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Collette Davis v. Abington Mem Hosp, 3rd Cir. (2014)
Collette Davis v. Abington Mem Hosp, 3rd Cir. (2014)
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No. 12-3514
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No. 12-3515
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No. 12-3521
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No. 12-3522
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JOHN DUNCHESKIE; DIANE READ; THELMA HARRIS;
ELEANOR JACKSON
Appellants
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH;
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL;
EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL; JEANES HOSPITAL
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Nos. 2-09-cv-05520, 2-09-cv-05548, 2-09-cv-05549,
2-09-cv-05550, 2-09-cv-05551)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 10, 2014
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Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 26, 2014)
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OPINION
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Jared K. Cook, Esq.
Michael J. Lingle, Esq.
J. Nelson Thomas, Esq.
Thomas & Solomon
693 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14607
Attorneys for Appellants
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I.
The five cases on appeal are among several similar
actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic
underpayment in the healthcare industry. The parties are
nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a
putative class, and their alleged employers. Allegedly, the
defendants2 maintained three unlawful timekeeping and pay
policies (collectively, the Policies). First, under the Meal
Break Deduction Policy, the defendants timekeeping system
automatically deducted thirty minutes of pay daily for meal
breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received
a break. Second, under the Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule
Work Policy, the defendants prohibited employees from
recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts.
Third, under the Unpaid Training Policy, the defendants did
not pay employees for time spent at compensable training
sessions. Because of the Policies, the plaintiffs allege that
they regularly worked hours both under and in excess of
[forty] per week and were not paid for all of those hours.
Appendix (App.) 845, 1469, 1655, 233031, 3259.
In November 2009, the plaintiffs filed parallel
complaints in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the defendants,3 asserting
violations of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.; the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
regular time and overtime each week but were not paid
regular and overtime wages was implausible on its face
(quotation marks omitted)). Other courts have adopted a
more lenient approach, holding that, [w]hile Defendants
might appreciate having Plaintiffs estimate of the overtime
hours worked at [the pleading stage], a FLSA complaint will
survive dismissal so long as it alleges that the employee
worked more than forty hours in a week and did not receive
overtime compensation. Butler v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 800
F. Supp. 2d 662, 668 (D. Md. 2011).
We agree with the middle-ground approach taken by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lundy v.
Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d
Cir. 2013). In Lundy, the court held that in order to state a
plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege [forty] hours of work in a given workweek as well as
some uncompensated time in excess of the [forty] hours. Id.
at 114 (emphases added) (citing 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1)
(requiring that, for a workweek longer than forty hours, an
employee who works in excess of forty hours shall be
compensated time and a half for the excess hours)).
Similar to the plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Lundy
alleged that their employers, a collection of hospitals,
healthcare providers, and related entities, failed to
compensate them adequately for time worked during breaks,
outside of scheduled shifts, and during required training
sessions. Id. at 109. Plaintiff Patricia Wolman typically
worked 37.5 hours per week, occasionally worked an
additional 12.5-hour or slightly longer shift, and was not
compensated for, inter alia, work done during thirty-minute
meal breaks (which were typically missed or interrupted) or
outside of her scheduled shifts (typically an extra fifteen
minutes per shift). Id. at 11415 (quotation marks omitted).
The court held that Wolman failed to state a claim for
overtime because, while her allegations could theoretically
put her over the forty-hour mark in one or another
unspecified week (or weeks), they suppl[ied] nothing but
low-octane fuel for speculation as to that conclusion. Id. at
115. Plaintiff Kelly Iwasiuk similarly averred that she
typically worked thirty hours per week, worked extra shifts
totaling between 37.5 and forty-five hours approximately
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twice a month, and was not compensated for, inter alia, work
done during meal breaks or outside of her scheduled shifts.
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Like Wolman, Iwasiuk d[id]
not allege that she was denied overtime pay in a week where
she worked . . . additional shifts. Id. The court therefore
held that Iwasiuks allegations were similarly implausible.
Id.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a
plausible claim contains factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because Wolman and Iwasiuk each failed to allege a single
workweek in which [she] worked at least [forty] hours and
also worked uncompensated time in excess of [forty] hours,
they did not satisfy this standard, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district courts dismissal of the FLSA overtime
claims. Lundy, 711 F.3d at 11415.
In the present case, each named plaintiff alleges that he
or she typically worked shifts totaling between thirty-two
and forty hours per week and further alleges that he or she
frequently worked extra time. For instance, Collette Davis
typically worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift five days
per week, totaling forty hours, exclusive of the 2.5 hours
deducted from her pay for meal periods (during which she
frequently worked), the one to two hours she worked after
her shift, and the twenty hours of annual continuing education
units she was required to complete. App. 82021. Because
they typically worked full time, or very close to it and also
worked several hours of unpaid work each week, Plaintiffs
Br. 24, the plaintiffs surmise that [i]t [is] certainly plausible
that at least some of the uncompensated work was performed
during weeks when the plaintiffs[] total work time was more
than forty hours, Plaintiffs Br. 27. We disagree.
Determining whether a plausible claim has been pled
is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. None of the named plaintiffs has alleged a
single workweek in which he or she worked at least forty
hours and also worked uncompensated time in excess of forty
hours. Of the four named plaintiffs who allege that they
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C.
The plaintiffs finally contend that the District Court
erred in denying them another opportunity to amend the
complaint. We review for abuse of discretion. Krantz v.
Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir.
2002).
In its September 8, 2011 opinion dismissing the
amended complaint, the District Court emphasized that any
repleaded allegations would have to remedy the gaping
deficiencies identified by at least seven other district
courts that had dismissed similar complaints filed by the
same counsel. App. 55 & n.70. A District Court has
discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the
plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his
complaint, but chose not to resolve them. Krantz, 305 F.3d
at 144. Because the plaintiffs were on notice as to the
deficiencies of their complaints, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs leave to file a
fourth amended complaint.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Courts orders
will be affirmed.
See