DLD-263

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1463
___________
RASHEEN NIFAS,
Appellant
v.
BRIAN V. COLEMAN; M. ZAKEN;
T. BERRIER; W. LEGGETT;
E. MANCHAS; R. CLARK;
S. RYMAROWICZ; D. HOOPER;
C. ABEREGG; V. KNIZNER;
CO.1 BARKLEY; CO.1 CASTELLO;
CO.1 A.W. EICHER; CO.1 A. ROLL;
CO.1 STROUTMAN; CO.1 R.F. COLLINS;
K. CROSS; P. YETTER;
T. CESARINO-MARTIN; R. PETRUS;
J. MONAS; M. VARNER;
I. DICIO; D. VARNER;
T. WILLIAMS; R. MACINTYRE;
T. MARK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01486)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 31, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 13, 2013)

_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Rasheen Nifas, a Pennsylvania inmate proceeding pro so, filed a complaint in the
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by numerous corrections employees. The District Court granted
the defendants motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim in part, preserving
only the Eighth Amendment claims.1 The remaining defendants thereafter moved for summary
judgment on those claims, which the District Court granted. Nifas timely filed this appeal. For
the following reasons, we will affirm.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Courts March 5, 2012 order granting in part the defendants motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010). Dismissal is
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, . . . [the]
plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility. Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). We also
exercise plenary review over the District Courts February 12, 2012 order granting summary
judgment to the defendants, using the same standard as the District Court. See Pichler v.

Nifas filed a notice of appeal from the District Courts March 5, 2012 order dismissing
several defendants and claims. See C.A. No. 12-1705. That appeal was later dismissed for
failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(a); L.A.R. 3.3 and Misc. 107.1(a).
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UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record
reveals no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We agree with the District Court that Nifass complaint failed to state claims for
retaliation. Although he sufficiently alleged that he was engaged in conduct protected by the
First Amendment when he filed grievances and lawsuits against prison officials, see Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002), and in some instances sufficiently alleged that
adverse action was taken against him, the complaint failed to demonstrate a causal connection
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and any adverse action. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000).2 Our review of the complaint also convinces
us that the District Court properly determined that Nifas failed to state a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause with respect to the prisons disciplinary
proceedings. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
We also agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on Nifass various Eighth Amendment claims. Nifas claimed that SCI-Fayette
corrections officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they (1) failed to protect him
from threats of violence and ongoing sexual harassment; (2) failed to take reasonable measures
to protect his safety when fellow inmate Rodriguez attempted to spray cleaning solvent in his
eyes; (3) used excessive force in the course of subduing him during the ensuing physical

The District Court also properly noted that some of Nifass retaliation claims were subject to
dismissal as unexhausted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
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altercation with inmate Rodriguez; (4) failed to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force;
and (5) failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment.
The defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Nifass failure to protect claims.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a general duty on prison officials to protect inmates from
violence by other prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). In order to
succeed on a failure to protect claim under 1983, an inmate must demonstrate that corrections
officers acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See BeersCapitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). The undisputed facts here do not show
that Nifas was exposed to a risk of serious harm with respect to the incident involving inmate
Rodriguez or the alleged threats and sexual harassment he received from other inmates. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Nifas also failed to
establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference, which requires showing that
they knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837.
The defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Nifass excessive force and
failure to intervene claims. In reviewing excessive force claims in the context of the Eighth
Amendment, we look to whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 14 (1992). In conducting that inquiry, we examine the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the extent of injury
inflicted, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, and any efforts to temper the
severity of a forceful response. See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000). Here,
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Nifas alleged that Rodriguez sprayed cleaning solvent in his eyes and officers responded by
ramming Nifass head into a steel doorway and forcefully jumping on his back and shoulder.
A video recording of the incident, however, shows that Nifas was the initial aggressor in the
altercation with Rodriguez and that corrections officers responded with an objectively
reasonable amount of force in order to subdue him and restore discipline.3 Because we find
that no constitutional violation occurred with respect to excessive force, Nifas also cannot
succeed on his failure to intervene claims. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir.
2002).
Finally, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Nifass medical treatment
claims. In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate
medication treatment, an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
Here, the record reflects that Nifas received prompt medical treatment for minor injuries,
which included scrapes and cuts, resulting from the officers unplanned use of force following
the incident with Rodriguez. The undisputed facts do not demonstrate a constitutional
violation with respect to either deliberate indifference or a serious medical need. See Brooks
v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000).

Nifas has filed a motion in this Court for leave to file declaration from a witness and two
exhausted grievances in support of appeal, contending that the video recording of the incident
with Rodriguez had been altered and important evidence was deleted. He maintains that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim because a material factual
dispute exists with respect to whether he or Rodriguez started the altercation and the types of
force subsequently employed by corrections officers. The motion is denied, as Nifas never
presented such evidence of video tampering to the District Court. See Theriot v. Parish of
Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.