Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Published
Published
No. 12-2161
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00320-NKM-BWC)
Argued:
Decided:
515
Granby,
LLC
(Granby)
and
Marathon
on
the
proceeding.
issue
of
just
compensation
in
condemnation
was
substantially
justified
or
special
circumstances
28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A).
The district
United
States
was
admittedly
unreasonable,
the
United
position
as
whole
is
substantially
justified,
and
to
I.
A.
Granby
owned
1.604-acre
parcel
of
land
in
Norfolk,
establishments,
and
office
space.
Although
the
United
States
was
interested
in
obtaining
Granbys
reappraised
in
2009
at
In
downturn,
it
value
of
$6.175
million.
negotiations
to
purchase
the
1.604-acre
parcel
the
Fifth
lien,
the
United
action;
other
parties
but
Amendments
States
lienholders
were
not
Takings
joined
were
joined.
Clause.
Marathon
put
on
Marathon
as
Because
of
its
party
to
the
notice
as
interested
participated
in
the
including
incentive.
value
of
the
developers
entrepreneurial
governments
evidence.
the
motions
to
exclude
certain
types
of
valuation
The
government
ordered
new
appraisal
for
its
trial
Each of the
2412(d)(2)(H).
Here,
the
jurys
verdict
of
28
$13.4
That Granby
grounds
that
the
governments
position
was
substantially
judge,
who
recommended
eligible
for
because
the
fees,
that
costs,
both
and
governments
Granby
other
and
expenses
position
was
Marathon
under
not
found
justified,
that
the
it
did
circumstances.
governments
not
position
reach
the
was
question
EAJA
substantially
The district
the
were
Because
substantially
of
special
II.
The arguments on appeal mirror those before the district
court.
substantially
position
justified
should
because
automatically
substantial justification.
an
unreasonable
foreclose
court
prelitigation
from
finding
as
circumstances
district
matter
that
court
of
would
did
not
law,
make
that
an
reach
there
are
no
special
award
unjust.
Because
the
question
of
the
special
U.S.
552,
56263
(1988).
Pierce v. Underwood,
district
court
561
F.3d
302,
326
(4th
Cir.
abuses
its
United States v.
2009).
Although
this
rubber-stamping
of
district
court
decisions
regarding
we
have
stated,
the
EAJA
provides
that
parties
who
EEOC v.
Cody v.
Caterisano, 631 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pierce,
487 U.S. at 566 n.2).
as
more
than
frivolousness.
487
context,
merely
U.S.
position
is
at
undeserving
of
56566.
the
substantially
In
sanctions
for
eminent-domain
justified
when
the
seeming
relatively
straightforward,
determining
991 F.2d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Paisley, 957 F.2d at
1165).
specific
question
of
balancing
the
governments
prelitigation
guidance
that
the
notwithstanding,
governments
we
have
prelitigation
no
difficulty
and
litigation
of
the
United
States. 3
As
the
Supreme
Court
has
beyond
the
issue
on
which
the
petitioner
prevailed
to
acted
reasonably
in
causing
the
litigation
or
in
recognized
the
need
to
consider
both
the
For
10
this analysis, we can draw guidance from the views of our sister
circuits, who have addressed the question directly, albeit with
differing results.
Governments
court
must
litigation
considered alone.
award
fees
position
is
itself
even
if
the
reasonable
when
1989); see also Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir.
1998).
prelitigation
position
without
creating
bright-line
rule.
E.g., Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007);
United
States
v.
Marolf,
277
F.3d
1156,
1164
n.5
(9th
Cir.
we
elaborate
below,
we
endorse
the
latter
approach
as
assessing
the
reasonableness
of
awards
of
attorneys
11
defense
of
unreasonable
when
the
positions.
Roanoke
River
Basin
governments
unjustified
prelitigation
position
forces a lawsuit, the petitioner may recover fees under the EAJA
for
the
entire
suit,
even
if
the
governments
litigation
281 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Roanoke River Basin Assn, 991
F.2d at 139
reasonableness
on
the
of
[the
governments]
position
in
the
significance
of
the
governments
prelitigation
the
EAJA
unjustifiably
was
designed
forcing
to
litigation,
prevent
then
(1984);
see
also
Jean,
496
U.S.
the
government
avoiding
from
liability
by
159
n.7.
Such
12
42 U.S.C. 4651.
369,
373
(1943)
(defining
just
compensation
as
fair
market
value).
B.
In
light
of
the
principles
discussed
above,
we
are
short,
prelitigation
we
adopt
position
will
the
view
that
generally
lead
the
court
must
an
to
unreasonable
an
award
independently
determine
whether
prelitigation
of
position
is
unreasonable
its
If the
and
its
13
compensation
had
reasonable
should
examine
basis
in
fact
and
law.
such
factors
as:
the
experience,
of
bad
relationship
of
faith
the
on
the
part
governments
of
the
various
government;
appraisals
to
the
each
and
the
severity
of
the
alleged
governmental
misconduct.
1996
WL
393171,
*2
(4th
Cir.
July
15,
1996)
(per
the
prelitigation
district
court
valuation
finds
position
that
was
the
governments
unreasonable
but
its
of
the
compensation.
prelitigation
position
on
the
action
for
just
to
resort
River
to
Basin
litigation
Assn,
991
14
or
to
prolong
F.2d
at
138.
litigation.
Assessing
the
effect
of
the
governments
misconduct
will
necessarily
vary
To be clear,
Because
the EAJA itself defines which parties are eligible for EAJA fee
awards, the district court may not consider whether a party who
otherwise meets the statutory threshold needs fees in order to
litigate.
Additionally, the
added).
In
other
words,
the
prevailing
partys
15
identify
the
effects
of
the
governments
unreasonable
prelitigation position. 6
The
conduct
of
the
prevailing
party
may
also
become
496
U.S.
justification
at
159.
Once
determination
is
the
made,
threshold
a
the
petitioning
party
is
entitled
to
fees
substantial-
sizeable
See
award
of
Id. at 163.
If
and
expenses,
the
16
party
resolution
unduly
of
the
2412(d)(1)(C).
and
unreasonably
matter
in
protracted
controversy.
28
the
final
U.S.C.
Hensley
Therefore,
the
v.
Eckerhart,
district
court
461
may
U.S.
424,
consider
436
the
(1983).
prevailing
III.
For
the
reasons
stated
above,
we
vacate
the
district
EAJA was not before us because the trial court made no finding
on
that
issue.
If
necessary
on
remand,
the
district
court
17