Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No.

175352,
January 18, 2011
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled
as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold
any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited the
case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6,
1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that
respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted
and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held
thatthe office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not
appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the
PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent
Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman
during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation
since Section
7, Article
XIV
of
the
1935
Constitution
states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled

corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We
also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the
Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it
corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for

Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed
its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second
part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the
PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II.

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the
PNRC?
III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive

portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC
is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties,
and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not
the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will
consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It
is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide
a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that
when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest]
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the
PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this
matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could
have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected
by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this
case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1,

1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence
notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature
of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in
PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from
the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter
and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva
Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code
just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the
PNRCs special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the
State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so
as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a
private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is
treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never
raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost
all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that
would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of

disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the
Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that
were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to
now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution .]

Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.

counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors
of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently
questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes
were

not

properly

counted

hence

he

filed

a quo

warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group.
And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de
Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with
each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel
for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an
assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any
administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez
inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed
an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to
intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as
a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez
leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can
appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the
constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the
guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a
stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the
litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as

constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest

which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A
mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could
not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.

TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO
B. FERNAN

4.

Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing

Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

FACTS:

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session
of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of
the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who
voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M.
Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of
session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from
the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator
Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed
a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that
"[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court
held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically
for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually

ISSUES:
1.

Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2.

Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3.

Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the

position of Senate minority leader?

extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,

this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the
Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by
the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of
the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has
been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCDUMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition
by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be
accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.

Jose Avelino vs Mariano Cuenco

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to
speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and
other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however,
together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to
forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised
by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they

the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to

the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC
should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators
want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be
the resolution?

even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order.

There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz

Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the

was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten

disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said

senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other

adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and

(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with

he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his

their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the

followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be

resolution been approved only by ten or less.

made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment

of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions
of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to deliver his

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a
hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the
morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions

speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that

in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as

approved and was even recognized by the President of the

evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23

Philippines the following day.

Cuenco took his oath of office

senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,

thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC

excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of

to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House

HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take

cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers,

does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all

the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter

such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of

requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority

the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent

(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes

efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this

constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to

Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they

satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys

could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members;

ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the

if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,

requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally

and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same

elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14,
1949)

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority
of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do
business and the fact that said provision was amended in the

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take

Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall

cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to

constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the

the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends

framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the

that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected

number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual

president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;

members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual

one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the

members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by

number of senators nor does it change the majority which if

reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of

mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1

the house or for other causes which make attendance of the

or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was

member concerned impossible, even through coercive process

elected unanimously there was no quorum.

which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume

jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which
justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the
majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement
in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the
evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in
Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy

to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the

amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a
mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the
members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5)
Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of twothirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member
was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so
as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United

States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual
members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.

disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to
inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A.
No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of
that body.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House
Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or

agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If,
then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due
enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon
the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle
of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just.

VIRGILIO
O.
GARCILLANO
vs.
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY,
INFORMATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS

Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy

arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo
and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional
director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable
outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was
recorded and was played during the house of representative
investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed
before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized
communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee
be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic
reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules,
empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized
documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to
empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?
Held:

No,

the

Supreme

Court

mentioned

the

following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the

questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a

constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of

the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates
internet
web
page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the
more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,
could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in
the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules

of

procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation

cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was
not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the
land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required
publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without
due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they
already published such rules through their web page, in observance of
the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the
court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the
constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction
preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al., Petitioner, v. SENATE

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Respondent.
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S.
Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics
Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion
of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5
Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile as
Senate
President,
the
Ethics
Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to
name its representatives to the Committee,
prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he
will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then
chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that
the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the
Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the
hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to
the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments
to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the
need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of
the Whole.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint
against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this
petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior
resort;
3. Whether
the
transfer
of
the
complaint
against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative
of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW

First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has

an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case,
Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the
petition before the Court. While it may be true that
she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the
author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case
are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part
of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be
resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.

of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the

right to equal protection.

Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

does not apply to this case. The issues presented here
do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions
which are within the competence and jurisdiction of
the Court.

Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of

the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their
members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published,unless such rules
expressly provide for their publication before the rules
can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself
provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about
one of its members alleged irregular or unethical
conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics
Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to
nominate their members to the Ethics Committee.
The referral of the investigation to the Committee of
the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken
by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority

Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee

of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

PARTIALLY GRANTED

Enrique Morales vs
Abelardo Subido
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of
a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors
degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He
began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his
present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales
was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same
time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the
mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected
his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and
civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido
invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who
has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who
has served the police department of a city can be qualified for
said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was

being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the

following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city
or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was
actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the
conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by
producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate
bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the
bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the
matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative
secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10
is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by
the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act
to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as
the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC
would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth

trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of

lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all
cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there
are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity
of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar
hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

HENRY JUN DUEAS, JR.,

vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
and ANGELITO JET REYES

recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his

cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its
own funds for the revision of the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts.

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private

respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes were rival
candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd
legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. After the
canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the
winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to
private respondents 27,107 votes.
Not conceding
defeat, private respondent filed an election protest,
praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was
cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through
insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and
anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of
his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioners
votes.

In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET

directed the continuation of the revision and
appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counterprotested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules. Instead of complying with the order, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October
27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its
order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots
in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and

On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution

under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled
jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to
dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue
with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and
sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election.
This was with the end in view of ascertaining the true
choice of the electorate. It was the HRETs position that
the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the
unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the
HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled
that its task of determining the true will of the
electorate was not confined to the examination of
contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could
motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved
in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not
be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a motion to
withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested
precincts. Convinced that it could not determine the
true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district
of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of
the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counterprotested precincts, it had no other recourse but to
continue the revision and appreciation of all the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing the Resolution, to continue the revision and
appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested
precincts.

(2) Whether or not HRETs assumption of the burden of

the costs of the continued revision amounted to an
illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds
nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power

to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule,
not be reviewed by this Court . the power granted to
the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any
wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither
assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET
nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.

(1) HRETs Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw /

Abandon Counter-protest

First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative

District of Taguig City, where respondent protested the
election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counterprotested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730
precincts were the subject of the revision proceedings.
While 100% of the protested precincts were already
revised, only 25% or 140 of the counter-protested
precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were actually
done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET
only been allowed to continue its proceedings,
petitioner
claims
that
respondents
were
only
speculating that a sufficient number of fake/spurious
ballots would be discovered in the remaining 75%
counter-protested
precincts
and
that
these
fake/spurious ballots would overturn the result of the
election.

Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the

HRET as an independent constitutional body require that
any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that
body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not
on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence.
But the Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of
discretion by the HRET.

Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET shall

be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its members. By
employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic
that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of

election contests involving its members is exclusive and

exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its
own full, complete and unimpaired.

Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its

constitutional mandate, the Tribunal adopted Rule 7 of
the HRET Rules:
The Tribunal shall have exclusive
control, direction and supervision of all matters
pertaining to its own functions and operation.

In this connection and in the matter of the revision of

ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to
continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of
Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue
the revision proceedings ex propio motu, that is, of its
own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioners
view that he ought to have been allowed by HRET to
withdraw his counter-protest, there was nothing to
prevent the HRET from continuing the revision of its own
accord by authority of Rule 88.

The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its

prerogative under Rule 88 was its own determination
that the evidence thus far presented could affect the
officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation
of contested ballots and election documents, the
determination of whether the evidence could influence
the officially proclaimed results was a highly technical
undertaking, a function best left to the specialized
expertise of the HRET.

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive

prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
contests involving its members, the Court cannot
substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the
HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented
during the initial revision could affect the officially
proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the
revision proceedings could lead to a determination of
the true will of the electorate. TheCourt should merely
test whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. If
the Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed
with these election protest proceedings, the Tribunal will
no longer have exclusive control, direction and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions
and operation. It will constitute an intrusion into the
HRETs domain and a curtailment of the HRETs power
to act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the
evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial
revision.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once

acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v.
HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to
withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated.
Certainly, the Tribunal
retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and
the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion

is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to

deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the
cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by
certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to
respondent
HRET
whose
independence
as
a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by
Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988, thus:

The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive

character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of
the Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as `intended to be
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally
in the legislature [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)].
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818
(1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as
that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, judicial

review of decisions or final resolutions of the House

Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise
of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the tribunals decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or,
paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse. (emphasis supplied)

(2) HRETs Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision

Proceedings

When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or

tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise
provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to
employ all writs, processes and other means to make its
power effective. Where a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. Since the HRET possessed the authority to
motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had
the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the
disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the
ballots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. We
hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides
that the HRET has exclusive control, direction and
supervision of its functions. The HRETs order was but
one aspect of its power.

Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the

Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are
vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such
other powers as are necessary or incidental to the
accomplishment of its purposes and functions as set
forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law.
(emphasis supplied)

Certainly, the HRETs order that its own funds be used

for the revision of the ballots from the 75% counterprotested precincts was an exercise of a power
necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its
primary function as sole judge of election protest cases
involving its members.

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET

has the power to order the continuation of the revision
of the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then
he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing
to prevent the HRET from using its own funds to carry
out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such
power on the part of the HRET becomes useless and
meaningless.

Second, Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that

the HRET has an allotted budget for the Adjudication of
Electoral Contests Involving Members of the House of
Representatives. The provision is general and
encompassing enough to authorize the use of the
HRETs funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a
protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the

use of HRET funds for the revision of the remaining 75%

counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less
violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. To
reiterate, the law (particularly RA 9498) itself has
appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests in
the HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and
having received the proper appropriation for that
purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the
disbursement and allocation of such funds.

Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own

rules and disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it
deemed best. This is specially significant in election
contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital
public interest in determining the true will of the
electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the HRET
from ordering any of the parties to make the additional
required deposit(s) to cover costs, as respondent in fact
manifested in the HRET. Such disbursement could not
be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference to a party since the benefit would actually
redound to the electorate whose true will must be
determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private,
interest. The Court declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals that [o]ver and above the desire of the
candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people. Thus, in an
election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be
incidental.

All told, it should be borne in mind that the present

petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it promulgated Resolution No. 08-353
dated November 27, 2008. But what is grave abuse of
discretion? It is such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as
to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in

contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition
for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing
of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a
contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. Using the foregoing as yardstick, the
Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to discharge
the onus probandi imposed on him.