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  • On South Sudan, Egypt's "Explanation of Abstention" in UNSC, Aug 12, 2016

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    Matthew Russell Lee
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    In UNSC, S Sudan "Rejects" Resolution As Four Abstain: Russia, China, Venezuela & Egypt By Matthew Russell Lee, Exclusive UNITED NATIONS, August 12 -- As the UN Security Council prepared to meet on South Sudan on August 12, the vote was pushed back from 10 am to 3 pm and the draft weakened to omit triggers for an arms embargo and to require cooperation with the Salva Kiir government. When the vote occurred, there were four abstentions: China, Russia, Egypt and Venezuela. It was adopted 11-0-4. Here is the final version, as obtained from the UN and put on Scribd by Inner City Press, here. US deputy ambassador David Pressman said that if there is obstruction, the Council will vote about whether to impose an arms embargo. Tweeted photo here. The Chamber was hardly full, tweeted photo here. Then after the other members' speeches, including Egypt citing the Security Council's inaction on its Burundi resolution and France entirely ignoring that, South Sudan was given the floor and trashed the resolution. Photo of South Sudan government trio here. One expected someone - the US? - to do a reply. But back down at the stakeout, the US and France walked together down the hall; others noted the contradictions between some members speeches and their votes. It was done. Inner City Press this morning exclusively published a memo that the International Crisis Group sent to lobby the Council, against sanctions -- in this case against Salva Kiir's Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, about whom we have repeatedly reported. The author, Casie Copeland, has appeared more publicly in the page of the UK Independent, here. In her ICG memo some may see an echo of the NYT's current series on “think tanks” in Washington, or may question how opposing sanctions on Malong, given his history then and since, is consistent with researching and lobbying for peace. Ms. Copeland's explanation, which we requested, we publish in full below. Separately Inner City Press hears that neither Kiir-favoring Uganda nor Sudan may officially send new troops to South Sudan, leaving it for Kenya and, yes, Ethiopia. From the ICG memo: "From: Casie Copeland [at] crisisgroup.org Date: 2015-09-06 Subject: South Sudan Sanctions I hope this finds you well and enjoying the last days of summer. I am writing with respect to the proposed sanctions on two South Sudanese generals. As you know, the ceasefire workshop after some delays is now scheduled from September 10-15. Both the government and opposition have nominated a set of strong military and police leaders to the workshop and individuals we know to be serious about taking the next steps to establish modalities for the ceasefire - such as identification of forces, number of forces in Juba, withdraw of allies, re-supply procedures, and so on. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic for the outcomes of the workshop. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the fate of this very tenuous agreement rests on the parties abilities to come to agreement at the workshop and leave committed to implementing the agreement. Sanctions at this point would dramatically undermine IGAD's ability to secure workable arrangements for the ceasefire and thus, potentially the overall agreement. However the threat of sanctions for those who undermine the workshop or violate the agreement afterthe workshop could be useful. This is particularly true from the perspective of the government. The Chief of General Staff, despite his reservations about much of the peace agreement, came to the venue the day of the signing in Juba to support his President's decision. His support for Kiir was critical in overcoming many of his Bahr el Ghazal (and other) constituency's threats to withdraw support from Kiir if he signed the agreement. To sanction him would appear to be a "slap in the face" to a man whose support for the President's decision to sign was critical in maintaining cohesion in Juba and whose continue

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    In UNSC, S Sudan "Rejects" Resolution As Four Abstain: Russia, China, Venezuela & Egypt By Matthew Russell Lee, Exclusive UNITED NATIONS, August 12 -- As the UN Security Council prepared to meet on South Sudan on August 12, the vote was pushed back from 10 am to 3 pm and the draft weakened to omit triggers for an arms embargo and to require cooperation with the Salva Kiir government. When the vote occurred, there were four abstentions: China, Russia, Egypt and Venezuela. It was adopted 11-0-4. Here is the final version, as obtained from the UN and put on Scribd by Inner City Press, here. US deputy ambassador David Pressman said that if there is obstruction, the Council will vote about whether to impose an arms embargo. Tweeted photo here. The Chamber was hardly full, tweeted photo here. Then after the other members' speeches, including Egypt citing the Security Council's inaction on its Burundi resolution and France entirely ignoring that, South Sudan was given the floor and trashed the resolution. Photo of South Sudan government trio here. One expected someone - the US? - to do a reply. But back down at the stakeout, the US and France walked together down the hall; others noted the contradictions between some members speeches and their votes. It was done. Inner City Press this morning exclusively published a memo that the International Crisis Group sent to lobby the Council, against sanctions -- in this case against Salva Kiir's Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, about whom we have repeatedly reported. The author, Casie Copeland, has appeared more publicly in the page of the UK Independent, here. In her ICG memo some may see an echo of the NYT's current series on “think tanks” in Washington, or may question how opposing sanctions on Malong, given his history then and since, is consistent with researching and lobbying for peace. Ms. Copeland's explanation, which we requested, we publish in full below. Separately Inner City Press hears that neither Kiir-favoring Uganda nor Sudan may officially send new troops to South Sudan, leaving it for Kenya and, yes, Ethiopia. From the ICG memo: "From: Casie Copeland [at] crisisgroup.org Date: 2015-09-06 Subject: South Sudan Sanctions I hope this finds you well and enjoying the last days of summer. I am writing with respect to the proposed sanctions on two South Sudanese generals. As you know, the ceasefire workshop after some delays is now scheduled from September 10-15. Both the government and opposition have nominated a set of strong military and police leaders to the workshop and individuals we know to be serious about taking the next steps to establish modalities for the ceasefire - such as identification of forces, number of forces in Juba, withdraw of allies, re-supply procedures, and so on. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic for the outcomes of the workshop. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the fate of this very tenuous agreement rests on the parties abilities to come to agreement at the workshop and leave committed to implementing the agreement. Sanctions at this point would dramatically undermine IGAD's ability to secure workable arrangements for the ceasefire and thus, potentially the overall agreement. However the threat of sanctions for those who undermine the workshop or violate the agreement afterthe workshop could be useful. This is particularly true from the perspective of the government. The Chief of General Staff, despite his reservations about much of the peace agreement, came to the venue the day of the signing in Juba to support his President's decision. His support for Kiir was critical in overcoming many of his Bahr el Ghazal (and other) constituency's threats to withdraw support from Kiir if he signed the agreement. To sanction him would appear to be a "slap in the face" to a man whose support for the President's decision to sign was critical in maintaining cohesion in Juba and whose continue

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    On South Sudan, Egypt's "Explanation of Abstention" in UNSC, Aug 12, 2016

    Uploaded by

    Matthew Russell Lee
    In UNSC, S Sudan "Rejects" Resolution As Four Abstain: Russia, China, Venezuela & Egypt By Matthew Russell Lee, Exclusive UNITED NATIONS, August 12 -- As the UN Security Council prepared to meet on South Sudan on August 12, the vote was pushed back from 10 am to 3 pm and the draft weakened to omit triggers for an arms embargo and to require cooperation with the Salva Kiir government. When the vote occurred, there were four abstentions: China, Russia, Egypt and Venezuela. It was adopted 11-0-4. Here is the final version, as obtained from the UN and put on Scribd by Inner City Press, here. US deputy ambassador David Pressman said that if there is obstruction, the Council will vote about whether to impose an arms embargo. Tweeted photo here. The Chamber was hardly full, tweeted photo here. Then after the other members' speeches, including Egypt citing the Security Council's inaction on its Burundi resolution and France entirely ignoring that, South Sudan was given the floor and trashed the resolution. Photo of South Sudan government trio here. One expected someone - the US? - to do a reply. But back down at the stakeout, the US and France walked together down the hall; others noted the contradictions between some members speeches and their votes. It was done. Inner City Press this morning exclusively published a memo that the International Crisis Group sent to lobby the Council, against sanctions -- in this case against Salva Kiir's Chief of General Staff Paul Malong, about whom we have repeatedly reported. The author, Casie Copeland, has appeared more publicly in the page of the UK Independent, here. In her ICG memo some may see an echo of the NYT's current series on “think tanks” in Washington, or may question how opposing sanctions on Malong, given his history then and since, is consistent with researching and lobbying for peace. Ms. Copeland's explanation, which we requested, we publish in full below. Separately Inner City Press hears that neither Kiir-favoring Uganda nor Sudan may officially send new troops to South Sudan, leaving it for Kenya and, yes, Ethiopia. From the ICG memo: "From: Casie Copeland [at] crisisgroup.org Date: 2015-09-06 Subject: South Sudan Sanctions I hope this finds you well and enjoying the last days of summer. I am writing with respect to the proposed sanctions on two South Sudanese generals. As you know, the ceasefire workshop after some delays is now scheduled from September 10-15. Both the government and opposition have nominated a set of strong military and police leaders to the workshop and individuals we know to be serious about taking the next steps to establish modalities for the ceasefire - such as identification of forces, number of forces in Juba, withdraw of allies, re-supply procedures, and so on. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic for the outcomes of the workshop. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the fate of this very tenuous agreement rests on the parties abilities to come to agreement at the workshop and leave committed to implementing the agreement. Sanctions at this point would dramatically undermine IGAD's ability to secure workable arrangements for the ceasefire and thus, potentially the overall agreement. However the threat of sanctions for those who undermine the workshop or violate the agreement afterthe workshop could be useful. This is particularly true from the perspective of the government. The Chief of General Staff, despite his reservations about much of the peace agreement, came to the venue the day of the signing in Juba to support his President's decision. His support for Kiir was critical in overcoming many of his Bahr el Ghazal (and other) constituency's threats to withdraw support from Kiir if he signed the agreement. To sanction him would appear to be a "slap in the face" to a man whose support for the President's decision to sign was critical in maintaining cohesion in Juba and whose continue

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    Egypt EOV

    Egypt voted abstain on the UNMISS extension resolution in light of its reservation
    on the increasing tendency of this Council to encroach the guiding principles of UN
    Peacekeeping Operations.
    This very Council has witnessed only two weeks ago the adoption of a resolution
    deploying a UN Police component in Burundi without the consent of the Burundian
    government, which later issued a statement rejecting the resolution.
    The host governments consent to the deployment is a legal, operational and
    practical necessity, that should not be ignored or brushed aside. However, in the
    context of the conflict in South Sudan, the Council is adopting a resolution that
    ignores the Transitional Government of National Unitys position regarding the
    deployment of the Regional Protection Force, as well as IGADs Communique on
    August 5th regarding the coordination with the government regarding the Forces
    size, equipment, mandate, and time of deployment.
    Unfortunately, the resolution used the in principle acceptance of the South
    Sudanese government as a pretext to adopt all the details of the Forces work in
    South Sudan without direct consultation with the government. On the contrary, it
    included threats that amount to blackmailing- to impose further measures in case
    the government does not accept the terms included in the resolution. This attitude
    prejudges the results of tomorrows meeting of the East African Chiefs of Defense
    Staff as stated in para 12 of the abovementioned IGAD Communique, which should
    provide the core of the governments consent, as it is impossible to exclude the
    government from discussions on the details of deploying forces on its territories.
    We reiterate our full support to the work of UNMISS is protection of civilians. This
    entails securing the Forces capacity to undertake this serious task. The main
    question is: will the Council bear the responsibility of guaranteeing the security and
    safety of these forces? Will the relevant Troop Contributing Countries accept
    sending their troops to countries without their governments consent? Will these
    missions still be called peacekeeping?
    We appreciate the AU and IGADs efforts to secure peace in South Sudan. IGAD
    countries have courageously taken their responsibilities stop the suffering of the
    South Sudanese people. We were looking forward to the Councils consensus on

    the practical and detailed steps of the Councils resolution today in close
    consultations with the government of South Sudan prior to the Councils
    authorization of the deployment.
    Our delegation has engaged in the negotiations on this resolution in good faith and
    a constructive manner. We sought until the last moment- to reach a consensual
    compromise to no avail.
    Mr. President, Egypt rejects any attempts to score points at our expense. As a
    neighbor who shares a common history, we are cognizant of the suffering of the
    innocent civilians in South Sudan, including women, children and elderly, and call
    for its immediate ending. In this regard, we save no efforts to give the people of
    South Sudan their chance in a decent life full of hope, peace and stability. The
    question is how to reach this common goal. We still believe that this situation needs
    wiser approach from the Council without taking actions that could undermine the
    already fragile political process and take the country- and the whole region- to an
    uncontrollable whirlpool of violence.
    The ending of the suffering of our brothers and sisters in South Sudan will not be
    possible without joining the efforts of the Security Council, and the African Union
    to boost the political process, support the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation
    Mechanism JMEC, national reconciliation, confidence building measures between
    all parties and tackling the root causes of the conflict. Any other measures will not
    be anything but temporary relievers that will soon lose its effect.

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