Professional Documents
Culture Documents
William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 3rd Cir. (1987)
William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 383, 3rd Cir. (1987)
2d 383
17 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 888, 16 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 934,
Bankr. L. Rep. P 71,988, 13 O.S.H. Cas.(BNA) 1424,
1987 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 28,048
We also find that we share concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court
over this issue and that we should decide it. Finally, we must determine the
effect, if any, that the automatic bankruptcy stay has on the Secretary's petition.
We conclude that, although the stay prevents us from enforcing the petition
with regard to the fine required by the citation, it does not extend to that portion
of the citation that orders abatement of health and safety violations, and for that
portion of the citation, we grant the Secretary's petition for enforcement.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2
Morysville did not contest the citation within fifteen working days after it was
issued. Therefore, on March 4, 1986, the citation became a final order of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission that is not reviewable by
any court or agency. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 659(a). The Secretary petitioned this Court
for summary enforcement of this final order pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660.
We in essence denied summary enforcement by setting the matter down for
oral argument, and we now consider the Secretary's Petition for Enforcement in
light of that argument and the written submissions of the parties.
II. JURISDICTION
4
Our jurisdiction over this case must be assessed in light of both OSHA and the
Chapter 11 petition filed by Morysville. Putting aside for the moment the
bankruptcy of Morysville, we look to an OSHA provision, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660,
as the source of our jurisdiction. By its terms, section 660(b) grants us original
and exclusive jurisdiction. It provides that the Secretary may obtain
"enforcement of any final order of the Commission by filing a petition for such
relief in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the alleged
violations occurred or in which the employer has its principal office...." 29
U.S.C. Sec. 660(b). Section 660(b) also specifically incorporates Sec. 660(a),
which provides that "[u]pon the filing of the record with it, the jurisdiction of
the court [of appeals] shall be exclusive...." 1
5
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is
related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of that proceeding could
conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy....
An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights,
liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and
which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt
estate.
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984); In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d
797, 802 (3d Cir.1985).
10
11
Although section 1334(b) alters the effect of the jurisdictional grant of section
660(b) by expressly rendering it non-exclusive, it does not divest us of our
jurisdiction. Rather, the effect of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(b) is to grant the district
court overseeing the bankruptcy concurrent original jurisdiction. 2 2] We thus
share concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court overseeing the
petitioner's bankruptcy, and because the instant enforcement petition was first
filed with us, we must decide if we should defer to the district court in this
matter.3
12
The purpose of both sections 660(b) and 1334(b) is the expeditious resolution
of the controversy at hand. The legislative history of OSHA details this
purpose. If an employer wishes to contest a citation, he has numerous
procedures which may be followed; when a citation is not contested and has
become final, however, the order is uncontestable and is to be entered as "an
automatic court enforcement order" of the Court of Appeals. See S.Rep. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
5177, 5191; see also id. at 5211; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5228, 5235. Because of the
importance of providing a safe workplace for employees, Congress provided
summary enforcement to allow the Secretary to expeditiously rectify workplace
hazards.
13
14 broad grant of jurisdiction will enable the bankruptcy courts, which are created
This
as adjuncts to the district court for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction, to
dispose of controversies that arise in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy code.
Actions that formerly had to be tried in State court or in the Federal district court, at
great cost and delay to the estate, may now be tried in the bankruptcy court.
15
S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5939; see also H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5963,
6400 (using similar language).
16
Given the reasons for these bases of jurisdiction, no purpose would be served if
we were to defer to the district court for it to exercise the original, nonexclusive jurisdiction it shares with us. Transferring this petition would work
contrary to the stated purpose of section 660(b) of OSHA. Rather than
providing for expeditious enforcement, it would hinder the intended summary
process. Moreover, the transfer is not necessary to the expeditious
administration of the bankruptcy, the encouragement of which underlies the
jurisdictional grant over proceedings related to the bankruptcy. Because no trial
is required for this summary process, which is intended to be "automatic," no
Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction to enforce the final order of
the Commission, the question becomes whether the enforcement petition is
stayed by the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec.
362. The general rule under this section is that all non-bankruptcy proceedings
against a Chapter 11 petitioner are automatically stayed upon the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition. Two issues must be addressed in dealing with the
automatic stay provision. Does the court of appeals--as opposed to the
bankruptcy court--have jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the
provision? If so, does the provision apply to the instant action?
case pending in Texas district court). Cf. EEOC v. Hall's Motor Transport Co.,
789 F.2d 1011, 1013 (3d Cir.1986) (filing of bankruptcy petition does not act as
automatic stay of suit under Title VII). Finding that we have jurisdiction to
determine the applicability of the automatic stay provision to the pending
petition for enforcement, we turn to the question whether the automatic stay
provision applies to the instant action.
B. APPLICATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
21
11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, the automatic bankruptcy stay provision, generally stays
the commencement or continuation of judicial proceedings against the debtor
upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, including the enforcement of
judgments.6 The section contains certain exceptions:
22
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... does not
operate as a stay--
23
....
24
25
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the enforcement of judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power[.]
26
27
Because the Secretary had not commenced the instant proceeding before
Morysville filed its petition, only paragraph (4) is implicated. The legislative
history explains that paragraph (4) provides an exception to the automatic stay
"where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law."
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6299 (emphasis supplied); see also S.Rep. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787,
5838. This court has therefore found that paragraph (4), together with paragraph
(5), exempts from the automatic stay equitable actions brought by state and
federal agencies to correct violations of regulatory statutes enacted to promote
health and safety. See United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 818 F.2d
1077 (3d Cir.1987); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.1984); see also Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S.Ct.
755, 761, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986) (one of the purposes of paragraph (5) is to
protect public health and safety).
28
There are two components to the citation for which the Secretary seeks
summary enforcement. The citation orders Morysville to abate its continuing
violations of OSHA. It also orders the debtor in bankruptcy to pay a fine of
$21,000. In light of the principles applicable to governmental enforcement
actions against bankrupt entities, we examine each of these components in turn
to determine the respective applicability of the automatic stay.
29
30
We are mindful of the position in which this conclusion may place financially
distressed businesses. Although protected by the automatic stay from
enforcement of direct money judgments, see infra, companies that have sought
bankruptcy protection are not automatically insulated from orders to abate,
which may have as great or greater financial consequences than direct money
judgments. Nevertheless, an entity that operates in a regulated sphere is obliged
to comply with the relevant regulations; otherwise, it must exit the field. As we
have specifically found in the OSHA field, "Congress did contemplate that the
32 the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
Since
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share,
enforcement by a governmental unit of money judgment would give it preferential
treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
33
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6299. Thus, although the stay does not operate against
actions or proceedings by governmental units "attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a [health and safety] law," id. at 343, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News at 6299; see also S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 52, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5838, it does prevent a
governmental unit from enforcing a money judgment. The Secretary is not
before us to fix the amount of damages owed by Morysville; under 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 659(a), a final determination of that issue has been made. Rather, he in part
seeks summary enforcement of a money judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec.
660. The automatic stay clearly prevents us from enforcing this portion of the
citation. As punishment for past violations, it is not a fully prospective order,
which, despite the financial consequences to the distressed corporation, we may
enforce to protect workers from the hazards of an unsafe work.
34
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 705,
83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985), distinguished orders requiring the abatement of
We find no feature of federal health and safety regulations that would alter the
application of the Supreme Court's analysis, which concerned only state health
and safety laws. Cf. Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 818 F.2d at 1086-87 (applying Penn
Terra to Clean Air Act); In re: Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175
(5th Cir.1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3622 (Feb. 23, 1987) (No.
86-1400) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). We must therefore deny
the petition insofar as it seeks entry of a $21,000 judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
36
We will grant the Secretary's petition insofar as it seeks to enforce that portion
of the citation that orders Morysville to abate its continuing violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. We will deny the Secretary's petition
insofar as it seeks to enforce the payment of a $21,000 penalty.
37
38
The court is confronted with the necessity of choosing between two statutes,
each of which grants jurisdiction to a different court.
39
Because the petition was filed in this court, consideration of our jurisdiction
may be the appropriate first step. As the majority points out, the petition for
enforcement here rests on 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660(b). The subsection provides that
in the instance of a noncontested citation, the Secretary may file a petition for
enforcement that shall be entered by the clerk of the court of appeals. Any
contempt proceeding arising from that order is to be conducted by the court of
appeals.
40
Subsection (b) of Sec. 660 contains no language granting jurisdiction, but does
state "the provisions of subsection (a) ... shall govern such proceedings to the
extent applicable." Subsection (a), in turn, provides that "any person adversely
affected or aggrieved" may petition the court of appeals for review of the
merits of a commission order." After the petition is filed, the commission must
forward the record to the court of appeals. The statute specifies that "[u]pon
such filing, the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding." If the court had
remanded the matter to the commission for additional evidentiary findings, and
the case returns to the court, "upon the filing of the record with it, the
jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive."
41
A close reading of the statute reveals that it does not specifically grant
"exclusive" jurisdiction to the court of appeals to enforce a noncontested
citation. Subsection (b) refers back generally to subsection (a) "to the extent
applicable." But subsection (a) confers "exclusive" jurisdiction only in cases
where the record has been returned to the court after remand. The word
"exclusive" is conspicuously absent when the statute refers to jurisdiction on
the initial filing of the record.
42
To some extent, therefore, the statute is ambiguous and does not clearly state
that the court of appeals' jurisdiction is exclusive in the circumstances
presented here. Although the majority's conclusion that the statute gives us
exclusive jurisdiction is a permissible one, it is not compelled by the language
itself.
43
44
The question then becomes which court should assume original jurisdiction.
The majority admits that enforcement of the citation will undoubtedly alter the
46
As we said in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984),
Congress intended, through this legislation, "to grant comprehensive
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and
expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate." The
majority's action here frustrates that aim.
47
When a case presents a realistic possibility that hearings and fact findings might
be necessary and jurisdiction is present in both the trial and appellate courts,
sound judicial administration dictates that the trial court address the matter in
the first instance. Appellate procedures by their collegial nature are
cumbersome and not readily adaptable to trials and fact finding.
48
49
51
52
In a district court, the situation is different because to a great extent each judge
functions individually and independently of the others. Increasing the number
of judges in that forum has a far greater impact on total case-handling capacity
than in an appellate body. A district court consequently may more easily
expand to absorb additional work. This fundamental difference between the
courts suggests that matters not requiring the special treatment of multi-judge
review should be docketed in the first instance in the district courts.
53
54
With all respect to Judge Weis' reading of the statute, the exclusive jurisdiction
provision at the end of subsection (a) appears to us to modify the entire
subsection, covering both contested and uncontested citations. Moreover,
neither the statute nor logic mandates that exclusive jurisdiction depends on
whether the record was returned for additional evidentiary findings
Additionally, as one appellate court has noted, "the Sec. 362 exceptions to the
automatic stay, as well as the provisions of [former 28 U.S.C.] Sec. 1471(b)
[now 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(b) ], recognize that courts other than the bankruptcy
court have jurisdiction to hear related proceedings involving the debtor."
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d
429, 439 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); see also infra Part III.B (discussing
applicability of the exceptions to the automatic stay). Finding that the automatic
stay did not apply to a Title VII action, a panel of this court had no occasion to
question its jurisdiction, despite Sec. 1334(b) and the financial consequences
that would flow from any order. See EEOC v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 789
F.2d 1011, 1013-14 (3d Cir.1986). Other courts faced with proceedings not
within the purview of the automatic stay have similarly found the disputes
justiciable. See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.1986)
(EEOC Title VII action); Ahrens Aircraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 23, 24 (1st
Cir.1983) (per curiam) (NLRB backpay order)
Conversely, had the petition first been filed with the district court, the issue
would concern whether that court should defer to us
Similarly, had the petition first been filed with the district court, transfer would
work against the reasons for the concurrent original, non-exclusive jurisdiction
Additionally, while we hold that the automatic stay is unavailing, see infra Part
III.B, case-by-case relief is available to bankrupt debtors through Sec. 105(a).
As the House Report recognized in the context of state health and safety
regulations,
[t]he States will be able to enforce their police and regulatory powers free from
the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court has ample additional power to prevent
damage to the bankrupt estate by such actions on a case-by-case basis. By
exempting these State actions from the scope of the automatic stay, the court
will be required to examine the State actions more carefully, and with a view to
protecting the legitimate interests of the State as well as of the estate, before it
may enjoin actions against the debtors or the estate.
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 175, reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News 5963, 6135. The analysis does not vary where, as here, a federal
health and safety regulation is involved.