DENVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTOMATED BAGGAGE

HANDLING SYSTEM- PROJECT FAILURE ANALYSIS

MSc Project Management

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to critically analyse the Denver International
Airport Baggage Handling System project in order to detail the underlying
reasons for the perceived failures in the project and to provide
recommendations on how effective project management could have helped to
avoid the problems the project encountered.
A thorough analysis of the activities of the project from nature of project,
contracting, design, construction, testing, stakeholder management, risk
management, project controls, as well as the overall project leadership was
carried out and failure causal factors were identified. A recommendation was
also made on how the project should have been managed to ensure project
success. The analysis viewed the project from both project management and

project perspectives.

Student: @00380661
25-Feb-14
Number of words: 2558

Table of Contents
1.
1.1
2.
2.1

Introduction ................................................................................................................. 2
Project Failure .......................................................................................................... 2
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 3
Failure Modes of the Project .................................................................................... 6

3.

Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 10

4.

References ................................................................................................................. 11

Page 1 of 13

1. Introduction
Projects are increasingly considered strategic assets for many organisations today
(Dinsmore & Rocha, 2012) as such project management is occupying a progressively
central role (Morris, et al, 2011). Successful delivery of projects underpins the progress
and development of humanity (Morris, et al, 2011). The Denver International Airport
project was initiated to cater for the teaming air passengers at Denver city.
This report seeks to analyse the Denver Automatic Baggage System Project with the aim
to uncover the underlying reasons for its perceived failure. A thorough analysis of the
activities of the project was considered in order to identify the failure causal factors. A
recommendation was also made on how Denver automatic baggage system project should
have been managed to ensure project success.
The analysis viewed the project from both project management and project perspectives.
The project is said to be an all-round catastrophic colossal failure (Schlohs, 1996;
Neufville, 1994; Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008); cost overruns, schedule delays, poor
quality of product, inability to meet stakeholder expectations and so on.
Big and complex projects fail at an alarming rate (Matta & Ashkenas, 2003). So was the
case with Denver baggage handling project. Most project failures term from failure to
identify and properly manage risks (Matta & Ashkenas, 2003).

1.1 Project Failure

A project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service or
result (PMI, 2013, p. 417). It is temporary in the sense that it has a definite beginning
and an end. The end comes when objectives are met or when the project is terminated
because the objectives will not or cannot be met; or when the need for the project no
longer exists.
It is very ambiguous trying to establish the success or failure of a project due to the
unclear way project success can be measured because different people have different
opinions about project success or failure (Belassi & Tuckel, 1996)

Page 2 of 13

A project that has not delivered the required/expected quality, with the available
resources, on time, within budget and achieved expected benefits has failed (PMI (2013,
p.35).
However, that a project is not completed within budget and time does not make it a failed
project (Hallgren & Wilson, 2007). A project can still be a success even with the failing
of the project management if it can deliver its long term objectives (Munns & Bjeirmi,
1996). The Australian Sydney Opera house, for instance, came in 10 years late and about
1500% over budget but is considered an architectural achievement and perhaps a wonder
of the modern world (Hallgren & Wilson, 2007; Murray, 2004).
Its however important to note that a project must have either of two outcomes: its either it
succeeds or fails and that project managers have to understand that the chances of a
project getting into trouble are greater than those of getting out of it (Kleim, 2012).

2. Discussion
The Denver Airport Automatic Baggage Handling System Project that was supposed to
be a mega monumental achievement of a project and the worlds largest automated
airport baggage handling system turned out to be a colossal tragedy (Schlohs, 1996;
Neufville, 1994; Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008).
Faced with the need for greater airport capacity, the city of Denver elected to construct a
new state of the art airport that would cement Denvers position as an air transportation
hub. Covering a land area of 140 km2, the airport was designed to handle more than 50m
passengers annually (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008; Neufville, 1994).
The construction started in 1989.
In 1991 Denver airport management suggested that an airport-wide integrated automated
baggage-handling system should be added to the project scope.
In 1992 the automated baggage system was introduced against expert advice from Breier
Neidle Patrone Associates, the feasibility consultant, that the complexity of the system
makes it unfeasible (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008). 16 bidders were invited to bid. Only
Page 3 of 13

3 returned bids. Report indicated none could achieve the Oct 1993 deadline when the
airport will be opened. Management approached BAE; to expand the United Airlines
baggage handling system into an integrated system handling all 3 concourses, all airlines,
departing as well as arriving (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008)
The main objective of the automated baggage system was to reduce aircraft turnaround
time to as low as 30 minutes (Neufville, 1994) thereby enhancing efficient operations and
eliminating the time wasting manual conveyor and tug baggage handling and sorting
system (Goetz & Szyliowicz,, 1997).
This would, however, not be achieved as it became obvious in the course of executing
the project that the complexity of the system was underestimated (Schlohs, 1996;
Neufville, 1994; Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008) and risks were not properly identified.
The airport was idle for 16 months with a cost impact of $1.1m per day as maintenance
charges (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008).

Project Schedule Summary

Actual

Duration in Years
Planned

Project Duration (Years)

Chart 1 Project Schedule Summary

The project was estimated to cost approximately $5 billion at completion with greater
financial supports coming from the Federal Government and over $400 million from the
airlines. It however overran its budget by about 30% due to complications around the

Page 4 of 13

construction of the automated baggage handling system (Neufville, 1994). See charts
below.
Table 1- Cost of Denver International Airport (Dollars in millions)
Cost category
Airport planning, land, and construction
Capitalized interest
Bond discounts and issuance expense
Total costs to Denver Airport System
Costs to others
FAA facilities
United Airline's special facilities
Continental Airline's special facilities
Rental car facilities
Total costs to others

Cost
$3,214
919
136
$4,269
224
261
73
66
624

624

Grand total costs of Denver International Airport

$4,893

Source: GOA/RCED-95-35BR, (1994). New Denver Airport - Impact of the

delayed baggage system. Briefing Report at the Honorable Hank Brown, U.S.
Senate. http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/rc9535br.html

Project Cost
(x$1000,000)

Project Cost - (Million Dollars)

Cost
Variance - (+$57);
overrun of 29.5%

$300.00
$250.00
$200.00
$150.00
$100.00
$50.00
$-

Project Cost

Project Cost
Budgeted Cost

Actual Cost At Project

Completion

$193.00

$250.00

Chart 2 - Project Cost

By 1994, Denver Airport had run into a bonded debt of more than $3.8 billion. These
problems made Denver Airport to be unable to open by October 1993 as planned and also

Page 5 of 13

missed another three opening dates in April and May 1994 under increasing pressure
from stakeholders.
By March 1995, the delay had resulted to additional $500 million (Neufville D. R.,
1994).
By August 1994, the Mayor of Denver had decided that a backup system of tug and cart
be implemented. BAE was charged liquidated damages of $12,000 per day for the delay.
The system was reduced from 3 concourses to 1. When it was tested, bags were crushed,
jammed on the track or thrown off the track. It was a monumental failure. Had it
succeeded the Denver Automated Baggage Handling System would have been the most
advanced airport baggage handling system in the world (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008).
The system was commissioned in 1995 only to be scrapped in 2005 due to unusual
expensive high cost of maintenance of $1.0m/month which was much higher than the
cost of a manual tug and trolley system (Schlohs, 1996; Neufville, 1994; Calleam
Consulting Ltd, 2008).

2.1 Failure Modes of the Project

Schlohs, (1996); Neufville, (1994); and Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008 identified that the
Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System Project failed as a result of
underestimation of the complexity of the project; changing of project strategy effected by
both the airlines and the Denver management; electrical, mechanical and software
failures; lack of scope change control which lead to introduction of new systems like the
automated baggage system that were not part of the initial plan; the design of the
baggage system itself was very complex and prone to errors; lack of proper planning like
the tight time line that was obviously unachievable but was tenaciously stuck on even
with new additions to scope and expert advice that it was not achievable. Also the tight
schedule could not allow the system to be adequately tested; poor procurement
management system that ignored the bids of professionals who indicated that the baggage
system could not be completed within the remaining project duration (2 years); inefficient
or lack of communication management. No communication controls imagine a city
Page 6 of 13

worker cancelling purchase orders for the filters for electricity without any knowledge
that the filters were part of the project. The filters ended up arriving later than they should
have; force-fitting the baggage handling system into the configuration of the already
constructed airport - the automatic baggage handling system had to be forced to fit in the
boundaries of the airport passenger buildings, the underground tunnel that connects the
concourses and the terminal.
To further compound issues, Walter Slinger, who was the systems de facto sponsor died
in October 1992 leaving the project without that required crucial leadership. His
successor lacked the technical know-how required to manage such project. Stakeholder
involvement was another failure mode. Denver initiated the DIA project without
involving major stakeholders like Continental and United airlines who collectively
contributed over 70% of passenger traffic at Stapleton airport. This was a major
contributor to the incessant changes to the project strategy when the airlines got involved
in the project (Neufville, 1994; Goetz &Szyliowicz,, 1997). There were no backup
systems that would serve as alternatives.
2.2 Recommended Project Management Best Practice
2.2.1

Change control

Changes are a constant in projects. Therefore project teams must be ready for them to
avoid surprises (Stare, 2010). It is, however, very important to examine other potential
risks that can arise if changes are approved before approving such changes (Thomsett,
2002).
Every project scope change comes with a ripple effect (Harding, 2012). Changes that
occur at engineering stage of a project only affect engineering cost. the later in a project
a scope change occurs the more impact in terms of both cost and potential schedule
delay (Harding, 2012).
Denver should have had a proper change management process that is robust enough to
control changes. That would have eliminated the complexity introduced by the various
changes that took place on the project.

Page 7 of 13

2.2.2

Planning and Control

A well-thought out project schedule allows time for items such as, permitting, safety
reviews, detailed design, tie-ins, bidding cycles, equipment deliveries, construction
durations, and so on (Harding, 2012). It also has to be logically sequenced to assure that
tasks that need to be completed before their successors are completed before moving to
the next task.
A good project plan would have ensured that:

Scope was clearly defined indicating what is in and out of the project (Maylor,
2010, p.70)

A Work Breakdown Structure prepared that would have being useful for resource
allocation and communication with project team and other stakeholders (Maylor,
2010, p.70)

A logical resource loaded schedule with critical path developed. This would have
guided Denver to construct the airport physical structures in a logical sequence
with the baggage handling system. That would have eliminated the unnecessary
costly reworks. The schedule would have also helped to ensure that designs are
completed before construction starts.

2.2.3

Stakeholders Management

Stakeholder buy-in is essential in any successful project. A leading cause of project

failure is failure to pay attention to those stakeholders with the greatest influence over the
implementation and sustainability of the project. Effective management of stakeholders
requires proactive and ongoing stakeholder engagement; including identification,
communication and risk planning, and active collaboration throughout the project life
cycle (Maylor, 2010; PMI, 2013; Kangas, 2011). The management of stakeholders can
either positively or detrimentally impact a project (Scott, et al. 2006).
Lack of engagement and or management of major stakeholders like united and
continental airlines resulted to major hold-ups on the project that led to a continuous
change in the project strategy, thereby affecting project completion time and cost.
Denver airport project management should have engaged key stakeholders throughout
the project like was the case with the management of Heathrow Terminal 5 project and
Page 8 of 13

the London Olympic 2012 where stakeholder engagement was one of the critical success
factors (Elson, 2013; Kintra, 2013; Caldwell et al, 2009).
2.2.4

Risk Management

Every project involves risks (Harding, 2012). Risks are uncertain events or conditions
that, if they occur, have positive or negative effect on project objectives (PMI, 2013).
Planned and systematically adopted risk management procedure is essential in keeping a
project on time and within budget with all requirements fulfilled (Iskanius, 2009).The
objective of risk management is to increase the probability and impact of positive events
and or decrease the probability of impact of negative events (PMI, 2013).
Denver should have carried out a risk management exercise at the beginning of the
project to identify potential risks and put together plans on how these risks would be
managed (Harding, 2012). (See Appendix 1 DIA ABS Risk Register). This would have
captured risks like electrical failure and the consequent delivery and installation of filters
and so on (Calleam Consulting Ltd, 2008).
2.2.5

Communication Management

Communication is an exchange of information. Proper communication is vital to the

success of a project (Kerzner, 2009). A sure-fire way for a project to fail is by lack of
communication (Harding, 2012). Communication on a large project can be so complex.
Denver should have set up a communication matrix to establish the required
communications channels and assure that nothing is missed (Harding, 2012). There
should have being consistent project meetings, meetings with stakeholders addressing
progress, issues, risks and defining way forward and so on like was the case on Heathrow
T5 and London 2012 Olympics.
2.2.6

Leadership and Skills

Achieving projects success depends on people as people are the most critical project
management resource (Nauman & Khan, n.d).
Project leaders are decision makers and can overcome project potential change thereby
contributing significantly to project success (Atkinson, 1999).
Even Walter Slinger was not skilled enough to handle the project.
A good and skilled leadership should have been established to be able to handle even
political issues that affected the project.
Good leadership of the ODA and BAA was behind the success of the 2012 Olympic
Games and the Heathrow T5 projects (Brady & Davies, 2010; Kintrea, K & APM, 2013)

Page 9 of 13

2.2.7

Controlling cost

Cost is the universal and most highly visible performance metric for indicating project
success (Tichacek, R. L.2006).
Denver should have established project budget and had a system for monitoring and
controlling cost on the project.
2.2.8

Use of Experts

The management should have used industry expert organisations to execute the project.
Rejecting expert advices on major issues like the feasibility of implementing the
integrated baggage system, schedule, etc. was a big error.

3. Conclusion
According to Calleam Consulting Ltd, the Denver Baggage handling project is a classic
example of a project failure. As with so many other project failures Denver suffered
from:

Underestimation of project complexity

A colossal lack of planning that resulted to numerous changes in strategy

A clearly unachievable excessive schedule pressure from various stakeholders

Making firm commitments in the face of eminent unsurmountable risks and

uncertainties

Evidently non-existent or poor stakeholder management

Communication breakdowns

Poor designs

Absence of risks management

Failure to understand the impact changes might have on the project

Conspicuously missing management oversight

Majorly, Denver perished for lack of knowledge of the management team. Even Walter
Slinger was not that experienced on this kind of project. Moreover automated baggage
systems were relatively new, as such even BAE personnel have a diminutive knowledge
of what was involved.
Page 10 of 13

4. References

1. Belassi, W. & Tukel, O. I. (1996). A new framework for determining critical

success/failure factors in projects International Journal of Project Management.
14(3). 141-151.
2. Calleam Consulting Ltd. 2008. Case Study Denver International Airport
Baggage Handling System An illustration of ineffectual decision making.
Accessed on February 25, 2014. Available at
http://calleam.com/WTPF/?page_id=2086.
3. Caldwell, et al., (2009). Procuring complex performance in construction: London
Heathrow Terminal 5 and a Private Finance Initiative hospital. Retrieved Feb 26,
2014, from,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1478409209000399
4. Carson, S. J., Madhok, A., & Wu, T. (2006). Uncertainty, opportunism, and
governance: The effects of volatility and ambiguity on formal and relational
contracting Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 1058-1077.
5. Chapman, C. (2006). Key points of contention in framing assumptions for risk
and uncertainty management. International Journal of Project Management,
24(4), 303-313.
6. Definitions of fail and failure. Retrieved 24th February, 2014 from
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/failure
7. Definitions of fail and failure Retrieved 24th February, 2014 from
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
8. Denver International Website (www.flydenver.com)
9. Dinsmore, P. C. & Rocha, L. (2012). Enterprise Project Governance: A Guide to
the Successful Management of Projects across the Organization. Project
Management Journal, 44(1), 107. DOI: 10.1002/pmj.21317
10. Elson, K., 2013. A learning Legacy from the London 2012 Construction
Programme.
11. Gibbs, W.W. 1994. "Softwares Chronic Crisis." Scientific American. September
1994: p. 72-81.

Page 11 of 13

12. Goetz & Szyliowicz,. (1997, July). Revisiting transportation planning and
decision making theory: The case of Denver International Airport. Retrieved
February 26, 2014,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096585649600033X
13. Hallgren, M & Wilson, T. (2007). The nature and management of cirses in
construction projects: Projects-as-practice observations. International Journal of
Project Management. 26(2008), 830-838.
14. Harding, J. (2012). Avoiding Project Failures. Chemical Engineering. 2012
15. Kerzner, H., (2001). Project management: A systems approach to planning,
scheduling, and controlling (7th ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc
16. Kintrea, K. & Association for Project Management (APM), 2013. Lessons Learnt
from the London 2012 Games Construction Project. Programme Management
17. Kliem, R. L. (2012). Managing Projects in Trouble: Achieving Turnaround and
Success. Project Management Journal, 44(1), 109 DOI: 10.1002/pmj
18. Maylor, H, 2010. (4th ed). Project Management. Prentice Hall pub.
19. Meyer, A. D.; Loch, C. and Pich, M. 2001. Uncertainty and Project Management.
Beyond the critical path mentality. Insead R&D
20. Nauman, S. & Khan, A. M. (n.d). Patterns of Leadership for Effective Project
Management. Journal of Quality and Technology Management
21. Morris, P. W. G.; Pinto, J. K. & Sderlund, J. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of
Project Management. Oxford University.
22. Tichacek, R. L. (2006). Effective Cost Management Back to Basics. Cost
Engineering. 48(3)
23. Thomsett, R. (2002). Radical project management. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper
Saddle River
24. Schloh, M. (1996). Analysis of the Denver International Airport baggage system.
Retrieved 25th February, 2014, from
http://www5.in.tum.de/~huckle/schloh_DIA.pdf
25. Scott, J. Shwant, S. & Sheryl, L. (2006). A case Study of Project and Stakeholder
Management Failures: Lessons Learnt. Project Management Journal. 37(5). 2635.
26. Stare, A. (2010). Comprehensive management of project change. Economic and
business review. 12(3) 195210.
27. PMI, 2013. PMBOK 5th ed. PMI Pub
Page 12 of 13

28. Neufville, R. de. 1994. "The Baggage System at Denver: Prospects and Lessons."
Journal of Air Transport Management. 1(4): 229-236.

Page 13 of 13

Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System Project Risk Register

Project No:
Project Name:
Project Description:

Denver International Airport Baggage

Denver
Handling
International
System Airport
Project Baggage
Failure MHandling System Project Failure M
Construction of automated baggage handling system at the new Denver International Airport
Risk Identification

Risk ID
No.

Risk Category

Denver International Airport Baggage Handling System Project Failure M

DIA - XYZ

Risk Description

Risk Analysis

Credible Potential Consequense

Risk Response Planning

RAM

RISK H/M/L

Risk Owner/
Manager

Risk Response
Strategy

Mitigation Plan

Scope Definition Project Poorly Scoped

Cost Escalation and Schedule

Slippage

5C

PM

Mitigate

Clear scope definition at planning

stage

Architecture and
Design complexity
Design Issues

High complexity design prone to

errors; Result to failed process;
Maintainability challenges.

5C

PM

Mitigate

Engage experts, allow adequade

duration for proper reviews and
approvals

Inadequate though-out Schedule

and Plan for Execution; Arbitrary
Schedule. Tight timeline

Inability to meet schedule;

Construction errors arising from
quest to complete on time.

5C

PM

Mitigate

Develop a realistic resource loaded

project schedule; establish project
reporting system

Underestimation of budget

Shortage of funds; Need for

supplimentary budget; debts etc.

5C

PM

Mitigate

Carry out a complete scope review to

ensure scope is completely captured;
cost estimate to address entire scope

Lack of adequate change control

Scope creep resulting to time delay

and escalation of cost

5C

PM

Mitigate

Institue a change management

system and enforce compliance

Lack of project strategy; change in

strategy; no defined direction

Confusion; Reworks; scope creep;

cost escalation; project delay

5C

PM

Mitigate

Engage all relevant stakeholders to

establish strategy; avoid change of
strategy

No direction

5C

PM

Mitigate

Hire Strong leader with relevant skills

to manage the project; employ
expert subcontractors and suppliers

Understimation of project
complexity

Understimation of project
complexity

5C

PM

Mitigate

Use the MoDeST complexity frame

work to establish the nature of the
project

Government's Political Influence.

Imposing Vendors on the Project
(Refusal to Award Operating
Contract to BAE)

Negative influece impacting Cost

and Schedule; Breakdown of
equipment due to being operated
by unskilled personnel.

5C

PM

Mitigate

Engage stakeholders continously

through the project life cycle to
prevent political influences

5C

PM

Mitigate

Contract with specialist

5C

PM

Mitigate

Review system design; spare [arts

plan

Schedule

Budget

Change Control

Strategy

Project Leadership Poor Leadership

Complexity

Political Risks

10

Stakeholders
Management

11

Electric Power
Failure

12

Traffic Isssues

13

Communication

High
Medium
Low

Inability to meet stakeholder

Not paying attention to
requirements resulting to project
Stakeholders Needs/Requirements
delays
Failure of electrical power leading
to lack of power supply for
Total system collapse
equipment
Congestion at the airport packing
space; tight interconnection of
conveyor systems

Potential jams, chaos etc.

5C

PM

Mitigate

propre transportation system design

Lack of or ineffective
communication

Inmproper or lack of distribution of

information; confusion on the
project

5C

PM

Mitigate

Establish communication matrix;

define communication channels;

Avoid:
Accept:
Mitigate:
Transfer:

Integrity
Assurance/Monitoring &
Control

To eliminate the root cause of the problem

Do nothing
Take an action to reduce the probability of the risk
Transfer the risk to a 3rd party

RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX

INCREASING PROBABILITY (Likelihood)

CONSEQUENCES

INCREASING SEVERITY

Category

People

Asset / Production

Environment

Reputation

Community Relation

Security

Cost (Contract and

Commercial Risk
Only)

No injury or health
effect

No damage

No effect

No impact

No impact

No impact

No change in cost

Slight injury or health

effect (FAC, MTC)

Slight damage
(10k$ & no disruption
to operation)

Slight effect
(within fence, no
exceedance)

Slight impact (Eg.

public awareness)

Incidental problem
with community
relations resolved with
compensation

Minor injury or health

effect (LTI 4 days or
less, RWC)

Minor damage
(10k$ - 100k$ & brief
disruption)

Minor effect
(temporary
containment. Slight
exceedance)

Limited impact
(Eg. local / public
media)

Major injury or health

effect (LTI, PPD >4
days)

Moderate damage
(0.1 - 1.0M$ & partial
shutdown)

Permanent Total
Major damage
Disability (PTD) or up (1.0 - 10.0M$ & partial
to 3 fatalities
operation loss)

More than 3 fatalities

Moderate effect
Considerable impact
(recoverable
(Eg. region / state /
environmental loss /
public media)
repeated exceedance)

Major effect
(severe damage
recoverable /
extended
exceedance)

Massive effect
Extensive damage
(widespread chronic
(>10M$ & substantial
effects / constant high
operation loss)
exceedance)

Major Impact
(Eg. extensive
adverse media)

Massive impact
(Eg. extensive
adverse media)

Re-instatement of no
go areas

Several days of
blockade of local
facilities, legal
litigations)

Severe damage to
environment reported
in the media

Impossible to operate
without major military
support

Time (Contract and

Never heard of in the
commercial Risk
Aviation Industry
Only)

No time over run

Slight

Time over run <5% of

Extra Costs Valued at
original - Denver
Contract Rates and
Airport Magement not
Contained within
Responsible, no
Approved Project
critical time
Budget
constraints

Minor

Extra Costs Valued at

New Rates but
Contained within
Budget

Time over run <10%

of original - Denver
Airport Management
not Responsible, no
critical time
constraints

Moderate

Extra Costs but less

than 10% addition on
Budget

Time over run >15%

of original - Denver
Airport Management
not Responsible, no
critical time
constraints

Significant

Extensive

Time over run <5% of

original - Denver
Airport Management
partly/wholly
Responsible and /or
critical time
constraints
Time over run <10%
of original - Denver
Extra Costs more than
Airport Management
10% addition on
partly/wholly
Budget and claims for
Responsible and/or
loss and expense
critical time
constraints

Heard of in the
Aviation Industry

Has happened in the

Has happened at
Has happened at
Industry or more
Denver Int Airport or Denver Int Airport
than once per year
once per year in the more than once per
in the Aviation
Industry
year in
Industry

NEGLIGIBLE

LOW

MEDIUM

Extra Costs and more

than 10% addition on
Budget

HIGH

Appendix 2 - The MODeST Frame Work of Project Complexity

Element of complexity

Examples of issues that make management complex

Lack of clarity of requirements
Large scale, high value, high importance, high urgency

Mission

Large number of constraints legal, health and safety, security

High level of interaction and interdependency with other projects

High level of uncertainty novelty, implications and side effects

Multiple time zones project team members operating in
Lack of collocation of project team
Organisation
Linguistic differences between team members
Lack of appropriate organisational structure used in the project
High level of change that the project produces in the organisation
Lack of common or appropriate project management method
Inappropriate human, financial or other resources
Delivery
Problematic communications in the project team
Lack of clear or timely decision-making
Lack of flexibility for the project manager to respond to changes
Large number of stakeholders with differing requirements
Lack of commitment to the project by key stakeholders
Stakeholders
Interference in the project by key stakeholders
Lack of relationships with key stakeholders
Problematic inter-relations between stakeholders
Lack of leadership shown by project manager
Cultural and other differences between team members
Team
Low level of motivation of team
Lack of project, technical and business experience in the team
Lack of appropriate training for team members
Source: Maylor, H. (2010. P64). Project Management. Prentice Hall Pub

NEGLI