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United States v. Albert Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 2d Cir. (1992)
United States v. Albert Hudson, 972 F.2d 504, 2d Cir. (1992)
2d 504
Peter Norling, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y. (Andrew J. Maloney, U.S. Atty.,
Edward Mechmann, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., of counsel), for appellant.
David A. Lewis, New York City (The Legal Aid Soc., of counsel), for
defendant-appellee.
Before: PRATT and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges, and KELLEHER,
District Judge.*
ALTIMARI, Circuit Judge:
On appeal, Hudson's sole contention is that the four level enhancement to his
base offense level, because he "otherwise used" a dangerous weapon, was
impermissible double counting, since the use of the dangerous weapon had
already resulted in an increase in the base offense level by making the crime an
aggravated assault. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand for
resentencing.
BACKGROUND
3
In addition to raising the base offense level by making the crime an aggravated
assault, Hudson's use of the car also caused the PSR to recommend a further
four-level increase to level 19, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A2.2(b)(2), because
Hudson had "otherwise used" a dangerous weapon in commission of the
offense. "Otherwise used" is defined as conduct that "did not amount to the
discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing
a firearm or other dangerous weapon." See U.S.S.G. 1B1.1, comment. (1.g.).
The PSR also recommended that Hudson be credited with the standard twolevel reduction for "Acceptance of Responsibility", pursuant to U.S.S.G.
3E1.1, resulting in a total offense level of 17. Because Hudson had only one
prior conviction, for petit larceny, his criminal history category was determined
to be Category I. This produced a Guidelines range of 24-30 months.
6
At sentencing, the district court rejected Hudson's argument and accepted the
Guidelines range of 24 to 30 months computed by the Probation Department.
According to the district court, Hudson's conduct constituted aggravated assault
because "the reasonable inference is that this defendant intended to harm the
marshals." Hudson was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 months, to
be followed by three years' supervised release.
DISCUSSION
9
On appeal, Hudson argues that the addition of four levels to his base offense
level because he "otherwise used" a dangerous weapon was impermissible
double counting. Specifically, Hudson contends that since the use of the
dangerous weapon had already resulted in an increase in the base offense level
by making the crime an aggravated assault, it was unfair to penalize him again
for use of a weapon by upwardly adjusting his offense level.
10
Hudson did not raise the present objection to his sentence before the district
court. Consequently, a threshold issue is whether he has waived his "double
counting" argument. The issue raised by Hudson on appeal is a difficult
question that has only been addressed by one recent case in the Fourth Circuit.
See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir.1992) (Wilkinson, J.).
Consequently, we believe that Hudson has raised a novel issue that should be
addressed on its merits. See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183,
1203 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3029, 120 L.Ed.2d 900
(1992). Because the issue on appeal involves a purely legal interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, our review is de novo. See, e.g., United States v.
Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Irabor, 894 F.2d 554,
555 (2d Cir.1990).
Hudson argues that his use of an automobile as a dangerous weapon is
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13
The facts in Williams, where the Fourth Circuit rejected the same argument that
Hudson is making here, are essentially indistinguishable from the present case.
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault with a chair,
which, like an automobile, is not an inherently dangerous weapon. 954 F.2d at
205. In rejecting Williams' contention that the four-level upward adjustment for
use of a dangerous weapon constituted impermissible double counting, the
Fourth Circuit held that the dangerous weapon adjustment "rationally reflects
the Guideline's graduated adjustment scheme." Id. at 206. However, the
Williams court did not distinguish between assaults involving inherently
dangerous weapons, and those involving ordinary objects which only become
dangerous weapons when used. Rather, the court in Williams, reasoning by
analogy, concluded that because U.S.S.G. 2A2.2 is appropriate in the usual
circumstance, it is appropriate under all circumstances. 954 F.2d at 206-207.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the defendant's argument in Williams
was driven by its conclusion that double counting is always permissible, except
when explicitly forbidden by the Guidelines. Id. at 207-208. That is not the law
in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 23-26 (2d
Cir.1992); United States v. Olvera, 954 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3011, 120 L.Ed.2d 885 (1992). Therefore, we choose not to
follow Williams.
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CONCLUSION
16
Based on the foregoing, we vacate and remand this case for further sentencing
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Honorable Robert J. Kelleher, Senior Judge of the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation