Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit
2d 320
Randall filed an answer, and after default judgment was entered against
Aerosol, Randall was given leave to file a third-party complaint against Mark
Gilbert and Presto Products Corporation (Presto). Randall's third-party
complaint alleged in substance that Presto, which had purchased the stock of
Aerosol from Randall, and Gilbert, who owned substantially all of Presto's
shares, had converted the assets of Aerosol to themselves and thereby became
liable to Allied for the value of the shipments in question.
Presto then filed a counterclaim against Randall, claiming he had breached the
warranties made in connection with Presto's purchase of Aerosol's stock.
Gilbert counterclaimed against Aerosol for the value of services he allegedly
rendered Aerosol to enable it to continue in business.
The cause was tried to the court which entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law, after hearing evidence on behalf of all parties except Aerosol, against
which the default judgment had been entered previously. Judgment was entered
in favor of plaintiff Allied and against defendants Gilbert and Presto in the
amount of $11,898.36, the stipulated balance due on the purchase of Genetron
12, and in favor of Presto against Randall on Presto's counterclaim in the
amount of $6,058.24, the amount paid by Presto for the purchase of Aerosol's
capital stock.
Defendants Gilbert and Presto appeal from the judgment against them in favor
of plaintiff Allied (No. 19945). Presto appeals from the judgment entered in its
favor against Randall, claiming the amount of the judgment is inadequate (No.
13945). Plaintiff Allied cross-appeals from the judgment insofar as the
judgment denied Allied's claims against Randall (No. 13946). Albert Randall,
one of the appellees in No. 13945 and the only appellee in No. 13946, has not
participated in this appeal. Only Allied Chemical Corporation, Mark Gilbert
and Presto Products Corporation have appeared.
We hold initially that the findings of fact made by the court are not clearly
erroneous; they are amply supported by the evidence. Rule 52(a), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.
Gilbert and Presto contend the trial court erred in considering Allied a creditor
of Aerosol and entering judgment for the full amount due Allied against Gilbert
and Presto.
The court below made no specific finding that the debt due Allied was a debt of
Aerosol. After setting out findings of fact, the court did, however, refer to the
debt twice as being a debt owed by Aerosol to Allied. This is tantamount to a
specific finding that the debt due Allied was a debt of Aerosol.
10
11
Shortly after Presto's purchase of Aerosol's stock, Gilbert and Presto caused the
entire inventory of Aerosol to be sold to Ever-Ready, Inc., another corporation
owned and controlled by Gilbert, for a price of $5,618.76. This amount was
substantially below the book value of the inventory. Since no notice of the sale
of such inventory was given to Allied or any other creditor of Aerosol in the
manner required by the Illinois Bulk Sales Act, the trial court correctly held
this sale to be a violation of the Act. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 121 1/2 78-80a (1957).
12
13
During the period when Presto and Gilbert owned and operated Aerosol,
Aerosol paid Ever-Ready at least $15,300 as reimbursement for 'salaries, rental,
electricity, postage, insurance and other costs allegedly advanced on behalf of
Aerosol.' The trial court found as a fact that these 'charges were arbitrary and
At all times after Presto acquired the capital stock of Aerosol, Gilbert owned
substantially all of the shares of Presto and Ever-Ready. He was in full control
of both corporations, as well as of Aerosol through his control of Presto. Gilbert
personally participated in or ordered the transactions involving the three
corporations and treated all as if they were his sole property.
15
16
The circumstances of this case require that the corporate entities of Gilbert's
corporations be disregarded, for they did not exist apart from Gilbert's will. The
corporations were treated as different parts of one operation. To recognize the
corporate entities when in fact they were but the alter ego of Gilbert would
promote injustice. Shamrock Oil and Gas Co. v. Ethridge, D.C.D.Colo., 159
F.Supp. 693 (1958); Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. Glass,
Mo.Ct.App., 327 S.W.2d 538 (1959). See Holland v. Joy Candy Mfg. Corp., 14
Ill.App.2d 531, 145 N.E.2d 101 (1957).
17
'The effect of applying the alter ego doctrine, of course, is that the corporation
and the person who dominates it are treated as one person, so that any act
committed by one is attributed to both, and if either is bound, by contract,
judgment, or otherwise, both are equally bound.' Shamrock Oil and Gas Co. v.
Ethridge, supra, 159 F.Supp. at 697.
18
The judgment entered against Gilbert and Presto for the full amount due Allied
finds substantial support in the record.
19
Presto complains that the judgment in its favor against Randall was inadequate.
This judgment was for the amount paid by Presto to Randall for Aerosol's
shares and was the extent of Presto's investment in Aerosol. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the district court properly limited Presto's
recovery to the amount it paid Randall for his Aerosol shares.
20
Gilbert complains of the failure of the trial court to enter a judgment in his
favor against Randall due to Randall's admitted breaches of the warranties
contained in the agreement of sale of Aerosol's shares. The warranties in this
agreement were in favor of Presto, the purchaser, not in favor of Gilbert. As
between Randall on the one hand and Presto and Gilbert on the other there is no
ground for disregarding Presto's corporate entity. The district court correctly
refrained from entering a judgment against Randall in Gilbert's favor.
21
Allied contends that the trial court erred in failing to hold Randall personally
liable to it for the unpaid account. With respect to this cross-appeal, No. 13946,
Allied states in its brief: 'Although plaintiff is convinced that the trial court
erred in failing to enter judgment in its favor against Randall, * * * it would
have been content to abide by the decision below * * * (except for the appeal
taken by Gilbert and Presto).' On oral argument, Allied's counsel agreed that its
appeal could property be described as 'protective.'
22
In view of these concessions by Allied and our conclusion that the judgment
against Gilbert and Presto in favor of Allied was correct, we do not reach the
merits of the cross-appeal and affirm the finding of the trial court that Randall
was not personally liable for the debt due Allied.
23
Allied's prayer for the assessment of all costs of these appeals, including a
reasonable fee for its attorneys, is denied.
24
The judgments entered by the district court are in all respects affirmed.
25
Affirmed.