Professional Documents
Culture Documents
James Williams v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, and W. Morgan, C.O., Attica Correctional Facility, 781 F.2d 319, 2d Cir. (1986)
James Williams v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, and W. Morgan, C.O., Attica Correctional Facility, 781 F.2d 319, 2d Cir. (1986)
James Williams v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, and W. Morgan, C.O., Attica Correctional Facility, 781 F.2d 319, 2d Cir. (1986)
2d 319
The disciplinary proceeding arose out of the alleged failure of Williams to stand
The disciplinary proceeding arose out of the alleged failure of Williams to stand
in his cell as ordered during a count of prisoners. The guards at Attica count the
prisoners twice daily. Since 1980, the inmates have been required to stand by
their bunks and turn on their cell lights while being counted. Prisoners Legal
Services of New York, Attica: A Report on Conditions 24 (1983), (reproduced
at Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1044 (2d Cir.1985) (Appendix A)).
On September 22, 1983 defendant Morgan filed an Inmate Misbehavior Report
accusing plaintiff Williams of failing to stand during the count, despite being
ordered to do so.
Seven months after the decision of the New York Supreme Court, Williams,
acting pro se, filed the present suit in the Western District of New York.
Williams' handwritten complaint alleged that defendants Morgan and Smith had
Williams requested "$5,000 for the 30 days I was held in my cell illegally as
well as $2,000 for cruel and unusual punishment."
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"Plaintiff's
response does not adequately address the facts brought out in defendants'
affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment. I also find that defendants
did not act in bad faith, were not intentionally, recklessly or wantonly indifferent,
grossly negligent, nor did they personally know, acquiesce or participate in any
deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights."
DISCUSSION
I. Qualified Immunity
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Williams argues, however, that Jones v. Smith, 120 Misc.2d 445, 466 N.Y.S.2d
175 (Sup.Ct.1983), aff'd mem., 101 A.D.2d 705, 475 N.Y.S.2d 809 (4th
Dept.1984), aff'd on other grounds, 64 N.Y.2d 1003, 489 N.Y.S.2d 50, 478
N.E.2d 191 (1985), clearly established that his conviction had to be supported
by more than Morgan's report. Even assuming arguendo that a single decision
of a state's trial court can "clearly establish" federal constitutional rights, we
disagree. The decision was rendered August 3, 1983, made available in legal
reporters only some time later, and eventually affirmed, on other grounds, in
1985. The hearing at issue in this case occurred on September 27, 1983, less
than two months after the decision was rendered by the Wyoming County
Supreme Court and while the appeal was pending. We cannot say that a
reasonable prison official should on that date have known of Jones or the law it
promulgated.
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Plaintiff also claims, however, that his complaint alleged that the defendants
violated his due process right "to call witnesses and present evidence in his
defense, 'when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.' " McCann, supra, 698 F.2d at 122
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41
L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). See also Ponte v. Real, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 2195,
85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). The prisoner's right to call witnesses was initially
recognized in 1974, Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974, and was
clearly established in 1979, McCann, supra, 698 F.2d at 124-25. Williams'
complaint, liberally construed, alleged that defendants impaired that right.
Williams noted in his complaint that the New York Supreme Court had found
his imprisonment in keep lock to have been illegal and sought damages for that
"illegal" incarceration. Defendants concede that the Supreme Court's decision
rested on the fact the Hearing Officer failed to call Williams' witness. It may
reasonably be inferred that Williams claimed that the incarceration was illegal
for the same reasons relied on by the New York Supreme Court. The district
court's conclusion that the defendants were sheltered from suit by qualified
immunity was therefore erroneous.
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Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 158 (2d Cir.1984). When, however, a party moves for
summary judgment, and documents his motion, setting forth specific facts
denying the claims, the opposing party must, "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See also S.E.C. v.
Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978). Mere conclusory
allegations or denials will not suffice, Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d
Cir.1983). However, if "the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does
not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied
even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Patrick, supra, 745 F.2d at
160 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (1963
Amend.)).
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Officer Morgan's involvement in this case does not fall within any of these
categories. He claims that his "participation in the events described in the
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