Week 4: Code of Professional Responsibility

RONQUILLO, ET. AL. vs. CEZAR, AC No. 6288

(2006)
(Grossly Immoral Conduct)
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension
of respondent from the practice of law for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a
piece of property over which he has no right nor
interest, and that he refuses to return to them the
amount they have paid him for it.
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen
currently residing in Cannes, France, together
with her minor children, Alexander and Jon
Alexander.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent
entered into a Deed of Assignment.[1] For the
price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of
the complainants, his rights and interests over a
townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood
Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent
also obligated himself to deliver to complainants
a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with
Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April
19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase
price, respondent further undertook to have
Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property in favor of the complainants.
Respondent
received
from
complainants
P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of
Assignment. The balance was to be paid by
complainants in four equal quarterly installments
of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued
in favor of respondent four postdated checks in
the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent
was able to encash the first check dated August
17, 1999.[2]
Complainants subsequently received information
from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in
full the price of the townhouse at the time he
executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent
also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of
the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with
Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili
Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on
the second check she issued to respondent in the
amount of P187,500.00.
On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their
counsel, wrote respondent, informing him that
they were still willing to pay the balance of the

purchase price of the townhouse on the condition

that respondent work on Crown Asias execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the
alternative, complainants demanded the return of
the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest,
within ten days.[3] The amount of P937,500.00
represents the P750,000.00 down payment and
the first quarterly installment of P187,500.00
which complainants paid respondent.
In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to
complainants,[4] respondent claimed that he was
working now on a private project which hopefully
will be realized not long from now, and requested
for a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000
within which to either completely pay Crown Asia
or return the money at your (complainants)
option. The period lapsed but respondent did not
make good his promise to pay Crown Asia in full,
or return the amount paid by complainants.
On February 21, 2002, complainants counsel sent
respondent a second letter[5] demanding the
return of the amount of P937,500.00, including
legal interest, for failing to comply with his
promise. The demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint[6] that
respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral
or
deceitful
conduct.
Allegedly,
respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and he ought to be disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law.
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
(IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan,
to whom the instant disciplinary case was
assigned
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation, found respondent guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9,
2003, she recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors,
through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated
October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation
of Commissioner San Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney

for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1

of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Conduct, as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties. This Court has made clear in
a long line of cases[7] that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted
in his private capacity when he entered into a
contract with complainant Marili representing to
have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he
failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of
his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid
that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer
property over which one has no legal right of
ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
concealed this lack of right from complainants.
He did not inform the complainants that he has
not yet paid in full the price of the subject
townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no
right to sell, transfer or assign said property at
the time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the
purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred
Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not
entitled to it, made matters worse for him.
Respondents adamant refusal to return to
complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid
him, which was the fruit of her labor as an
Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is
morally
reprehensible.
By his
actuations,
respondent failed to live up to the strict standard
of morality required by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an
officer of the court.
Respondents culpability is therefore clear. He
received a letter from complainants counsel
demanding the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the
alternative, the return of the money paid by
complainants. In reply to said letter, respondent
acknowledged his obligation, and promised to
settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:
xxx

I am working now on a private project which

hopefully will be realized not long from now but I
need a little time to fix some things over. May I
please request for a period of 20 days from May
15, 2000 within which to either completely pay
Crown Asia or return the money at your option.
(Emphasis supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not

having full ownership over the subject townhouse
unit and lot, as he has yet to completely pay
Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce
the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with
Crown Asia over the subject unit, which would
show the extent of his right of ownership, if any,
over the townhouse unit and lot in question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent
sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only
after almost two years had passed, after
respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return
to complainants the amount they paid him, that
complainants sent respondent a second letter[8]
demanding solely the return of the amount of
P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this
time, it was indubitable that respondent would
not be able to perform his end of their
agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It
is granted only to those of good moral character.
[9] The Bar must maintain a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing.[10] Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the
public at large,[11] and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.[12]
Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants
prayer that respondent be directed to return the
money he received from them in the amount of
P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the court into the
conduct of one of its officers. The only question
for determination in these proceedings is whether
or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. [13] Thus, this
Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the
complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T.
Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of THREE (3) YEARS, effective
immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts

for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
BARRIENTOS vs. LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC No.
6408 (2004)
(Non-Payment of Debt)
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment
filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for
deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C.
Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra
only. It states that: sometime in September of
2000, respondent issued several Equitable
PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia,
amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia,
totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a preexisting debt; the checks bounced due to
insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P.
22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text
messages to complainants asking for the
deferment of the criminal charges with the
promise that she will pay her debt; respondent
however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16,
2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried
to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in
exchange for the bounced checks which were in
the possession of complainants; the title covered
an area of 5,000 square meters located at
Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered
in the name of Victoria Villamar which was
allegedly paid to respondent by a client;
complainants
checked
the
property
and
discovered that the land belonged to a certain
Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria
Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to
respondent pursuant to a transaction with the
Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch
with respondent over the phone but the latter
was always unavailable, thus the present
complaint.1
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2
of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she
issued
several
Equitable
PCIBank
checks
amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but
not to Isidra; said checks were issued in payment
of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had
already been paid and replaced with new checks;
Isidra signed a document attesting to the fact

that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer

exists;3 she also issued in favor of Olivia several
Equitable
PCIBank
checks
amounting
to
P67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing
obligation; the checks which were the subject of
the complaint filed at the City Prosecutors Office
in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession
of respondent and the criminal case filed by
complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already dismissed;
the Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S.
Nos. 01-14090-034 were never filed in court;
Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance;
respondent did not send text messages to Isidra
and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal
complaints neither did she present any title in
exchange for her bounced checks; she never
transacted with Isidra since all dealings were
made with Olivia; and the present complaint was
initiated by Isidra only because she had a
misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to
extract money from respondent.5
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by
Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the
Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed
as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines was brought
about by some misunderstanding and error in the
accounting of the records of the account of Atty.
Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty.
Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-complainant
Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from
me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the
corresponding checks were given to Isidra
Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as cocomplainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms.
Isidra Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro
but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the
complaint was brought about by a case of some
mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had
already signed an affidavit of desistance and
submitted the same before the Municipal Trial
Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere
Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP
22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;

7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to

1361 the case was not filed in court and I have
also executed an affidavit of desistance for said
complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to
the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I
have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L.
Meteoro.6
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice
of Hearing requiring both parties to appear before
it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both
parties appeared and agreed to settle their
misunderstanding.7
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that
the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent
acknowledged
as
her
indebtedness
to
complainant will be settled on a staggered basis.
Another hearing was then set for February 5,
2002. Respondent failed to appear in said hearing
despite due notice. It was then reset to February
28, 2002 with the order that should respondent
fail to appear, the case shall already be
submitted for resolution.8
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings.
However, this time, it was complainant who was
unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002,
respondent was absent and was warned again
that should she fail to appear in the next hearing,
the Commissioner shall resolve the case. On said
date, respondent did not appear despite due
notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the
Commission a motion for reconsideration of the
July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days
before the scheduled hearing; she had already
paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in
March of 2002, respondents father was admitted
to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to
settle her remaining balance as planned; and
because of said emergency, respondent was not
able to fully settle the balance of her debt up to
this date. Respondent prayed that she be given
another 60 days from August 1,2002 to finally
settle her debt with complainant.10
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order
granting respondents motion and setting aside
the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while
respondent claims that she already paid
complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the
receipts she submitted evidencing payment
amount only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was
then set for May 28, 2003 at which time
respondent was directed to present proof of her

payments to the complainant. The hearing was

however reset several times until August 20,
2003 at which time, only complainant appeared.
Respondent sent somebody to ask for a
postponement which the commission denied. The
commission gave respondent a last opportunity
to settle her accounts with complainant. The
hearing was set for October 7, 2003 which the
commission said was "intransferrable."12
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared.
The commission noted that respondent was duly
notified and even personally received the notice
for that days hearing. The case was thereafter
submitted for resolution.13
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his
report pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty.
Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
violation
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility. This Office holds that she has.
More particularly, the respondent, by initially and
vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein
complainant and then subsequently admitting
liability by proposing a staggered settlement has
displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has
shown herself to possess poor moral characters.
In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the
reopening of this case, the respondent made a
false assertion that she had settled up to
P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the receipts
she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is
more disconcerting is that while she is aware and
duly notified of the settings of this Office
respondent has seemingly ignored the same
deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not
offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has
she controverted the complainants charge that
she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer
certificate of title (TCT) which had been entrusted
by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a
transaction which the former had with the
Quedancor where respondent was formerly
employed. Based on all the foregoing findings
and the deliberate failure of the respondent to
come forward and settle her accountabilities,
inspite of several warnings given her by the
undersigned, and her failure to attend the
scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office
is convinced that Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro
has committed a glaring violation not only of her
oath as a lawyer but also the dictates of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member
of the Bar must constantly be of good moral
character and unsullied honesty.14
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A.
Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice

of law for two years and meted a fine of twenty

thousand pesos.15

practice of law for six (6) months and Restitution

of P84,000.00 to complainant.17

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another

motion for reconsideration stating that: she was
not able to receive the notice for the October 7
hearing because she was in Bicol attending to
pressing personal problems; she only arrived from
the province on October 25, 2003 and it was only
then that she got hold of the Order dated October
7; from the very beginning, respondent never
intended to ignore the Commissions hearings; as
much as she wanted to pay complainant in full,
the financial crisis which hit her family since 2001
has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that
day, the expenses incurred by respondent due to
the hospitalization of her father has not been paid
in full by her family; the family home of
respondent in Cabanatuan has already been
foreclosed by the bank; respondents husband
has been confined recently due to thyroid
problems and respondent herself had sought
medical help on several occasions due to her
inability to conceive despite being married for
more than five years; if not for said reasons,
respondent could have already paid the
complainant despite respondents knowledge that
the amount complainant wanted to collect from
her is merely the interest of her debt since she
already returned most of the pieces of jewelry
she purchased and she already paid for those
that she was not able to return. Respondent prays
that the resolution of the case be deferred and
that she be given another 90 days from said date
or until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever
balance remains after proper accounting and
presentation of receipts.16

We agree with the findings and recommendation

of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of
respondent offering a transfer certificate of title
to complainants in exchange for the bounced
checks that were in their possession.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of

the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs. Atty. Elerizza A. LibiranMeteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, with modification, and considering
respondents glaring violation not only of her oath
as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A.
Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just

debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not
only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured.19 They must at all
times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations.
They must conduct themselves in a manner that
reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially
tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra
Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD,
however, respondent eventually acknowledged
her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of
P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a
staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her
financial obligation runs counter to the precepts
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above
quoted, and violates the lawyers oath which
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice.21
After respondent acknowledged her debt to
complainant, she committed herself to the
payment thereof. Yet she failed many times to
fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of
the hearings and merely submitted a motion for
reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBPCBD Commissioner had already submitted the
case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick
days before the hearing and asked for sixty days
to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to
fulfill her promise and did not appear before the
Commission in the succeeding hearings despite

due notice. After the case was submitted anew

for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent
filed another motion for reconsideration, this time
saying that she was in the province attending to
personal matters. Again she asked for another
ninety days to settle her entire debt. This
repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise
puts in question her integrity and moral
character. Her failure to attend most of the
hearings called by the commission and her
belated pleas for reconsideration also manifest
her propensity to delay the resolution of the case
and to make full use of the mechanisms of
administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several
checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the
prosecutors office in Cabanatuan City. Her only
excuse is that she was able to replace said
checks and make arrangements for the payment
of her debt, which led to the dismissal of the
criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence.22 The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public
interest and public order.23 It also manifests a
lawyers low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of
the profession she should hold in high esteem.24
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer,
regardless of whether or not the same were
issued in his professional capacity to a client,
calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we
explained in Co vs. Bernardino:25
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for
misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity. Where, however, the misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing him from
the office of attorney.
The
evidence
on
record
clearly
shows
respondents propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related

to his professional duties as a member of the bar,

puts his moral character in serious doubt26
(Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized
in March 2002 and that she and her husband also
had to seek medical help which greatly affected
her ability to pay. She however did not present
any proof to substantiate such claims. She also
did not appear personally before the complainant
and the commission, in spite of the many
opportunities given her, to make arrangements
for the payment of her debt considering the
circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she
waited until the case was submitted for resolution
to allege such facts, without presenting any proof
therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since
respondent has not offered any explanation for,
nor has she controverted the complainants
charge that she tried to negotiate with them a
transfer certificate of title that had been
entrusted to her by a client, she should be held
liable therefor. Basic is the principle that if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of
proving her cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which she
bases her claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove her exception or defense.27
Simply put, the burden is not on the respondent
to prove her innocence but on the complainants
to prove her guilt. In this case, complainants
submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of
Victoria Villamar together with their lettercomplaint, which according to complainants was
the title respondent tried, through her sister-inlaw, to negotiate with them in exchange for the
bounced checks in their possession.28 No other
evidence or sworn statement was submitted in
support of such allegation. Respondent in her
answer,
meanwhile,
denied
having
any
knowledge regarding such matter and no further
discussion was made on the matter, not even in
the hearings before the commission.29 For this
reason, we hold that respondent should not be
held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to
complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but
only for the non-payment of debts and the
issuance of worthless checks which were
sufficiently proved and which respondent herself
admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege and demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.30
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted
by respondents misconduct. The IBP Board of

Governors recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for six
months. In Lao vs. Medel,31 which also involved
non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless
checks, the Court held that suspension from the
practice of law for one year was appropriate.
Unlike in the Lao case however, respondent is this
case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by
receipts amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem
that six months suspension from the practice of
law and the restitution of P84,000.00 to
complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient
in this case.

would be paying the monthly rental during the

extension period. Complainant approved such
request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00
per month for the period beginning 1 October
1999 until 30 June 2000.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is

found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of
law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision,
and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra
Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance
of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from
date of finality of herein decision.

Sometime in October 2000, a report reached

complainants office that respondent had secretly
vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with
her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed
complainants repeated written demands for
payment of her obligations despite due receipt of
the same, compelling complainant to file the
present Complaint.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the

record of respondent and served on the IBP as
well as the court administrator who shall circulate
herein Resolution to all courts for their
information and guidance.

In her Answer,[4] respondent alleged that she

had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had
not vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously.
She also averred that she transferred to another
place because she was given notice by the
complainant to vacate the premises to give way
for the repair and renovation of the same, but
which
never
happened
until
presently.
Respondent actually wanted to ask that
complainant to account for her deposit for the
apartment unit, but she could not do so since she
did not know complainants address or contact
number. For the same reason, she could not turn
over to the complainant the door keys to the
vacated apartment unit.

SO ORDERED.
CHAM vs. PAITA-MOYA, AC No. 7494 (2008)
(Non-Payment of Debt)
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Complaint[1] for disbarment filed
by complainant Wilson Cham against respondent
Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed
deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and,
thereafter, vacating the same without paying the
rentals due.
According to the Complaint, on 1 October 1998,
respondent entered into a Contract of Lease[2]
with Greenville Realty and Development Corp.
(GRDC), represented by complainant as its
President and General Manager, involving a
residential apartment unit owned by GRDC
located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon
City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per month
for a term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract,
respondent informed the complainant that she
would no longer renew the same but requested
an extension of her stay at the apartment unit
until 30 June 2000 with a commitment that she

Respondent stayed at the leased premises up to

October 2000 without paying her rentals from July
to October 2000. She also failed to settle her
electric bills for the months of September and
October 2000. The Statement of Account as of 15
October 2004[3] shows that respondents total
accountability is P71,007.88.

After the mandatory preliminary conference

conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, the
parties were given time to submit their respective
Position Papers per Order[5] dated 17 February
2006. On 29 March 2006, complainant filed his
Position Paper.[6] Respondent, despite the
extension given, did not file hers. Hence, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
On
8
September
2006,
Investigating
Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his
Report and Recommendation,[7] recommending
the imposition of the penalty of three-month
suspension on respondent for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that
herein respondent be held guilty of having
violated the aforequoted provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and imposed upon her

the penalty of three (3) months suspension from

the practice of law.

unliquidated damage, shall be deemed admitted

when not specifically denied.

The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed

Resolution No. XVII-2006-585[8] dated 15
December 2006, amending the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and approving
the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:

Moreover, a settled rule of evidence is that the

one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where it is the plaintiff
(complainant herein) who alleges non-payment,
the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant (respondent herein) to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.
The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged
by payment.[11]

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED,

the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
We do not agree with the foregoing Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint should
not be dismissed and respondent must face the
consequences of her actions.
It is undisputed that by virtue of a lease contract
she executed with GRDC, respondent was able to
occupy the apartment unit for a period of one
year, from 1 October 1998 to 30 September
1999, paying a monthly rental of P8,000.00. Upon
the expiration of the lease contract[9] on 30
September 1999, the same was renewed, but on
a month-to-month basis at an increased rental
rate of P8,650.00. Under such an arrangement,
respondent was able to stay at the leased
premises until October 2000, undoubtedly
incurring electric bills during the said period.
A review of the records would reveal that
respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to
pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully
substantiate that respondent has existing
obligations that she failed to settle.
Annex D[10] of the Complaint is a letter dated 11
September 2000 signed by complainant and
addressed to respondent demanding that she
settle her unpaid rentals for the period of three
months, particularly, from 1 July to 30 September
2000. The letter appears to have been received
by one Purificacion D. Flores. Annex H of the
same Complaint is another letter dated 30 August
2004 by complainant reiterating his earlier
demand for respondent to settle her unpaid
rentals, as well as her unpaid Meralco bills. This
second letter of demand was sent through
registered mail and received by one Nonie
Catindig. Respondent did not expressly deny
receipt of both letters of demand in her Answer to
the Complaint. Having failed to rebut the
foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to
have admitted them. Section 11, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied
deemed admitted. Material averment in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount of

Apropos is another well-settled rule in our

jurisprudence that a receipt of payment is the
best evidence of the fact of payment.[12] In
Monfort v. Aguinaldo,[13] the receipts of
payment, although not exclusive, were deemed
to be the best evidence. A receipt is a written
and signed acknowledgment that money or goods
have been delivered. In the instant case, the
respondent failed to discharge the burden of
proving payment, for she was unable to produce
receipts or any other proof of payment of the
rentals due for the period of 1 July to 20
September 2000.
It is thus evident to this Court that respondent
willfully failed to pay her just debts. Her unpaid
rentals and electric bills constitute just debts,
which could be any of the following: (1) claims
adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by
the debtor.[14]
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the
moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them
when they became due. Respondent should have
complied with just contractual obligations, and
acted fairly and adhered to high ethical standards
to preserve the courts integrity, since she is an
employee thereof.
Indeed, when respondent
backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such
act
already
constituted
a
ground
for
administrative sanction.
Respondent left the apartment unit without
settling her unpaid obligations, and without the
complainants
knowledge
and
consent.
Respondents abandonment of the leased
premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and
electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct
violative
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01
thereof, which explicitly state:
CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents defense that she does not know
where to find the complainant or his office is
specious and does not inspire belief considering
that she had been occupying the apartment unit
and paying the rents due (except for the period
complained of) for almost two years. How she
could have dealt with complainant and GRDC for
two years without at all knowing their office
address and contact numbers totally escapes this
Court. This is only a desperate attempt to justify
what is clearly an unjustifiable act.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they
are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[15] In so
doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial and legal system is ensured.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. As part of those duties, they
must promptly pay their financial obligations.
Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for
any
professional
or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the
Court.[16]
The Court stresses that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege.[17] It demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.
[18] In this case, respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of her as a guardian
of law and justice.[19]
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her
professional or private capacity is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an
essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege.[20] The Court has held that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct,[21] for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one years suspension from the
practice of law,[22] or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation.[23]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted

by respondents gross misconduct. The case at
bar merely involves the respondents deliberate
failure to pay her just debts, without her issuing a
worthless check, which would have been a more
serious offense. The Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP recommended that she be suspended
from the practice of law for three months, a
penalty which this Court finds sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty
of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED
for one month from the practice of law, effective
upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the
record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
well as on the court administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ALEJANDRO vs. ALEJANDRO, AC No. 4256
(2004)
(Bigamy and Concubinage)
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by
Jovita
Bustamante-Alejandro
charging
respondents Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and
Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and
concubinage.
Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty.
Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that
they were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia,
Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract;
[1] that she bore him three (3) sons, namely,
Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971, 1973, and
1978, respectively, as evidenced by their
respective Certificates of Live Birth;[2] that
respondent abandoned her and their children in
1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty.
Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin,[3] at 27-C Masbate
St., Quezon City; that respondents have since
then been publicly representing themselves as
husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin
gave birth to Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January
17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and
scandalous
relationship
with
complainants
husband whom she named as the father of her
son in the latters Certificate of Live Birth;[4] and,
that in said Certificate of Live Birth, respondent
Atty. Villarin identified herself as Ma. Cristina V.
Alejandro having been married to Atty. Alejandro
on May 1, 1990 at Isabela Province. Complainant

alleged that she filed this administrative

complaint when she learned that her husband
has been nominated as a regional trial court
judge. She insists that he is not fit to be a judge
considering that he, and co-respondent Atty.
Villarin, do not even possess the basic integrity to
remain as members of the Philippine Bar.
We required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint in our Resolution dated
July 4, 1994. When copies of our resolution and of
the complaint and its annexes addressed to
respondent Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St.,
Quezon City were returned unserved with
notation moved, we required complainant to
submit the correct and present address of her
husband.[5] No similar return of service with
respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on the
record.
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated
December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that her
husbands correct address remains to be 27-C
Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him who
told the postman that he had already moved;
and, that any subsequent service by mail will
result in the same failure as respondent will
either refuse service or misrepresent a change of
address again. Complainant therefore asked that
copies of the complaint and Court resolution
requiring comment be served personally upon her
husband by the Courts process servers. We noted
and granted the prayer.[6] However, when the
Courts process server attempted to effect
personal service on February 16, 1995,
respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of
the house and his house helper refused to accept
service. Consequently we considered the copies
as having been served upon respondent Atty.
Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,[7]
and required him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt
for his continued failure to file comment, and to
file such comment, considering the considerable
length of time that has lapsed since he has been
first required to do so. Respondent Atty. Alejandro
failed to comply. Hence, we fined him P1,000.00
and directed that he file the required explanation
and comment on the administrative complaint.[8]
When copies of both resolutions were again
returned unserved with postal notations moved,
we required complainant anew to submit the
correct and present address of respondents,
within ten (10) days from notice, under pain of
dismissal of her administrative complaint.[9] In a
handwritten letter dated September 10, 1998,
complainant disclosed respondents present
address as 12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas.
[10]

We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation, within ninety (90) days from
notice, in our Resolution of March 17, 2003.
In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended
that both respondents be disbarred on the
following rationalization:
In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme
Court (Second Division) ruled that respondent
Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a copy of the
instant administrative complaint and of the
Courts Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by
substituted service pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6
of the Rules of Court.
In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court
dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty. Alejandro
and Atty. Villarin were directed to file their
Comment on the instant Complaint within ten
(10) days from notice of said Resolution. To date,
no Comment has been filed by either respondent
Atty. Alejandro or Atty. Villarin. x x x
Complainant submitted a photocopy of the
Marriage Contract (Annex A of the lettercomplaint) between herself and respondent Atty.
Alejandro
executed
on
3
March
1971.
Complainant also submitted photocopies of the
Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the lettercomplaint) of the children born out of her
marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro. These
documentary evidence submitted by complainant
clearly show that there was and is a valid and
subsisting
marriage
between herself and
respondent Atty. Alejandro at the time she filed
the instant administrative complaint against said
respondent, her husband.
In support of her charge of bigamy and
concubinage against respondents Alejandro and
Villarin, complainant submitted a photocopy of
the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the lettercomplaint) of one Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The
said Birth Certificates states that the mother of
said Paolo Villarin Alejandro is Ma. Cristina Arrieta
Villarin, while his father is one Warfredo Tomas
Alejandro. Said Birth Certificate also states that
the parents of Paolo Villarin Alejandro were
married on May 1, 1990 in Isabela Province.
Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin
Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and
considering the failure of respondents Atty.
Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges of
complainant, it is submitted that there is
sufficient evidence on record which establishes
the
immoral/illicit
relationship
between
respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin.

However, there is no evidence on record which

would establish beyond doubt that respondent
Atty. Alejandro indeed contracted a second
marriage with Atty. Villarin while his marriage to
herein complainant was subsisting. Thus, it is
recommended that as prayed for by complainant,
respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin be
disbarred for willful violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

We
have
already
held
that
disbarment
proceedings is warranted against a lawyer who
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman[15] who had
borne him a child.[16] We can do no less in the
instant case where respondent Atty. Alejandro
made himself unavailable to this Court and even
fled to another country to escape the
consequences of his misconduct.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted

and
approved
the
above
report
and
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003169 dated September 27, 2003.

The same penalty however cannot be imposed on

respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that our
Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment
on the administrative complaint was never
deemed served upon her, in the same way that it
was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it does not
appear that copies of the administrative
complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution
requiring comment were even sent to her.
Although sent at the address she allegedly shared
with co-respondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope
bearing the copies was addressed to the latter
only.[17] That was why when both service by
registered mail and personal service failed, the
copies were deemed served solely upon Atty.
Alejandro.[18]

We agree with the IBP recommendation with

respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.
Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Thus we have in a number of cases[11]
disciplined members of the Bar whom we found
guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack
of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission
to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another.[12] He
is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply
and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can
hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional
honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in
other relations.[13] The administration of justice,
in which the lawyer plays an important role being
an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in him.[14]
In the instant case, sufficient evidence was
presented to show that respondent Atty.
Alejandro, while being lawfully married to
complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with
another woman, co-respondent Atty. Villarin.
Although the evidence presented was not
sufficient to prove that he contracted a
subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact
remains that respondent Atty. Alejandro exhibited
by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar.

The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of

the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive for
her to file answer. It is noted however that the
same was sent to respondents old address at 27C Masbate St., Quezon City, not 12403 Dunlop
Drive, Houston, Texas, which was respondents
new address on record supplied by the
complainant. The return of service therefore
showed the postal notation moved. Considering
the
serious
consequences
of
disbarment
proceedings, full opportunity upon reasonable
notice must have been given respondent to
answer the charge and present evidence in her
behalf. It is only in clear cases of waiver that an
administrative case be resolved sans respondents
answer.
WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent
Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is DISBARRED
from the practice of law, to take effect
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Let
copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.
Alejandros personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris
A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
GUEVARRA vs. EALA, AC No. 7136 (2007)

(Adulterous Relationship)

My everdearest Irene,

DECISION

By the time you open this, youll be moments

away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
youre about to do.

Per Curiam:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4,
2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following
account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who
was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled
Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three
children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,
complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at
Megamall.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only

for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness
with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make
your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you
from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments of
your single life. But more importantly, I will love
you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I
have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my
heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually

went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did
not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was
busy with her work.

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

In February or March 2001, complainant saw

Irene and respondent together on two occasions.
On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.

Eternally yours,

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to

Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom,
a folded social card bearing the words I Love You
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day
of his wedding to Irene, reading:

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL

ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS.
AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]

NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that
of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th
Street, New Manila where, as he was to later
learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a concert, she
was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having
sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the abovequoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING
THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance,

in or about the third week of September 2001,

the couple attended the launch of the Wine All
You Can promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong
City. Their attendance was reported in Section B
of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A
photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.
[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their
adulterous relationship supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4.
Respondent specifically denies having
ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that
their relationship was low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as the
general public was concerned, was still known to
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the
complainants wife and his apparent abandoning
or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his
writing the love letter to complainants bride on
the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue
his love for her until we are together again, as
now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the
bar, the reason being that Respondents
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship
with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial
and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in
public, even if Mary Anne is aware of
Respondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted

his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of
paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the
marriage
contract.[7]
(Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the
COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support
the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable
social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs
afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
obsessively his illicit love for the complainants
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage,
betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainants marriage, commits adultery with his
wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations
in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely personal
and low profile special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would
be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a
REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl
and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of
Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant
attached to the Reply, as Annex A, a copy of a
Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes
signature and naming respondent as the father of
her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who
was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes
Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH
MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003
from respondent in which he denied having
personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached
to
the
complainants
Reply.[15]
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due

to the pendency of a civil case filed by

complainant for the annulment of his marriage to
Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant

before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD,

complainants Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to
Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.[16] Respondents counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.[17]

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in

setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the
case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as
its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

After
investigation,
IBP-CBD
Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven.

Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the

present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As
the
IBP-CBD
Investigating
Commissioner
observed:

The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that

respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
reading:

While it may be true that the love letter dated

October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even
taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainants wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which support
the
accusation
of
complainant
against
respondent.

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest,
immoral
or
deceitful
conduct
(Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code
reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled
and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by
Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly
reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20]
(Italics and emphasis in the original)

The petition is impressed with merit.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17

October 2002, respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit: Respondent
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being [that] their relationship was low
profile and known only to immediate members of
their respective families . . . , and Respondent
specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are
an admission that there is indeed a special
relationship between him and complainants wife,
Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje
(Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was
indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child
Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainants
wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the

child. It should be underscored that respondent

has not categorically denied that he is the father
of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents Answer, he does not
deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of
the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any
married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband and by the man who
has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be
married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative
pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form
of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations
omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of
having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live
Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent
a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And
the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the
desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows
that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the
Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent
never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St.
Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness
stand, declared that Irene gave the information in
the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38
years old and a lawyer.[31]

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship

between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly
preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by
one party which is more conclusive and credible
than that of the other party and, therefore, has
greater weight than the other[32] which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative
case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant
evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment
does not lie because his relationship with Irene
was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney
is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or
court or disciplinary agency
evidence of the ground
suspension
(Emphasis
supplied),

order of the foreign

shall be prima facie
for disbarment or
and
underscoring

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the

grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under
scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse
under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall
keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife,
or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a
married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman
not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as grossly immoral
conduct
depends
on
the
surrounding
circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
Apropos
is
the
following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:
[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not
deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which
act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that
the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty.
Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of

whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case substantiate
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit
affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath
he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in
the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of
Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive
Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the

pendency of the investigation of the case before
the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41]
on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainants
petition
for
nullity
of
his
(complainants) marriage to Irene had been
granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of
facts alleged in the instant case, which was
pending review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on
motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January
16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed
before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular
No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied
by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and
Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place
before the marriage was declared null and void.
[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extramarital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant
was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for
review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his
December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003
reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for
adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutors
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong
held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced
by complainant would, in the fair estimation of

the Department, sufficiently establish all the

elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent
Moje conceded to complainant that she was going
out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she
did when complainant confronted her about Ealas
frequent phone calls and text messages to her.
Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions.
Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he
knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact,
he (Eala) himself was married to another woman.
Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more
confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm
the illicit relationship involving both respondents.
This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks
away from the church where she had exchange
marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that
of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself
admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
office. The happenstance that it was in that said
address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold
office for the firm that both had formed smacks
too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for
that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both
respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit
affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What
finally militates against the respondents is the
indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of
the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala
was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of
the unlawful and damning nature of the
adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth
certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied,
in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father
of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and
thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainants motion to withdraw his petition for
review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the
criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools,
Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution
No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is
DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation
of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies
of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
MACARUBBO vs. MACARUBBO AC No. 6148
(2004)
(Contracted Second Marriage with Deceit)
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by
herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on
June 6, 2000 a verified complaint[1] for
disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 00734-A, alleging that respondent deceived her into
marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.

Detailing
the
circumstances
surrounding
respondents
complained
act,
complainant
averred that he started courting her in April 1991,
he representing himself as a bachelor; that they
eventually contracted marriage which was
celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev.
Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18,
1991[2] in the latters Manila office, and the
second on December 28, 1991[3] at the Asian
Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that
although respondent admitted that he was
married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family
and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent
entered into a third marriage with one Josephine
T. Constantino; and that he abandoned
complainant and their children without providing
them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence
consisting of the marriage contract between
respondent and Helen Esparza[4] and that
between
her
and
respondent,[5]
and
photographs[6] of their (complainant and
respondent) nuptials and of captured moments in
their life as a couple and a family.
Copy of the complaint could not be immediately
served upon respondent owing to the difficulty of
locating him.[7]
Complainant later filed a Manifestation[8] before
the IBP, furnishing therein respondents address
where he supposedly resided with his third wife Jo
T. Constantino-Macarubbo. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline thereupon thrice[9] required
respondent to file his Answer. He failed to do so,
however, on motion of complainant,[10] he was
declared in default.[11] Complainant was thus
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner came out
with a Report and Recommendation on January
22, 2001.[12]
By Resolution of May 26, 2001,[13] however, the
IBP Board of Governors remanded the case to the
Investigating Commissioner to ensure proper
notice or another opportunity to serve notice to
the respondent. Subsequently or on September 5,
2001, respondent filed a Manifestation/Ex Parte
Motion to Re-Open Proceedings[14] which was
granted.[15]
By
Comment
of
October
18,
2001,[16]
respondent denied employing deception in his
marriage to complainant, insisting instead that
complainant was fully aware of his prior

subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that

she dragged him against his will to a sham
wedding to protect her and her familys reputation
since she was then three-months pregnant.
Respondent submitted in evidence the final and
executory October 30, 2000 Decision of Branch IV
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao
City in Civil Case No. 5617, Edmundo L.
Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,[17] declaring his
marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew
attention to the trial courts findings on the basis
of his evidence which was not controverted, that
the marriage was indeed a sham and make
believe one, vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and
intimidation, and further exacerbated by the
existence of a legal impediment and want of a
valid marriage license.
Respondent also submitted a certification from
the National Statistics Office that complainants
name does not appear in the National Index of
Marriages for Bride;[18] another certification from
the National Statistics Office-Office of Civil
Registrar General that it has no record of the
December 28, 1991 marriage of complainant and
respondent;[19] and an attestation from the
Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite that Marriage License No. 772176221
which was used in complainant and respondents
marriage is not on file in its records.[20]
Admitting having sired complainants two children,
Juris Alexis and Gabriel Enrico, respondent denied
ever abandoning them.
In his Supplemental Comment,[21] respondent
claimed that he left complainant and their two
children with her consent after explaining to her
that the pain and shame of living in sin and
ridicule was unbearable.
To refute the charge that he had abandoned
complainant and their two children, he presented
copies of fully paid educational plans[22] for the
high school and college education of the children;
a Philippine National Bank check dated January
18, 1999 for P22,556.33 representing his
payment of the final amortization of his car which
has been in complainants possession since 1997;
[23] a copy of a petition of complainant in a civil
case filed against respondent with the Quezon
City RTC, for judicial authorization to sell certain
properties of respondent, wherein she admitted
that respondent issued three postdated checks in
the amount of P2,000.00 each for his childrens
allowance covering the period October 1999 to
December 1999;[24] and copy of his August 9,
1999 letter to complainant demanding custody of
his children, he having been barred from seeing

them, as well as the return of his personal

properties in complainants possession.[25]
To disprove that he is of depraved moral
character, respondent submitted certifications
from the Office of the Bar Confidant,[26] Office of
the Ombudsman,[27] Department of Justice,[28]
and the Philippine National Police in his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan[29] that he has no
cases of any nature pending with them. And he
too submitted letters from the Department of
Interior and Local Government[30] and the Metro
Manila Development Authority[31] addressed to
him to show that he is a civic-spirited person.
Finally,
respondent,
in
his
Supplemental
Comment, raised the additional defenses that the
judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to
complainant is res judicata upon the present
administrative case; that complainant is in
estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in
partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T.
Constantino;[32] and that she resorted to forumshopping in bringing both this administrative
action and the civil case with the Quezon City
RTC.
Stressing that he had always been the victim in
his marital relations, respondent invoked the final
and executory August 21, 1998 Decision of
Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC in JDRC Case No.
4320, Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C.
Esparza,[33] declaring his first marriage void on
the ground of his wifes psychological incapacity.
After hearing during which both complainant and
respondent took the witness stand, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report
and Recommendation[34] the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
it
is
recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarrubo be SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS
for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on
the moral norms of the profession. Moreover, it
must likewise be impressed on respondent that
he should comply with the moral and legal
obligations incumbent upon him as a father of the
children as a result of his relationship with
complainant. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors subsequently passed
Resolution No. XV-2003-351[35] which adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.
The final disposition of the present administrative
case is now before this Court.

It appears that respondent began his legal career

in 1986 as Legal Officer of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports after which he
became Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the
Civil Service Commission.[36] He later became an
Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer, then a
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice,
before finally bowing out of public service after
about 14 years or in July 2000 to engage in
private practice.[37]
The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in
probity and good demeanor, thus rendering him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court[38] bears reiterating.
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is
indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his private
affairs which warrant disciplinary action by this
Court as the guardian of the purity and integrity
of the legal profession.
The incontrovertible facts show that while
respondent had a subsisting marriage with Helen
Esparza with whom he had two children,[39] he
entered into a second marriage with complainant.
While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment,
this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge
of impropriety. He and complainant started living
as husband and wife in December 1991 when his
first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only
on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was
annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage.
[40] Such conduct is inconsistent with the good
moral character that is required for the continued
right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine bar.[41] It imports moral turpitude and
is a public assault upon the basic social institution
of marriage.[42]
Even assuming arguendo that respondent was
coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress,
by his own admission as the following transcript
of his testimony reflects, ceased after their
wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited
with her and even begot a second child by her.
xxx
ATTY. PAGUIA [Complainants Counsel]
Q: Are you claiming that the complainant coerced
you again to marry her?
A: Yes, I was.

Q: Did she use a gun to coerce you?

A: A lot of people appearing around and a lot of
bad mouth from her, threats to sue me and to
even kill me by people around.
Q: So insofar as you are concerned the
complainant committed a crime of coercion
against yourself?
A: Yes.
Q: And is it correct for me to say that you did not
file any case before the Prosecutors Office.
A: I reported that matter to the police.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: In what way did M[s]. Florence Teves coerce
you?
A: She placed me in a place where she could
guard me and she treated (sic) to sue me,
destroy my career. And at the time of the
marriage she sent people to fetch me from my
place to be there. And there are a lot of people
with strange faces.
ATTY. PAGUIA
Q: How many days or hours did this coercion last?
A: Thats continuing.
Q: From what day to what day?
A: Its started when she said she was pregnant
until the date of the alleged marriage.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission who
got her pregnant at that time?
A: Although there was a carnal knowledge once.
Q: Of course you know that the complainant
delivered the child after your marriage, is it not?
A: Yes, six months after because she was already
pregnant three months during that time already.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Commission what is
the name of the child was (sic)?
A: Juris. I recognized the children. Theres no
problem about that. I gave them educational
plan, I gave them support.
Q: After the first child you continued living with
the complainant, is it not?

A: Intermittently I get out and then she would call

pagkat may sakit yong bata so I have to go back.

A: I guess six or seven.

Q: What is his name?

Q: Of course it was your responsibility as father to

the child to see the condition of the child?

A: Mico.

A: Yes, thats why whenever she comes and tells

me that the child is sick I go there.

Q: Who provided the support for these children

from the time they were born up to the present?

Q: After your wedding with the complainant can

you tell the Honorable Commission where you
resided?

A: When I was there I gave for their subsistence.

COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: When you say where you resided, both of
them?

Q: Will you please tell the Commission how much

was that?
A: I buy groceries for them and I gave also for
their leisure and for their education.

ATTY. PAGUIA: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When you gave this support during the

intermittently that you had with them?

A: In the residence of Florence.

A: Intermittently also.

ATTY. PAGUIA

A: Roughly, Compaero, can you tell the Honorable

Commission from that time they were born to this
time how much you were giving them?

Q: How long did you live with the complainant

after your wedding?

A: I cannot compute.

A: Intermittently again few months then I get out

then when the child is sick I have to visit.

COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION

COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION

Q: What about on a monthly basis, do you recall?

Q: When you say intermittently you dont stay

there?

A: I cannot compute although when I left with her

consent in 1997 I left valuables in the amount of
P400,000.00.

A: Not permanently.
ATTY. PAGUIA

Q: When you say with her consent, did you tell

her that you are leaving?

Q: How often did you come home to the

residence of the complainant?

A: Yes, Your Honor, she agreed because I said I

can no longer bear living with sin.

A: Whenever she call that the child is sick.

x x x[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Q: So you live (sic) with her up to what year?

The saying that photographs do not lie could not

be any truer in those submitted in evidence by
complainant which show a typical happy family
with respondent essaying out his role as a
husband to complainant and a father to their two
kids. Respondent cannot thus take refuge in the
earlier mentioned finding in the decision of
Tuguegarao City trial court in the annulment case
he filed against complainant. The decision,
rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve
as res judicata on the final resolution of the
present case. As this Court held in In re Almacen,
[44] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a
lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of

A: Intermittently 1995.
Q: You mentioned that you have two children with
the complainant?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you remember when your second child
with the complainant was born?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Do you know how old the second child with the
complainant is?

an administrative case against him,[45] or if an

affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does
not affect its course,[46] then the judgment of
annulment of respondents marriage does not also
exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof clear
preponderance of evidence in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar is met,
then liability attaches.[47]
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to
secure the annulment of his first two marriages
and is in the process of procuring the annulment
of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding
of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent,
by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage:
xxx
ATTY. PAGUIA
Q: After getting married to the complainant is it a
fact that you entered into a third marriage to one
Josephine Constantino?
A: I think that is . . .
Q: I will reform, Your Honor. Do you know a person
by the name of Josephine Constantino?
A: Yes
Q: What relation if any do you have with her?
A: I am separated to her since 2000.
COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION
Q: Were you married to Josephine Constantino?
A: Yes, but its in the process of annulment.
x x x[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In both his marriages to his first wife and to
complainant, respondent claimed that he was
made to enter into the marital union against his
will. That claim is an affront to the intelligence of
the members of this Court to distinguish fact from
fiction, reality from fantasy. It is not easy to
believe that a lawyer like respondent could easily
be cowered to enter into any marriage. One
incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but
two such in succession would tax ones credulity.
And then, there is a third marriage to Josephine T.
Constantino which is again the subject of another
annulment case. It would not come as a surprise
if in that pending case, he would again put blame
on his third wife in order to send the marriage to
oblivion.

Respondent here has exhibited the vice of

entering into multiple marriages and then leaving
them behind by the mere expedient of resorting
to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of
respondents conduct is incalculable upon his exwives as well as the children he had by them,
their lives having been dislocated beyond recall.
Respondents assertion that he has not failed to
support his children by complainant is not totally
supported by the evidence on record. He may
have secured educational plans for them and
doled out some sums of money in the past, but it
appears that he has failed to provide them
regular, monthly support. In fact, he admitted
that even before he left complainants residence
in 1995, he was only giving intermittent support
to his children with her.[49]
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent
undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for
the rearing of our children, for the development
of values essential to the survival and well-being
of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole. This must be checked if
not stopped.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be
perceived to be of good moral character and
must lead a life in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community.[50] The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such, including that
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution
of
marriage,[51]
outrages
the
generally accepted moral standards of the
community.
In sum, respondent has breached the following
precepts
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
There can then be no other fate that awaits
respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or

suspended from the practice of law.[52] The

penalty of 3 months suspension recommended by
the IBP is, not commensurate to the gravity of his
conduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo
is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is
likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to
this Court that he is supporting or has made
provisions for the regular support of his two
children by complainant.[53]
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
SAMANIEGO vs. FERRER, AC No. 7022 (2008)
(Failure to Give Support)
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F.
Samaniego against respondent Atty. Andrew V.
Ferrer for immorality, abandonment and willful
refusal to give support to their daughter, filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to
Atty. Ferrer as a potential client. Atty. Ferrer
agreed to handle her cases[1] and soon their
lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms.
Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she
fell in love with him.[2] He said she flirted with
him and he succumbed to her temptations.[3]
Thereafter, they lived together as husband and
wife from 1996 to 1997,[4] and on March 12,
1997, their daughter was born.[5] The affair
ended in 2000[6] and since then he failed to give
support to their daughter.[7]
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms.
Samaniego presented their daughters birth and
baptismal certificates, and the photographs taken
during the baptism. She testified that she knew
that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not
think he was already married. She also testified
that she was willing to compromise, but he failed
to pay for their daughters education as agreed
upon.[8] Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the
hearing since he did not want to see Ms.
Samaniego.[9]

In his position paper,[10] Atty. Ferrer manifested

his willingness to support their daughter. He also
admitted his indiscretion; however, he prayed
that the IBP consider Ms. Samaniegos complicity
as she was acquainted with his wife and children.
He further reasoned that he found it
unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10
children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-138[11] dated
November 12, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon
Atty. Ferrer the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law for his refusal
to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The
IBP also admonished him to be a more
responsible member of the bar and to keep in
mind his duties as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[12] with prayer for us to
reduce the penalty, to wit:
Without passing judgment on the correctness or
incorrectness of the disposition of the Honorable
Commission on Bar Discipline, herein respondent
most humbly and respectfully begs the
compassion of the Honorable Court and states
that the gravity of the penalty imposed and
meted out, depriving herein respondent to earn a
modest living for a period of six (6) months, will
further cause extreme hardship to his family of
ten (10) children.[13]
We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for evaluation. Upon finding that Atty.
Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a
member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms.
Samaniego, with whom he sired a child while he
was lawfully married and with 10 children, the
Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that we
affirm Resolution No. XVII-2005-138 and deny the
prayer for reduced penalty.[14]
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrers failure to
give support to his daughter with Ms. Samaniego.
We also agree with the Office of the Bar Confidant
that Atty. Ferrers affair with Ms. Samaniego
showed his lack of good moral character as a
member of the bar. We dismiss, however, Ms.
Samaniegos charge of abandonment since Atty.
Ferrer did not abandon them. He returned to his
family.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his
words, his indiscretion which ended in 2000. We
have considered such illicit relation as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to
disciplinary action.[15] The penalty for such
immoral
conduct
is
disbarment,[16]
or

indefinite[17]
or
definite[18]
suspension,
depending on the circumstances of the case.
Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,[19] we
ruled that suspension from the practice of law for
two years was an adequate penalty imposed on
the lawyer who was found guilty of gross
immorality. In said case, we considered the
absence of aggravating circumstances such as an
adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to
support his family; or maintaining illicit
relationships with at least two women during the
subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his
legal wife and cohabiting with other women.[20]
In this case, we find no similar aggravating
circumstances. Thus we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP and Office of the Bar
Confidant as adequate sanction for the grossly
immoral conduct of respondent.
On another point, we may agree with
respondents contention that complainant was not
entirely blameless. She knew about his wife but
blindly believed him to be unmarried. However,
that one complicit in the affair complained of
immorality against her co-principal does not
make this case less serious since it is immaterial
whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari delicto.[21] We
must emphasize that this Courts investigation is
not about Ms. Samaniegos acts but Atty. Ferrers
conduct as one of its officers and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.[22]
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and
all members of the bar of the following norms
under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
xxxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
xxxx
Needless to state, respondent ought always to
keep in mind the responsibilities of a father to all
his children. If there be a resultant hardship on

them because of this case, let it be impressed on

all concerned that the direct cause thereof was
his own misconduct.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V.
Ferrer GUILTY of gross immorality and, as
recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant,
SUSPEND him from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective upon notice hereof, with
WARNING that the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the
penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to
report the date of his receipt of this Decision to
this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the courts all over the country.
Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to
the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
In Re: TERREL, G.R. No. 1209, May 15, 1903
(Acting as Counsel for an Association Created for
the Purpose of Evading the Law)
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D.
TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was
ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of
February, 1903, why he should not be suspended
as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for
the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of
the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been
notified that the said organization was made for
the purpose of evading the law then in force in
said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro
Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to
him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by
his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these
charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in
answer thereto. After reading testimony given by

said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United

States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged
with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits
in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
below found, and decided as a fact, that the
charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell
were true, and thereupon made an order
suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the
court to transmit to this court a certified copy of
the order of suspension, as well as a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was
based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and
have reached the conclusion that they were such
as to justify the court below in arriving at the
conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of
the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a
nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge
of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
evading the laws against crime constitutes such
misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
misconduct in his office, and for which he may be
removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a violation of law, are acts which
justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant
in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was
acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not,
therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the
acts with which he is charged in this proceeding,
while
unprofessional
and
hence
to
be
condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we
are of opinion that the ends of justice will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine
Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day
of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D.
Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for
a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so
ordered.
CASTANEDA vs. AGO, G.R. No. L-28546, July
30, 1975
(Barratry and Ambulance Chasing Not Act as
Instigator of Controversy)
CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago,

have been commuting to this Court for more than
a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and
Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In
1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries
or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and
on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs.
Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961
a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87.
Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion
was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house
and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing
in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed
the petition and Ago appealed. On January
31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice
attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house
and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff
sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the
highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and
Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17,
1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in
favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined
by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of
Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered
against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential house and lots
which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
could not legally be reached for the satisfaction
of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint
that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin
suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ
of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to
her husband's venture in the logging business
which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued
an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds

and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering

the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the
respondents' certificates of title and issuing new
ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any
writ of possession. A situation thus arose where
what the Manila court had ordered to be done,
the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court
lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously
issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and
issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But
enforcement of the writ of possession was again
thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a
temporary restraining order which it later lifted
but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court
finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and
restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with this
Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
possession. This Court found no merit in the
petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on
June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July
18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2,
1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
37830-R), praying for the same preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed
the petition. The respondents then appealed to
this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed
the petition in a minute resolution on February 8,
1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court
of Appeals where they filed another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave
due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and
ejectment from the one-half share in the
properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago
dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending
decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986
and ordering respondent Court to proceed with
the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits
without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners
Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition
for review of the aforesaid decision.

1.
We do not see how the doctrine that a
court may not interfere with the orders of a coequal court can apply in the case at bar. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the
writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered
with by its co-equal court, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the
restraining order it had previously issued against
the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of
possession; it is the Court of Appeals that
enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2.
Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1
where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy
on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly
bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would
be answerable. The case invoked is not at par
with the present case. In Comilang the actions
were admittedly instituted for the protection of
the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husband's
business venture.
3.
Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil.
419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person to half-interest in the property is adversely
determined, the said appellate court assuming
that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "thirdparty" to her husband. The assumption is of
course obviously wrong, for, besides living with
her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance
of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in
which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale
made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ
of possession may not issue until the claim of a
third person is adversely determined, but that the
writ of possession being a complement of the writ
of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the
latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former,
unless in the interval between the judicial sale
and the issuance of the writ of possession, the
rights of third parties to the property sold have
supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly
inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there
has been no change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest therein from the time
the writ of execution was issued up to the time
writ of possession was issued, and even up to the
present.
4.
We agree with the trial court (then
presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents
Agos to raise the question that part of the

property is unleviable because it belongs to

Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the
levy was made and the properties advertised for
auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very
properties in question; (4) her husband had
moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties
were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had
thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the
deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor
failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be
levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house
and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and
(9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his
wife filed the complaint for annulment of the
sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share
in the properties cannot be levied upon on the
ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The
spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5.
The decision of the appellate court under
review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of
possession to and ejectment from the one-half
share in the properties involved belonging to
Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but
is merely an inchoate interest, a mere
expectancy, constituting neither legal nor
equitable estate, and will ripen into title when
only upon liquidation and settlement there
appears to be assets of the community. 3 The
decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that
injunction does not issue to protect a right not in
esse and which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or
even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The
Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila
court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted
from the house, but the decision under review
would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now,
which part of the house would be vacated by
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to

stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the

decision would actually separate husband and
wife, prevent them from living together, and in
effect divide their conjugal properties during
coverture and before the dissolution of the
conjugal union.
6.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of
the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's
sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must
now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance
of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to
doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another
(5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and
their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those
who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public
servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with
candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries
of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper
his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath
to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7.
In view of the private respondents'
propensity to use the courts for purposes other

than to seek justice, and in order to obviate

further delay in the disposition of the case below
which might again come up to the appellate
courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986
(the mother case of the present case). We find
that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more
than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not
even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed
their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs
Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they
impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental
complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended
supplemental
complaint,
which
impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to
the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance,
dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the
suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p.
815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in
the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all
untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that
the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the
spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment
to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago,
and the business venture that he entered into,
which resulted in the replevin suit, did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or
not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same issue that we
have already resolved, as barred by laches, in
striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive
portion of which was herein-before quoted. This
ruling applies as well to the first cause of action
of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege
that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the
sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized
and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5,
1964. This second cause of action fails to state a

valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the

order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the
sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff
did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or
liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for
which they bought the properties at the auction
sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at
the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of
P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for
P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where
Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08
out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil
case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos
suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was
under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when
the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay
the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules
of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is
the concern of the vendees Castaedas but did
not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of
the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the
sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January
31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually
states no valid cause of action and is moreover
barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral
damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of
action derives its life from the preceding causes
of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said
fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the
Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were
compelled to retain the services of counsel for
not less than P7,500; that because the Agos
obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties
to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived
of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964,

the value of such deprived use being 20%

annually of their actual value; and that the filing
of the unfounded action besmirched their
feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the
court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that
after the filing of the complaint, the defendants,
taking advantage of the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with
gross bad faith and evident intent to cause
damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration
of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause
more damage, the defendants sold to their
lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in
question; that the purchasers acquired the
properties in bad faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation while the
defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged
the parcels bought by them to the Rizal
Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in
bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an
allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the
aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause
of action of the supplemental complaint, which is,
the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to
cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs,
Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy
Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith,
while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in
bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan
Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who
acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge
that the properties are the subject of a pending
litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in
the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint, the validity of the cause of action
would depend upon the validity of the first cause
of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos
would suffer no transgression upon their rights of
ownership and possession of the properties by
reason of the agreements subsequently entered
into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the

sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is

also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid
on the ground that the conjugal properties could
not be levied upon, then the transactions would
perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already
indicated that the issue in the first cause of
action of the original complaint is barred by
laches, and it must therefore follow that the first
cause of action of the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint is also
barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to
the
remaining
cause
of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of
Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is
ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new
and independent action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and
Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
decision be made a part of the personal file of
Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.