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United States v. Robert Mann, 4th Cir. (2013)
United States v. Robert Mann, 4th Cir. (2013)
United States v. Robert Mann, 4th Cir. (2013)
No. 12-6590
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
In 1998, a jury convicted Robert Cy Mann of possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of
powder cocaine, and the district court sentenced him in accord
with the then-applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Following Amendment 750 to the Guidelines, which lowered
sentences for certain crack cocaine offenses, the district court
granted Manns motion to reduce his sentence. The Government contends that when the district court originally sentenced Mann it found him responsible for more than 8.4
kilograms of crack cocaine and therefore erred in subsequently finding him eligible for the sentence reduction. Finding that the district court did not clearly err in holding that it
had not originally made a finding that rendered Mann ineligible for the reduction, or otherwise abuse its discretion, we
affirm.
I.
A jury convicted Mann of one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base (Count 18) and one count of
distribution of cocaine (Count 25), both in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (2006).1
1
The jury also convicted Mann on a conspiracy count, which the district
court dismissed on double jeopardy grounds and which is not at issue here.
B.
The Government also argues that the district court could
have made additional findings as to drug amounts, consistent
with its original findings, in making its resentencing determination. We have not addressed this contention in a published
opinion, but our sister circuits agree that additional findings
lie within a sentencing courts discretion. See, e.g., United
States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[N]othing
prevents the court from making new findings that are supported by the record and not inconsistent with the findings
made in the original sentencing determination."); United
States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641, 646 (6th Cir. 2009) ("We do
not agree . . . that the district courts previous determination
of more than 1.5 kilograms means that it cannot also find
more than 4.5 kilograms.").
That the district court may have possessed this authority
does not aid the Government here. For the Government does
not even argue that the court was under any obligation to
make new findingsand for good reason. The court was
under no such obligation. See United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d
1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that courts need not
engage in new factual determinations in a 3582(c)(2) proceeding because such a proceeding "is not a de novo resentencing"); see also Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2683, 2691 (2010) ("Section 3582(c)(2)s text, together with
its narrow scope, shows that Congress intended to authorize
only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and
not a plenary resentencing proceeding."). The district court
may reasonably have concluded that the facts of Manns conviction would not support any additional finding of responsibility for 8.4 kilograms or more of crack cocaine. The court
did not err in exercising its discretion not to make additional
findings more than a decade after the original sentencing.
More broadly, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mann was eligible for a sentence reduction.
Under 3582(c)(2), "the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.]
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such
a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C.
3582(c)(2). Because the district court correctly concluded
that "the guideline range applicable to th[e] defendant has . . .
been lowered as a result of [Amendment 750]," and reasonably concluded that no exclusion applied, Manns reduction
accords with Sentencing Commission policy. See U.S.S.G.
1B1.10(a) (2011). In addition, the 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh in Manns favor, particularly given that he has
already served a substantial sentence and seems to have been
a model prisoner, genuinely interested in rehabilitation. See
18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
III.
In sum, the district court did not commit clear error in holding that when originally sentencing Mann it had made no
finding of a sufficient drug quantity to make Mann ineligible
for a sentence reduction. Nor did it otherwise abuse its discretion in granting the reduction. For these reasons, the judgment
of the district court is
AFFIRMED.