NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1496
___________
RANDALL WINSLOW,
Appellant
v.
P. J. STEVENS; J. LAZARUS; J. COLVILLE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-04550)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. ONeill, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 1, 2015
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 2, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Randall Winslow appeals pro se from the District Courts dismissal of an action
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Winslow was involved in a case before the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County in which he had hired an attorney. Winslow contends that the attorney had
agreed to appeal his case but then failed to do so. Thereafter, Winslow pursued a pro se
breach of contract case against that attorney. The Court of Common Pleas granted
summary judgment in favor of Winslows lawyer on the ground that Winslow had failed
to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3, which requires a certificate
of merit in an action that claims a licensed professional deviated from an acceptable
professional standard. One of Winslows arguments before the Court of Common Pleas
was that Rule 1042.3 violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court
affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Winslows petition to appeal.
Disappointed but undaunted, Winslow thought the federal courts might grant him
the relief he sought. Accordingly, he brought a civil rights complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the three Pennsylvania
Superior Court judges that had decided his state appeal. Winslows federal complaint
argued that Rule 1042.3 is unconstitutional, and sought, among other things, declaratory
relief, a trial against his attorney in a county other than Chester County, and a [p]roper
proceeding for redress and remedy. After briefing on the defendants motion to dismiss,
the District Court dismissed Winslows complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Winslow thereafter
attempted to file an amended complaint naming the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and
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the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as defendants, but the District Court denied that
attempt, stating that no case was pending. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction to review the District Courts order dismissing Winslows
complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district courts
decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519,
529-30 (3d Cir. 2012). We construe Winslows pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may affirm the judgment on any basis that the
record supports, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Multiple jurisdictional and pleading rules doom Winslows lawsuit, but we
recognize our independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). To resolve this appeal, it
suffices to rely on the following analysis.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars certain cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Thus, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from
state-court judgments[.] Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). That rule applies to challenges to state court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the
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state courts action was unconstitutional. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) [T]here are four requirements that must be met for
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the
plaintiff complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting
the district court to review and reject the state judgments. Great W. Mining & Mineral
Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284) (alterations in original).
Although Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine that applies only in limited
circumstances, id. at 169 (quotations omitted), there is no question that these four
requirements apply to Winslows federal lawsuit. The only prerequisite that Winslow
meaningfully disputes is the fourth one, as he characterizes his case as an independent
constitutional challenge that does not require direct review and rejection of the state
courts judgment in his state suit against his lawyer. Here, there is nothing independent
about Winslows federal claims. The Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court
each explicitly considered and rejected Winslows constitutional challenge to Rule
1042.3.1 What Winslow seeks is an improper review of the proceedings already
conducted by the lower tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance

Winslow also argued before the District Court that Rule 1042.3 violated the Contract
Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution. The state courts did not comment
on that legal theory because, apparently, Winslow did not raise it during his state
proceedings. That does not change the outcome here because Winslow may not escape
Rooker-Feldman by raising a new constitutional theory in federal court. Valenti v.
Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992).
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with lawi.e., that his case against his attorney should not have been dismissed because
Rule 1042.3 is unconstitutionalas opposed to an independent claim that simply denies
a legal conclusion reached by the state court. Id. at 168-69. As a result, the District
Court did not err in applying Rooker-Feldman to Winslows complaint and in dismissing
his challenge to the judgment against him in his state case.
That said, construing Winslows pleadings liberally, it is perhaps possible that he
also sets out a facial challenge to Rule 1042.3 seeking a prospective declaration that the
rule is unconstitutional, which would apply in future cases but would not disturb the
dismissal of his prior state case against his attorney. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
would not bar such a challenge. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87; Centifanti v. Nix, 865
F.2d 1422, 1424-30 (3d Cir. 1989). But cf. Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.
1988) (denying what was asserted to be a general challenge as a skillful attempt to mask
the true purpose of the action).
But even if we construe Winslows pleadings as such a challenge, we must still
affirm the District Courts judgment because Winslow lacks constitutional standing. The
fact that Rooker-Feldman does not bar a particular claim does not itself imply that a
plaintiff has standing to bring it. See Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court, 252 F.3d 828,
836-38 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, Winslow lacks standing as there is no foreseeable prospect
that Rule 1042.3 will bar some hypothetical future lawsuit he might assert against an
attorney or other licensed professional. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
97-113 (1983). Thus, there is no justiciable case or controversy involving Winslow and
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Rule 1042.3. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991) ([A]fter separating
out [plaintiffs] impermissible request that the federal district court overturn the state
judgment against him, his situation is indistinguishable from that of any other citizen of
Utah who, without any palpable chance of being subjected to those procedures in the
future, might desire to challenge that states default judgment rule.); cf. also Brown v.
Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff lacked standing to seek
prospective relief when he could not pursue claims predicated upon past application of
allegedly unconstitutional rule).2
The remaining question is whether the District Court should have allowed
Winslow to file an amended complaint, as Winslow attempt to do after the District Court
had closed the case. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482
F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) ([I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer
amendmentirrespective of whether it is requestedwhen dismissing a case for failure
to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.); Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). In its opinion, the District Court did not
explicitly consider whether Winslow should have had the opportunity to amend his
complaint, or determine that amendment would have been inequitable or futile. But here,
Winslows jurisdictional and standing deficiencies are incurable and any amendment

One consequence of this is that Winslow could not resuscitate his suit simply by suing
the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who propagate rules like Rule 1042.3.
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would indeed have been futile. As a result, we conclude that the District Court did not
err in denying Winslow the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the District Courts judgment.