Popular Culture and Ideological

Discontents: A Theory
Gabriel BaroHaim

Introduction
This paper is concerned with the nature of popular culture, and
particularly with its role of providing commentaries on the effects of
ideology on social experience. To illustrate this role and to provide
some analytic corroboration of the nature of popular culture, we will
first examine some of the limitations of the dominant theoretical
conceptions of the relationship between ideology and popular culture. By w a y of suggesting an alternative approach, we will then
examine some of the basic features of popular culture--e.g., escapism, liminality, and rituals of resistance--paying special attention
to their common characteristics. 1
The issue of the relationship between ideology and culture, including popular culture, enjoyed a resurgence during the past decade,
especially in England. Various studies have attempted to recover the
basic culture-as-reflection-of-ideologyposition from the early Marxist orthodoxy and to revitalize it with ideas borrowed from Gramsci
and Althusser, and with selected concepts from semiotics and structuralism (Hall 1983; Gurevitch et al. 1982; Bennett 1980; Hall et al.
1980; Barrett et al., 1979; Bigsby, 1976).
These studies, however, continue to be burdened by Marxist baggage, and so have been unable to view ideology as a system of beliefs
which can themselves become a source of tension and dissatisfaction even for its adherents. To view ideology in this way is to move
beyond the old base/superstructure dichotomy and leads to an
~A cross-cultural o b s e r v a t i o n is in order: the E n g l i s h s c h o l a r l y literature usually
refers to c o n t e m p o r a r y u r b a n culture or p o p u l a r culture as a w o r k i n g class p h e n o m e n a ( B e n n e t t 1980; Hall et al. 1976), w h e r e a s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a distinction is often
m a d e b e t w e e n m a s s culture a n d p o p u l a r culture (Fiedler 1975). T h e former c o n n o t e s a
widely accessible a n d b r o a d l y accepted p h e n o m e n o n (such as r o m a n c e reading),
while the l a t t e r refers to s o m e t h i n g different from m a i n s t r e a m interest or consumption, h a v i n g some 'color' a n d folkloristic flavor, such as w o m e n ' s wrestling clubs
(Peterson, 1977). By c o n t r a s t , Western Europe, J a p a n ( S h i b a t a & Yoshida 1983), a n d
I s r a e l (Bar-Haim, 1990), t h e t e r m p o p u l a r culture is more unified; it c o n n o t e s w h a t e v e r
p a s s e s as c o n t e m p o r a r y u r b a n , secular, a n d b r o a d l y accessible.
Politics, Culture, and Society
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u n d e r s t a n d i n g that culture and ideology are separate. Ideology can

then appear as the engine of social action while cultural representations, appear as reactions to and commentaries on it. Cultural
representations in other words, m a y be viewed as a way of coping
with the effects of actions and policies inspired by ideology.
In order to investigate the role played by cultural representations
in alleviating the psychosocial stresses t h a t result from ideological
imperatives, or from their ensuing translations into social action, it
is necessary to consider ideology and culture in something other
t h a n a subordiante relationship. The tendency to subordiante cultural representations to ideological meanings is common in m a n y of
the studies concerned with the nature of ideology-culture relationships. This makes it difficult for them to see t h a t cultural representations are often engendered because of ideology, and not from it or by
it, and t h a t the role of cultural representations is to provide symbolic
and expressive commentaries to those everyday living concerns that
emanate from ideological imperatives.

The Relationship Between Popular Culture and Ideology

Clifford Geertz's (1964) suggestion that we consider how personal
sentiments and attitudes are cast into the public forms is central to
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the relationship of ideology and culture, since both
transform private sentiments and tensions into public expressions.
However, there are f u n d a m e n t a l differences in what and how each
one transforms. In order to understand these differences, I will first
briefly compare the features of ideology with those of another belief
system, such as religion. It will then be possible to contrast the
common characteristics of both belief systems with those of popular
cultural expressions.
There are evident differences between religion and ideology with
regard to the elements of social life they transform and interpret, the
levels at which they operate, and the aspects of life they highlight.
Religion, . . . focuses on the everyday life and on its proper conduct.
Ideology, by contrast, is concerned not so much with the routine
immediacies of the everyday, but with achieving especially mobilized
projects. Ideology seeks to gather, assemble, husband, defer, and control the discharge of political energies. Religions, however, is ultimately concerned with the round of daily existence and the recurrent
crisis of the life cycle. (Gouldner 1976, pp. 26-27).
According to Gouldner, ideologies seek earthly reaction and reforms,
whereas religions seek transcendental reconciliation. Ideologies

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permit interpretation t h a t is 'not possible within the terms of everyday life's ordinary language' while religious interpretations are just
the opposite. 2
In spite of these differences, however, as belief systems ideology
a n d religion share f u n d a m e n t a l characteristics. Both strive to produce m e a n i n g s and interpretations t h a t either shape a present social
order or subvert it in order to replace it. These m e a n i n g s and interpretations become motivations for social action.
While ideology and religion bestow value upon social action, popular culture reacts to the m e a n i n g s and actions produced by these
belief systems by a t t e m p t i n g to devalue their validity without necessarily subverting their raison d'etre. As opposed to ideology or religion, popular cultural p h e n o m e n a cannot be regarded as a belief
system g e r m a n e to some kind of social action aimed for or against a
n o r m a t i v e order. T h a t is, popular culture does not have an interrelated set of definite ideas, an utopian vision t h a t would legitimate
moral a n d social action, nor does it d e m a n d c o m m i t m e n t s or mobilize motivations. By a n d large, this modern, urban, and secular type
of culture is a reaction to the ideological forces t h a t inherently
develop a n d m a i n t a i n social routines, casting into public forms the
concerns and anxieties sensed by people whose lives are affected.
As a reaction, popular cultural p h e n o m e n o n is by definition a
c o m m e n t on w h a t it reacts to. R. Williams' (1958, p. 285) observation
t h a t "the idea of culture is a general reaction to a general and major
c h a n g e in the conditions of our c o m m o n life" bears on the nature of
popular culture. The wide range of popular cultural p h e n o m e n a are
generated at the expense of d o m i n a n t belief systems such as ideology, religion, various forms of spiritual movements, and the like-often for the purpose of suggesting their inadequacy or bankruptcy.
Popular culture thrives on disillusionment, frustrations, anxieties
and c h a n g e s effected by ideology, religion, or other belief systems. It
prospers in times of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t with "redeeming vision" a n d
with supporting social a n d value systems. Popular representations
are always present even in times of high ideological or spiritual
2For a discussion on the similarity between religion and ideology, see the section
regarding the inclusive approach in Roland Robertson: "Basic Problem of Definition"
in Kennet Thompson and Jeremy Tunstall (eds.), Sociological Perspectives, Penguin
Books, London, 1971. For a complementary treatment of ideology as a belief system
see John E. Thomson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, especially the interpretation
of the work ofV. N. Volosinov. George H. Lewis's thesis that popular culture may be
playing the role once played by religion seems to me to be erroneous and contradictory. Ironically, however, Lewis's arguments can be corroborative since he implies
that the vitality of popular culture today is similar to religious fervor in the past. See
"Between Consciousness and Existence: Popular Culture and the Sociological Imagination." Journal of Popular Culture, vol. 15, Spring 1982, No. I.

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tides, but the vitality of their creation and their popularity stand in
an inverse relationship to the spellbinding power of dominant meaning production systems, i.e., the expressive reaction stands in
inverse relation to social action. The French write Michael Tournier's observation aptly applies here: 'The more I laugh the less I joke.'
Willner (1970:141), who examined the roots and d y n a m i c of the
French student revolt in 1968, which gave m a n y students a feeling of
life more "real" t h a n w h a t could be gained by writing graffiti on
walls or viewing political cabaret, quoted one of the students who
said:
One of the most widespread slogans in May--it would be quite useless
to attempt to locate its origin--was: "culture is the inversion of life."
Debord (1967) made a corroborative observation while discussing
the notion of "spectacle":
S p e c t a c l e in g e n e r a l , as t h e c o n c r e t e i n v e r s i o n of life, is t h e autonom o u s m o v e m e n t of t h e n o n - l i v i n g .

What Debord seems to have in mind is t h a t a spectacle is a commentary and not the social action out of which social life evolves.
In order for discotheques, yoga clubs, video game arcades, rock
concerts, and other forms of popular culture to reach the levels of
popularity they enjoy today, some kind of change must have
occurred in peoples' attraction to definitions and interpretations
produced by ideology. It m a y be t h a t rapid increase of popular culrural phenomena, accompanied by a persistent public interest, is
symptomatic of a deep social crisis in the sense t h a t no existing
belief system is able to produce relevant m e a n i n g s and acceptable
interpretations of everyday life for a critical mass of people. The
extreme case is the connection between popular cultural phenomena, the demise of values, and social decay, as during the Roman
decline (Brantlinger 1983).
The case of Israel (Bar-Haim, 1990) provides a recently documented example of relation between popular cultural expressions
and ideology. ~ During the first decades of its existence Israel was
aThe example is particularly interesting because it has a sociology of knowledge
aspect. That is, when the observers of popular culture phenomena are themselves
caught by ideology, their coverage, if they are journalists, or their subjects of research,
if they are social scientists, become influenced toward minimizing the importance
and the diffusion of cultural phenomena. But more important, these observers neglected to assess the existence of popular phenomena among those not involved in the
ideological implementation. During the first three decades of the state, neither media
coverage nor research on mass/popular culture was common, although there has
been growing interest on the subject in recent years.

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caught up in the ideological enthusiasm of the new State. During

this time popular cultural phenomena receded among large parts of
the population who were ideologically committed, though not
a m o n g those who immigrated due not to ideological commitments
but to historical and social circumstances. Journalists and social
scientists paid scant attention to the popular cultural expressions
employed or invented by these non-committed immigrants and other
social groups. Students of social science in the early period of the
state regarded themselves as a "mobilized elite" who thought it more
urgent to evaluate the implementation goals of state ideology.
Instead of inquiring into the expressive aspects of youth culture, for
example, research concentrated on various aspects of socialization
a m o n g youth ideological movements; instead of research into forms
of popular culture among various ethnic i m m i g r a n t - - s u c h as social
games, gambling and jokes as means of coping with a new reality-research focused on the rate of ethnic intermarriage as an indicator
of ideological adjustment to new styles of life. Three decades later,
following an erosion in state ideology, both expressive phenomena
as well as research in this area began to emerge.

Cultural Representations as Expressive Resources

The interpretations, commentaries, and meanings produced by

contemporary popular culture do not reflect the perspectives of the
deviant, bizarre, or rebellious nor do they exclusively reflect the
perspective of a particular social class. Rather, popular culture
reflects the outlook of diverse social groups employing expressive
resources to react to existing social policies and the dominant ideologles they express. Ideologies are not only the motor of social action
but, as Geertz contended, they are also the vehicle for transforming
sociopsychological concerns into public meanings. These meanings
can eventually become a source of the discontent and distress t h a t
needs to be commented and reflected upon (but with different m e a n s
and in different ways). In a sense, ideologies produce interpretations
of social reality which are favorable and helpful to their carrying
groups, but which are insufficient or detrimental to others.
In general, the nature of ideology is such t h a t it exerts demands
and makes claims on social reality by advocating various social
actions (Habermas 1979; Ricoeur 1966). Certain social groups are
more vulnerable t h a n others to these demands and therefore tend to
invent or appropriate cultural representations aimed at providing
some kind of expressive c o m m e n t a r y and, consequently, at attaining a feeling of pseudo liberation. In other words, the use of cultural

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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as expressive resources is m o s t p r e v a l e n t a m o n g
social groups t h a t are more v u l n e r a b l e or more exposed to the effects
of ideology, a n d w h i c h are therefore m o r e receptive t h a n others to
hopeful social visions.
F o r example, the creativity of y o u n g people in producing or
e m b r a c i n g p o p u l a r p h e n o m e n a more readily t h a n adults can be
explained b y the intense ideological d e m a n d s placed on t h e m /
Social groups are v u l n e r a b l e to ideologies according to the potential effects of these ideologies on their lives. For example, certain
groups of w o m e n a n d men, b e c a u s e t h e y are susceptible to feminist
ideology or b e c a u s e t h e y are t h r e a t e n e d b y its repercussions, often
tend to cope by e m p l o y i n g expressive s y m b o l s a n d i m a g i n a t i v e
p o p u l a r forms such as W o m e n ' s storytelling clubs and support
groups, or Divorced Men's cooking contests. Similarly, J. R a d w a y
(1986:112) found t h a t female readers of r o m a n c e novels exhibit an
expressive form of resisting the p a t r i a r c h a l ideology.
We have discovered that romance reading, rather than being a form of
gratuitously elaborated free play, is in fact an activity with both
practical and symbolic relevance to the context of their daily lives.
Indeed it is a practice that has been adopted because it can be fit within
the material and social constraints of that situation and because it
enables them to address one of the most persistent costs of that
situation...
T h e s a m e p a t t e r n of reaction across social classes can be ass u m e d to occur where s i g n i f i c a n t technological changes, bureaucratic programs, modernization ventures or psychiatric revolution
are perceived as t h r e a t e n i n g peoples' lives. It is not b y chance t h a t
prodigious computers, o m n i p o t e n t robots, o m i n o u s genetic hybrids,
or c o n n i v i n g p s y c h i a t r i s t s h a v e been such p o p u l a r targets lately in
jokes, cartoons, television parodies, social g a m e s of all kinds,
~P r e s s u r e s t h a t result from concern over school performance, career choices, proper
d a t i n g b e h a v i o r , etc. lead t h e m to resort to various expressive resources as a way of
coping w i t h e u t h a v i n g to c o n f r o n t either the source of these ideological pressures or
the e n s u i n g contradictions. The weighty d e m a n d s of p a r e n t s a n d schools often lead to
expressive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t e n a b l e y o u n g people to culturally e n a c t social conf r o n t a t i o n s with all t h a t p a r e n t s a n d schools r e p r e s e n t (Hall a n d Jefferson, ~976:20).
For example, sixties y o u t h resorted to a n a v a l a n c h e of expressive p h e n o m e n a in
r e a c t i n g to middle-class p a r e n t a l a n d school values, w h i c h they r e g a r d e d as materialistic a n d conservative. Similarly, E a s t E u r o p e a n y o u t h h a v e r e s p o n d e d to the i n t e n s e
ideological p r e s s u r e s to w h i c h t h e y are subjected by e m b r a c i n g Western y o u t h culture
s y m b o l s , i m a g e r y , a n d heroes (Bar-Haim, 1987). A d u l t s are not free from ideological
d e m a n d s , of course. B u t w i t h t h e i r life style already defined a n d with t h e i r basic social
c o m m i t m e n t s a l r e a d y formed, t h e y are less v u l n e r a b l e , less t h r e a t e n e d , a n d therefore
less in need of o s t e n t a t i o u s expressive resources t h a n are youth.

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science fiction, films a n d other forms a n d genres of cultural representations. The genres t h a t have concerned themselves with such
topics capture the technocratic m e t a p h o r while echoing people's
anxiety over the uncontrollable effects of technocracy.
Likewise, the "good guy" in Western m o v e s - - T a r z a n , Rambo,
S u p e r m a n , Popeye, the Smurfs, a n d others--are exaggerated or the
inverse archetypes of real incumbents of active social roles t h a t
d o m i n a t e public life, such as international terrorists, hypocritical
moralists, pompous politicians, bellicose generals, incompetent
bureaucrats, and the like. Such popular characters can be a s s u m e d
to be in higher d e m a n d a m o n g certain social groups based on the
degree to which they feel alienated from and frustrated by leaders or
by the ideology they represent.
Popular culture suggests neither realistic nor utopian alternatives. If alternatives are proposed, they are in the form of allegories
t h a t allude to events and incumbents, the social reality which is
either a source of concern or of disillusionment. Popular culture
c o m m e n t s on ideological effects without t a k i n g either an alternative
stance or a transcendental position.
Not only do popular cultural p h e n o m e n a not advance alternatives
but even if they do appear to take a political or a social stance, the
public context within which it is exercised dissolves its social mission into a creative symbolic gesture, diffused amidst a multitude of
competing daily occurrences, e.g., graffiti (Castleman, 1982) or
youth subculture (Brake, 1985, Clarke et al. 1976). Everyday life, as
the palpable arena in which ideologies are translated into social
action, bestows upon the messages of popular cultural expressions a
limited, noncommitted, and temporary validity.
These very characteristics, however, are also responsible for the
s t r e n g t h of popular cultural p h e n o m e n a . George Orwell (1972; p. 12),
for example, in an a t t e m p t to define the principle guiding the popularity o f " d i r t y jokes," observed that: "A dirty joke is not, of course, a
serious attack upon morality, but it is a sort of m e n t a l rebellion, a
m o m e n t a r y wish t h a t t h i n g s were otherwise." Douglas (1979), exam i n i n g the structure and function of jokes, corroborates Orwell,
n o t i n g t h a t "it [the joke] is frivolous in t h a t it produces no real
alternative, only an exhilarating sense of freedom from form in
general."
A joke can become popular if it alludes to actual social events or
basic persistent concerns. Similarly, cartoons, video games, rock
lyrics, etc. which catch the public consciousness and touch a sensitive nerve can attain popularity. Once the event fades away by
being crowded out by other competing events, losing its initial

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novelty, or e x h a u s t i n g the available resources of representation-new ones or new versions take its place. These perpetual changes
a m o n g the sources of inspiration of popular cultural representation,
a n d consequently a m o n g the representations themselves, produce a
c o n s u m e r a t t i t u d e / e x p e c t a t i o n of a limited " e n c h a n t i n g duration"
of each representation.
Such an attitude does not allow for extensive and long-term actualization of the various " p r o n o u n c e m e n t s " expressed by popular culture, which engenders m u c h of the ad hoc fermentation a r o u n d
them. The short-lived, transformative, a n d f r a g m e n t e d character of
these representations give t h e m the power to devalue ideology, with
its t e n d e n c y toward holism, implementation, and reification. If
myth, as Barthes (1977:165) defined it (based on Marx), "consists in
overturning the cultural, the ideological, the historical into the
' n a t u r a l ' . . . , " then popular culture, at least in its early stage when it
serves as a commentary, is in fact anti-myth. If ideology tends to
become 'nature,' popular representations elude s u c h a transformation unless they become an ideological category, at which point they
would cease to be a feature of popular culture.
One m a y a s s u m e t h a t a n y popular cultural p h e n o m e n o n t h a t
becomes popular a m o n g an audience is a social commentary. At
least this would be true if m a n i p u l a t i o n s by the culture industries
played no role. But of course, they are involved to a certain extent.
On the other hand, the idea t h a t sophisticated m a n i p u l a t i o n s can
account for the production of popularity is a simplification. It cannot
explain, for example, why, at a n y given time, equally m a n i p u l a t e d
representations do not become equally popular. Gottdiener (1985:
998) convincingly argues that:
I n effect, e v e n t h o u g h a s p e c t s of s e m i o s i s are controlled b y i n d u s t r y ,
i m p o r t a n t degrees of freedom r e m a i n for the p r o d u c t i o n of m e a n i n g s
t h a t are i n d e p e n d e n t of e i t h e r t h e logic of e x c h a n g e v a l u e or the
d o m i n a n t cultural sensibility.

Eventually, the messages of popular cultural p h e n o m e n a are ideologically appropriated a n d adopted, suggesting social affinities, as
with popular music or dress styles (Hall, Jefferson, 1976). However,
precisely because of the potential for social co-optation and its ensuing routinization and predictability, these representations c h a n g e
form a n d content at a tremendous rate. ~ They can become rejuven:'The idea of the initial liberating potential of the blues and its later incorporation
into an ideological category has been expressed by S. Cohen and L. Taylor: Escape
Attempts (see bibl.), pg. 122. A similar idea has been expressed regarding rock music
in which an excessive anti-structural tendency in the late 60's provoked a return to a
simpler rock style, "a kind of reprimitivization parallel to the movements in the visual

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ated and stimulate the invention of new forms and genres until they
inexorably "surrender" again. Thus, the role of fads is to replace
obsolete messages--those that have ceased to be either effective
commentaries or have been utterly incorporated into the ideologically defined corpus of social meanings. As such, they can no longer
provide non-committed commentaries on ordinary social life.
IdeoloEy: Inability to Comment on Its Own Effects

Two altogether different approaches to the relationship between

culture and ideology can be brought to bear upon a conception of
popular culture: Geertz' anthropocentric approach, which regards
ideology as a cultural system, and the basic Marxist matrix espoused
by the Frankfurt School, which subordinates culture to ideology. An
inherent weakness of both approaches is that they fail to distinguish
between culture and ideology, instead absorbing one into the other
or subjecting one to the rules of the other.
Geertz (1964) regarded ideology as one of symbolic structures
"through which attitudes incited by sociopsychological stresses are
given public existence." But highlighting the linguistic symbolism
in ideological slogans he attempts to broaden the concept of ideology
to refer to "systems of interacting symbols" and "patterns of interworking meanings."
Even if delivered symbolically, however, ideological slogans are
not effective expressive symbols. Geertz is mistaken in his claim
that ideology is itself a cultural system. The main goal of ideology is
to eventually gain political and social domination and, consequently, to produce correlated normative meanings that support
such aspirations. Metaphors, hyperbole, personifications, and other
symbolic forms can be invented and used to this end, but these are
qualitatively different from cultural expressions. They are subordihated to ideological goals, and denote and evoke the predicaments
and problems subsumed in these goals.
arts," as B. Martin has argued (B. Martin, A Sociology of Contemporary Cultural
C]~ange, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 198t). In this case, however, the intercalate stages
of non e n g a g e m e n t and ideological commitments were reversed, though the principle
r e m a i n e d the same. Martin (pg. 180) mentioned Burke's pertinent term "the principle
of entelechy" and Koestler's concept of the "principle of infolding." The two principles
imply an exhaustion of the initial message and an introduction of a new one. C.
Wright Mills in White Collar (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, London, 1956:334) observed:
"The ruling symbols are so inflated in the mass media, the ideological speed-up is so
great, that such symbo]s, in their increased volume intensification and persuasion
are worn out and distrusted. The mass media hold a monopoly of the ideological deed;
they spin records of political emptiness,"

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Geertz overlooks the existence of a system of cultural representations whose raison d'Otre stems from the inherent effects of ideology
or from other active systems of belief. Furthermore, the type of
psychosocial stress with which Geertz is concerned cannot be transformed into "public forms" by the same factors t h a t caused the
stress. Hence, one m a y assume that popular representations are
nourished by the psychosocial stress that results from ideology and
its social correlates and t h a t transforms it into expressive symbols.
Ideologies, because of their constant reference to their source of
inspiration and interpretation, and their incapacity to answer everyday concerns (Gouldner 1976), lack the motivation and plasticity
needed to produce expressive forms of self-reflection.
Ideologies also seem unable to produce the expressive symbols
t h a t are necessary to de-ritualize in public m e a n i n g s rituals of the
social structure. In other words, expressive articulations that are
able to encode direct or indirect self-reflecting commentaries cannot
be produced by ideology, which is itself a primary target against
which such commentaries are created, appropriated or adapted.
An illustrative example can be seen in the attempts of East European socialist countries to generate popular cultural forms t h a t
would be compatible with and spiritually akin to Marxist-Leninist
ideology. The mass celebrations of such events as the first of May or
Soviet Bolshevik Revolution Day, which were intended to become
mass popular festivals, instead degenerated into orchestrated political events for which the official culture imposed symbols and imagery that failed to develop beyond mere slogans and propaganda
devices (Lane, 1981). Not only have these organized celebrations not
deritualized the rituals of the social structure, but they have become
occasions for the regime to affirm its ideological principles and
social structure.
Ironically, some genuine expressions of popular culture, such as
jokes and allegorical stories which are inspired by rumours concerning the leadership, often result precisely from the association of
these celebrations with the official ideology and its institutional
expressions. Ideological impositions on youth culture and even on
folklore have created a highly politicized pseudo-grass roots popular
culture. Silverman, (1983:53-61) who inquired into the politics of
folklore in Bulgaria, observed:
What could be more political than Bulgarian folkdancing? This question might be posed by a naive layman, but one informed observer
would quickly answer that virtually all cultural phenomena in Bulgaria are in some way affected by politics. More specifically, folklore,
with its ties to the past, plus its potential for manipulating the national

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consciousness, is indeed an important arena for government involvement.

The government of India provides a different example in its
attempt to appropriate and benefit from the production of rituals
celebrating the Independence and consolidation of the State, which
were previously organized by social groups without official political
guidance. Contrasting Indian popular celebrations (carnivals, festivals and funfests) before and after the State took control of them,
Menon (1987:39) observed:
Under government scrutiny and motivated by authoritarian prudery,
the anarchic, creative side of the people's festival is flattened out and
sanitized, and all areas of duality are standardized. It is offered to the
population as a pure avenue for consumption and voyeurism...
These governmental festivals inevitably reproduce the existing exploitative attitude of the dominant culture to an extent that they
represent, no longer negativity, but cooptation.
The indirect, hidden messages encoded in popular cultural representations do no mix easily with dogma, although, as suggested, in
time they do acquire connotations that express the needs and interests of certain classes. Expressive symbols generated by ideology or
religion are so directly connected to the dogma that inspires them
t h a t they cannot effectively comment on situations and events that
are produced by their respective dogmas, at least in secularized
Western society. If expressive symbols are employed by ideological
art (such as realist-socialist literature or Nazi Germany films), they
are essentially propaganda, even though some may be sophisticated
and subtle. This is true for both official and unofficial ideologies, and
for the subtle, overt, ambiguous, and diffuse alike.
In sum, then, expressive symbols that entail comments on the
social order cannot be produced by a belief system whose production
of m e a n i n g is directly and ostensibly determined and identified with
specific social actions and policies. Such symbols are instead
derived from a system of representations t h a t produces expressive
symbols which are not initially ideologically engaged. Some of these
symbols succeed in capturing the popular consciousness and thus
become social commentaries.
Thirty years ago L. Lowenthal (1956), a prominent member of the
F r a n k f u r t School, stated t h a t popular culture was a 'manipulated
reproduction of reality as it is.' According to this view, culture is a
direct expression of social relations, lacking any independent status.
The Marxist approach of subordinating culture to ideology has pervaded the study of popular culture, leading to a blurred distinction

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b e t w e e n the two. B e n n e t t (1980:17) explicitly a c k n o w l e d g e d this

problem in a r g u i n g t h a t
One of the most important theoretical difficulties impeding the development of the study of culture and ideology is the absence of any
generally agreed vocabulary through which to conceptualize the
internal economy of the cultural and the ideological spheres and the
relationship between them. The lack of any clear differentiation of
meaning between the concepts of culture and ideology is symptomatic
of this.
V i e w i n g popular culture as a mere reflection of social relations
overlooks the fact t h a t p o p u l a r culture is a reaction a g a i n s t a n d an
escape from the b u r d e n s o m e effects of ideologies of all kinds, a n d of
their related actions a n d policies. 6 As a n y reaction t h a t is at least
r e l a t i v e l y i n d e p e n d e n t of the p h e n o m e n a to w h i c h reacts, some popular cultural r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are able to offer non-committal reflections on ideological i m p e r a t i v e s a n d their social policies. This is
true, at least, until the reaction itself becomes ideologically identifled a n d adopted, b u t then Soon it loses its a p p e a l a n y w a y , giving
w a y to the creation or a p p r o p r i a t i o n of new ones.
The term "ideology" ceases to m a k e sense if it is employed indisc r i m i n a t e l y to account for a n y s y s t e m of representations, conscious
or unconscious, r e g a r d l e s s of t e n u o u s n e s s of its a t t a c h m e n t to a
specific ideological source a n d to the institutional a n d h u m a n
m e d i a t o r s w h o negotiate the final m e a n i n g of these representations.
If a n y cultural p h e n o m e n o n is perceived as an extension of ideology
in the d o m a i n of expressive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , or is perceived as a
m e c h a n i c a l reflection of it, t h e n the concept of ideology is so inclusive t h a t it becomes a n a l y t i c a l l y meaningless.
The contradictions of the various c o n n o t a t i o n s attributed to the
concept of ideology are s u m m e d up by Giddens (1979, p. 178):
We c a n n o t r e g a r d " i d e o l o g y " b o t h as a type of s y m b o l s y s t e m , d i s t i n c t
from o t h e r types, a n d at the s a m e t i m e as a set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h
c a n a p p l y i n p r i n c i p l e to all forms of s y m b o l i c action.

If ideology is all-encompassing, there can be no e x p l a n a t i o n of

w h y a n d h o w people in their o r d i n a r y lives react, in e v e r y d a y language, to the social forces t h a t s h a p e their destiny. The M a r x i s t
conception t h a t all cultural r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are ideologically col6Pertinent to this issue is R. Williams criticism of the direct "reflections" between
material social process and consciousness, which, according to Williams leads to
simple reductionism (Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press, 1977, pg. 61).
The issue of "reflection" has been liberated by the introduction of the term "homol-

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291

ored, precludes the possibility t h a t ideology itself produces dissatisfactions t h a t require c o m m e n t a r y in terms t h a t differ from a n d are
unaffected by ideology and its social correlates. In suggesting that
all phases of popular expressions are ideologically determined, the
Marxist conception overlooks the internal d y n a m i c s of each of
representation, indiscriminately lumping together their qualitatively distinctive stages of creation and development.
For a l t h o u g h still within the Marxist tradition, a less deterministic position has been put forth by such neo-Marxists as Stuart Hall
a n d his disciples. While acknowledging his debt to R a y m o n d Williams, who holds a more narrow view, Hall appropriated and elaborated on Gramsci writings. By employing Gramsci's central concept
of "hegemony," Hall is able to allow ideology a more flexible role,
a n d to endow cultural representations with a more a u t o n o m o u s
status t h a n Williams could accept. Hegemony, argues Hall, "works
t h r o u g h ideology but it does not consist of false ideas, perceptions,
definitions" (1980:39). Nevertheless, "political structure" and the
overall "capitalist type" of society ultimately permeates Hall's
analysis, forming a historical frame that remains deterministic. As
a result, Hall's conclusions as to how a n d w h y cultural expressions
are produced are predictable.
As opposed to Hall and his colleagues, Geertz's anthropocentric
view t h a t ideology is in fact a cultural system has a more functionalist bent. He does not subsume his analysis of ideology into a
political-historical frame, and so is less deterministic t h a n Hall, but
Geertz's work on the relationship between ideology and culture is
p e r m e a t e d by a broader conception of the coherence a n d order of the
social whole. This, for Geertz the term "culture" denotes a "transmitted pattern of m e a n i n g s . . , expressed in symbolic forms by m e a n s
of which m e n communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (1973:89).
The Basic Elements, The Common Perspective

As the above c o m m e n t s suggest, w h a t is needed for this study of

popular culture is an approach t h a t overcomes the limitations of the
ogy." The term, introduced in its new interpretation by Williams, has been intensively
employed by the members of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham. See Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds.), Resistance Through
Rituals, and Dick Hebdige, Subculture, Methuen, London 1979. In spite of its importance, homology as a concept m a y be only a different but more flexible way to state the
basic model of Marxism. Williams candidly stated: "On the other hand, 'correspondence' and 'homology' can be in effect restatements of the base-superstructure model
and of the 'determinist' sense of deterministic" (Williams: Marxism and Literature,
pp. 166).

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Politics, Culture, and Society

functionalist, Marxist, and neo-Marxist perspective. To that end, I

suggest a focus on three distinct but interrelated features of popular
culture--"escapism . . . . liminality," and "rituals of resistance"-which should enable us to gain greater insight into our earlier discussion of the relationship between popular culture and ideology.
Popular culture employs the three features just mentioned in various combinations and stylistic arrangements. The three elements
represent states of temporary liberation from the controlling effects
of ideology. They suggest an i m a g i n a r y liberation from the stifling
limitations and feelings of e n t r a p m e n t imposed by these effects, but
they do so by fostering an illusion of control over them.
"Escapism" characterizes various mass expressive phenomena
that are reactions against the overwhelming control of certain social
routines. The term should be used as a generic one for such various
interrelated forms as "make-believe," "self-delusion," "vicarious
feeling," "pseudo-event," and the like. Escapism is a strong component of diverse genres, such as a m u s e m e n t parks, science fiction,
romantic movies, holiday recreations, sports contests, etc. (Cohen,
1976; Boorstin, 1962).
Although they represent opposing perspectives, the former radical
and the latter conservative, Cohen and Boorstin agree t h a t in the
recent decades escapism has become increasingly pervasive. Not
only is escapism a strategy for evading the e n t r a p m e n t routines, but
it also provides a way of imagining and discovering new realities, a
form of wish fulfillment. According to Cohen (1976:123), the genres
of popular culture are sources of fantasies; they are routes of escape
from the m u n d a n e i t y of everyday life. Watching a movie is more
t h a n mere entertainment, for "all magic and m y t h are there." Reminiscing on his childhood, Fellini, the grand myth-maker, supports
this view:
Hollywood told me that, no, there were other things, other myths,
attractive, pleasurable, perhaps a bit silly sometimes, but never
imposed on you in the usual authoritative pre-emptory way. A movie,
then, was like a fabulous Christmas present. People all over the world
still love America because of its movies, its fairytales. (Time, 1986).
In discussing various aspects of the consumer society, Featherstone (1983:6) makes a corroborative remark: "The mundane, prosaic, over-routinized lives experienced by m a n y individuals contrast
sharply with the over-optioned lives celebrated in the consumer
culture imagery."
The "liminoid" feature of popular culture develops "outside economic and political process" (Turner, 1982; pp. 20-61). Liminality is a

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293

reaction a g a i n s t an inert and ritualized institutional order. It

implies a t e m p o r a r y a n d suspenseful state, an interstice of quasidisorder between two points t h a t are defined, reified and regulated
by social institutions. Fictional adventure a n d m y s t e r y genres are
typical of this type of p h e n o m e n a (Cawelty, 1976). As in escapism,
liminal genres permit an i m a g i n a r y feeling t h a t the freedom of the
quasi-disorder could become a permanent, n o r m a l state of present
social life. The various forms of "play" are in fact various degrees of
liminality. According to H a n d e l m a n (1977), play is diametrically
opposed to ritual. While play h a s the quality of doubting the social
order, ritual integrates it; whereas ritual validates the social order,
play calls it into question. Thus, play is a liminal reaction to ritualized order. Douglas observes t h a t jokes are also anti-ritual (1979).
Indeed, the various genres of h u m o u r a n d games are expressions
of liminality.
M a n y m o d e r n cultural p h e n o m e n a involve the production of"rituals of resistance," which often center around stylistic expressions
of youthful protest, as seen, for example, in the sprawling Western
youth subcultures (Brake, 1985) a n d in those of Eastern Europe.
There is general agreement t h a t stylistic expressions of youth are a
reaction to political or class discontent.
As is true of escapism and liminality, rituals of resistance involve
a subtle, i m a g i n a r y feature. The stylistic expressions of youth subcultures suggest an i m a g i n a r y expansion of social options, a way of
" w i n n i n g space" (Hall and Jefferson, 1980). T h r o u g h endless expressive combinations of dance, music, and language, youths elevate the finite to the i m a g i n a r y infinite, suggesting their aspiration
to a world freer and less oppressive t h a n the one they experience.
Cohen, (1972:23) who analyzed the emergence of English working
class youth sub-cultures, explained the rise of Mods in the following
manner:
9 .. the original mod style could be interpreted as an attempt to realize,
but in an imaginary relation the conditions of existence of the socially
mobile blue collar worker9
Bar-Haim (1987), who reported a n d analyzed the attraction of E a s t
E u r o p e a n youth to Western commercial artifacts, implied the imagin a r y by concluding:
It seems that the commercial items from the West and symbols of
Western youth culture enable young East Europeans to expand the
perceived social space form the existing officially imposed imagery.

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Politics, Culture, and Society

Conclusions

Ideology is a belief system t h a t produces specific meanings and

actions and entails certain effects. The development of popular cultural expressions are reactions to ideological constraints and directives. Whether the m e a n i n g s it produces subvert or integrate a
certain social order, ideology always imposes demands, requires
commitments, draws boundaries, and mobilizes social action, all of
which becomes a source of tension and a focus of psychosocial
concern with which people must cope.
Shils's statement twenty six years ago t h a t popular culture is the
"painfully developed art of coping with the miseries of existence"
(1961) remains applicable today, although it is incomplete. Popular
culture is not only the representational art of coping, a mere m e a n s
of adjusting, 7 but also an indirect symbolic commentary on social
life or on a specific ideological conception of it. Furthermore, this
symbolic c o m m e n t a r y is directed not only at the source of psychosocial stress, but also at a longed-for, imagined social reality to
replace the existing one.
Not all of w h a t passes for popular culture can be considered as a
c o m m e n t a r y on social life, but the analytic distinction between w h a t
is a c o m m e n t a r y and w h a t is mass manipulation or merely a form of
relaxation seems to be more complex t h a n it m i g h t appear. To contend, for example, t h a t beauty contests or romantic novels are but
another form of capitalism's aesthesia seems grossly simplistic, for
it ignores the resonance of these genres, beyond external manipulation, as indirect comments on the conditions of life and as a wishful
attempt to realize a different social experience. It is difficult to see
how these popular culture phenomena, for example, if were some
form of ideological extension would assume a wishful aspiration for
an i m a g i n a r y social life whose principles are antithetic to those
prescribed by ideology. From the perspective of ideology, of curse,
this would be self-defeating. It could be argued, of course, that ideology would benefit by operating a certain degree of harmless catharsis, but such an a r g u m e n t assumes t h a t ideologies contain a built-in
m e c h a n i s m t h a t allows antithetic behavior in order to ensure its
own survival. Neither the functionalist a r g u m e n t nor Althusser's
7The popular cultural representations as expressive resources have some adjustment functions although they drastically differ from primary or secondary adjustments. Thus, Goffman defined the "secondary adjustment" as "Any habitual
arrangement by which a member of an organization employs unauthorized means, or
obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting around the organization assumptions as to what he should do and get and hence what he should be" (Asylums, N.Y.,
Anchor Books, 1961. pp. 189).

Gabriel Bar-Ham

295

thesis (1969) of the "unconscious" influence of ideology provides a

tenable explanation of how people are able to comment reflectively
on the social forces that impinge on their lives. The popularity of
some genres over others, or the popularity of certain genres in a
certain period of time and not in others, may be explained by a
critical mass of individuals who find in that imaginary perspective a
release from some specific social action or situation at work.
Finally, both arguments--that an ideology is a cultural system
and that a cultural system is an ideology--exclude the presence of a
system of representations engendered by the very existence ofideological effects, and whose raison d'etre is the reaction to those
effects.

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