27. Aguirre vs.

Rana (403 SCRA 343)

FACTS:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled
mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took
the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to
now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in an election. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondents services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
HELD:
The Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members
of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if
the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here
passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
28. In re: Atty. Marcial Edilion (884 SCRA 554)
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
1. In re: Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 (1975)
FACTS:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant
for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks
of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated
and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang
back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners
admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant,
stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was
able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears

that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular
activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the
examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed
the Bar?
HELD:
Yes. It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the
before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major
subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could
it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline
of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of
the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing
upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take
the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Lanuevo is therefore disbarred, and Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
2. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Vs. CA, 237 SCRA 519 (1994)
FACTS:
The case arose when the Bureau of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioners
application to amend its BOI certificate by changing the scope of its registered product
from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Eventually, Mariwasa filed an MR of the said
BOI decision. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed an petition for

review with respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. CA temporarily

restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms
twenty (20) days after its issuance, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not
have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226 (the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987). Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and
Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a
Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot
be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal
laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226 , a substantive right which under
the constitution cannot be modified. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever
inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the
question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme
Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was
enacted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to
be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
The substantive right to appeal from decisions or orders of the BOI under EO 226
remains and continues to be respected. Circular I-91 simply transferred the venue of the
appeals from the decisions of this agency to respondent CA and a different period of
appeal 15 days from notice (sa EO 226 30 days from receipt of decision). It did not make
an incursion into the right to appeal.
3. In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of
their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
HELD:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate

preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived,
the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.
4. Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines is charged before the military
commission with war crimes. The petitioner tenders that National War Crimes Office
established by Executive Order 68 has no jurisdiction over his case since the Philippines
is not a signatory of the Hague Convention. He also claimed that Melville Hussey and
Robert Port are not attorneys authorized to practice law in the Philippines and that they
do not have personality as prosecution since the United Stated is not a pary in interest in
the case.
ISSUE:
Is Executive Order No. 68 illegal on the ground that the Philippines is not a signatory of
the Hague Convention?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the order is valid and constitutional in pursuant to Section
3 Article 2 of the Constitution.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions
form part and are wholly based on generally accepted principles of international law.
Such rules and procedures therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed in the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
the treaties between the belligerent countries. This rights and obligations were not
erased by the assumption of full sovereignty.
Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the
rules of court. There is nothing in the said executive order which requires that counsel
appearing before the said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the
Philippines. Petition is DENIED.
5. Omico Mining & Industrial Corp., vs Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285
Judge entered into a contract of personal and professional services with private
individuals to head defendants legal department for a fixed yearly salary. The
challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which is patently void because it is

contrary to law and public policy. The contract of professional services entered into
between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the
Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law in contravention of Section 35
of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited rule was promulgated by this
Court pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on
sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges
and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a Judge of the CFI.
This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their
full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special
favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and the desire to promote the public interest. Private respondent should have
known or ought to know that when he was elevated to the bench of the CFI as a judge
thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended and continued to be
suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.
Original petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to set
aside the orders and judgment rendered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963
(Alfredo Catolico v. Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, et al.) as having been made
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
I
FACTS
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. N1963 and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos, against
Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his
personal capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said
corporation, alleging two (2) causes of action. The first, for the return of ten (10)
certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the
second, for the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation. Under the
first cause of action, plaintiff Catolico alleged among others that he is a resident of
Cavite City where he is a judge of the Court of First Instance and stockholder of the
defendant Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation holding thirty (30) certificates of
stock duly paid up bearing Nos. 13437 to 13466, the same having been issued to him
way back in August, 1969; that defendant corporation, through its co-defendant
Frederick G. Webber, pleaded with him that ten (10) certificates of stock, Nos. 13437 to
13446, be allowed to remain with them under their responsibility, jointly and severally,
for the specific purpose of using said certificates as part collateral for a loan in the
amount of P10,000,000.00, the defendants were then negotiating with the Development
Bank of the Philippines, and that both defendants, jointly and severally, promised to
return said certificates of stock upon the approval or disapproval of the loan application;
that when disapproval of said loan application appeared imminent, the defendants again
pleaded with him for the retention of the same ten (10) certificates of stock because
they were negotiating for the purchase of the Bunning and Company of Tuguegarao for
P2,000,000,00, and that they needed said certificates as part collateral for the
transaction; that when those two transactions failed, he demanded several times of the

defendants for the return to him of the ten (10) certificates aforementioned so that he
could use them, but said demands were of no avail; that in view of the failure of the
defendants to comply with his demands, he is forced to file the complaint seeking the
return to him of said ten (10) certificates of stock. Under the second cause of action,
plaintiff after reproducing the pertinent averments in the first cause of action, among
which is the averment that he is a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, further
alleged that on October 13, 1968, both defendants entered into a contract of personal
and professional services with him under the terms of which he was to head defendant
corporation's legal department with the condition that he should render such services
only after his office hours, "even into the dead wee hours of the night and wherever such
services would not run in conflict with his duties as Judge"; that in consideration of such
services, the defendants undertook to pay him a yearly salary of P35,000.00 from the
date of the contract, but where a case shall have been settled in and out of court, and
defendants shall have won or saved money because of such settlement, he shall be paid
by way of commission ten percent (10%) of the amount involved in the litigation and/or
settlement; that, pursuant to said contract, he has rendered legal services as head of the
legal department of defendant Omico and has attended to the personal consultation of
defendant Frederick G. Webber until the filing of the complaint, when, by reason thereof,
their official relations were severed; that the defendants should render the corresponding
accounting of his unpaid commission and salaries, taking into consideration the partial
payments and advances given to him as salary; that a more detailed specification of the
services rendered by him in favor of the defendants were made in a letter to the
defendants, mailed on May 28, 1973 from his official residence in Cavite City; that the
defendants refused and failed to render such accounting and to pay his emoluments, in
spite of his repeated demands to that effect. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that, on the first
cause of action, defendants be ordered to return to him the ten (10) certificates of stock,
or, in case the return thereof cannot be done, to issue in his favor the same number and
amount of certificates of stock as replacement or to pay him the par value thereof; and,
on the second cause of action, defendants be ordered to render the corresponding
accounting of the amounts due him in accordance with the averments in the complaint,
and to pay him the balance as reflected in the accounting as approved by the court; to
pay him moral, exemplary, punitive and afflictive damages, in such amounts as assessed
by the court; to pay him attorney's fees and costs; and to grant him such other reliefs
available in the premises. 1
Served with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint, the petitioners, as
defendants therein, on June 10, 1973 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two
grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff
is not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his
permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of action, the contract of personal
and professional services between plaintiff and defendants was entered into in the City
of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with
Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that
with regard to the stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and,
with respect to the contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed
that the plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial
Corporation, the same is illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the
Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar. The motion to dismiss
contains the following notice of hearing: t.hqw

The Clerk of Court

Court of First Instance of Cavite City Branch II
Greetings:
Please include the foregoing motion in the calendar of the Honorable Court on Saturday,
June 16, 1973, and have the same submitted for resolution without further arguments on
the part of the defendants.
(Sgd.) JOSE F. PEREZ
COPY FURNISHED:
(By registered Mail)
Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, Counsel for the Plaintiff,
5-C Banawe, Quezon City
Attached to the motion is Registry Receipt No. 45297 issued by Manila Central Post Office
on June 9, 1973. 2
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the
parties nor their respective counsels appeared in court. But the court, noting that there
was no clear showing in the record that notice of hearing of said motion had been served
upon counsel for the plaintiff, issued on June 18, 1973 an Order postponing consideration
of the motion "until counsel for the defendants shall have shown to the satisfaction of
the Court that a copy of his motion to dismiss has been furnished counsel for the
plaintiff." The Order adds that "in said event, the Clerk of Court shall calendar anew the
hearing of the motion to dismiss furnishing a copy of the date of the bearing to counsels
for the plaintiff and for the defendants." 3 Copies of said Order were sent to the
respective counsels of the parties on June 10, 1973 by registered mail. 4
While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had
not yet presented to the court the required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11,
1974, filed a petition to declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his
evidence ex parte. In said petition, plaintiff alleged, in substance, that defendants had
been served with summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of
January 11, 1974, or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the service of summons,
defendants had not filed their answer to the complaint; that the defendants had filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on June 10, 1973, the hearing of which had been set to
June 16, 1973 but the notice of said hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to
Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, counsel for plaintiff; that the Revised Rules of Court provides that
petitions and motions should be sent to opposing parties who should be notified of the
date of the hearing thereof; that the notice of hearing in defendants' motion to dismiss is
fatally defective, it being addressed to the Clerk of Court; and that because of that
defect, defendants' motion to dismiss is a "useless piece of paper", citing Philippine
Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Hon. Pedro A. Revilla, G.R. No. L-31869, promulgated on
August 8, 1973. 5 By Order of January 15, 1974, the court granted the petition 6 and,
consequently, it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment
thereon on January 29, 1974, the dispositive portion of which reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants directing the latter:

1. To return to the plaintiff ten (10) certificates of stock corresponding to 100,000 shares
of the Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation in the name of Vicente Resonda bearing
Nos. 13437 up to and including 13446 or in lieu thereof, to deliver to said plaintiff new
certificates of the above-named corporation of equivalent value;
2. To pay to the plaintiff the total amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-six
Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-five Pesos and Eleven centavos (P1,186,435.11) at the
legal rate of interest until said amount is fully paid;
3. To pay to the plaintiff by way of attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00);
4. To pay the costs." 7
On March 5, 1974, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, advancing the
arguments (1) that the judgment is contrary to law and the liberal interpretation of the
Revised Rules of Court, in that they have complied with the provisions of Section 10 of
Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, by stating in the motion to dismiss that a copy thereof
was furnished by registered mail to Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, counsel for the plaintiff, and
attaching thereto the registry receipt therefor issued by the Manila Central Post Office;
that the purpose of the notice has been served because as per certification of the post
office of Quezon City, said Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag received the copy of the Motion to
Dismiss before June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion; and that, with
respect to the return card, they have not received the same, hence, they could not
comply with the submission thereof; (2) that the circumstances obtaining in the case do
not warrant the default order which finally paved the way for the rendering of judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, because counsel for the plaintiff had received a copy of the
motion to dismiss one day before the hearing thereof; that said motion should have been
acted upon, considering that it contains contentious issues which when resolved would
show the complaint to be "nothing but empty claims"; and that the ruling in Philippine
Advertising Counselors, Inc. cannot apply, because the facts therein are at variance with
those of the present case; and (3) that the defendants have a valid defense and strong
evidence to rebut and/or controvert the claims of the plaintiff as shown by the affidavits
of Jose F. Perez and Hilarion P. Dugenio, legal counsel and corporate secretary,
respectively, of Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation. The motion contains a notice to
counsel for plaintiff that the hearing thereof has been set for March 15, 1974. 8
On March 15,1974, plaintiff Catolico, on his own behalf, filed a motion to postpone
hearing of the motion for reconsideration to April 29, 1974, to enable him to prepare an
intelligible opposition thereto. The motion does not contain a notice of hearing. It merely
states at the foot thereof that a copy of said motion was furnished Pio R. Marcos and
Guillermo Bandonil, counsel for defendants, without stating how delivery was effected. 9
But notwithstanding absence of notice of hearing, the court, considering the absence, of
objection thereto on the part of the defendants, granted the motion for postponement,
with the condition that the defendants be furnished with a copy of the opposition; that
defendants may file their reply to the opposition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof; and that thereafter the matter be deemed submitted for resolution. 10
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before
the court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they

had not received a copy thereof, 11 plaintiff Catolico filed a motion for immediate
execution of judgment, alleging, among other things, that said judgment had already
become final and executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default
lifted; that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a
"manifest attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them
an opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the
same to the prejudice" not only of respondent Catolico but also of "some forty to fifty
creditors who filed complaints against the defendants for estafa and civil suits for
collection amounting to hundreds of thousands of pesos"; that some 80% of defendants'
assets and properties had already been sold at fantastically low prices to defraud
creditors who had been deceitfully assured by the management that they are well
protected; that the judgment might become ineffective "due to the notoriously deceptive
movements" (sic) to which the defendants "daily and continuously expose themselves";
and that immediate execution of the judgment is the only protection that can be
rendered to plaintiff under the premises. 12
On June 18, 1974, the Court issued simultaneously two (2) Orders, one denying
defendants' motion for reconsideration, 13 and the other directing the issuance of a writ
of execution of its decision of January 29, 1974. In the latter Order, the court appointed
the City Sheriff of Manila, herein respondent Leonardo Alcid, to execute said writ of
execution. 14
On June 19, 1974, defendants filed their notice of appeal to this Court, an appeal bond
and a record on appeal. The record on appeal was approved on August 27, 1974 only
because of the absence of the respondent Judge from his station, he being then a
participant in the seminar of Judges of Court of First Instance in the Development
Academy of the Philippines at Tagaytay City. 15
On the same date, June 19, 1974, in the afternoon, respondent Sheriff of Manila, through
his Senior Legal Assistant and Acting Executive Sheriff Dominador Q. Cacpal served a
notice of garnishment to the defendants, together with a writ of execution issued by the
respondent Judge. On July 22, Pio R. Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of defendant Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to
respondent Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the
legal remedies available to hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment. Among the
reasons presented by Marcos are that defendants were not given a chance to have their
day in court in the motion for immediate execution of judgment and that they have
already appealed from the lower court's decision and order of immediate execution. 16
Because of the impending execution of the judgment by default which they believe to be
illegal, defendants, on July 25, 1974, filed with this Court the instant petition praying,
among other things, that respondent Judge be restrained from commanding the City
Sheriff of Manila, or his duly authorized representative, to execute the decision of January
29, 1974. The petition assails mainly the Order of respondent Judge, declaring the
defendants in default, the consequent reception of the evidence of the plaintiff ex parte
and the judgment by default rendered thereon, as having been made without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion because said respondent Judge
failed to resolve first the defendants' motion to dismiss. In a resolution dated July 24,
1974, We required, without giving due course to the petition, respondents to comment
on said petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof, and, as prayed for, issued a
temporary restraining order. Respondent Judge and private respondent Catolico filed

separate comments. Per resolution dated August 20, 1974, We resolved to consider their
comments as their Answer to the petition.
In his answer, respondent Judge justifies his failure to act on the aforesaid motion to
dismiss the complaint in this wise: t.hqw
In insisting in their petition that it was obligatory for this respondent to grant or deny
said motion to dismiss, counsels who filed this petition seem to be feigning ignorance as
to reasons why this respondent chose to ignore their motion to dismiss and considered it
a mere scrap of paper. It is humbly submitted that said reasons have been amply set
forth and discussed in the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. N-1963 (Annex F to the
petition) in accordance with the decision of this Honorable Tribunal in the case of
Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc., versus Hon. Pedro Revilla, et al., G.R. No. L31869), to this effect: t.hqw
'Finally, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that notice of a motion shall be
served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it, and Section 5 of the same rule requires the motion to be directed to
the parties concerned and to state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. A
motion which fails to comply with these requirements is nothing but a useless piece of
paper ...' (Emphasis supplied).
Counsels who filed the instant petition know more than anybody else that their motion to
dismiss did not comply with the standards required in the decision above quoted for it
was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the party concerned. As such, said motion
to dismiss was but 'a useless piece of paper' without any legal standing, and, therefore,
could neither be granted nor denied, by this respondent ....
Subsequently, or on September 6, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss
said petition on the ground that the remedy of certiorari and prohibition is no longer
available to the herein petitioners, inasmuch as they had already perfected their appeal.
17 Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that their appeal is
inadequate to protect their rights for, without the restraining order issued by this Court,
the respondents could have executed the decision and orders in question. 18
II.
ISSUES
The first issue to be resolved here is whether the respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in
default, in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment thereon.
The second is whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper
remedy available to petitioners.
III
1. With regard to the first issue, respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the
complaint is a "useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated
therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned, that is, the plaintiff

or his counsel, as required by the rules. We do not agree. As copied verbatim above, the
notice of hearing states the time and place of hearing, and a copy thereof was sent
through registered mail seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing of the motion
but actually received by plaintiff's counsel one (1) day before said date, as per
certification of the Quezon City Post Office.
To Our mind, what is decisive here is that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the time and
place of the hearing of the motion to dismiss. We have said in Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction and Company, 19 "unless the movant sets the time and
place of hearing the court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules
themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition." In the
Matusa case, We said that granting that the notice is defective for failure to specify the
exact date when the motion to dismiss should be heard, the Court, in taking cognizance
of the motion on the date set for the hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such
a pleading may have had, especially if it is taken into account that upon receipt of the
motion to dismiss, plaintiff was properly notified of the existence of said pleading. 20
Indeed, We declared that there may be cases where the attendance of certain
circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to truncate the adverse literal
application of the pertinent rules violated." 21 The case at bar is such an instance,
because private respondent had sufficient notice of the place, time and date when the
motion to dismiss was to be heard. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners
in default. The motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such declaration
was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of default while a motion to
dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. 22 The irregularity of the order of default is
evident from the fact that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for
filing an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel
had not yet received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to
dismiss. Under Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the motion to dismiss
is denied or if the determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer
within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of
the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. In other words, the
period for filing responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time the
defendant receives notice of the denial or deferment of his motion to dismiss. Inasmuch
as petitioners were declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending
resolution, they were, therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the
trial of the case on the merits, in their absence, without due notice to them of the date of
hearing, was a denial of due process. 23 Consequently, the order of default, the
judgment and the order of execution are patent nullities.
In connection with the foregoing, We notice the ambivalence with which the respondent
Judge applied the rules. Thus, while he was unduly strict regarding the requirements of
notice of hearing to the defendants, he was, at the same time, unduly liberal with
respect to the plaintiff. For instance, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration did not contain
any notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, or even the address of the plaintiff who
signed personally said motion. Notwithstanding the absence of these data, respondent
Judge readily granted the motion. Then there is plaintiff's motion for immediate
execution of judgment pending appeal. Although it was apparent that a copy of said
motion could not have been received by the counsel for the defendants at their office in
Baguio City prior to the date of the hearing on June 3, 1974, considering that it was only

on May 29, 1974 when a copy of said motion was allegedly posted by registered mail at
the Manila Post Office, respondent Judge did not require, as he did with respect to
defendants' motion to dismiss, proof of service of the notice thereof. Such conduct falls
short of the requirement that the official conduct of a judge should not only be free from
impropriety, but also from the appearance of impropriety..
2. There is, moreover, the consideration that the challenged judgment seeks to enforce
a contract which is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The
contract of professional services entered into between private respondent and the
petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted
private practice of law and in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited Rule was promulgated by this Court,
pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound
reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and
functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high
official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Court of First
Instance. 24 This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned
to give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in
the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and the desire to promote the public interest.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to
the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an
attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the
judicial position. 25
It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, is considered inexistent and void from the beginning. 26
3. On the question of the remedy availed of by petitioners, respondents maintain that
where appeal is available, as it has been shown to be available to the petitioners when
they perfected their appeal in Civil Case No. N-1963, the remedy of certiorari and/or
prohibition cannot be resorted to. In resolving this question, We advert to Our ruling in
Matute v. Court of Appeals, supra, where We stated: t.hqw
In opposing the instant petition, the plaintiff-respondent contends that the remedy of the
defendant petitioner is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary appeal pursuant to
Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3 which reads: t.hqw
'A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance with
Rule 38.' .
We do not agree. The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is properly, though
not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does
not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a
more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment
by default set aside as a nullity.

It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is

differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former
irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such a right
and may exercise the same after having the order of default and the subsequent
judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of origin. Moreover the
former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by virtue of
which he can contest only the judgment by default on the designated ground that it is
contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter, however, has the option to avail of the
same remedy or to forthwith interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of
the order of default even before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the
event that the latter has been rendered, to have both court decrees the order of
default and the judgment by default declared void. The defendant-petitioner's choice
of the latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment by default not on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the ground
that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order
of default..
Granting, however, that an appeal is open to the defendant-petitioner, the same is no
longer an adequate and speedy remedy considering that the court a quo had already
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and the carrying out of such writ loomed as a
great probability. This is in consonance with the doctrine enunciated in Vda. de Saludes v.
Pajarillo and Bautista (78 Phil. 754) wherein this Court held that an 'appeal under the
circumstances was not an adequate remedy there being an order or execution issued by
the municipal court.' Hence, the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal
is relaxed where, as in the instant case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution.
The above ruling applies with cogent force in the present case..
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of execution
rendered by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 are hereby set aside, and the
respondent Judge is ordered to hear and decide the motion to dismiss the complaint,
taking into account Our foregoing opinion. The temporary restraining order is made
permanent, with costs against private respondent.
6. People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 (1965)
FACTS:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio
Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as privateprosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes
practice of law.
HELD:
No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or
friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail
Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by
the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there could be no possible conflict in the duties
of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney
Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer
and demanding payment for such services. Thus, the appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case
at bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.
7. Dia-Anonuevo vs. Bercasio 68 SCRA 81 (1975)
8. De Guzman vs Visayan Rapid Transit Co., 68 Phil 649 (1939)
G.R. No. 46396
September 30, 1939
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals of
September 20, 1938, in the above-entitled case on various alleged errors of law.
The Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., during the time
the legal services are claimed to have been rendered by the petitioner, were operating
automobile lines in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, Nicolas
Concepcion, was at the time the president, general manager, and controlling stockholder
of these two transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion engaged the
professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of
Manila. The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the suppression, reduction and
refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the respondent
transportation companies. According to the petitioner, these toll bridges are in places
known as Bago, Calatrava, Danao, Hinigiran, Malogo, Talavan-Dacu, Talabangay,
Bagacay, Binmalayan and Sicaba. At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it
appears that the respondent transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70
as toll charges up to December 31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-seventh of
their gross income up to that date, and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll
charges were detrimental to the transportation business of the respondent if not
remedied in time. The herein petitioner accordingly took steps to obtain first the
suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund of
P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros. For this

purpose, he appears to have signed Exhibit A which Concepcion brought to Manila,

asking that the Bago and Malogo bridges be declared free, and said petition was filed
with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in January, 1933.
Believing that the suppression of tolls on the Bago and Malogo bridges could not be
effected, the petitioner filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and Communication,
petition Exhibit B asking for the reduction of toll charges over the eleven (11) bridges in
Occidental Negros. This fact was brought to the knowledge of Nicolas Concepcion who in
turn wrote to the petitioner, Exhibit K-1, the pertinent part of which reads thus:
Now compadre if this toll business will not all be effected I would like to request you
therefore to work for at least 50 per cent reduction on all toll bridges, so that our little
business will prosper a bit. We will always hope of course for the best to come. (In
English.)
The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the transportation companies' petition
and urged the provincial board of Occidental Negros to act favorably. The provincial
board, however, declined to follow the suggestion. The Secretary of Commerce and
Public Works warned the provincial officials by sending them the communication, dated
April 23, 1934, with the admonition that "if the toll rates have not been revised by . . .
June 15, 1934, this office, much to its regrets, will be forced to withdraw its approval of
the existing toll rates." By reason of this communication, the provincial board, on March
7, 1934, with the conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a resolution reducing the
tolls for 2-ton trucks or more, the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the
respondents, from P1.20 to P0.50 on one bridge, and from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other.
And on April 10, 1935 "upon authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the
Department of the Interior" the provincial board refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally
collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc., and the Negros Transportation
Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future payments for tolls by said companies.
As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been benefited with an
economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months. (Exhibit V.)
The various incidental questions raised by the petitioner revolves around the reasonable
compensation to which he is entitled, and we pass on to the consideration of this point.
Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative
and did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains
that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results
to his clients. It is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation,
and the only question is the reasonable amount to which he is entitled. He claimed in the
lower court the sum of P20,000. The trial court awarded him P10,000. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reduced this amount to P3,500.
Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer . . .." The
following are the circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an
attorney: the amount and character of the services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble
involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services
were rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the

property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional character and
social standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee is
absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a
much a larger fee when it is to be contingent that when it is not. The financial ability of
the defendant may also be considered not to enhance the amount above a reasonable
compensation, but to determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair and just
compensation for the services rendered, or as as incident in ascertaining the importance
and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation. (Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil.,
419; Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil., 499.)
The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing
with the authorities concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers
submitted in evidence, for he appears to have had various conferences with the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Secretary of the Interior, the
Secretary of Labor and the Insular Auditor, and had otherwise taken steps to secure the
objectives of his clients. The importance, merits and value of professional services of a
lawyer are measured not alone by his work taken separately, but by his work taken as a
whole. There are services which, when taken separately, may not in themselves have
any noticeable special merit, but when considered in connection with the other works
and services of the lawyer to which they are related, acquire an unquestionable value.
That is why even the time employed is not itself an appropriate basis for fixing the
compensation. (Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil., 350; Bachrach vs. Teal and Teal
Motor Co., 53 Phil., 631, 634.)
The respondents in their brief insinuate that the services of the petitioner were
unsolicited and unauthorized. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals, upon the
proof submitted, concluded that the employment of the petitioner was duly made and
solicited by the president and manager of the respondent corporations, and such finding
cannot be disturbed. "It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive
the just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client . . . That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good
faith trying to serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for his services. . . ." (Wolfson vs. Anderson, 48 Phil., 672, 675.)
The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but
the intention and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And
in any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services. (Panis vs.
Yangco, 52 Phil., 499, 502.)
No hard and fast rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what
is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case.
(2 Thornton on Attorney at Law, p. 783.)
We have noted in the beginning that the services here were rendered in a case of an
administrative nature. But that does not alter the application of the proper rule:
Professional services, to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation, are as
legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury
that the claim presented or the defense set up against a claim presented by the other

party ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates; and the
legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to receive
compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal,
if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness. (Stanton vs.
Embry, 23 Law. ed [U.S.], 983, 985.)
As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of
the toll of the bridges in the said province, the respondents were benefited with an
economy of P78,448. The refund to the said corporations of the amount of P50,000 is a
great relief and enhancement of their business. Facts and circumstances considered, we
are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of the petitioner is P7,000,
deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which the petitioner had already
received.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly modified, without pronouncement
regarding costs. So ordered.
9. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
FACTS:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods
appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify
for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of
the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1.Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2.Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3.Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held
various positions in various foreign corporations.
4.In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
5.In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes practice
of law?
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted
in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases.
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal

institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation.
10. In Re: Edillion, 84 SCRA 554
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership
dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment
of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the
stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to
be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to
liberty and property and thereby null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of
the respondent.
HELD:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar
associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which
is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a
member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives
and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does
not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police
power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The
name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent
member of the bar.
11. Tejan vs Cusi, Jr., 57 SCRA 154 (1974)
G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974
In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No.
59 of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of
the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was
required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed
or suspended from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition
in court containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit:
The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court

show that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a verified petition for issuance of a
new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente
Calongo, alleging therein as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate
was lost by the herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent
search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and is therefore now presumed
to be lost," and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco, when you know very well
that the owner's duplicate copy has always been in the custody of Municipal Judge
Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted
by Vicente Calongo, and that as a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon.
Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967,
directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312.
In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two (72) hours from the receipt hereof to
explain why you shall not be removed or suspended from the practice of law.
Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967
denying the material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the
circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition.
Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed
and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and, together with Adm. Case No.
58 against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for hearing on
January 24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned,
among others, the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one
for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well
as the subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit
himself from hearing the administrative case in view of the latter's conflicting positions
as prosecutor and judge at the same time. The oral motion was denied.
On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against
petitioner. At the said hearing Municipal Judge Saludares testified by more or less
reiterating the testimony he previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief from
the order in Misc. Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of title.
The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968.
On April 15, 1968, petitioner filed the present petition, and on April 17, 1968, this Court
gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon petitioner's posting of a bond.
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear
and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because
jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in
courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of
first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised
Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.
We find petitioner's contentions without merit.
1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from
the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the

admission of persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper

administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the
administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the
manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission
to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the
right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it.
When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the
trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the
enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited.
The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to
investigate and suspend members of the bar.
The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:
SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice
for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension
such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court
in the premises.
SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further
proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court
of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the
receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
to determine the matter ex parte.

shall be
had full
produce
if upon
proceed

These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which read:
SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers. Courts of First Instance may suspend a lawyer from
the further practice of his profession for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such lawyer will not be privileged to practice his
profession in any of the courts of the Islands until further action of the Supreme Court in
the premises.
SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. Upon such suspension the judge of the Court
of First Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a
certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the
same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme
Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer permanently from the roll as it shall
find the facts to warrant.

SEC. 25. Hearing of charges. No lawyer shall be removed from the roll or be suspended
from the performance of his profession until he has had full opportunity to answer the
charges against him, and to produce witnesses in his own behalf and to be heard by
himself and counsel, if he so desires, upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable
notice the accused fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.
2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are
not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and
thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate
into the conduct of its own officers. 1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the
Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the
disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own
knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending
before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the
court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his
continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to
promote the purity of the administration of justice.
3. Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or suspended from
the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard
by himself or counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). 2
While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice, Sec.
9 of Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far as applicable, the procedure
outlined by the preceding actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of
complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance."
Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is
granted 10 days from service of a copy of the complaint within which to file his answer. It
is desirable, therefore, that a similar period should be granted by the Court of First
Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in procedure. We
find, however, that in the case at bar, petitioner not only failed to question as
unreasonable, the period granted to him by the court within which to answer the
complaint, but actually was not substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to
the complaint within the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.
Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far as
may be applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the Solicitor General of
complaints against lawyers referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern
the filing and investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in
Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent Judge, should be the

one to conduct the present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable
to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts
of First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers
to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28
to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the
investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the Supreme
Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the
order of suspension and the statement of the facts upon which the same is based,
required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of
the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension or
removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant." In other words,
under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General would, therefore, be
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the present person is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner.
12. Alcala vs. Vera, 56 SCRA 30 (1974)
Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala. April 19, 1963, Atty. De
Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to inform Alcala about
the adverse decision. July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of
execution. That was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty.
De Veras failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala
can appeal his case had already lapsed. As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a
civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he averred that he
sustained damages due to Atty. De Veras negligence. The court however ruled that
Alcala is not entitled to damages. Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty.
De Vera.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his
client of the status of the case.
HELD:
No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss
in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of the status of the
case, however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such
negligence. But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage
to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De
Vera guilty of simple negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty.
De Veras failure to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total
dedication or devotion to the clients interest expected of Atty. De Vera under the
lawyers oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client
to collect damages from the negligent lawyer.

13. Catimbuha vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 190 (1983)

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of
the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal
Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat.
Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated
September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that
"the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to
allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants
in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional
taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate
criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less
serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of
the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August
1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan
opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated
August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on
September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others,
that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be
set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon
motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San
Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as
may be fixed by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: t.
hqw
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear

in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided
by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4
and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine
who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected
to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provide: t.hqw
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Unless the offended
party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately
from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the
direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active
conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides
that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an
agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil.
621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property
through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the
municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is
not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place,
the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the
case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a
lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his
supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense
counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more
reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and
control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve
his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has
personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he
cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and
September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana
and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are
hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance
and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan.
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

14. Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. Vs. Pagalilauan, 172 SCRA 399 (1989)
This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision ordering herein petitioner,
Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation to reinstate Rogelio A. Abanto his former
position without loss of seniority rights, to pay him 12 months backwages in the amount
of P18,000.00 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,800.00.
On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its
"Legal Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living
allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00.
On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that
he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged
failure to perform his duties well.
On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal.
The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed.
This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal.
Hence, this present petition.
The only issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not there was an employeremployee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban. The petitioner
questions the jurisdiction of the public respondents considering the alleged absence of
an employer-employee relationship. The petitioner contends that its relationship with
Aban is that of a client with his lawyer. It is its position that "(a) lawyer as long as he is
acting as such, as long as he is performing acts constituting practice of law, can never be
considered an employee. His relationship with those to whom he renders services, as
such lawyer, can never be governed by the labor laws. For a lawyer to so argue is not
only demeaning to himself (sic), but also his profession and to his brothers in the
profession." Thus, the petitioner argues that the labor arbiter and NLRC have no
jurisdiction over the instant case.
The contention is without merit.
A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private
corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a

staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table
of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the
same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer
basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up
of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors,
nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals.
This Court is not without a guide in deciding whether or not an employer-employee
relation exists between the contending parties or whether or not the private respondent
was hired on a retainer basis.
As stated in the case of Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., (G.R. No. 80680, January
26, 1989):
This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an
employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection
and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the
presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power
to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been
held to be the decisive factor.
Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his
appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living
allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties
well. (Exhibit "B").
Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said
corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing
appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the
exercise of his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation.
The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its
power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control
over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work.
Moreover, estoppel lies against the petitioner. It may no longer question the jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter and NLRC .
The petitioner presented documents (Exhibits "2" to "19") before the Labor Arbiter to
prove that Aban was a managerial employee. Now, it is disclaiming that Aban was ever
its employee. The proper procedure was for the petitioner to prove its allegations that
Aban drank heavily, violated company policies, spent company funds and properties for
personal ends, and otherwise led the employer to lose trust and confidence in him. The
real issue was due process, not the specious argument raised in this petition.
The new theory presented before this Court is a last-ditch effort by the petitioner to
cover up for the unwarranted dismissal of its employee. This Court frowns upon such
delaying tactics.
The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter being supported by substantial evidence are
binding on this Court. (See Industrial limber Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. No. 83616, January 20, 1989).

Considering that the private respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment in
1980, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former or similar position without loss of
seniority rights, if it is still feasible, to backwages without qualification or deduction for
three years, (D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan 159 SCRA 107 (1988); Flores v. Nuestro, G.R.
No. 66890, April 15, 1988), and to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00. Should reinstatement prove no longer feasible, the petitioner will pay him
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (City Trust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87;
Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 166; Metro Drug v. NLRC, et al., 143 SCRA 132; Luzon
Brokerage v. Luzon Labor Union, 7 SCRA 116). The amount of such separation pay as
may be provided by law or the collective bargaining agreement is to be computed based
on the period from 24 October 1978 (date of first employment) to 4 October 1983 (three
years after date of illegal dismissal). [Manila Midtown Commercial Corporation v.
Nuwhrain 159 SCRA 212 (1988)].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioner is ordered
to reinstate the private respondent to his former or a similar position without loss of
seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction
and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner
shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated
three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
15. Ramos vs Rada, 65 SCRA 179 (1975)
FACTS:
Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte.He was
charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government
Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on
December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated
in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation. His acceptance of such
appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against Rada which was filed
with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973. Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada
requested permission to accept appointment. It was not indicated that his acceptance
and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as
messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII
HELD:

Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of
Civil Service Rule XVIII and meted a penalty of reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his
entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it
would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment
his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from
engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and
without forseeable detriment to the Government service.
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must
secure a written permission from proper government authority.
16. Beltran vs. Eliao Abad, 132 SCRA 452 (1984)
FACTS:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations. His
subsequent practice of law was questioned and complained by the President of Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, Inc. Respondent explained that (1) he had already paid for the
Bar Admission Fee,(2) he was notified of the oath-taking by the Supreme Court and
signed the Lawyers Oath by one clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidante,(3) he
participated Annual General Meeting of IBP Quezon City, and paid his statement dues
and was included as a voting member for officers and directors also conferred to him a
certificate of Membership in Good Standing from IBP QC Chapter,(4) and the Supreme
Court never issued any order in the striking of his name in the roll of attorneys, and paid
his dues and PTR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was sentenced fine and imprisonment for twenty five (25) days.
Respondent should know that the circumstances which he narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right (or privilege) to practice law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature
in the Roll of Attorneys.
He was found in violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing x x x:
xxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
xxx
From which respondent cannot further deny.
17. Bacarro vs. Pinataca, 127 SCRA 218 (1984)
FACTS:This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and
immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan;
that because of respondent's betrayal, her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral
distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a

member of the Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the
truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each
other, does not justify him for disqualification to the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case
involving his good moral character
HELD:
Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has
legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan
as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that
he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a
new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership
in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal
obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the
applicant must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and
uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the
ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of
law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen"
He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for
his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course
and passing the Bar examinations.
18. Diao vs. Martinez, 7 SCRA 475
FACTS:
2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false
representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite
academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended
to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the allegations in
his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diao may continue to practice the law profession.
HELD:
The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had acquired
a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar exam.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the
Rolls of Attorneys.

19. In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA

FACTS:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused the
death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years
and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter which was
approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not
allowed to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyers oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already
terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before
it was terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyers oath office and admit him to the
practice of law.
HELD:
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in
the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of
maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify
that he has reformed and has become a responsible member of the community through
sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have
actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit
to the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyers
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and thereafter to practice the legal profession.

20. Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584 (1981)

FACTS:
This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty.
Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale
with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the
registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was
that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon
City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself

elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator
Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA).
The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite
the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof
but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not
adverted in his previous denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his
malfeasance as a public official, and whether or not the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.
HELD:
Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground
for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule
1.03).
LAWYERS DUTIES TO SOCIETY
1. Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 (1974)
FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del
Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made
a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA
justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered
through negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then
ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the
CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices
of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by
reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the
justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as
well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the
ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the
judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should
not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even
stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be
fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As
an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In
short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
2. In Re: Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
FACTS:
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in
1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a
portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was
released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow
of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.
HELD:
Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted
his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact
of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense).

The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been
committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

3. Orence vs. CA 298 SCRA 133 (1998)

FACTS:
During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the property in
litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The illegal
entry took place while the case was pending in the CA & while a writ of preliminary
injunction was in force.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was gross misconduct
HELD:
Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of its occupants & in
contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making utterances showing
disrespect for the law & this Court, are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he
says that they peacefully took over the property, such peaceful take-over cannot
justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force.
Through his acts, he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
4. De Ysasi vs. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 (1994)
FACTS:
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a
hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm
administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he missed work.
He was confined and while hes nursing from his infections he was terminated, without
due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before
the National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually
abandoned his work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD:
No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed
to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and

especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between

their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This case
may have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to
have both parties find an off court settlement but records show that no such effort was
made. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should
be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that (a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement. Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of
a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same.