CAA

Chevron: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

NSO v. Lujan. NSO is TS but CH not listed, did not give explanation why CH not detrmbl. Hldg. Abuse of Disc. Court says

4: No $ considerations, only BSCDA. N.Mexico Cattle Growers Assn. (see also Ctr. Bio. Div v. Badgley: hldg. dec. to not L based
only on BASCD so not A/C). May overturn if fail to consider properly all 5 fctrs T/ES (Def. of W. v. Norton: b/c excluded H cons in
pv .lands But P.Bear -found only some segments as T applying DPS.) DIST: Trout Unlimited Uph. reg. req. hatchery fish same as
Evol. Sig. Ut. (ESU), but T/ES status based on the viability of a natural, self-sustaining population & hatchery consid. in terms of
Poz/Neg impacts on goal - including ESU is a good faith disagr. supported by sci. on both sides in such situations we stay our
hand. See also Modesto Irr. Dist. v. Gutierrez: upholding dec. to place Steelhear/Rbow trouts in dist. categs.
4(b)(2) NSO v. Lujan: may exclude area from CH if benefits of exclusion > benefits of dsgnt., unless he determines BSCDA shows
failure EXTCT. (b)(6)(c): if Determinable: Has 1y or show not prudent. Sierra Club v. USFWS: No listing of Gulf sturgeon citing
Prudence bc no benefit beyond 7Consultation: Court, not okay bc standard diff., CH purpose to provide for recovery not just
survival. Servs reg. defined destr. or modif. as a dir. or indr. alteration that apprcbly dmshes the val. of CH for both the
survival and recov. of a listed spe hold: Serv. cannot set higher standard. (see also Gifford Pinchot Task Force (Holding same Reg.
as imprmsbl.)ESA was enacted not mrly to forstll the ECXT-S, but to allow a S to recover to the pt it may be delisted. NRDC v. US
Dept. of Int.: Prudence def. rej. bc against clear int: that an imprud dsgn. should occur only in rare cir." even if on priv land.
7: Consult. 7(a)(2) COA. TVA v. Hill look at agcy. action and jeopidze. Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Evans: perm. enjoin timber
sales in Spotted Owl, H until serv completed a new s.owl mgmt. pln. & env. analz. Thomas v. Petterson ESA req. Bio-Asmt. to det.
wthr it was going to affect H (largest constructor of rds). [BioOp/A] Bennet v Spear fed agcy. action may adversely affect LS
consult w. FWS Serv. must give BioOp. explain how will affect the S or its H; if concludes jeop. cont. existence of any LS or
dstrct. or adv. modif. of CH . Bio-Op must include rsbl + prud. alts that Serv. believes will avoid that conseq. If Bio-Op.
concludes no jeop. or AHM, or it offers rsbl prud alts, the Serv. must give ITS showing impact of such inc. take nec/appr to min.
such impact, and setting TOC under which Agcy. has to comply. ["Action] Conner v. Burford in prep Bio-Op. before issuance
Oil/Gas lease, the agcy. encompasses not only leasing decision but all post-lsg. actv & impacts. Tejon Indians v. US Dpt. of Energy
Neg. & exec. K is action. Turtle Island Restoration Ntwk fishing permit issuance is AA. ["Adv. Mod."] Gifford Pinchot Task Force
Reversed as A/C/CL finding that CH loss was not AM due to existence of external H. Natn'l Wildlife Fed upheld injunction limiting
H2O sup. & Alloc. to avoid irreparable harm" to type of Salmon. 9 any personinc. priv. prop. owners. (not E plants) Good v.
US no take unless all econ val. is destroyd. McKittricks: Criminal Liab. 11(b) knowing raised standard from willfully to
knowingly, req. only knowlg. that he was shooting an animal."
TVA v. Hill. 7: no exceptions, its mandatory & commands Fed Agcy. to ensure their actions authorized/funded do not
jeopardize ES. 2: says that need to conserve and definitions section defines conserve as taking all actions necessary.expressio
unius: 10 lists exemptions and none apply to Fed. Gov. so expressio unius.Intent: HR Bill -species val incalc, hrgs with expert
testimony & congressmen saying interests of S as a priority Hist: Prior ver of ESA less expansive, and Compare lang. of other
Stats.: "action here not limited here only to future events, b/c NEPA has explicit word with this function shows Congress did not
want to limit it.
In Re Polar Bear. Found fac.: 1 & 5 (Need sea ice, reduction of sea ice would hurt their prey, reduce habitats, harm reproduction,
etc.) Sec. determined PB likely to become ES in FRSBL future so should be listed as TS. Chev. Def.: Court says RSBL b/c Sci. and
peer reviews dominantly fav to finding.

language 4(3) is clear about intent, have to designate CH, no exceptions in original ESA. 78' Amd. allow exception when
not prudent, but no efforts to gather info or eval data avail. at time that had passed since the S's L.

Marsh v ONRC. The standard that governs an agencys decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is the rule of reason

standard. The Rule of Reason turns on the value of the new information to the still pending decision making process even after
the initial proposal is approved. NEPA requires a hard look at the environmental effects of their planned action, even after a
proposal has received initial approval In this respect the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is similar to the
decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance. If there remains major Federal action, and if the new info is sufficient to
direct action - noscitur a soclis a word gathers meaning from the company it keeps + "C does not engage in mere
show that a remaining action will affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or extent not already
surplusage." Harm needs to mean something different than other words defining take, cant only be indir. Permissible. Cites to
considered, a SEIS must be prepared." If Q Fact overrule only if: arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion If Q of Law
TVA: to protect animals. looked at committee reports, Amnd.'82: 10 1982 - addes ITPs, suggest they meant to prohibit
overrule only if unreasonable.
indirect, and no one could req. pmt. for direct takings so this suggests the take provision also includes indir. minimize and
mitigate the impact of activity on listed species Compare lang. of other Stats.: Newer one was more protective.
Ethyl Corp v. EPA (RE: the a/c standard of review under Title V)), is highly deferential. It presumes agency action to be valid. It
forbids the court substitution its judgment, and requires affirmance if a rational basis exists for the decision. Therefore, the court
4(f)(1) Recovery Plans. S shall develop and implement plansfor the conservation and survival of endangered species. Idea of
must review exercising a narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.
ESA is to get species off of being listed and recovery plans are supposed to play crucial role in this.
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble Standard applied in reviewing agency action not to file an EIS in the first instance, will
NEPA
be upheld if reasonable. Reasonableness depends on factors such as: environmental significance of the new information,
Calvert Cliffs: 102, mandates particular, careful and informed decision-making process and creates enforceable duties, to defend probably accuracy of impact, degree to which agency supported its decision not to supplement with a statement of explanation
agcy. must prove full consideration of the detailed EIS under 102(2)(C), at every important stage in the decision making process
or additional data.
(including cons. of alts). ... this language does not provide an escape hatch for foot-dragging agencies; it does not make
Ctr. for Bio. Div. v. NHTSA. NHTSA set CAF standards for light truck vehicles, declared a FONSI. Did not consider other vehicles,
procedural requirements discretionary. Congress did not intent Act to be a paper tiger to the fullest extent possible sets a
the most feasible CO2 rate, reasonable alternatives, or cumulative effect. The impact of GHG emissions on climate change is
high standard for the agencies, which must be enforced by courts. What possible purpose in 102(2)(C) that the detailed
precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct. Any given rule setting a CAFE standard
statement accompanies proposals, if it means no more than phys. proximity? NEPA meant more than to regulate paper flow;
might have an individually minor effect on the environment, but these rules are collectively significant actions taking place
the word accompany musnt be read narwly as to make Act Ludicrous. It indicates C int. that envir factors be considered
over a period of time. NHTSA acknowledged that the range of impacts from the considered alternatives is very narrow and
through review process. : FONSI may be based on impact less mitig. mesrs, subj to certain limitations. (Cabinet Mountains).
minimal. But, the agency justified its choice of range and refusal to consider alternatives because standards more stringent than
CEQ auth. by Exec. Ord. with issuing regulations which are entitled to subtl deference. (Andrus v. Sierra Club).
those represented would not satisfy the statutory requirement to establish standards that are both technologically feasible and
Metropolitan v. PANE (Thresh/Scope). Psych. effects alone do not require an EIS. NEPA limited prop actionss effect on phys.
economically practicable.... NEPA's requirements must be applied in light of the constraints placed on the agency by EPCA. 9th
env., a risk of an accident is not an effect. to take enviro out of context and say adverse env eff. too broad, embraces
Cir. concluded that FONSI was Arbitrary and Capricious.
virtually any consequence of a gov action that someone thought adverse. Context shows C was talking about the phys.
Vermont Nuclear Yankee Power v. NRDC (Re: NEPA 102(c)(iii) Alternatives). What Alternative means: The detailed statement of
environment, Designed to promote HW by alerting re effect of Prp. Actn on the phys. enviro. - Cs concerns suggests that
alternatives cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought
environmental effects and impact under 102 includes a reasonable causal relationship between a change in the physical
conceivable by the mind of man - regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have been at the time the
environment and the effect at issue (here, fear), and environmental impacts must be proximate. -Fear does not qualify as an
project was approved. The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not
effect on the human environment, and even if it did, the causal relationship between reopening the nuclear facility and the
subject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action. Administrative decisions should
neighbors fear was too attenuated. -(consequentialist) If psychological health accepted caused by risk were cognizable,
be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, not
agencies would be obliged to expend considerable resources developing psychiatric expertise that is not otherwise relevant to
simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached. Alternatives must be reasonably apparent. Roosevelt v. EPA. The
their congressionally assigned functions. At least one court of appeals has expressed serious doubts about whether socioagency can eliminate alternatives that do not promote its goal. Citizens Against Burlington Inc. v. Busey. Courts scrutinize the
economic effects can ever be considered, even if some physical effects are also present. (Olmsted Citizens for a Better
agencys defined objective to ensure is not unreasonably narrow. Wyoming v. USA. Agencys decision was not based on all
Community - no impact statement required for conversion of a mental hospital into a prison hospital). Aesthetic effects should
relevant factors or a rational connection between facts and choice made. DuBois v. USDA.
rarely compel the completion of an impact statement, since they can be adequately described in the environmental assessment;
Federal action is when an action is entirely, or partially financed, regulated or approved by federal agency. (River Rd. Alliance Inc. Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual Cases or Controversies. 2. One
v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army.) Other courts require discussions in the EIS of socioeconomic effects that are interrelated" with
essential aspect of this requirement is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do
so. This requires the litigant to prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the
physical effects. (Tongass Conserv. Soc. v. Cheney.)
challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision (Lujan v. DOW).
Hanley I (Re: Def. of Env and Env Impact 102(C)(i-ii)) NEPA must be construed to include protection of the quality of life for
city residents (Not just Nature). Noise, traffic, crime etc., all affect the urban environment (under 102(c), and are surely results
1. Injury-in-Fact: The P must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of the profound influences of . . . high density urbanization [and] industrial expansion. Ps do raise many environmental
of the challenged conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.
considerations that should not be ignored. But EIS still not necessarily required.
City of LA v. Lyons. Sierra Club v. Morton No injury-in-fact, bc Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its
ESA
Hanley II (Re: what does significantly mean?) Opposition based solely upon a psychological distaste for having a jail located
members use Mineral King for any purpose
Once listed as endangered, S is granted protections of 7 (prohibiting Fed. Agcy. action jeopardy) and 9 (against any person
so close to residential apartments Use of an area influences whether there will be a finding of significant effects on the quality
taking a species), albeit with the escape clauses of 10.
of the human environment. Two Part Test to determine whether an Impact is Significant: 1. To what extent will the agency action So when can a non-profit organization sue on behalf of its members? According to Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
11(g) Citizen Suit: Cause of Action= ESA viol. and gov. for failing to enf. prohib (9) or failing to do non-discretionary duty (4)
cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses; and 2. the absolute adverse environmental
Commission, it can do so when: 1. Its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2. The interests it seeks
2: (a)Findings various species...rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untampered by
effects ... Here, Jail will increase crime, and remanded for reconsideration. : Statutory concept of significant impact has no
to protect are germane to the organizations purpose; and 3. Neither the clam asserted nor the relief requested requires the
adequate concern and conservation; .... these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
determinate meaning, to interpret it sensibly requires comparison and prediction: whether costs and time to prepare the EIS is
participation of individual members in the lawsuit
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people (b) Purposes: ...to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
commensurate with the likely benefits from a more searching evaluation than an EA provides (River Road Alliance Inc. v. Corp of
which ES or TS depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the their conservation, and to take such steps as may be
Engineers.) Dept. of T. did not have to produce an EIS for proposed rules about Mexican trucks entering the US: Where an agency Zone of Interests Test: A Prudential Standing Requirement: The injury must have been an interest within the Zone of Interests to
appropriate to achieve the purpose of .
has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over relevant actions, the agency cannot be
be protected or regulated by statutes the agencies allegedly violated. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
3 Definitions (6) Endangered. any S which is in danger of extinct throughout all or a significant portion of its range. (20)
considered a legally relevant cause of the effect. (Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen). When the Federal
Inc. v. Camp and Barlow v. Collins PPL have standing for review of agcy action under 10 of the APA where the alleged injury was
Threatened. Any S likely to become ES w/in foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. (3) Conserve,
Government has failed to exercise its power to prevent actions by others, Courts have generally held NEPA inapplicable. (IE.: It is to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statues that the agencies were claimed
taking all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any LS to the point where it no longer needs to be L. (16)
not a federal action when the government fails to stop something that would adversely affect the human environment)
to have violated. 2. Causation. Must be a causal connection between the injury and the offending conduct so that the injury is
Species. For purposes of L. decisions, is defined as including any subspecies of fish or wildlife of plants, and any Distinct
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt.
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party who is
Population Segment (DPS) of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature. (19) Take "means to
not before the court. 3. Redressability. P must also show that the injury is fairly traceable to the Ds allegedly unlawful conduct
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct, harass
Kleppe v. Sierra A comprehensive EIS is appropriate when there are significant cumulative, or synergistic environmental effects,
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Allen v. Wright.
includes negligent acts.
but it is left to the discretion of the agency when this is the case (Court defers to agency discretion over the proper scale of
matter; the Court must defer to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. The Court does not simply impose its own
construction. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. Can reverse the Admin.s action if it is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
U.S. v. Mead (Circum. Chevron) Courts defer only when C delegated auth. to the agcy. generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in deference to that authority. Two
Interpretations of CAA 111(a)(3) stationary source means any building, structure or installationDo other sections of law
illuminate the text in in question? CAA 302(j).
NRDC (Re: 108(a)(1)) "" ambiguous, resolved by context of the Act as a whole (deliberate inclusion of 30 days); & legislative
history (timetable provided, sought to prevent foot-dragging; Amd. did not made it optional.) Shall means mandatory
"Congress doesnt use language that would be mere surplusage."
Lead Industries(109) Court upholds EPAs consideration of PHW only, and refuses to consider costs or technological feasibility in
setting the NAAQs for Pb ( Considered those risk in passing the 1970s amendments). Defer to agcy. expertise in procedure
and results for est. NAAQs. Structure of Act explicitly includes these factors in 111, so purposely not included here. : EPA
Revw/Reviz list if nec. every 5y. Has been sued for failure (American Lung Association v. Browner). But - Court has held that the
agcy. has discretion, but must take some action rby deadline (Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas).
Whitman v. American Trucking Re: 109(a)(1) Discretion was well within the limits of non-deleg. precedents (Int. Princ.) (Art. I1 ). Intel. Prcp., here: Requisite in , means sufficient, but no more than necessary. Congress does not hide elephants in
mouse holes. & PHW means? Health of the Community/ways and means of conserving the health of the members of a
community, as by preventive medicine, organized care of the sick, etc. Breyers Concurrence: Senate dir. focused on T/$
implem. mandates C intent: Adm. to dev. AQ std independently of T/$ - Commt. Hrg. est.: 1) PHW > T/$. 2) Pol. growth
deleterious even with avail. T. This years legislation strengthens the technology forcing goals of the act.
Admn. agcies. have less discr. when det. broad sweeping reg. schemes than they do when making minor regulations that only
target a small number of people. Conclusion: Adm. given deference re the PHW improved by lowering emiss. stds for O2 and
PM.
Union Electric (110) Admin. may not account $/T fsbl. when evaluating SIP satisfaction of NAAQs ( Considered those risk in
passing the 70s amds.); and NAAQS design ( tech forcing no T/$). : There's sev. points in the SIP reg. process at the St./Fed.LV
where probs of T/$ fsbl. may be consid. Among adj-mechanisms variances/exmptss/enfrmt Ords. (eg. 118, etc.) EPA auth. to
ascertain rsblns of state agencys det. of BACT. (AK Dep. ofEnv. Cons. v. EPA).
CARE v. EPA (110)(offset ex) St. SIP req. imp. of regs suff. to offset air pollution expected from NS/MSS. Geo. Area picked okay.
Congress intended for the states and EPA to have flexty re SIP. Offset Prog. for econ grwt. To be sensibly admin., had to
divide the region since sci. understanding of O2 poltn limited. MA v. EPA Spec. Sol.: Rex S. Req. CAA sweeping def. of Air Pol.,
inc: any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical or chemical substance or matter which is
emitted. Anything following Including must be a subset of what precedes it. Endangerment Findings: EPA found that GHG
contributed to Global Warming, and that it adversely affected the PHW. Coaltn. for Resp. Reg. v. EPA The Endgr. Finding and
Tailpipe Rule are neither C or Arb. EPAs interpretation of CAA is unambiguously correct supported by Mass. v. EPA. Tailpipe
R(upheld) = 100,000/TPY is acceptable for MSS. But Time/Tailor, no ruling. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA EPA is asserting
newfound authority (using 111(d)) to regulate Mills of small sources, and to decide how much of them to regulate. EPA lacks
authority to tailor the Acts unambiguous thresholds of 100/250TYP, to accommodate for GHG Agcies must always give
effect to the unamgsly exprsd int of Cong. So may not interp to req: PSD and Title V permitting for SS based on their GHG
emissions. Cant treat GHG as pollutant for purposes of defining major emitting facility/ modification, in the PSD context of major
sources in the Title V context.

Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter: harm means in 9. Dictionary: harmto cause hurt or damage, to injure, does not just involve

analysis). 102(2)(C) requires an EIS for all major Federal actions. Sierra Club unsuccessfully argued that in the aggregate, it was
a federal action. Court says that Timing under 40 C.F.R.1502.5 is clear that an EIS needs to be submitted along with a proposal.
(So it can be included with any recommendation). Not clear at what point an EIS should be started Majority is just saying we
should defer because otherwise the court would invite litigation, if it has to be done when contemplated. : Under some
circumstances the agency may be required to consider synergistic effects between proposals, such as the impacts of multiple
proposed amendments to a regulation. (Western Watersheds Projects v. Kraayenbrink.) By far the most important factor in
segmentation decisions is whether the proposed project has independent utility. County said that it had independent utility, and
provided over 50 exhibits, whereas, and each road that would consist future HWY. some of the roads in the county were
operating at an unacceptable level of service, and traffic was expected to increase. Based on this information, the Corps found it
would provide independent utility as a means of transportation. (Preserve Endangered Areas v. US Army Corps of Engineers). If
EIS says info is not available, need to explain why it cant get that info (40 C.F.R. 1502.22 Incomplete or unavailable info).

Weinberger v Catholic Action of Hawaii 102(2)(C) requires that the EIS be subject to provisions of the FOIA Exempts disclosure
of matters classified by an Executive Order to be kept secret. it is clear C intended that the publics interest in ensuring that
FAgencies comply with NEPA must give way to the Government need to preserve military secrets; the Hypothetical EIS departs
from the express intent of Congress. Under Kleppe: EIS need not be prepared simply because a project is contemplated but only
when it is proposed. Here, Navy cannot confirm or deny such a proposal. : Agencies must consider environmental impacts as
soon as it is reasonably possible to do so, meaning that they must be covered in the programmatic EIS if there is enough
evidence available to make that feasible. Pacific Rivers Council.

Save the Yaak Committee USFS plans a road in five segments to facilitate Logging. Prepared EAs for each and did not consider
the actual logging in the EA process. We conclude there is a clear nexus between the timber contracts and the improvement of
the road. Virtually all of the testimony established that the purpose of the road was to make the log hauling more efficient,
productive, and safe. There is no indication that the road was reconstructed for any other reason. Road wouldntve been
constructed but for the contempl timber sales. an EIS must cover subst phases of development when the dependency is
such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.
[From Thomas v. Peterson

Thomas v. Peterson (Part II) Consideration of cumulative impacts after the road was already approved is insufficient for NEPA.
A central purpose of an EIS is to force the consideration of environmental impacts in the decision-making process. There is
considerable evidence suggesting that the road and the timber sales will have cumulatively significant impacts. In Trout
Unlimited v. Morton, we held that subsequent phases of development must be covered in the first EIS phase when [their]
dependency is such that it[is] irrational, or unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.
The dependency of the road on the timber sales meets this standard; it would be irrational to build the road and then not sell the
timber to which the road was built to provide access. If the sales are sufficiently certain to justify construction of the road, then
they are sufficiently certain for their environmental impacts to be analyzed along with those of the road. Public interest in
conducting training (naval) exercises under realistic conditions (sonar dangerous to whales), plainly outweighs the interests
advanced by the plaintiffs. But, this does not mean that military interests always trump other considerations. (Winter v. NRDC)

Standing Test: Constitutional Requirements + Prudential Requirements (e.g. Zone of Interests Test) = Standing.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Respondents have no standing to obtain an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior to
enforce the ESA on matters outside the US. Did not prove redressability or injury-in-fact.
Pro v. Sub Viol. Procedural: In its decision making process, Agency didnt do what it was required by law to do
Substantive: Agency did what it was supposed to do, but its decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." still must show YOU were injured.
Violation vs. Injury. 1) Substantive Violation: Allege that the Agency did what it was supposed to do, but its actions or conclusions
were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law (APA 706). Procedural Violation:
Allege that the Agency failed to undertake non-discretionary procedure
Substantive Injury: You suffer an actual harm an injury in fact Procedural Injury: You (maybe) suffer harm because the
Agencys failure to do a non-discretionary procedure makes it more likely that you will suffer a future, substantive injury
Administrative Procedure Act 702: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statue, is entitled to judicial review thereof. APA 702 suits do much of what
explicit citizen suit provisions in CAA, CWA and ESA do: Allow private citizens to act as private attorneys general to vindicate a
personal legal right to have executive agencies perform their non-discretionary duties as long as the citizen has an injury in fact
and the injury falls within the zone of interests the regulation was meant to protect. Still need to show that you: Meet traditional,
Article III standing requirements, and injury falls within the zone of interests statute was meant to protect. Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services Civil penalties for ongoing violations provide sufficient deterrence to support redressability.
C. Citizen Suits 42 U.S.C.A. 7604. US v. SCRAP example of legitimate attenuated injury. MA v. EPA: The State has a quasisovereign interest. The State has an interest in the land on its coast, and they have shown the injury of losing coastal property as
the water rises.