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Vincent Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Co., Inc., Jarka Corporation of Philadelphia, Third-Party, 246 F.2d 875, 3rd Cir. (1957)
Vincent Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Co., Inc., Jarka Corporation of Philadelphia, Third-Party, 246 F.2d 875, 3rd Cir. (1957)
2d 875
Vincent KLIMASZEWSKI
v.
PACIFIC-ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CO., Inc., Appellant,
JARKA
CORPORATION OF PHILADELPHIA, Third-party
Defendant.
No. 12111.
swing out of its usual course. The plaintiff was struck by the swinging draft and
badly hurt.
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Klimaszewski recovered a verdict in the trial court and the defendant appeals.
Since the verdict was in plaintiff's favor we may take it, and the defendant
concedes, that there was evidence from which it could have been found that the
cause of the slipping cable and therefore the accident, was a loose becket or
bolt in the winch to which the cable had been fastened. The winch was part of
the ship's equipment.
The plaintiff's case was based upon the two usual claims: (1) unseaworthiness,
and (2) negligence.
The jury was given a series of specific interrogatories to answer. One of the
answers exonerated the plaintiff's employer, Jarka Corporation, from any
carelessness. Jarka, which had been joined by defendant as a third-party
defendant, is therefore, out of the case at this time. Other interrogatories put
directly to the jury the questions of seaworthiness and negligence in these
words:
'Did the plaintiff sustain injuries which were caused either in whole or in part
by--
'(a) any failure of the defendant to provide plaintiff with a safe and seaworthy
vessel and safe appurtenances, equipment or appliances, and to keep them in a
safe and seaworthy condition?
'(b) any negligence on the part of any of the officers, agents or employees of the
defendant?'
The jury answered both of these questions in the affirmative thus finding both
unseaworthiness and negligence.
We do not have any doubt that on these facts and on this finding a case of
liability is made out. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 1946, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct.
872, 90 L.Ed. 1099, extended protection from injuries due to unseaworthiness
to longshoremen in the course of unloading a vessel. This case does not take us
one inch further than that because here the job being done was loading the
ship. It is almost precisely like Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 1954, 347 U.S.
396, 74 S.Ct. 601, 98 L.Ed. 798, affirming per curiam, 9 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d
478. In both Petterson and this case that which caused the injury was a piece of
ship's equipment. But in the Petterson case the court had to go further than we
do here because the block which broke may have been brought on by a
stevedoring company and made a part of ship's equipment by incorporation,
according to the court. Our own decision in Gindville v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 3 Cir., 1955, 224 F.2d 746, is likewise in point, although there we had
to consider a more difficult question than here, namely, what constituted
unseaworthiness. There the unseaworthiness consisted in improper stowing of
the cargo. Here it is part of the regular loading equipment.
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The appellant complains of the failure of the trial judge to give certain
instructions. Several of them were to the effect that the jury could consider the
fact that defendant had surrendered control of the vessel to a reliable
stevedoring contractor. Feinman v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 3 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d
393, and Brabazon v. Belships Co., 3 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 904, are cited. The
requested charge was clearly erroneous in so far as plaintiff's action was based
on unseaworthiness. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 1954, 347 U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct.
601, 98 L.Ed. 798, affirming per curiam, 9 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 478; Rogers v.
United States Lines, 1954, 347 U.S. 984, 74 S.Ct. 849, 98 L.Ed. 1120,
reversing per curiam, 3 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 57. Since the special jury finding
of unseaworthiness is sufficient to support the judgment, defendant could not
have been prejudiced by the failure to charge as requested. Everything correct
in the other requests was substantially covered by the charge given or in the
nature of comments on the evidence which the court could refuse. The charge
of the court was very comprehensive. One mistake was made when the case
was described as one under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. 688. But the court
quickly corrected this mistake. We find nothing in the charge which would
mislead the jury. We think that this body had well presented to it what the case
involved and were compelled to meet the issue by giving specific answers to
specific questions.
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