Professional Documents
Culture Documents
John Larrabee, by His Sister, and Conservator Judith Burnham Jones v. Edward Derwinski, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Veteran's Affairs of the U.S., Robert Perreault, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Veteran's Medical Center in Newington Ct, 968 F.2d 1497, 2d Cir. (1992)
John Larrabee, by His Sister, and Conservator Judith Burnham Jones v. Edward Derwinski, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Veteran's Affairs of the U.S., Robert Perreault, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Veteran's Medical Center in Newington Ct, 968 F.2d 1497, 2d Cir. (1992)
John Larrabee, by His Sister, and Conservator Judith Burnham Jones v. Edward Derwinski, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Veteran's Affairs of the U.S., Robert Perreault, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Veteran's Medical Center in Newington Ct, 968 F.2d 1497, 2d Cir. (1992)
2d 1497
claim. We now substantially affirm, holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over all of plaintiff's claims in light of 38 U.S.C.A. 511 (1991).
BACKGROUND
2
Larrabee is a forty-nine year old Army veteran of the Vietnam War. In May
1968, he was wounded in combat, sustaining serious injuries to his legs and
feet. Four years later Larrabee was discharged and was determined by the
Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") to have a 100% employment-related
disability.
Tragically, Larrabee's return to civilian life during this turbulent period was
difficult. Besides other personal problems he experienced, Larrabee abused
alcohol, necessitating several visits to the VA Hospital in Northhampton,
Massachusetts.
Larrabee's injuries, which caused memory loss and seizures, deepened his
preexisting alcohol and personality problems. Between his discharge in late
1976, and 1988, Larrabee was repeatedly admitted to the VA Hospital in
Newington, Connecticut for a variety of alcohol-related medical problems.
Finally, in June 1988, Larrabee was admitted to a general psychiatric unit at the
Newington VA Hospital, where he remains today.
Jones alleges that the VA proposed to discharge Larrabee in June 1990 without
arranging for his placement in another suitable medical facility--to dump him,
DISCUSSION
9
We pause to address two procedural matters. First, although the defendants did
not challenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over Larrabee's
procedural due process claim until this appeal was taken, this argument is
properly before us because such jurisdictional claims may be raised in federal
court at any stage of the proceeding. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104,
72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d
251, 254 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 939, 117 L.Ed.2d
110 (1992). Second, Larrabee now concedes that section 511(a) deprived the
district court of jurisdiction over his statutory claims. Accordingly, we address
only the question of jurisdiction over Larrabee's substantive and procedural due
process claims.
10
11
(a) The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a
decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by
the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans. Subject to
[exceptions set forth in] subsection (b), the decision of the Secretary as to any
such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any
13
All parties agree that none of the exceptions in section 511(b) give the district
court jurisdiction in this case. The crucial inquiry, consequently, is whether
plaintiff's complaint challenges "a decision by the Secretary under a law that
affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans...." Id. We
conclude that it does. We do not make this judgment in a vacuum, however,
because this statute has a long and rich history.
14
Since Congress first legislated in the area of veterans' benefits over fifty years
ago, it has consistently precluded judicial review of veterans' benefits
determinations. See Note, Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of
the Veterans' Administration: Does 38 U.S.C. 211(a) Preclude Review?, 55
Fordham L.Rev. 579, 594 (1987), cited with approval in H.R.Rep. No. 963,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782;
see, e.g., World War Veterans' Act, ch. 320, 5, 43 Stat. 607, 608, 609 (1924)
(current version at 38 U.S.C.A. 511(a) (1991)); Economy Act of 1933, ch. 3,
5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (current version at 38 U.S.C.A. 511(a) (1991)); Act of
October 17, 1940, ch. 893, 11, 54 Stat. 1193, 1197 (current version at 38
U.S.C.A. 511(a) (1991)). Section 211(a)1 of the Veterans' Benefits Act of
1957, Pub.L. No. 85-56, 71 Stat. 83, 92 (current version at 38 U.S.C.A.
511(a) (1991)), which consolidated and simplified veterans' benefits law,
prohibited review of "any question of law or fact concerning a claim for
benefits or payments." Id.; see also Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-857,
211(a), 72 Stat. 1105, 1115 (same) (current version at 38 U.S.C.A. 511(a)
(1991)).
15
16 decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law
the
administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
17
18
In 1974, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to review the 1970
amendments, and it held that section 211(a) insulated from judicial review
decisions "made by the Administrator in the interpretation or application of a
particular provision of the statute to a particular set of facts." Johnson, 415 U.S.
at 367, 94 S.Ct. at 1166 (emphasis added). It did not bar review of the very
statute itself. Accordingly, under Johnson, facial challenges to the veterans'
benefits statutes could be brought in district court pursuant to its federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331. See Johnson, 415 U.S. at 367, 94 S.Ct.
at 1165-66.
19
20
1380, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988) ("the question whether a [VA] regulation violates
the Rehabilitation Act is not foreclosed from judicial review by 211(a)").
Concerned that "the Court's opinion in Traynor would inevitably lead to
increased involvement of the judiciary in technical VA decision-making",
H.R.Rep. No. 963, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5803, Congress overhauled section 211 in the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act ("VJRA"), Pub.L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
See generally Note, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial
Review ... Slowly!, 67 Wash.U.L.Q. 889, 895-96, 904-12 (1989). The VJRA
provides, for the first time, judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations
in the Federal Circuit; at the same time it broadens section 211's preclusion of
judicial review by other courts. See H.R.Rep. No. 963, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5809.
21
22
(d)(1) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant
questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.
The court shall hold unlawful and set aside any regulation or any interpretation
thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied upon
in the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals that the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit finds to be--
23
24
25
26
27
(2) Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter presents a
constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a
factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the
facts of a particular case.
28
Id.
29
We agree (with the only other Circuit to consider this statutory scheme) that "
[t]hese provisions amply evince Congress's intent to include all issues, even
constitutional ones, necessary to a decision which affects benefits in this
exclusive appellate review scheme." Hicks v. Veterans Admin., 961 F.2d 1367,
1370 (8th Cir.1992); see also H.R.Rep. No. 963, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5809; Note, supra, 67
Wash.U.L.Q. at 910-11. Although district courts continue to have "jurisdiction
to hear facial challenges of legislation affecting veterans' benefits," Disabled
Am. Veterans v. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 962 F.2d 136, 140 (2d
Cir.1992) (emphasis added), other constitutional and statutory claims must be
pursued within the appellate mill Congress established in the VJRA. The
district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Larrabee's claims that
the defendants violated his due process rights in this case.
CONCLUSION
30
Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the judgment of the district court that
dismissed Larrabee's statutory and substantive due process claims. We vacate
that portion of the judgment that awarded defendants summary judgment on
plaintiff's procedural due process claim and remand with instructions to
dismiss.