1.

THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 10372, July 30, 2014 ]

AURORA R. LADIM, ANGELITO A.
ARDIENTE, AND DANILO S. DE LA
CRUZ V. ATTY. PERLA D. RAMIREZ.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third
Division, issued a Resolution dated July
30, 2014, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 10372 (Aurora R. Ladim,
Angelito A. Ardiente, and Danilo S. de la
Cruz v. Atty. Perla D. Ramirez). - On
March 23, 2007, a verified complaint [1]
for disbarment was filed against Atty. Perla
D. Ramirez by Aurora R. Ladim, Angelito
A. Ardiente, and Danilo S. de la Cruz, who
were all employees of Lirio Apartments
Condominium in Makati City, where Atty.
Ramirez resides. [2]
The complaint stemmed from various
incidents from 1990 to 2007 involving
complainants, other employees, lessees,
and unit owners of Lirio Apartments
Condominium and Atty. Ramirez.[3] The
tenants alleged that Atty. Ramirez kept
asking
"impertinent
personal
questions,"[4] knocking on their doors, and
using offensive language.[5] Another
tenant complained that Atty. Ramirez kept
entering units undergoing repairs " because
of her fear that people [were] damaging
the building."[6] The "keys hanging [on]
the door"[7] of one unit were lost the day
she entered the unit.[8]
The latest incident involved Atty. Ramirez
shouting at the condominium employees
and using offensive language.[9] She
accused the maintenance personnel of
destroying the building and the security
guards of trying to destroy her car.[10] She
also started shouting that the condominium
residents were prostitutes.[11] The
condominium employees tried to pacify
her, even calling her brother, Dr. Nicholas
Ramirez, to intervene.[12] "Dr. Ramirez
assured [them] that he will get in
touch"[13] with Atty. Ramirez's friend,
Malou Jacob, since Malou was the only
one who could pacify her.[14]
Since 2004, Atty. Ramirez has refused to
pay any of her association dues. [15] She
claimed that no one has been leasing her
unit [16] and argued that the association
dues should be paid only by those who
lease their units. [17]
Atty. Ramirez, on the other hand, filed
several cases before the Office of the City

Prosecutor against the condominium

employees, accusing them of malicious
mischief, grave oral defamation, slander,
and threats. [18] All the cases were
dismissed for lack of merit. [19]

maintenance of the highest degree

morality and faithful compliance with
rules of the legal profession are
continuing requirements for enjoying
privilege to practice law. [32]

In her position paper [20] before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Atty. Ramirez did not admit or deny the
allegations in her complaint but stated her
long years of service as a government
lawyer. [21] She also expressed that:

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred

from the practice of law for gross
misconduct. Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court provides:

I do not believe that the three complainants

are my equal, therefore, for reasons above
stated, [sic] I move for the outright
dismissal of the complaints charge [sic]
against me. [22]
In his report and recommendation, [23] the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C.
Antiquiera found Atty. Ramirez guilty of
violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of reprimand.
[24]
Commissioner Antiquiera found that
"respondent's language and choice of
words [show] her lack of respect and
decorum in her dealings with other
people."[25] He also found that Atty.
Ramirez "largely relied on her legal
expertise and experience to demand
respect from others but she never [gave]
them a fair treatment."[26]
The Commissioner, however, took note of
the "forgetful, suspicious, and fearful
attitude"[27] of Atty. Ramirez and
complainants' belief that "something must
be wrong with her mentally."[28] He
concluded that her mental issues may
explain her actions and "she may not
[have] deliberately intend[ed] to injure
other people."[29]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors, in its Resolution No.
XX-2013-848, [30] dated June 22, 2013,
adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Commissioner.
While we adopt the findings of fact of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, we do
not believe that a mere reprimand is
enough to punish Atty. Ramirez for her
actions.
As this court stated in Bernardo v. Atty.
Mejia:[31]
[T]he practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to
the rigid standards of mental fitness,

of
the
the
the

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of

attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Lawyers should treat everyone with
kindness and respect, whether they are
colleagues, members of the court, or the
public in general. Anything less would be
conduct unbecoming of one in the legal
profession.
In Tapucar v. Atty. Tapucar: [33]
As this Court often reminds members of
the Bar, they must live up to the standards
and norms expected of the legal
profession, by upholding the ideals and
tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional
Responsibility
always.
Lawyers must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency, as well as morality
including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. For they are at all times subject to
the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and
community approbation. Needless to state,
those whose conduct both public and
private fails this scrutiny would have to
be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly. [34]
(Emphasis supplied)
As a lawyer, Atty. Ramirez is sworn to
uphold not only her oath but also the
provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
states:

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL

TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Instead of answering the allegations
concerning her rude and disrespectful
attitude, Atty. Ramirez haughtily asked the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to dismiss
the complaint because complainants were
not her equal, referring to them as "clerk,
janitor, and maintenance man,"[35]
respectively. Worse, she flaunted her
credentials, [36] believing that being a
former government lawyer allows her to
disregard the tenets of her profession.
Her arrogance manifests her lack of moral
fitness to practice law. Her disrespect
toward her neighbors and toward
complainants shows a blatant disregard to
the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Atty. Ramirez's actions do her
profession a disservice and, as such, a
penalty higher than a reprimand is in order.
"The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor."[37] Taking
into account her advanced age and her
"alleged mental issues,"[38] we find that
the appropriate penalty is suspension for
six (6) months from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Perla D. Ramirez,
having been found in violation of Canon
7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished
to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered into respondent's records as
attorney. Copies shall likewise be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts
concerned. (Villarama, Jr., J., designated
Acting Member in view of the vacancy in
the Third Division per Special Order No.
1691 dated May 22, 2014.)

SO ORDERED."
5. EN BANC
A.C. No. 6470, July 8, 2014
MERCEDITA
DE
JESUS,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL
SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
before the Court is a disbarment complaint
filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the
following grounds: grave misconduct,
dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness
to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by
complainant before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged
that on 1 March 2002, respondent had
drafted and notarized a Real Estate
Mortgage of a public market stall that
falsely named the former as its absolute
and registered owner. As a result, the
mortgagee sued complainant for perjury
and for collection of sum of money. She
claimed that respondent was a consultant
of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was
government-owned.
Prior
thereto,
respondent had also notarized two
contracts that caused complainant legal
and financial problems. One contract was a
lease agreement notarized by respondent
sometime in September 1999 without the
signature of the lessees. However,
complainant only found out that the
agreement had not been signed by the
lessees when she lost her copy and she
asked for another copy from respondent.
The other contract was a sale agreement
over a property covered by a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which
complainant entered into with a certain
Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February
1998. Respondent drafted and notarized
said agreement, but did not advise
complainant that the property was still
covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to
her complaint, complainant subsequently
submitted three Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent
and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino
(Tolentino),
complainants

secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not

signed by the principals named therein and
bore only the signature of the named
attorney in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso
(Limpioso).
Tolentinos
Affidavit
corroborated complainants allegations
against respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of
the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her
comment on the Complaint within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained
that the mortgage contract was prepared in
the presence of complainant and that the
latter had read it before affixing her
signature. However, complainant urgently
needed the loan proceeds so the contract
was hastily done. It was only copied from
a similar file in respondents computer, and
the phrase "absolute and registered owner"
was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it
should not be a cause for disciplinary
action, because complainant constructed
the subject public market stall under a
"Build Operate and Transfer" contract with
the local government unit and, technically,
she could be considered its owner. Besides,
there had been a prior mortgage contract
over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the
propertys absolute owner, but she did not
complain. Moreover, the cause of the
perjury charge against complainant was
not the representation of herself as owner
of the mortgaged property, but her
guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was
even dismissed, because the prosecutor
found that complainant and her spouse
had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same
market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement,
respondent countered that the document
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was
actually new. She gave the courts copy of
the agreement to complainant to
accommodate the latters request for an
extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and
notarized a new one, relying on
complainants assurance that the lessees
would sign it and that it would be returned
in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her
promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a
property covered by a CLOA, respondent
claimed that complainant was an
experienced realty broker and, therefore,
needed no advice on the repercussions of

that transaction. Actually, when the

purchase agreement was notarized,
complainant did not present the CLOA,
and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly
stated that the property was the subject of a
case pending before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB); complainant was thus notified
of the status of the subject property.
Finally, respondent maintained that the
SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence were properly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the
documents that the attorney-in-fact
personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the
formers participation in the execution of
the
document.
Moreover,
the
acknowledgment clearly stated that the
document must be notarized in the
principals place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after
respondent submitted her Comment. After
her rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent
Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of
Additional Evidence.5 Attached thereto
were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following: (1) an
Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which
referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as
attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked
the signatures of either the principal or the
attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with
incomplete signatures of the parties
thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement;
(5) a lease contract that lacked the
signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned
Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance
claim form (Annual Declaration by the
Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter
toa potential investor in Japan; (9) an
unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an
unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and
hearing, the parties submitted their
respective Position Papers.6 Notably,
respondents Position Paper did not tackle
the additional documents attached to
complainants Urgent Ex ParteMotion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate
revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as
notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the
parties who had purportedly appeared
before her. He accepted respondents

explanations with respect to the lease

agreement, sale contract, and the three
SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he
found that the inaccurate crafting of the
real estate mortgage contract was a
sufficient basis to hold respondent liable
for violation of Canon 187 and Rule
18.038 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Thus,
he
also
recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22
May 2008, unanimously adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, with
the modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one
year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that
the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they
were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule
VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the
Urgent Ex ParteMotion of complainant
was actually a supplemental pleading,
which was prohibited under the rules of
procedure of the Committee on Bar
Discipline; besides, she was not the proper
party to question those documents. Hence,
the investigating commissioner should
have expunged the documents from the
records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating
circumstances be considered, specifically
the following: absence of prior disciplinary
record; absence of dishonest or selfish
motive; personal and emotional problems;
timely good faith effort to make restitution
or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings; character or
reputation; remorse; and remoteness of
prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its
Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10
March 2012, denied respondents motion
for reconsideration for lack of substantial
reason to justify a reversal of the IBPs
findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago through a letter
addressed to then acting Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio transmitted the

documents pertaining to the disbarment

Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURTS RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the
complaint against respondent and the
parties submissions in this case, the Court
hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the
charges against respondent, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional
documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of Section 4,
Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A comparable argument was
raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in
which the respondent therein opposed the
admission of the birth certificates of his
illegitimate children as evidence of his
grossly immoral conduct, because those
documents were obtained in violation Rule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasoned as follows:

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules

on Evidence provides that "evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or these
rules." There could be no dispute that the
subject birth certificates are relevant to the
issue. The only question, therefore, is
whether the law or the rules provide for the
inadmissibility of said birth certificates
allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the rule
on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of
birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in
evidence. On the other hand, the Revised
Rules of Evidence only provides for the
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It
should be emphasized, however, that said
rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the
state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained
that: The Constitutional proscription
enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual.

It governs the relationship between the

individual and the State and its agents. The
Bill of Rights only tempers governmental
power and protects the individual against
any
aggression
and
unwarranted
interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly,
it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged
"warrantless search" made by Roque, a coemployee of appellant at the treasurer's
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of
the
constitutional
proscription
on
unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where
complainants, as private individuals,
obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised
Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public
documents are, therefore, admissible and
should
be
properly
taken
into
consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law
contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized
documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondents argument that the Urgent ExParteMotion of complainant constitutes a
supplemental pleading must fail as well.
As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary pleading. Its
usual office is to set up new facts which
justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief
with respect to the same subject matter as
the controversy referred to in the original
complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be
said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed
by complainant was a supplemental
pleading. One of her charges against
respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the
SPAs and lease agreement attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not
legally barred from submitting additional
evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the
charges against respondent, the Court finds
that she committed misconduct and

grievously violated her oath as a notary

public.
The important role a notary public
performs cannot be overemphasized. The
Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document
is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has
personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not
hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process
may be undermined, and public confidence
in notarial documents diminished.21 In
this case, respondent fully knew that
complainant was not the owner of the
mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real
estate mortgage contract does not make
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only
heightens the latters liability for tolerating
a wrongful act. Clearly, respondents
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon
122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the
unsigned lease agreement executed by
complainant sometime in September
199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees
signatures, she could have given
complainant a certified photocopy thereof.
It even appears that said lease agreement is
not a rarity in respondents practice as a
notary public. Records show that on
various occasions from 2002 to 2004,
respondent has notarized 22 documents
that were either unsigned or lacking
signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary
action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer
to demand that a document be signed in his
or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a

document unless the persons who signed it
are the very same ones who executed it
and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.27
Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do
no falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is
unfit to continue enjoying the solemn
office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to
disbar lawyers who were found to be
utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule
is that disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and the
Court will not disbar a lawyer where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish
the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by
respondent of her basic duties as a notary
public warrants the less severe punishment
of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual
disqualification
to
be
commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy
Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of
violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02,
and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary
public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE YEAR
effective immediately. Her notarial
commission,
if
still
existing,
is
IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary
public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered
into the personal records of respondent as
a member of the bar and furnished to the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
7. THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 10276, July 02, 2014]
SOCORRO T. GUSTILLO VS. ATTY.
ROSELLER B. AMAZONA.
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Third

Division, issued a Resolution dated July 2,
2014, which reads as follows:

placing serious doubt on his/her moral

character and his/her fitness to be a lawyer.
As explained in Lizaso v. Amante: [5]

"A.C. No. 10276 (Socorro T. Gustillo vs.

Atty. Roseller B. Amazona). - This
involves a disciplinary complaint filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) by complainant Socorro T. Gustillo
against respondent Atty. Roseller B.
Amazona.

As early, as 1923, however, the Court laid

down in in Re Vicente Pelaez the principle
that it can exercise its power to discipline
lawyers for causes which do not involve
the relationship of an attorney and
client. . .. [6]

In her complaint, Gustillo charged

respondent with "conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and gross dishonesty."[1] She
alleged that in 2004, respondent asked her
to rediscount three (3) checks which were
subsequently dishonored for the reason
"ACCOUNT CLOSED."[2] Each of these
checks amounted to P60,000, thus totaling
to P180,000. Complainant added that
respondent had failed to "make good [on
the checks] and to settle his obligation"[3]
despite having executed promissory notes
and written undertakings to make such
settlement. [4]
Respondent failed to file an answer to the
complaint.
In a report and recommendation dated
March 15, 2013, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero found
respondent liable and recommended that
the latter be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
In a resolution dated April 16, 2013, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted and
approved with modification the report and
recommendation
of
Investigating
Commissioner Cachapero. The IBP-BOG
modified the report and recommendation
by adding: (1) an order for respondent to
restitute to complainant the amount of
P180,000 within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice; and (2) a warning that
respondent's repetition of similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.
Neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration.
After a careful examination of the records,
the court agrees with the conclusions of
Investigating Commissioner Cachapero
and the IBP-BOG. As noted by
Investigating Commissioner Cachapero,
complainant failed to indicate if there was
an attorney-client relationship between her
and respondent. However, this court has
long settled that the lack of an attorneyclient relationship is not a bar to
disciplinary sanction where a lawyer acts
in an unprofessional manner, thereby

Thus,
unprofessional
conduct
or
misconduct, as manifested in financial
dealings with others, has served as ample
ground for the disciplining of lawyers. In
Lizaso v. Amante, a lawyer was
indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law for failing to account for and return
funds received for investment. [7]
In this case, the annexes attached to the
complaint indicate that respondent did
issue checks, which were dishonored for
the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." These
annexes also show that respondent
executed written undertakings and
promissory notes to settle his obligations
to complainant. Despite these, he failed to
make such settlement.
This court has repeatedly emphasized that
the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer . . . takes part in
one of the most important functions of the
State - the administration of justice - as an
officer of the court."[8] Thus, "[l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."[9]
Respondent has fallen short of the high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required of lawyers. He
took advantage of complainant to secure
undue gains for himself and inflicted
serious damage on the latter. It is therefore
proper to suspend respondent from the
practice of law.
However, in the strict context of the
present case being an administrative (i.e.,
disciplinary) proceeding, we find improper
the IBP-BOG's inclusion of an order for
respondent to restitute to the complainant
the amount of P180,000 within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.
Administrative cases to discipline lawyers
are distinct from civil cases, which involve
private disputes between persons. While
the latter affords the plaintiff an
opportunity to demand the fulfilment of a
duty and/or compensation for a harm done,
the former does not. As this court
explained in Pimente v. Llorente: [10]

Disbarment proceedings are undertaken

solely for public welfare. The sole
question for determination is whether a
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the
privileges as such or not. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of
the Court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and
generally has no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. [11]
[Emphasis supplied]
WHEREFORE,
respondent
ATTY.
ROSELLER
B.
AMAZONA,
is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months. He is likewise WARNED
that a repetition of similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be served on
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this resolution
be attached to respondent's personal record
as attorney. (Villarama, Jr., J., designated
Acting Member in view of the vacancy in
the Third Division per Special Order No.
1691 dated May 22, 2014.)
SO ORDERED."
9. EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an
administrative Complaint1 for disbarment
dated February 1, 2008 filed by
complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant)
against respondent Pedro S. Diamante
(respondent), charging him of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyers oath for fabricating and
using a spurious court order, and for
failing to keep his client informed of the
status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to
be a recognized illegitimate son of the late
Luis Tan, secured the services of
respondent in order to pursue a case for
partition of property against the heirs of
the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the
engagement,
respondent
filed
the
corresponding complaint3 before the

Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,

Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case
No. 03-11947. The complaint was
eventually dismissed by the RTC in an
Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of
cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified
of such dismissal as early as August 14,
2007,6 complainant learned of the same
only on August 24, 2007 when he visited
the formers office.7 On such occasion,
respondent allegedly asked for the amount
of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal
fees and other costs, but since complainant
could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was
given the amount of P500.00 purportedly
as payment of the reservation fee for the
filing of a notice of appeal before the
RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan
handed the amount of P10,000.00 to
respondent, who on even date, filed a
notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007,
the RTC dismissed complainants appeal
for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by law.
Respondent, however, did not disclose
such
fact
and,
instead,
showed
complainant an Order12 dated November
9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC
(November 9, 2007 Order) directing the
submission of the results of a DNA testing
to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan,
within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Considering the technical requirements for
such kind of testing, complainant
proceeded to the RTC and requested for an
extension of the deadline for its
submission. It was then that he discovered
that the November 9, 2007 Order was
spurious, as certified by the RTCs Clerk
of Court.13 Complainant also found out
that, contrary to the representations of
respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the
instant administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated
September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that
it was complainants failure to timely
produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for
the appeal fees that resulted in the late
filing of his appeal. According to him, he
informed complainant of the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal, but the
latter insisted in pursuing the same. He
also claimed to have assisted complainant
"not for money or malice" but being a
desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
courts unfavorable decision.16
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated

September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner
found
respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly
recommended that the penalty of
suspension for a period of one (1) year be
meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found
complainants
imputations
against
respondent to be well-founded, observing
that instead of meeting complainants
allegations squarely, particularly, the issue
of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the
partition case, respondent sidestepped and
delved on arguments that hardly had an
effect on the issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner
did not find credence in respondents
accusation that the spurious November 9,
2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who
was motivated to fabricate the same to
cover up his lapses that brought about the
dismissal of complainants appeal and
make it appear that there is still an
available relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the
IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report
and recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether
or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the
CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the IBPs findings,
subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it
is the lawyers duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of
his case as it is crucial in maintaining the
latters confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to
clients request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of
an attorney to inform his client of

whatever important information he may

have acquired affecting his clients case.
He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review
thereof. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the clients
interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his
actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would
be binding upon his client. Concomitantly,
the lawyer is expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to the clients cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of
August 14, 2007, respondent already knew
of the dismissal of complainants partition
case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he
never bothered to inform complainant of
such dismissal as the latter only knew of
the same on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the formers office. To add insult to
injury, respondent was inexcusably
negligent in filing complainants appeal
only on September 12, 2007, or way
beyond the reglementary period therefor,
thus resulting in its outright dismissal.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the
legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional
employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal
the dismissal of complainants appeal by
fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order
which purportedly required a DNA testing
to make it appear that complainants
appeal had been given due course, when in
truth, the same had long been denied. In so
doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct that
caused undue prejudice and unnecessary
expenses on the part of complainant.
Accordingly, respondent clearly violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which
provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound

to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25
failing in which whether in his personal or
private capacity, he becomes unworthy to
continue his practice of law.26 A lawyers
inexcusable neglect to serve his clients
interests with utmost diligence and
competence as well as his engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
in order to conceal such neglect should
never be countenanced, and thus,
administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents
conduct of employing a crooked and
deceitful scheme to keep complainant in
the dark and conceal his cases true status
through the use of a falsified court order
evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27
His acts should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
and dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.28 In this regard, the Courts
pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is
instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a
lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer.1wphi1 They are unacceptable
practices. A lawyers relationship with
others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers
oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good
moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to the admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is
also essential for remaining in the practice
of law. We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in
his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit
to continue in the practice of law.30
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous
cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective
cases, the Court suspended them for a
period of six (6) months. In Mejares v.
Romana,31 the Court suspended the
lawyer for the same period for his failure
to timely and adequately inform his clients
of the dismissal of their petition. In the
same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the
same penalty was imposed on the lawyer

who consistently failed to update his client

of the status of his cases, notwithstanding
several follow-ups.

Please take notice that the Court, Third

Division, issued a Resolution dated March
3, 2014, which reads as follows:

However, in cases where lawyers engaged

in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct by falsifying documents, the Court
found them guilty of Gross Misconduct
and disbarred them. In Brennisen v.
Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer
who falsified a special power of attorney
in order to mortgage and sell his clients
property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the
penalty of disbarment was meted out
against the lawyer who falsified an in
existent court decision for a fee.

"A.C. No. 7958 (Spouses Carlito and

Leonida Lising v. Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana). - Complainant spouses, Carlito
and Leonida Lising, (complainants)
alleged that in May 1997, Atty. Glicerio
Sampana (Atty. Sampana) sold to them a
parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-119277
and situated at Lot 4, Block 2, Phase 7-C,
Rocka Village II, Tabang Plaridel, Bulacan
for P355,600.00. Despite complainants'
substantial payment of the amount of
P312,000.00 as of June 2, 2000, Atty.
Sampana never executed a contract to sell
in their favor notwithstanding several
demands from them.

As
already
discussed,
respondent
committed acts of falsification in order to
misrepresent
to
his
client,
i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available
remedy in his case, when in reality, his
case had long been dismissed for failure to
timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue
prejudice to the latter. To the Court,
respondents acts are so reprehensible, and
his violations of the CPR are so flagrant,
exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability
to discharge his duties as a member of the
bar. His actions erode rather than enhance
the public perception of the legal
profession. Therefore, in view of the
totality of his violations, as well as the
damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent
deserves
the
ultimate
punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S.
Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for
Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule
1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in
this Court. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
10. THIRD DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 7958, March 03, 2014]
SPOUSES CARLITO AND LEONIDA
LISING V. ATTY. GLICERIO A.
SAMPANA.
Sirs/Mesdames:

When a case was filed against Atty.

Sampana before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for
unsound business practices, specific
performance, violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 957, and damages,
complainants were caught by surprise
when a document purporting to be their
contract to sell was produced by Atty.
Sampana. A closer examination of the said
contract to sell disclosed that it was signed
by one Alexander Dacayan (Dacayan),
their alleged attorney-in-fact, the brotherin-law of complainant Leonida Lising,
who was never authorized to represent
them. As per declaration of Dacayan, he
was forced to sign the said contract to sell.
Complainants further alleged that Atty.
Sampana sold the same lot to spouses
Orlando Miranda and Amelita D. Payuyo.
They averred that Atty. Sampana employed
fraud and deceit, took advantage of his
superior knowledge of the law to
unlawfully deprive them of the lot, and
unjustly enriched himself at their expense
and prejudice.
In his comment, Atty. Sampana denied the
allegations and claimed that on June 3,
2000, complainants, represented by
Dacayan, entered into a contract to sell
over the subject lot under a 1995 Joint
Venture Agreement with his client,
Remegio Q. Sampana, the lot owner; and
Rocka Villa Realty, the project developer,
and that it was agreed that the balance in
the amount of P185,000.00, shall be paid
by complainants within 3 months from
date of contract. After their initial payment
of P50,000.00 in December 2000,
complainants failed to pay the remaining
balance. More than 3 years had lapsed, but
the complainants never tried to

communicate with the owners. They did

not reply either to a final demand letter
sent to them and to Dacayan.
Consequently, the owner decided to sell
the lot to a third party. When complainants
found out about the sale, they protested.
The owner, however, asked them to pay
their outstanding obligation within one
week in return for the lot. Complainants,
however, never came back to pay.
In its Report and Recommendation, [1] the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty.
Sampana guilty of unethical, unlawful and
illegal acts relative to the double sale of
the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
119277 and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
In its Resolution, [2] dated May 15, 2011,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The IBP Resolution is
hereby quoted as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-295
Adm. Case No. 7958
Sps. Carlito & Leonida Lising vs.
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent's
guilty of illegal and unethical acts as
evidenced by the decision of the HLURB,
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year with stern Warning that
repetition of the similar act shall be dealt
with
more
severely.
Furthermore,
Respondent is Ordered to Return the
amount received from complainant
otherwise his Suspension shall continue.
RUDOLFO G. URBIZTONDO
Acting Secretary for the Meeting
Atty. Sampana filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in a
resolution, [3] dated June 21, 2013.

The
Court
agrees
with
the
recommendation of the IBP except with
respect to the last sentence which has the
effect of making his suspension
conditional and indefinite.
Atty. Sampana violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients on their
attorney requires in him a high standard
and appreciation of his duty to his clients,
his profession, the courts, and the public.
The Bar must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and
fair dealing. A lawyer can do honor to the
legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the Bar, to the
courts, and to his clients. To this end,
members of the legal fraternity can do
nothing that might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession. [4]
By his unethical conduct, the respondent
deserves the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year imposed upon him by the IBP. The
Court, however, deletes the last sentence
of the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors ordering the respondent "to
return the amount received otherwise his
suspension
shall
continue."
This
imposition, as earlier stated, has the effect
of making his suspension conditional and
indefinite. Moreover, the policy of the
Court is to let a complainant claim and
collect the amount due from a respondent
in an independent action, civil or criminal.
Nevertheless, the Court will look with
disfavour at the non-payment by the
respondent of his due and demandable
obligation.
WHEREFORE, the June 21, 2013
Resolution of the IBP denying Atty.
Glicerio A. Sampana's motion for
reconsideration and affirming its May 15,

2012 decision suspending him from the

practice of law for one (1) year is hereby
MODIFIED in that the order to return the
amounts received from complainants is
DELETED. This decision is immediately
executory and is without prejudice to the
filing of any civil or criminal action
against the respondent.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished
the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country. (Abad, J.,
on official leave, Bersamin J., designated
Acting Member, per Special Order No.
1640 dated February 19, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
14. A.C. No. 5440
2014

December 10,

SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN

PEDRO, Complainants, vs. ATTY.
ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is a complaint for
disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and
Donelita San Pedro (complainants) against
Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent).1
This case involves a determination of
whether respondent violated his duty to
hold in trust all moneys and properties of
the client; his duty to account for all funds
and property collected or received for or
from the client; and his duty to deliver the
funds and property of the client when due
or upon demand under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The facts are summarized as follows:
On or about November 21, 1996,
complainants engaged the services of
respondent to facilitate the transfer of title
to property, in the name of Isabel
Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants.2
Complainants then gave respondent a
check for P68,250.00 for the payment of
transfer taxes.3 They also gave respondent
a check for P13,800.00 for respondents
professional fee.4
Respondent failed to produce the title
despite complainants repeated followups.5
Several letters were sent by respondent
explaining the delay in the transfer of

title.6 However, respondent still failed to

produce the title.
Complainants subsequently referred the
case to the barangay.7 Respondent refused
to return the amount complainants gave for
the transfer taxes.8 Complainants were
then issued a certificate to file action.9
They also sent a letter demanding the
refund of the money intended for the
transfer taxes.10 Respondent still did not
return the money.
On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another
letter to complainants. He promised to
settle the transfer of the land title.11
However, respondent reneged on this
promise.12 Complainants were then forced
to obtain a loan from Philippine American
Life and General Insurance Company to
secure the transfer of the title to the
property in their names.13
Respondent contested the allegations of
complainants. According to him, it was
complainants who caused the three-year
delay in the transfer of title to
complainants names. Complainants were
not able to furnish respondent several
important documents: (a) original copy of
the deed of extrajudicial petition; (b)
affidavit of publication with the clippings
of the published item in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (c) a barangay
certificate from the barangay where the
property is located as required by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.14
In addition, respondent argued that
complainants paid him the measly sum of
P13,800.00 despite all the work he did for
them, including facilitating the sale of the
property. These involved "being-pulled
from the office four or five times to
discuss . . . the details of the transaction
[with the sellers]; going twice to the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna[,]
Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance of
a [n]ew owners duplicate copy of the title;
going twice to the office of the Register of
Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make
verification and submit the court [o]rder;
[and facilitating the] preparation and
notarization of the Deed of Absolute
Sale."15
Respondent also claimed that retention of
the money is justified owing to his
receivables from complainants for the
services he rendered in various cases:
1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and
Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas,
for Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Santa Rosa, Laguna. This case was

dismissed by the Honorable Court for

alleged lack of jurisdiction, the issue of
possession being intertwined with that of
ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and
Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas
for Accion Publiciana docketed as Civil
Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled
Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and
Donelita San Pedro et al., for nullity of
title, [r]econveyance with prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
directed specifically to herein complainant.
This case was assigned to the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.]
Respondent, for and in behalf of herein
complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and
[o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of
the injunction, which was favorably acted
upon. Consequently[,] the case was
dismissed by the Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas
versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San
Pedro et al., for [r]e-partition and
[r]econveyance, which was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna,
Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein
complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they
[filed] against Greg Ramos and Benjamin
Corsino, which case, as per reliable source,
was discontinued by complainant after the
civil aspect of the same was amicably
settled.16 Respondent further alleged that
complainants challenged him to prove his
worth as a lawyer by doing away with the
requirements
and
expediting
the
cancellation of the Marcaidas title.17
The present administrative case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.18 The parties were
then called to a mandatory conference
before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.19 They were required to
submit
their
position
papers.20
Respondent did not submit his position
paper.21
On July 8, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag,
submitted
his
findings
and
recommendation.
The
Investigating
Commissioner found that respondent
violated Canon 16, Rules 16.0122 and
16.0323 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found

that both checks issued to respondent were
encashed despite respondents failure to
facilitate the release of the title in the name
of complainants.24 Complainants had to
obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of
title in their names.25
Moreover, respondent admitted his liability
in his letters to complainants.26
Complainant Nicasio San Pedros affidavit
of desistance is immaterial.27
The
Investigating
Commissioner
recommended the disciplinary action of
"censure and warning," hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
most respectfully recommended that the
disciplinary sanction of CENSURE and
WARNING be given the respondent with
the admonition that he be extremely
careful of his acts to forego severe penalty
in the future.28
In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted with
modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. It held:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for Respondents violation
of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he failed to effect the transfer of
property despite encashment of the two
checks, Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months and Ordered to Returnthe
amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty (P68,250.00) Pesos to
complainants within thirty days from
receipt of notice.29 (Emphasis, italics, and
underscoring in the original)
On November 14, 2008, respondent filed
his motion for reconsideration.30 The IBP
Board of Governors denied respondents
motion in the Notice of Resolution No.
XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into

consideration. Thus, Resolution No.

XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.31 (Emphasis and
italics in the original)
On December 11, 2013, this court resolved
to note the following: (a) Notice of
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated
August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of
Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution No.
XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the
IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBPs
letter dated October 7, 2013 transmitting
the documents pertaining to the case.32
In the manifestation and motion dated
October 25,2013, respondent requested for
a formal hearing, reasoning that he "wants
to exercise his right to confront his
accusers [to] cross[-]examine them and
that of their witness."33The manifestation
and motion was denied by this court in the
resolution dated September 22, 2014.34
The main issue in this case is whether
respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for failing to hold in trust the money of his
clients.
After considering the parties arguments
and the records of this case, this court
resolves to adopt and approve the Notice
of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated
June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law
is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who
meet the high standards oflegal proficiency
and morality. Any conduct that shows a
violation of the norms and values of the
legal profession exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability."35
An examination of the records reveals that
respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds
of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property of his client when due

or upon demand. However, he shall have a

lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's
funds; contempt. When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded, he may
be punished for contempt as an officer of
the Court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
A lawyers duty under Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is
clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship
between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or
from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a
lawyer collects or receives money from his
client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation
and office expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the money was
spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the
money does not materialize) constitutes a
blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyers] failure to return the clients
money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.36(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent admitted that there were
delays in the transfer of title of property to
complainants
name.1wphi1
He

continuously assured complainants that he

would still fulfill his duty. However, after
three (3) years and several demands from
complainants, respondent failed to
accomplish the task given to him and even
refused
to
return
the
money.
Complainants alleged failure to provide
the necessary documents to effect the
transfer does not justify his violation of his
duty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondents assertion of a valid lawyers
lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien
has the following elements:
An attorneys retaining lien is fully
recognized if the presence of the following
elements concur: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the
clients funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees.
Further, the attorneys retaining lien is a
general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and
applies to the documents and funds of the
client which may come into the attorneys
possession in the course of his
employment.37
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements
of a valid retaining lien. He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for
attorneys fees. The enumeration of cases
he worked on for complainants remains
unsubstantiated. When there is no
unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees,
lawyers cannot validly retain their clients
funds or properties.38
Furthermore, assuming that respondent
had proven all the requisites for a valid
retaining lien, he cannot appropriate for
himself his client's funds without the
proper accounting and notice to the client.
The rule is that when there is "a
disagreement, or when the client disputes
the amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of
his fees .... "39
We also note that despite complainant
Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance
dated March 14, 2008, both complainants
signed their comment to respondent's
motion for reconsideration and prayed that
the motion be dismissed for lack of
merit.40
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani
A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months. He is
also ordered to RETURN to complainants
the amount of P68,250.00 with 6% legal
interest from the date of finality of this

judgment until full payment. Respondent is

further DIRECTED to submit to this court
proof of payment of the amount within 10
days from payment. Let a copy of this
resolution be entered in respondent Atty.
Isagani A. Mendoza's personal record with
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a
copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

15. A.C. No. 5116

April 13, 2015

DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS,

INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOHNNY
LANDERO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed
against Atty. Johnny P. Landero
(respondent) on the
grounds of
professional misconduct and violation of
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in August 1997, complainant
Davao
Import
Distributors,
Inc.
(complainant),. through its representative
and branch manager, Jimmy Pandili
(Pandili), engaged the services of
respondent to file a Complaint2 against
Angelita Librando and Juanito Du
(Librando and Du, respectively) for the
recovery of one split type air-conditioner
with replevin and damages. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3854 (civil
case) before Branch 3 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General
Santos City.
Apparently, Librando purchased on
installment basis a split-type floormounted air-conditioner from complainant
in the amount of P86,740.00 which the
former installed in her beauty salon located
in a commercial building owned by Du.
When Librando failed to pay, Pandili went
to her salon only to find out that the same
had already closed down. Left in the
premises, however, was the airconditioning unit Librando purchased from
complainant. Claiming that Du refused to
release the unit to complainant as he
allegedly intended to retain the same as a

lien for Librando's unpaid

complainant filed the said case.

rentals,

On the scheduled date of pre-trial on

November 10, 1997, respondent failed to
appear. And since he also failed to inform
complainant or Pandili of the scheduled
pre-trial, they too were unable to attend.
As a result, the case was dismissed for
non-suit through an Order3 of even date
and Du was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte in support of his
counterclaim. On December 9, 1997, the
MTCC issued a Decision4 ordering
complainant to pay Du the amounts of
P70,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00
as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
Without
filing
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, complainant appealed the
MTCC Decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). On July 31, 1998, the RTC
issued its Decision5 affirming the MTCC
Decision.
Complainant then disbursed to respondent
the amount of P1,900.00 so that he may
file a petition for review before the Court
of Appeals (CA). Initially, respondent filed
a motion for extension of time to file said
petition. However, he failed to file the
same such that on January 22, 1999 the CA
issued a Resolution6 dismissing the
appeal.
Hence, this Complaint for Disbarment
where
complainant
asserts
that
respondent's actuations of (1) not
appearing in the pre-trial of the case, (2)
not availing of the legal remedies against
the dismissal of the Complaint due to nonsuit, and (3) failing to file a petition for
review, constitute unprofessional behavior
or misconduct and violations of Canon 12
of the CPR, which merit disciplinary
action, if not, disbarment.
Respondent's Defense
In response to the allegations hurled
against him, respondent explained that
upon receiving Du's Answer with
Counterclaims, he was alarmed to find out
that the property in question was already in
the custody of the sheriff. This was
allegedly by reason of an attachment in an
another civil action filed by a different
person against Librando. Respondent thus
conferred with the counsel of Du and
requested
him
to
withdraw
the
counterclaim but was turned down as Du
wanted to pursue his claim for damages.
He then informed Pandili of the seizure of
the property by the sheriff and of Du's
decision not to withdraw the counterclaim.

The two of them allegedly thereafter

agreed to just abandon the case. But when
he discussed to Pandili that it is possible
that complainant may be assessed for
damages, Pandili allegedly panicked and
requested him to delay the execution of the
judgment on the counterclaim for fear that
he would be terminated from his job.
Acceding, respondent appealed the
judgment on Du's counterclaim but the
RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
MTCC Decision. When informed about
this, Pandili allegedly took from
respondent the case folder despite the
latter's warning that they only have 15
days to file a Petition for Review with the
CA. It was only after 30 days that Pandili
returned to him and begged that he file an
appeal, again, for fear that he would be
terminated by complainant. Out of pity,
and despite knowledge of the expiration of
the period for filing an appeal, respondent
still filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review. Du's counsel
opposed the motion pointing out that
respondent misled the CA as to the date of
his receipt of the assailed RTC Decision so
as to make it appear that the said motion
was timely filed. The CA thus ordered
respondent to explain. It was at this
juncture that respondent opted not to file
the intended petition anymore allegedly
because he would not want to waste the
time of the court in resolving a petition
which is baseless and admittedly filed out
of time. Proceedings before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines
On May 24, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner, Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala
(Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala) recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for three months.7 This was after
she found respondent negligent in the
performance of his duty as counsel for
complainant and as an officer of the Court.
As counsel for complainant, it was
respondent's duty to attend the pre-trial,
justify the filing of the complaint, and
oppose Du's counterclaim. Respondent,
however, was remiss in his duty by
deliberately failing to attend the pre-trial,
which caused prejudice to complainant in
that it was declared in default and was
assessed for damages. Moreover, while
respondent claimed that he did not proceed
with the filing of the petition for review
with the CA because it was already out of
time, the records, on the contrary, show
that he was actually granted by the CA an
extension of 15 days to file the intended

petition. Only that he did not file the same

on purpose notwithstanding his receipt
from complainant of the amount of
P1,900.00 as payment for docket fees.
In a Resolution8 dated July 17, 2008, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved
the
recommendation
of
Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala
but
modified the period of suspension by
increasing it from three months to six
months. Respondent then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,9 which the IBP Board
of Governors denied in a Resolution10
dated March 21, 2014.
Hence, the transmission of the whole
record of the case to this Court for its final
action.
Our Ruling
We agree with complainant that respondent
displayed unprofessional behavior and
misconduct and violated the CPR.
Respondent himself admitted that he
deliberately did not appear at the
scheduled pre-trial conference in Civil
Case No. 3854 despite notice and that he
did not file a petition for review after
receiving from his client the payment for
docket fees and after being granted by the
CA an extension of time to file the same.
From these facts alone, it cannot be denied
that
respondent's
acts
constitute
misconduct which at the same time amount
to violations of the CPR.
The Court has already held in People v.
Sevilleno11 and reiterated in Consolidated
Farms, Inc. v. Atty. Alpon, Jr.12that Canon
1813 of the CPR requires every lawyer to
serve his client with utmost dedication,
competence and diligence. He must not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable.
As complainant's counsel in Civil Case
No. 3854, respondent is duty-bound to
handle the same with zeal and all due
diligence.1wphi1 Hence, even assuming
that there is truth to his allegation that he
and Pandili already agreed to abandon the
case, he should have still attended the
scheduled pre-trial to formally move for its
withdrawal.
However,
despite
his
awareness that his absence in the pre-trial
would result to a dismissal of the case with
prejudice and to a declaration of his
client's default with respect to Du's
counterclaim, respondent still deliberately
did not appear thereat. It is worth noting
that at that time, Du had already filed an
Answer with Counterclaim. If respondent

was indeed concerned about his client's

cause, he should have, under the
circumstances, observed the mandate of
Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. It
provides:
RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of
plaintiff. - Except as provided in the
preceding section, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save
upon approval of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon
him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal,
the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion he manifests his
preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph shall be
without prejudice. A class suit shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Had respondent moved for dismissal under
the above-quoted rule, the case filed by
complainant would have been dismissed
without prejudice thereby giving it the
alternative of re-filing the case should
there be a change in circumstances. But
due to respondent's absence and also his
failure to inform complainant of the
scheduled pre-trial, the Complaint was
dismissed based on Section 314 of the
same Rule. This has. the effect of an
adjudication on the merits which, needless
to state, curtailed the right of the
complainant to refile the case. Moreover,
had respondent been present at the pre-trial
and had informed complainant of the
same, the latter would not have been
declared in default and, therefore, would
have had the opportunity to present
evidence to refute Du's claim for damages
against it. To stress, an attorney is bound to
protect his client's interest to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence.15 This,
respondent failed to do in utter disregard
of Canon 18 of the CPR.
Anent respondent's failure to file the
Petition for Review despite being granted
an extension of time to do so, his
explanation is as follows:
o) That because of pity I filed an extension
of time to file a petition for review alleging

that the plaintiff had just received a

decision and the filing is within the
reglementary period copy furnished the
counsel of Juanito Du[.] This was opposed
by his counsel alleging [I misled] the court
[as] to the correctness of the date of receipt
. of said decision. So the court issued an
order directing the undersigned respondent
to explain. x x x Because of said
opposition the herein counsel decided not
to proceed [with] the filing of [a] petition
for review considering it was already filed
out of time and it will only waste the
golden time of the court in reviewing a
baseless appeal, so the herein respondent
advised the manager to be man enough to
accept the truth, otherwise the herein
respondent would be dragged deeper in
helping him;16
The Court finds respondent's reason to be
unacceptable if not downright disrespectful
to the courts. The same only underscores
his blatant violation of Rule 12.03, Canon
12 of the CPR, which states:
CANON 12 - A LA WYER SHALL
EXERT
EVERY
EFFORT
AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST
IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 -A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so.
Respondent needs lecturing that sympathy
towards a client does not justify his act of
stating in his motion for extension that he
received the RTC Decision at a later date
to make it appear that the filing of the said
motion is well-within the period for filing
an appeal. Given his years of experience in
the legal profession, respondent should be
well aware that "[a] lawyer is first and
foremost an officer of the court. Thus,
while he owes his entire devotion to the
interest and causes of his client, he must
ensure that he acts within the bounds of
reason and common sense, always aware
that he is an instrument of truth and
justice. More importantly, as an officer of
the court and its indispensable partner in
the sacred task of administering justice,
graver _responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect
to its processes. Thus, any act on his part
which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or
impede and degrade the administration of

justice constitutes professional misconduct

calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him."17
All told, the Court finds respondent to
have committed acts violative of Canons
12and18 of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the
July 17, 2008 Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Johnny P. Landero is
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective
immediately. He is directed to report the
date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect Let a copy of
this Resolution be entered in the personal
records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.

17. A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015

EDUARDO
A.
MAGLENTE,*Complainant, v. ATTY.
DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative
complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by
complainant Eduardo A. Maglente
(complainant), before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), against respondent
Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent),
praying that the latter be directed to return
the amount of P48,000.00 that he received
from the former.
The Facts

Complainant, as President of Samahan ng

mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III,
Incorporated(Samahan), alleged that he
engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in order to
determine the true owner of the land being
occupied by the members of Samahan.2 In
connection therewith, he gave respondent
the aggregate amount of P48,000.00
intended to cover the filing fees for the
action to be instituted, as evidenced by a
written acknowledgment executed by
respondent himself.3 Despite the payment,

respondent failed to file an action in court.

When confronted, respondent explained
that the money given to him was not
enough to fully pay for the filing fees in
court.4Thus, complainant asked for the
return of the money, but respondent
claimed to have spent the same and even
demanded more money.5 Complainant
further alleged that when he persisted in
seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum,
respondent told him to shut up because it
was not his money in the first place.6
Hence,
complainant
filed
this
administrative complaint seeking the
return of the full amount he had paid to
respondent.

In his defense,7 respondent denied

spending complainants money, explaining
that he had already prepared the initiatory
pleading and was poised to file the same,
when he discovered through the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite
costly. This prompted him to immediately
relay such information to complainant who
undertook to raise the amount needed.
While waiting, however, the instant
administrative case was filed against him.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated

October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), and
accordingly, recommended that he be: (a)
meted with the penalty of Censure, with a
warning that a repetition of the same will
be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b)
directed to account for or return the
amount of P48,000.00 to complainant.10

The Investigating Commissioner found

that respondent clearly received the
amount of P48,000.00 from complainant,
which was intended to answer for the
filing fees of a case he was supposed to
file for the Samahan, but which he failed
to do so.11 In this relation, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that
had respondent prepared the complaint and
performed research works, as he claimed,
then he could have kept a reasonable
amount for his effort under the doctrine of
quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he
could not present any proof in this
respect.12

In a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2013, the

IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation,
with
modification
increasing the recommended penalty from
Censure to suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months.
Aggrieved,
respondent
moved
for
reconsideration14 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution15 dated May 3,
2014.
The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether

or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
The Courts Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the

Court concurs with the findings of the IBP,
except as tothe penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes

up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such clients cause with
diligence, care, and devotion, whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyers
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him
by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable for violating Rule
18.03, Canon 18of the CPR,17 which
reads:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a

legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection [therewith] shall
render him liable.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that

complainant engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of filing a case
in court, and in connection therewith, gave
the amount of P48,000.00 to answer for
the filing fees. Despite the foregoing,
respondent failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse
that the money he received from
complainant was not enough to fully pay
the filing fees.

Furthermore, respondent also violated

Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
CPR when he failed to refund the amount
of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him
despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all

money or property collected or received
for or from the client.

Having
established
respondents
administrative liability, the Court now
determines the proper penalty to be
imposed.

Jurisprudence provides that in similar

cases where lawyers neglected their
clients affairs and, at the same time, failed
to return the latters money and/or property
despite demand, the Court meted out the
penalty of suspension from the practice of
law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of
one (1) year for his failure to perform his
undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter.22
Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the
same penalty was imposed on a lawyer
who failed to render any legal service to
his client as well as to return the money he
received for such purpose.24 In view of
the foregoing, the Court finds it
appropriate that respondent be meted with
the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year.

similar acts will be dealt with more

severely.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to

return to complainant Eduardo A.
Maglente the amount of P48,000.00 he
received from the latter within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to

respondents record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

18. A.C. No. 8000

xxxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the

funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. x x x.

Verily, when a lawyer receives money

from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to
the client showing that the money was
spent for the
intended purpose.
Consequently, if the money was not used
accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client.18 A lawyers failure
to return the money to his client despite
numerous demands is a violation of the
trust reposed on him and is indicative of
his lack of integrity,19 as in this case.

Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such

skill, care, and diligence as men of the
legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional
employment,20 and hence, must be
disciplined accordingly.

Finally, the Court sustains the directive for

respondent to account for or return the
amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is
well to note that while the Court has
previously
held
that
disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondentlawyers administrative and not his civil
liability, it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature
for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his
client in a transaction separate and distinct
[from] and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.25 Since the
aforesaid amount was intended to answer
for filing fees which is intimately related
to the lawyer-client relationship between
complainant and respondent, the Court
finds the return thereof to be in order.26

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R.

Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found
GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or

August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a ComplaintAffidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by
complainant
Chamelyn
A.
Agot
(complainant) against respondent Atty.
Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him
of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath
for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to
account for and return her money despite
several demands.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant
alleged that she was invited as maid of
honor in her best friends wedding on
December 9, 2007 at the United States of
America. To facilitate the issuance of her
United States (US) visa, complainant
sought the services of respondent who
represented himself as an immigration
lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they
entered into a Contract of Legal Services
(Contract),2
whereby
respondent
undertook to facilitate and secure the
release of a US immigrant visa in
complainants favor prior to the scheduled
wedding. In consideration therefor,

complainant paid respondent the amount

of P350,000.00 as downpayment and
undertook to pay the balance of
P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US
visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that
should complainants visa application be
denied for any reason other than her
absence on the day of the interview and/or
for records of criminal conviction and/or
any court-issued hold departure order,
respondent is obligated to return the said
downpayment.4 However, respondent
failed to perform his undertaking within
the agreed period. Worse, complainant was
not even scheduled for interview in the US
Embassy. As the demand for refund of the
downpayment
was
not
heeded,
complainant filed a criminal complaint for
estafa and the instant administrative
complaint against respondent.5
In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008,
respondent claimed that his failure to
comply with his obligation under the
Contract was due to the false pretenses of a
certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had
believed to be a consul for the US
Embassy and to whom he delivered the
amount given by the complainant.
Respondent elaborated that he had a
business relationship with Pineda on the
matter of facilitating the issuance of US
visas to his friends and family, including
himself. He happened to disclose this to a
certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred
his friend, the complainant, whose
previous US visa application had been
denied, resulting in the execution of the
Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda
reneged on his commitments and could no
longer be located but, nonetheless,
assumed the responsibility to return the
said amount to complainant.7 To buttress
his claims, respondent attached pictures
supposedly of his friends and family with
Pineda as well as electronic mail messages
(e-mails) purportedly coming from the
latter.8
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated
April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
(IBP)
Investigating
Commissioner
found
respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty
of suspension for a period of four (4)
months, with a warning that a repetition of
the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10
The Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful
conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as
an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to

deliver the services he contracted; and (c)

being remiss in returning complainants
downpayment of P350,000.00. The
Investigating Commissioner did not lend
credence to respondents defense anent his
purported transactions with Pineda
considering that the latters identity was
not proven and in light of respondents
self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs
and e-mails, which were bereft of any
probative value.11
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012,
the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report
and recommendation with the modification
increasing the period of suspension to six
(6) months and ordering respondent to
return the amount of P350,000.0012 to
complainant within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice, with legal interest from
the date of demand.13
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether
or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the
CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court concurs with the IBPs findings,
subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In
this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
In
the
instant
case,
respondent
misrepresented himself as an immigration
lawyer, which resulted to complainant
seeking his assistance to facilitate the
issuance of her US visa and paying him the
amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment
for his legal services. In truth, however,
respondent has no specialization in
immigration law but merely had a contact
allegedly with Pineda, a purported US
consul, who supposedly processes US visa

applications for him. However, respondent

failed to prove Pinedas identity
considering that the photographs and emails he submitted were all self-serving
and thus, as correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any
probative value and consequently cannot
be given any credence. Undoubtedly,
respondents deception is not only
unacceptable,
disgraceful,
and
dishonorable to the legal profession; it
reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him
unfit to practice law.15
Corollary to such deception, respondent
likewise failed to perform his obligations
under the Contract, which is to facilitate
and secure the issuance of a US visa in
favor of complainant. This constitutes a
flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule
18.03 A lawyer shall not neglecta legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,
once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such
clients cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed upon him.16
Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively
liable,17 as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR
when he failed to refund the amount of
P350,000.00 that complainant paid him,
viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer

and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and
good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature
of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money
or property collected or received for or
from his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure
to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional
ethics.20
Anent the proper penalty for respondents
acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their
clients affairs and, at the same time, failed
to return the latters money and/or property
despite demand, the Court imposed upon
them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v.
Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of one (1) year for his failure
to perform his undertaking under his
retainership agreement with his client and
to return the money given to him by the
latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the Court
suspended the lawyer for a period of two
(2) years for his failure to return the
amount his client gave him for his legal
services which he never performed. In this
case, not only did respondent fail to
facilitate the issuance of complainants US
visa and return her money, he likewise
committed
deceitful
acts
in
misrepresenting himself as an immigration
lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his
client. Under these circumstances, a graver
penalty should be imposed upon him. In
view of the foregoing, the Court deems it
appropriate to increase the period of
suspension from the practice of law of
respondent from six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's
recommendation ordering respondent to
return the amount of P350,000.00 he
received
from
complainant
as
downpayment. It is well to note that "while
the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer's administrative and not
his civil liability, it must be clarified that
this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature - for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer
from his client in a transaction separate

and distinct [from] and not intrinsically

linked to his professional engagement."23
Hence, since respondent received the
aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees,
the Court finds the return thereof to be in
order.

and thereafter as President of OneCard

Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy
Group of Companies. He resigned from his
post effective August 11, 2008 and
transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as
the Vice President for Finance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P.

Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules
16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, effective upon the finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.1wphi1

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the

Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under the
Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS
for LCI for "updating purposes". The GIS4
identified Guarin as Chairman of the
Board of Directors (BOD) and President.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to

return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot
the legal fees he received from the latter in
the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety
(90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this

complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR by knowingly listing him as a
stockholder, Chairman of the Board and
President of LCI when she knew that he
had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as
chairperson of the BOD or been President
of LCI. He also never received any notice
of meeting or agenda where his
appointment as Chairman would be taken
up. He has never accepted any
appointment as Chairman and President of
LCI.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to

respondent's record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

19. A.C. No. 10576

2015

January 14,

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN,
Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment
filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty.
Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for
allegedly filing a
false
General
Information Sheet (GIS) with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule
1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G.
de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer

Mired with allegations of anomalous

business transactions and practices, on
December 18, 2008, LCI applied for
voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS

with the SEC listing Guarin as a
stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and
President of LCI. She argued that the GIS
was provisional to comply with SEC
requirements. It would have been corrected
in the future but unfortunately LCI filed
for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.
She averred that the GIS was made and
submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the
information from the last BOD meeting
held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was
a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on
October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text
message and asked him to meet with her so
hemay sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning
shareholdings.
Guarin
responded in the affirmative and said that
he would meet with her on Friday, October
17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to
show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the
strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty.

Limpin filed the GIS on November 27,

2008.

bank accounts and these do not show that

Guarin was a stockholder.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any

board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented
Secretarys Certificates dated May 16,
20066 , May 22, 20067 , and June 13,
20078 bearing Guarins signature.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April

15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in totothe
CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for
reconsideration17 but was denied in the
March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP
Board of Governors.

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there

were pending criminal complaints against
the directors and officers of LCI, where
she and Guarin are co-respondents:
Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los
Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card,
Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised
as a defense that the November 27, 2008
GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She
averred that this Court held that "when the
criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any
administrative disciplinary proceedings for
the same act must await the outcome of the
criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings."11 During the mandatory
preliminary conference, however, both
parties stipulated that the complaint filed
by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to
Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin
failed to present sufficient evidence to
warrant disbarment.1wphi1 She stated
that merely presenting the GIS does not
constitute as proof of any unethical
conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that
Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus
recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for three months. It
noted that based on the submissions of the
parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of
LCI consequently making him ineligible
tobe a member of the BOD. Neither was
there proof that Guarin acted as the
President of LCI but was a mere signatory
of LCIs bank accounts. This made the
verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso
de los Angeles had the authority to appoint
or designate directors or officers of
Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this
procedure was not legally permissible.
Despite knowing this to be irregular, she
allowed herself to be dictated upon and
falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the
company. The Secretarys Certificates with
Guarins signature Atty. Limpin presented
were of no moment since inthese Guarin
merely acceded to become a signatory of

We adopt the report and recommendation

of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their
first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, ratherthan seek exceptions as
loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand
can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.1wphi1 As Justice
Malcolm
stated
"[t]he
serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges
pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as
an officer of the court in accordance with
his oath."21
Grounds for such administrative action
against a lawyer may be found in Section
27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office and (2) any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and
stipulations of the parties, we agree with
the IBP that there is no indication that
Guarin held any share to the corporation
and thatt he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.23 It is undisputed that Atty.
Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was
a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she
posits that she had made the same in good
faith, her certification also contained a
stipulation that she made a due verification
of the statements contained therein. That
Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would
sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the
instrument. We also note that there was no
submission which would support the
allegation that Guarin was in fact a
stockholder. We thus find that in filing a

GIS that contained false information, Atty.

Limpin committed an infraction which did
not conform to her oath as a lawyer in
accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.1wphi1
We also agree with the IBP that in
allowing herself to be swayed by the
business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD
and officers of the corporation despite the
rules enunciated in the Corporation Code
with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed
Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of
Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false
document we see it fit to increase the
recommended penalty to six months
suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Accordingly,
we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C.
Limpin from the practice of law for SIX
(6) MONTHS effective upon finality of
this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record
as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and
all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

20. A.C. No. 10537

2015

February 3,

REYNALDO
G.
RAMIREZ,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. MERCEDES
BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated
in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and
ears of their clients. Lawyers are expected
to prosecute or defend the interests of their
clients without need for reminders. The
privilege of the office of attorney grants
them the ability to warrant to their client
that they will manage the case as if it were
their own. The relationship between an
attorney and client is a sacred agency. It

cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse

that the lawyer accepted the case only
because he or she was asked by an
acquaintance.
The
professional
relationship remains the same regardless of
the reasons for the acceptance by counsel
and regardless of whether the case is
highly paying or pro bono.
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallos
(Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost
appeal, terminating the case of her client
not on the merits but due to her
negligence. She made it appear that the
case was dismissed on the merits when, in
truth, she failed to file the Appellants
Brief on time. She did not discharge her
duties of candor to her client.
This court resolves the Petition for
Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under
Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Resolution of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines affirmed with
modification its earlier Resolution3 dated
March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity
to conduct fact finding for this court, it
found that respondent Atty. Margallo had
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility.4
Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.5
In the Complaint6 filed on January 20,
2010 before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,
complainant
Reynaldo
Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he
engaged Atty. Margallos services as legal
counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title
entitled "Spouses Roque v. Ramirez."7 The
case was initiated before the Regional Trial
Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo
contacted him on or about March 2004, as
per a referral from a friend of Ramirezs
sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had
offered her legal services on the condition
that she be given 30% of the land subject
of the controversy instead of attorneys
fees.10 It was also agreed upon that
Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo
P1,000.00 per court appearance.11
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial
Court promulgated a Decision adverse to
Ramirez.12 Atty. Margallo advised him to

appeal the judgment. She committed to file

the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.13
The Appeal was perfected and the records
were sent to the Court of Appeals
sometime in 2008.14 On December 5,
2008, the Court of Appeals directed
Ramirez to file his Appellants Brief.
Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who
replied that she would have one
prepared.15
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted
Atty. Margallo to follow up on the
Appellants Brief. Atty. Margallo informed
him that he needed to meet her to sign the
documents necessary for the brief.16
On several occasions, Ramirez followed
up on the status of the brief, but he was
told that there was still no word from the
Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo
informed Ramirez that his Appeal had
been denied.18 She told him that the Court
of Appeals denial was due to Ramirezs
failure to establish his filiation with his
alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim.19 She also informed him that they
could no longer appeal to this court since
the Decision of the Court of Appeals had
been promulgated and the reglementary
period for filing an Appeal had already
lapsed.20
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals.
There, he discovered that the Appellants
Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a
Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies
for filing beyond the reglementary
period.21
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Codeof
Professional Responsibility.22 By way of
defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she
had agreed to take on the case for free,
save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per
hearing. She also claimed that she had
candidly informed Ramirez and his mother
that they only had a 50% chance of
winning the case.23 She denied ever
having entered into an agreement
regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of
the value of the land subject of the
controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not
have taken on the Appeal except that the
mother of Ramirez had begged her to do
so.24 She claimed that when she instructed
Ramirez to see her for document signing
on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When
he finally showed up on March 2009, he

merely told her that he had been

busy.25Her failure to immediately inform
Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the
Court of Appeals was due to losing her
clients number because her 8-year-old
daughter played with her phone and
accidentally erased all her contacts.26
Mandatory conference and findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The dispute was set for mandatory
conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only
Ramirez appeared despite Atty. Margallo
having received notice.28 The mandatory
conference was reset to July 22, 2010.
Both parties then appeared and were
directed to submit their position papers.29
Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva
recommended that Atty. Margallo be
reprimanded for her actions and be given a
stern warning that her next infraction of a
similar nature shall be dealt with more
severely.30 This was based on his two key
findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the
reglementary period for filing an
Appellants Brief to lapse by assuming that
Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the
case instead of exhausting all means
possible to protect the interest of her
client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been
remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in
the loss of Ramirezs statutory right to
seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.32
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board
of Governors resolved to recommend a
penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo
with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely. Ramirez seasonably filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on July 16,
2013.34 In the Resolution dated March 21,
2014, the Board of Governors granted
Ramirezs Motion for Reconsideration and
increased the recommended penalty to
suspension from practice of law for two
(2) years.35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 139-B,
Section 12 of the Rules of Court.36 She
alleged that the recommended penalty of
suspension was too severe considering that
she had been very careful and vigilant in
defending the cause of her client. She also
averred that this was the first time a
Complaint was filed against her.37
Ramirez thereafter filed an undated
Motion to adopt his Motion for
Reconsideration previously filed with the

Commission on Bar Discipline as a

Comment on Atty. Margallos Petition for
Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated
October 14, 2014, this court granted
Ramirezs Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her
Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This courts ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a
client is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence."41 Lawyers are expected to
exercise the necessary diligence and
competence in managing cases entrusted to
them. They commit not only to review
cases or give legal advice, but also to
represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by
either the client or the court. The
expectation to maintain a high degree of
legal proficiency and attention remains the
same whether the represented party is a
high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and
18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule
18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection there with shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to
clients request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes,
Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing
to justify his absence in a scheduled
preliminary conference, which resulted in
the case being submitted for resolution.
This was aggravated by the lawyers
failure to inform his client about the
adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals,
thereby precluding the litigant from further
pursuing an Appeal. This court found that
these actions amounted to gross negligence
tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and
his client is one imbued with utmost trust

and confidence. In this light, clients are led

to expect that lawyers would be evermindful of their cause and accordingly
exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is
expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyers
duty of competence and diligence includes
not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to
the counsels care or giving sound legal
advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch,
and urging their termination without
waiting for the client or the court to prod
him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyers negligence in
fulfilling his duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. While such negligence
or carelessness is incapable of exact
formulation, the Court has consistently
held that the lawyers mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is
per se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Respondent
Atty.
Margallo
was
unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal
counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and
coordination between respondent Atty.
Margallo and her client was palpable but
was not due to the lack of diligence of her
client. This cost complainant Ramirez his
entire case and left him with no appellate
remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the
merits of his case, but because a person
privileged to act as counsel failed to
discharge her duties with the requisite
diligence.
Her
assumption
that
complainant Ramirez was no longer
interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor
excuse. There was no proof that she
exerted efforts to communicate with her
client. This is an admission that she
abandoned her obligation as counsel on the
basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible
means to protect complainant Ramirezs
interest, which is contrary to what she had
sworn to do as a member of the legal
profession. For these reasons, she clearly

violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules

18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents,
entrusted to manage the interests of
another, use their authority or power for
their benefit or fail to discharge their
duties. In many agencies, there is
information assymetry between the
principal and the entrusted agent. That is,
there are facts and events that the agent
must attend to that may not be known by
the principal.
This information assymetry is even more
pronounced in an attorney client
relationship. Lawyers are expected not
only to be familiar with the minute facts of
their cases but also to see their relevance in
relation to their causes of action or their
defenses. The salience of these facts is not
usually patent to the client. It can only be
seen through familiarity with the relevant
legal provisions that are invoked with their
jurisprudential interpretations. More so
with the intricacies of the legal procedure.
It is the lawyer that receives the notices
and must decide the mode of appeal to
protect the interest of his or her client.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer
and her client is regarded as highly
fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the
client, it is the lawyer that has the better
knowledge of facts, events, and remedies.
While it is true that the client chooses
which lawyer to engage, he or she usually
does so on the basis of reputation. It is
only upon actual engagement that the
client discovers the level of diligence,
competence, and accountability of the
counsel that he or she chooses. In some
cases, such as this one, the discovery
comes too late. Between the lawyer and
the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that
should bear the full costs of indifference or
negligence. Respondent Atty. Margallos
position that a two-year suspension is too
severe considering that it is her first
infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza
Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:
As regards the appropriate penalty, several
cases show that lawyers who have been
held liable for gross negligence for
infractions similar to those of the
respondent were suspended for a period of
six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a
lawyer who failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice
which resulted in the submission of the
case for decision was found guilty of gross
negligence and hence, suspended for six
(6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.

Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did

not file a pre-trial brief and was absent
during the pre-trial conference was
likewise suspended for six (6) months. In
Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected
a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
was also suspended for six (6) months.
Thus,
consistent
with
existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to
impose the same penalty against
respondent and accordingly suspends him
for a period of six (6) months.45
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the
clients without procedural remedies. On
the other hand, respondent Atty. Margallos
neglect resulted in her client having no
further recourse in court to protect his
legal interests. This lack of diligence, to
the utmost prejudice of complainant
Ramirez who relied on her alleged
competence as counsel, must not be
tolerated. It is time that we communicate
that lawyers must actively manage cases
entrusted to them. There should be no
more room for an inertia of mediocrity.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the
constitutionally
mandated
duty
to
discipline lawyers.46 Under the current
rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be
delegated to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The findings of the Integrated
Bar,
however,
can
only
be
recommendatory, consistent with the
constitutional powers of this court. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its
nature, recommendatory. Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that recognizes that the
severity of the infraction is worth a penalty
of two-year suspension. We read this as a
showing of its desire to increase the level
of professionalism of our lawyers.
This court is not without jurisdiction to
increase the penalties imposed in order to
address a current need in the legal
profession. The desire of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher
ethical standard for its members' conduct
is laudable. The negligence of respondent
Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of
candor is reprehensible.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is
DENIED. The Recommendations and
Resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated
March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED,
ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty.
Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

two (2) years, with a stern warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely. This decision
is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

24. A.C. No. 10573

2015

January 13,

FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court's
disciplinary authority in resolving this
disbarment complaint against his former
lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr.,
whom he has accused of gross misconduct.
Antecedents
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to
handle the labor disputes involving his
company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz
Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guicos legal
services included handling a complaint for
illegal dismissal brought against CVC
(NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-9261-05
entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (KMM) Katipunan CVC San
Lorenzo Ruiz Chapter, Ladivico Adriano,
et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corp. and
Fernando Chu).2 On September 7, 2006,
Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered
a decision adverse to CVC.3 Atty. Guico
filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.
According to Chu, during a Christmas
party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty.
Guicos residence in Commonwealth,
Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to
prepare a substantial amount of money to
be given to the NLRC Commissioner
handling the appeal to insure a favorable
decision.4 On June 10, 2007, Chu called
Atty. Guico to inform him that he had
raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty.
Guico told him to proceed to his office at
No. 48 Times Street, Quezon City, and
togive the money to his assistant,
Reynaldo
(Nardo)
Manahan.
Chu
complied, and later on called Atty. Guico
to confirm that he had delivered the money
to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico
instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007
at the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato
Street, Quezon City. Atthe UCC Coffee
Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of
an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in
favor of CVC.5 The draft decision6 was
printed on the dorsal portion of used paper
apparently emanating from the office of

Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the latter

told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to
issue the decision. But Chu could only
produce P280,000.00, which he brought to
Atty. Guicos office on July 10, 2007
accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu,
and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it
was Nardo who received the amount
without issuing any receipt.7
Chu followed up on the status of the CVC
case with Atty. Guico in December 2007.
However, Atty. Guico referred him to
Nardo who in turn said that he would only
know the status after Christmas. On
January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo,
who invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot
Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu
asked Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner
had accepted the money, but Nardo replied
in the negative and simply told Chu to
wait. Nardo assured that the money was
still with Atty. Guico who would return it
should the NLRC Commissioner not
accept it.8
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC
promulgated a decision adverse to CVC.9
Chu confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn
referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of the motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Guico caused the preparation and
filing of an appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as
legal counsel on May 25, 2009.10
In his position paper,11 Atty. Guico
described the administrative complaint as
replete with lies and inconsistencies, and
insisted that the charge was only meant for
harassment. He denied demanding and
receiving money from Chu, a denial that
Nardo corroborated with his own
affidavit.12 He further denied handing to
Chu a draft decision printed on used paper
emanating from his office, surmising that
the used paper must have been among
those freely lying around in his office that
had been pilfered by Chus witnesses in
the criminal complaint he had handled for
Chu.13
Findings and Recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors
IBP
Commissioner
Cecilio
A.C.
Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had
violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for
demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu; and recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his
act of extortion and misrepresentation that

caused dishonor to and contempt for the

legal profession.14
On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the findings of IBP
Commissioner Villanueva in its Resolution
No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the
recommended penalty of disbarment to
three years suspension, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering Respondents
violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years with Warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely and Ordered to
Return the amount of Five Hundred Eighty
Thousand (P580,000.00) Pesos with legal
interest within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice.
Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16
but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion for reconsideration on March 23,
2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17
Neither of the parties brought a petition for
review vis--vis Resolution No. XX-201387 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.
Issue
Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyers Oath
and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for
demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision
from the NLRC?
Ruling of the Court
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests on the complainant to establish
respondent attorneys liability by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Indeed, this Court has consistently
required clearly preponderant evidence to
justify the imposition of either disbarment
or suspension as penalty.18
Chu submitted the affidavits of his
witnesses,19 and presented the draft
decision that Atty. Guico had represented
to him as having come from the NLRC.
Chu credibly insisted that the draft

decision was printed on the dorsal portion

of used paper emanating from Atty.
Guicos office,20 inferring that Atty. Guico
commonly printed documents on used
paper in his law office. Despite denying
being the source of the draft decision
presented by Chu, Atty. Guicos
participation in the generation of the draft
decision was undeniable. For one, Atty.
Guico impliedly admitted Chus insistence
by conceding that the used paper had
originated from his office, claiming only
that used paper was just "scattered around
his office."21 In that context, Atty. Guicos
attempt to downplay the sourcing of used
paper from his office was futile because he
did not expressly belie the forthright
statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico
stated by way of deflecting the imputation
was that the used paper containing the
draft decision could have been easily taken
from his office by Chus witnesses in a
criminal case that he had handled for
Chu,22 pointing out that everything in his
office, except the filing cabinets and his
desk, was "open to the public xxx and just
anybody has access to everything found
therein."23 In our view, therefore, Atty.
Guico made the implied admission
because he was fully aware that the used
paper had unquestionably come from his
office.
The testimony of Chu, and the
circumstances narrated by Chu and his
witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico
of presenting to Chu the supposed draft
decision that had been printed on used
paper emanating from Atty. Guicos office,
sufficed to confirm that he had committed
the imputed gross misconduct by
demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu to obtain a favorable decision.
Atty. Guico offered only his general denial
of the allegations in his defense, but such
denial did not overcome the affirmative
testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude
that the production of the draft decision by
Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu
to raise money to ensure the chances of
obtaining the favorable result in the labor
case. As such, Chu discharged his burden
of proof as the complainant to establish his
complaint against Atty. Guico. In this
administrative case, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.24
What is the condign penalty for Atty.
Guico?

In taking the Lawyers Oath, Atty. Guico

bound himself to:
x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; x x x support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; x
x x delay no man for money or malice x x
x. The Code of Professional Responsibility
echoes the Lawyers Oath, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.1wphi1
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
The sworn obligation to respect the law
and the legal processes under the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a continuing condition
for every lawyer to retain membership in
the Legal Profession. To discharge the
obligation, every lawyer should not render
any service or give advice to any client
that would involve defiance of the very
laws that he was bound to uphold and
obey,25 for he or she was always bound as
an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the
Legal Profession.26Verily, he or she must
act and comport himself or herself in such
a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Legal
Profession.27 Any lawyer found to violate
this obligation forfeits his or her privilege
to continue such membership in the legal
profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly
violated the law in appearing to counsel
Chu to raise the large sums of money in
order to obtain a favorable decision in the
labor case. He thus violated the law against
bribery and corruption. He compounded
his violation by actually using said
illegality as his means of obtaining a huge
sum from the client that he soon
appropriated for his own personal interest.
His acts constituted gross dishonesty and
deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his
ethical commitments under the Lawyers
Oath not to delay any man for money or
malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that forbade
him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant

conduct eroded the faith of the people in
him as an individual lawyer as well as in
the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing
so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct
and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave
misconduct is "improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful
in character, and implies a wrongful intent
and not mere error of judgment."28 There
is no question that any gross misconduct
by an attorney in his professional or
private capacity renders him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a
ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment, because good
moral
character
is
an
essential
qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such
privilege.29
Accordingly, the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to suspend him
from the practice of law for three (3) years
would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he
should be disbarred,30 for he exhibited his
unworthiness of retaining his membership
in the legal profession. As the Court has
reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:31
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this
country should remain faithful to the
Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as
members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up ones
misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an
unworthiness to continue enjoying the
privilege to practice law and highlights the
unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be
ordered
to
return
the
amount
ofP580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That
amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from
Chu in the guise of serving the latters
interest as the client. Although the purpose
for the amount was unlawful, it would be
unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully
account for and to return the money to
Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding
is administrative in character, for, as the
Court has pointed out in Bayonla v.
Reyes:32

Although the Court renders this decision in

an administrative proceeding primarily to
exact the ethical responsibility on a
member of the Philippine Bar, the Courts
silence about the respondent lawyers legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will
be both unfair and inequitable. No victim
of gross ethical misconduct concerning the
clients funds or property should be
required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the
respondents liability. x x x
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and
DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S.
GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of
the Lawyers Oath, and Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and DISBARS him from
membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. His name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Guicos personal record
as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to all courts and quasijudicial offices in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

According to the complainant, unknown to

him at that time was that, a month earlier
or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had
already demanded and received a total of
Eight
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora
Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De
Taza proffered to him, which was to
expedite the proceedings of their case
before the Court. Handwritten receipts4
signed by one Atty. Norlita De Taza were
submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received P300,000 shall
be used to expedite the case which, in turn
shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2
mos. from receipt of said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be
returned, if the same should not be
included in the Decision, the 300,000.00
shall be returned.
Signed

30. A.C. No. 7676

expedite the proceedings before the Court.

This amount was over and above the
parties stipulated retainer fee as evidenced
by a contract.3

June 10, 2014

AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This
concerns
an
administrative
complaint1 for disbarment against Atty.
Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the
latter's demand for and receipt of
exorbitant sums of money from her client
purportedly to expedite the proceedings of
their case which was pending before the
Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that
sometime in February 2005, he, along with
his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to
represent them in the case of Eliza T.
Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses
Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No.
174552.2 The complainant claimed that
sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza
demanded the sum of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) from him to

Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007

Receipt
The amount of P500,000 has been
advanced as part of expense [sic] to
expedite the process before the courts. The
said amount has been advanced by Ms.
Aurora Dizon and the same should be
reimbursed to her by her siblings upon
winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant
went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila
and learned that the Court had already
denied the petition on November 20, 2006,
contrary to Atty. De Tazas representations
that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she
could no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the
complainant instituted a complaint for
disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents9
from other individuals who attested that
Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks
and/or failed to pay off her debts to them.

A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an

affidavit10which was attached to the
complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza
issued 11 checks11 in her favor amounting
toP481,400.00, which were all dishonored
by the bank. Demand letters sent to her
went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of
Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was
attached to the complaint, averred that
Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for
P50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said
check was dishonored by the bank for
being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento
submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty.
De Taza owes herP29,560.39 and failed to
pay the said amount despite repeated
demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant
through a letter15 informed the Court that
Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the
country as she was joining her husband in
the United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10,
2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the
Court to file a Comment. However, the
copy of the Resolution was returned
unserved with the postal carriers notation
"RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The
Court then resolved by virtue of the
Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a
copy to Atty. De Tazas office address at
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates.
Said copy was also returned unserved with
the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18
dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant
inform the Court of Atty. De Tazas new
address, which the complainant faithfully
complied with by giving Atty. De Tazas
new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009,
directed the Clerk of Court to resend a
copy of the Resolution dated December
10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to
Atty. De Taza using the latters U.S.A.
address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of
the Resolution dated December 10, 2007
with the complaint was returned; this time,
with the postal carriers notation "RTSUnclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20
dated September 9, 2009, held that the said
copy of the Resolution was deemed served
and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as
having waived the filing of her comment.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was

sent to the parties, in which they failed to
appear. Thus, the parties were directed to
file their respective position papers. The
complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the
IBP, averred that he was already residing
abroad and maintained that he had already
submitted his documentary evidence at the
time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De
Taza, for her part, did not file any position
paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23
dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty.
De Taza be suspended for a period of two
years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the
Commission
on
Bar
Disciplines
recommendation in a Resolution24dated
January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondents
demand of [P]800,000.00 to expedite the
case pending in the Supreme Court when,
in fact, the case had long been dismissed,
Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD
BE
HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR ISSUING BOUNCING
CHECKS,
DEMANDING
AND/OR
RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER
CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF
HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty.
De Taza was not able to refute the
accusations against her. Numerous
attempts were made to afford her an
opportunity to defend herself from the
complainants allegations, but all these
efforts were only met with silence.
Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade
her creditors, only she would certainly
know. But as far as the Court is concerned,
all means were exhausted to give Atty. De
Taza an avenue to oppose the
complainants charges. Her failure and/or
refusal to file a comment will not be a

hindrance for the Court to mete out an

appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that
disciplinary proceedings are investigations
by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer
is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool,
Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the
Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary
Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v.
Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, [they
are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted
with
the
duties
and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required."29 Based on the
documentary evidence submitted by the
complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza
manifested a propensity for borrowing
money, issuing bouncing checks and
incurring debts which she left unpaid
without any reason. The complainant even
submitted a document evidencing Atty. De
Tazas involvement in an estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22
case filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J2815-36) for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaintaffidavits executed by her other creditors.
Such conduct, while already off-putting
when attributed to an ordinary person, is
much more abhorrent when the same is
exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a

lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that

she is not only a symbol but also an
instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks
which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on her. It shows a
lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series
of worthless checks also shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent,
unmindful to the deleterious effects of
such act to the public interest and public
order.1wphi1 It also manifests a lawyers
low regard to her commitment to the oath
she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession she should hold in
high esteem."30
Atty. De Tazas actuations towards the
complainant and his siblings were even
worse as she had the gall to make it appear
to the complainant that the proceedings
before the Court can be expedited and
ruled in their favor in exchange for an
exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme
was employed by Atty. De Taza just to
milk more money from her clients.
Without a doubt, Atty. De Tazas actions
are reprehensible and her greed more than
apparent when she even used the name of
the Court to defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer
is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent
for that particular purpose. And if he does
not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client.31 In this
case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza
demanded money is baseless and nonexistent. Thus, her demand should not
have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the
following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3)
gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty.
Erlinda
Espejo33
suspended
the
respondent from the practice of law for

two years when the latter issued checks

which
were
dishonored
due
to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same
penalty was meted out by this Court to the
erring lawyer who issued worthless checks
to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35
the Court held that suspension from the
practice of law for four years was the
appropriate sanction for a lawyer who
defrauded his client into paying
P42,000.00 to him for the purported filing
of a petition for annulment of marriage.
The respondent therein presented to his
client a copy of the petition with stamped
receipt from the trial court when in reality,
no such petition was filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the
respondent therein demanded P14,000.00
from the complainant to be put up as
injunction bond and asked for additional
sums of money on other occasions,
supposedly to pay the judge who was
handling the case. When the complainant
verified this with the judge, the judge
denied the respondents allegations. The
complainant later learned that the bond
was also unnecessary, as the application
for a writ was already denied by the trial
court. Due to the foregoing, the Court
suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the
privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are
vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach."37 "The Judiciary has
been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member
of the legal profession to further stoke the
embers of mistrust on the judicial system
with such irresponsible representations is
reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no
reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty.
De Taza from the practice of law for two
years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita
De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for TWO YEARS with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the

same or similar infraction would be dealt

with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in Atty.
Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
27: [A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014 ]
FLORENCIO
A.
SALADAGA,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARTURO
B. ASTORGA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Membership in the legal profession is a
high personal privilege burdened with
conditions,[1] including continuing fidelity
to the law and constant possession of
moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of
the law, play a vital role in the preservation
of society, and a consequent obligation of
lawyers is to maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct.[2] Failure to
live by the standards of the legal
profession and to discharge the burden of
the privilege conferred on one as a
member of the bar warrant the suspension
or revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and
respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered
into a Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase on December 2, 1981 where
respondent sold (with right of repurchase)
to complainant a parcel of coconut land
located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under
the said deed, respondent represented that
he has the perfect right to dispose as
owner in fee simple the subject property
and that the said property is free from all
liens and encumbrances.[3] The deed
also provided that respondent, as vendor a
retro, had two years within which to
repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased within the said period, the
parties
shall
renew
[the]
instrument/agreement.[4]
Respondent failed to exercise his right of
repurchase within the period provided in
the deed, and no renewal of the contract
was made even after complainant sent
respondent a final demand dated May 10,
1984 for the latter to repurchase the
property.
Complainant remained in

peaceful possession of the property until

December 1989 when he received letters
from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte),
Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the
property was mortgaged by respondent to
RBAI, that the bank had subsequently
foreclosed on the property, and that
complainant should therefore vacate the
property.[5]
Complainant was alarmed and made an
investigation. He learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled
by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early
as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure
proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT
No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and
his wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a
deed of sale dated March 27, 1979
between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject
property to RBAI on March 14, 1984,
RBAI foreclosed on the property, and
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635
on March 27, 1991.[6]
Complainant
was
subsequently
dispossessed of the property by RBAI.[7]

Aggrieved, complainant instituted a

criminal complaint for estafa against
respondent with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed
as I.S. No. 95-144.
The Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte approved the
Resolution[8] dated April 21, 1995 in I.S.
No. 95-144 finding that [t]he facts of
[the] case are sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief that Estafa x x x has been
committed and that respondent herein is
probably guilty thereof.[9] Accordingly,
an Information[10] dated January 8, 1996
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally
charging respondent with the crime of
estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and
2 of the Revised Penal Code,[11]
committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing
himself as the owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay
Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural
Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
knowing fully well that the possessor and
owner at that time was private complainant
Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de
Retro Sale which accused executed in

favor of private complainant on 2nd

December,
1981,
without
first
redeeming/repurchasing
the
same.
[P]rivate
complainant
knowing
of
accused[s] unlawful act only on or about
the last week of February, 1991 when the
rural bank dispossessed him of the
property, the mortgage having been
foreclosed, private complainant thereby
suffered damages and was prejudiced by
accused[s] unlawful transaction and
misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against
respondent was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant
administrative cases against respondent by
filing before this Court an AffidavitComplaint[12] dated January 28, 1997 and
Supplemental
Complaint[13]
dated
February 27, 1997, which were docketed
as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728,
respectively.
In both complaints,
complainant sought the disbarment of
respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.[14]
In his Consolidated Answer[15] dated
August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP,
respondent denied that his agreement with
complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He
claimed that it was an equitable mortgage
and that, if only complainant rendered an
accounting of his benefits from the
produce of the land, the total amount
would have exceeded P15,000.00.
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating
Commissioner
and
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
In a Report and Recommendation[16]
dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBPs Commission
on Bar Discipline found that respondent
was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase but later
on claimed that the agreement was one of
equitable mortgage. Respondent was also
guilty of deceit or fraud when he
represented in the Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase dated December 2,
1981 that the property was covered by
TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant
the owners copy of the said certificate of
title, when the said TCT had already been
cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT
No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Respondent made

matters even worse, when he had TCT No.

T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT
No. T-7235 under his and his wifes name
on January 4, 1982 without informing
complainant. This was compounded by
respondents subsequent mortgage of the
property to RBAI, which led to the
acquisition of the property by RBAI and
the dispossession thereof of complainant.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be (1)
suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with warning that a similar misdeed
in the future shall be dealt with more
severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum
of P15,000.00, the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retro sale,
with interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondents commission of
unlawful acts, especially crimes involving
moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty, grossly
immoral conduct and deceit, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioners Report
and Recommendation with modification as
follows: respondent is (1) suspended from
the practice of law for two years, with
warning that a similar misdeed in the
future shall be dealt with more severity,
and (2) ordered to return the sum of
P15,000.00 received in consideration of
thepacto de retro sale, with legal interest.
[17]

The Courts Ruling

The
Court
agrees
with
the
recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years, but it
refrains from ordering respondent to return
the P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase
dated December 2, 1981 in favor of
complainant. However, respondent insists
that the deed is not one of sale with pacto
de retro, but one of equitable mortgage.
Thus, respondent argues that he still had
the legal right to mortgage the subject
property to other persons. Respondent
additionally asserts that complainant
should render an accounting of the produce
the latter had collected from the said
property, which would already exceed the
P15,000.00 consideration stated in the
deed.
There is no merit in respondents defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract
between respondent and complainant is

actually one of sale withpacto de retro or

of equitable mortgage, respondents
actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present
administrative cases, clearly show a
disregard for the highest standards of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held
administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal
profession, he took an oath where he
undertook to obey the laws, do no
falsehood, and conduct [him]self as a
lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion.[18]
He
gravely violated his oath.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly

found, and the IBP Board of Governors
rightly agreed, that respondent caused the
ambiguity or vagueness in the Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase as he was
the one who prepared or drafted the said
instrument. Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of
mortgage and referred to himself and
complainant
as
mortgagor
and
mortgagee, respectively, rather than as
vendor a retro and vendee a retro. If
only respondent had been more
circumspect and careful in the drafting and
preparation of the deed, then the
controversy between him and complainant
could have been avoided or, at the very
least, easily resolved. His imprecise and
misleading wording of the said deed on its
face betrayed lack of legal competence on
his part. He thereby fell short of his oath
to conduct [him]self as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion.
More
significantly,
respondent
transgressed the laws and the fundamental
tenet of human relations as embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had
the right to mortgage it to complainant but,
as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that
his agreement with complainant is
embodied in an instrument that clearly
expresses the intent of the contracting
parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract
must see to it that the agreement faithfully
and clearly reflects the intention of the
contracting parties.
Otherwise, the

respective rights and obligations of the

contracting parties will be uncertain, which
opens the door to legal disputes between
the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty
caused by respondents poor formulation
of the Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase was a significant factor in the
legal controversy between respondent and
complainant.
Such poor formulation
reflects at the very least negatively on the
legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration
Act,[19] the law in effect at the time the
PNB acquired the subject property and
obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in
1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged
property in foreclosure proceedings
becomes final, such purchaser becomes
entitled to the issuance of a new certificate
of title in his name and a memorandum
thereof shall be indorsed upon the
mortgagors original certificate.[20] TCT
No. T-662, which respondent gave
complainant when they entered into the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase
dated December 2, 1981, does not bear
such
memorandum
but
only
a
memorandum on the mortgage of the
property to PNB in 1963 and the
subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with
bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he
entered into the Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase dated December 2, 1981
with the latter. He made it appear that the
property was covered by TCT No. T-662
under his name, even giving complainant
the owners copy of the said certificate of
title, when the truth is that the said TCT
had already been cancelled some nine
years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to
correct the wrong statement in the deed
when he was subsequently issued a new
copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4,
1982,[21] or barely a month after the
execution of the said deed. All told,
respondent clearly committed an act of
gross dishonesty and deceit against
complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for lw and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only

mandated to personally obey the laws and
the legal processes, he is moreover
expected to inspire respect and obedience
thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01
states the norm of conduct that is expected
of all lawyers.[22]
Any act or omission that is contrary to,
prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance
of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is
unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad
enough to include such element.[23]
To be dishonest means the disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
untrustworthy; lacking in integrity,
honesty, probity, integrity in principle,
fairness and straightforwardness. On the
other hand, conduct that is deceitful
means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or
device that is used upon another who is
ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon. In
order to be deceitful, the person must
either have knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless and conscious ignorance
thereof, especially if the parties are not on
equal terms, and was done with the intent
that the aggrieved party act thereon, and
the latter indeed acted in reliance of the
false statement or deed in the manner
contemplated to his injury.[24]
The actions of respondent in connection
with the execution of the Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase clearly fall
within the concept of unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct. They violate Article
19 of the Civil Code. They show a
disregard for Section 63 of the Land
Registration Act. They also reflect bad
faith, dishonesty, and deceit on
respondents part.
Thus, respondent
deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondents breach of his oath, violation
of the laws, lack of good faith, and
dishonesty are compounded by his gross
disregard of this Courts directives, as well
as the orders of the IBPs Investigating
Commissioner (who was acting as an agent
of this Court pursuant to the Courts
referral of these cases to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation),
which caused delay in the resolution of
these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required
respondent to comment on complainants
Affidavit-Complaint in A.C. No. 4697 and

Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728

on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively.[25] While he requested for
several extensions of time within which to
submit his comment, no such comment
was submitted prompting the Court to
require him in a Resolution dated February
4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, and (2) submit
the
consolidated
comment.[26]
Respondent neither showed cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for such failure, nor
submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP
and during the proceedings before the
IBPs
Investigating
Commissioner,
respondent was again required several
times to submit his consolidated answer.
He only complied on August 28, 2003, or
more than six years after this Court
originally required him to do so. The
Investigating Commissioner also directed
the parties to submit their respective
position papers. Despite having been
given several opportunities to submit the
same, respondent did not file any position
paper.[27]
Respondents disregard of the directives of
this Court and of the Investigating
Commissioner, which caused undue delay
in these administrative cases, contravenes
the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
xxxx
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
Respondents infractions are aggravated by
the fact that he has already been imposed a
disciplinary sanction before. In Nuez v.

Atty. Astorga,[28] respondent was held

liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney
for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for
two years, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, is proper.
The Court, however, will not adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to order
respondent to return the sum of P15,000.00
he received from complainant under the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase.
This is a civil liability best determined and
awarded in a civil case rather than the
present administrative cases.

In Roa v. Moreno,[29] the Court

pronounced that [i]n disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue
is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar.
Our only concern is the
determination
of
respondents
administrative liability. Our findings have
no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may choose to file
against each other. While the respondent
lawyers wrongful actuations may give rise
at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be
determined in the appropriate case; and
every case must be resolved in accordance
with the facts and the law applicable and
the quantum of proof required in each.
Section 5,[30] in relation to Sections 1[31]
and 2,[32]Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
states that in administrative cases, such as
the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is
required, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[33]
The Court notes that based on the same
factual antecedents as the present
administrative
cases,
complainant
instituted a criminal case for estafa against
respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC.
When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.[34] Unless the
complainant waived the civil action,

reserved the right to institute it separately,

or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, then his civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the
estafa committed by respondent is deemed
instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
The civil liability that complainant may
recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A
includes restitution; reparation of the
damage
caused
him;
and/or
indemnification
for
consequential
damages,[35] which may already cover the
P15,000.00 consideration complainant had
paid for the subject property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby
found GUILTY of the following: breach of
the Lawyers Oath; unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for
the Court and causing undue delay of these
cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, reckoned from receipt of this
Decision, with WARNING that a similar
misconduct in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this
Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
28: [A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 ]
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L.
OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY
ANGELYN
OROLA-BELARGA,
MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP,
AND
KAREN
OROLA,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. JOSEPH
ADOR RAMOS, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Courts resolution is a disbarment
complaint[1] filed against respondent Atty.
Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule
15.03) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel,
(all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn
Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and
Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are
the children of the late Trinidad LasernaOrola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q.
Orola (Emilio).[2]

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola

(Karen) is the daughter of Maricar AlbaOrola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola
(Antonio), the deceased brother of the
above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio.[3]
In the settlement of Trinidads estate,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and
docketed as Special Proceeding No. V3639, the parties were represented by the
following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty.
Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of
Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn,
and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty.
Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as
counsel for and in behalf of Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs[4] of the late
Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with
respondent as collaborating counsel; and
(c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for
and in behalf of Emilio, the initially
appointed administrator of Trinidads
estate. In the course of the proceedings, the
Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
moved for the removal of Emilio as
administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latters son, Manuel
Orola, which the RTC granted in an
Order[5] dated September 20, 2007 (RTC
Order). Subsequently, or on October 10,
2007, respondent filed an Entry of
Appearance as collaborating counsel for
Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.[6]
Due to the respondents new engagement,
complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), claiming that he
violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he
undertook to represent conflicting interests
in the subject case;[7] and (b) Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he
breached the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio.[8] Complainants further claimed
that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of
Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the
withdrawal
of
respondents appearance, the same was
obtained only on October 18, 2007, or
after he had already entered his appearance
for Emilio on October 10, 2007.[9] In this
accord, respondent failed to disclose such
fact to all the affected heirs and, as such,
was not able to obtain their written consent
as required under the Rules.[10]
For his part, respondent refuted the
abovementioned charges, contending that
he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs
of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He
pointed out that the records of the case

readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad

were represented by Atty. Villa, while the
Heirs of Antonio were exclusively
represented by Atty. Azarraga.[11] He
averred that he only accommodated
Maricar's request to temporarily appear on
her behalf as their counsel of record could
not attend the scheduled June 16 and July
14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances
thereat were free of charge.[12] In fact, he
obtained Maricars permission for him to
withdraw from the case as no further
communications transpired after these two
hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar
before he undertook to represent Emilio in
the same case.[13] He added that he had
no knowledge of the fact that the late
Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein,
asserted that no information was disclosed
to him by Maricar or their counsel of
record at any instance.[14] Finally, he
clarified that his representation for Emilio
in the subject case was more of a mediator,
rather than a litigator,[15] and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties,
he formally withdrew his appearance on
December 6, 2007.[16]In support of his
assertions, respondent submitted the
affidavits of Maricar[17] and Atty.
Azarraga[18] relative to his limited
appearance and his consultation with
Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel
for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IB
In the Report and Recommendation[19]
dated September 15, 2008 submitted by
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De
La
Rama,
Jr.
(Investigating
Commissioner), respondent was found
guilty of representing conflicting interests
only with respect to Karen as the records
of the case show that he never acted as
counsel for the other complainants. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that
while
respondent's
withdrawal
of
appearance was with the express
conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of
Karen, who was already of age and one of
the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under
Rule 15.03 of the Code.[20]
On the other hand, the Investigating
Commissioner held that there was no
violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the
Rules as complainants themselves
admitted that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from his former
client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his
previous employment.[21] Considering
that it was respondent's first offense, the
Investigating Commissioner found the

imposition of disbarment too harsh a

penalty and, instead, recommended that he
be severely reprimanded for his act with
warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.[22]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved
with
modification
the
aforementioned report in its Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-641[23] dated December
11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008641), finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules but imposed
against respondent the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of
law.

Respondent's
motion
for
reconsideration[24] was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XX-2013-17[25] dated
January 3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or
not respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBPs finding
that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the
Code, but reduced the recommended
period of suspension to three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND
TRANSACTIONSWITH
HIS
CIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that
a lawyer is prohibited from representing
new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste.[26] It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and doubledealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their

lawyers, which is of paramount importance

in the administration of justice.[27] In
Hornilla v. Salunat[28] (Hornilla), the
Court explained the concept of conflict of
interest, to wit:

reinstatement as administrator in the same

case, he clearly worked against the very
interest of the Heirs of Antonio
particularly, Karen in violation of the
above-stated rule.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer

represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is
whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client.
This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in
his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance
thereof.[29]
(Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Respondent's
justification
that
no
confidential information was relayed to
him cannot fully exculpate him for the
charges against him since the rule on
conflict of interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition
from representation with respect to
opposing parties in the same case. In other
words, a lawyer cannot change his
representation from one party to the
latters opponent in the same case. That
respondents previous appearances for and
in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only
a friendly accommodation cannot equally
be given any credence since the aforesaid
rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.
[31]

It must, however, be noted that a lawyers

immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond
the lawyers employment with the client.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.[30]
Applying the above-stated principles, the
Court agrees with the IBPs finding that
respondent
represented
conflicting
interests and, perforce, must be held
administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the
collaborating counsel not only for Maricar
as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of
Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of
Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
succeeded in removing Emilio as
administrator for having committed acts
prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when
respondent proceeded to represent Emilio
for the purpose of seeking his

of any explanation showing the bases of

the IBP Board of Governors modification;
as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule
139-B of the Rules which specifically
mandates that [t]he decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based.[34]
Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty
without any ample justification therefor.
To this end, the Court is wont to remind
the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce
in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the
requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the
facts and the reasons on which the same is
based is akin to what is required of courts
in promulgating their decisions. The
reasons for handing down a penalty
occupy no lesser station than any other
portion of the ratio.[35]

Neither can respondent's asseveration that

his engagement by Emilio was more of a
mediator than a litigator and for the
purpose of forging a settlement among the
family members render the rule
inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion,
his conduct is likewise improper since
Rule 15.04,[32] Canon 15 of the Code
similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the
written consent of all concerned before he
may act as mediator, conciliator or
arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably,
respondent failed in this respect as the
records show that respondent was remiss
in his duty to make a full disclosure of his
impending engagement as Emilios
counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio
particularly, Karen and equally secure
their express written consent before
consummating the same. Besides, it must
be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as
such in settling a dispute cannot represent
any of the parties to it.[33] Accordingly,
for respondents violation of the
aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is
warranted.

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the

penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months to be
more appropriate taking into consideration
the following factors: first, respondent is a
first time offender; second, it is undisputed
that respondent merely accommodated
Maricars request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the
June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to
her lawyers unavailability; third, it is
likewise undisputed that respondent had no
knowledge that the late Antonio had any
other heirs aside from Maricar whose
consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly
after his first appearance as counsel for
and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be
said that he acted in good faith; and fourth,
complainants admit that respondent did not
acquire confidential information from the
Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
them any knowledge obtained in the
course of his previous employment, hence,
the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement
with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v.
Lokin, Jr.,[36] the Court similarly imposed
the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three months to the
counsel therein who represented parties
whose interests are hostile to his other
clients in another case.

In this case, the penalty recommended by

the Investigating Commissioner was
increased from severe reprimand to a
suspension of six (6) months by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court
observes that the said resolution is bereft

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph

Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of
representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of

three (3) months, with WARNING that a

repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
31:[ A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014 ]
CAROLINE CASTAEDA JIMENEZ,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDGAR B.
FRANCISCO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January 3,
2013[1] and March 22, 2014,[2] adopting
and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
which found Atty. Edgar B. Francisco
(Atty. Francisco) administratively liable
for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended the penalty of suspension of
one (1) year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received
a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,[3] filed
by
Caroline
Castaeda
Jimenez
(complainant) against Atty. Francisco for
multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his
Answer.[4] On June 26, 2009, the
mandatory conference was held and
terminated. Only the counsel for Atty.
Francisco appeared. The notice of the said
conference addressed to complainant was
returned with the notation unknown at the
given address. No new address was
provided by the complainant. Both parties
were required to submit their respective
position papers. For this purpose, Atty.
Francisco adopted his Answer.
The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark
Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for
estafa against complainant, her sister
Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo,
Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron,
Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.
[5] The said complaint was docketed as IS
No. 074314 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged
that he was the true and beneficial owner
of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which
was incorporated specifically for the
purpose of purchasing a residential house
located in Forbes Park, Makati City
(Forbes property). The incorporators and

original stockholders of Clarion were as

follows:
Thomas K. Chua

P500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua

P500,000.00

Myla Villanueva

P249,998.00

Edgar B. Francisco -

P1.00

Soledad Gamat

P1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of

Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the
above-named stockholders, except for
Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed
of assignment of their respective shares in
favor of complainant, who was then
Jimenezs common-law partner. Clarions
total
capitalization
was
only
P5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve
its purpose of purchasing the Forbes
property, Clarion simulated a loan from the
complainant
in
the
amount
of
P80,750,000.00.
Thereafter,
Clarion
purchased the Forbes property in the
amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo
Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed
a check in the said amount which was
funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale,
however, was undervalued. In the deed of
sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes
property
was
purchased
for
P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money
used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and
Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in
Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of
trust. On the other hand, Mylas 249,997
shares were transferred to complainant
based on a deed of assignment. The
remaining one (1) share was transferred to
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These
transactions appeared in Clarions General
Information Sheet (GIS) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed shares
of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez

P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez

P 749,997.00

Ma. Carolina C. Crespo

1.00

Edgar B. Francisco -

P 1.00

Soledad Gamat

P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred

all his shares to complainant by another
deed of assignment, making her the holder
of Clarion shares amounting to
P1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenezs complaint, while

he was in prison in the United States in
2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco that
his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel),
approached
the
complainant
and
threatened her, claiming that the United
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
about to go after their properties. Marcel
succeeded in persuading complainant to
transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to
Geraldine Antonio, through another deed
of assignment. Again, this was reflected in
Clarions GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty.
Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the
estafa case, put the Forbes property for
sale sometime in August 2004. The said
property was eventually sold to Philmetro
Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro) for
the amount of P118,000,000.00 without
Jimenezs knowledge. This sale was again
undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the
deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to
Jimenez that he was the one who received
the payment for the sale of the Forbes
property and that he handed all the
proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano
in the presence of complainant.

Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based

on complainants alleged participation in
the fraudulent means in selling the Forbes
property which was acquired by Clarion
with Jimenezs money. Complainant was
duty-bound to remit all the proceeds of the
sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial
owner. Complainant and her corespondents, however, misappropriated
and converted the funds for their personal
use and benefit.
In support of Jimenezs complaint for
estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an
affidavit reiterating its factual averments.
[6] A perusal of this affidavit likewise
would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Francisco:
1.
Sometime in August 2004,
complainant called him, asking for
assistance in the documentation of the sale
of the Forbes property owned by Clarion.
Atty. Francisco asked her if she had
secured permission from Mark Jimenez
and complainant answered in the
affirmative.
2.
The Board of Directors of
Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him
to negotiate the sale of the property.

3.
For purposes of the sale, he
opened an account with Security Bank,
San Francisco Del Monte branch. When
the cash payment was deposited, he
withdrew the amount and handed the same
to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence
of complainant.
4.
All transfers of shares were
caused without any consideration. The
transfer taxes, however, were paid.
5.
When Mark Jimenez returned to
the Philippines, he was able to confirm that
the sale of the Forbes property was without
his knowledge and approval. The proceeds
of the sale had already been farmed out to
different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6.
The frequent changes in
stockholdings were premeditated in order
to steal the money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading
the allegations in the complaint for estafa
filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even
more betrayed when she read the affidavit
of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as
her personal lawyer and Clarions
corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion.
This prompted her to file a disciplinary
case against Atty. Francisco for
representing
conflicting
interests.
According to her, she usually conferred
with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal
implications of Clarions transactions.
More
significantly,
the
principal
documents relative to the sale and transfer
of Clarions property were all prepared and
drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members
of his law office.[7] Atty. Francisco was
the one who actively participated in the
transactions involving the sale of the
Forbes property. Without admitting the
truth of the allegations in his affidavit,
complainant argued that its execution
clearly betrayed the trust and confidence
she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this
reason, complainant prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondents Position

In his Answer,[8] Atty. Francisco replied

that Jimenez initially engaged his services
in 1998 for the incorporation of Clarion for
the purpose of purchasing a residential
house in Forbes Park, where he intended to
live with his long-time partner, the
complainant;
that
the
original
incorporators and stockholders of Clarion

held their respective shares in trust for

Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in
the ownership of Clarion shareholdings
were also pursuant to Jimenezs orders;
and that as the corporate secretary and
legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all
the legal documentation to give effect to
the said transfers and, ultimately, to the
purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that
sometime in 2004, Jimenez was
imprisoned in the United States for
excessive contributions to the Democratic
Party; that during this time, Jimenezs son,
Marcel, and the complainant, asked him
again to change the ownership of Clarion
shares in order to avoid the attachment of
Jimenezs properties in a tax evasion case;
that he acceded to the request on the belief
that this was in accordance with Jimenezs
wishes; and that as a result, almost 100%
of Clarions ownership was transferred in
the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that,
thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk
to prospective buyers and to negotiate the
sale of the Forbes property until it was sold
for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and
complainant led him to believe that
Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they
were in constant communication with him;
that all these representations, however,
turned out to be false when Jimenez
returned to the Philippines and discovered
that the proceeds of the sale were coursed
through other corporations set up by
complainant and her sister; that Jimenez
likewise learned of the successive sale of
his other properties, including Meridian
Telekoms Inc., by the members of his
family; and that this led to the filing of the
estafa case against the complainant and the
others. As a witness to the fraud committed
against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed
the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said
transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he
violated neither the rule on disclosures of
privileged communication nor the
proscription
against
representing
conflicting interests, on the ground that
complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of
Clarion, but never of the complainant. He
might have assisted her in some matters,
but these were all under the notion that
Jimenez had given him authority to do so.
Further, though he acted as legal counsel
for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed,
as a corporation has a separate and distinct

personality from its shareholders. While he

admitted that the legal documentation for
the transfer of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property were prepared by him and
notarized by the members of his law firm,
he averred that these acts were performed
in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a
lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he
served no conflicting interests because it
was not a former client and a
subsequent client who were the
opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant
was indeed his client, the rule on
privileged communication does not apply
to his case. Here, complainant failed to
allege, much less prove, the requisites for
the application of the privilege. When Atty.
Francisco denied being her lawyer, the
complainant should have established, by
clear and convincing evidence, that a
lawyer-client relationship indeed existed
between them. Complainant failed to do
this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit
in the estafa case was but a truthful
narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Caete,[9]
where the Court ruled that the fact that
one of the witnesses for the defendant had
been formerly the lawyer for the defendant
in this suit was no ground for rejecting his
testimony. In this case, he merely attested
to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in
the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was
likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful
and illegal motives and purposes were not
covered by the privilege. It was just
unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of
complainant.
The Findings
Commissioner

of

the

Investigating

In the Commissioners Report,[10] dated

November 7, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner), found Atty.
Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR
and recommended that he be suspended for
one (1) year from the practice of law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner
noted that the subsequent affidavit of
desistance executed by Jimenez in the
estafa case did not affect the investigation
conducted by the CBD as it was not an
ordinary
court
which
accepted
compromises or withdrawals of cases.
After weighing on the claims of the
parties, the Investigating Commissioner

concluded that nothing in the records

would show that a lawyer-client
relationship
existed
between Atty.
Francisco
and
Jimenez.[11]
The
circumstances would show that Atty.
Francisco was an original incorporator and
shareholder of Clarion. He was also the
legal counsel and corporate secretary of
the said corporation, the articles of
incorporation of which did not include
Jimenez as an original incorporator. He
became a stockholder only in 2001, when
Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas
Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs
participation in Clarion affairs again
stopped when he assigned the entirety of
his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100%
of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco,
the report stated that it would appear that
the latter permitted misrepresentations as
to Clarions ownership to be reported to
the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating
Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Franciscos clear admission that the
transfer of shares within Clarion were
without any consideration, ran counter to
the deeds of assignment that he again
admittedly executed as corporate counsel.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have
simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the
Forbes property, which displayed his
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1
of the CPR. Further, when he executed the
affidavit containing allegations against the
interest of Clarion and complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty.
Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that
constituted representation of conflicting
interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21
of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,[12] the
IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto,
the findings and recommendation of the
CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said
resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved
for its reconsideration.[13]
Atty. Francisco appealed to the
compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning
out that the penalty of suspension of one
(1) year is too severe considering that in
his more than three decades of practice, he
had never been involved in any act that
would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary action upon him. It was only
in 2007, when his client, Jimenez,
experienced a difficult crisis involving his

children and common-law partner that he

experienced a major upheaval in his
professional life. He apologized for his not
being too circumspect in dealing with the
relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty.
Francisco reiterated that his participation
in the execution of the documents
pertaining to the sale of the Forbes
property were all connected to his capacity
as Clarions corporate secretary and legal
counsel, not to mention his ties with his
client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted
that he owed fidelity to Clarion and
Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended
to the incorporators and shareholders of
Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought
advice in her capacity as a shareholder in
Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his
part. In his own words, Atty. Francisco
insisted that Carol is not Clarion and vice
versa.[14]
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for
reconsideration was an affidavit executed
by Jimenez, stating that he had retained the
legal services of Atty. Francisco since
1999. Espousing Atty. Franciscos
defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty.
Franciscos law firm was in charge of all
the companies he owned in the
Philippines. He directed Atty. Francisco to
execute all the documentation to show his
ownership of these companies, including
Clarion. These documents were in the
possession of complainant for safekeeping.
When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,
Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in
the filing of his certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings before the electoral
tribunals. While he was in prison in the
United States, it was Atty. Francisco who
visited and told him that his children, Myla
and Marcel, were then facilitating the sale
of one of his companies, Meridian
Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He
asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about
his childrens betrayal and to wait until he
could go home. When he filed the criminal
cases against his children and complainant,
the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping
case against Atty. Francisco. According to
Jimenez, the people who committed crimes
against him were now exhausting all
possible means to keep Atty. Francisco
silent and to prevent the latter from
performing his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,[15] the
IBP-BOG denied the respondents motion
for reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the

Court.
The Courts Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR
and the Lawyers Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of
every lawyer to laws and legal processes.
To the best of his ability, a lawyer is
expected to respect and abide by the law
and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is
contrary thereto. A lawyers personal
deference to the law not only speaks of his
character but it also inspires respect and
obedience to the law, on the part of the
public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states
the norm of conduct to be observed by all
lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or
prohibited or unauthorized by, or in
defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct
does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad
enough to include such element.[16] To be
dishonest means the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be
unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness[17] while conduct that
is deceitful means the proclivity for
fraudulent
and
deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the
true facts, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon.[18]

Membership in the legal profession is

bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach, in order to promote the publics
faith in the legal profession.[19] To say
that lawyers must at all times uphold and
respect the law is to state the obvious, but
such
statement
can
never
be

overemphasized. Considering that, of all

classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law.[20]
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the
Bar, he also took an oath to obey the
laws, do no falsehood, and conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion.[21]
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty.
Francisco clearly violated the canons and
his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate
client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to
the SEC, the significant matters regarding
its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents
submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco,
in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares,
making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said
transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the
alleged
orders
of
Jimenez.
The
Investigating Commissioner was correct in
pointing out that this ran counter to the
deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as
corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume
that
Atty.
Francisco
is
knowledgeable in the law on contracts,
corporation law and the rules enforced by
the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion,
it was his duty and obligation to register
valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he
chose to advance the interests of his
clientele with patent disregard of his duties
as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco
admitted to have simulated the loan
entered into by Clarion and to have
undervalued the consideration of the
effected sale of the Forbes property. He
permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably,
therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a
series of grave legal infractions and was
content to have granted the requests of the
persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in
accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or
pursuant
to
complainants
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a
blind eye on Atty. Franciscos act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting
untruthful statements to be embodied in
public documents. If the Court allows this
highly irregular practice for the specious
reason that lawyers are constrained to obey
their clients flawed scheming and
machinations, the Court would, in effect,

sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This

would undermine the role of lawyers as
officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded
lawyers that their support for the cause of
their clients should never be attained at the
expense of truth and justice. While a
lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause
of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
he must do so only within the bounds of
the law. It needs to be emphasized that the
lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and justice,
and must be held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His
responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a
course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions.[22]
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos
admissions show that he lacks candor
regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the
CPR provides that, [a] lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the
court. Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the
CPR provides that a lawyer shall do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by an artifice. Lawyers
are officers of the court, called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. They
act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule
of law. They are expected to act with
honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the court.[23]
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly
violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in
the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and
deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1)
and to act with candor, fairness and good
faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty.
Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to
do any falsehood nor consent to the doing
of the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged Communication
With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged
representation of conflicting interests and
disclosure of privileged communication,
the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides
that, [a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written

consent of all concerned given after a full

disclosure of the facts.[24] The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This
is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
clients most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with the client.
Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is
to
avoid
representing
conflicting
interests[25] Thus, even if lucrative
fees offered by prospective clients are at
stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger a
violation of the prohibition against conflict
of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,[26] the Court
discussed the application of the rule on
conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to
represent conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is their duty to
contend for that which duty to another
client
requires
them to
oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have
particularized various tests to determine
whether a lawyers conduct lies within this
proscription. One test is whether a lawyer
is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim
in behalf of one client and, at the same
time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test
is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or
previous employment.
The proscription against representation of
conflicting interest applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that

the lawyer would not be called upon to

contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client,
or that there would be no occasion to use
the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one
case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions
of the lawyers respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance
of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the
rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of
the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary
nature of the ties between an attorney and
his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be
precluded from accepting and representing
other clients on the ground of conflict of
interests, if the lawyer-client relationship
does not exist in favor of a party in the first
place.
In determining whether or not Atty.
Francisco violated the rule on conflict of
interests, a scrutiny of the parties
submissions with the IBP reveals that the
complainant failed to establish that she
was a client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainants claim of being Atty.
Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated,
considering its detailed refutation. All that
the complaint alleged was that Atty.
Francisco was Clarions legal counsel and
that complainant sought advice and
requested documentation of several
transfers of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property. This was only successful
in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed,
drafted the documents pertaining to the
transaction and that he was retained as
legal counsel of Clarion. There was no
detailed explanation as to how she
supposedly engaged the services of Atty.
Francisco as her personal counsel and as to
what and how she communicated with the
latter anent the dealings she had entered
into. With the complaint lacking in this
regard, the unrebutted answer made by
Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a
detailed narrative of his engagement as
counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would
have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity in the
amount of narrative details presented by
the parties. Atty. Franciscos claim that he
was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez,
and not of the complainant, was clearly
established in a sworn statement executed

by Jimenez himself. Complainants

evidence pales in comparison with her
claims of being the client of Atty.
Francisco couched in general terms that
lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that
complainant opted not to file a reply to
Atty. Franciscos answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence
showing their professional relationship.
She also failed to appear during the
mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD
without even updating her residential
address on record. Her participation in the
investigation of the case apparently ended
at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings,
lawyers enjoy the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to clearly prove the
allegations in the
complaint
by
preponderant evidence. Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced
by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they
testify,
the
probability
or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the
same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although
it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.[27]
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have
prevented his entanglement with this
fiasco among the members of Jimenezs
family by taking an upfront and candid
stance in dealing with Jimenezs children
and complainant. He could have been
staunch in reminding the latter that his
tasks were performed in his capacity as
legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be
that as it may, Atty. Franciscos
indiscretion does not detract the Court
from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably
failed to discharge the burden of proving
that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At
most, he served as the legal counsel of
Clarion and, based on the affirmation

presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say,

complainant failed to establish that Atty.
Francisco committed a violation of the rule
on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client
privilege does not apply. In Mercado v.
Vitriolo,[28] the Court elucidated on the
factors essential to establish the existence
of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client
relationship, or a prospective attorneyclient relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to
a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain
the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment. The reason for this is to
make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer
without fear that what he tells the lawyer
will be divulged or used against him, and
for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.
xxx
(2) The client made the communication in
confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client
does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than
one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which
it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on
quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant
to the instruction of his client and
delivered to the opposing party, an offer
and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel
not in his professional capacity, are not
privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from

the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his
attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his
rights or obligations. The communication
must have been transmitted by a client to
his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or
business or personal assistance, and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach
to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at
bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of
complainant.
As
discussed,
the
complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and
Atty. Francisco. The records are further
bereft of any indication that the advice
regarding the sale of the Forbes property
was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence.
Neither was there a demonstration of what
she had communicated to Atty. Francisco
nor a recital of circumstances under which
the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her
complainant was that she sought legal
advice from respondent in various
occasions.[29]
Considering
that
complainant failed to attend the hearings at
the IBP, there was no testimony as to the
specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not
impossible, to determine if there was any
violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such
confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on
privileged
communication
between
attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege.
[30] It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of
proving that the privilege applies, failed in
this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized,
even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violating of the
lawyers oath and/or for breaching the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the CPR,[31] for the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those

who are qualified and who possess good

moral character.[32] The appropriate
penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.[33]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
willful appearance as an attorney for a
party without authority. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the
rule on conflict of interests and disclosure
of privileged communication, the acts of
Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively
allowing Clarion to make untruthful
representations to the SEC and in other
public
documents,
still
constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney, for which a suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months
is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty.
Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation
of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result
in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into
the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform
the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision so that the Court can determine
the reckoning point when his suspension
shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
34: [ A.C. NO. 4947, February 14, 2005 ]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, PETITIONER, VS.

ATTY. JUSTO ARAS, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed
by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the
disbarment of her estranged husband Atty.
Justo Paras on alleged acts of deceit,
malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his
comment[2] to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999,[3]
the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a
Report and Recommendation dated 13
January 2004[4] of Commissioner Lydia
A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, which Report reads in part, as
follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9,
1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus
Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda,
Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all
surnamed Paras executed a Special Power
of Attorney prepared by the respondent to
sell parcels of land located in Matobato,
Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority
to their mother to sell the subject real
properties previously registered in the
name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein
respondent was one of the signatories
therein.
Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966
on the basis of said Special Power of
Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real
property located in Matobato, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental which was with the
respondents full knowledge since he was
residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at
that time and from that time, the Yap
family had been in possession of the
subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June
1998 her attention was called to the fact
that a free patent title to the aforesaid
property was issued in respondents name
and upon verification with the DENR,
Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City,
complainant was able to get copies of the
documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585
pertaining to the Notice of Application for

Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by

the respondent; over the aforesaid lots
previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to
Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of
Property Rights and Interest Over Real
Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus
dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application
dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent
under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized
officer to administer oath; Letter of
Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated
June 4, 1985 and Order of Approval dated
August 19, 1985 signed by District Land
Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free
Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent
Justo J. Paras.
Complainant
alleged
that
the
aforementioned application was made by
the respondent without her knowledge and
consent and those acts of deceit,
machinations
and
falsification
of
documents were deliberately willfully, and
maliciously committed by the respondent
in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art.
171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a
lawyer and a transgression of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent
surreptitiously obtained a free patent title
over real properties which had been
previously sold by his own mother to
Aurora D. Yap and now still under the
control and possession of complainants
natural family, a fact respondent allegedly
withheld from the Bureau of Lands which
he had full knowledge in successfully
causing the release of a free patent in his
name and unjustly and unlawfully
deprived the rightful owners of their
legitimate title to the said property in
betrayal of the court to pervert the
administration of justice in gross violation
of his oath of office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In his Comment, respondent alleged that

complainant was obviously not the owner
of the properties and considering that the
properties were applied for free patent
titling during their marital union prior to
its breakage, complainant was likewise a
communal owner thereof and as such was
also complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great
portion of the public lands classified as
forested zone in Matobato were declared
and reclassified into public agricultural
lands, then publicly surveyed and
parcelized by lots identified in the survey
map based on actual or known occupants;
then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a

public announcement that the lands were

available for private ownership thru Free
Patent Application available only to native
settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps
including complainant being native or
natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D.
Yap who in 1985 was said to be already
an American citizen; complainant and her
family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to
apply for free patent over said questioned
properties for the reason that respondent
had already occupied the properties;
introduced improvements thereon; acted as
owner thereof; and could easily align his
right to the property which had been
identified in the public survey as Heirs of
Vicente Paras, otherwise the questioned
properties allegedly according to the Yaps
will be applied for and awarded to other
qualified natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent
Application was filed by him over the
communal property of him and the
complainant as well as those purchased by
him including the portion whose
occupancy of a public land was purchased
by Aurora D. Yap from Ledesma Vda de
Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all
of them were not qualified to apply for
ownership of an agricultural public land
via free patent; none of them being a
natural born Filipino or native settler and
were disqualified from a gratuitous grant
of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of
giving to him and the complainant the
properties was hatched and executed by
the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco
D. Yap to circumvent the law and prevent
the properties from being given by the
government to some other qualified
persons. He allegedly applied for issuance
of free patent in good faith and thereafter
took dominion and control of the
properties in the concept of a legitimate
owner under authority of a gratuitous grant
of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or
any member of her family much less
American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not
made any prior demand for the return of
the questioned properties; nor filed a
complaint
under
the
Katarungang
Pambarangay Law; nor filed an
administrative remedy before the DENR
for the cancellation and reversion/transfer
of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor
brought any action in any civil court for
either quieting of title, or cancellation of

free patent title or recovery of ownership

or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such
civil court determination on whether or not
complainant or her family were qualified
to become grantee of a government
gratuitous grant of public agricultural land,
if the Honorable Supreme Court will
decide that complainant, her mother,
brothers and sisters were within the ambit
of the term natural born citizen or native
citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to
them rightfully belong the ownership of
the questioned titled public agricultural
lands; and that he can never be guilty of
the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such
cession, respondent alleged that he will
gladly deliver and transfer title t them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and
prayed for recovery of possession of all
conjugal/communal properties including
the herein questioned properties for after
he left the conjugal home in 1988
possession of all these properties, real and
personal were until now with the
complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5]
to respondents Comment, therein refuting
respondents claims that he was used as a
dummy since complainant and her
siblings had previously acquired Free
Patents in their names. Complainant
further alleged that respondent is morally
unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court because of his falsely declaring
under oath that he had been occupying the
subject real property since 1985 when in
fact he did not and was never in
occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline issued an Order[6]
noting the filing of the last pleading and
setting the instant case for hearing. Several
hearings[7] were conducted wherein
complainant presented all her witnesses
together with their respective affidavits
and supporting documents[8], which were
all subjected to cross-examination by the
respondent.
Likewise,
respondent
presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and
supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded her Report and
made a recommendation, as follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent
committed deceit and falsehood in having
applied for free patent over lands owned

by another over which he had no actual

physical possession being aware of the fact
that the same was previously transferred in
the name of Aurora Yap; an act which
adversely reflected on his fitness to
practice law in violation of Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the
complaint for as long as there was a
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which partakes the nature
of proper disciplinary action pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment
and Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the
Undersigned respectfully recommends for
the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from
the practice of his law profession for a
period of three (3) months from receipt
hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the
IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a
registered member be furnished a copy of
the Order and notified of the said
suspension for proper enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated
27 February 2004,[10] the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified
the latters recommended penalty by
recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months for violation of Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The case is
confirmation.

now

before

us

for

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors

that respondent should be sanctioned. We
find, however, that the recommended
penalty is not commensurate to the gravity
of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a
lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal
profession[11] as the bar should always
maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing among its members. By and large,
a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients.[12] To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity,

honesty and integrity

profession.[13]

of

the

legal

In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:

It bears stressing that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law during good behavior
and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or
right, an attorneys right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring an
attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him
unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney, and thus to protect the public
and those charged with the administration
of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or
of his duties as an attorney and counsellor
which include the statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. These statutory grounds
are so broad as to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity. It is a settled rule that
the enumeration of the statutory grounds
for disciplinary action is not exclusive and
a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds
other than those specifically provided in
the law. Generally a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court, or an
unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the
privileges and to manage the business of
others in the capacity of an attorney, or for
conduct which tends to bring reproach on
the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right
but merely a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[15] One of
those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor.

And in the recent case of Bergonia v.

Merrera[16], we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and
the courts. They are bound by their oath to
speak the truth and to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court
that respondent violated his lawyers oath
as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates upon each
lawyer, as his duty to society and to the
courts, the obligation to obey the laws of
the land and to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in
the candor required of him as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the court in his
acts of applying for the issuance of a free
patent over the properties in issue despite
his knowledge that the same had already
been sold by his mother to complainants
sister. This fact, respondent even admitted
in the comment that he filed before this
Court when he alleged that the said
properties were public land under the
Forestal Zone when the mother of the
respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some
portions of entire occupancy of the
Parases[17].
Moreover,
respondent
committed deceit and falsehood in his
application for free patent over the said
properties when he manifested under oath
that he had been in the actual possession
and occupation of the said lands despite
the fact that these were continuously in the
possession
and
occupation
of
complainants family, as evidenced no less
by respondents own statements in the
pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status
of complainant and her family as natural
born citizens, this Court holds that the
instant case is not the proper forum to
address such issue. Furthermore, as
correctly held by the Investigating
Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to
who instituted the complaint for as long as
there was a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Likewise,
any other action which the parties may
make against each other has no material
bearing in this case. For, it must be
remembered that administrative cases

against lawyers belong to a class of their

own. They are distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.

his deplorable behavior in the present case

which grossly degrades the legal
profession warrants the imposition of a
much graver penalty.

In line herewith, this Court in In re

Almacen,[18] held:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty.

Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath
and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, with a
WARNING that commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will result
in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Accent should be laid on the fact that

disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but is rather an investigation by
the Court into the conduct of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the
instant
case
indubitably
reveal
respondents failure to live up to his duties
as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby occasioning sanction from this
Court.
At this juncture, we take note that on 18
October 2000, in our Decision in A.C. No.
5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled
Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo de Jesus
Paras, respondent was previously meted
with suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months on the charge of
falsifying his wifes signature in bank
documents and other related loan
instruments, and for one (1) year from the
practice of law on the charges of
immorality and abandonment of his own
family.
Considering the serious nature of the
instant offense and in light of respondents
prior misdemeanors for which he was
penalized with a six (6) month and one (1)
year suspension from the practice of law,

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished

the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be
entered in the record of respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
35: [ADM. CASE NO. 9612, March 13,
2013 ]
JOHNNY M. PESTO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
MARCELITO
M.
MILLO,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An attorney who conceals his inefficiency
and lack of diligence by giving wrong
information to his client regarding the
matter subject of their professional
relationship is guilty of conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court. He
thereby violates his Lawyers Oath to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his client. He also thereby violates
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, by which he is
called upon to serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Antecedents
In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto
(Johnny), a Canadian national, charged
Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court,
misleading his client, bungling the transfer
of title, and incompetence and negligence
in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife
Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services
of Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of title
over a parcel of land to her name, and the

adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;[1]

that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo
the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer
of title[2] and P10,000.00 for the adoption
case;[3] that Atty. Millo thereafter
repeatedly gave them false information
and numerous excuses to explain his
inability to complete the transfer of title;
that Atty. Millo likewise made them
believe that the capital gains tax for the
property had been paid way back in 1991,
but they found out upon their return to the
country in February 1995 that he had not
yet paid the tax; that when they confronted
him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had
already paid the same, but he could not
produce any receipt for the supposed
payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly
returned to Abella the amount of
P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of
Atty. Millos office in exasperation over
his stalling tactics; and that Atty. Millo
then further promised in writing to assume
the liability for the accrued penalties.[4]
Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for
letting the adoption case be considered
closed by the Tarlac office of the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two
years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo
made him and his wife believe that an
interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been
scheduled on February 14, 1995, but when
they arrived at the Tarlac DSWD they were
dismayed to be told that no such interview
had been scheduled; that adding to their
dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at
all; that it was only upon reaching home in
Quezon City when he received word from
Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been
scheduled on February 23, 1995 at 10:00
a.m.; that when they went to the hearing,
Atty. Millo could not be found; and that
they learned after an hour of waiting in the
courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had
requested the hearing to be moved to the
afternoon without their knowledge.[5]
Exasperated by Atty. Millos neglect and
ineptitude,
Johnny
brought
this
administrative complaint in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14,
1995, praying for disciplinary action to be
taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the
refund of P15,643.75 representing the
penalties for the non-payment of the
capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00
given for the adoption case. Being a
resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita
Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to
represent him during his and his wifes
absence from the country.

On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty.

Millo to file his answer.[6] Although an
extension of the period to file was granted
at his instance,[7] he filed no answer in the
end.[8] He did not also appear at the
hearings despite due notice.[9]
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny
through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The
proceedings were held in abeyance to
await the appropriate motion from
Johnnys counsel.[10]
The administrative matter did not move for
several years. The long delay prompted
Johnny to write to the President of the IBP
on October 28, 1998.[11] It was only on
April 2, 2001, however, that the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
scheduled another hearing on June 29,
2001.[12] At that hearing, Atty. Millo
appeared through a representative, and
presented a manifestation/motion,[13]
whereby he claimed that Johnny had
meanwhile died, and that Abella would be
withdrawing the complaint against him.
On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD,
through Commissioner Victoria GonzalezDe los Reyes, deemed the case submitted
for resolution.[14]
On October 4, 2010, Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to
whom the case had been meanwhile
transferred, submitted a report and
recommendation, whereby he found Atty.
Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for six months.[15]
In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted
on November 19, 2011,[16] the IBP Board
of Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner Fernandez,
but lowered the suspension to two months;
and ordered Atty. Millo to return the
amount of P16,000.00, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and finding respondent guilty of
the charges level(led) against him, Atty.
Marcelito Millo is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) months and is ordered to return the
amount of P16,000.00 to complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for

a reconsideration, stating that he had
honestly believed that Abella had already
caused the withdrawal of the complaint
prior to her own death; that he had already
caused the preparation of the documents
necessary for the transfer of the certificate
of title, and had also returned the
P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the
adoption case had been finally granted by
the trial court; that he had lost contact with
Johnny and Abella who resided in Canada;
that Juan Daquis, Abellas brother, could
have confirmed that the charge had arisen
from a simple misunderstanding, and that
Abella would cause the withdrawal of the
complaint, except that Daquis had
meanwhile died in November 2011.[17]
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors denied Atty. Millos motion for
reconsideration.[18]
Ruling
We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235,
but modify the penalty.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes
and concerns of his clients. He must be
ever mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the clients. His duty to
safeguard the clients interests commences
from his engagement as such, and lasts
until his effective release by the clients. In
that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care
as his clients interests may require.[19]
Atty. Millos acceptance of the sums of
money from Johnny and Abella to enable
him to attend to the transfer of title and to
complete the adoption case initiated the
lawyer-client relationship between them.
From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed
the duty to render competent and efficient
professional service to them as his clients.
Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
inefficient and negligent in going about
what the professional service he had
assumed required him to do. He concealed
his inefficiency and neglect by giving false
information to his clients about having
already paid the capital gains tax. In
reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax,
rendering the clients liable for a substantial
financial liability in the form of penalties.
Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the
obligation to serve his clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, expressly so demanded of
him, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL

SERVE
HIS
CLIENT
WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xx x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
A serious administrative complaint like
this one should not be taken for granted or
lightly by any respondent attorney. Yet,
Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of
Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored
it for a long period of time. Despite being
given several opportunities to do so, Atty.
Millo did not file any written answer. He
thereby forfeited his right and chance to
reasonably explain the circumstances
behind the charges against him. Had the
complaint been untrue and unfair, it would
have been quite easy for him to refute it
quickly and seasonably.
Indeed, a
refutation was the requisite response from
any worthy and blameless respondent
lawyer.
His
belated
and
terse
characterization of the charge by claiming
that the charge had emanated from a mere
misunderstanding was not sufficient. He
did not thereby refute the charge against
him, which omission indicated that the
complaint had substance. It mattered little
now that he had in the meantime returned
the amount of P14,000.00 to the clients,
and that the application for adoption had
been eventually granted by the trial court.
Such events, being not only post facto, but
also inevitable from sheer passage of time,
did not obliterate his liability based on the
neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on
his clients. The severe lesson that he must
now learn is that he could not ignore
without
consequences
the
liberal
opportunity the Court and the IBP allowed
him to justify his neglect and ineptitude in
serving his clients concerns. Towards him
the Court now stays its hand of leniency,
lest the Court be unfairly seen as too
willing to forego the exaction of
responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful
and inept as he had been towards his
clients.
It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo
purposely disregarded the opportunity to
answer the charges granted to him out of a
desire to delay the investigation of the
complaint until both Johnny and Abella,
being residents in Canada, would have
already lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as
happened here, would have already
departed this world and be no longer able
to rebut whatever refutations he would

ultimately make, whether true or not. But

the Court is not about to condone such
selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to
him and to others similarly disposed that
an attorney who is made a respondent in a
disbarment proceeding should submit an
explanation, and should meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.[20]
The obvious reason for the requirement is
that an attorney thus charged must thereby
prove that he still maintained that degree
of morality and integrity expected of him
at all times.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse
by consistently absenting himself from the
scheduled hearings the IBP had set for his
benefit. His disregard of the IBPs orders
requiring his attendance in the hearings
was not only irresponsible, but also
constituted utter disrespect for the
Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such
conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a
lawyer, because lawyers are particularly
called upon to obey Court orders and
processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with orders from
the duly constituted authorities.[21]
Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,[22] the
Court saw the respondent attorneys odious
practice of repeatedly and apparently
deliberately not appearing in the scheduled
hearings as his means of wiggling out from
the duty to explain his side. A similar
treatment of Atty. Millos disregard is
justified. Indeed, he thereby manifested
evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member
of the Legal profession should nurture in
himself.
Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his
belated response to the charge was due to
the assurances of Abella that she would be
withdrawing the complaint. The Court
disbelieves him, however, and treats his
claim as nothing but a belated attempt to
save the day for himself. He ought to
remember that the withdrawal of an
administrative charge for suspension or
disbarment based on an attorneys
professional misconduct or negligence will
not furnish a ground to dismiss the charge.
Suspension or disbarment proceedings that
are warranted will still proceed regardless
of the lack or loss of interest on the part of
the complainant. The Court may even
entirely ignore the withdrawal of the
complaint, and continue to investigate in
order to finally determine whether the
charge of professional negligence or
misconduct was borne out by the record.
[23] This approach bespeaks the Courts
consistent view that the Legal Profession is
not only a lofty and noble calling, but also

a rare privilege reserved only for the

deserving.
Verily, disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys are unlike civil suits where the
complainants are the plaintiffs and the
respondent attorneys are the defendants.
They neither involve private interests nor
afford redress for private grievances. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare, for the purpose of
preserving the courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to
practice law before them. Every attorney is
called to answer for every misconduct he
commits as an officer of the Court. The
complainant or any other person who has
brought the attorneys misconduct to the
attention of the Court is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of
justice.[24]
The
IBP
Board
of
Governors
recommended suspension from the
practice of law for two months as the
penalty to be imposed. The recommended
penalty is not well taken. We modify the
penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct, and could
not be given a soft treatment. His
professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law
because he had caused material prejudice
to the clients interest.[25] He should
somehow be taught to be more ethical and
professional in dealing with trusting clients
like Johnny and Abella, who were
innocently too willing to repose their
utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and
in his trustworthiness as a legal
professional. He should remember that
misconduct has no place in the heart and
mind of a lawyer who has taken the
solemn oath to delay no man for money or
malice, and to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion. Under the circumstances,
suspension from the practice of law for six
months is the condign and commensurate
penalty for him.
The Court notes that Atty. Millo already
returned the P14,000.00 received for the
transfer of title. Although he ought also to
refund the amount of P15,643.75
representing the penalty for the late
payment of the capital gains tax, the Court
cannot order him to refund that amount
because it is not a collection agency.[26]
The Court may only direct the repayment
of attorneys fees received on the basis that
a respondent attorney did not render
efficient
service
to
the
client.

Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund

the P10,000.00 given in connection with
the adoption case, plus interest of 6% per
annum, reckoned from the finality of this
decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and
HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO
guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Lawyers Oath; SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from notice, with the
STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with
more severely; ORDERS him to return to
the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto
within ten days from notice the sum of
P10,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS
him to promptly submit to this Court
written proof of his compliance within
thirty days from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Marcelito M. Millos
personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to
the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
36: [ A.C. NO. 6128, December 19, 2006 ]
ROSEMARIE
L.
HSIEH,
COMPLAINANT, VS ATTY. SALVADOR
QUIMPO
AND
ATTY.
NANCY
QUIMPO, RESPONDENTS
The present complaint of Rosemarie Loria
Hsieh[1]
(complainant)
against
respondents-spouses Attorneys Salvador
and Nancy Quimpo, for gross misconduct,
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The following antecedents spawned the
filing of the complaint.
Complainant, together with one Pilar
Cabuslay, was arrested for drug trafficking
and possession of marijuana during a buybust operation conducted by police
operatives within the vicinity of Isetann
Department Store, Manila. Her car, a
Mitsubishi Eclipse which she boarded in
going to the site of the operation, was
impounded by the police authorities. And
she was detained at the Manila City Jail.

Complainant secured the services of

respondents who represented her and Pilar
during the inquest and preliminary
investigation of the case.
As complainant did not have sufficient
funds to defray the expenses attendant to
her defense, she, while on detention at the
Manila City Jail or on May 21, 1999,
authorized respondents, who in the
meantime were able to secure the release
of the car, to sell it by signing a Deed of
Sale the complete particulars of which
were left in blank.
By complainant's claim, respondents
informed her that the proceeds of the sale
would defray "expenses in dismissing her
case and expediting and facilitating her
release from the Manila City Jail;"[2]
respondents, however, ceased to appear on
her behalf, forcing her to secure the
services of another lawyer; and when she
demanded the return of her car,
respondents refused, claiming that it would
serve as payment for their legal services.
Complainant thus filed a complaint for
replevin[3] against respondents. She soon
discovered, however, that the car was
already registered in the name of
respondents by virtue of the Deed of Sale.
[4]
While complainant was able to regain
possession of the car, the Traffic
Management Group seized it from her and
charged her with carnapping and theft,[5]
and respondents were eventually able to
get hold of it.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that
they agreed to handle complainant's case
for P20,000 as acceptance fee, and
P1,000,000 success fee, but as complainant
did not have money, she convinced them to
accept the Deed of Sale covering her car as
a form of assurance that she would settle
any outstanding account.
Respondents claim further that on
September 1999, as there was a big
possibility that complainant would be
released on bail, she secured the services
of another lawyer without her informing
them, and to avoid a "humiliating"
situation, they withdrew as her counsel but
demanded full settlement of her
outstanding
account;
and
since
complainant failed to settle her account,
she and respondents mutually agreed on
September 21, 1999 to "give effect" to the
Deed of Sale which they caused to be
notarized.

The IBP Investigator defined the issue in

the present complaint to be whether
respondents, as counsels for complainant,
violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility "when they acquired from
the complainant the [car]."
The IBP investigator found that there was
a breach of trust on respondents' part, in
light of, among other things, the lack of
justification of the charge of P600,000 for
attorney's fees, and the fact that the order
allowing complainant to post bail was
issued two months after the deed of sale
was concluded and, therefore, the amount
could not have represented the success fee
even if there was such an agreement for
the payment thereof.
. . . [T]here is here a case of a breach of
trust on the part of the respondents. It is
submitted that respondents took advantage
of the fact that the Deed of Sale of Motor
Vehicle was already signed in blank by the
complainant and which was in their
possession coupled with the fact that
complainant was still in jail. Their act of
"filling in" the details of the blank
instrument by causing the name of Atty.
Nancy Quimpo as well as the purchase
price of the sale at P600,000.00 to be
indicated therein and Atty. Nancy
Quimpo's signing the same in 21
September 1999 [see p. 3, Respondents'
Reply to Complainant's Position Paper]
was unethical if not improper, and smacks
of lack of delicadeza especially since the
amount
of
P600,000.00
allegedly
representing legal fees or expenses
incurred
have
not
been
clearly
substantiated or justified by the
respondents. It is further pointed out that
the complainant was allowed to post bail
only on 09 November 1999 [see Order
dated 09 November of Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 54; Annex F,
Complainant's Reply to Respondent's
Position Paper]. This is roughly two (2)
months after the questioned instrument
was allegedly notarized. At this time [21
September 1999], respondents were thus
not entitled to collect a success fee from
the complainant even if there was an
agreement between the parties for the
payment of such a fee. Ergo,
saidP600,000.00 could not also be
considered a success fee payable to the
respondents. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into
his possession. Moreover, the respondents
were duty-bound to observe faithfulness
towards their client and should have

conducted themselves with utmost

professionalism in discharging their
fiduciary
duty.[6]
(Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)
By Report[7] dated July 22, 2005, the IBP
thus recommended:
. . . that both respondents, Atty. Salvador
Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, be
STRONGLY REPRIMANDED, and that a
repetition by respondents of this offense
shall be dealt with more severely.
However, it is further recommended that
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 90 and the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan, Branch 129, be required to
submit their decisions in the replevin case
[Civil Case No. Q-00-41395]and the
carnapping/theft cases [Criminal Case
Nos. C-67161 and C-67162], respectively,
as soon as they are promulgated, to enable
the Honorable Supreme Court to determine
whether there is a need to revise or adjust
the herein recommended penalty, assuming
the same is approved.[8] (Underscoring
supplied)
It appears from the computer-generated
Deed of Sale that complainant's first name,
the particulars of the car, and the month
and year (May 1999) of the signing of the
document were the only data originally
provided therein. It can thus be reasonably
concluded that the other important
particulars, such as the vendee's name
respondent Atty. Nancy Quimpo, and the
purchase price P600,000, were
subsequently filled up.
If the Deed of Sale was originally intended
to serve as security for the payment of
complainant's outstanding account with
respondents, as claimed by the latter, why
was not the name of the obligee for whom
the security was allegedly executed
respondents not also printed out? And
why did not respondents bother to advise
complainant of the eventual sale of the car
and account the proceeds thereof? It is on
this account that this Court finds the
above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP
Investigator in holding respondents to have
committed breach of contract well-taken.
Although a lawyer's lien over a client's
property in satisfaction of his lawful fees
and disbursements is recognized by this
Court, the same cannot be exercised
haphazardly.
This Court's pronouncement that a
fiduciary relationship requires a high
degree of fidelity and good faith and is
designed to remove all such temptation
and to prevent everything of that kind from

being done for the protection of the

client[9] bears reiterating.

ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ,

RESPONDENT.

It is thus this Court's duty to look into

dealings between attorneys and their
clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in
which they may stand unequal.[10]

This resolves the complaint for suspension

or disbarment Hied by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE)
through its president, Atty. Virginia C.
Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008
against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz
(Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of
PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (I

As the breach of the trust reposed upon

respondents constitutes a violation of the
Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION,
this Court finds that the recommended
penalty therefor is not commensurate.
Instead, respondents' suspension for three
months from the practice of law would be
reasonable.
On the IBP-CBD recommendation that the
courts
before
the
replevin
and
carnapping/theft cases involving the same
parties were lodged submit their decisions
to enable this Court to determine whether
there is a need to revise or adjust the
penalty, the same does not lie.
Administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct
from
and
may
proceed
independently of civil and/or criminal
cases. Hence, the disposition in the
administrative case is not governed by that
in the civil and/or criminal cases and vice
versa.[11]
WHEREFORE,
respondents
Atty.
Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo
are SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of Three (3) Months from
notice, with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all
courts in the country, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED
38: [ A.C. No. 10134, November 26,
2014 ]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT
EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT, ATTY. VIRGINIA
C. RAFAEL, COMPLAINANT, VS.

PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and

2nd level court employees in the Judiciary
held its 11th National Convention/Seminar
in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005.
As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty.
Diaz was entrusted with all the money
matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the
liquidation for the 11th PACE national
convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz
only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th
PACE national convention in Iloilo
City[2]; that during the 12thconvention, an
election of officers was conducted and
Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National
Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on
the last day of the convention or on March
31, 2007, the outgoing Board of Directors,
including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved
Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the
amount of P30,000.00 as term-end bonus
for each PACE official qualified thereto;
that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation
report for the 12th convention; that there
was no turn over of monies belonging to
the association as a matter of procedure
despite a letter of demand, dated June 20,
2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;[3] and that the
new set of PACE officers issued Board
Resolution No. 00-07 directing past
president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past
treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they
failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for
the Davao and Iloilo conventions.[4]
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that
she had filed the Statement of Liquidation
for the 11th national convention in Davao
in less than a week after the said
convention; that it was duly audited by the
national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the
net proceeds of that convention was "fully
accounted,
liquidated
and
entirely
deposited to PACE accounts;"[5] that she
also filed the Statement of Liquidation for
the 12th national convention on May 22,
2007; that the report, together with the
cash, checks and original receipts, were
received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed
by former PACE officers;[6] that she
denied running for re-election as PACE

national treasurer during the Iloilo

convention as she had already filed her
certificate of candidacy for Board Member
of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay;[7] that the approval of the
P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest
with her solely, rather, it was approved by
the previous board of directors; and that
she never sponsored the bonus, as it was
initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded
by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah
Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she
was not privy to the disbursement of the
said term-end bonus.[8]
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP
Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After
an exchange of pleadings, the mandatory
conference was held. Afterwards, the
protagonists were directed to submit their
respective position papers. Thereafter, the
case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).[9]
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty.
Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated
June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case
against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty.
Diaz offered documentary evidence to
show that she was able to submit the
liquidation
reports
for
the
two
aforementioned conventions of PACE. He
also took note that Atty. Rafael herself
acknowledged the liquidation report made
by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao
City convention.[10] As to the sufficiency
and completeness of these reports, this
would be better resolved through an audit
rather than in disbarment proceedings.
Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not
consider the position of Atty. Diaz as
national treasurer of PACE to have any
connection with her being as a lawyer.
Thus, according to him, she should be
sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws
of PACE instead of a disbarment case.[11]
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz
ran for re-election in the PACE elections
even though she was no longer connected
with the Judiciary and therefore
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez
opined that the best evidence, which was
the "certificate of candidacy," was never

offered,[12] and that Atty. Diaz, being a

lawyer, knew that her bid for re-election
would be a useless exercise since she
would not be able to assume office if she
won.[13]
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed
Atty. Diaz's assertion that she never
sponsored the appropriation of the
P30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the
approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a
collegial action among the Board of
Directors.
Again,
Commissioner
Fernandez was of the view that her
participation in the passage of the
questioned board resolution was not
connected to her being a lawyer.[14]
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
adopting and approvingthe report and
recommendation
of
Commissioner
Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint
against Atty. Diaz.[15]
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued
the Extended Resolution,[16] dated June
21, 2013, granting the complainant's
motion for reconsideration. It reversed and
set aside its earlier resolution and
suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of
law for one (1) year.[17]
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions
regarding (i) Atty. Diaz' liquidation of
PACE funds; (ii) her running for reelection when she was no longer with the
Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the
term-end bonus when she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, constituted a
"triple - whammy" of questionable
actions[18]committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and
adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended
Resolution.
Everyone should keep in mind that the
practice of law is only a privilege. It is
definitely not a right. In order to enjoy this
privilege, one must show that he possesses,
and continues to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.
One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Candor
in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioner's honorable membership in the
legal profession. Lawyers are required to
act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
conduct of litigation and in their relations

with their clients, the opposing parties, the

other counsels and the courts. They are
bound by their oath to speak the truth and
to conduct themselves according to the
best of their knowledge and discretion, and
with fidelity to the courts and their clients.
[19]
Time and again, the Court has held that the
practice of law is granted only to those of
good moral character. The Bar maintains a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves
beyond reproach at all times, whether they
are dealing with their clients or the public
at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.[20]
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a
servant of the law and belongs to that
profession which society entrusts with the
administration of law and the dispensation
of justice. For this, he or she is an
exemplar for others to emulate and should
not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily,
this Court has been exacting in its demand
for integrity and good moral character
from members of the Bar. They are always
expected to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and to
refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of this noble
profession.[21]
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the
finances of PACE; her running for reelection, including her non-admission that
she ran for said election as shown not by
her certificate of candidacy but by the
affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of
the questioned term-end bonus of PACE
officers, including herself even though she
was no longer working in the Judiciary,
were definitely not the candor the Court
speaks of. There was much to be desired in
Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. AlibutdanDiaz is found GUILTY of violating
Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period ofthree (3) months.
This decision
executory.

shall

be

immediately

Let copies of this Decision be furnished

the Court Administrator for its distribution
to all courts of the land; the IBP; and the

Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered

into respondent's personal records as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del
Reyes,* and Leonen, JJ., concur

Castillo,

45: [ A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015 ]

ALVIN
S.
FELICIANO,
COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY.
CARMELITA
BAUTISTA-LOZADA,
RESPONDENT.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment[1]
dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S.
Feliciano (complainant) against respondent
Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty.
Lozada) for violation of Section 27,[2]
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the
records, are as follows:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc
promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No.
6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs.
Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada[3]
suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby
found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and
16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of willfully disobeying
a final and executory decision of the Court
of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant, for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with
finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.[5]
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for
injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil
Case no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto
Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et

al., where complainant was one of the

respondents, complainant lamented that
Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the
plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto
Lozada, and actively participated in the
proceedings of the case before Branch 75
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City. To prove his allegation, complainant
submitted certified true copies of the
minutes of the hearings, dated June 12,
2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007,
wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as
one of the counsels,[6] as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing
that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.[7]
Complainant argued that the act of Atty.
Lozada in appearing as counsel while still
suspended from the practice of law
constitutes willfull disobedience to the
resolutions of the Court which suspended
her from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court
resolved to require Atty. Lozada to
comment on the complaint against him.[8]
In her Comment[9] dated November 19,
2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was
forced by circumstances and her desire to
defend the rights of her husband who is
embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed
that she believed in good faith that her
appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is
not within the prohibition to practice law,
considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client. She insisted that
her husband is a victim of grave injustice,
and his reputation and honor are at stake;
thus, she has no choice but to give him
legal assistance.[10]
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred
the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[11]
In its Report and Recommendation[12]
dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her
suspension from the practice of law as
imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty.
ozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board
of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that

it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada

be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of
Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in
the instant case, the lawyer must desist
from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the
period of suspension.[13]
Suffice it to say that practice of law
embraces "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." It includes "[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.[14]
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is
undisputed. Based on the records, there is
no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations,
that is, in appearing and signing as counsel
for and in behalf of her husband,
conducting
or
offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting
direct and cross-examination, all constitute
practice of law. Furthermore, the findings
of the IBP would disclose that such
actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in JuneJuly 2007 were done within the period of
her two (2)-year suspension considering
that she was suspended from the practice
of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It
would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from
2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when
Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of
her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07
and actively participated in the
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or
within the two (2)-year suspension, she,
therefore, engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails
to convince. She knew very well that at the
time she represented her husband, she is
still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court
about it. Neither did she seek any
clearance or clarification from the Court if
she can represent her husband. While we
understand her devotion and desire to
defend her husband whom she believed
has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada

should not forget that she is first and

foremost, an officer of the court who is
bound to obey the lawful order of the
Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[15]
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a
harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes
the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture
that amid an adversity, families will
always look out and extend a helping hand
to a family member, more so, in this case,
to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty.
Lozada's actuation was prompted by her
affection to her husband and that in
essence, she was not representing a client
but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to
mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C.
Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and
Jimmy P. Baliga,[16] citing Molina v. Atty.
Magat,[17] where this Court suspended
further respondents from the practice of
law for six (6) months for practicing their
profession despite this court's previous
order of suspension, we, thus, impose the
same penalty on Atty. Lozada for
representing her husband as counsel
despite lack of authority to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that
aims to purge the law profession of
unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor
of the legal profession. While the Supreme
Court has the plenary power to discipline
erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant

manner so as not to frustrate its

preservative principle. The Court, in the
exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is
inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming the errant lawyer is possible.
[18]

Bansig stressed that the marriage between

respondent and Bunagan was still valid
and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alba,
and that the first marriage had never been
annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty.

Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found
GUILTY of violating Section 27,[19] Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months from the practice of law, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.

Bansig alleged that respondents act of

contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming
of a member of the Bar, which renders him
unfit to continue his membership in the
Bar.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all

courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
append a copy of this Decision to
respondents record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the
Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall
take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
46: [ A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014 ]
ROSE
BUNAGAN-BANSIG,
COMPLAINANT,VS. ATTY. ROGELIO
JUAN A. CELERA, RESPONDENT.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment[1]
dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant
Rose Bunagan-Bansig(Bansig) against
respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
(respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on
May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie
R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a
contract of marriage, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Civil Registry
of Manila.[2] Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of
respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's
marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8,
1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of
San Juan, Manila.[3]

In a Resolution[4] dated February 18,

2002, the Court resolved to require
respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment
on the complaint, despite receipt of the
copy of the Court's Resolution, as
evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No.
30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution[5]
dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment on
the complaint against him.[6]
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an
Omnibus Ex Parte Motion[7] praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on
the complaint be deemed as a waiver to
file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent
claimed that while it appeared that an
administrative case was filed against him,
he did not know the nature or cause thereof
since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion,
he received no other pleading or any
processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus
Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him
and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and
her husband. He also explained that he was
able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his
brother who is occupying their former
residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3,
Quezon City. Respondent further averred
that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent
to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been
the family's erstwhile counsel and her
younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his
law office address, but she failed to send a
copy of the complaint to him. Respondent

suspected that Bansig was trying to

mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig
has an unpaid obligation amounting to
P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered
a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he
and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at
least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He
then prayed that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint and be given time to file his
answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution[8] dated July 7, 2003, the
Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to
furnish respondent with a copy of the
administrative complaint and to submit
proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the
complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a
copy of the administrative complaint was
furnished to respondent at his given
address which is No. 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City,
as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.[9]
On March 17, 2004, considering that
respondent failed anew to file his comment
despite receipt of the complaint, the Court
resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure.[10]
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his
Explanation,[11] reiterated that he has yet
to receive a copy of the complaint. He
claimed that Bansig probably had not
complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the
same already. He requested anew that
Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of
the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court
granted respondent's prayer that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint, and
required Bansig to furnish a copy of the
complaint to respondent.[12]
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her
Manifestation,[13] lamented the dilatory
tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent
in what was supposedly a simple matter of
receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that
the Court should sanction respondent for
his deliberate and willful act to frustrate
the actions of the Court. She attached a
copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a
copy of the complaint was mailed at

respondent's residential address in Angeles

City as shown by Registry Receipt No.
3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a
Show Cause Order to respondent as to why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with
or held in contempt for failure to comply
with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
despite service of copy of the complaint by
registered mail.[14]
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the
returned and unserved copy of the Show
Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to
respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No.
55621, with notation RTS-Moved. It
likewise required Bansig to submit the
correct and present address of respondent.
[15]
On September 12, 2005, Bansig
manifested
that
respondent
had
consistently
indicated
in
his
correspondence with the Court No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City as his residential address.
However, all notices served upon him on
said address were returned with a note
moved by the mail server. Bansig
averred that in Civil Case No. 59353,
pending before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at Unit
8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City.[16]
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved
to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his
new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex,
922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.
[17]
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's
failure to comply with the Show Cause
Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to
file his comment on this administrative
complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a
penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if
said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE
Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the
comment required thereon.[18]
In a Resolution[19] dated January 27,
2010, it appearing that respondent failed to
comply with the Court's Resolutions dated
June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing
by respondent of his comment on the

complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty.

Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera
for non-compliance with the Resolution
dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a
report of compliance with the Resolution.
The Court likewise resolved to REFER the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[20]
However, the Return of Warrant[21] dated
March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn
M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, AntiGraft Division of the NBI, showed that
respondent cannot be located because
neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora
Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared
that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant
lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot
be found or located and there were no
leads
to
determine
respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot
be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's
Resolution, reported that as per their
records, the address of respondent is at No.
41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd.,
Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear
before the mandatory conference and
hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4,
2010, Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala, of the IBP-CBD, declared
respondent to be in default and the case
was
submitted
for
report
and
recommendation. The Order of Default
was received by respondent as evidenced
by a registry return receipt. However,
respondent failed to take any action on the
matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its
Report
and
Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Celera
be suspended for a period of two (2) years
from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers.[22] The
issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an

officer of the court in the dispensation of

justice.
Hence,
an
administrative
proceeding for disbarment continues
despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against
him despite numerous notices.
In
administrative
proceedings,
the
complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. For the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, this Court has consistently held
that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.[23]
In the instant case, there is a
preponderance of evidence that respondent
contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. The first
marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 3, 2001 by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C.
Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio
Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan
at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City
Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states
that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the
Mary the Queen Church, Madison St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of
the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage
while the latters first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a
year from his first marriage to Bunagan
which is indicative that indeed the first
marriage was still subsisting at the time
respondent contracted the second marriage
with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage
contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best
evidence of their contents, as provided for

under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. When the
original of a document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly
indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox
copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish
the existence of two marriages entered into
by respondent. The certified xerox copies
should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him
unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
[24]
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the Bar. He made a mockery
of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds
for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court.[25]
This case cannot be fully resolved,
however, without addressing rather
respondents defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of its Resolution requiring him to

file his comment on the complaint. This

case has dragged on since 2002. In the
span of more than 10 years, the Court has
issued
numerous
directives
for
respondent's compliance, but respondent
seemed to have preselected only those he
will take notice of and the rest he will just
ignore. The Court has issued several
resolutions directing respondent to
comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any
answer thereto. He claimed to have not
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his
failure to comment on the complaint
against him. Ironically, however, whenever
it is a show cause order, none of them have
escaped respondent's attention. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the
complaint had not reached him, he cannot,
however, feign ignorance that there is a
complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have
easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in
dealing with respondent's nonchalant
attitude towards this case; accommodating
respondent's
endless
requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well
as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous
affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried
to reach respondent for more than a
decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different
locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite
earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent,
the
latter,
however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of
failure to receive the complaint. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible,
respondent just disappeared. In a manner
of speaking, respondents acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of
the Court in order to delay the disposition
of the case and to evade the consequences
of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent
is respondents deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a
sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect
to the judicial institution. Respondents
conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held
that a Courts Resolution is not to be

construed as a mere request, nor should it

be complied with partially, inadequately,
or selectively. Respondents obstinate
refusal to comply with the Courts orders
not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect
of the Courts lawful orders which is only
too deserving of reproof.[26]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to
disregard not only the laws of the land but
also the lawful orders of the Court, it only
shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO
JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and willful disobedience
of lawful orders rendering him unworthy
of continuing membership in the legal
profession.
He
is
thus
ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
shall forthwith record it in the personal file
of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies
thereof to all its Chapters. SO
ORDERED.
48: [ A.C. No. 6490 [Formerly CBD Case
No. 03-1054], July 09, 2013 ]
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION
TABANG, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.
GLENN C. GACOTT, RESPONDENT.

This case involves a complaint for

disbarment directly filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).[1]
Complainants alleged that sometime in
1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang
sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio
Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacotts
father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a
total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural
land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of
several parcels belonging to different
owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the
governments agrarian reform program,
Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast
tracts of agricultural land as she already
owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott
advised her to put the titles of the parcels
under the names of fictitious persons.[2]
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to
purchase seven parcels and obtained the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) under the names of fictitious
persons, as follows:
1. TCT No. 12475 Amelia Andes;
2. TCT No. 12476 Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 Elizabeth Dungan;
and
7. TCT No. 12794 Andes Estoy.[3]
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion
Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as
they were in need of funds for their
medication and other expenses. Claiming
that he would help complainants by
offering the parcels to prospective buyers,
respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from
Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the
parcels.[4]
About a year after respondent borrowed
the titles and after he failed to negotiate
any sale, complainants confronted
respondent. Respondent then told the
complainants that he had lost all seven
titles.[5]
On the pretext of offering a remedy to
complainants, respondent advised them to
file petitions in court for re-issuance of

titles. Pretending to be the authorized

agent-representative of the fictitious
owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang
filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.[6]
In the course of the proceedings, the public
prosecutor noticed similarities in the
signatures of the supposed owners that
were affixed on the Special Powers of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in
favor of Lilia Tabang. The public
prosecutor, acting on his observation,
asked the court to have the supposed
owners summoned.[7]
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia
Tabang had the petitions voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice to their being
re-filed.[8]
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set
of petitions. This time, she changed the
fictitious owners signatures in the hope of
making them look more varied.[9]
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a
new set of petitions, respondent executed
several
documents
that
included
revocations of SPAs and various affidavits
of recovery purportedly signed by the
parcels (fictitious) owners. Respondent
then caused the annotation of these
documents on the TCTs of the seven
parcels.[10]
Also, respondent caused the publication of
notices where he represented himself as
the owner of the parcels and announced
that these were for sale.[11] Later,
respondent succeeded in selling the seven
parcels. He received a total of ?
3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the
sales.[12]
Alleging that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit,
complainants filed their complaint directly
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
on February 3, 2003. The case was
docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the
owners of the seven parcels were not
fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold
the seven parcels. He added that Lilia
Tabang had been merely the broker for the
seven parcels and that she had
unsuccessfully demanded a balato of
twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of
the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged
that after she had been refused to be given
a balato, Lilia Tabang had threatened to
defame him and seek his disbarment.[13]

In her Report and Recommendation dated

March 4, 2004,[14] IBP Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility.
She
recommended
that
respondent
be
suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,[15]
the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
report
of
Commissioner
Navarro.
However, the IBP Board of Governors
increased the penalty to disbarment.
Thereafter, the case was referred to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,
[16] the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the IBP. The Court noted that majority
of the pieces of evidence presented by
complainants were mere photocopies and
affidavits and that the persons who
supposedly executed such documents were
neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus,
there could not have been adequate basis
for sustaining the imposition of a penalty
as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to
Investigating Commissioner Dennis B.
Funa. Hearings were conducted on March
22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006;
August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006;
February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.[17]
The complainants presented several
witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze,
President of the Swiss American Lending
Corporation.[18] Heinze testified that in
April 2001, a friend introduced him to
respondent who, in turn, introduced
himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels
in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They
agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at
P900,000.00. His company, however, paid
only P668,000.00. Heinze noted that his
company withheld payment upon his
realization that Lilia Tabang had caused
the annotation of an adverse claim and
upon respondents failure to produce
Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.

Another of complainants witnesses was

Atty. Agerico Paras.[19] He testified that
Heinze introduced him to respondent who,
in turn, introduced himself as the owner of
seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a
lot priced at P2,300,000.00. He paid for
the said parcel in two (2) installments.
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had

caused the annotation of an adverse claim,

he wrote to respondent asking him to
either work on the cancellation of the
claim or to reimburse him. He added that
respondent was unable to produce Amelia
Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel
he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of
the seven parcels, also testified for
complainants.[20] He testified that in
February 2001, he was introduced to
respondent who claimed that several
parcels with a total area of thirty (30)
hectares were owned by his mother.
Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for
the price of P2,000,000.00 which he paid
in cash and in kind (L-300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on
the matters stated in the Complaint.[21]
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa
required the complainants to submit their
Position Paper. Respondent filed his
Motion for Reconsideration and the
Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who,
respondent claimed, deprived him of the
chance to cross-examine complainants
witnesses,
and
was
bent
on
prejudicing[22] him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited
himself. Following this, the case was
reassigned to Investigating Commissioner
Rico A. Limpingco.

seven (7) owners who were introduced to

him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia
Tabang could not have been the owner of
the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs
executed by the parcels owners clearly
made her a mere agent and him a subagent. He also assailed the authenticity of
the public announcements (where he
supposedly offered the seven [7] parcels
for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement.
He surmised that the signatures on such
documents appearing above the name
Glenn C. Gacott had been mere forgeries
and crude duplications of his own
signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated
August 23, 2010,[25] Commissioner
Limpingco found respondent liable for
gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
He likewise noted that respondent was
absent in most of the hearings without
justifiable reason, in violation of Rule
12.04 of the CPR.[26] He recommended
that respondent be disbarred and his name,
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution[27]
adopting the Report of Investigating
Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.[28]
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal
with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

In the meantime, with the Supreme Court

En Bancs approval of the IBP-CBDs
Rules of Procedure, it was deemed proper
for an Investigating Commissioner to
submit
his/her
Report
and
Recommendation based on matters
discussed
during
the
mandatory
conferences, on the parties Position
Papers (and supporting documents), and on
the results of clarificatory questioning (if
such questioning was found to be
necessary). As such, respondents Motion
for Reconsideration was denied, and he
was required to file his Position Paper.[23]

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed

before the Supreme Court his Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time (to file
Petition
for
Review/Appeal).
On
September 20, 2011, the Court granted
respondents Motion and gave him an
extension of thirty (30) days to file his
Appeal. The Supreme Court warned
respondent that no further extension will
be given. Despite this, respondent filed
two (2) more Motions for Extension the
first on September 29, 2011 and the second
on November 3, 2011 both of which
were denied by the Court.

On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his

Position Paper.[24] Subsequently, the case
was deemed submitted for Commissioner
Limpingcos Report and Recommendation.

Despite the Courts denials of his Motions

for Extension, respondent filed on
December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit
Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached
Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied
by the Court on April 17, 2012.

In his Position Paper, respondent noted

that he filed criminal complaints against
Lilia Tabang on account of Tabangs
statement that she had fabricated the
identities of the owners of the seven (7)
parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he
had relied on the Torrens Titles of the

For resolution is the issue of whether or

not respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility,
thus
warranting his disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records,
the Court concurs with and adopts the
findings
and
recommendation
of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP
Board of Governors. It is clear that
respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule
1.01 of the CPR when he executed the
revocations of SPAs and affidavits of
recovery and in arrogating for himself the
ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia
Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities,
the complainants own complicity does not
negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of
respondents offense. Quite the contrary,
his offense is made even graver. He is a
lawyer who is held to the highest standards
of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing. Perverting what is expected of
him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of
the law to prejudice and torment other
individuals. Not only did he countenance
illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did
he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated
it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred
for any of the following grounds:
a.

deceit;

b.

malpractice;

c.

gross misconduct in office;

d.

grossly immoral conduct;

e.
conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
f.

violation of the lawyer's oath;

g.
willful disobedience of
lawful order of a superior court; and

any

h.
willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do
so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that
disbarment is proper when lawyers commit
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in
usurping the property rights of other
persons. By way of examples:

a.
In Brennisen v. Contawi:[29]
Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was
disbarred for having used a spurious SPA
to mortgage and sell property entrusted to
him for administration.
b.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:[30] One
of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B.
Gabor, was disbarred for having
acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the
absence of the purported vendors and for
taking advantage of his position as
Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing
one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said
Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was
fictitious.

b.
The witnesses manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability
or improbability of their testimony;
c.
The witnesses interest or want
of interest and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and
d.
The number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.

c.
In Daroy v. Legaspi:[31] The
Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon
Legaspi for having converted to his
personal use the funds that he received for
his clients.

In this case, complainants have shown by a

preponderance of evidence that respondent
committed gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must

be done with utmost caution. As this Court
noted in Moran v. Moron:[32]

Specifically, complainants have shown not

only through Lilia Tabangs testimony but
more so through the testimonies of Dieter
Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro
Gallinero that:

Disbarment should never be imposed

unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer,
by his serious misconduct, should no
longer remain a member of the bar.
Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution, only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe
such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine
would accomplish the end desired.[33]
Moreover, considering the gravity of
disbarment, it has been established that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify its imposition.[34]
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,[35]
[p]reponderance of evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.[36]
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a
court may consider the following in
determining preponderance of evidence:
a.
All the facts and circumstances
of the case;

a.
respondent
misrepresented
himself as the owner of or having the right
to dispose of the subject parcels;
b.
respondent actively sought to
sell or otherwise dispose of the subject
parcels;
c.
respondent perfected the sales
and received the proceeds of the sales
whether in cash or in kind of the subject
parcels;
d.
such sales were without the
consent or authorization of complainants;
and
e.
respondent never remitted the
proceeds of the sales to complainants.
More importantly, complainants witnesses
showed that when respondent had been
confronted with Lilia Tabangs adverse
claims and asked to substantiate the
identities of the supposed owners of the
subject parcels, he had failed to produce
such persons or even show an iota of proof
of their existence. In this regard, the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico
Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are
particularly significant in so far as they
have been made despite the fact that their
interest as buyers is contrary to that of
complainants
interest
as
adverse
claimants.

In contrast, respondent failed to present

evidence
to
rebut
complainant's
allegations.
Respondents defense centered on his
insistence that the owners of the seven
parcels were not fictitious and that they
had voluntarily sold the seven parcels.
Respondent also evaded the allegations
against him by flinging counterallegations. For instance, he alleged that
Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded
a balato from the proceeds of the sale of
the subject parcels and that after she had
been refused, she threatened to defame
respondent and seek his disbarment. In
support of this allegation, he pointed out
that he had filed criminal complaints
against Lilia Tabang. He also surmised that
the signatures on the subject documents
appearing above the name Glenn C.
Gacott were mere forgeries and crude
duplications of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court,[37] the burden of proof is vested
upon the party who alleges the truth of his
claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus,
in
Leave
Division,
Office
of
Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Gutierrez[38]
where a party resorts to bare denials and
allegations and fails to submit evidence in
support of his defense, the determination
that he committed the violation is
sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove
his allegation that the supposed owners of
the seven parcels are real persons. Quite
the contrary, he failed to produce the
slightest proof of their identities and
existence, much less produce their actual
persons. As to his allegations regarding
Lilia Tabangs supposed extortion and
threat and the forgery or crude duplication
of his signature, they remain just that
allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts
and circumstances which support these
claims.
At best, respondent merely draws
conclusions from the documents which
form the very basis of complainants own
allegations and which are actually being
assailed by complainants as inaccurate,
unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent
makes much of how Lilia Tabang could
not have been the owner of the seven (7)
parcels since her name does not appear on
the parcels TCTs[39] and how he merely
respected the title and ownership of the
ostensible owners.[40] Similarly, he makes
much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a
mere agent in the SPAs.[41] However,

respondent loses sight of the fact that it is

precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs
and SPAs indicate and the deception they
engender that are the crux of the present
controversy. In urging this Court to sustain
him, respondent would have us rely on the
very documents assailed as fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can
come up with are generic, sweeping, and
self-serving allegations of (1) how he
could not have obtained the TCTs from
Tabang as it is a standing policy of his
law office not to accept Torrens title [sic]
unless it is related to a court case[42] and
because [he] does not borrow any Torrens
title from anybody and for whatever
purpose;[43] (2) how complainants could
not have confronted him to demand the
return of the TCTs and how he could not
have told them that he lost the TCTs
because [a]s a lawyer, [he] always
respects and recognizes the right of an
owner to keep in his custody or possession
any of his properties of value;[44] and (3)
how he could not have met and talked with
Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his
services only to refuse Lilia Tabang
because legal practice constituted his
livelihood, and there was no reason for
him to refuse an occasion to earn income.
[45]
Rather than responding squarely to
complainants allegations, respondent
merely embarks on conjectures and
ascribes motives to complainants. He
accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a
balato of twenty percent (20%) from the
proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels,
and of threatening to defame him and to
seek his disbarment after she had been
refused.
This
evasive
posturing
notwithstanding, what is clear is that
respondent failed to adduce even the
slightest proof to substantiate these claims.
From all indications, Lilia Tabang had
sufficient basis to file the present
Complaint and seek sanctions against
respondent.
Given the glaring disparity between the
evidence adduced by complainants and the
sheer lack of evidence adduced by
respondent, this Court is led to no other
reasonable conclusion than that respondent
committed the acts of which he is accused
and that he acted in a manner that is
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that a lawyer owes substantial

duties not only to his client, but also to his

brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of
the most important functions of the State
the administration of justice as an officer
of the court.[46] Accordingly, [l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.[47]

CITY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.

SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN
JOSE, ANTIQUE, RESPONDENT.

Respondent has fallen dismally and

disturbingly short of the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him. Quite the
contrary, he employed his knowledge and
skill of the law as well as took advantage
of the credulity of petitioners to secure
undue gains for himself and to inflict
serious damage on others. He did so over
the course of several years in a sustained
and unrelenting fashion and outdid his
previous wrongdoing with even greater,
more detestable offenses. He has hardly
shown any remorse. From how he has
conducted himself in these proceedings, he
is all but averse to rectifying his ways and
assuaging
complainants
plight.
Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and
this Court his duplicity by repeatedly
absenting himself from the IBPs hearings
without justifiable reasons. He also vexed
this Court to admit his Appeal despite his
own failure to comply with the much
extended period given to him, thus inviting
the Court to be a party in delaying
complainants cause. For all his perversity,
respondent deserves none of this Courts
clemency.

The Case

WHEREFORE,
respondent
ATTY.
GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly
violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is
DISBARRED
and
his
name
orderedSTRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision
be attached to respondent's personal record
as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
49: [ A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013 ]
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
WESTERN
VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBIWEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO

A lawyer who forges a court decision and

represents it as that of a court of law is
guilty of the gravest misconduct and
deserves the supreme penalty of
disbarment.

Before this Court is the complaint for

disbarment against Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
(respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his
having allegedly falsified an inexistent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional
Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas
Regional Office, represented by Regional
Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya,
Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a
written communication from Mr. Ballam
Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United
Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a
copy of the decision dated February 12,
1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela
in Special Proceedings Case No. 084
entitledIn the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose
petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.[1]
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received
another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating
the request for a copy of the decision in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled
In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.[2]
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket
clerk to retrieve the records of Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then
discovered that the RTC had no record of
Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead,
the court files revealed that Judge Penuela
had decided Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria,
whose petitioner was one Serena Catin
Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and
case records did not exist,[3] Mr. Hunt sent
a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a
machine copy of the purported decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In

the Matter of the Declaration of

Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that
had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in
court proceedings in the UK.[4]
After comparing the two documents and
ascertaining that the document attached to
the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified
court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr.
Hunt to apprise him of the situation.[5]
The discovery of the falsified decision
prompted the Clerk of Court to
communicate on the situation in writing to
the NBI, triggering the investigation of the
falsification.[6]
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of
Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on
March 4, 2005,[7] wherein he stated that it
was the respondent who had facilitated the
issuance of the falsified decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter
of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The
allegations against the respondent were
substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an
affidavit dated March 20, 2005.[8]
The NBI invited the respondent to explain
his side,[9] but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent. The
NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley
Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter
appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI
forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman
for Visayas the records of the
investigation, with a recommendation that
the respondent be prosecuted for
falsification of public document under
Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).[10] The NBI
likewise recommended to the Office of the
Court Administrator that disbarment
proceedings be commenced against the
respondent.[11] Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member
of the Court) officially endorsed the
recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant.[12]
Upon being required by the Court, the
respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,
[13] whereby he denied any participation
in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirleys petition for the annulment of her
marriage; that he had given advice on the
pertinent laws involved and the different
grounds for the annulment of marriage;
that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone

back to him to present a copy of what

appeared to be a court decision;[14] that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that
he had caused the falsification of the
decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo
that the falsified decision would not hold
up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an
overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had
previously resorted to people on Recto
Avenue in Manila to solve his
documentation problems as an OFW; and
that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles
Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a
resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong,
Antique, had executed a sworn statement
before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit
with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to
the effect that her late husband, Manuel
Jalipa, had been responsible for making
the falsified document at the instance of
Dy Quioyo.[15]

except for the names and dates?

Respondent failed to explain this.
Secondly, respondent did not attend the
NBI investigation and merely invoked his
right to remain silent. If his side of the
story were true, he should have made this
known in the investigation. His story
therefore appears to have been a mere
afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible
reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister,
Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate
him in this incident.[19]

Thereafter, the
Court issued
its
resolution[16] treating the respondents
counter-affidavit as his comment, and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of

Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII2008-709[21] denying the respondents
motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP
Board of Governors then forwarded the
case to the Court in accordance with
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[22] of the Rules
of Court.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June
14, 2006,[17] Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
found the respondent guilty of serious
misconduct and violations of the
Attorneys Oath andCode of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for
one year. She concluded that the
respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it
appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with
Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in
truth and in fact the proceedings related to
the petition for declaration of presumptive
death of Rolando Austria, with Serena
Catin Austria as the petitioner;[18] and that
the respondent had received P60,000.00
from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision.
She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of
merit. Respondent contends that it was one
Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated
the issuance and as proof thereof, he
presented the sworn statement of the
widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a
contention is hard to believe. In the first
place, if the decision was obtained in
Recto, Manila, why was it an almost
verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated

February 1, 2007,[20] the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with
modification,
the
report
and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner
by
suspending
the
respondent from the practice of law for six
years.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved:

(1)
to
treat
the
respondents
comment/opposition as his appeal by
petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainants reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the
respondent to file a reply to the
complainants comment within 10 days
from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to
transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors. Indeed, the respondent was
guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a
court decision in consideration of a sum of
money.
The respondents main defense consisted
in blanket denial of the imputation. He
insisted that he had had no hand in the
falsification, and claimed that the
falsification had been the handiwork of Dy
Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had
resorted to the shady characters in Recto
Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems
he had encountered as an OFW, hinting
that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing
unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his
implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit

generation of the falsified decision are not

persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical
declaration on the respondents personal
responsibility for the falsified decision,
which by nature was positive evidence,
was not overcome by the respondents
blanket denial, which by nature was
negative
evidence.[23]
Also,
the
imputation of wrongdoing against Dy
Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did
not command credence. It is worthy to
note, too, that the respondent filed his
counter-affidavit only after the Court,
through the en banc resolution of May 10,
2005, had required him to comment.[24]
The belatedness of his response exposed
his blanket denial as nothing more than an
afterthought.

Worse, the act made a mockery of the

administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification,
which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on
the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.

The respondent relied on the sworn

statement supposedly executed by Mrs.
Jalipa that declared that her deceased
husband had been instrumental in the
falsification of the forged decision. But
such reliance was outrightly worthless, for
the sworn statement of the wife was
rendered unreliable due to its patently
hearsay character. In addition, the
unworthiness of the sworn statement as
proof of authorship of the falsification by
the husband is immediately exposed and
betrayed by the falsified decision being an
almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge
Penuela in the real Special Proceedings
Case No. 084.

x x x support [the] Constitution and obey

the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; x x x not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue on groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man
for money or malice, and x x x conduct
[themselves as lawyers] according to the
best of [their] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [their] clients x x x.

In light of the established circumstances,

the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a nonexistent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
demands that all lawyers should uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the
Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyers
disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law.[25] Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the
respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part.

It then becomes timely to remind all

members of the Philippine Bar that they
should do nothing that may in any way or
degree lessen the confidence of the public
in their professional fidelity and integrity.
[26] The Court will not hesitate to wield its
heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to
meet the enduring demands of their
Attorneys Oath for them to:

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the

verity that the practice of the legal
profession is always a privilege that the
Court extends only to the deserving, and
that the Court may withdraw or deny the
privilege to him who fails to observe and
respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons
of ethical conduct in his professional and
private capacities. He may be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law not
only for acts and omissions of malpractice
and for dishonesty in his professional
dealings, but also for gross misconduct not
directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the
office and his unworthiness of the
principles that the privilege to practice law
confers upon him.[27] Verily, no lawyer is
immune from the disciplinary authority of
the Court whose duty and obligation are to
investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or
private capacity.[28] The test is whether
the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, and whether
the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy
to continue as an officer of the Court.[29]
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND
PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS
him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to
remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any
pending or contemplated proceedings to be
initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
for
dissemination to all courts of the country,
and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
50: [ A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012 ]
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO S.
SAMSON, RESPONDENT.
The Court has often reminded members of
the bar to live up to the standards and
norms of the legal profession by upholding
the ideals and principles embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject
to the watchful public eye and community
approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private
fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined
and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.[1]
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura
filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint[2] for
Disbarment or Suspension before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline against
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for
grossly immoral conduct.
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a
Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and
a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May
2002 stating therein that the crime of
RAPE was committed against her person
sometime in December, 2001 and on 19
March 2002 when she was merely thirteen
(13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty
eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B.

Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay

5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur,
Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein
Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON
admitted that sexual intercourse indeed
transpired between the herein Complainant
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and
himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary
investigation, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines
issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June
2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and
finding the existence of probable cause for
the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
and
issued
the
corresponding
INFORMATION
for
QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed
a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in
the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02
October 2002 was elevated to [the
Department of Justice], by way of a
PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending
resolution by the Department of Justice.
8. The act/s committed by the herein
Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson
against the herein ComplainantMARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore
stated clearly constitute grossly
immoral conduct under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines which provides for a penalty of
DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an
Attorney by the SUPREME COURT.
Complainant narrated in her Sworn
Statement[3] that sometime in December
2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping
in the maids room at respondents house
when respondent entered and went on top
of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked
her breast, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain and
found blood stain in her panty. She stated
that another incident happened on March
19, 2002 at respondents poultry farm in
Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Respondent asked her to go with him to
the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter,
respondent gave her five hundred pesos
and warned her not to tell anyone what had
happened or he would kill her and her
mother.

In
her
Supplemental-Complaint,[4]
complainant averred that respondent
allowed her to sleep in his house after her
mother agreed to let her stay there while
she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the
night she was sexually abused, she was
awakened when respondent went on top of
her. She struggled to free herself and
shouted, but respondent covered her mouth
and nobody could hear as nobody was in
the house. Complainant also claimed that
on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to
6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a
multi-cab. When they arrived at his
poultry farm in Alegria, respondent
dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved
futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer[5] that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in
paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect
that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a
complaint against him for Rape at the
Provincial Prosecutors Office with
qualification that the said complaint for
Rape was dismissed.
Respondent,
however, has no knowledge or information
as to the truth of the allegation that she
was 13 years.
5.
Respondent vehemently denies the
truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of
the complaint to the effect that the acts of
respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The truth is that [the] act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done
[with] mutual agreement after respondent
gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submit[s] that his act of
having sex with complainant once does not
constitute gross[ly] immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a
person who [has] sex with a woman with
mutual agreement and complainant
[accepts] compensation therefore. Having
sex with complainant once with just
compensation does not amount to immoral
conduct.
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon
Ventura who was an employee at the Law
Office of respondent herein. The said
Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and
[had a grudge] against the herein
respondent who terminated her services
due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against
respondent as well as this Administrative
Case is a well orchestrated and planned act
of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against

respondent as a result of her separation

from the employment in the Law Office of
the respondent. This claim is supported by
the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the
former Office Clerk at the Law Office of
respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires
to get back [at] respondent, she demanded
from respondent to settle with her and
demanded the payment of the amount [of]
P2,000,000.00[;] otherwise she will file a
case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come
across with Corazon Ventura, the latter
made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the
case [for] rape did not prosper because the
Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case,
Corazon Ventura [sent word] to respondent
that she is amenable for the amount of
P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura
wanted to extort from respondent so that
she [can] get even with him and his wife
for separating her from the employment;
9.
Complainant is a woman of loose
moral character. This is supported by the
Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is
hereto attached as Annex 3.
And
Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize
Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument
in putting down the respondent herein
because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her
biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable
reputation. The fact [that] Corazon Ventura
is not the biological mother of Maria
Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial
order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
Respondent has not violated any grounds
mentioned in this rule. Respondent
respectfully submits that his having sex
with complainant with just compensation
once does not amount to immoral conduct.
For who among men will not yield to
temptation when a woman shall invite him
for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his
Counter-Affidavit[6] which he submitted
to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged
therein that complainant usually stayed
late at night with her male friends when
her mother was out of the house. He
claimed that he heard rumors that
complainant had sexual affairs with
different boys. Respondent narrated that
on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their
rented house. Complainant told him that
they wanted to go out to swim but they did
not have money. When she asked if he
could spare some amount, he gave her

money. He told her in jest that he wanted

to see her that afternoon and go to a place
where they could be alone, and he was
surprised when she agreed.
He just
thought that for complainant, sex is a
common thing despite her age. At around
5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her
house. She casually walked towards the
car and boarded it. He told her that they
will not check in a lodging house because
people might recognize him.
Upon
reaching his poultry farm, respondent met
his farm worker and asked him if he could
use the latters hut. The farm worker
agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant
did not hesitate in entering the room.
Respondent
did
not
notice
any
involuntariness on her part as she
undressed herself. He asserted that they
had sexual intercourse based on their
mutual understanding. Thereafter, the
complainant dressed up and walked back
to the multi-cab where she waited for him.
He told her not to tell anyone about what
had happened, to which she replied
natural buang kay motug-an meaning,
shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He
alleged that she accepted the money he
gave because she needed to buy some
things but her mother did not give her any
allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and
the last incident. He claimed that he was
able to confirm that complainant is no
longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating
Prosecutors found that probable cause
exists for respondent to stand trial for
qualified seduction.[7] The charge of rape,
however, was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence. An Information was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan
del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who
was not satisfied with the dismissal of the
rape charge, filed a motion for
reconsideration. When said motion was
denied, complainant filed a petition for
review with the Department of Justice
(DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the
findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant
and her mother appeared before the public
prosecutor and executed their respective
Affidavits of Desistance.[8] Complainant
stated that what happened between
respondent and her in March 2002 was
based on mutual understanding. Thus, she
was withdrawing the complaint she filed
against respondent before the RTC as well
as the one she filed before the IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline.

Accordingly, the criminal case against

respondent was dismissed.[9]
In its Report and Recommendation[10]
dated October 10, 2007, the IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline
recommended
that
respondent
be
suspended for a period of one year from
the practice of law for immorality with the
warning that repetition of the same or
similar act will merit a more severe
penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of
Governors of the IBP issued Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED
and APPROVED with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that respondent
is found guilty of immorality, the victim
is a minor, respondent and his wife was
victims guardians and for being a married
man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
five (5) years with Stern Warning that
repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.[11]
Complainant now moves to reconsider the
IBP Resolution. She argues that the
penalty imposed by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity and depravity
of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral
conduct by forcing himself to have sexual
intercourse with a young and innocent lass
of 13 years of age. He also took advantage
of his moral ascendancy over complainant
considering that she was then staying at
respondents residence. Moreover, there
was a betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity considering that respondent was a
married man. She insists that this
detestable behavior renders respondent
unfit and undeserving of the honor and
privilege which his license confers upon
him. Thus, complainant prays that the
penalty of disbarment be imposed.[12]
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[13] of the IBP
Resolution. He asserts that complainant
has not presented any proof of her
minority. Likewise, during the sexual
encounter, complainant was not under their
custody. He contends that complainants
mother even testified that her daughter

stayed at respondents house only until

February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and
since this is the first time he has been
found administratively liable, he is entitled
to a reduction of the penalty to one year
suspension from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,
[14] the possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and
a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. It is
the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in
order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
[15] Consequently, any errant behavior on
the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers
public or private activities, which tends to
show said lawyer deficient in moral
character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion
of the upright and respectable members of
the community.[16] Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute
a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency.[17]
From the undisputed facts gathered from
the evidence and the admissions of

respondent himself, we find that

respondents act of engaging in sex with a
young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral
conduct
that
warrants
sanction.
Respondent not only admitted he had
sexual intercourse with complainant but
also showed no remorse whatsoever when
he asserted that he did nothing wrong
because she allegedly agreed and he even
gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
carnal knowledge of a woman other than
his wife manifests his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and his
own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the
fact that he procured the act by enticing a
very young woman with money showed
his utmost moral depravity and low regard
for the dignity of the human person and the
ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,[18] we held that
the moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue
as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and
confidence
reposed
on
him
by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,[19]
who for a time was under respondents
care.
Whether the sexual encounter
between the respondent and complainant
was or was not with the latters consent is
of no moment. Respondent clearly
committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral
and highly reprehensible act.
Such
conduct is a transgression of the standards
of morality required of the legal profession
and should be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
expressly states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for, among others, any deceit, grossly
immoral conduct, or violation of the oath

that he is required to take before admission

to the practice of law. It bears to stress
that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme
Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely
show the lawyers lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers.[20]
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v.
Cabanting[21] that a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag
v. Lumaya,[22] the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an
Affidavit of Desistance during the
pendency of this case is of no moment.
Complainants Affidavit of Desistance
cannot have the effect of abating the
instant proceedings in view of the public
service character of the practice of law and
the nature of disbarment proceedings as a
public interest concern.
A case of
suspension or disbarment is sui generis and
not meant to grant relief to a complainant
as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts. A disbarment
case is not an investigation into the acts of
respondent but on his conduct as an officer
of the court and his fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar.[23]

Illicit sexual relations have been

previously punished with disbarment,
indefinite
or
definite
suspension,
depending on the circumstances.[24] In
this case, respondents gross misbehavior
and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a
serious flaw in his character, his moral
indifference to sexual exploitation of a
minor, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but
put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict
but appropriate disciplinary action.[25]
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the
power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never
be decreed.[26] However, in the present
case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.[27]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S.
Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of
office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is
immediately executory, be made part of
the records of respondent in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.