Organizational Behavior and Human

Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947965

ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR
AND HUMAN
DECISION PROCESSES
www.academicpress.com

Sabotage in the workplace: The role

of organizational injustice
Maureen L. Ambrose,a Mark A. Seabright,b and
Marshall Schminkec,*
a

University of Central Florida, USA

Western Oregon University, USA
College of Business Administration, P.O. Box 161400, University of Central Florida, Orlando,
FL 32816-1400, USA
b

Abstract
This study examines the relationship between injustice and workplace sabotage. Drawing
on the organizational justice and workplace deviance literatures, we hypothesize that injustice
will be the most common cause of sabotage, and that the source of injustice will inuence the
goal, target, and severity of sabotage behavior. The results generally support our hypotheses.
First, injustice was the most common cause of sabotage. Second, when the source of injustice
was interactional, individuals were more likely to engage in retaliation, and when the source of
injustice was distributive, individuals were more likely to engage in equity restoration. Third,
the source of injustice and the target of sabotage were generally the same, although this relationship was stronger for organizational targets than for individual targets. Finally, there
was an additive eect of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on the severity of
sabotage. We discuss the implications of these results for future research on sabotage and
deviant workplace behavior. 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
I worked at the Janacka machine, which cuts the hides and skin o the pineapple. We usually worked a straight ten-hour shift, so a lot of people would just burn out. To combat that,
people would try to get more breakswe were only allowed two breaks per shift. To do this,
they would send a pineapple down the wrong direction, or send a glove down, and it would
break the whole machine. If the Janacka machine shuts down, you cant cut the pineapple,
the line cant go on. The whole production line shuts down. It takes at least three hours to
x, so youre getting paid for three hours at least for just sitting around. Lance, pineapple
packer. (Sprouse, 1992, p. 18)

Workplace sabotage has been of interest to a broad range of researchers and

practitioners. The present study builds from this previous work and focuses on the
relationship between perceived unfairness and sabotage behavior. We draw on the
organizational justice and workplace deviance literatures as a basis for our research,
in which we propose that the principal cause of sabotage is perceptions of organi*

Corresponding author. Fax: 407-823-3725.

E-mail address: mschminke@bus.ucf.edu (M. Schminke).

0749-5978/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 7 4 9 - 5 9 7 8 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 3 7 - 7

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zational injustice. Additionally, we propose that dierent congurations of distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice lead to dierent types of sabotage behavior.
Organizational justice is a promising perspective for understanding workplace
deviance (Greenberg & Alge, 1998). A number of scholars have theorized about how
dierent types and combinations of injustice lead to dysfunctional consequences
(Folger & Baron, 1996; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997;
Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b; Greenberg & Alge, 1998; Neuman & Baron, 1997;
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). However, although there has been substantial theorizing
about justice and deviance, few empirical studies exist, and those that do suer from
two limitations. First, the extant empirical justice research has focused on relatively
few dysfunctional behaviors, primarily theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) and
retaliation (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). We believe it is useful to study a wider set of
deviant behaviors. Such expansion is instrumental in developing a better understanding of contextual inuences and boundary conditions on the causes of deviant
behavior. In the present paper, we extend previous work by examining a broad
category of deviance, workplace sabotage.
An additional characteristic of most of the relevant empirical work is that it has
been relatively coarse-grained, examining the eect of injustice (distributive, procedural, and/or interactional) on whether or not employees engage in a specic act of
deviance, such as theft. Research does not consider how dierent types of injustice
may aect the type of deviance in which an individual engages. Here, we match this
multidimensional perspective on justice (distributive, procedural, and interactional)
with a more ne-grained image of deviance. Specically, we describe how types of
injustice aect the goal, target, and severity of sabotage behavior.
Below, we briey review relevant research and present a series of hypotheses
outlining the relationships between justice and sabotage. We then describe a study
that examines these relationships between justice and sabotage and discuss the implications of our ndings.

2. Sabotage
Workplace sabotage is behavior intended to damage, disrupt, or subvert the
organizations operations for the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating
unfavorable publicity, embarrassment, delays in production, damage to property,
the destruction of working relationships, or the harming of employees or customers
(Crino, 1994, p. 312). Most recent research argues for conceptualizing sabotage as a
rational behavior that stems from an individuals reaction to his or her environment
(Analoui, 1995; DiBattista, 1996; Jermier, 1988). This research has focused on categorizing sabotage behaviors and/or identifying its motivation (e.g., Analoui, 1995;
Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987; Jermier, 1988). The sabotage literature suggests ve
possible motives: powerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, boredom/fun, and
injustice. These labels reect the terminology used in the sabotage literature to denote antecedent conditions to sabotage. We consider each below.
2.1. Powerlessness
Powerlessness stems from a lack of freedom or autonomy (Allen & Greenberger,
1980; Bennett, 1998). Sabotage that results from powerlessness is an eort to attain
control for its own sake. It involves trying to change the nature of work or the inducements/contributions equation to achieve a nonsanctioned end (i.e., something
that benets the person or workgroup, not the organization). Examples include
wildcat strikes to enhance a bargaining position or breaking machinery to gain

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unscheduled breaks. Empirical research suggests that individuals who feel powerless
may engage in sabotage (Bennett, 1998; DiBattista, 1991) and that such destructive
behavior can increase individuals sense of control (Allen & Greenberger, 1980).
Some researchers identify powerlessness as a source of injustice (Bennett, 1998, p.
228), creating a potential source of confusion between powerlessness and injustice as
sabotage motives. However, to maintain the conceptual distinction between these
two, we conne our conceptualization of the power motive to acts aimed at obtaining control, rather than regaining justice.
2.2. Organizational frustration
Organizational frustration is dened as an interference with goal attainment or
goal maintenance (Spector, 1978). In this case, it is the emotional state of frustration
that drives the sabotage. For example, anger over inadequate resources to do the job
may lead to a cathartic destruction of property (Taylor & Walton, 1971). As with
powerlessness, research demonstrates that sabotage is related to organizational
frustration (Chen & Spector, 1992; Spector, 1975; Storms & Spector, 1987; Taylor &
Walton, 1971). However, some clarication may be needed to distinguish between
frustration and other possible motives. For example, researchers also have recognized that powerlessness can be frustrating (Bennett, 1998, p. 228) and that injustice
can elicit frustration (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975). However, we conceptualize frustration as the motive for sabotage only if it is the blocking of goals per se that drives
the act. Frustration is not the underlying motive if the employee is frustrated as the
result of something else (e.g., powerlessness or injustice). In such cases, the source of
the frustration (powerlessness or injustice) would be the motive for sabotage.
2.3. Facilitation of work
Facilitation of work occurs when the goal of the sabotage is to make the work
activity easier to accomplish. Research demonstrates that attempting to make the
work process easier can be a cause of sabotage (Bensman & Gerver, 1963; Taylor &
Walton, 1971). However, it is important to distinguish between facilitation of work
and related concepts like power. Power generally involves breaking the rules, whereas
facilitation of work involves bending the rules. Power is any eort to change or restructure the work to achieve a personal or nonsanctioned end. It restructures social
relationships, but does not necessarily make the work easier (Taylor & Walton, 1971).
Facilitation of work involves nonsanctioned means to achieve sanctioned ends. The
classic example of work facilitation is the use of a tap in airplane manufacturing
(Taylor & Walton, 1971). A tap is a steel screw that rethreads a nut so that a misaligned bolt will t. In the short run, this makes work easier, but in the long run
employees know that it weakens the strength of the connection and may therefore be
detrimental to the organization. Although many eorts to facilitate work are innocuous or perhaps even benecial, these eorts lead to sabotage in cases such as this
when individuals ease the work process at a cost (or potential cost) to the organization.
2.4. Boredom/fun
Boredom/fun is identied as the motive for sabotage when the primary goal of the
activity is to cut boredom, generate excitement, or have fun. Changing the time on
the punch clock, or pulling the re alarm may add just the right level of excitement to
an otherwise boring day (Crino, 1994, p. 317). Research indicates that employees
may engage in sabotage in an eort to alleviate boredom and/or entertain themselves
or their coworkers (Crino, 1994; DiBattista, 1991; Giacalone & Rosenfeld, 1987;
Taylor & Walton, 1971).

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2.5. Injustice
Injustice refers to an employees belief that he or she (or someone else) has been
treated unfairly. An employee who feels unjustly treated may try to even the score
by committing sabotage. As Crino (1994, p. 315) has observed, an employee who has
been shown disrespect, passed over for promotion, given additional responsibilities
with no pay increase, denied adequate resources to do the job, or didnt receive what
he or she considered adequate credit for work performed from co-workers or
management ts the prole of the classic disgruntled saboteur.
Injustice is a frequently cited cause of sabotage (Crino, 1994; Crino & Leap, 1989;
DiBattista, 1989, 1996; Neuman & Baron, 1998; Robinson & Bennett, 1997;
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Sieh, 1987; Tucker, 1993). Although this claim has not
been directly tested in the sabotage literature, empirical research on justice demonstrates that perceived injustice is associated with forms of deviance such as theft
(Greenberg, 1993a,b) and vandalism (DeMore, Fisher, & Baron, 1988).
Early organizational justice literature distinguished between two types of fairness:
distributive (the perceived fairness of outcomes such as pay) and procedural (the
perceived fairness of procedures). (See Cropanzano & Greenberg (1997) for a review.) However, as the eld evolved, justice researchers recognized the importance of
how procedures were enacted. Justice research began to focus on interactional justicethe fairness of the interpersonal treatment the individual receives from a decision-maker. Two dimensions of treatment have been shown to be important to
judgments of interactional justice: explanations and interpersonal sensitivity.
There has been debate in the justice literature about how to incorporate interactional justice into a general justice framework. Bies and Moag (1986) originally
described interactional justice as a third type of justice. However, subsequent researchers suggested interactional justice was best conceptualized as the social side
of procedural justice, rather than a distinct type of justice (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Bies, 1989; Tyler & Bies,
1990). Yet more recent research has argued for considering interactional justice as a
distinct form of justice (Malatesta & Byrne, 1997; Masterson, Lewis-McClear,
Goldman, & Taylor, 1997; Moye, Masterson, & Bartol, 1997).
What is clear in this debate is that individuals respond not only to outcomes and
procedures, but also to interpersonal interactions. It is also clear that there are both
structural and social elements that aect justice perceptions (Brockner, Ackerman, &
Fairchild, 2001; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Greenberg, 1993a). Greenberg (1993a) presents a model that explicitly considers this distinction. He identies two dimensions for classifying classes of justice: category of
justice (procedural and distributive) and focal determinant (structural and social). In
this typology, traditional procedural and distributive justice are classied as structural forms of justice. Interactional justice (separated into the two dimensions of
informational justice and interpersonal justice) is classied as a social form of justice.
(See also Folger & Skarlicki, 1998.) This distinction between structural and social
aspects of justice is relevant to our examination of sabotage. We expand on it below.
2.6. Dominant motives
There is little research that addresses which of the sabotage motives is most
dominant. However, a review of the literature provides some basis for prediction.
Injustice as a cause of sabotage is a theme that arises in both the sabotage
(Crino, 1994; Crino & Leap, 1989; DiBattista, 1989, 1996; Dubois, 1979; Sieh,
1987; Tucker, 1993) and justice literatures (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). Indeed, Greenberg and Alge (1998, p. 84), in their discussion of
workplace aggression (sabotage is a form of aggression, Neuman & Baron, 1998,

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p. 400) suggest that an approach based on organizational justice is arguably one

of the most promising orientations. They note that recent surveys show that
both British (Hoad, 1993) and American workers (Neuman, Baron, & Geddes,
1996) believe that unfair treatment is the dominant cause of aggression in the
workplace. Thus, we expect injustice will also be the most common motive for
sabotage. We predict:
H1:. Injustice will be a more frequent cause of sabotage than powerlessness, frustration, facilitation of work, or boredom/fun.

3. Sabotage as a form of deviance

Recently there has been increased interest in deviant behavior in the workplace.
(See Robinson & Bennett, 1997, and Robinson & Greenberg, 1998, for reviews.)
Topics in this stream of research include workplace aggression (Baron & Neuman,
1996; Folger & Baron, 1996), incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999), revenge (Bies
& Tripp, 1998), theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993b, 1996; Hollinger & Clark, 1983),
organization-motivated aggression (OLeary-Kelly, Grin, & Glew, 1996), organizational retaliatory behavior (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), and antisocial behavior
(Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997; Robinson & OLeary-Kelly, 1998). Workplace
sabotage, however, has been largely overlooked as a type of deviant behavior. (For
an exception see Giacalone, Riordan, & Rosenfeld, 1997.)
This surge of interest in deviant behavior has spawned a variety of terms and
denitions that are both overlapping and unique. An extensive discussion of these
variations on a theme, and sabotages place among these, is beyond the scope of this
paper. (See Robinson & Greenberg, 1998, for such a review.) However, several aspects of our denition warrant discussion.
First, the main dierence between sabotage and the general concept of deviance is
that sabotage explicitly focuses on doing harm whereas deviance focuses on violating
norms. Although there is considerable overlap between these two constructs because
deviance is potentially harmful or likely to be perceived as harmful, deviance can be
functional or even benecial (Robinson & Bennett, 1997) whereas by denition
sabotage cannot be.
Second, sabotage is both narrower than some conceptualizations of deviance and
broader than others. For example, although Robinson and Bennett (1995) include
gossiping and showing favoritism as forms of deviance, these behaviors are unlikely
to constitute sabotage. On the other hand, we would conceptualize organizational
retaliatory behavior as a subset of sabotage. These behaviors reect sabotage motivated by retaliation and focus on more subtle and covert forms of retaliation.
Sabotage includes these less subtle and more overt forms of behavior as well.
Third, it is important to note that the organizational damage caused by sabotage
can be either direct or indirect. Sabotage can target an individual, a unit, or the
whole organization (Giacalone et al., 1997, p. 121). Moreover, sabotage can have
multiple targets and the organization need not be the primary victim.
Although we use the term sabotage in this paper, we recognize that we risk adding
to the proliferation of terms used to describe various types of deviant behavior. The
preceding discussion, however, suggests that sabotage is not just another term for the
general concept of deviance nor is it the same as other types of deviant behavior. It is
dierent enough from these other forms to warrant separate consideration. Moreover, we believe that the label sabotage is useful in this study, as it is the term used in
much of the literature on which we rely (particularly for our discussion of causes).
Additionally, our study relies on secondary data. Sabotage was the term used during
that data collection.

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Positioning sabotage as a form of deviance provides a framework for dierentiating

among types of sabotage. As noted above, sabotage research has focused primarily on
identifying causes of sabotage and dierent types of sabotage behaviors. However, this
research has not systematically considered similarities and dierences between dierent acts of sabotage. The literature on workplace deviance provides a framework for
such an analysis. The deviance literature suggests that deviant behavior varies in terms
of goal, target, and severity. The rst dimension, goal, concerns Greenbergs (1996)
distinction between restoration of equity and retaliation. The other two dimensions,
target and severity, follow from Robinson and Bennetts (1995) typology of workplace
deviance. The following sections describe each dimension and provide predictions
about how injustice aects these sabotage dimensions.
3.1. Goal of sabotage
Early research on justice and deviance focused on distributive justice and used an
equity theory approach for understanding sabotage (DeMore et al., 1988; Fisher &
Baron, 1982; Sieh, 1987). This research suggested that the goal of sabotage (theft or
vandalism in these studies) was an attempt to restore equity; that is, to compensate
for an outcome that was deserved but was not received. Indeed, Adams (1965, p. 276)
in his description of equity theory suggests, [Individuals] do not simply become
dissatised with conditions they perceive to be unjust. They usually do something
about them. Thus, sabotage was seen as a means to redistribute outcomes to restore
a state of equity that was motivated by distributive injustice.
Yet the literature suggests there are other goals individuals hope to achieve when
they engage in sabotage as a response to injustice. For example, recent research on
revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1998; Bies et al., 1997) suggests individuals may take revenge
against someone who has mistreated them. Folger and Skarlicki (1998) suggest that
injustice may create moral outrage, which spurs the individual to action. The work is
consistent with work on sabotage that suggests that sabotage (and deviance in
general) can serve two dierent goals: instrumental and expressive (Dubois, 1979;
Robinson & Bennett, 1997). Robinson and Bennett (1997, p. 16) describe an instrumental motivation aimed at repairing the situation, restoring equity, or improving the current situation and an expressive motivation to vent, release, or
express ones feelings of outrage, anger or frustration.
Greenberg (1996) identies two types of responses to injustice that appear to be
related to instrumental and expressive goals: restoration of equity or retaliation.
Restoration refers to an attempt to increase the levels of reward received in order to
make up for a good the individual believes he or she deserved but that was denied.
Retaliation describes an actors behavior designed to harm a target who has caused
harm to the actor, regardless of whether or not the behavior redistributes resources.
(See Neuman & Baron (1997, p. 45) for a similar distinction.) Greenberg s formulation essentially recasts the distinction between instrumental and expressive goals
from a justice perspective. We adopt this formulation because it provides a more
focused characterization of the goal of sabotage.
With respect to retaliation, Greenberg draws on Kempers (1966) concept of
reciprocal deviance. Reciprocal deviance is deviance designed to punish the target.
It is founded on motives of revenge. Greenberg (1996) suggests that individuals may
engage in deviant behavior (in Greenbergs case, theft) in an attempt to harm a target
that has harmed them, regardless of whether or not the behavior redistributes resources. (See also, Cropanzano & Baron, 1991.)
But what might motivate individuals to retaliate against a target? What might
cause an employee to want to get back at an organization or individual when there
is no material gain for doing so? Research suggests that interactional justice may
play an important role in retaliatory sabotage. For example, Bies and Tripp (1998)

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identify demeaning treatment and destructive criticism (i.e., interpersonal insensitivity) as a motive for revenge. Folger and Skarlicki (1998, p. 43) indicate that
interactional justice (especially lack of interpersonal sensitivity) takes on paramount importance in predicting retaliation and aggression in the workplace.
However, there is a dilemma in examining restoration of equity and retaliation in
organizations. The two dierent motives can be manifested in the same behavior. This
dilemma was overcome by Greenberg (1996) in an ingenious laboratory experiment
that distinguished between these motives. Greenberg found that when individuals were
treated in a distributively unfair way, they stole only if the theft could restore their
perceived inequity (i.e., if the stolen item had value). When individuals were treated in
an interpersonally unfair way, they stole even if the item was of no value to them.
We expect individuals to engage in sabotage both as an attempt to restore equity
and as a method of retaliation. However, as in the Greenberg (1996) study, we expect
individuals will attempt to restore equity when they believe they have been treated in
a distributively unfair way and retaliate when they believe they have been treated in
an interpersonally unfair manner. Thus, we hypothesize:
H2:. Individuals who feel theyve been treated distributively unfairly will engage in
sabotage behavior in an attempt to restore equity. Individuals who feel they have
been treated interpersonally unfairly will engage in sabotage behavior in retaliation.
3.2. Target of sabotage
Robinson and Bennett (1995) presented a typology of workplace deviance that
identies two dimensions of deviant behavior: target (who is harmed by the behaviorindividual/organization) and severity (the magnitude of the harmminor/
serious). This typology allows researchers to organize a broad range of behaviors as
deviant (e.g., taking frequent coee breaks (organizational-minor), theft (organizational-serious)), while maintaining important distinctions between those behaviors.
The framework also provides a foundation for systematically examining the relationship between proposed causes of deviant behavior and a constellation of behaviors that fall along these dimensions.
Robinson and Bennetts (1995) distinction between deviance directed at individuals and deviance directed at the organization is similar to a distinction made in the
justice literature between structural and social aspects of justice (Folger & Skarlicki,
1998; Greenberg, 1993a). The former is injustice created by the organizational system
(procedural and distributive justice); the latter is injustice created through interaction
with a specic individual (interactional justice). Research suggests that individuals
responses to injustice are likely to correspond to its source. Sheppard, Lewicki, and
Minton (1992) suggest that when individuals are treated unjustly, they may experience a need to punish those blamed for the problem. Bennett (1998) suggests that
when managements decisions seem capricious or enforcement seems biased, employees are likely to behave in a hostile fashion toward the individual they perceive to
be responsible. However, if they perceive the organization to be responsible they may
retaliate against the organization. OLeary-Kelly et al. (1996) submit that aggressive
behavior will be directed against the specic target believed to be responsible for the
negative outcome. Robinson and Bennett (1995, p. 567) suggest that organizational
variables are more likely to inuence deviance directed at harming organizations
and individual variables are more likely to explain interpersonal forms of deviance.
Thus, we expect that saboteurs will target their sabotage at the source of the perceived
injustice. That is, when the source of the injustice is structural (created by the organizational system), the target of the sabotage should be the organization. When the
source of injustice is social (created by interaction with a specic individual), the
target of the sabotage should be the individual. Thus, we hypothesize:

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H3:. The target of sabotage behaviors (organizational/individual) will be the same as

the source of the perceived unfairness (organizational/individual).
We should note one area of ambiguity concerning the target dimension. Robinson
and Bennett (1997, p. 7) state that, The second dimension, individually directed
versus organizationally directed deviance, reects the target of the action, whether it
is directed at the organization or whether it is directed at other individuals in the
organization. However, Robinson and Bennett (1995, 1997) note that the dimension captures who is harmed by the action. Although one would expect the target of
the sabotage to be related to who is harmed, these are not necessarily the same.
Indeed, research on organizational aggression suggests that targets of harm and
entities harmed may diverge, for at least two reasons. First, individuals may displace
their aggression. An employee may feel unfairly treated by his or her supervisor, but
unable to retaliate against the boss and therefore vent his or her anger on a coworker. Second, individuals may engage in behavior that, in harming the source of
the problem, harms others as well. Construction workers may feel an organization
does not pay them enough, so they do not work carefully. However, in the end, the
harm to the customer may be even greater than the harm to the company.
The question then becomes whether individuals are more likely to harm innocent
bystanders when they target other individuals or when they target the organization.
There is little empirical research to guide our prediction here. However, OLearyKelly et al.s (1996) work on organizationally motivated aggression provides some
guidance. OLeary-Kelly et al. suggest that when individuals attribute the impetus
for their aggressive behavior to factors in the physical environment, their aggression
is more likely to be directed against nonspecic targets. The physical environment is
most likely to be associated with organizational targets. Thus, we expect that when
the target of harm and the entity harmed diverge, individuals will be more likely to
be harmed when organizations are the targets, than organizations are likely to be
harmed when individuals are the targets. We propose:
H4:. When the target of the sabotage and the entity harmed by the sabotage are not
the same, saboteurs are more likely to harm individuals when targeting organizations
than to harm organizations when targeting individuals.
3.3. Severity of sabotage
The severity dimension of Robinson and Bennetts (1995) typology captures the
seriousness of the harm that results from the behavior. The relationship between
justice type and deviance severity has received little attention in the literature. We
know of no empirical research that explicitly examines this relationship. Moreover,
the research that is most directly relevant focuses on deviance frequency (Skarlicki &
Folger, 1997), rather than severity. Other researchers work is suggestive of a relationship between interactional injustice and the severity of response, but this relationship is not the primary focus of the work (e.g., Baron, Neuman, & Geddes,
1999). For this reason, we have tried to cast a wide net in theorizing on the eect of
injustice on sabotage severity. Our review of the justice and deviance literature revealed four possibilities. The rst two suggest that justice type has a direct or an
additive eect on sabotage severity; the last two advance interaction eects.
First, interactional justice may have a main or direct eect on deviance severity.
The extreme examples most authors provide of workplace violence stem from an
individuals perspective that they have been wronged interpersonally (Folger &
Baron, 1996; Greenberg & Alge, 1998). The research that most directly addresses this
issue is the work of Skarlicki and Folger (1997), who suggest that interactional
justice is a critical factor in workplace aggression. They suggest that interactional

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justice generates stronger main eects on aggression than the structural forms of
justice (i.e., distributive and procedural justice). Moreover, they note that interactional justice has been associated with an extreme form of workplace aggression
physical assault (Folger, Baron, & McLean Parks, 1996, cited in Folger & Skarlicki,
1998), a result demonstrated by Baron et al. (1999). The work implies that interactional justice may play a direct role in deviance severity.
Second, types of injustice may have an additive eect on deviance (McLean Parks
& Kidder, 1994; McLean Parks, 1997). This eect reects the sum of justice types,
rather than their individual or interactive eects. McLean Parks and Kidder (1994)
propose a catastrophe function or Popeye eect for distributive, procedural, and
interactional injustice. According to this formulation, when accumulated injustices
reach a certain threshold, the employee markedly switches to another form of behavior which is quite dierent in nature from the previous form of behavior (i.e.,
malevolent as opposed to benevolent). . .. Once this threshold has been reached, the
change can be quite drasticin the words of the immortal Popeye, Thats all I can
stands, cuz I cant stands no more (McLean Parks & Kidder, 1994, p. 133). A
similar formulation can be found in the literature on frustration and workplace
aggression (Martinko & Zellars, 1998). Baron and Neuman (1996), for example,
found a relationship between workplace aggression and the number of frustrating
workplace changes. A threshold or additive model may be especially helpful in understanding deviance severity because it focuses on behavioral discontinuities in
response to justice.
Third, there may be a two-way interaction between justice type and deviance.
Greenberg (1993b) has shown that distributive justice interacts with information
validity and interpersonal sensitivity in determining amount of theft. In their analysis
of workplace aggression, Greenberg and Alge (1998) propose that distributive injustice is a necessary, but not sucient, condition to elicit aggressive behavior.
Rather, it is the interaction of distributive justice and either procedural or interactional justice that leads individuals to engage in aggressive behavior. However,
Greenberg and Alges analysis suggests an important distinction between the eect of
procedural and interactional justice. They note that there is no research demonstrating a link between structural injustice and active aggression (although they do
not rule out this possibility). They note the evidence is suggestive that active aggression may result from the interaction of distributive injustice and socially insensitive treatment.
Fourth, there may be a three-way interaction between justice type and deviance
(Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Skarlicki and Folger examined the eect of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on the frequency of organizational retaliatory behavior (ORB). They hypothesized that there would be a three-way
interaction for the three types of justice. The results supported their predictions.
The relationship between distributive justice and ORB was signicant only when
all three types of justice were low. However, if employees perceived either procedure or interactions as fair, distributive injustice was not signicantly related to
ORBs.
These possibilities inform four competing hypotheses:
H5a:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when they experience interactional injustice than when they experience either distributive injustice or
procedural injustice.
H5b:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when they experience multiple types of injustice. More specically, sabotage severity will increase in
direct proportion to the sum of types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional).

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H5c:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when they experience both distributive injustice and interactional injustice than when they experience
only one source of injustice or when distributive injustice is paired with procedural
injustice.
H5d:. Individuals will engage in more serious forms of sabotage when they experience all three sources of injustice simultaneously (distributive, procedural, and interactional). More specically, distributive injustice will increase sabotage severity
only when procedural injustice is paired with interactional injustice.

4. Method
Procedure
The 132 rst-person accounts of sabotage activities in the book Sabotage in the
American workplace: Anecdotes of dissatisfaction, mischief, and revenge. (Sprouse,
1992) served as data for the study. These accounts are self-reports, typically 200800
words in length, from individuals interviewed by Sprouse. Sprouses sample is not a
scientic one. To identify subjects he distributed iers, placed ads in newspapers,
received referrals from friends, and friends of friends. The book only includes accounts from individuals who did something they werent supposed to do at work.
Sprouse reports interviewing individuals who did not engage in sabotage, however
these accounts are not included in the book.
Three trained raters (see below) read the accounts, evaluating and coding each on
four dimensions: (1) the antecedent condition (cause) of the sabotage (powerlessness,
frustration, facilitation of work, boredom/fun, or injustice), (2) who was the target of
the sabotage (individual, organization), (3) who was harmed by the sabotage (individual, organization), and (4) the severity of the sabotage. If the cause was injustice, raters then coded (5) the existence of distributive injustice (1 yes, 2 no),
(6) the existence of procedural injustice, (7) the existence of interactional injustice, (8)
whether the source of injustice was structural (organizational) or social (individual),
and (9) whether the goal of the sabotage was restoration (of equity) or retaliation.
Raters were provided with denitions of the antecedent conditions for sabotage
that are consistent with the denitions of each provided in the introduction to this
paper. For each account, raters identied the primary cause of the sabotage. Thus,
only one cause of sabotage was identied for each account. If the cause was injustice,
coders then evaluated which types of injustice occurred (distributive, procedural, or
interactional) and of these, which was the primary source of injustice. Coders also
determined whether the cause of injustice was the result of structure (characteristics
of the organization systems like work rules or compensation systems) or was social
(interpersonal treatment).
Severity of sabotage and who was harmed by the sabotage were coded according
to Robinson and Bennetts (1995) typology of deviance behavior. Raters used the
specic examples provided by Robinson and Bennett (Figs. 1 and 2, pp. 562563 and
565, respectively) as a guide for determining the appropriate category of the act. The
severity of the act was rated on an 8-point scale based on the x-axis from Robinson
and Bennetts Fig. 1, which they termed seriousness or harmfulness. For ratings of
who was harmed by the sabotage, raters used the y-axis from the Robinson and
Bennett gures to categorize the act as harmful to an individual or to the organization. For assessing the target of sabotage, raters focused on who (an individual) or
what (the organization) was the intended target of the sabotage episode. Raters were
instructed that the intended target might dier from who was actually aected. For
example, if an employee sent customers damaged goods to get back at the organi-

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957

Table 1
PRL reliability
PRL reliability
Severity of sabotage
Harmed by sabotage
Target of sabotage
Cause of sabotage
Distributive injustice
Procedural injustice
Interactional injustice
Source of injustice (structural/social)
Goal of sabotage (restore/retaliate)
a

.77a
.98
.95
.93
.72
.79
.94
.90
.94

This variable is an interval scale. The reliability statistic is Cronbachs a.

zation, the organization would be identied as the target, even though the customer
may have been harmed. Additionally, coders assessed whether the goal of the sabotage was retaliation or the restoration of equity (as with cause, the primary goal was
identied; a single goal was determined for each scenario). With the exception of
severity of harm, all ratings were categorical.
Rater training began with each rater reading the Robinson and Bennett (1995)
article and discussing the deviance typology with the authors until a clear understanding of each dimension and the examples provided in the gures was reached.
Raters were also provided with denitions and descriptions of the antecedent conditions for sabotage, the three types of justice, the distinction between structural and
social sources of injustice, and the distinction between restoration of equity and
retaliation. Raters then independently coded ve scenarios. The scenario ratings
were compared both across raters and to a master coding prepared by the authors.
Raters were then debriefed, and discrepancies were discussed among raters and the
authors. The raters then coded ve additional scenarios. This round of coding
demonstrated substantial agreement both between raters and with the master
coding, so no additional training was conducted. The 10 training scenarios were
excluded from the analyses. The ratings for the 122 remaining scenarios were analyzed.
After all ratings were completed, we assessed interrater agreement using Rust and
Cooils (1994) Proportional Reduction in Loss (PRL) coecient. PRL allowed us to
assess agreement across multiple raters on categorical ratings. This measure generalizes many existing measures, including Cronbachs a. For this reason, the measures
can be interpreted using the same standards as Cronbachs a. As can be seen in Table
1, the reliabilities range from .72 to .98 (mean .88), indicating acceptable interrater
agreement for each of the variables.

5. Results
Our rst hypothesis examined the prevalence of injustice as a cause of sabotage
behavior. The results support the hypothesis. Perceived injustice was the most frequent cause of sabotage behavior; it was more frequent than all of the other causes
combined (v2 4:72, df 1, p < :05). The frequencies for the causes are shown in
Table 2. Of the 122 scenarios, injustice was identied as the cause for 73. The second
most common cause was powerlessness, followed by boredom/fun, frustration, and
facilitation of work. (Two scenarios were coded as other.)
Our second hypothesis predicted that when individuals perceived distributive
injustice as the cause, they would engage in sabotage to restore equity, whereas
when individuals perceived interactional injustice, they would engage in sabotage to
retaliate. (Here, we included only the 61 cases for which the primary cause of

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M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947965

Table 2
Motives for sabotage behavior
Cause

Frequency

Injustice
Powerlessness
Boredom/Fun
Frustration
Facilitation of work
Other
Total

73 (59.8%)
24 (19.7%)
13 (10.7%)
8 (6.6%)
2 (1.6%)
2 (1.6%)
122

sabotage was either distributive or interactional injustice.) As shown in Table 3, the

v2 for this hypothesis was signicant (v2 12:28, df 1, p < :001). Of the scenarios that reected interactional injustice, retaliation was the most commonly
identied goal. For the cases of distributive injustice, restoration was the most
common goal.
Our third hypothesis suggested that the target of the sabotage would be the same
as the source of the perceived unfairness. This hypothesis is partially supported
(v2 6:26, df 1, p < :01). As shown in Table 4, when the source of the injustice
was structural (organizational), saboteurs were more likely to target the organization
than individuals. However, when the source of injustice was social (individual), the
saboteur was as likely to target an individual as the organization.
Our fourth hypothesis examined the relationship between the target of sabotage
and the entity harmed (Table 5). We predicted that sabotage targeted at the organization was more likely to miss its mark and harm individuals than sabotage
targeted at individuals. The results revealed a signicant v2 (v2 10:47, p < :01).
However, the results were not as predicted. Sabotage targeted at individuals was
more likely to harm organizations than sabotage targeted at organizations was to
harm individuals.
Our nal hypotheses examined the relationship between the severity of sabotage
and the source of injustice. We used linear regression to assess the four competing
hypotheses. The dependent variable for each model was sabotage severity, rated on
an 8-point scale. The models for testing Hypotheses 5a, 5c, and 5d included the main

Table 3
Type of justice and goal of sabotage
Type of injustice

Goal of sabotage
Retaliation

Restoration

Distributive
Interactional

14
22
36

21
4
25

35
26
61

v2 12:28, p < :001.

Table 4
Source of injustice and target of sabotage
Source

Structural
Social

v2 6:26, p < :01.

Target
Organization

Individual

38
15

8
12

46
27

53

20

69

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959

Table 5
Target of sabotage and entity harmed by sabotage
Harmed by sabotage

Individual
Organization

Target of sabotage
Individual

Organization

5
22

2
93

7
115

27

95

122

v2 10:47, p < :01.

eect terms, two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction, respectively, of

distributive, procedural, and interactional injustice. For Hypothesis 5b, we created
dummy variables indicating whether the raters noted the presence of one, two, or
three types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional). This approach
allows for nonlinearity in the additive eect of injustice.
As shown in Table 6, Hypotheses 5a, 5c, and 5d were not supported. The predicted main eect and interaction eects for these three hypotheses were not signicant.
Hypothesis 5b, however, was supported. As Table 7 reects, the sum of the three
types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional) was signicantly related to the severity of sabotage (F 2:89, df 3, 118, p < :05). Fig. 1 displays the
cumulative eect of injustices on sabotage severity. The average severity for sabotage
unrelated to injustice (i.e., sabotage caused by powerlessness, frustration, facilitation
of work, and boredom/fun) was 5.74. The experience of one type of injustice increased sabotage severity to 6.02; two types of injustice increased it to 6.67; and three
types of injustice increased it to 7.89.

6. Discussion
This study examined the relationship between injustice and sabotage behavior. In
general, the results supported our hypotheses. As predicted, injustice was the most
Table 6
Main and interaction eects for type of injustice on sabotage severity
Main eects
model (H5a)

Two-way
interactions
model (H5c)

Three-way
interaction
model (H5d)

Independent variables
(Constant)
Distributive injustice
Procedural injustice
Interactional injustice
Distributive  procedural injustice
Distributive  interactional
injustice
Procedural  interactional
injustice
Distributive  procedural 
interactional injustice

B
5.69 (.16)
.43 (.26)
.40 (.33)
.29 (.29)

B
5.72 (.18)
.37 (.32)
).18 (.57)
.46 (.48)
.92 (.74)
).29 (.60)

B
5.72 (.18)
.37 (.32)
).18 (.61)
.45 (.50)
.93 (.86)
).28 (.65)

).02 (.72)

).02 (1.52)

F
Multiple R
R2
df

2.97
.27
.07
3, 118

*
**

p < :05.
p < :01.

).01 (1.73)
1.78
.29
.09
6, 115

1.52
.29
.09
7, 114

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M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947965

Table 7
Additive eect of type of injustice on sabotage severity
Model

(Constant)
One type of injustice
Two types of injustice
Three types of injustice

5.74 (.17)
.28 (.28)
.65 (.32)
1.22 (.49)

0.09
0.19
0.23

F
Multiple R
R2
df

2.89
.26
.07
3, 118

*
**

p < :05.
p < :01.

Fig. 1. Relationship between number of types of injustice and sabotage severity.

common cause of sabotage behavior. Also, distributive injustice was associated with
sabotage behavior aimed at restoring equity, while interactional injustice was associated with retaliatory sabotage behavior. Whereas the source of the injustice
(structural or social) aected the target of the sabotage (organization or individual),
this eect was clearest for structural sources of injustice. The results also revealed
that saboteurs are more likely to miss their mark when they target individuals than
when they target organizations. Finally, the additive eect of the three types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and interactional) determined the severity of the
sabotage. Below we discuss these results in greater detail.
The sabotage literature tends to identify causes of sabotage without exploring
their relative importance. While injustice is often noted as a potential cause, it rarely
gures prominently in mainstream work on sabotage. Put dierently, a survey of the
sabotage literature is likely to leave the reader with the impression that injustice is, at
best, one of many possible causes of sabotage or, at worst, a relatively minor motive.
The results of the present study are in sharp contrast to this image. Our study indicates that injustice is a dominant cause of sabotage. Injustice clearly warrants
greater attention in the sabotage literature.
From a practical perspective, this research is encouraging. It suggests that the
primary causes of sabotage are workplace phenomena that can be managed. Research on justice provides useful guidelines for increasing workplace fairness. Similarly, because powerlessness was the second most frequent cause of sabotage,
research on empowerment may also provide a useful framework for managing
sabotage.
This result also has implications for justice research. It is interesting to note that
of the potential causes for sabotage, justice, and powerlessness dominated, accounting for nearly 80% of the sabotage events. As these two constructs share

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961

common consequences, it could be useful for justice researchers to consider what

other characteristics these two domains have in common. These areas may be more
tightly related than we traditionally believe. For example, it is clear that both share
a common link in terms of the importance of control. We might gain additional
insights to organizational justice by considering shared and unique attributes of
each.
Our results also suggest that sabotage behavior can fulll two motives: restoration
of equity and retaliation against a harm-doer. As predicted, distributive injustice was
more likely to be associated with sabotage aimed at restoring equity, while interactional injustice was more likely to be associated with retaliation. Interestingly,
procedural injustice was as likely to be associated with restoration (8 of 13 incidents)
as retaliation (5 of 13 incidents). Apparently, when the structure of procedures is
unfair, individuals are as likely to perceive this as taking from them something they
deserve (restoration) as they are to perceive themselves as being harmed (retaliation).
Our results also provide some support for the rational view of sabotage. Sabotage
is often conceptualized as being a hot response. Thus, we might expect sabotageinclined individuals to lash out at anything around them. But our results suggest that
saboteurs do not randomly engage in sabotage activities. Rather, they target their
behavior at the perceived source of the injustice. When the source of injustice is seen
as structural, caused by the organization, the target is the organization. However, the
match is not quite as clean when the injustice stems from an interpersonal interaction. Here, saboteurs are as likely to target the organization as to target individuals.
The relationship between injustice and eects of sabotage become muddier when
one considers that there is not a perfect correlation between who or what is the target
and who or what is harmed. The results for Hypothesis 4 show that in approximately
20% of the cases, the target of the sabotage is dierent from the entity that is harmed.
However, the collateral damage is nearly always to the organization. When saboteurs target organizations, they hit their mark 98% of the time. However, when
saboteurs target individuals, 81% of the time they do greater harm to the organization than to the individual.
These results are inconsistent with our generalization of the prediction of OLeary-Kelly et al. (1996). However, in retrospect, there may be several reasons for this.
First, OLeary-Kelly et al.s predictions were based on the impetus for aggression
that stems from the physical environment. When injustice is caused by the organization, it is likely that individuals can clearly identify the sourcethus making a
match between the source and target more likely. Why then might acts of sabotage
aimed at individuals be more likely to harm the organization? An examination of the
22 vignettes in which that occurred reveals three themes. First, the organization
appears to be harmed when the individual targeted is the owner or a visible representative of the organization. That is, employees may harm their nemesis by harming
the organization that person owns or represents. In this latter case, the target individuals may ultimately be made to look bad when the sabotage is discovered. The
second theme is characterized by individuals who withdraw from work (e.g., work
slowly, le false work reports, quit) in an eort to respond an unreasonable boss.
The third theme is individuals who harm the organization by taking to an extreme
the rules that their boss insists upon. This is similar to the idea of working to
rule that characterizes union slowdowns. But in this case, the individual is reacting
to the unreasonable expectations of a single individual (the boss). They do not view
the organization as the problem.
We believe these results are intriguing from a number of perspectives. They underscore the importance of frontline supervisors and managers to the overall well
being of the organization. In an eort to retaliate against such bosses, individuals
frequently harm the organization. However, it is important to note here that the
number of cases of interpersonal deviance was small. Moreover, post-hoc analyses

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M.L. Ambrose et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89 (2002) 947965

reveal no signicant relationship between the source of the injustice (organizational

vs. interpersonal) and who is harmed (organization or individual).
Our results did not support our prediction that interactional injustice would be
associated with more serious sabotage than either distributive injustice or procedural
injustice. Nor did they support our prediction that the types of injustice would interact to predict the severity of sabotage. However, we did nd that distributive,
procedural, and interactional injustice exerted an additive eect on sabotage severity:
the greater the cumulative injustice, the more serious the sabotage. Moreover, the
lack of any two- or three-way interactions (see Table 6) indicates that this additive
eect is blind to particular combinations of types of injustice. The combined results
from our four competing hypotheses indicate that sabotage severity is a purely additive function of the number of types of injustice (distributive, procedural, and
interactional). This nding diers from that of Skarlicki and Folger (1997). Two
aspects of this result warrant attention.
First, the Skarlicki and Folger study examined the frequency of ORB. Our study
examines the severity of the behavior. It may be that the additive eect of injustice is
most relevant when individuals are considering engaging in more seriously harmful
behavior. Second, our assessment of justice in this study is fundamentally dierent
from that represented in previous work. We have dichotomous measures that indicate injustice/no injustice. In other studies, justice can vary from high to moderate to
low. Additionally, in many cases, we lack information about the other forms of
justice. We only know if individuals described the situation as unjust on a particular
dimension. We do not know if the lack of discussion of a particular type of justice
indicates fairness on that dimension or not. Nonetheless, the additive eect revealed
in this study supports a threshold or Popeye model of justice outcomes (McLean
Parks & Kidder, 1994). However, as there are many dierences between our work
and previous work (outcome type, severity, and measurement), further research is
needed to clarify the basis for this eect.
All studies suer from limitations and this one is no exception. Our data
source is one such limitation; several potential problems exist with this self-report
methodology. (We are sampling only individuals who admitted to engaging in
sabotage activities and agreed to be interviewed; it is retrospective; it reects only
the saboteurs perspective of the events; we must sometimes make inferences
about motives, etc.) However, we believe it provided a rich, interesting set of data
for this initial study about fairness and sabotage. In many ways, this approach
conforms to that recommended by Giacalone and Rosenfeld (1987). For example,
it relies on accounts that were collected outside the work place. However, the
results should be considered in the context of the data limitations. Nonetheless,
we hope these results provide greater understanding about the relationship between justice and sabotage, and that future research will extend this work in eld
settings in which the relationships we identify here may be studied more systematically.
Interest in the relationship between justice and deviance behavior is growing. In
this study we attempt to increase our understanding of the relationship between
sabotage and justice by integrating frameworks from organizational justice and
workplace deviance. We hope our research adds a useful perspective for understanding these relationships, and that our results provide insights to the eect of
organizational injustice on the goal, target, and severity of sabotage behavior.

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