A

PROJECT REPORT
ON

UTI BANK
FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF INFORMATION &
MANAGEMENT
Session : 2010-11
Submitted To :Deptt. Of B.I.M.
S.D. (PG) College
Panipat

Submitted By :JAI DEEP

B.I.M. Final Year
University Roll No.

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87
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STUDENT DECLARATION
I JAI DEEP Singh student of B.I.M. S.D. College, Panipat, hereby
declare that this Project Report on UTI BANK . is submitted in
the partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree of bachelor
of information & management is of my own efforts and not for the
award of any other title or prize.

MRS. JASPINDER KAUR

Project Incharge
Lecturer in B.I.M.
S.D. (PG) College
Panipat

Submitted by :JAI DEEP

B.I.M. Final Year
S.D. (PG) College
Panipat.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly grateful to :Mrs. Jaspinder

S.D. College
For introducing me to Financial Management and giving us the
opportunity to work on this case-study. Without her help consent,
help and guidance, this case-study could not have been
successfully completed.
This case-study was undertaken with lots of good intentions given
the constraint of time and resources. I believe to have done
sufficient justices and the final offering as it lies in the readers
hands as it ownes its existence to lots of people.
Above all its entire gods grance that I was able to complete my
project successfully.
My friends whose blessing are constant source of inspirations that
enabled me to complete this work.
Mr. JAIDEEP
B.I.M. Final year
S.D. College
3-

Panipat.

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Executive Summery
The future of Indian Banking represents a unique mixture of unlimited
opportunities amidst insurmountable challenges. On the one hand we see the scenario
represented by the rapid process of globalization presently taking shape bringing the
community of nations in the world together, transcending geographical boundaries, in the
sphere of trade and commerce, and even employment opportunities of individuals. All
these indicate newly emerging opportunities for Indian Banking. But on the darker side
we see the accumulated morass, brought out by three decades of controlled and
regimented management of the banks in the past. It has siphoned profitability of the many
banks, accumulated bloated NPA and threatens Capital Adequacy of the Banks and their
continued stability.
New Private Sector Banks in India can solve their problems only if they assert a
spirit of self-initiative and self-reliance through developing their in-house expertise. They
have to imbibe the banking philosophy inherent in de-regulation NPA is a problem
created by the Banks and they have to find the cause and the solution - how it was created
and how the Banks are to overcome it. An attempt is made in this study the present
situation and to arrive at a solution to solve this problem.

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Design of the study

Title of the project:
Non Performing Assets and its impact on Profitability of New Private Sector
Banks.

Scope of study: Scope of my study restricted only to 7 New Private Sector Banks NPA
datas and Advances, and for Comparison of Credit risk path 7 old selected Private Banks
is taken.
Need For Study:

This study will help to know the recent norms of NPA.

This study helps to know how NPA Causing Problems to Banking Sector and
what might be the solution to overcome from this problem and also its impact on
Profitability of New Profit Banks.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Profitability is considered as a benchmark for evaluating performance of any
business enterprise including the banking industry.

However, increasing Non-

Performing Assets, have a direct impact on profitability of banks and financial

institutions. Legally speaking banks and financial institutions are not allowed to book
income on such account and at the same times they are forced to make provision on such

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assets. So This project is undertaken to now impact of NPA on Profitability of New

Private Sector Banks.

Objectives of Study
1. To study the RBI norms on Non Performing Assets, and the various reasons for
the existence of huge level of NPA in Indian banking.
2. To know the performance comparison of New Private Banks Non performing
asset for past 3 years.
3. To know the impact of non performing assets on profitability of New Private
Banks, and comparison of credit risk path of New Private Banks with 7 selected
Old Private Banks.
4. To study the various steps taken by the banks to bring down the NPAs in
respective bank branches.
5. To recommend measures for Improving performance and reduction of Non
Performing Assets.

Methodology
Primary Data:
Views of the concerned officials were gathered by directly interacting with them, and
such data was found very useful while analyzing and drawing conclusions.
Secondary Data:

Recent RBI norms of NPA.

IBA Bulletin 0f 2005-06 is referred to collect data for Net NPA, and Advances.

Web site of UTI Bank and other Web sites.

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Plan of analysis:
In this study quadrant analysis is used on the calculated figures.
Limitations:

The study is based mostly on secondary data.

Data has been drawn from journals, so information may not be complete.

For the analysis only the advances and NPA percentages of banks and operating
profit, provisions and contingencies as a whole and net profit of New PSBs are
taken into consideration.
INTRODUCTION
It's a known fact that the banks and financial institutions in India face the problem

of swelling non-performing assets (NPAs) and the issue is becoming more and more
unmanageable. In order to bring the situation under control, some steps have been taken
recently. The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 was passed by Parliament, which is an important step towards
elimination or reduction of NPAs.
MEANING OF NPAs:
An asset is classified as non-performing asset (NPAs) if dues in the form of
principal and interest are not paid by the borrower for a period of 180 days. However
with effect from March 2004, default status would be given to a borrower if dues are not
paid for 90 days. If any advance or credit facilities granted by bank to a borrower become
non-performing, then the bank will have to treat all the advances/credit facilities granted
to that borrower as non-performing without having any regard to the fact that there may
still exist certain advances / credit facility.
NPA IN INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM:

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NPA surfaced suddenly in the Indian banking scenario, around the Eighties, in the
midst of turbulent structural changes overtaking the international banking institutions,
and when the global financial markets were undergoing sweeping changes. In fact after it
had emerged the problem of NPA kept hidden and gradually swelling unnoticed and
unperceived, in the maze of defective accounting standards that still continued with
Indian Banks up to the Nineties and opaque Balance sheets.
In a dynamic world, it is true that new ideas and new concepts that emerge
through such changes caused by social evolution bring beneficial effects, but only after
levying a heavy initial toll. The process of quickly integrating new innovations in the
existing set-up leads to an immediate disorder and unsettled conditions. People are not
accustomed to the new models. These new formations take time to configure, and work
smoothly. The old is cast away and the new is found difficult to adjust. Marginal and submarginal operators are swept away by these convulsions. Banks being sensitive
institutions entrenched deeply in traditional beliefs and conventions were unable to adjust
themselves to the changes. They suffered easy victims to this upheaval in the initial
phase.
Consequently banks underwent this transition-syndrome and languished under
distress and banking crises surfaced in quick succession one following the other in many
countries. But when the banking industry in the global sphere came out of this
metamorphosis to re-adjust to the new order, they emerged revitalized and as more
vibrant and robust units. Deregulation in developed capitalist countries particularly in
Europe, witnessed a remarkable innovative growth in the banking industry, whether
measured in terms of deposit growth, credit growth, growth intermediation instruments as
well as in network.
During all these years the Indian Banking, whose environment was insulated from
the global context and was denominated by State controls of directed credit delivery,
regulated interest rates, and investment structure did not participate in this vibrant

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banking revolution. Suffering the dearth of innovative spirit and choking under undue
regimentation, Indian banking was lacking objective and prudential systems of business
leading from early stagnation to eventual degeneration and reduced or negative
profitability. Continued political interference, the absence of competition and total lack of
scientific decision-making, led to consequences just the opposite of what was happening
in the western countries. Imperfect accounting standards and opaque balance sheets
served as tools for hiding the shortcomings and failing to reveal the progressive
deterioration and structural weakness of the country's banking institutions to public view.
This enabled the nationalized banks to continue to flourish in a deceptive manifestation

and false glitter, though stray symptoms of the brewing ailment were discernable here
and there.
The government hastily introduced the first phase of reforms in the financial and
banking sectors after the economic crisis of 1991. This was an effort to quickly resurrect
the health of the banking system and bridge the gap between Indian and global banking
development. Indian Banking, in particular PSBs suddenly woke up to the realities of the
situation and to face the burden of the surfeit of their woes. Simultaneously major
revolutionary transitions were taking place in other sectors of the economy on account
the ongoing economic reforms intended towards freeing the Indian economy from
government controls and linking it to market driven forces for a quick integration with
the global economy. Import restrictions were gradually freed. Tariffs were brought down
and quantitative controls were removed. The Indian market was opened for free
competition to the global players. The new economic policy in turn revolutionalised the
environment of the Indian industry and business and put them to similar problems of new
mixture Of opportunities and challenges. As a result we witness today a scenario of
banking, trade and industry in India, all undergoing the convulsions of total reformation
battling to kick off the decadence of the past and to gain a new strength and vigor for
effective links with the global economy. Many are still languishing unable to get released

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from the old set-up, while a few progressive corporate are making a niche for themselves
in the global context.
During this decade the reforms have covered almost every segment of the
financial sector. In particular, it is the banking sector, which experienced major reforms.
The reforms have taken the Indian banking sector far away from the days of
nationalization. Increase in the number of banks due to the entry of new private and
foreign banks; increase in the transparency of the banks' balance sheets through the
introduction of prudential norms and norms of disclosure; increase in the role of the
market forces due to the deregulated interest rates, together with rapid computerization
and application of the benefits of information technology to banking operations have all
significantly affected the operational environment of the Indian banking sector.
In the background of these complex changes when the problem of NPA was
belatedly recognized for the first time at its peak velocity during 1992-93, there was
resultant chaos and confusion. As the problem in large magnitude erupted suddenly banks
were unable to analyze and make a realistic or complete assessment of the surmounting
situation. It was not realized that the root of the problem of NPA was centered elsewhere
in multiple layers, as much outside the banking system, more particularly in the transient
economy of the country, as within. Banking is not a compartmentalized and isolated
sector delinked from the rest of the economy. As has happened elsewhere in the world, a
distressed national economy shifts a part of its negative results to the banking industry. In
short, banks are made ultimately to finance the losses incurred by constituent industries
and businesses. The unprepared ness and structural weakness of our banking system to
act to the emerging scenario and de-risk itself to the challenges thrown by the new order,
trying to switch over to globalization were only aggravating the crisis. Partial perceptions
and hasty judgments led to a policy of ad-hoc-ism, which characterized the approach of
the authorities during the last two-decades towards finding solutions to banking ailments
and dismantling recovery impediments. Continuous concern was expressed. Repeated

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correctional efforts were executed, but positive results were evading. The problem was
defying a solution.
The threat of NPA was being surveyed and summarized by RBI and Government
of India from a remote perception looking at a bird's-eye-view on the banking industry as
a whole delinked from the rest of the economy. RBI looks at the banking industry's
average on a macro basis, consolidating and tabulating the data submitted by different
institutions. It has collected extensive statistics about NPA in different financial sectors
like commercial banks, financial institutions, urban cooperatives, NBFC etc. But still it is
a distant view of one outside the system and not the felt view of a suffering participant.
Individual banks inherit different cultures and they finance diverse sectors of the
economy that do not possess identical attributes. There are distinct diversities as among
the 29 public sector banks themselves, between different geographical regions and
between different types of customers using bank credit. There are three weak nationalized
banks that have been identified. But there are also correspondingly two better performing
banks like Corporation and OBC. There are also banks that have successfully contained
NPA and brought it to single digit like Syndicate (Gross NPA 7.87%) and Andhra (Gross
NPA 6.13%). The scenario is not so simple to be generalized for the industry as a whole
to prescribe a readymade package of a common solution for all banks and for all times.
Similarly NPA concerns of individual Banks summarized as a whole and
expressed as an average for the entire bank cannot convey a dependable picture. It is
being statistically stated that bank X or Y has 12% gross NPA. But if we look down
further within that Bank there are a few pockets possessing bulk segments of NPA
ranging 50% to 70% gross , which should consequently convey that there should also be
several other segments with 3 to 5% or even NIL % NPA, averaging the bank's whole
performance to 12%. Much criticism is made about the obligation of Nationalized Banks
to extend priority sector advances. But banks have neither fared better in non-priority
sector. The comparative performance under priority and non-priority is only a difference
of degree and not that of kind.

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The assessment of the mix-of contributing factors includes:

1. human factors (those pertaining to the bankers and the credit customers),
2. environmental imbalances in the economy on account of wholesale changes and
also
3. Inherited problems of Indian banking and industry.
Variable skill, efficiency and level integrity prevailing in different branches and in
different banks accounts for the sweeping disparities between inter-bank and intra-bank
performance. We may add that while the core or base-level NPA in the industry is due to
common contributory causes, the inter-se variations are on account of the structural and
operational disparities. The heavy concentrated prevalence of NPA is definitely due to
human factors contributing to the same.
No bank appears to have conducted studies involving a cross-section of its operating
field staff, including the audit and inspection functionaries for a candid and
comprehensive introspection based on a survey of the variables of NPA burden under
different categories of sectoral credit, different regions and in individual Branches
categorized as with high, medium and low incidence of NPA. We do not hear the voice of
the operating personnel in these banks candidly expressed and explaining their failures.
Ex-bankers, i.e. the professional bankers who have retired from service, but possess a
depth of inside knowledge do not out-pour candidly their views. After three decades of
nationalized banking, we must have some hundreds of retired Bank executives in the
country, who can boldly and independently, but objectively voice their views. Everyone is
satisfied in blaming the others. Bank executives hold 'willful defaulters' responsible for
all the plague. Industry and business blames the government policies.
Important fact-revealing information for each NPA account is the gap period
between the date, when the advance was originally made and the date of its becoming
NPA. If the gap is long, it is the case of a sunset industry. Things were all right earlier, but

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economic variance in trade cycles or market sentiments have created the NPA. Credit
customers who are in NPA today, but for years were earlier rated as good performers and
creditworthy clients ranging within the top 50 or 100. Significant part of the NPA is on
account of clout banking or willfully given bad loans. Infant mortality in credit is solely
on account of human factors and absence of human integrity.
Credit to different sectors given by the PSBs in fact represents different products.
Advance to weaker sections below Rs.25000/- represents the actual social banking. NPA
in this sector forms 8 TO 10% of the gross amount. Advance to agriculture, SSI and big
industries each calls for different strategies in terms of credit assessment, credit delivery,
project implementation, and post advance supervision. NPA in different sector is not
caused by the same resultant factors. Containing quantum of NPA is therefore to be
programmed by a sector-wise strategy involving a role of the actively engaged
participants who can tell where the boot pinches in each case. Business and industry has
equal responsibility to accept accountability for containment of NPA. Many of the present
defaulters were once trusted and valued customers of the banks. Why have they become
unreliable now, or have they?
The credit portfolio of a nationalized bank also includes a number of low-risk and
risk-free segments, which cannot create NPA. Small personal loans against banks' own
deposits and other tangible and easily marketable securities pledged to the bank and held
in its custody are of this category. Such small loans are universally given in almost all the
branches and hence the aggregate constitutes a significant figure. Then there is food
credit given to FCI for food procurement and similar credits given to major public
Utilities and Public Sector Undertakings of the Central Government. It is only the
residual fragments of Bank credit that are exposed to credit failures and reasons for NPA
can be ascertained by scrutinizing this segment.
Secondly NPA is not a dilemma facing exclusively the Bankers. It is in fact an all
pervasive national scourge swaying the entire Indian economy. NPA is a sore throat of the

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Indian economy as a whole. The banks are only the ultimate victims, where life cycle of
the virus is terminated.
Now, how does the Government suffer? What about the recurring loss of revenue
by way of taxes, excise to the government on account of closure of several lakhs of
erstwhile vibrant industrial units and inefficient usage of costly industrial infrastructure
erected with considerable investment by the nation? As per statistics collected three years
back there are over two and half million small industrial units representing over 90
percent of the total number of industrial units. A majority of the industrial work force
finds employment here and the sector's contribution to industrial output is substantial and
is estimated at over 35 percent while its share of exports is also valued to be around 40
percent. Out of the 2.5 million, about 10% of the small industries are reported to be sick
involving a bank credit outstanding around Rs.5000 to 6000 Crores, at that period. It may
be even more now. These closed units represent some thousands of displaced workers
Previously enjoying gainful employment. Each closed unit whether large, medium or
small occupies costly developed industrial land. Several items of machinery form security
for the NPA accounts should either be lying idle or junking out. In other words, large
value of land, machinery and money are locked up in industrial sickness. These are the
assets created that have turned unproductive and these represent the real physical NPA,
which indirectly are reflected in the financial statements of nationalized banks, as the
ultimate financiers of these assets. In the final analysis it represents instability in industry.
NPA represents the owes of the credit recipients, in turn transferred and parked with the
banks.
Recognizing NPA as a sore throat of the Indian economy, the field level
participants should first address themselves to find the solution. Why not representatives
of industries and commerce and that of the Indian Banks' Association come together and
candidly analyze and find an everlasting solution heralding the real spirit of deregulation
and decentralization of management in banking sector, and accepting self-discipline and
self-reliance? What are the deficiencies in credit delivery that leads to its misuse, abuse or

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loss? How to check misuse and abuse at source? How to deal with erring Corporate? In
short, the functional staff of the Bank along with the representatives of business and
industry has to accept a candid introspection and arrive at a code of discipline in any final
solution. And preventive action to be successful should start from the credit-recipient
level and then extend to the bankers. RBI and Government of India can positively
facilitate the process by providing enabling measures. Do not try to set right industry and
banks, but help industry and banks to set right themselves. The new tool of deregulated
approach has to be accepted in solving NPA.

REASONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF HUGE LEVEL OF NPAS IN THE

INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM (IBS):
The origin of the problem of burgeoning NPAs lies in the quality of managing
credit risk by the banks concerned. What is needed is having adequate preventive
measures in place namely, fixing pre-sanctioning appraisal responsibility and having an
effective post-disbursement supervision. Banks concerned should continuously monitor
loans to identify accounts that have potential to become non-performing.
To start with, performance in terms of profitability is a benchmark for any
business enterprise including the banking industry. However, increasing NPAs have a
direct impact on banks profitability as legally banks are not allowed to book income on
such accounts and at the same time banks are forced to make provision on such assets as
per the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines.

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Also, with increasing deposits made by the public in the banking system, the
banking industry cannot afford defaults by borrowers since NPAs affects the repayment
capacity of banks.
Further, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) successfully creates excess liquidity in the
system through various rate cuts and banks fail to utilize this benefit to its advantage due
to the fear of burgeoning non-performing assets.

Some of the other reasons were:

After the nationalization of banks sector wise allocation of credit disbursements

became compulsory.

Banks were compelled to give credit to even those sectors, which were not
considered to be very profitable, keeping in mind the federal policy.

People in the agricultural sector were hardly interested in returning the loans as
they were confident that the loans with the interest would be written off by the
successive governments.

The small scale industries also availed credit even though they were not sure of
performing to the extent of returning the loans.

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Banks were also not in the position to press enough securities to cover the loans in
calls of timings.

Even if the assets were provided they proved to be substandard assets as the
values that could be realized were very low.

Free distribution done during loan mails (congress regime) also contributed to
the heavy increase in NPAs.

The slackness in effort by the bank authorities to collect or recover loan advances
in time also contributes to the increase in NPAs.

Lack of accountability of the officers, who sanctioned the loans led to a caste
whole approach by the officers recovering the loans.

Loans sanctioned to under servicing candidates due to pressure from the

ministers and other politicians also led to the non recovery of debts.

Poor credit appraisal system, lack of vision while sanctioning credit limits.

Lack of proper monitoring.

Reckless advances to achieve the budgetary targets.

Lack of sincere corporate culture, inadequate legal provisions on foreclosure and

bankruptcy.

Change in economic policies/environment.

Lack of co-ordination between banks.

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Some of the internal factors of the organization leading to NPAs are:

Division of funds for expansion, diversification, modernization, undertaking

new projects and for helping associate concerns, this is coupled with
recessionary trends and failure to tap funds in the capital and debt markets.

Business failure( product, marketing etc.,),inefficient management, strained

labor

relations,

inappropriate technology, technical problems, product

obsolescence etc.,

Recession , shortage of input, power shortage, price escalation, accidents,

natural calamities, besides externalization problem in other countries leading
to non payment of overdue.

Time/cost overrun during the project implementation stage.

Government policies like changes in the excise duties, pollution control

orders.

Willful

default,

siphoning

off

of

funds,

fraud,

misappropriation,

promoters/directors disputes etc.,

Deficiencies on the part of the banks like delay in release of limits and delay
in release of payments/subsidies by the government.

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Operational definitions:
NPA: An asset is classified as non-performing asset (NPAs) if dues in the form of
principal and interest are not paid by the borrower for a period of 90 days.
Standard Assets: Such an asset is not a non-performing asset. In other words, it carries
not more than normal risk attached to the business.
Sub-standard Assets: It is classified as non-performing asset for a period not exceeding
18 months
Doubtful Assets: Asset that has remained NPA for a period exceeding 18 months is a
doubtful asset.
Loss Assets: Here loss is identified by the banks concerned or by internal auditors or by
external auditors or by Reserve Bank India (RBI) inspection
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR): It is the reserve which the banks have to maintain with itself
in the form of cash reserves or by way of current account with the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI), computed as a certain percentage of its demand and time liabilities. The objective
is to ensure the safety and liquidity of the deposits with the banks.
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR): It is the one which every banking company shall
maintain in India in the form of cash, gold or unencumbered approved securities, an
amount which shall not, at the close of business on any day be less than such percentage
of the total of its demand and time liabilities in India as on the last Friday of the second
preceding fortnight, as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) may specify from time to time.

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RBI GUIDELINES ON INCOME RECOGNITION (INTEREST INCOME ON

NPAs)
Income Recognition: Income from Non Performing Assets should not recognize on
accrual basis but should be booked as income only when it is actually received. Therefore
interest should not be charged and taken into income account till the account become
standard asset.

Interest charged to be stopped

Provision to be made

Over Due: Any amount due to the Bank under any credit facility is
Over due if it is not paid on the due date fixed by the Bank.
Out of Order: An account should be treated as out of order

If the outstanding balance remains continuously in excess of the sanctioned limit/

drawing power.

In cases where the outstanding balance in the principal operating account is less
than the sanctioned limit/ drawing power, but there are no credits continuously
for 90 days as on the date of Banks Balance Sheet or Where are credits are not
enough to cover the interest debited during the same period.

A Non Performing Asset shall be an advance where:

Term Loan: Interest and/ or installment of principal remain over due for a period of
more than 90 days.
Cash Credit/ Over Draft: If the account remains out of order for a period more than
90 days.
Bills: Overdue for a period of more than 90 days.
Other accounts: Any amount to be received remains overdue for a period of more than
90 days.
Short duration crops: If the installment of principal or interest there on remains
overdue for two crop seasons.

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Long duration crops: If installment of principal or interest there on remains overdue for
One Crop season.
An account would be classified as NPA only if the interest charged during any
quarter is not serviced fully within 90 days from the end of the quarter.

ASSET CLASSIFICATION
Standard Assets:
Is one which does not disclose any problem and which does not carry more than normal
risks attached to the business.
Substandard Assets:
Which has remained NPA for a period of less than or equal to 12 months.
Doubtful Assets:
If it has remained NPA for a period exceeding 12 months.
Loss Assets:
A loss asset is one where loss has been identified by the bank.

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RBI

GUIDELINES

ON

PROVISIONING

REQUIREMENT

OF

BANK

ADVANCES:
Loss Assets: 100% of the outstanding amount.
Doubtful Assets: 100% of unsecured portion.
Secured portion
Up to one year
One to three years
More than 3 years

20%
30%

1. Outstanding stock of NPA as on

75% w.e.f.31st March, 06

100% w.e.f.31st March,07

31.3.2004

100% w.e.f.31st March,05

2. Advances classified as doubtful more

than 3 years on or after 31.3.2004

Substandard Assets: Secured portion 10% and unsecured portion 20% on total
outstanding.
Standard Assets: A general provision of 0.40% (For direct Agriculture & SME Sector
0.25%). Provisioning for standard assets will be done at corporate office centrally.

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Calculation of Net NPA (Non Performing Asset)

Formula:
GROSS NPA
LESS: Balance in Interest Suspense Account
LESS: DICGC/ECGC Claims received but pending for adjustment
LESS: Part payment received and kept in suspense account
Illustration: (Based on annual reports of UTI bank 2005-06)
Particulars
Gross NPA of UTI for the year 2006
LESS: Balance from interest suspense account
LESS: DICGC/ECGC Claims received but pending for

Amount
37428
12704
36

adjustment
LESS: Part payment received and kept in Suspense A/c

2928

NET NON PERFORMING ASSETS

21760

NET NPA IN PERCENTAGE

0.97%

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THE NARASIMHAN COMMITTEE'S FIRST REPORT

The salient features of these reforms include:

Phasing out of statutory pre-emption - The SLR requirement have been brought
down from 38.5% to 25% and CRR requirement from 7.50% to 5.75%. (Presently
4.5%)

Deregulation of interest rates - All lending rates except for lending to small
borrowers and a part of export finance have been de-regulated. Interest on all
deposits are determined by banks except on savings deposits.

Capital adequacy - CAR of 9 % prescribed with effect from March 31, 2000.

Other prudential norms - Income recognition, asset classification and provisioning

norms has been made applicable. The provisioning norms are more prudent,
objective, transparent, and uniform and designed to avoid subjectivity.

Debt Recovery Tribunals - 22 DRTs and 5 DRATs have already been set up and 7
more DRTs will be set up during the current financial year. Comprehensive
amendment in the Act have been made to make the provisions for adjudication,
enforcement and recovery more effective.

Transparency in financial statements - Banks have been advised to disclose

certain key parameters such as CAR, percentage of NPAs, provisions for NPAs,
net value of investment, Return on Assets, profit per employee and interest
income as percentage to working funds.

Entry of new private sector banks - 9 new private sector banks have been set up
with a view to induce greater competition and for improving operational
efficiency of the banking system. Competition has been introduced in a controlled

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manner and today we have nine new private sector banks and 36 foreign banks in
India competing with the public sector banks both in retail and corporate banking

Functional autonomy - The minimum prescribed Government equity was brought

to 51%. Nine nationalized banks raised Rs.2855 crores from the market during
1994-2001. Banks Boards have been given more powers in operational matters
such as rationalization of branches, credit delivery and recruitment of staff.

Hiving off of regulatory and supervisory control - Board for financial supervision
was set up under the RBI in 1994 bifurcating the regulatory and supervisory
functions.

NARASIMHAN COMMITTEE- SECOND REPORT

The Narasimhan Committee on Banking Reforms, in its second report, has
combined drastic surgery with a strong dose of medicine to cure the ailing industry. Onperforming assets (NPAs) have been the bane of the industry. The panel has identified
poor credit decisions by managements, cyclical changes in the economic environment,
directed credit and crude forms of behest-lending as the factors responsible for poor asset
quality. The panel points a finger at priority sector credit as having a high contamination
coefficient and suggests that quantitative targets have caused erosion of asset quality. It
laments the fact that infusion of recapitalization funds notwithstanding, NPAs remain
uncomfortably high. Yet it recommends that advances covered by government guarantees
that have turned sticky should also be reckoned as net NPAs.
The Narasimhan Committee's solution for NPAs is the creation of an Asset
Reconstruction Fund (ARF), which will take over the bad debts of banks from their
balance sheets to enable them to start on a clean slate. Recapitalization through budgetary
infusion, the panel correctly points out, is not a sustainable option. But bankers are
skeptical about the workability of the ARF. A senior banker asked, "At what price will the
ARF take over my NPAs? How will the discount be worked out?" He said that the ARF

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cannot bail out banks under the present legal system. Although every bad debt is secured,
banks cannot encash the security because of legal hurdles. The Urban Land Ceiling Act is
a major deterrent to debt recovery. Bankers say that the legal system has to be revamped
to facilitate recovery so that the ARF can pick up "NPAs at a viable price".
The committee has recommended that net NPAs be brought down to less than 5
per cent by the year 2000 and 3 per cent by the year 2002. "Easier said than done," says a
top banker. "Already we do a lot of window-dressing. Outstanding accounts are shown as
priority lending to meet targets. We keep lending to defaulters to roll over the NPAs.
Fixing unrealistic targets will be counterproductive."
The committee has recommended that banks should not lend to defaulters, but
bankers say that this is unrealistic. They claim that in the absence of fresh loans, the
defaulting companies will close down, and leading to loss of jobs. "Will that be
acceptable?" asks a banker. Bankers also complain that they are forced by the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) to lend to sick companies, yet more often
than not there is no turnaround and the accounts turn bad.
Credit Risk and NPAs:
Quite often credit risk management (CRM) is confused with managing nonperforming assets (NPAs). However there is an appreciable difference between the two.
NPAs are a result of past action whose effects are realized in the present i.e. they
represent credit risk that has already materialized and default has already taken place.
On the other hand managing credit risk is a much more forward-looking approach
and is mainly concerned with managing the quality of credit portfolio before default takes
place. In other words, an attempt is made to avoid possible default by properly managing
credit risk. Considering the current global recession and unreliable information in
financial statements, there is high credit risk in the banking and lending business. To

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create a defense against such uncertainty, bankers are expected to develop an effective
internal credit risk models for the purpose of credit risk management.

Usage of financial statements in assessing the risk of default for lenders:

For banks and financial institutions, both the balance sheet and income statement
have a key role to play by providing valuable information on a borrowers viability.
However, the approach of scrutinizing financial statements is a backward looking
approach. This is because; the focus of accounting is on past performance and current
positions.
The key accounting ratios generally used for the purpose of ascertaining the
creditworthiness of a business entity are that of debt-equity ratio and interest coverage
ratio. Highly rated companies generally have low leverage. This is because; high leverage
is followed by high fixed interest charges, non-payment of which results into a default.
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of RBI and Basel committee on banking supervision
(BCBS):
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has issued capital adequacy norms for the Indian
banks. The minimum CAR which the Indian Banks are required to meet at all times is set
at 9%. It should be taken into consideration that the bank's capital refers to the ability of
bank to withstand losses due to risk exposures.
To be more precise, capital charge is a sort of regulatory cost of keeping loans
(perceived as risky) on the balance sheet of banks. The quality of assets of the bank and
its capital are often closely related. Quality of assets is reflected in the quantum of NPAs.

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By this, it implies that if the asset quality was poor, then higher would be the quantum of
non-performing assets and vice-versa.
Market risk is the risk arising due to the fluctuations in value of a portfolio due to
the volatility of market prices.
Operational risk refers to losses arising due to complex system and processes. It is
important for a bank to have a good capital base to withstand unforeseen losses. It
indicates the capability of a bank to sustain losses arising out of risky assets.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has also laid down certain
minimum risk based capital standards that apply to all internationally active commercial
banks. That is, bank's capital should at least be 8% of their risk-weighted assets. This
infact helps bank to provide protection to the depositors and the creditors.
The main objective here is to build a sort of support system to take care of
unexpected financial losses thereby ensuring healthy financial markets and protecting
depositors.
IMPACT OF EXCESS LIQUIDITY:
One should also not forget that the banks are faced with the problem of increasing
liquidity in the system. Further, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is increasing the liquidity in
the system through various rate cuts. Banks can get rid of its excess liquidity by
increasing its lending but, often shy away from such an option due to the high risk of
default. In order to promote certain prudential norms for healthy banking practices, most
of the developed economies require all banks to maintain minimum liquid and cash
reserves broadly classified into Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and the Statutory Liquidity
Ratio (SLR).
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) is the reserve which the banks have to maintain with
itself in the form of cash reserves or by way of current account with the Reserve Bank of

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India (RBI), computed as a certain percentage of its demand and time liabilities. The
objective is to ensure the safety and liquidity of the deposits with the banks.
On the other hand, Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) is the one which every
banking company shall maintain in India in the form of cash, gold or unencumbered
approved securities, an amount which shall not, at the close of business on any day be
less than such percentage of the total of its demand and time liabilities in India as on the
last Friday of the second preceding fortnight, as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) may
specify from time to time.
A rate cut (for instance, decrease in CRR) results into lesser funds to be locked up
in RBI's vaults and further infuses greater funds into a system. However, almost all the
banks are facing the problem of bad loans, burgeoning non-performing assets, thinning
margins, etc. as a result of which, banks are little reluctant in granting loans to corporates.
As such, though in its monetary policy RBI announces rate cut but, such news are
no longer warmly greeted by the bankers.
HIGH COST OF FUNDS DUE TO NPAs:
Quite often genuine borrowers face the difficulties in raising funds from banks
due to mounting NPAs. Either the bank is reluctant in providing the requisite funds to the
genuine borrowers or if the funds are provided, they come at a very high cost to
compensate the lenders losses caused due to high level of NPAs.
Therefore, quite often corporate prefer to raise funds through commercial papers
(CPs) where the interest rate on working capital charged by banks is higher.
With the enactment of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, banks can issue notices to the defaulters
to pay up the dues and the borrowers will have to clear their dues within 60 days. Once
the borrower receives a notice from the concerned bank and the financial institution, the

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secured assets mentioned in the notice cannot be sold or transferred without the consent
of the lenders.
The main purpose of this notice is to inform the borrower that either the sum due
to the bank or financial institution be paid by the borrower or else the former will take
action by way of taking over the possession of assets. Besides assets, banks can also
takeover the management of the company. Thus the bankers under the aforementioned
Act will have the much needed authority to either sell the assets of the defaulting
companies or change their management.
But the protection under the said Act only provides a partial solution. What banks
should ensure is that they should move with speed and charged with momentum in
disposing off the assets. This is because as uncertainty increases with the passage of time,
there is all possibility that the recoverable value of asset also reduces and it cannot fetch
good price. If faced with such a situation than the very purpose of getting protection
under the Securitization Act, 2002 would be defeated and the hope of seeing a must have
growing banking sector can easily vanish.
Non Performing Assets of New Private Sector Banks-Sector wise (2006 data)
Centurion Bank of Panjab Ltd

Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

10.68

3.39

Small Scale Industries

11.23

3.57

Others

8.99

2.85

HDFC Bank Ltd

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Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

22.85

3.92

Small Scale Industries

19.15

3.28

Others

174.26

29.88

Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

45.65

2.05

Small Scale Industries

35.58

1.60

Others

13.06

0.59

Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

110.37

41.06

Small Scale Industries

12.92

4.81

Others

24.80

9.23

ICICI Bank Ltd.

Indusind Bank Ltd

Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd

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Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

3.26

8.17

Small Scale Industries

Others

15.36

38.49

Sector

Amount( in Crore)

Percentage to total

Agriculture

56.71

15.17

Small Scale Industries

13.84

3.70

Others

0.30

0.08

UTI Bank Ltd

RECOVERY MEASURES:
s

Broadly speaking, recovery measures could be classified into two categories,

namely, legal measures and non-legal measures.
Legal Measures
1. Debt Recovery Tribunals(DRT)
In the context of recovery from NPAs DRT are assuming great importance since
efforts are on to set up & more DRT during this year and also to strengthen them.
Though the recovery through DRT is at present less than two per cent of the claim

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amount, banks and Fls have to depend heavily on them. Efforts are on to amend the
recovery act to assign more powers to DRTs. More importantly, the borrowers tendency
to challenge the verdict of the Appellate Tribunals in the High court to seek naturaljustice needs to be checked, Otherwise, early recovery efforts through DRTs would be
futile.

Secondly, training of presiding officers of Tribunals about the intricacies of

banking practices is very essential. Further, the numbers of recovery officers have to be
enhanced in every DRT for effective recovery. Finally, banks and Fls have to come
forward to provide liberal help to DRTs to equip them in terms of infrastructure,
manpower, etc.

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2. National Company Law Tribunal :

As per the announcement made in the Budget-2001-02, Sick Industrial Company
Act will be repealed and Board for Industrial Finance and Reconstruction will be woundup. As an alternative arrangement, it is proposed to set up NCLT by amending the
Companies Act 1956. In August 2001, the NCLT is expected to consolidate the powers
of BIFR, High court and Company Law Board to avoid multiplicity of forums. In
matters of rehabilitation of sick units, all concerned parties are supposed to abide by the
orders of NCLT.

There shall be 10 benches, which will deal with rehabilitation,

reconstruction and winding-up of companies. It is estimated to complete the entire

process during a period of 2-3 years as against 20-27 years presently taken. The Tribunal
will have, in addition, powers of contempt of court.
A rehabilitation and revival fund will be constituted to make interim payment of
dues to workers of a company declared sick or is under liquidation, protection of assets of
sick company and rehabilitate sick companies. While NCLT will be acting on the lines of
BIFR in the matters of rehabilitation viability of the projects will be assessed on cash test
and not in the present test of net-time limit for completing each formality relating to
rehabilitation and winding-up. Though the Bill is well drafted to ensure NCLT to become
time wise, and more effective than BIFR in respect of rehabilitation and winding-up,
doubts are raised about the implementation of the Bill taking into account the present
political economy. In any case, it is too early to comment.

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3. Corporate Debt Restructuring Body

A need was felt to special agency to facilitate debt restructuring because there has
been some hesitancy on the part of Bank and financial institution to implement RBI
guidelines on debt restructuring recently three-tire body, CDR has been set up to
coordinate corporate debt restructuring program. It is yet to be operationalized CDR
consist of Forum Group and cell. While the forum evolves broad policy guidelines, the
group takes decisions on the proposals pecommended by the Cell. Initially, the borrower
approaches his Lead bank/FI with a request to restructure debt which in turn puts up the
proposal to the Cell. The CDR Covers only multiple banking accounts enjoying credit
facilities exceeding Rs.20crore. Cases of DRT, BIFR and willful defaults, doubtful and
loss accounts and suit-filed cased are outside the purview of the CDR. Thus standard and
sub-standard accounts are only eligible to seek CDR shelter. Decisions of the group are
based on the super majority principle. If 75 percent of the secured creditors agree to the
rehabilitation plan, it is binding on the other banks/Fis.
The CDR is a voluntary system based on debtor- creditor agreement and intercreditors agreement. No banker/borrower can take recourse to any legal action during the
stand-still period of 90-180 days. Lastly, CDR will observe the RBI Guideline on Debt
Restructuring issued in March 2006. While the arrangements under CDR seem to be
feasible from the debt restructuring perspective, its success depends upon the cooperation
extended by borrowers and bankers, on the one hand, and understanding among banks

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and Fis, on the other. Doubts are raised about the implementation of these agreements
taking into the present working of the loan consortium arrangements.
4. Asset Reconstruction Corporation.
It is proposed to set up ARCs in the private sector to take over NPAs in the public
sector banks. The RBI will be the regulator of these ATCs. The ARC will buy NPAs of
the banks and financial institutions at the pre-determined discounted value and issue NPA
redemption bonds, which carry a fixed return. ARCs are expected to be managed by
professionals to effect maximum recovery of NPA, which will help in redemption of
bonds after some time. The Finance Ministry has finalized the draft Bill to set up ARCs.
Though the proposed scheme seems to be attractive, its success will depend upon the
efficiency of DRTs and courts. Further, if ARC is going to depend on the staff deputed by
weak banks, its recovery chances are doubtful.
5. Company Mergers.
Under the Companies Act, 1956, mergers are permitted. In 1977, Sec 72-A was
inserted in the Income Tax Act to offer tax incentives to healthy companies which take
over the sick companies and prepare revival plans. Response to this scheme formalities
as per the instructions of the High Court and Income Tax Department. Tax incentives are
found to be inadequate to motivate healthy companies to come forward and take
advantage of the scheme. Recovery of bank dues on company-mergers is not assured
since hardly 7.8 per cent of sick companies are successfully revived. Encouraged by the
success achieved in company mergers in developed countries, a review of the scheme
under section 72-A of IT Act is called for.

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NON LEGAL MEASURES

1. Reminder System
The cheapest mode of recovery is by sending reminders to the borrowers before
the loan installment falls due. Generally, response to this arrangement particularly from
honest borrowers is encouraging. But efforts need to be strengthened in banks in
sending reminders on timely basis.
2. Visit to Borrowers Business Premise/Residence
This is a more dependable measure of recovery. Visits need to be properly
planned. Involvement of staff at all levels in the bank branch is called for. Costs
involved in recovery need to be kept to the minimum. Frequent visits are called for in
case of hardcore borrowers. Over the years, it is observed that the number and quality of
visits are going down. Consequently, the recovery process is affected.
3. Recovery Camps
In respect of agricultural advances, recovery camps should be organized during
the harvest season. To ensure maximum advantage, recovery camps need to be properly
planned. It is also essential to take the help of outsiders, particularly, revenue officers in
the state government, local panchayat officials, regional

approach

to give a wide

publicity of the recovery camps to be organized in the local area, mobilize as many
farmers as possible and motivate the staff to get involved in the recovery drive.

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4. Rephrasing Unpaid Loan Installments

In respect of small advances, bankers need to be system pathetic in respect of
sincere and hardworking borrowers. If such borrowers fail to pay loan installments due
to natural calamities or for some other convincing reasons, unpaid loan installments may
be replased/rescheduled. Bankers efforts need to be strengthened in the regard.
5. Rehabilitation of Sick Units
Sick units both in SSI and non SSI sectors should be identified on timely basis
keeping in mind the official definitions. Causes of sickness should be genuine. If the
project is found viable in terms of Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), rehabilitation
package has to be prepared keeping in mind the broad parameters suggested by the RBI.
The package should be implemented at the earliest by the bank and the borrower. Close
monitoring of the progress of implementation is called for. There are several success
stories on rehabilitation of sick units. But in general, it is observed that the success rate
in revival of sickness is discouraging. Further, in the process of financial sector reforms,
banks and Fis are hesitant to rehabilitate due to the threat of failure in rehabilitation.
Recently, the RBI has permitted banks not to make provision for sick SSI units during the
first year of implementation. New guidelines on rehabilitation of sick SSI units will also
be issued soon by the RBI. For successful rehabilitation, it is essential to create a
sense of urgency on the part of both banks and borrowers. Efforts on the part of the
government in terms of concessions, reliefs etc. Should be made on timely basis.
Understanding between bank and SFCs should be strengthened. Above all, stern action
against willful defaulters is called for.

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6. Loan Compromise
This is the last resort of recovery.

This should be voluntary. It calls for a

professional approach in preparing the compromise proposal for which each bank is
expected to introduce a scheme. Committee approach should be adopted to decide on the
loan compromise. Delays in taking decisions should be avoided. Recently, one Time
Settlement (OTS) scheme was introduced by the RBI. The overall response to the
scheme was limited. Hence, each bank is expected to come out with its own OTS
scheme. In addition, training of operating staff is essential to change their mindset. For
effective recovery, loan compromise should be taken up on priority basis.
7. Appointment of Professional Agencies for Recovery
Recently, IBA has worked out certain guidelines for banks on matters concerning
the appointment of outside professional agencies whose services can be utilized to
ascertain the whereabouts of the borrowers and enforcement of securities. There is some
hesitancy on the part of public sector banks in engaging them for recovery purposes due
to unpleasant experiences in certain cases. But during the post VRS scenario, it is
suggested to seek such outsourcing. This should be done after examining the credentials
of the professionals. It is also essential to keep a constant vigil on their practice.

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Unit Trust of India Bank

UTI Bank was the first of the new private banks to have begun operations in
1994, after the Government of India allowed new private banks to be established. The
Bank was promoted jointly by the Administrator of the specified undertaking of the, Unit
Trust of India.

Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC)

General Insurance Corporation Ltd.

Other four PSU companies, i.e.

National Insurance Company Ltd.,
The New India Assurance Company,
The Oriental Insurance Corporation and United Insurance Company Ltd.
The Bank today is capitalized to the extent of Rs. 280.51 Crores with the public

holding

(other

than

promoters)

at

72.46

%.

The Bank's Registered Office is at Ahmedabad and its Central Office is located at
Mumbai. Presently the Bank has a very wide network of more than 469 branch offices
and Extension Counters. The Bank has a network of over 2016 ATMs providing 24hrs a
day banking convenience to its customers. This is one of the largest ATM networks in the
country.
The Bank has strengths in both retail and corporate banking and is committed to
adopting the best industry practices internationally in order to achieve excellence.
Mission of UTI Bank:

Customer Service and Product Innovation tuned to diverse needs of individual

and corporate clientele.

Continuous technology upgradation while maintaining human values.

Progressive globalization and achieving international standards.

Efficiency and effectiveness built on ethical practices.

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Core Values

Customer Satisfaction through

--Providing quality service effectively and efficiently

--Smile, it enhances your face value" is a service quality stressed on
--Periodic Customer Service Audits

Maximization of Stakeholder value

Success through Teamwork, Integrity and People

Promoters:
UTI Bank Ltd. has been promoted by the largest and the best Financial Institution of the
country, UTI. The Bank was set up with a capital of Rs. 115 crore, with

UTI contributing Rs. 100 crore,

LIC - Rs. 7.5 crore and

GIC and its four subsidiaries contributing Rs. 1.5 crore each.

Board of Directors:
The Bank has 12 members on the Board. Dr. P. J. Nayak is the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Bank.
The members of the Board are :
Dr. P. J. Nayak

Chairman & Managing Director

Shri Surendra Singh

Director

Shri N.C. Singhal

Director

Shri A.T. Pannir Selvam

Director

Shri J.R. Varma

Director

Dr. R. H. Patil

Director

Smt. Rama Bijapurkar

Director

Shri R B L Vaish

Director

Shri S. Chatterjee

Executive Director (Whole Time Director)

Shri S B Mathur

Director

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Shri M V Subbiah

Director

Shri Ramesh Ramanathan

Director

History of UTI Bank

1993- The Bank was incorporated on 3rd December and Certificate of business on14th
December. The Bank transacts banking business of all description. UTI Bank Ltd. was
promoted by Unit Trust of India, Life Insurance Corporation of India, General Insurance
Corporation of India and its four subsidiaries.
- The bank was the first private sector bank to get a license under the new guidelines
issued by the RBI

1994 First branch of UTI Bank inaugurated at Ahmedabad by Dr. Manmohan Singh,
Hon'ble Finance Minister, Government of India.

1995 Completes first profitable year in operation

1996 Crosses Rs.1000 crore deposit mark
1997 The Bank obtained license to act as Depository Participant with NSDL and
applied for registration with SEBI to act as `Trustee to Debenture Holders'.
- Rupees 100 crores was contributed by UTI, the rest from LIC Rs 7.5 crores,
GIC and its four subsidiaries Rs 1.5 crores each.

1998 The Bank has 28 branches in urban and semi urban areas as on 31st July. All
the branches are fully computerised and networked through VSAT. ATM
services are available in 27 branches.
- The Bank came out with a public issue of 1,50,00,000 No. of equity shares of
Rs 10 each at a premium of Rs 11 per share aggregating to Rs 31.50 crores and
Offer for sale of 2,00,00,000 No. of equity shares for cash at a price of Rs 21
per share. Out of the public issue 2,20,000 shares were reserved for allotment
on preferencial basis to employees of UTI Bank. Balance of 3,47,80,000
shares were offered to the public.

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- The company offers ATM cards, using which account-holders can withdraw
money from any of the bank's ATMs across the country which are interconnected by VSAT.
- UTI Bank has launched a new retail product with operational flexibility for its
customers.
- UTI Bank will sign a co-brand agreement with the market, leader, Citibank NA
for entering into the highly promising credit card business.
- UTI Bank promoted by India's pioneer mutual fund Unit Trust of India along
with LIC, GIC and its four subsidiaries.

1999 - UTI Bank and Citibank have launched an international co-branded credit card.
- UTI Bank and Citibank have come together to launch an international co
branded credit card under the MasterCard umbrella.
- UTI Bank Ltd has inaugurated an off site ATM at Ashok Nagar here, taking the
total number of its off site ATMs to 13.m
2000 -The Bank has announced the launch of Tele-Depository Services for its
depository clients.
- UTI Bank has launch of `iConnect', its Internet banking Product.
-UTI Bank has signed a memorandum of understanding with equitymaster.com
for e-broking activities of the site.
- Infinity.com financial Securities Ltd., an e-broking outfit is typing up with UTI
Bank for a banking interface.
- Geojit Securities Ltd, the first company to start online trading services, has
signed a MoU with UTI Bank to enable investors to buy\sell demat stocks
through the company's website.
- Indiabulls has signed a memorandum of understanding with UTI Bank.
- UTI Bank has entered into an agreement with Stock Holding Corporation of
India for providing loans against shares to SCHCIL's customers and funding
investors in public and rights issues.

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- UTI Bank has tied up with L&T Trade.com for providing customized online
trading solution for brokers.

2001 - UTI Bank launched a private placement of non-convertible debentures to rise up

to Rs 75 crore. - UTI Bank has opened two offsite ATMs and one extension
counter with an ATM in Mangalore, taking its total number of ATMs across the
country to 355.
- UTI Bank has recorded a 62 per cent rise in net profit for the quarter ended
September 30, 2001, at Rs 30.95 crore. For the second quarter ended September
30, 2000, the net profit was Rs 19.08 crore. The total income of the bank during
the quarter was up 53 per cent at Rs 366.25 crore.
2002 - UTI Bank Ltd has informed BSE that Shri B R Barwale has resigned as a
Director of the Bank w.e.f. January 02, 2002. A C Shah, former chairman of
Bank of Baroda, also retired from the bank's board in the third quarter of last
year. His place continues to be vacant. M Damodaran took over as the director
of the board after taking in the reins of UTI. B S Pandit has also joined the
bank's board subsequent to the retirement of K G Vassal.
- UTI Bank Ltd has informed that Shri Paul Fletcher has been appointed as an
Additional Director Nominee of CDC Financial Service (Mauritius) Ltd of the
Bank.And Shri Donald Peck has been appointed as an Additional Director
(nominee of South Asia Regional Fund) of the Bank.
- UTI Bank Ltd has informed that on laying down the office of Chairman of LIC
on being appointed as Chairman of SEBI, Shri G N Bajpai, Nominee Director of
LIC has resigned as a Director of the Bank.
2002 - B Paranjpe & Abid Hussain cease to be the Directors of UTI Bank.
- UTI Bank Ltd has informed that in the meeting of the Board of Directors
following decisions were taken: Mr Yash Mahajan, Vice Chairman and

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Managing Director of Punjab Tractors Ltd was appointed as an Additional

Director with immediate effect. Mr N C Singhal former Vice Chairman and
Managing Director of SCICI was appointed as an Additional Director with
immediate effect.
- UTI Bank Ltd has informed BSE that a meeting of the Board of Directors of the
Bank is scheduled to be held on October 24, 2002 to consider and take on record
the unaudited half yearly/quarterly financial results of the Bank for the half
year/Quarter ended September 30, 2002.
-UTI Bank Ltd has informed that Shri J M Trivedi has been appointed as an
alternate director to Shri Donald Peck with effect from November 2, 2002.
2003 -UTI Bank Ltd has informed BSE that at the meeting of the Board of Directors of
the company held on January 16, 2003, Shri R N Bharadwaj, Managing Director
of LIC has been appointed as an Additional Director of the Bank with immediate
effect.
- UTI Bank, the private sector bank has opeaned a branch at Nellore. The bank's
Chairman and Managing Director, Dr P.J. Nayak, inaugurating the bank branch
at GT Road on May 26. Speaking on the occasion, Dr Nayak said, "This marks
another step towards the extensive customer banking focus that we are providing
across the country and reinforces our commitment to bring superior banking
services, marked by convenience and closeness to customers.
-UTI has been authorised to launch 16 ATMs on the Western Railway Stations of
Mumbai Division.
-UTI filed suit against financial institutions IFCI Ltd in the debt recovery tribunal
at Mumbai to recover Rs.85cr in dues.
-UTI bank made an entry to the Food Credit Programme, it has made an entry
into the 59 cluster which includes private sector, public sector, old private sector
and co-operative banks.
- Shri Ajeet Prasad, Nminee of UTI has resigned as the director of the bank.

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- Banks Chairman and MD Dr.P.J.Nayak inaugurated a new branch at Nellore.

-UTI bank allots shares under Employee Stock Option Scheme to its employees.
-UTI Bank ties up with UK govt fund for contract farming
-Shri B S Pandit, nominee of the Administrator of the Specified Undertaking of the
Unit Trust of India (UTI-I) has resigned as a director from the Bank w.e.f
November 12, 2003.

2004 -Comes out with Rs. 500 mn Unsecured Redeemable Non-Convertible Debenture
Issue, issue fully subscribed
-UTI Bank Ltd has informed that Shri Ajeet Prasad, Nominee of the
Administrator of the Specified Undertaking of the Unit Trust of India (UTI - I)
has been appointed as an Additional Director of the Bank w.e.f. January 20,
2004.
-UTI Bank opens new branch in Udupi
-UTI Bank ties up with Shriram Group Cos
-Unveils premium payment facility through ATMs applicable to LIC & UTI Bank
customers
-Metaljunction (MJ)- the online trading and procurement joint venture of Tata
Steel and Steel Authority of India (SAIL)- has roped in UTI Bank to start off
own equipment for Tata Steel.
-DIEBOLD Systems Private Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Diebold
Incorporated, has secured a major contract for the supply of ATMs and services
to UTI Bank
-HSBC completes acquisition of 14.6% stake in UTI Bank for $67.6 m
-UTI Bank installs ATM in Thiruvananthapuram
-Launches `Remittance Card' in association with Remit2India, a Web site offering
money-transfer services

2005: UTI Bank appointed by Government of Karnataka as the sole banker for the
Bangalore One (B1) project.
- UTI Bank launches a powerful version of Kisan Credit Card.

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8-

- UTI Bank gets listed on the London Stock Exchange, raises US$ 239.30 million
through Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs).
- UTI Bank and Bajaj Allianz join hands to distribute general insurance products.
- UTI Bank and Visa International launch Mobile Refill facility - Anytime,
Anywhere Pre-Paid Mobile Refill for all Visa Cardholders in India.
- UTI Bank wins International Financing Review (IFR) Asia India Bond House
award for the year 2005.
- UTI Bank extends banking services to the rural milk producers in Anand and
Kheda districts in Gujarat.

2006: UTI Bank and UTI Mutual Fund to launch a new service for sale and redemption
of mutual fund schemes through the Banks ATMs across the country.
- UTI Bank opens its first international branch in Singapore.
- UTI Bank and LIC join hands to launch an Annuity Card for group
pensioners of LIC.
- UTI Bank ties up with Geojit Financial Services to offer Online Trading service
to its customers.

-4
9-

SWOT Analysis
Weakness

Strength
UTI Bank has been in the banking

industry

since

1994.

It

Tedious procedures have to be

has

followed before advancing loans

successfully completed 12 years in

causing inconvenience to customers.

the Banking industry.

The bank has a sound network i.e
Anywhere Banking facility in 450
Branches and 1891ATM's at strategic
locations in India.
UTI Bank stands one among the top

ten banks in India and is ranked 1st

in growth in business
The

bank

is

having

well

experienced, trained, most dedicated

and committed staff.
In has a strong customer base.

Opportunities
Global

aspirations

of

Indian

consumers and growing integration

with NRIs.
The bank can optimize the growth
opportunities arising out of retail
banking and small and medium
enterprises (SMEs).
Further expansion of ATMs networks

Threat
Bank is facing competition from its
other Private Sector Banks and even
the foreign Banks
Changing economic policies of
Government

will

have

serious

impact on interest rates and reserve

ratio maintained with RBI

and possible arrangements of sharing

networks of other banks by issuing

-5
0-

mutual funds and insurance.

Products and Services of UTI Bank
Consumer banking
UTI Bank is providing in consumer banking the following products and services: Savings Account
Salary Power
Power Salute
Priority Banking
Women Account
Senior Privilege
AZAADI"- No Frills Savings Account
RFC (D) Account
Fixed Deposits
Recurring Deposits
Lockers
Debit Card
Travel Currency Card
Encash 24
Remittance Card
Visa Money Transfer
Power Transfer
Current Account
Normal Current Account
Business Advantage Account
Business Classic Account
Business Privilege Account
Channel One

-5
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Demand drafts at correspondent bank locations available at very nominal charges.

Free Pay Order facility.
Free Demand Drafts
Intercity Cash Deposit
Intercity Cash Withdrawal
Home Branch Cash Withdrawal
Retail loans - UTI Bank is providing following loan facilities to the customers in retail
loan section.
Power Drive
Power Home
Asset Power
Personal Power
Loans against Securities
Consumer Power
Study Power
Corporate banking - In corporate banking UTI Bank is providing following services.
Cash Management Services
Lending/Financing
Trade Service
Current Account
Fixed Deposits

-5
2-

Lending/Financing
Working capital finance
Cash credit / working capital demand loan
Loan against FCNR (B) deposit
Term lending
Project loan
Bill finance supply / purchase bills
Channel finance
Asset securitization
Line of credit
Bank guarantees
Trade Service
Trade Finance
Bills Discounting
L/C Backed bill discounting
Drawee Bill Discounting
Drawer Bill Discounting
Financial advisory service
It is banks endeavor to offer customer complete personal finance solutions.
Through banks financial Advisory Services bank understand customers investment
requirements and design tailor made financial solutions for them.
Beyond merely advising customers, Bank will also help the customers to invest in
a variety of instruments including.

-5
3-

 Mutual Funds
Bank assurance
Equity
Tax consultancy
IPO Buzz
Fixed Income Products
Portfolio Tracker
NRI SERVICES
In UTI Bank, realize that as an NRI, customer banking needs are special. And in
keeping with this philosophy, and offer valued NRI customers a plethora of services
customized to their needs, such as
The entire bouquet of NRI Deposit Products & Services.
International Debit Card with Accident Insurance cover
Free Internet Banking facility
Portfolio Investment scheme for capital market transactions.
Correspondent Banking/Remittance arrangements in all major currencies

Capital markets
Depository Services
eDepository Services
Debenture Trusteeship
Clearing bank for NSE/BSE/OTECI

-5
4-

 Clearing Members for Derivatives Segment

Broker Financing
Issue Management
M&A Advisory
IPO Funding
Online Trading

Government Business
UTI Bank is the First Private Sector Bank to be authorised by the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) and Government of India for collecting Taxes on behalf of a State
Government. The Bank is handling Collection of Commercial Taxes in the twin cities of
Hyderabad and Secunderabad for Govt. of Andhra Pradesh since July 2001.
UTI Bank is now authorised by Reserve Bank of India and Govt. of India for
conducting all Central Government and State Government Business commencing with
October 1, 2003. The authorisation means the Bank can undertake the following
business on behalf of Central and State Governments:
Treasury
Foreign Exchange Desk
International Banking
Money Market Desk
Constituent SGL Facility
Retail G-sec
Deposit Rate
Newsletter
Foreign Exchange

-5
5-

-5
6-

Findings
And
-5
7-

Analysis

Design of the study

Title of the project:
Non Performing Assets and its impact on Profitability of New Private Sector
Banks.

Scope of study: Scope of my study restricted only to 7 New Private Sector Banks NPA
datas and Advances, and for Comparison of Credit risk path 7 old selected Private Banks
are taken.
Need For Study:

This study will help to know the recent norms of NPA.

This study helps to know how NPA Causing Problems to Banking Sector and
what might be the solution to overcome from this problem and also its impact on
Profitability of New Profit Banks.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

-5
8-

Profitability is considered as a benchmark for evaluating performance of any

business enterprise including the banking industry.

However, increasing Non-

Performing Assets, have a direct impact on profitability of banks and financial

institutions. Legally speaking banks and financial institutions are not allowed to book
income on such account and at the same times they are forced to make provision on such
assets. So This project is undertaken to now impact of NPA on Profitability of New
Private Sector Banks.

Objectives of Study
6. To study the RBI norms on Non Performing Assets, and the various reasons for
the existence of huge level of NPA in Indian banking.
7. To know the performance comparison of New Private Banks Non performing
asset for past 3 years.
8. To know the impact of non performing assets on profitability of New Private
Banks, and comparison of credit risk path of New Private Banks with 7 selected
Old Private Banks.
9. To study the various steps taken by the banks to bring down the NPAs in
respective bank branches.
10. To recommend measures for Improving performance and reduction of Non
Performing Assets.

Methodology
Primary Data:

-5
9-

Views of the concerned officials were gathered by directly interacting with them, and
such data was found very useful while analyzing and drawing conclusions.
Secondary Data:

Recent RBI norms of NPA.

IBA Bulletin 0f 2005-06 is referred to collect data for Net NPA, and Advances.

Web site of UTI Bank and other Web sites.

Plan of analysis:
In this study quadrant analysis is used on the calculated figures.
Limitations:

The study is based mostly on secondary data.

Data has been drawn from journals, so information may not be complete.

For the analysis only the advances and NPA percentages of banks and operating
profit, provisions and contingencies as a whole and net profit of New PSBs are
taken into consideration.

Impact of Provisions and Contingencies on Net Profit of New Private Banks.

Performance comparison of New Private Sector Banks Operating Profit of 3 years
S No

Banks

Operating Profit ( in Crore)

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
103
19
-

Bank of Panjab Ltd*

2
3
4
5
6

Centurion Bank Ltd*

HDFC Bank Ltd
ICICI Bank Ltd
Indusind Bank Ltd.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.

12
1008
2481
445
127

31
1344
2956
401
133

148
1979
4691
225
211

7
8

UTI Bank Ltd

Yes Bank

698
-

566
(4)

994
99

-6
0-

Interpretation: As we seen in graph ICICI Bank Ltd. Operating Profit is increasing year
by year followed by HDFC Bank Ltd.
Performance

comparison

of

New

Private

Sector

Banks

Provisions

and

Contingencies of 3 years

S No

Banks

Bank of Panjab Ltd*

2
3

Centurion Bank Ltd*

HDFC Bank Ltd

Provisions and Contingencies ( in Crore)

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
66
81
117
498

6
678

60
1108

-6
1-

4
5
6
7
8

ICICI Bank Ltd

Indusind Bank Ltd.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
UTI Bank Ltd
Yes Bank

844
183
48
420
-

951
191
49
231
0

2151
188
92
509
44

Interpretation:
ICICI Bank Ltd making large Provisions for losses compares to HDFC Bank Ltd and UTI
Bank Ltd may be because of their credit worthiness.

-6
2-

Performance comparison of New Private Sector Banks Net Profit 3 years

S No

Banks

Bank of Panjab Ltd*

2003-04
37

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Centurion Bank Ltd*

HDFC Bank Ltd
ICICI Bank Ltd
Indusind Bank Ltd.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
UTI Bank Ltd
Yes Bank

(105)
510
1637
262
79
278
-

Net Profit (in Crore)

2004-05
2005-06
(61)
25
666
2005
210
85
335
(4)

88
871
2540
37
118
485
55

-6
3-

Interpretation:
ICICI Bank Ltd and HDFC Bank LTD Net Profit is Increasing Even though lot of Money
has spent on Provision and Contingency. It may be because of their risk taking ability.

-6
4-

Analysis of above data:

As we see the above graphs, ICICI Bank Ltd Operating Profit is increasing year
by year followed by HDFC Bank Ltd. UTI Bank Ltd Operating Profit is decreased in
2004-05 but its suddenly increased to 994crore in 2005-2006. But Bank of Panjab Ltd
Operating Profit for 2003-04 is 103 crore but suddenly it decreases to 19 crore 1n 200405, then it amalgamated with Centurian Bank Whose Operating Profit is Comparatively
Low in 2003-04 and 2004-05 after amalgamation it increases to 148crore. Even Indusind
Bank Ltd Operating Profit is go on Decreasing and as Yes Bank is very new so initially it
had made loss of 4crore but made 99crore operating profit in 2005-06.
Provisions and Contingencies made by ICICI Bank Ltd and HDFC Bank Ltd is
Comparatively high it may be because of risk taking ability and have strong financial
background with more experience, And also these banks are able to provide adequate
finance to Different Sectors. As we seen UTI Bank Ltd Operating Profit in 2004-05
decreased and in 2005-06 increased so the Provisions made is low in 2004-05 but high in
2005-06 it may be because of large advances made by bank in 2005-06. But Bank of
Panjab Ltd Operating Profit gone down in 2004-05 to 19crore but it has incurred to make
81crore Provisions and Contingencies it may be because of wrong Strategy made by bank
to provide finance and to maintain operating Profit, same situation has faced by
Centurion

Bank

Ltd

in

the

year

2005-06.

So

only

Both

Bank of Panjab Ltd and Centurion Bank Ltd Amalgamated to make strong finance
Background. Indusind Bank Operating Profit coming down year by year. Kotak Mahindra
is performing better enough next to ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, UTI Bank. As Yes Bank is
new so initially it incurred 4crore loss so no provisions were made but it made Provisions
in 2005-06.
ICICI Bank Ltd, HDFC Bank Ltd and UTI Bank Ltd had comparatively high Net
Profit it may be because of risk taking ability and strong financial background with more
experience. As heavy Provisions were incurred by Bank of Panjab Ltd and Centurion
Bank Ltd till 2004-05 had amalgamated to make Positive Net profit and named

-6
5-

themselves as Centurion Bank of Panjab Ltd. Indusind Bank have to adopt different
strategy to increase net profit as it incurring loss from past 3 years.
Analysis of Gross and Net NPA by taking 3 years Advances paid by New Private
Sector Bank.
Bank of Panjab Ltd
Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
2709
2520
-

NPA
168
126
-

NPA(%)
6.20
5.00
-

Advances
2353
2417
-

NPA
126
112
-

NPA(%)
5.35
4.64
-

Centurion Bank Ltd

Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
1705
2291
6848

NPA
221
156
315

NPA(%)
12.96
6.81
4.6

Advances
1556
2194
6533

NPA
69
55
74

NPA(%)
4.43
2.49
1.13

Intrepretation:
As Bank of Panjab Ltd and Centurion Bank has amalgamated in 2005 September, so we
can see a decrease in Gross NPA from 12.96% to 4.6% and Net NPA decreases to
1.13%. Of course it is a good sign to the company as it came below 5%, because if NPA
ratio of any Bank is more than 5% then it is said that the Banks need to adopt proper
strategy for recovery of debt.

-6
6-

HDFC Bank Ltd

Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
18064
25976
36357

NPA
336
439
509

NPA(%)
1.86
1.69
1.40

Advances
17745
25566
35061

NPA
28
61
155

NPA(%)
0.16
0.24
0.44

Interpretation:
From the above table we can see that Gross NPA of HDFC Bank Ltd has decreasing from
1.86 to 1.40 from 2003-04 to 2005-06. This accomplishment is on account of credit
growth, which was higher than the growth of Gross NPA and not through appreciable
recovery of NPA. There is neither reduction nor even containment of the threat because
as we seen increase in Net NPA from Past 3 years.
ICICI Bank Ltd
Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
65106
91920
148200

NPA
3060
3925
2223

NPA(%)
4.70
4.27
1.50

Advances
64948
91405
146163

NPA
1423
1505
1053

NPA(%)
2.19
1.65
0.72

Interpretation:
From above table we can see that Gross NPA of ICICI Bank Ltd has decreasing from 4.70
to 1.50 from 2003-04 to 2005-06. This accomplishment is on account of credit growth,
which was higher than the growth of Gross NPA and not through appreciable recovery of
NPA. There is neither reduction nor even containment of the threat. ICICI Bank Ltd is
providing high advances compare to other banks in 2005-2006.

-6
7-

Indusind Bank Ltd

Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
7848
9093
9376

NPA
259
321
269

NPA(%)
3.3
3.53
2.90

Advances
7301
9000
9310

NPA
212
244
195

NPA(%)
2.90
2.71
2.09

Interpretation:
Indusind Bank need to adopt strategy in reducing NPA as its advances were more in
2004-05 and also Gross NPA has increased it may be because of their credit worth. And
again it decreases Gross NPA in 2005-06 this ups and down can affect credit worthiness
of the bank.
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.
Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
2105
4058
6353

NPA
20
28
38

NPA(%)
0.95
0.69
0.60

Advances
2097
4017
6349

NPA
3
15
15

NPA(%)
0.14
0.37
0.24

Interpretation:
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd Net NPA is Increasing from 2003-04 to 2004-05 and again it
decreases to 0.24 in 2005-06. it implied that NPA of Kotak Mahindra Bank are in ups and
down it may be because of any natural calamities or change in recovery measures etc.
but Gross NPA and Net NPA of Kotak Mahindra Bank is less than 1%. So its good sign to
Bank.

UTI Bank Ltd

-6
8-

Banks

Gross

Gross

Gross

Net

Net

Net

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06

Advances
9386
15628
22400

NPA
275
311
374

NPA(%)
2.93
1.99
1.70

Advances
9363
15603
22314

NPA
112
217
218

NPA(%)
1.20
1.39
0.98

Interpretation
UTI Bank Ltd Gross and Net NPA has decreases from 2.93 to 1.70 and 1.20 to 0.98
respectively from 2003-04 to 2005-06. This accomplishment is on account of credit
growth, which was higher than the growth of Gross NPA and not through appreciable
recovery of NPA. There is neither reduction nor even containment of the threat.

Performance Comparison of Net NPA of New Private Sector Banks

New PSBs

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

4.69

4.64

-6
9-

Bank of Panjab Ltd*

Centurion Bank
Ltd*

4.43

2.49

1.13

HDFC Bank Ltd

0.16

0.24

0.44

ICICI Bank Ltd

2.21

1.65

0.72

Indusind Bank Ltd.

2.72

2.71

2.09

Kotak Mahindra
Bank Ltd.

0.17

0.37

0.24

1.29

1.39

0.98

UTI Bank Ltd

Yes Bank

Interpretation:

-7
0-

From above chart we can see that Bank of Panjab Ltds NPA increasing till its
amalgamated with Centurion Bank Ltd, and came nearer to 5%, after amalgamation both
Bank of Panjab Ltd and Centurion Bank Ltd named themselves as Centurion Bank of
Panjab Ltd. And in 2005-06 its NPA comes down 1.13% comparatively from previous
year NPA.
We can say that HDFC Bank Ltd has strong financial background and credit
worthiness so it can provide more advances to people and also it is efficient enough to
recover those advances so its Net NPA has coming down and it is less than 1%. So HDFC
is performing well.
In 2003-04 ICICI Bank Ltd Net NPA is more but its declining slowly and came to
0.72 from 2.21 in 2005-06. it may be because of its credit worthiness and strong recovery
measures. ICICI Bank Ltd is real risk taker so we cannot compare it with other small
banks because it providing high advances compare to other banks.
Indusind Bank Ltd Net NPA almost same for 2003-04 to 2004-05 and declines to
2.09 in 2005-06.
As Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd providing comparatively low advances to avoid
credit risk so its NPA is low compare to other Banks.
Even UTI Bank is performing well in recovering debts so its NPA came down
from previous year.

-7
1-

IMPACT OF NPAS ON BANKS' PROFITS AND LENDING PROWESS:

"The efficiency of a bank is not always reflected only by the size of its balance
sheet but by the level of return on its assets. NPAs do not generate interest income for the
banks, but at the same time banks are required to make provisions for such NPAs from
their current profits.
NPAs have a deleterious effect on the return on assets in several ways

They erode current profits through provisioning requirements

They result in reduced interest income

They require higher provisioning requirements affecting profits and accretion to

capital funds and capacity to increase good quality risk assets in future, and

They limit recycling of funds, set in asset-liability mismatches, etc there is at

times a tendency among some of the banks to understate the level of NPAs in
order to reduce the provisioning and boost up bottom lines. It would only
postpone the In the context of crippling effect on a bank's operations in all
spheres, asset quality has been placed as one of the most important parameters in
the measurement of a bank's performance under the CAMELS supervisory rating
system of RBI.

-7
2-

Credit risk path of the New Private Banks by Comparing with selected 7 Old PSBs
using Quadrant Analysis.
Credit risk path of the New Private Banks:

New Private
Banks

NPA to Net

Advances(crores)

Advances

Quadrant
analysis

( %)
2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

4.64

2417

HL

Centurion Bank Ltd*

2.49

1.13

2194

6533

HL

HL

HDFC Bank Ltd

0.24

0.44

25566

37661

LH

LH

ICICI Bank Ltd

1.65

0.72

91405

146163

LH

LH

Indusind Bank Ltd.

2.71

2.09

9000

9310

HL

HL

Kotak Mahindra Bank

0.37

0.24

4017

6349

LL

LL

1.39

0.98

15603

22314

LL

LL

Bank of Panjab Ltd*

Ltd.
UTI Bank Ltd

-7
3-

Interpretation
Credit risk path of the New PSBs: A Quadrant Analysis
In the chart below an attempt is made to trace the relationship between NPA
proportion and the size of credit portfolio (advances) of New Private Banks. For this
purpose proportion of gross NPAs representing credit risk inherent is taken on the Xaxis and gross credit levels are taken on the Y-axis. Since these two parameters are assets,
which are stock concept variables, they have been plotted on the basis of 2 years 2005
and 2006 for a comparative analysis.
QUADRANT TABLE- 2005
LEVEL
CREDIT LEVEL

LOW (BELOW AVG)

(L)

HIGH (ABOVE AVG)

(H)

NPA

LOW

LL (2)

LH (2)

HIGH

HL (3)

HH (0)

QUADRANT TABLE- 2006

LEVEL
CREDIT LEVEL

LOW (BELOW AVG)

(L)

HIGH (ABOVE AVG)

(H)

NPA

LOW

LL (2)

LH (2)

HIGH

HL (2)

HH (0)

-7
4-

As depicted in the tables, the banks are divided into 4 quadrants namely LL, LH,
HL and HH (the figures are arrived at by taking the averages). The average of NPAs for
the year 2005 is 1.93% and this figure is measured against each bank, any percentage
above this figure falls in the H category and percentage below 1.93% falls in the L
category. The same applies with the advances. The average of advances for 2005 is
21,457 crores and 37,622 crores for 2006. The average of NPA for 2006 is 0.93%. L
represents low or below average of the New Private Banks and, H represents high or
above average. E.g. while LL means low in credit size and low in NPAs, LH implies low
in NPA and High in credit size. The following facts are visible from the quadrant table:
1).As depicted in the tables, most of the new private banks fall in the HL quadrant. In
2005 there were 3 banks, which was 2 in 2006. As seen in the quadrants, the NPA was
high compared to its credit size and the credit size is low in the New Sector Banks it
might be because these banks hesitate to take risk and improper recovery measures.
2).There was 2 banks in the LL quadrant in 2005 which remain same in 2006 also. It
means NPA Level and Credit size is low.
3). Bank of Panjab Ltd* is in HL quadrant, there is high level of NPA and Low Advances
in 2005 . So only Bank of Panjab Ltd. has merged with Centurion Bank in 2005
September and named as Centurion Bank of Panjab Ltd but still its in HL quadrant so still
this banks has to adopt proper strategy in providing advances and recovering debts.
5) The best performing bank in this sector was the ICICI Bank which was high in its
credit size compared to the rest of the banks and still maintained a low NPA level
followed by HDFC Bank Ltd..

-7
5-

-7
6-

Credit risk path of the 7 selected Old PSBs:

Old Private
Banks

NPA to Net

Advances(crores)

Advances

Quadrant
analysis

( %)
2005

2006

2005

2006

2005

2006

City Union Bank Ltd

3.37

1.95

2013

2550

LL

LL

Development Credit

6.34

4.50

2156

1867

HL

HL

ING Vysya Bank Ltd

2.13

1.76

9081

10232

LH

LH

Lord Krishna Bank Ltd

4.22

3.11

1387

1421

HL

HL

Bank of Rajastan Ltd

2.50

0.99

2896

4065

LL

LL

5.83

5.66

3976

4006

HH

HL

2.29

1.18

6287

7792

LH

LH

Bank Ltd

The United Western

Bank Ltd.
The Karnatak Bank Ltd

Interpretation

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7-

Credit risk path of the 7 Private Sector Banks: A Quadrant Analysis

In the chart below an attempt is made to trace the relationship between NPA
proportion and the size of credit portfolio (advances) of 7 old Private Banks. For this
purpose proportion of gross NPAs representing credit risk inherent is taken on the Xaxis and gross credit levels are taken on the Y-axis. Since these two parameters are assets,
which are stock concept variables, they have been plotted on the basis of 2 years 2005
and 2006 for a comparative analysis.
QUADRANT TABLE- 2005
LEVEL
CREDIT LEVEL

LOW (BELOW AVG)

(L)

HIGH (ABOVE AVG)

(H)

NPA

LOW

LL (2)

LH (2)

HIGH

HL (2)

HH (1)

QUADRANT TABLE- 2006

LEVEL
CREDIT LEVEL

LOW (BELOW AVG)

(L)

HIGH (ABOVE AVG)

(H)

NPA

LOW

LL (2)

LH (2)

HIGH

HL (3)

HH (0)

-7
8-

As depicted in the tables, the banks are divided into 4 quadrants namely LL, LH,
HL and HH (the figures are arrived at by taking the averages). The average of NPAs for
the year 2005 is 3.81% and this figure is measured against each bank, any percentage
above this figure falls in the H category and percentage below 3.81% falls in the L
category. The same applies with the advances. The average of advances for 2005 is 3971
crores and 4562 crores for 2006. The average of NPA for 2006 is 2.74%. L represents
low or below average of the PSBs and, H represents high or above average. E.g. while
LL means low in credit size and low in NPAs, LH implies low in NPA and High in credit
size. The following facts are visible from the quadrant table:
1).As depicted in the table in 2005, out of 7 Private Sector Banks, 2 are fall under LL, i.e.
Low in NPA and Low in credit size, 2 fall under LH i.e. Low in NPA and High in credit
size. And remaining out of 3, 2 fall under HL i.e. High in NPA and Low in credit size.
2) As depicted in the table in 2006, out of 7 Private Sector Banks, 2 are fall under LL, i.e.
Low in NPA and Low in credit size, 2 falls under LH i.e. Low in NPA and High in credit
size. And 3 fall under HL i.e. High in NPA and Low in credit size.
3) There were 2 banks in the HL quadrant in 2005 which increased to 3 in 2006. It means
NPA Level is increasing year by year.
4). The United Western Bank Ltd moved from HH to HL , there is high level of NPA and
High Advances in 2005 which moved to High level of NPA and Low level of advances in
2006. Its not good sign to Bank because as in 2005 there is High NPA and Credit size so
Bank reduces its advances in 2006, but also its NPA increasing.
5) The best performing bank in this sector was the ING Vysya Bank which was high in its
credit size compared to the rest of the banks and still maintained a low NPA level.

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Comparison of New Private Banks credit path with Old selected Private Banks
credit path by using above Quadrant Analysis.

When compare to Old PBs, New PBs are performing well from past 2 years.

Old PBs Net NPA on Advances are crossing 5% or nearer to 5 %, but almost all
New PBs Net NPA on Advances are below 3%. It is good sign to New PSBs as it
has strong credit path.

New PBs are taking high risk by Providing more and more advances when
compare to Old PB,

Majority of Old PBs provide advances to Priority sectors whose recovery are
very difficult, because advances paid for agriculture are very difficult to recover,
but New PBs are able to provide advances to both priority and non priority
sectors but it not expanded its services over villages. Thats why New PBs
recovering its advances very quickly.

Adverse Effects of NPA on the Working of New Private Banks:

NPA has affected the profitability, liquidity and competitive functioning of New
Private Banks and finally the psychology of the bankers in respect of their disposition
towards credit delivery and credit expansion. Between 2004 and 2006 New Private Banks
incurred a total amount of Rs.4399 Crores towards provisioning NPA. This has brought
Net NPA to Rs.5780 Crores or 1.20% of net advances. To this extent the problem is
contained, but at what cost? This costly remedy is made at the sacrifice of building
healthy reserves for future capital adequacy. The enormous provisioning of NPA together
with the holding cost of such non-productive assets over the years has acted as a severe
drain on the profitability of the New Private Banks. In turn New Private Banks are seen
as poor performers and unable to approach the market for raising additional capital. This
has alternatively forced New Private Banks to borrow heavily from the debt market to
build Tier II Capital to meet capital adequacy norms putting severe pressure on their
profit margins, else they are to seek the bounty of the Central Government for repeated
Recapitalization.

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Findings:

The brightest spot in the Indian banking industry in 2005-2006 was the massive
cleaning up of banks balance sheets by reducing non performing assets (NPAs).
The net NPAs of 7 New Private Banks are reduced by (-) 18% while compare to
previous year, i.e. from 2097 to 1709. Which was 6% higher Net NPA in 2004-05
when compare to 2003-04.

Net Profit of New Private Banks are increased by 28% from 2004-05 to 2005-06.
It may be because of provisions made in 2006 is comparatively low.

Most of the New Private Banks fall under LL quadrant i.e. Low in NPA and Low
in credit path in 2005-06.

All New Private Banks Net NPA on advances is less than 5% in 2005-06, its
good sign for companies to increase profit.

New Private Banks recorded a growth in advances of 50.3% in 2006 as compare

to 42.5% of the previous year. When compare to total advances of Old Private
Banks rose from 34.9% to 40.37%. we can say New PSBs Credit capacity is
more while compare to Old PSBs.

Most banks were able to take advantage of fat profits from treasury operations,
brought about by the lower interest rates, to make higher provisions for bad debts.
As a result, out of 7 new Private Banks, 2 New Private Banks- i.e. HDFC Bank
Ltd and Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd Net NPA on advances has become less than
1%. Followed by ICICI Bank Ltd. And UTI Bank Ltd Net NPA on advances are
less than 2%.

ICICI is Best Performer in New Private Banks as it providing higher advances by

taking risk compare to other banks, and is able to its NPA less than 2%.

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Suggestions
1. Fixing up the budget for profits and recovery rather than for advances. Budget
oriented approach at times leads to release of credit facilities without ensuring
compliance of covenants of sanction. A suitable mechanism could be drawn at
each bank level to provide monetary benefits/ re-organization of the operating
staff particularly for recovery in NPAs write-off cases.
2. Projects with old technology should not be considered for finance.
3. Up gradation of credit skills of the operating staff working in advance to avoid
over and under finance.
4. Timely sanction/ release of loan to avoid time and cost overruns. and also proper
checking of documents while sanctioning loan are recommended.
5. It is suggested for possible restructuring of banks through mergers and
acquisitions to keep themselves competitive in the high credit risk market in
India.
6. One of best solution to overcome NPA is OTS ( One Time Settlement), RBI has
advised all banks to provide a simplified mechanism for one time settlement of
loans where the principle amount is equal to or less than 25000/- and which have
become doubtful and loss assets.

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Conclusion
An attempt is made in this study to present a comprehensive picture of nonperforming advances of New Private banks in India, touching upon various quantitative
and qualitative trends in the post reform period, besides carrying out with some policy
and strategic implications. Undoubtedly India is one of the few countries where NPA
levels are very high as there is an increase in the percentage of gross advances eroding
their Profit by major basic points, after netting the provision.
New Private Banks NPA has come down i.e. less than 1%. While compare to old
Private Banks whose NPA is more than 5%. It may be because of the proportion of credit
risk among the priority sector advances is double that of non-priority advances implying
the irrationality of (administered) price controls, which still exists in some form. External
factors outweigh the internal factors contributing to this high accumulation of NPAs. If
the banks have to survive in the competitive and increasingly globalize market conditions
they should be helped both by the RBI and the government in the form of faster recovery
climate, especially for the legal processes of enforcement of contracts.
The quadrant analysis of credit risk clearly identifies that 7 New Private banks are
comparatively performing well when compare to old selected PSBs. It also offers scope
for mergers and acquisitions among the banks to be better prepared for high risk credit
marketing in India. And also quadrant analysis helps to identify profitability position of
New Private Banks by using advances provided and Non Performing Assets.
Unless New Private Banks adopt proper Strategy to prevent huge level of NPAs,
it go on affecting Profitability of Banks.

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Abbreviation used:
IBA: Indian Banking Association
NPA: Non Performing Assets
PBs: Private Banks
UTI Bank Ltd: Unit Trust of India Bank
ICICI Bank Ltd : Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India
HDFC Bank Ltd.: Housing Development Finance Corporation Bank Ltd

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Bibliography

Indian Banking Association (IBA) Bulletin 2005-06

Websites
-

www.Indianbankingassociation.com

www.utibank.com

www.Google.com

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