Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Industrial Risk Management - Overview
Industrial Risk Management - Overview
INDUSTRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
function of probability,
consequences and vulnerability
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment and risk analysis of technical
systems can be defined as a set of
systematic methods to:
Identify hazards
Quantify risks
Risk assessment
Risk analysis is teamwork
Ideally risk analysis should be done by bringing
together experts with different backgrounds:
chemicals
human error
process equipment
Risk assessment is a
continuous process!
Risk Assessment
System definition
Hazard identification
Analysis of accident scenarios
Estimation of accident frequencies
Consequence analysis and modelling
Risk estimation
and quantitative
assessments
At all steps, risk
reducing measures
need to be considered
Consequences
Risk
What if
Checklists
HAZOP
Task analysis
Index (Dow, Mond)
Consequences
Risk
Consequences
Risk
Identify
Safety
Barriers
2.
3.
4.
5.
Low
High
Part of
Also
Other than
Reverse
No
flow
Low
flow
High
flow
Missing
ingredients
Impurities
Wrong
material
Reverse
flow
Empty
Low
level
High
level
Low
interface
High
interface
Open to
atmosphere
Low
pressure
High
pressure
Freezing
Low
temp.
High
temp.
Auto
refrigeration
Agitation
No
agitation
Poor
mixing
Excessive
mixing
Irregularmixing
Foaming
Phase
separation
Reaction
No
reaction
Slow
reaction
"Runaway
reaction"
Partial
reaction
Side
reaction
Wrong
reaction
Decomposition
Utility
failure
External
leak
External
rupture
Start-up
Shutdown
Maintenance
Processvariable
Flow
Level
Pressure
Temperature
Other
Vacuum
Cond. Probabil
B
Very low
1
Severity
S
Low
1
Rare
Low
Significant
Likely
Significant
High
Frequent
high
Very high
Decision making
Criticality
Judgement
Meaning
Cr < X
Acceptable
No action required
X < Cr < Y
Cr > Y
Not
acceptable
based on
Quantity
hazardous units
.
(,
).
Bowtie Analysis
Synergistic adaptation of Fault Tree Analysis, Causal
And
IE
UE 2
UE 3
OR
OR
UE 4
UE 5
IE
DP
OR
And
CE
IE
OR
OR
IE
DP
ME
ME
DP
ME
ME
SCE
IE
Prevention
ME
ME
SCE
IE
UE 6
UE 7
UE 8
DP
Barriers
Mitigation
Fault Tree
Event tree
Unwanted Events (UE) / Initiating Events (IE) / Critical Events (CE) : Loss of
Containment (LOC) or Loss of Physical Integrity (LPI) / Secondary Critical
Events (SCE) / Dangerous Phenomena (DP) / Major Events (ME)
Consequence assessment
The consequence assessment is used to
estimate:
The extent or distance to which casualties or
damage may occur as a consequence of an
accident;
The conditional probability of loss of life or
damage as a consequence of an accident;
Instantaneous
Tank Rupture
Immediate ignition
BLEVE
Instantaneous Cloud/
Pool Evaporation
Dispersion
Near miss
Delayed Ignition
Flash fire
Example BLEVE
Two-phase jet
No ignition
Near miss
No ignition
Dispersion
Immediate ignition
Jet Fire
Delayed Ignition
Flash fire
plume rise
Ammonia toxicity
Probit function Pr = 35.9 + 1.85 ln(C t )
2
100%
10
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0
10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Concentration (ppm)
Probit value
Probability
Fatal probability
Effective Cloud
Width (ECW)
A
West
East
South
Consequence assessment in
practice
Consequence assessment is often an expert-
Storage equipment
Process equipment
Transport equipment
Pipes networks
Packaging equipment
Other facilities
1. Pressure transport equipment
2. Atmospheric transport equipment
Continuous,
Instantaneous
10 min
Continuous,
10 mm
Pressure vessel
510-7 y-1
510-7 y-1
110-5 y-1
Process vessel
510-6 y-1
510-6 y-1
110-4 y-1
Reactor vessel
510-6 y-1
510-6 y-1
110-4 y-1
1a. Instant.
release to
atmosphere
Single
containment
With a
protective
outer shell
Double
containment
Full
containment
Membrane
5 10-6 y-1
2a. Contin.
10 min to
atmosphere
2b. Contin.
10 min to
secondary
container
5 10-6 y-1
3a. Contin.
10 mm to
atmosphere
3b. Contin.
10 mm to
secondary
container
1 10-4 y-1
5 10-7 y-1
5 10-7 y-1
5 10-7 y-1
5 10-7 y-1
1 10-4 y-1
1.2510-8y-1
5 10-8y-1
1.2510-8y-1
5 10-8y-1
1 10-4y-1
1 10-8y-1
see note
In-ground
Mounded
1b. Instant.
release to
secondary
container
1 10-8y-1
1 10-8y-1
The
Thefailure
failurefrequency
frequencyofofaamembrane
membranetank,
tank,
determined
by
the
strength
of
the
secondary
determined by the strength of the secondary
container,
container,should
shouldbe
beestimated
estimatedcase
caseby
bycase
caseusing
using
the
data
on
the
other
types
of
atmospheric
tanks
the data on the other types of atmospheric tanks
Workers
Solvent S
Temperature
Control
PB1
Solvent S
Containment
System
Workers
Bow-tie
SCENARIO
Major Events
Critical Event
Initiating events
IE
And
ME
IE
AE
IE
OR
IE
ME
AE
IE
OR
IE
AE
IE
OR
IE
And
IE
AE
IE
OR
IE
OR
CE
IE
AE
IE
Fault Tree
ME
AE
IE
Preventive
Barriers
ME
Mitigative
Barriers
ME
ME
Event Tree
Hardware
Software
Lifeware (human action, behaviour)
10-2 10-3
Fireproofing
10-2 10-3
Blast-wall or bunker
Flame or Detonation
arrestor
10-2 10-3
10-1 10-3
- International Electrotechnical
Commission, develops electric, electronic and
electrotechnical international standards
Probability of
Failure on Demand
(PFD)
10-1 10-5
1 10-1
10-1 10-2
based
1 10-1
10-1
10-1 10-2
Procedures
Qualitative=Consequence-based:
advantages and disadvantages
Analysis is (relatively) easy Selection of scenarios and
and fast
Decision process is simple
(either safe or unsafe)
Results are easy to
communicate (based on
easy-to-understand accident
scenarios)
Expensive and
cumbersome analysis,
which requires expert
knowledge
The probabilistic element
in the result is hard to
communicate
Result suggests large
accuracy, but it includes
large uncertainty
The presence of accept
criteria (hard political
decision) is necessary
beforehand
Results of QRA:
Individual Risk and Societal Risk
1.E-03
10-6
10-7
10-8
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
1.E-09
1
10
100
1000
Expected Fatalities
10000
Limited
damage
Reversible
damage
Severe
(fatalities)
Catastrophe
(off-site
fatalities)
e-3
e-4
Scenarios for
consequence
analysis
are typically in the
yellow zone
e-5
e-6
e-7
e-8
Acceptable
"ALARA", scenarios to be analysed on consequences
Unacceptable
Is there a difference?
Kirchsteiger (1999) concludes:
Risk acceptance
For societys acceptance the following factors
play a role:
Risk aversion
Cost/benefit and ALARA principle
The source of the risk: fatality risk in
apartments is a factor 150 less acceptable
than in traffic (Swedish study)
Existing risk criteria are founded on comparison
with general fatality risk (ca. 10-4 per year for
young people) and the costs, society is willing to
pay for saving a human life
Acceptance criteria
For consequence-based method:
accident states:
for what is or is not acceptable depends in
the end upon current social tolerance and
what is regarded as tolerable at one time may
well be regarded as intolerable at another.