UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY D. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 01-1090

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.
(CA-99-236-7-F)
Submitted: December 10, 2001
Decided: December 28, 2001
Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL
Anthony D. Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Gregory Wenzl Brown, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

DAVIS v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Anthony D. Davis appeals from the district courts order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellee, and dismissing his employment discrimination action alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e (West 1994 &
Supp. 2001), on the ground that the summary judgment motion was
unopposed. Our review of the record discloses that this appeal is subject to dismissal as moot.
Following the filing of a notice of appeal, by counsel, from the
underlying judgment, Davis filed in the district court a pro se Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) motion in which he claimed attorney malpractice in failing to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the district
courts entry of an adverse order without consideration of evidence he
could submit. The district court granted the Rule 60(b) motion, and
ordered Davis to request from this court a limited remand of the
action in light of the district courts grant of the Rule 60(b) motion
and pursuant to Fobian v. Storage Technology Corp., 164 F.3d 887,
891-92 (4th Cir. 1999). By order of April 24, 2001, we granted the
limited remand, and the district court considered fully the evidence
Davis submitted in opposition to Appellees summary judgment
motion.* Because the basis for Daviss notice of appeal was remedied
when we granted the limited remand and the district court granted
Daviss Rule 60(b) motion and considered the opposition evidence
Davis filed, Daviss ground for appeal was rendered moot.
We therefore dismiss this appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
*Davis filed a second notice of appeal to the district courts adverse
finding following full consideration of the claims, which has been
assigned appeal No. 01-2230, and which currently is pending with this
court in mediation.