly that the attitude of the

Government and War Office towards the national movement

was permissive, if not actually restrictive, and that the force
raised was the resultant, not of the concerted energies of the
nation directed by its natural leaders, but of the friction
between the unorganized enthusiasm of public-spirited
individuals and the passive resistance of the recognized
authorities.

nation's

Flattering references to the patriotism of the

volunteers

there were

difficult to find a single

plenty,

but

it

would

be

utterance of responsible ministers

during that period which could be construed as a deliberate

effort

to

stir

up the national enthusiasm,

to

encourage

waverers, or to rebuke the faint-hearted.

As

regards the details of the raising of the volunteer

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

12

military

was

Attitude of

contingents, the

Offi(>e^^^

governed by the predominant desire to turn the energies

of the volunteers, which the politicians insisted on their

attitude

of

the

authorities

would give least trouble in

animated them was
in its essence the same as that which had inspired the famous
" dismounted preferred " telegram to the colonies.
Let them
come if they insisted on it, but not more than could be
helped, and let them give as little trouble as possible.
Instead of trying to secure all the capable men who were
ready to come forward, and equipping and organizing them
accepting, into such directions as

the

way

The

of organization.

spirit that

down certain fixed rules for units,

sum for equipment, and complacently

themselves, they laid

allowed a certain

awaited the result.

might have displayed
or at home,

A vast

mass of

itself in

was thus

patriotic energy

which

personal service, either abroad

frittered

away

in the organizing of

county funds, and the buying of horses, uniforms and

accoutrements in competition with the War Ofi&ce. The
desired end was undoubtedly attained.
The overworked
War Ofi&ce was not worried by the task of organizing and
despatching large bodies of half-trained or untrained men.
in a state of bustling activity and

The nation was kept

abstained largely from criticism

weeks of the war.

And

during the most anxious

not more than some 20,000

volunteers out of two or three times that number who
might have been secured if that had been the object aimed
lastly,

managed

at

to carry

through their purpose of serving their

country.
Anunwarlike
nation.

When we

consider

national emotion

the depth and intensity of the

about the war we might reckon even

100,000 volunteers a disappointingly small fraction out of a

population of forty millions.
But we must not forget that
the British nation had in recent generations become abso-

The most elementary proficiency in the

use of firearms was practically confined to the members of
the volunteer forces, and it is only from men who feel that
lutely unwarlike.

they can be of some service that volunteers can be expected,

even in the most patriotic nation. There can be little doubt
that under an equal stress of patriotic emotion a little people

THE CBISIS AT HOME

like the Swiss

13

would have found many more volunteers than

the English, for the simple reason that the

who can march,

skirmish, and shoot

is

number

of

men

larger in Switzerland

than in the United Kingdom. If British statesmen really

cherish the hope that they can find the necessary reserve of
strength for the emergency of a great

war in the voluntary

must make that

patriotism of their fellow countrymen, they

voluntary patriotism possible by compulsorily extending the

knowledge of the use of arms

whole manhood of the

to the

nation.

In discussing the attitude of the

sary to

remember

first

War

of all that there

Office, it is neces- Absence of

was no scheme

for P^^^^^^-

the use of the volunteer forces for foreign service prepared

beforehand, and no staff available to

Here again the cause

scientifically

trained

is

to

work such a scheme.

be found in the absence of a

department specially devoted to the

thinking and planning for such emergencies and responsible

for

drawing up a scheme, and

existed to

work

it

when

in

the absence of a

no

less

the

cause of

for

seeing

that

the

men

the occasion came, in other words

Staff.
That absence was
contemptuous disbelief in the

General
the

value of the volunteers

entertained in the

War

Office

disbelief which the experience of the war threatened at

one moment to supersede in the public mind by an even
more dangerous disbelief in the value of training and
A trained staff, judging by the light of historical
discipline.
experience, would have known exactly what value to put
upon the auxiliary forces, and have remembered that there
are occasions when, in default of highly trained troops, great
things can be done with untrained material if its physical
and moral quality is good, the supply of it abundant, and the
stress of

time not too great.

But there was yet another factor that governed the The fear of
attitude of the Government and the War Office not only invasion.
as regards the volunteers, but on the whole question of
reinforcing the army in South Africa, and that was the
anxiety to safeguard the United

Kingdom

against invasion.

was that anxiety which dominated most of the measures

decided upon in Downing Street and Pall Mall during these
It

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

14

months. We see it alike in the measures taken, such as

the formation of provisional battalions, the raising of the Eoyal
Keserve Eegiment,* and the creation of new batteries of field
and in the measures neglected, such as the failure
to despatch to South Africa immediately all available regular
artillery,

The

units.

and

international situation was, no doubt, disquieting

All

dangerous.

the same

this

concern about

the

conditional and remote danger of invasion, already provided

by the Navy, at the expense of a due concentration

power at the seat of hostilities was contrary to the most
elementary principles of strategy. But if these fears were
allowed to play so mischievous a part when a European war
was a mere possibility and the Navy was still untouched, one
may well ask what likelihood is there of any British Government having the courage in a great war to make a really
effective use of its Imperial striking forces, the Navy and the
Eegular Army, unless the local and temporary defence of
these islands is independently and autamatically provided
against

of

for?
The Imperial
Yeomanry.

The

which determined the acceptance of

particular cause

^ contingent of Yeomanry, hitherto steadily declined by the

War

Office, was a telegram from Sir R. BuUer, sent on the

day after Colenso, asking for 8,000 irregular mounted infantry
A conference with some of the
organized in companies.

leading officers
at the

War

commanding Yeomanry regiments was held

on December 18, and it was decided to

Office

cavalry rates of pay, 3,000 men, a figure increased

raise, at

and eventually 10,500. It is open to question

whether the most effective proceeding would not have been
to have made use of the existing Yeomanry organization as
far as possible, and to have called upon the Yeomanry
later to 8,000,

regiments to volunteer for active service as units, bringing

them up
*

How

strength,

completely

authorities

bounty

war

to

is

home

shown by the

and replacing individuals who were

defence predominated in the minds of the

fact that while in February, 1900, they ofiered a

Royal Reserve Regiment for

was over, that they
allowed re-enlistment for foreign service, and then only on condition that
those who had already joined the Royal Reserve Regiment should refund

home

of

22

defence,

the bounty.

for old soldiers enlisting in the

it

was not

till

April, after the crisis

THE CBISIS AT HOME

15

unable or unwilling to go by enlisting for the term of the

war any one who could ride and shoot. By this means the
Yeomanry would have been put on their mettle, and the units
would have gone out with a certain corps sentiment, which
distinguished performance in the field might have intensified
The War Office,
into a valued possession for the future.
however, decided to follow Buller's suggestion exactly, and
to raise a number of companies of mounted infantry organized
The raising and organization of
entirely for the occasion.
the force was mainly entrusted to officers connected with
the existing Yeomanry, and it was hoped that a good many
yeomen would join, but not more than half the permanent
staff of a Yeomanry unit was allowed to volunteer.
As a
matter of fact, though the Yeomanry supplied a valuable
element, in actual numbers only 1,898, or less than one-fifth
of the whole, joined this emergency force, which might
with almost equal propriety have been styled the Volunteer

Mounted Infantry.
As regards the
force, the

War

raising,

equipment, and despatch of the The

to provide the men with con^ttee.

Office undertook

bayonet, and ammunition, and to find tents and land

rifle,

transport

for

them

in

South Africa.

the
was

All the rest

purchasing of horses and horse equipment, of uniforms, the

mobilization, and even

the securing of sea transport^

delegated to a Committee of influential and patriotic gentle-

men

manage as best they could. This Committee, which

December 19 had provisionally consisted of Colonel
Lucas, Lord Chesham, and Lord Valentia, was formally
constituted* by an Army Order of January 4. The Committee was practically a little amateur War Office of its
own, and the Imperial Yeomanry was intended to be, for all
to

since

The Imperial Yeomanry Committee was composed

as

follows:

Colonel Lucas, general supervision; Mr. E. W. Beckett, M.P., finance;

Lord Valentia, Colonel the Hon. H. Crichton, and Lieut. -Colonel H. Le

Koy Lewis, enrolment and establishment

Colonel St. Quintin and

Lord Lonsdale, remounts and saddlery Captain the Hon. W. L. Bagot,
clothing and equipment Lord Harris, assisted by Rear- Admiral Sir John
Hext and Lieut.-General A. R. Badcock, transport and shipping. Mr. W.
Long, M.P., and Lord Chesham were on the Committee, but had no
;

defined functions.

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

16

purposes almost, except those of actual fighting, absolutely

It was
separate from the forces raised by the War Ofl&ce.

an extraordinary arrangement, typically British alike in its

of all formal organization and in the splendid
energy with which the members of the Committee threw

disregard

themselves into their work.

The lack

Unprepared, short-handed, and overworked as the

of

co-ordina-

q^^^
had

^^^^^

-^

-g

(difficult

War

to avoid the conclusion that if it

really believed in the value of this

Yeomanry

force,

and

been anxious to secure the largest force possible, it would

in one way or another have taken the business in hand itself,
if

necessary by incorporating the energies of the leaders of

into its own framework.

The
authorities
did
which
the
endeavour
to
only direction
in
insisting
on
the
control
was
Yeomanry
rigid
exercise a
companies being organized exactly on the lines of an ordinary
mounted infantry company, and in trying to keep down the
In other words the authorities interfered most
numbers.*
where their interference w^as unnecessary or harmful, and
left alone the matters where unified organization was most
As a matter of fact the system of a separate army
essential.

Yeomanry movement

the

in

broke

down very

shipping

From the very first

Yeomanry Committee making its own

largely in practice.

the absurdity of the

aprrangements

independently

of

the

Admiralty

The base and remount depots

at Cape Town were before long absorbed by the Imperial
authorities, and the separate stores of necessary military
articles were also eventually merged in the common stock
The independent purchasing
of the army in South Africa.

caused

it to

be abandoned.!

With the very

greatest difficulty the

Office to sanction the 608

men

Committee persuaded the War

required for a base depot at Cape

Town

for

a force which by the end of February had grown to 10,000 men, and 1,000
men for drafts; three weeks later, under the influence of so partial a
success as the occupation of Bloemfontein, this sanction was revoked

an attempt made

and

down

the total to 10,000, which was compromised

the Committee showed that it had already recruited over
to cut

to 10,500 when
that figure. The actual total up to July 1 was, however, 10,921
13,512 horses.

men and

t For one thing the Committee discovered that they, as private individuals, could not ship their men and horses together without coming

into eonfiict with the provisions of the

Merchant Shipping Act.

TBE CRISIS AT HOME

17

of remounts, saddlery, clothing, and equipment did not

In fact the only economy in the
conduce to economy.
scheme was that the War Office did not pay for all the

necessary military expenses of the various corps, but that

met by charitable contributions. Without

County Funds, and without the 50,000 given by
Messrs. Wernher, Beit & Co., which formed practically the
whole of the Central Yeomanry Fund, there can be no doubt
that the force could never have been raised or equipped
these were partly

the

as rapidly as it was, for the

(afterwards

raised

to

War

Office allowance of

35) per man and 40 per

higher than the cost of equipping

though

soldier through the

the

25

horse,

ordinary

Government departments, by no means

covered all the items that were really military necessaries.

The announcement of the formation of the Yeomanry

provoked immense enthusiasm all over the country. The
central office in Suffolk Street, Strand, and the local
recruiting depots were besieged by large crowds composed
in the main of a class of men far above the ordinary army
skilled operatives, clerks, farmers, "

younger sons,"
and even a considerable number of men of high rank and
The Duke of Norfolk, recognised head of the
position.
Eoman Catholic community in England, enlisted, as an
example to his co-religionists, and as an answer to the
violently anti-English attitude of the clerical party on the
Continent.
Of the twenty-two peers and twenty-seven
members of the House of Commons whose patriotism sent them
into the field, over three-quarters went as Yeomanry officers.
One company, the Duke of Cambridge's Own, was composed
entirely of men who paid their own way out, and devoted
their pay to the Widows and Orphans' Fund.
Patriotic
Englishmen hurried home from British Columbia, from
Chile, from China, from every end of the world, in the
hope of being allowed to serve their country.
In one
case a whole family of six brothers enlisted.
The standard
for physique, shooting,' and horsemanship was high, but
if the War Office had wished it, there would have been
no difficulty in raising at that moment two or three
times the number of men, without any appreciable loss of
recruit

VOL.

III.

Public
^^ ^^siasm.

TEE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

18
quality,

and there were thousands of

others, unskilled in

riding or shooting, but of excellent physique and intelligence,

gladly have come forward if any arrangement

had been made for accepting their services and training
them. Not only did the central committee work with rare
energy, but every local centre competed eagerly in order
to be the first to have its company raised, equipped, and
ready for starting. Over 1,500 yeomen embarked between
January 27 and the end of the month, 3,400 in February, an
equal number in March, and the last contingent sailed from
Southampton on April 14.
The original intention was to group the companies into
four company battalions, and the staff of the force was
But, as was the case with
organized on this assumption.
the original Army Corps, and as will always be the case with
organizations put together at the last moment, the nominal
organization never had any existence in practice. The different
companies were sent out as they were equipped on landing
they were sent up countiy, as mounted men were required, and though they wero again reconstituted into
two brigades, one with Lord Methuen and the other
attached to General Bundle's force, it wis not long before
these once more succumbed to the exigencies of events,
and eventually there was hardly a column or force that had
not with it its quota of Yeomaniy. Besides the companies
directly organized by the Yeomanry Committee, several
special corps were organized independently by private

who would

Yeomanry
organization.
The special
corps.

persons, but

assimilated

in

constitution to the

Yeomanry
The

companies, and afi&liated to the central organization.

Duke

of Cambridge's O^vn, raised

already been referred

by Lord Donoughmore, has

There was also a battalion (18th)

of sharpshooters raised by the Earl of Dunraven, "Paget's
Horse " (19th battalion), raised by Mr. George Paget, the
" Eoughriders " (20th battalion), raised by Lord Lathom, sis
Irish

companies,

to.

and

the

77th

(Manchester) Company.

Similar in constitution, but not affiliated, were Lord Lo vat's

Scouts and Lord

African experience.

Loch's contingent of

A number

men

with South

of other offers to raise and

equip corps were also made, but on conditions which the

-.MBER OF

General Piet. A. Cronje.

THE ExECUTlVF. COUNCIL OF THE S. AFRICAN REPUBLIC.
Photo

bii

B.

Gmnt,

St, H^h-nn,

TEE CBISIS AT HOME

19

Yeomanry Committee and the War Office did not see

Of the doings of the Yeomanry in the
to accept.

way

there will be plenty to tell in the later volumes.

their
field

Eor the

it is enough to say that the high quality, intellectual,

moral and physical, of the men enabled them within a
remarkably short time to make up for their lack of previous
training, and brought them, before their year of service was
out, fully up to a level with the best mounted troops in
South Africa.
In calling for volunteers from the Volimteer Infantry, The City
the War Office proceeded on the same general principles
y^i^J^j-s
that influenced them in the selection of the Imperial
Yeomanry, namely, the creating of new composite units in

present

preference to

making use

of existing corps.

Next

to the

Imperial Yeomanry, no corps that went out to the war

attracted so

The

much

attention as the City Imperial Volunteers.

origin of the force is to be found in

an interview which

took place on the afternoon of December 15 between Lord

Wolseley and Mr. (now Sir A.) Newton, the Lord Mayor of
London.
At this inter\iew a scheme was drawn up for
submission to Lord Lansdowne, by which the City offered to
raise, equip and transport to the front, at its own cost, a
corps of 1,000 picked marksmen from the various Volunteer
regiments in the London area, not more than twenty to be
taken from any one regiment.* On the following day the
Lord Mayor was informed that the offer was accepted. Large
subscriptions flowed in freely, including 25,000 from the
Common Council of the City, and over 65,000 of the
The
necessary 100,000 was subscribed within four days.
Union-Castle Company offered to take out 500 officers and
men free of charge Messrs. A. & C. Wilson, of Hull, offered
a ship to convey 550. It was decided, follo\ving the precedent of 1759, to present the freedom of the City to all
members of the force. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed,
and in the end the whole force sent out, of which the first
drafts embarked on January 13, amounted to some 1,740
men, selected from 47 different Volunteer corps. These
;

* This limit was, however, exceeded, and in several oases nearly forty
were allowed to join from one battalion.

c 2

THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

20

included 400 mounted infantry and a battery of 12i-pounder

Vickers-Maxim quickfirers, manned by the Honourable

Company.* The average age of the infantry was

twenty-four, and the average height 5 feet 8 inches, and in
this respect, as well as in social standing, the members of
the force were much above the average of the ordinary
regular.
But splendid corps as the C.I.V. were, and fully
as the members of it individually deserved the enthusiastic
send-off and welcome home that was given to them, it would
be absurd to make out that 1,740 men was a very great result
to show for the patriotic energies of a population of five
The fault lay not in any real want of patriotism,
millions.
Artillery

but in the lack of military training in

all

but an insignificant

portion of the whole, in the absence of the conception of the

duty of personal
the authorities

service,

and in the passive obstruction of

in other words, in the inherent defects of

our national organization.

The

service

companies,

Besides

the formation

of

the C.I.V.,

the

War

Office

authorized the formation of service companies of Volunteers

to be attached to regiments at the front to

make up

for the

companies converted into mounted infantry. These were to

be 110 strong, with four ofiicers. The scheme was applied
with true Procrustean rigidity, without much regard to the
number, keenness or efficiency of the Volunteer battalions
in particular regimental districts.
offered to go in a

50 per cent.

body

Several Volunteer battalions

in others the proportion exceeded

but such considerations were not allowed to

interfere with the scheme.

In Liverpool seven Volunteer

Glasgow four, had to divide one company
among themselves. In other cases there were not enough
men to form the necessary company. The waiting companies, which the War Office suggested should be formed in
case they might be wanted later, were not popular, and only
a few were ever formed. In all, some 9,000 Volunteers went

battalions, in

The command

ofiered to Sir

of the

Home

A.A.G. for the

whole was given to Colonel W. H. Mackinnon,

District, the

Howard Vincent

Major the Earl

command

was, owing

of Albemarle, that of the

Cholmondeley, and

of the battery to

of the infantry

originally

to his illness, transferred to

momited infantry

Major G. McMicking.

to Major

H.

0.

THE CRISIS AT HOME

21

out in these service companies,* a very small portion of the

have been sent if there had been any real

force that could

appreciation of the need of

men

or

any attempt

to strike

In
the iron of public emotion while it was still glowing.
addition to these companies of infantry, the authorities also
invited the Volunteer Engineer corps to furnish sections of
an of&cer and 25 men to be attached to companies E.E., and
of these over 400 officers and men ultimately went to South
Besides the Honourable Artillery Company, no
Africa.
other organized Volunteer artillery went out, with the
exception of the Elswick Battery of 12i-pounder quickfirers,
presented by Lady Meux, which, however, was not formed
from any existing volunteer organization, but provided and
manned entirely by the Elswick "Works. Over 200 volunteer
artillerymen, however, went out to serve with the regular
Apart from the Volunteers who actually
field artillery.
went to South Africa, so many joined the Volunteers at this
critical period in order to

home

strengthen the force available for

defence, that within a year their

numbers went up by

nearly 50,000 men, an increase accompanied at the same

time by a marked increase in general efficiency.

Amid all the excitement and bustle of raising these new The
Volunteer forces and service sections, the departure for the
front of the Militia

attracted

Battalions were asked

if

comparatively

they would go;

little

officers

notice.

exhorted

men, who almost invariably replied in the affirmative %

equipment was supplemented by the "War Office,
and embarkation followed a few days later.
The first
Militia battalion to leave England since the Crimea, the
3rd Eoyal West Kent, sailed for Malta to relieve a regular
battalion on January 4, and was followed a week later by
two more battalions to the same place, one to Egypt, and
eight to South Africa. Another 22 battalions to South Africa
their

existing

* 16,500 in the

6,209 Volunteers

whole course

of the war.

who went with

the various

force altogether supplied over 26,000

t
1900,
X

Emergency camps

Including the C.I.V. and

contingents, the

Yeomanry

men.

for fourteen days' training

were attended, during

by 165,000 Volunteers.
Of the first twelve battalions invited only one declined, and only four
WQre received out of forty invited up to the beginning of March,

refusals

Militia.

TEE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA

22

In
to St. Helena followed in the next two months.
21,000 Militiamen went out to South Africa during 1900,
about the same number as the other volunteer contingents
added together, and were followed by another 40 battalions

and one
all,

later in the war, bringing

up the

total to 45,000.

This output

of voluntary patriotism from a force so consistently starved,

neglected, and squeezed as the Militia deserves more attention than

it

has usually received.

To some

extent, perhaps,

may be accounted for by the fact that, while the officers

in many cases stood to gain professionally by active service,
the men as a whole were of a class who had less to lose by
absence from England than the men who composed the other
it

voluntary contingents.

But the

chief reason

must be sought

in the greater belief in the value of the Militia entertained

by the

authorities,

which led them

to appeal not only to the

patriotism of the indi\ddual militiamen, but to the corporate

spirit of the battaHons, in the closer association of the force

with the Kegular Army, and in the longer and more systemIn other words, the example of the Militia
atic training.
during the South African crisis only reinforces the lesson
already indicated by the composition * of the other volunteer
contingents, that the voluntary reserve which we have to rely
on for great Imperial emergencies will vary directly with the
numerical strength and degree of training of the national
National military training is
defence force in this country.
the bed-rock on which alone we can hope to carry through
the great struggles which the future may have in store for us.
Of the Militia and Yeomanry one man in five, of the Volunteers one
and of the untrained and unorganized bulk of the male population of fighting age about one man in a thousand came forward in this
emergency.
*

in fifteen,