Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Circuit Judges
Circuit Judges
Rebecca R. Haywood
Michael L. Ivory
[ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
Elisa A. Long
[ARGUED]
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue
1500 Liberty Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act, a measure which profoundly revise[d] the old
sentencing process. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 367 (1989). One of the reforms effected by the Act
was the elimination of special parole and the
establishment of a new system of supervised release.
Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 397
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experience with you, and its been time, after time, after
time.
Section 3553(a)(2) directs a sentencing court to
consider the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, to provide just punishment, to deter further
criminal conduct, to protect the public and to provide
correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18
U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (D). Thornhills
recidivism, and the applicability of 3583(g) requiring
the imposition of a term of imprisonment, brought these
3553 considerations to the forefront of this revocation
hearing. We are well-satisfied that the Court took these
factors into account.
The Courts dialogue with defense counsel is
telling. Defense counsel argued that the Court did not
have to find a violation and that Thornhill just need[ed]
structure. The Court replied: Thats what weve been
trying to give her . . . Shes been here, and been here,
and been here. . . . So how else are we going to
accomplish that, without forcing her into a situation.
This exchange clearly reveals the Courts conclusion that
mere supervision had been ineffective in curbing
Thornhills substance abuse, deterring her criminal
conduct, or compelling her compliance with a regimen of
mental health treatment. In short, incapacitation and
deterrence had become necessary.
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society environment.
(App. 400.)2
A defendants
manageability, whatever that might mean, is not included
among the sentencing considerations listed under 3553(a).
Thus, the sole explanation provided by the District Court does
not show rational and meaningful consideration of the
3553(a) factors.3 This alone necessitates a remand for
resentencing.
Likewise, the District Courts other asides and
statements in the sentencing hearing do not reveal why Ms.
Thornhill was sentenced to three years imprisonment, let
alone indicate that the sentence was based on the 3553(a)
2