Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001 LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, Petitioner ZOSIMO A PESCA, Respondent. Vitug, J.
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001 LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, Petitioner ZOSIMO A PESCA, Respondent. Vitug, J.
136921
was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of
imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed
with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the
custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on
25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an
answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court
ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties.
Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect
that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the
parties. 1wphi1.nt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an
answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his
answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the
birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the
complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied,
however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to
declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate
court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article
68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." 1
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court
of Appeals,2 promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 3 promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina
ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner
argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its
dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its
assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to
prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined
inSantos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court,
in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases').
Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking,
her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The
children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the
home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to
change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for
11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA
reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs
CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case
would fall under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage
null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These guidelines are
mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law.
legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the
House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding
officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh
Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate
was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan
M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators
Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of
a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the
Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for
resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the
arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity
or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into
office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has
jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They
submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of
similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple.
One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called
political questions is the principle of separation of powers
characteristic of the presidential system of government the
functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their
nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and
of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which
belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable,
which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only
to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of
the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
decisions made by the other departments provided that such
acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by
the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom.
Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations
particularly those prescribed by the Constitution would be set at
naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice
under the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority
nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the
land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it
was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to
determine whether another branch of the government has
"kept within constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the
bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House
rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of
concerned the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no
concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as
void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion
were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a
well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke
the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial
question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did
the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the
Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by
majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the
concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may elect a minority
leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision
refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President
and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the
losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to
whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners
assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee
chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no
clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even
from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the
number greater than half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority,"
much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso
facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents,
which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which
was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a
member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators,
including those belonging to the minority. 39This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a
committee. 40History would also show that the "majority" in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority
vote of all its Members. Should there be more than one candidate
for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the
elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually
extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of
the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs
of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to
do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court
is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown
to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they
"are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.
To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the
practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the
legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or
its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain
implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the
actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of
power 52 by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law
thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine
the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought
against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding
of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid
down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise
of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term "grave
abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members
of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after
at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally
allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be
accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and
Separate Opinions
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The
case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. . . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally
took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in
support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which
persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and
specific provision of the Constitution." 6 In his view, "The word quorum is a
mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning.
A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Taada v. Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are
not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed
by a specific provision (Art. VI, 11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional
provision to be applied.
The cases 9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments
likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically
Art. VI, 18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall
be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had
jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties
and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction
over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 10 it declined to take
cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the
Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator
after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was
not a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional
representation of the political organizations in the Commission on
Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 11 this Court took cognizance of the case which
involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of
political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary
alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved
the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected
by the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments. 12 where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing
cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each
house shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the
Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are
political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the
government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations
nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has
jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the
question involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in
the same way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in
a narrow sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were
otherwise. The determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or
not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson
of Marbury v. Madison 13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its
power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the
Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional.
In other words, a court doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to
declare itself without jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary proper acknowledgment and respect for each
other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by
Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance
wheel in the State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and
as the Constitutional Court of the nation. 1Peculiar, however, to the present
Constitution, specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended
jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." 2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to have been
dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate reaction to the
abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question doctrine that in no small
measure has emasculated the Court. The term "political question," in this
context, refers to matters which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I
find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated inTolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance, 3 viz:
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the
Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's
imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can
still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows
itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent
and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think
of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can
lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence,
nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of stability
rather than quiescence.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly,
the Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel
against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial
positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They
receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the
house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are
only legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives
them the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective
chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the
majority of the members of the house to which they belong. 4 Thus, Art VI, 16(1)
of the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election
and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no
concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining
to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional
limitations were alleged.
In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present
there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of
the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The
case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which
provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. . . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally
took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in
support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which
persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that
calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and
specific provision of the Constitution." 6 In his view, "The word quorum is a
mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning.
A majority means more than one-half (1/2)." 7
In Taada v. Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats
intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are
not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed
by a specific provision (Art. VI, 11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the
Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, can properly inquire into without
running afoul of the principle of separation of powers.
Last year, 2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al. 3 presented an opportunity for me
to clarify my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo filed a
petition before the Court complaining that during a session by the House of
Representatives, he was effectively prevented from raising the question of
quorum which to him tainted the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, or the socalled "sin taxes" law. The Court, speaking again through Justice Mendoza,
dismissed Mr. Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts are denied the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
Concurring with the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position
then because of possible misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not
abandon my position in Tolentino, the facts as presented in Arroyo being
radically different from the former. In keeping with my view that judicial review is
permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I pointed out that the legislative
rules allegedly violated were purely internal and had no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of
a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as
the ones I made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "office" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of
internal rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I
previously invoked may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of
the Senate. There is to me no constitutional breach which has been made
and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The interpretation placed by
petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution clearly does not
find support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority vote required for
the election of a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of
Representatives speaks only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant
to be lawfully elected as such. There is here no declaration that by so electing,
each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into camps called the
"majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "offices" of Majority Floor Leader and
Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional offices. As
pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who
penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under paragraph 2,
Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will
be such officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision." With the prerogative
being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties
may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court,
conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous
move to overstep the same.
Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still
succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is
the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people,
that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that
the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly,
the Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel
against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse
becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial
tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution.
There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be
determined. The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging
millieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of
passion or personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to the dictum,
somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 4 that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a
clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention.
In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the
above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Footnotes
1 21 (1), BP 129; 5 (1), Art. VIII, Constitution.
2 See Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139, September 1,
1994; citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-24, April 18,
1989, and Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, 651-652,
January 27, 1993.
3 Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994; Vergara Sr.
v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753, December 21, 1987.
4 Avelino v. Cueno, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214
SCRA 789, October 20, 1992.
15 At p. 76.
16 At p. 78.
17 At p. 79.
18 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), per Concepcion, J.
19 Ibid., p. 1067, citing 16 CJS 413.
20 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
21 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971.
22 5 Phil 87 (1905).
23 91 Phil 882 (1952).
24 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
25 Art. VIII, 1, par. 2.
26 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989, per Cruz, J.
27 187 SCRA 377, July 12, 1990, per Grio-Aquino, J.
28 214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992, per Campos Jr., J.
29 272 SCRA 18, 47, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
30 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
31 Citing Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, 1988.
32 Citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, 1990.
33 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997, per Mendoza, J.
34 At p. 299.
35 Alleje v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 495, January 25, 1995;
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108, November 16, 1995;
Times Broadcasting Network v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 366,
June 19, 1997; Chico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122704, January
5, 1998.
36 Perez v. De la Cruz, 27 SCRA 587, 603 (1969), citing Webster's
International Dictionary, Unabridged; Concurring Opinion of J.
7 Id., at 79.
8 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
9 Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187
SCRA. 377 (1990); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
10 88 Phil. 654 (1951).
11 115 Phil. vii (1962).
12 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
13 Cranch 137, 2L.Ed. 60 (1803).
ROMERO, J., separate opinion;
1 235 SCRA 630.
2 August 14, 1997.
3 G.R. No. 127255; 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
1 Justice Jose C. Vitug, The court and its Ways, The Court System
Journal, June 1998, Volume 3 No. 2.
2 Sec. 1, Article VIII.
3 235 SCRA 630, 720.
4 277 SCRA 268, 289.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577,
November 18, 1998 Case Digest
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
3.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4.
Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is
that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions
of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing
specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene
in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been
laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the
power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said
that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no
grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts
as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be
the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot
be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown
to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted
the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation
of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of
the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for
reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the
warrant of arrest and motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was
filed before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the
penalty imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision,
engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase "by escaping during the
term of the sentence" thereto, so petitioner claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:
"Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence
prescribed as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty
of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
"And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as follows:
"From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not
prescribed because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to
satisfy the second element, to wit That the convict evaded the service of
the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter
of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of
this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,4 where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the
culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason
to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in
the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the
date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the
same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed
to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a
life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence
and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly
interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178
(nn) of the 1978 Election Code.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296,
otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced
petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum.
Held: The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment
as minimum to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978
Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This
being the case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which
allows the application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article
25 in relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional
penalty it prescribed in ten (10) years.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did
not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24,
1996.
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has
prescribed.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or
been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no
extradition treaty or committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the
date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a
life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
October 5, 2010
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary 12 summarized the
rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses
with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as
will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R.
No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would
result in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization,
the United States of America17(US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both
classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would
adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitionerorganizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat
of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and
Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with
the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of
designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration 21 of
resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed
to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied
organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and
specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the
filing of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the
Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the
Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a
prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano
of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and
Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion
charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato
Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being
front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations
KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE. 26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners.
For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA
9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished
under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more
imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it
easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.30(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC 33 cannot be
more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other
hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on
uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied
or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and
merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem. 35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on
Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v.
Commission on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein
petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions
of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual
controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory
grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a
perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for
plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize
acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal
statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of
penal statutes x x x may not be allowed." 64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no
case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute
is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair
the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that
can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. 65(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself
only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of
the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for"
so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from
the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it
unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An
analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down
a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori
in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of
making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed
injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct. 80 Since speech is not involved here, the
Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis
of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners
inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on
vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review
the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein
plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required
to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecutionunder RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis
of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council
SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146
Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010
NGO
Concerned
citizen,
taxpayer, and
lawyer
GR No.
178554
citizens
GR No.
178581
GR No.
178552
GR No.
178890
GR No.
179157
GR. No.
179461
certiorari and
prohibition
Respondents:
FACTS:
as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such
tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.
Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn
duty to uphold the Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
applied challenge.
i. As applied challenge considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants.
ii. Facial challenge is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as
to permit a facial analysis of its validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of
terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the
enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The
argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not
elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the
criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech.
Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:
- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that
the grounds for dismissal in this case are more procedural than substantive.
Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it becomes ripe for
adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.
said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said
applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in
Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes
Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in violation of
our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2),
for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any
data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec.
261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who,
being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for
failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of
residence to another city or municipality." 12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss 13 dated 2 April
2001. They contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful
statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they intended
to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of
Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even
date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of
Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence. 14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC
Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law
Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate
Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and
Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information
against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic
Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to
designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with
the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case. 15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the
recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed
to file the appropriate information with the proper court against
respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the
Republic Act No. 8189.16
Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion
alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both
dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her
with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez,
and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-039183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 24 denying for lack of merit
petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by
private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private
respondents complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section
261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12
of the Voters Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the
assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j),
in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners
are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their
right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which
COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that
Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a
definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1) 25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is
couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the
charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in
the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration
as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election
Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any
precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures
of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right
thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph,
attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the
Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and disqualifications
prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the
accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that
the applicants specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are
properly affixed in all copies of the voters application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the
Law Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the
COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere
perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts
covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following
allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their
applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of
Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B"
and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen,
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of
113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the
Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally
and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications
(Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they
have resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are
residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively;
photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.]
Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B.
Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth
District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of
the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex
"G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda
Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS
ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered
voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos.
26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of
Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are,
registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting
registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved.
The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of
double registration, but also for another election offense of
knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any
data or information required in the application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she
fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own
handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my
person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine;
and that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and
Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC
against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the
same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondents ComplaintAffidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will
enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, inLacson, this court resolved
the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it
is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we
underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of
due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to
be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal
charges in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC
Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they
were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that
the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because
they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to
Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed
with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the
Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the
nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing
that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They
were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense.
In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned
police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but,
the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual
harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner
with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process,
therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void
as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court
held that the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as
it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted
and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the
allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the
complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have
already been studied by the prosecutor. 32 The court frowns upon such superfluity
which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal
complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of
the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of
thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no
reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would
constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court
has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms
in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that
'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might
be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on
the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the
void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not
because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion
of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative
powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would
result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have
even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a
establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of
vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine"
which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application." It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague
in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election
offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its
specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is
an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged
provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that
makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the
import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to
the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the
Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not
rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section
45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws. 46 These provisions have
not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. 47 To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 48We hold that
petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its
constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for
overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the
case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC
in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a
misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing
the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory
expression under Section 26549of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election
offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a
determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated
on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution
of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The
COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices.
Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC
absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle
emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws
and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. 53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable
cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar,
held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against
Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be
allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain
the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January
2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of
merit petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial
is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June
2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS
COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the RTC
Barauen, Leyte against spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez
for knowingly making false or untruthful statement in their application for voters
registration relative to their place of residence and non registration in other
areas, which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
RA 8189 or the Voters Registration Act, to wit:
SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. xxx The application shall contain the following
data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration; x x x (j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of
any precinct;
SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses
under this Act: x x x (j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
against COMELEC, on the ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of
Section 45(j) for being contrary to the fair notice requirement Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as such penal provision is
vague on its face.
ISSUE
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted
to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on
certiorari
Facts:
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art
Section 7.
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;
xxxx
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public
respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated
August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of online/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as
such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community,
drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation
of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not
give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three
(3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise
created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their
respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the
grant therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it
is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent
provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act"
enacted on March 13, 1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to
priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and
amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall
continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to
operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic
Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to
operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games
of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance pursuant
to the license granted to it by public respondent.
SO ORDERED.
encroached on its (PAGCORs) authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-avis the above-stated special laws to centralize and regulate all games of chance.
Issue: WON the authority of ZAMBOECOZONE to operate/license games
includes games of chance/gambling.
Held: The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
"[t]o operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous
meanings in law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or
"gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while
an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance
rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as
"making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining
something of value."
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case at
bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to
exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The
lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate
the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922
enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows
the operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements
without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such
activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office
of the President, the latters interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical
construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which
may be regarded as bases thereof factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental
agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently
are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working
out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency
with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies,
inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the
power to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Petition granted.
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government
scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1,
2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. 2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). 3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding
student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause
to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as
follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a
high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
"President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose
accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses
and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the
said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II
of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came
from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since
it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the
case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of
the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It
should be threshed out during a full-blown trial. 13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public
officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration
and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a
public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a
public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of
the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously
cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for
any person having family or close personal relation with any public official
to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or
material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some
business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the
third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close
personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting
this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provision of law. 44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. 47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the
approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were
not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act
was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or
a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost
entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that
petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private
funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no
leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of
the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under
the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial
on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his
reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition forcertiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension
or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation.
A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu.
She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA
sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with
the Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied with finality.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa
case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?
DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. (2) While the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court.
RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. 33 Every
section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. 34
Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.
(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does
not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there by express provision of law. 44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28,
1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year
later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued
her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with
her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that
she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that
the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone
bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila
and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this
time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family
Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction
was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It
provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
the Supreme Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP
129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of
habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors
they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention
of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed
by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to
"protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of
the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues
regarding childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during
the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family
Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as
to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We
rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain
and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature
seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex
parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of
the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the
appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by
the legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor
General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a
work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under
the Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner
had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the
jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In
the same manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar
is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ
cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court
of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by
law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort
to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said
that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of
social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit
and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable
to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the
country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the
country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle,
since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the
peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise
enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus
in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as follows:
"As jointly stipulated by the parties, the pertinent facts x x x involved in this case
are as follows:
1. [Respondent] is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with
principal office address at the new Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone,
Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu;
2. [Petitioner] is sued in his official capacity, having been duly appointed and
empowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the duty
to act and approve claims for refund or tax credit;
3. [Respondent] is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA)
and has been issued PEZA Certificate No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 66, as amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components
primarily used in computers for export. Such registration was made on 6 June
1997;
4. [Respondent] is VAT [(Value Added Tax)]-registered entity as evidenced by VAT
Registration Certification No. 97-083-000600-V issued on 2 April 1997;
5. VAT returns for the period 1 April 1998 to 30 June 1999 have been filed by
[respondent];
6. An administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount
of P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the P12,267,981.04
VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was filed on 4 October 1999
with Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay Cebu;
7. No final action has been received by [respondent] from [petitioner] on
[respondents] claim for VAT refund.
"The administrative claim for refund by the [respondent] on October 4, 1999 was
not acted upon by the [petitioner] prompting the [respondent] to elevate the
case to [the CTA] on July 21, 2000 by way of Petition for Review in order to toll
the running of the two-year prescriptive period.
"For his part, [petitioner] x x x raised the following Special and Affirmative
Defenses, to wit:
1. [Respondents] alleged claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative
routinary investigation/examination by [petitioners] Bureau;
2. Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with laws and
regulations, the [respondent] has the burden of proof that the taxes sought to
be refunded were erroneously or illegally collected x x x;
3. In Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 459 (1997), the Supreme
Court ruled that:
"A claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of his or her
claim for tax credit/refund."
4. Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for refund/credit [partake of] the
nature of an exemption from tax. Thus, it is incumbent upon the [respondent] to
prove that it is indeed entitled to the refund/credit sought. Failure on the part of
the [respondent] to prove the same is fatal to its claim for tax credit. He who
claims exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of
organic or statutory law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be
permitted to exist upon vague implications;
5. Granting, without admitting, that [respondent] is a Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) registered Ecozone Enterprise, then its business is not subject
to VAT pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. ([RA]) 7916 in relation to
Section 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. As [respondents] business is not
subject to VAT, the capital goods and services it alleged to have purchased are
considered not used in VAT taxable business. As such, [respondent] is not
entitled to refund of input taxes on such capital goods pursuant to Section
4.106.1 of Revenue Regulations No. ([RR])7-95, and of input taxes on services
pursuant to Section 4.103 of said regulations.
6. [Respondent] must show compliance with the provisions of Section 204 (C)
and 229 of the 1997 Tax Code on filing of a written claim for refund within two (2)
years from the date of payment of tax.
"On July 19, 2001, the Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for
refund."4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the CTA granting the claim for refund or issuance
of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in favor of respondent in the reduced amount
of P12,122,922.66. This sum represented the unutilized but substantiated input
VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period covering April 1, 1998 to June
30, 1999.
The appellate court reasoned that respondent had availed itself only of the fiscal
incentives under Executive Order No. (EO) 226 (otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987), not of those under both Presidential Decree No. (PD)
66, as amended, and Section 24 of RA 7916. Respondent was, therefore,
considered exempt only from the payment of income tax when it opted for the
income tax holiday in lieu of the 5 percent preferential tax on gross income
earned. As a VAT-registered entity, though, it was still subject to the payment of
other national internal revenue taxes, like the VAT.
Moreover, the CA held that neither Section 109 of the Tax Code nor Sections
4.106-1 and 4.103-1 of RR 7-95 were applicable. Having paid the input VAT on
the capital goods it purchased, respondent correctly filed the administrative and
judicial claims for its refund within the two-year prescriptive period. Such
payments were -- to the extent of the refundable value -- duly supported by VAT
invoices or official receipts, and were not yet offset against any output VAT
liability.
markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and
maintained.22Banking and finance shall also be liberalized under minimum
Bangko Sentral regulation with the establishment of foreign currency depository
units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks. 23
In the same vein, respondent benefits under RA 7844 from negotiable tax
credits24 for locally-produced materials used as inputs. Aside from the other
incentives possibly already granted to it by the Board of Investments, it also
enjoys preferential credit facilities 25 and exemption from PD 1853.26
From the above-cited laws, it is immediately clear that petitioner enjoys
preferential tax treatment.27 It is not subject to internal revenue laws and
regulations and is even entitled to tax credits. The VAT on capital goods is an
internal revenue tax from which petitioner as an entity is exempt. Although
the transactions involving such tax are not exempt, petitioner as a VAT-registered
person,28 however, is entitled to their credits.
Nature of the VAT and the Tax Credit Method
Viewed broadly, the VAT is a uniform tax ranging, at present, from 0 percent to
10 percent levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the course of
trade or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods
or properties or on each rendition of services in the course of trade or
business29 as they pass along the production and distribution chain, the tax being
limited only to the value added30 to such goods, properties or services by the
seller, transferor or lessor.31 It is an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on
to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services. 32 As such,
it should be understood not in the context of the person or entity that is
primarily, directly and legally liable for its payment, but in terms of its nature as
a tax on consumption.33 In either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.
The law34 that originally imposed the VAT in the country, as well as the
subsequent amendments of that law, has been drawn from the tax credit
method.35 Such method adopted the mechanics and self-enforcement features of
the VAT as first implemented and practiced in Europe and subsequently adopted
in New Zealand and Canada.36Under the present method that relies on invoices,
an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or
outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports. 37
If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes 38 charged by a seller39 are
equal to the input taxes40 passed on by the suppliers, no payment is required. It
is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the excess has to be
paid.41 If, however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be
carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. 42 Should the input taxes
result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the
acquisition of capital goods,43 any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded44 to the taxpayer or credited45 against other internal revenue taxes.46
Zero-Rated and Effectively Zero-Rated Transactions
Although both are taxable and similar in effect, zero-rated transactions differ
from effectively zero-rated transactions as to their source.
Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and supply of
services.47 The tax rate is set at zero.48 When applied to the tax base, such rate
obviously results in no tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller of such
transactions charges no output tax, 49 but can claim a refund of or a tax credit
certificate for the VAT previously charged by suppliers.
Effectively zero-rated transactions, however, refer to the sale of goods 50 or
supply of services51 to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively
subjects such transactions to a zero rate.52 Again, as applied to the tax base,
such rate does not yield any tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller
who charges zero output tax on such transactions can also claim a refund of or a
tax credit certificate for the VAT previously charged by suppliers.
Zero Rating and Exemption
In terms of the VAT computation, zero rating and exemption are the same, but
the extent of relief that results from either one of them is not.
Applying the destination principle53 to the exportation of goods, automatic zero
rating54 is primarily intended to be enjoyed by the seller who is directly and
legally liable for the VAT, making such seller internationally competitive by
allowing the refund or credit of input taxes that are attributable to export
sales.55 Effective zero rating, on the contrary, is intended to benefit the
purchaser who, not being directly and legally liable for the payment of the VAT,
will ultimately bear the burden of the tax shifted by the suppliers.
In both instances of zero rating, there is total relief for the purchaser from the
burden of the tax.56 But in an exemption there is only partial relief,57 because the
purchaser is not allowed any tax refund of or credit for input taxes paid. 58
Exempt Transaction >and Exempt Party
The object of exemption from the VAT may either be the transaction itself or any
of the parties to the transaction.59
An exempt transaction, on the one hand, involves goods or services which, by
their nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the VAT under
the Tax Code, without regard to the tax status -- VAT-exempt or not -- of the party
to the transaction.60 Indeed, such transaction is not subject to the VAT, but the
seller is not allowed any tax refund of or credit for any input taxes paid.
An exempt party, on the other hand, is a person or entity granted VAT exemption
under the Tax Code, a special law or an international agreement to which the
Philippines is a signatory, and by virtue of which its taxable transactions become
exempt from the VAT.61 Such party is also not subject to the VAT, but may be
allowed a tax refund of or credit for input taxes paid, depending on its
registration as a VAT or non-VAT taxpayer.
As mentioned earlier, the VAT is a tax on consumption, the amount of which may
be shifted or passed on by the seller to the purchaser of the goods, properties or
services.62 While the liability is imposed on one person, theburden may be
passed on to another. Therefore, if a special law merely exempts a party as a
seller from its direct liability for payment of the VAT, but does not relieve the
same party as a purchaser from its indirect burden of the VAT shifted to it by its
VAT-registered suppliers, the purchase transaction is not exempt. Applying this
principle to the case at bar, the purchase transactions entered into by
respondent are not VAT-exempt.
Special laws may certainly exempt transactions from the VAT. 63 However, the Tax
Code provides that those falling under PD 66 are not. PD 66 is the precursor of
RA 7916 -- the special law under which respondent was registered. The
purchase transactions it entered into are, therefore, not VAT-exempt. These are
subject to the VAT; respondent is required to register.
Its sales transactions, however, will either be zero-rated or taxed at the standard
rate of 10 percent,64 depending again on the application of the destination
principle.65
If respondent enters into such sales transactions with a purchaser -- usually in a
foreign country -- for use or consumption outside the Philippines, these shall be
subject to 0 percent.66 If entered into with a purchaser for use or consumption in
the Philippines, then these shall be subject to 10 percent, 67 unless the purchaser
is exempt from the indirect burden of the VAT, in which case it shall also be zerorated.
Since the purchases of respondent are not exempt from the VAT, the rate to be
applied is zero. Its exemption under both PD 66 and RA 7916 effectively subjects
such transactions to a zero rate, 68 because the ecozone within which it is
registered is managed and operated by the PEZA as a separate customs
territory.69 This means that in such zone is created the legal fiction of foreign
territory.70 Under the cross-border principle71 of the VAT system being enforced by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),72 no VAT shall be imposed to form part of
the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the territorial border of the
taxing authority. If exports of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign
country are free of the VAT,73 then the same rule holds for such exports from the
national territory -- except specifically declared areas -- to an ecozone.
Sales made by a VAT-registered person in the customs territory to a PEZAregistered entity are considered exports to a foreign country; conversely, sales
by a PEZA-registered entity to a VAT-registered person in the customs territory
are deemed imports from a foreign country.74 An ecozone -- indubitably a
geographical territory of the Philippines -- is, however, regarded in law as foreign
soil.75 This legal fiction is necessary to give meaningful effect to the policies of
the special law creating the zone.76 If respondent is located in an export
processing zone77 within that ecozone, sales to the export processing zone, even
without being actually exported, shall in fact be viewed as constructively
exported under EO 226.78 Considered as export sales,79 such purchase
transactions by respondent would indeed be subject to a zero rate. 80
Tax Exemptions Broad and Express
Applying the special laws we have earlier discussed, respondent as an entity is
exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations.
This exemption covers both direct and indirect taxes, stemming from the very
nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for which the direct liability is
imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another.
Respondent, as an exempt entity, can neither be directly charged for the VAT on
its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added cost to such sales, the equivalent
VAT on its purchases. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where
the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
Moreover, the exemption is both express and pervasive for the following reasons:
First, RA 7916 states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on
business establishments operating within the ecozone." 81 Since this law does not
exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is deemed included.Exceptio firmat
regulam in casibus non exceptis. An exception confirms the rule in cases not
excepted; that is, a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within
the purview of the general rule.
Moreover, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the
transaction, it may still be passed on and, therefore, indirectly imposed on the
same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That no VAT shall be imposed
directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA
7916 also means that no VAT may be passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando
aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum. When anything is
prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.
Second, when RA 8748 was enacted to amend RA 7916, the same prohibition
applied, except for real property taxes that presently are imposed on land owned
by developers.82 This similar and repeated prohibition is an unambiguous
ratification of the laws intent in not imposing local or national taxes on business
enterprises within the ecozone.
Third, foreign and domestic merchandise, raw materials, equipment and the like
"shall not be subject to x x x internal revenue laws and regulations" under PD
6683 -- the original charter of PEZA (then EPZA) that was later amended by RA
7916.84 No provisions in the latter law modify such exemption.
Although this exemption puts the government at an initial disadvantage, the
reduced tax collection ultimately redounds to the benefit of the national
economy by enticing more business investments and creating more employment
opportunities.85
Fourth, even the rules implementing the PEZA law clearly reiterate that
merchandise -- except those prohibited by law -- "shall not be subject to x x x
internal revenue laws and regulations x x x" 86 if brought to the ecozones
restricted area87 for manufacturing by registered export enterprises, 88 of which
respondent is one. These rules also apply to all enterprises registered with the
EPZA prior to the effectivity of such rules.89
Fifth, export processing zone enterprises registered 90 with the Board of
Investments (BOI) under EO 226 patently enjoy exemption from national internal
revenue taxes on imported capital equipment reasonably needed and exclusively
used for the manufacture of their products;91 on required supplies and spare part
for consigned equipment;92 and on foreign and domestic merchandise, raw
materials, equipment and the like -- except those prohibited by law -- brought
into the zone for manufacturing.93 In addition, they are given credits for the value
of the national internal revenue taxes imposed on domestic capital equipment
also reasonably needed and exclusively used for the manufacture of their
products,94 as well as for the value of such taxes imposed on domestic raw
materials and supplies that are used in the manufacture of their export products
and that form part thereof.95
Sixth, the exemption from local and national taxes granted under RA 7227 96 are
ipso facto accorded to ecozones. 97 In case of doubt, conflicts with respect to such
tax exemption privilege shall be resolved in favor of the ecozone. 98
And seventh, the tax credits under RA 7844 -- given for imported raw materials
primarily used in the production of export goods, 99 and for locally produced raw
materials, capital equipment and spare parts used by exporters of non-traditional
products100 -- shall also be continuously enjoyed by similar exporters within the
ecozone.101Indeed, the latter exporters are likewise entitled to such tax
exemptions and credits.
Tax Refund as Tax Exemption
To be sure, statutes that grant tax exemptions are construed strictissimi
juris102 against the taxpayer103 and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 104
Tax refunds are in the nature of such exemptions. 105 Accordingly, the claimants of
those refunds bear the burden of proving the factual basis of their claims; 106 and
of showing, by words too plain to be mistaken, that the legislature intended to
exempt them.107 In the present case, all the cited legal provisions are teeming
with life with respect to the grant of tax exemptions too vivid to pass unnoticed.
In addition, respondent easily meets the challenge.
Respondent, which as an entity is exempt, is different from its transactions which
are not exempt. The end result, however, is that it is not subject to the VAT. The
non-taxability of transactions that are otherwise taxable is merely a necessary
incident to the tax exemption conferred by law upon it as an entity, not upon the
transactions themselves.108 Nonetheless, its exemption as an entity and the nonexemption of its transactions lead to the same result for the following
considerations:
First, the contemporaneous construction of our tax laws by BIR authorities who
are called upon to execute or administer such laws 109 will have to be adopted.
Their prior tax issuances have held inconsistent positions brought about by their
probable failure to comprehend and fully appreciate the nature of the VAT as a
tax on consumption and the application of the destination principle.110 Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. (RMC) 74-99, however, now clearly and correctly
provides that any VAT-registered suppliers sale of goods, property or services
from the customs territory to any registered enterprise operating in the ecozone
-- regardless of the class or type of the latters PEZA registration -- is legally
entitled to a zero rate.111
Second, the policies of the law should prevail. Ratio legis est anima. The reason
for the law is its very soul.
In PD 66, the urgent creation of the EPZA which preceded the PEZA, as well as
the establishment of export processing zones, seeks "to encourage and promote
foreign commerce as a means of x x x strengthening our export trade and
foreign exchange position, of hastening industrialization, of reducing domestic
unemployment, and of accelerating the development of the country." 112
RA 7916, as amended by RA 8748, declared that by creating the PEZA and
integrating the special economic zones, "the government shall actively
encourage, promote, induce and accelerate a sound and balanced industrial,
economic and social development of the country x x x through the
establishment, among others, of special economic zones x x x that shall
effectively attract legitimate and productive foreign investments." 113
Under EO 226, the "State shall encourage x x x foreign investments in industry x
x x which shall x x x meet the tests of international competitiveness[,] accelerate
development of less developed regions of the country[,] and result in increased
volume and value of exports for the economy." 114 Fiscal incentives that are costefficient and simple to administer shall be devised and extended to significant
projects "to compensate for market imperfections, to reward performance
contributing to economic development,"115 and "to stimulate the establishment
and assist initial operations of the enterprise." 116
Wisely accorded to ecozones created under RA 7916 117 was the governments
policy -- spelled out earlier in RA 7227 -- of converting into alternative productive
uses118 the former military reservations and their extensions, 119as well as of
providing them incentives120 to enhance the benefits that would be derived from
them121 in promoting economic and social development.122
Finally, under RA 7844, the State declares the need "to evolve export
development into a national effort"123 in order to win international markets. By
providing many export and tax incentives,124 the State is able to drive home the
point that exporting is indeed "the key to national survival and the means
through which the economic goals of increased employment and enhanced
incomes can most expeditiously be achieved." 125
The Tax Code itself seeks to "promote sustainable economic growth x x x; x x x
increase economic activity; and x x x create a robust environment for business to
enable firms to compete better in the regional as well as the global
market."126 After all, international competitiveness requires economic and tax
incentives to lower the cost of goods produced for export. State actions that
affect global competition need to be specific and selective in the pricing of
particular goods or services.127
All these statutory policies are congruent to the constitutional mandates of
providing incentives to needed investments, 128 as well as of promoting the
preferential use of domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopting
measures to help make these competitive.129 Tax credits for domestic inputs
strengthen backward linkages. Rightly so, "the rule of law and the existence of
credible and efficient public institutions are essential prerequisites for
sustainable economic development."130
VAT Registration, Not Application for Effective Zero Rating, Indispensable to VAT
Refund
also filed and approval thereof given. Besides, it is also presumed that the law
has been obeyed146 by both the administrative officials and the applicant.
Third, even though such an application was not made, all the special laws we
have tackled exempt respondent not only from internal revenue laws but also
from the regulations issued pursuant thereto. Leniency in the implementation of
the VAT in ecozones is an imperative, precisely to spur economic growth in the
country and attain global competitiveness as envisioned in those laws.
A VAT-registered status, as well as compliance with the invoicing
requirements,147 is sufficient for the effective zero rating of the transactions of a
taxpayer. The nature of its business and transactions can easily be perused from,
as already clearly indicated in, its VAT registration papers and photocopied
documents attached thereto. Hence, its transactions cannot be exempted by its
mere failure to apply for their effective zero rating. Otherwise, their VAT
exemption would be determined, not by their nature, but by the taxpayers
negligence -- a result not at all contemplated. Administrative convenience cannot
thwart legislative mandate.
Tax Refund or Credit in Order
Having determined that respondents purchase transactions are subject to a zero
VAT rate, the tax refund or credit is in order.
As correctly held by both the CA and the Tax Court, respondent had chosen the
fiscal incentives in EO 226 over those in RA 7916 and PD 66. It opted for the
income tax holiday regime instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime.
The latter scheme is not a perfunctory aftermath of a simple registration under
the PEZA law,148 for EO 226149also has provisions to contend with. These two
regimes are in fact incompatible and cannot be availed of simultaneously by the
same entity. While EO 226 merely exempts it from income taxes, the PEZA law
exempts it from all taxes.
Therefore, respondent can be considered exempt, not from the VAT, but only
from the payment of income tax for a certain number of years, depending on its
registration as a pioneer or a non-pioneer enterprise. Besides, the remittance of
the aforesaid 5 percent of gross income earned in lieu of local and national taxes
imposable upon business establishments within the ecozone cannot outrightly
determine a VAT exemption. Being subject to VAT, payments erroneously
collected thereon may then be refunded or credited.
Even if it is argued that respondent is subject to the 5 percent preferential tax
regime in RA 7916, Section 24 thereof does not preclude the VAT. One can,
therefore, counterargue that such provision merely exempts respondent from
taxes imposed on business. To repeat, the VAT is a tax imposed on consumption,
not on business. Although respondent as an entity is exempt, the transactions it
enters into are not necessarily so. The VAT payments made in excess of the zero
rate that is imposable may certainly be refunded or credited.
Compliance with All Requisites for VAT Refund or Credit
As further enunciated by the Tax Court, respondent complied with all the
requisites for claiming a VAT refund or credit. 150
First, respondent is a VAT-registered entity. This fact alone distinguishes the
present case from Contex, in which this Court held that the petitioner therein was
registered as a non-VAT taxpayer. 151 Hence, for being merely VAT-exempt, the
petitioner in that case cannot claim any VAT refund or credit.
Second, the input taxes paid on the capital goods of respondent are duly
supported by VAT invoices and have not been offset against any output taxes.
Although enterprises registered with the BOI after December 31, 1994 would no
longer enjoy the tax credit incentives on domestic capital equipment -- as
provided for under Article 39(d), Title III, Book I of EO 226 152 -- starting January 1,
1996, respondent would still have the same benefit under a general and express
exemption contained in both Article 77(1), Book VI of EO 226; and Section 12,
paragraph 2 (c) of RA 7227, extended to the ecozones by RA 7916.
There was a very clear intent on the part of our legislators, not only to exempt
investors in ecozones from national and local taxes, but also to grant them tax
credits. This fact was revealed by the sponsorship speeches in Congress during
the second reading of House Bill No. 14295, which later became RA 7916, as
shown below:
"MR. RECTO. x x x Some of the incentives that this bill provides are exemption
from national and local taxes; x x x tax credit for locally-sourced inputs x x x."
xxxxxxxxx
"MR. DEL MAR. x x x To advance its cause in encouraging investments and
creating an environment conducive for investors, the bill offers incentives such
as the exemption from local and national taxes, x x x tax credits for locally
sourced inputs x x x."153
And third, no question as to either the filing of such claims within the prescriptive
period or the validity of the VAT returns has been raised. Even if such a question
were raised, the tax exemption under all the special laws cited above is broad
enough to cover even the enforcement of internal revenue laws, including
prescription.154\
Summary
To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to
business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by
law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt
from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining
thereto. It has opted for the income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5
percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its
registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its
sales transactions intended for export may not be exempt, but like its purchase
transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the effective zero
rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having
satisfactorily complied with all the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit
for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is entitled to such
VAT refund or credit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 153866. February 11, 2005]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.
vs.
SEAGATE
Business companies registered in Special Economic Zone in Naga, Cebu -are entities exempt from AIRT, including the VAT. Although export sales are not
deemed exempt transactions, they are nonetheless zero-rated. Hence, in the
present case, the distinction between exempt entities and exempt transactions
has little significance, because the net result is that the taxpayer is not liable for
the VAT.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the May 27, 2002 Decision [2] of the CA.
The Facts
The CA quoted the facts narrated by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), as
follows:
1. Seagate
- is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the SEC to do
business in the Philippines, with principal office address at
theNaga, Cebu;
- engaged in the manufacture of recording components primarily
used in computers for export
- April 2, 1997 VAT-registered
- June 6, 1997 - registered with the PEZA
- April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 filed VAT returns
- October 4, 1999 filed a claim for refund of VAT input P
P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the
P12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review)
RDO 83 Talisay, Cebu
- BIR no action
- July 21, 2000 Seagate elevated the case to CTA by way of
Petition for review in order to toll the running of prescriptive period
2. Special and Affirmative Defenses of the BIR:
- the claim for tax refund/credit is subject to administrative routinary
investigation/examination by the BIR.
- Since taxes are presumed to have been collected in accordance with
laws and regulations, the [respondent] has the burden of proof that
the taxes sought to be refunded were erroneously or illegally collected;
- Claims for tax refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer. This is due to the fact that claims for
refund/credit [partake of] the nature of an exemption from tax.;
is entitled to
RULING:
YES. Respondent, a VAT-registered enterprise, has complied with all
requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT it paid on capital
goods it purchased.
It is not subject to internal revenue laws and regulations and is even entitled
to tax credits. The VAT on capital goods is an internal revenue tax from which
petitioner as an entity is exempt. Although the transactions involving such tax
are not exempt, petitioner as a VAT-registered person, [28] however, is entitled to
their credits.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for
review is DENIED for lack of merit.[3]
a PEZA-reg. enterprise w/n a special economic zone is entitled to the fiscal
incentives and benefits[8] provided for in either PD 66 or EO 226. It shall,
moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both
Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227[11] and 7844.[12]Respondent benefits under RA 7844
from negotiable tax credits[24] for locally-produced materials used as inputs. Aside
from the other incentives possibly already granted to it by the Board of
Investments, it also enjoys preferential credit facilities [25] and exemption from PD
1853.[26]
Nature of the VAT and the Tax Credit Method
VAT is a uniform levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the
course of trade or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or
lease of goods or properties or on each rendition of services in the course of
trade or business.
It is an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee
or lessee of the goods, properties or services. [32] As such, it should be understood
not in the context of the person or entity that is primarily, directly and legally
liable for its payment, but in terms of its nature as a tax on consumption. [33] In
either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.
If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes [38] charged by a seller[39]
are equal to the input taxes[40] passed on by the suppliers, no payment is
required. It is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the excess has
to be paid.[41] If, however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess
shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. [42] Should the input
taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the
acquisition of capital goods,[43] any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded[44] to the taxpayer or credited[45] against other internal revenue taxes.[46]
Zero-Rated vs. Effectively Zero-Rated Transactions (in effect similar ; As
to source different)
As
source
to
Zero-rated
transactions
export sale of
goods and supply of
services.[47] The tax rate
is set at zero.[48]
In effect
In both, there is total relief for the purchaser from the burden of
the tax
In
exemption
there
is
only
partial relief
because the
purchaser is not
allowed any tax
refund
of
or
credit for input
taxes paid.[58]
The object of exemption from the VAT may either be the transaction itself or
any of the parties to the transaction.[59]
exempt transaction
involves goods or services
expressly exempted from the
the Tax Code, without regard
status -- VAT-exempt or not
party to the transaction
exempt party
which are
VAT under
to the tax
-- of the
for
Effective
Zero
Rating,
[28]
[38]
Output taxes refer to the VAT due on the sale or lease of taxable goods,
properties or services by a VAT-registered or VAT-registrable person. See
last paragraph of 110(A)(3) and 236 of the Tax Code.
[39]
Presumed to be VAT-registered.
[40]
By input taxes is meant the VAT due from or paid by a VAT-registered person
in the course of trade or business on the importation of goods or local
purchases of goods or services, including the lease or use of property from
a VAT-registered person. See penultimate paragraph of 110(A)(3) of the
Tax Code.
[43]
These are goods or properties with estimated useful lives greater than one
year and which are treated as depreciable assets under 34(F) [formerly
29(f)] of the Tax Code, used directly or indirectly in the production or sale
of taxable goods or services. 3rd paragraph of 4.106-1(b) of RR 7-95.
[53]
Under this principle, goods and services are taxed only in the country where
these are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, but imports are taxed.
Id., p. 43.
[54]
[87]
[88]
A registered export enterprise is one that is registered with the PEZA, and
that engages in manufacturing activities within the purview of the PEZA
law for the exportation of its production. 2.i, Rule I, Part I of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as
The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the
1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted
to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains
that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are
deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance
which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and
maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence, respondent concludes that the
same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school,
churches and other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be
interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-conforming
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are allegedly covered by the
clause allowing for institutional and commercial uses.
Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in
applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to
existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the
St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under
the zoning ordinance.
To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our
Decision dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the
pertinent provisions of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit:
Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of
both Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential
zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and
places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the
institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance 1 . This clearly demonstrates
the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the
residential zone only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.
It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals
gave undue emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2,
Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to
define said term in order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision.
However, they neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said
Ordinance2 , there is now another zone, separate and distinct from a residential
zone, which is classified as "institutional", wherein health facilities, such as
hospitals, are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed within said
zone.
Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to
consider that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term
"institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by
the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the same section.
Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word
"institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the
said article. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the
express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not
expressly mentioned3 . Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it
must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a
residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded.
Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as
allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from
said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those
structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa,
Laguna.
Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a
thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore,
with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the
new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to
another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body
had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential
zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital,
within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
xxxx
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a nonconforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the
issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with
the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming
buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of
Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance:
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of
any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this
Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the
provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or
extended to occupy a greater area or land that has already been
occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or
moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where
such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this
Ordinance.4 (Emphasis ours.)
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly
resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited
under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is
erroneous.1awp++i1 As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both
zoning ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential
zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and
places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have been transferred to the
institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly indicates that
the allowable uses in the residential zone have been delimited only to those
expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
which no longer includes hospitals.
With respect to respondents claim that the controversy must now be decided in
light of latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning
Ordinance, it must be stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994
when respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed capacity medical institution, at which time, the zoning ordinance in
effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that the law in
force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is the applicable law
notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal. 5 Hence, in resolving the
instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the legality or
illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time of
the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of
its subsequent amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning
Ordinance.
Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both parties as
regards the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only. Apparently, the 1999
Zoning Ordinance was already enacted and in effect by the time the petitioners
appealed their case to this Court on 7 February 2005. Petitioners, however, in
their appeal, consistently maintained their argument that the expansion
undertaken by the respondent in 1994 violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and
respondent likewise limited itself to the defense that it had complied therewith. It
bears to emphasize that respondent called the attention of this Court to the
enactment of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance with this
latest zoning ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 6 This
rule holds even more true when the points of law, theories, issues and
arguments are belatedly raised for the first time in the motion for
reconsideration of this Courts decision.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James Hospital,
Inc., is hereby DENIED. However, this is without prejudice to respondent St.
James Hospital, Inc.s reapplication for expansion in accordance with the
requirements under zoning ordinances now in effect.
SO ORDERED.
est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. 3. The rule of casus omissus in
statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted
intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more
than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer
of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion
is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those
allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions,
such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the
1991 Zoning Ordinance
Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the Contract of Lease executed on August 25,
1981 providing:
"That the term of this LEASE shall be for a period of twenty (20) years,
renewable for another period of twenty (20) years at the option of the
LESSEE under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both parties." 5
On July 1, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment holding that the eleven (11)-year
lease contract superseded the twenty (20)-year lease contract. Thus, the court
ordered the ejectment of Banco Filipino from the premises on these grounds:
expiration of the eleven (11)-year lease contract and non-payment of the
adjusted rental. Banco Filipino was likewise ordered to pay back rentals in the
amount of P79,050.00 corresponding to the period from May 1994 up to the time
that it shall have surrendered to Tala possession of the premises. 6
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City affirmed the MTC
decision.7
Banco Filipino elevated the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the challenged decision.8
Banco Filipino sought for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision,
invoking in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration the Decisions of the
same court in two of the other illegal detainer cases initiated by Tala against
Banco Filipino, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39104 and 40524. In these cases,
the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the lease contract providing for a
period of twenty (20) years. Finding Banco Filipino's motions for reconsideration
meritorious, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed Resolution, thus:
"This Court agrees with petitioner that its Decision of August 30, 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39104, having been declared final and executory by no less
than the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586, now constitutes the law of the
case between the parties in the present case. Accordingly, this Court is not
at liberty to disregard or abandon the same at will without wreaking havoc
on said legal principle.
"WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court's
Decision of August 25, 1997 is hereby SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a
new one is rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision and DISMISSING the complaint for ejectment filed against herein
petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City." 9
Tala now comes to this Court on the lone ground that:
"The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering that principle of 'the
law of the case' finds application in the instant case." 10
Petitioner Tala contends that its complaint for illegal detainer should not have
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the basis of its decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39104. Petitioner claims that this decision is not a precedent.
The first in the series of illegal detainer cases filed by Tala against the bank
which reached the Supreme Court is CA-G.R. SP No. 39104. This involves the site
in Malabon. The Court of Appeals held that Banco Filipino cannot be ejected from
the subject premises considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract has
not expired. Tala elevated this Court of Appeals decision to the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 127586. In a Resolution dated March 12, 1997, the Supreme Court
dismissed Tala's petition as the "appeal" was not timely perfected, thus:
"Considering the manifestation dated January 31, 1997 filed by petitioner
that it is no longer pursuing or holding in abeyance recourse to the
Supreme Court for reasons stated therein, the Court Resolved toDECLARE
THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the
parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and
executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely perfected." 11
We agree with petitioner Tala that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39104 holding that the twenty (20)-year contract of lease governs the
contractual relationship between the parties is not a precedent considering that
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127586 did not decide the case on the merits. The
petition was dismissed on mere technicality. It is significant to note, however,
that the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 129887,12through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de
Leon, resolved the identical issue raised in the present petition, i.e., whether the
period of the lease between the parties is twenty (20) or eleven (11) years, thus:
"Second. Petitioner Tala Realty insists that its eleven (11)-year lease
contract controls. We agree with the MTC and the RTC, however, that the
eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas,
then Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied
having signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who
notarized the said contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include
the said document; and (3) the said contract was never submitted to the
Central Bank as required by the latter's rules and regulations (Rollo, pp.
383-384.).
"Clearly, the foregoing circumstances are badges of fraud and simulation
that rightly make any court suspicious and wary of imputing any
legitimacy and validity to the said lease contract.
"Executive Vice-President Arcenas of private respondent Banco Filipino
testified that he was responsible for the daily operations of said bank. He
denied having signed the eleven (11)-year contract and reasoned that it
was not in the interest of Banco Filipino to do so (Rollo, p. 384). The fact
was corroborated by Josefina C. Salvador, typist of Banco Filipino's Legal
Department, who allegedly witnessed the said contract and whose initials
allegedly appear in all the pages thereof. She disowned the said marginal
initials (id., p. 385).
"The Executive Judge of the RTC supervises a notary public by requiring
submission to the Office of the Clerk of Court of his monthly notarial report
with copies of acknowledged documents thereto attached. Under this
procedure and requirement of the Notarial Law, failure to submit such
notarial report and copies of acknowledged documents has dire
conditions: that the bank should pay P70,050.00 as monthly rental retroactive as
of September 1, 1992, with rental escalation of 10% per year; and advance
deposit equivalent to rents for four months, plus a goodwill of P500,000.00.
Banco Filipino did not comply and in April 1994, it stopped paying rents. Banco
Filipino denied having executed the lease contract providing for a term of eleven
(11) years; claiming that its contract with Tala is for twenty (20) years, citing the
Contract of Lease executed on August 25, 1981.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the eleven-year lease contract superseded the twenty-year lease
contract
HELD:
The eleven (11)-year contract is a forgery because (1) Teodoro O. Arcenas, then
Executive Vice-President of private respondent Banco Filipino, denied having
signed the contract; (2) the records of the notary public who notarized the said
contract, Atty. Generoso S. Fulgencio, Jr., do not include the said document; and
(3) the said contract was never submitted to the Central Bank as required by the
latter's rules and regulations. It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the
twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between
petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the
twenty (20)-year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet,
Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as
it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions
thereof. The validity of the twenty (20) year lease contract was further reinforced
on June 20, 2000 when the First Division of this Court rendered a Decision in G.R.
No. 137980, likewise upholding the twenty (20)-year lease contract, thus:
"In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court (G.R. No. 129887), we
have no option but to uphold the twenty-year lease contract over the elevenyear contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same. 'Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
That the principle of stare decisis applies in the instant case, even though the
subject property is different, may be gleaned from the pronouncement in Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. Stare decisis simply declares that, for
the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. Considering the above rulings, the term of the lease in
the present case is also twenty (20) years.
October 5, 2005 of Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A Case No.
6454 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta (Presiding Justice Acosta) concurred with the
findings of the majority that there was failure on the part of petitioner to comply
with the invoicing requirements; 21 he dissented, however, to the outright denial
of petitioners claim since there are other pieces of evidence proving petitioners
transactions and VAT status.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration23 of the Decision but the CTA En Banc
denied the same in a Resolution24 dated March 16, 2007. Presiding Justice Acosta
maintained his dissent.
Issue
Hence, the instant Petition with the solitary issue of whether the failure to print
the word "zero-rated" on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT on zero-rated sales.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner submits that:
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED BY DECIDING QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN
A MANNER THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:
A. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 1997 TAX CODE DO
NOT REQUIRE THAT INVOICES AND/OR RECEIPTS ISSUED BY A VATREGISTERED TAXPAYER, SUCH AS THE PETITIONER, SHOULD BE
IMPRINTED WITH THE WORD "ZERO-RATED."
B. THE INVOICING REQUIREMENTS PRESCRIBED BY THE 1997 TAX
CODE AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE WORDS "ZERO-RATED" BE
IMPRINTED ON THE SALES INVOICES/OFFICIAL RECEIPTS UNDER
REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95 ARE NOT EVIDENTIARY RULES
AND THE ABSENCE THEREOF IS NOT FATAL TO A TAXPAYERS CLAIM
FOR REFUND.
C. RESPONDENTS REGULATIONS ARE INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO
NOT IMPLEMENT THE 1997 TAX CODE BUT INSTEAD, [EXCEED] THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE LAW.
D. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
UNEQUIVOCALLY PROVED PETITIONERS ZERO-RATED
TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000.
E. NO PREJUDICE CAN RESULT TO THE GOVERNMENT BY REASON OF
THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO IMPRINT THE WORD "ZERO-RATED"
ON ITS INVOICES. PETITIONERS CLIENTS FOR ITS ZERO-RATED
TRANSACTIONS CANNOT UNDULY BENEFIT FROM ITS "OMISSION"
amendment by R.A. 9337. Panasonic argues that the 1997 NIRC, which applied to
its payments specifically Sections 113 and 237 required the VAT-registered
taxpayers receipts or invoices to indicate only the following information:
(1) A statement that the seller is a VAT-registered person, followed by his
taxpayers identification number (TIN);
(2) The total amount which the purchaser [paid] or is obligated to pay to
the seller with the indication that such amount includes the value-added
tax;
(3) The date of transaction, quantity, unit cost and description of the
goods or properties or nature of the service; and
(4) The name, business style, if any, address and taxpayer's identification
number (TIN) of the purchaser, customer or client.
Petitioner Panasonic points out that Sections 113 and 237 did not require the
inclusion of the word "zero-rated" for zero-rated sales covered by its receipts or
invoices. The BIR incorporated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A.
9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that did not yet exist at the time it issued its
invoices.
But when petitioner Panasonic made the export sales subject of this case, i.e.,
from April 1998 to March 1999, the rule that applied was Section 4.108-1 of RR
7-95, otherwise known as the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations, which
the Secretary of Finance issued on December 9, 1995 and [which] took effect on
January 1, 1996.1avvphil It already required the printing of the word "zero-rated"
on the invoices covering zero-rated sales. When R.A. 9337 amended the 1997
NIRC on November 1, 2005, it made this particular revenue regulation a part of
the tax code. This conversion from regulation to law did not diminish the binding
force of such regulation with respect to acts committed prior to the enactment of
that law.
Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to
the Secretary of Finance under Section 245 of the 1977 NIRC (Presidential Decree
1158) for the efficient enforcement of the tax code and of course its
amendments. The requirement is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient
collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. As aptly
explained by the CTAs First Division, the appearance of the word "zero-rated" on
the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely
claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If,
absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government
would be refunding money it did not collect.
Further, the printing of the word "zero-rated" on the invoice helps segregate
sales that are subject to 10% (now 12%) VAT from those sales that are zerorated. Unable to submit the proper invoices, petitioner Panasonic has been
unable to substantiate its claim for refund. 29
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT for the taxable quarters of 2000 must be denied. Failure to print the
From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the
word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents
buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was
actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the
government would be refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions.
Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner [Agencia
Exquisite of Bohol, Incorporated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos.
150141, 157359 and 158644, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 539, 550].